BODIES MOVING AND MOVED

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A Phenomenological Analysis of the Dancing Subject and the Cognitive and Ethical Values of Dance Art

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the origin of movement is also
the origin of ruling and directing

Herakleitos

Feelings are nothing,
nor are ideas,
everything lies in motility
from which, like the rest, humanity has taken
nothing but a ghost.

Antonin Artaud

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PROLOGUE

It was the year 1979, when I first entered a modern dance class in the Graham technique held by an English dance teacher educated at the Rambert school in London. Martha Graham's vocabulary was passed on through a long transformation process, from one individual to another all the way to Finland, to the southern industrial town, Tampere, in the late 70's. My teenage body didn't fit easily into that movement vocabulary. While I felt stiff and dumb, I didn't understand in generally the meanings of the movements in my body awareness; nonetheless, I noticed in my body some ideas of movements, their power and anguish, which were personified, though I didn't know then by whom.

I never became a professional dancer, but dance classes brought me to listen to the moving body, opening a new world from and into the body and its movements. Later, taking part in improvisation and release technique classes, I came upon the pleasure the moving body takes in being led by its internal "logic", the reasons of the lived body. This path led me into hours engaged in studying movements. It took a long time before I was able to conceptualise this field, which was opened to me through and in the movements; indeed, not until I began to study philosophy ten years ago, learning about the phenomenology of the body, which revealed this topic not only as a relevant object of study but also as a crucial issue of human existence.

One thing was sure, in the exercises of the very first dance classes, my body was answering me in a very complicated and inconsistent manner. For the first time, I was hearing the body's voice clearly, although I was unable to reflect on it. The body wasn't 'a thing', something distant from me, the body was me, my unknown potentials which I was now exploring. The body was me; hence, all failures and feelings of insufficiently touched so deeply and painfully the intimate self, which I first time discovered embodied matter, vulnerable as flesh and but also powerful and intelligent matter. There I was standing in my leotards,

naked on the floor, no place to hide myself from the other's gaze. This moving body was struggling to be disciplined into a Graham movement vocabulary, while the body constantly gave hints of its past history and its culture and of its own potentials for development. I never followed this path to its ends, the path of my bodily movement potentials.

Nevertheless, in the dance classes, while the body strove to learn the correct patterns of the movements, it was questioning the meanings of their patterns. The body often resisted movements imposed on it, felt shame at being humiliated into doing things which were against its potential identity. But there were only two options in taking in movements: perform them or leave the classes, no third one in the middle. I felt that the body's movement was always the self's declaration. The body was not able to deny movements while it was doing them. It is much easier to say something without meaning it. The complicated and inconsistent answers which movements evoked in me, made me convinced that I can never be entirely known to myself if the body constantly surprises me in this manner. I got to know that the body understands things through the movements which offer me knowledge, like a knowledge of touching, a knowledge of human relations, a knowledge of sexuality, which could not be acquired in any other ways. I found the body's structure to be enormously complicated, never be totally theorised, since it is not only an anatomical entity, but carries cultural and social meanings, the history of family and nation. Those meanings I came to face through the movements in dance classes, although the classes were not about them.

Later, when I was teaching modern dance myself, I made the painful observation watching my students, namely that also the vulnerable body is visible to the other. This also became obvious some years ago, when I began to watch and evaluate dance performances as a dance critic. The body reveals its past, its attitudes, its secrets to the other person, although it maintains its mystery and autonomy. As a dance teacher I found myself in a difficult situation with twenty different individuals, all unique and vulnerable in their bodies. I wondered, whether I can ever become a person who can take on such an enormous responsible to direct and mould those bodies into shape. But I understood that I can never escape the body politics of dance teaching and dance critique, since it is always there in one way or the other. Through these experiences I realised that

there are two crucial issues in my interest to research the dancing body: the ethics of the body and bodily knowledge.

Dance practice and awareness of my moving body made me convinced that carnal being is not an option but foundation for my being, understood long ago before I emerged into this world. After being imprisoned in this awareness of the body's understanding, constantly hearing its voice, its answers seeking its knowledge in trying to solve my problems, I have, since been unable to understand intellectual activities without the body, philosophy without the body, scientific theories without the body, history without the body, writing without the body, art without the body, religious doctrines without the body, sex without the body, love without the body. Although this carnal presence is from time to time unbearable, painful and felt as insignificant, this must be the condition for which gods, angels and the dead envy us.

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This dissertation is the result of a protracted project, ten years in process, three years in writing. Working in a terrain somewhere between the tradition of Western philosophy and dance practice, I undertook to develop a delicate negotiation between these two traditions and fields. This negotiation would not have been possible without wideranging support in the fields of both theatrical dance and philosophy, while it has also entailed to a certain isolation and solitude in these fields.

I had not only that privilege to have a supervisor, who gave me a feedback during my research process; I owe much to my colleagues and friends for inspiration, encouragement and/or critical attention to my work. Many colleagues from several departments have read and commented on the manuscript. I wish to thank Veikko Rantala (University of Tampere) for his comments on the language of the manuscript. Special thanks go to Lauri Mehtonen (University of Tampere) and Timo Laine (University of Jyväskylä) read a draft of part one and made encouraging comments. I am especially grateful to Susan Foster (University of California Riverside) for agreeing to read the manuscript and for her insight, criticism, detailed comments and suggestions for improvement. Also I am particularly grateful for support and encouragement provided by Jyri Puhakainen (University of Tampere) and his comments on my work. I wish to thank Vesa Jaaksi, Timo Klemola and Martti Kuokkanen at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tampere. Special thanks go to Robert MacGilleon for language consultation and refining the manuscript. Funding for this project has come from the Ministry of Culture (Opetusmisteriö).

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most heated dance debates in the 1990's arose when New Yorker's dance critic Arlene Croce published the essay, "Discussing the Undiscussable", in which she declared that she would not review Bill T. Jones' *Still/Here* - would not even see it - because she considered the show beyond the reach of criticism. Croce argues that the cast members of *Still/Here* - sick people whom Jones had signed up - had no choice other than to be sick.[1] In Croce's view, the choreographer had crossed the line between theatre and reality. Choreographer Bill T. Jones' *Still/Here* is based on a series of survival workshops which Jones, who is HIV positive, held around the U.S. The workshop participants, who were dying or critically ill, were videotaped talking about their pain, their anxieties and their hopes. During *Still/Here*, the tapes are played on screens whilst Jones' company dances in front of them. Arlene Croce said that she could not review someone she feels sorry for or hopeless about. She defined Jones' work as 'victim art', art that forces the viewer to pity blacks, abused women or homosexuals. Croce's writing aroused a cultural debate for and against, but also a discussion of the criteria of dance criticism. Unfortunately, this discussion has not yet reached philosophical reflection on making and perceiving a dancework.[2]

Croce stressed the point that mere victimhood in and of itself is insufficient for the creation of an art spectacle. Her argumentation of "crossing the line between theatre and reality" reveals one of the basic arguments for the existence of aesthetics: the justification for the autonomous position of art and its aesthetic values and aesthetic appreciation. For instance, aesthetician Anne Sheppard argues: "In the modern world it is common to assume that art has at least some degree of autonomy, that it exists in a sphere of its own and is to be judged in

1. Croce 1994/1995, 54
2. See, for instance, Roger Copeland's article, "Not/There: Croce, Criticism, and Cultural Wars", *Dance Theatre Journal*, Vol. 12, Summer 1995.

the first instance by values and standards peculiar to it."[1] The formulation of these values and standards in terms of art vary from one theory of aesthetics to another and one historical epoch to other. Croce describes this autonomy of Western theatrical dance, drawing a line between "theatre" and "reality", with the result that she refuses to evaluate "victimhood art" since it is located in the field of "reality", beyond her aesthetic criteria, which concern only "theatre". Although Sheppard also makes a distinction between 'aesthetic' and 'moral', she attempts to address moral values in art.[2] Discussing how aesthetically good literature is also of moral value, she ignores the case when aesthetic appreciation come into conflict with moral argumentation as in Bill T. Jones' case.[3] Also, she passes over the dilemma that aesthetic appreciation is itself a political act, in other words, an 'aesthetic attitude' is itself a moral and political attitude.[4]

According to Croce, moral argumentation in a dancework must be made artistically good in order for if to have any value.[5] Thus, mere moral or political argumentation is not enough, in fact, she ignores an artist's arguments if they are not aesthetically well made. This implies that she considers 'aesthetically good' as one of the most important values in danceworks.[6] When a dancing body is evaluated in "merely aesthetic" terms, the aesthetic appreciation means experiencing a dance as a matter of taste, in which the criterion of the dance is defined by standards and criteria of that dance tradition.[7] In other words, aesthetic appreciation in its narrow sense refers to the understanding of art as an

1. Sheppard 1987, 138
2. Sheppard 1987, 135-154
3. Sheppard 1987, 151
4. (See Sheppard 1987, 69). In her book *Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art*, Janet Wolff argues that aesthetics and politics are inseparable; as a result, all criticism is also ideological and political. It does not follow that aesthetics and politics are the same thing, nor that art is merely politics represented in a symbolic form (Wolff 1993, 65). This implies that Croce's criteria of the aesthetically good can be regarded as a moral and political attitude towards dance art. There is a politics of aesthetic values in dance art which is analysed in greater detail in Part Two.
5. Croce argues: "If an artist paints a picture in his own blood, what does it matter if I think it's not a very good picture?" (Croce 1994/1995, 58). Criticising Croce's essay, Roger Copeland nevertheless comes to the following conclusion: "...I find it hard to disagree with her attack on artists 'who think that victimhood in and of itself is sufficient to the creation of an art spectacle" (Copeland 1995, 19).
6. When Croce argues that an artist needs to paint a good picture, the criteria of the judgement of "good" remain obscure (Croce 1994/1995, 58).
7. See also Bernstein 1992, 4.

object of taste outside of cognition, truth, politics and ethics. Consequently, in dance practice, dance artists transform their bodies into aesthetic objects, whilst critics and the audience are supposed to evaluate their dance in terms of this exclusive context.[1]

This discourse of dance aesthetics - the claim that the prime interest and intent of Western theatrical dancing is aesthetic - has been challenged both in the philosophy of art and in dance practice, but an attempt to define art not in merely aesthetic terms is not always the most fruitful initial approach. For instance, Plato's well-known hostility to certain artistic practices was largely based on the idea that one should demand from the artist a concern for truth and an appropriate moral paradigm of behaviour. Arts, also dance art, may have values which are not aesthetic, unless 'aesthetic' stretches to cover everything conceivable that is of value in art. For instance, a dance and bodily movement might have a therapeutic value, or choreography may give us moral insight, or a certain dance performance may help us to understand points of view radically different from our own. Nevertheless, the definitions of the art which address "non-aesthetic" values of artworks tend in their formulations to be either too strict for an artistic pattern to be imposed on the model of moral ideals or too wide to include everything, failing to tell us why an artwork has moral or political importance. Moreover, the world after colonialism and the multicultural society challenge definitions of art values as treated not only from *my* perspective but also from the perspective of the other. Therefore, the project of a philosophy of art beyond mere aesthetic appreciation in the arts, even as it attempts to outline a philosophy of dance in this sense, seems to be rather too complicated a task as such to be taken as a subject of research.

The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate a politics of the aesthetic values of dance art and focus on the ethical and cognitive aspects of dancing. The aim is to evolve a *philosophical dance discourse* which concentrates on the Western theatrical dance also in non-aesthetic terms, addressing the possibilities of dance art to "discuss" various "issues" in

1. Some philosophers regard 'beauty' as the best name for aesthetic value. In Sheppard's view, an artist's expression in terms of emotions or the formal qualities of an artwork are a source of aesthetic value. She argues that in ballet, for instance, we find beauty in the formal patterns made by the movements of the dancers (Sheppard 1987, 18, 38). According to Moritz Geiger aesthetic and artistic values can be classified into three groups: formal values, imitative values, and values of positive content (Geiger 1986, 113-152).

its own special way - through movements - which do not give us purely aesthetic pleasure but reveal to us ethical and cognitive matters.[1] In the Western art dance choreographers and dancers have addressed moral and political issues through their works, while dance practice itself involves philosophical and ethical dilemmas, as, for instance, the discussion of Croce's writing shows. These moral and political issues, discussed in terms of dancing - or through the moving body - might also contribute a reflection in traditional philosophy, opening a new perspective on these matters.[2] Nevertheless, this research does not focus on analysing certain choreographers and the philosophical substance of their works, but seeks to establish how the dance is able to "communicate" these "issues".[3] This philosophical discourse on the dance diverges widely from topics with which the analytical philosophy of art has dealt for the last twenty years, topics like the question of the end of art. But also, the manners of discussing dance philosophically deviate from the usual discourses on the dance field and dance studies.

Developing a philosophical dance discourse, it is essential that both Western philosophy as a tradition of thinking and Western dance art as a tradition of bodily movement be brought into a mutual dialogue. Philosopher and dancer Susan Kozel emphasises the necessity of such as dialogue in her study "As Vision Becomes Gesture", in which she uses Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological concepts to interpret dance art.[4] Kozel criticises the philosophical approaches to dance and dance theories in which certain philosophical models and art theories

1. By this I do not mean an instrumental attitude towards dance art, the view that dance art is valuable only when it is a means to some end, knowledge or moral improvement. Without succumbing to the instrumentalist view of dance art, we should concede that dance art has a great variety of values; this study is concerned with the cognitive and ethical values of dance art.
2. Ian Jarvie in the book *Philosophy of the Film* addresses the overlap between the film and philosophy, not objectifying film as a study of aesthetics but demonstrating that film has many resources for conveying philosophical ideas.
3. Historically in the modern dance tradition the distinction between the dancer and the choreographer has been never clear, since most choreographers begin their career as dancers, while they may also both dance and make choreograpies. There are few choreographers who do not have a background as dancers in contemporary dance. Thus, the use of the term 'dancer' almost invariably refers also to both choreographers and so-called dancer-choreographers, although choreography and dancing differ from each other as artistic and social positions.
4. Kozel does not locate 'dance' in any historical or cultural context in her thesis.

are imposed upon dance.[1] Instead of philosophy conquering dance or dance eliminating the need for philosophy, philosophy should shed light on dance and dance in turn should question philosophy. Kozel comes to the conclusion that any theory of dance should not compromise the essence of dance through accepting rigid philosophical structures of thought but should let the dance phenomenon generate its own philosophical approach, and in so doing provide resources for continuing the critique of reason.[2] Developing a philosophical dance discourse, Kozel applies Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to provide dance with a new philosophical framework, which is not, in Kozel's terms, hostile to the lived experience of dance.

Apart from Kozel, there are few phenomenological approaches to the dance. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone's *The Phenomenology of Dance* (1966) draws mainly on Susanne K. Langer's art philosophy, without introducing detailed grounds for calling her discussion on dance a 'phenomenology'.[3] Sondra Horton Fraleigh's book *Dance and The Lived Body* (1987) uses phenomenological terms in interpreting Western theatrical dance, but does not analyse any phenomenologist's discourse in detail as a theoretical basis for a dance. This present study draws upon both Kozel's and Fraleigh's phenomenological approaches to dance, but without basing itself on these "phenomenologies of dance", it looks for its own method to bring together existential phenomenology and Western theatrical dance in dialogue.[4]

In examining the ethical and cognitive values of dance practice and danceworks, this study approaches these issues from the perspective of the dancing subject. It is obvious that the moving human body, though this term is not mentioned, is the focus of dance practice. The theory of the body, which comes close to body schema and body image as culturally shaped, sets the precondition for one's own body and one's

1. See also Julie Van Camp's review of Francis Sparshott's books, *Off the Ground: First Steps to a Philosophical Consideration of the Dance* and *A Measured Pace: Toward a Philosophical Understanding of the Arts of Dance*. She concludes her review with the remark: "But let us hope no one concludes that this is a model of how to do philosophy" (Van Camp, 1996).
2. (Kozel 1994, 95). See also Stanton B. Garner's method of applying phenomenology to contemporary drama (Garner 1994, 1-17).
3. See Kozel's critical analysis of Sheets-Johnstone's phenomenology of dance (Kozel 1994, 152-195).
4. We may add to the list of phenomenological approaches dances also, for instance, Verena Köhne-Kirsch's dissertation titled *Die "schöne Kunst" des Tanzes. Phänomenologische Erörterung einer flüchtigen Kunstart* and Louise Mathieu's study called "A

perception of another's. Reflecting on how human movement is able to "communicate" moral issues, the present study focuses on evolving a theory of the body, which explains the moral issues of dance art not only as representation or symbolic presentation, but the human body itself as the standpoint from which moral issues emerge. In other words, the body is not only a vehicle to present moral statements, but the subject of action itself. Western art dance, both ballet and modern dance, is often defined as an art in which the moving body is used as an instrument and a vehicle. Martha Graham (1894-1991) says in her article "A Modern Dancer's Primer for Action": "I am a dancer. My experience has been with dance as an art. Each art has an instrument and a medium. The instrument of the dance is the human body; the medium is movement."[1] Graham's argument stresses a dualistic and instrumental attitude towards the body. The body and movement are detached from the dancer as separated "things" which the dancer uses or which are used in an artwork. This dualism of modern dance and ballet lies both in the spoken and the written language of dance and in dance practice itself, but the dualism not only concerns dance practice, it is also a cultural phenomenon.

Evolving a nondualistic theory of the body, the present discussion will turn to existential phenomenological critiques of dualism and cultural Cartesianism. The ontological standpoint is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and its theory of the body. In *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945) Merleau-Ponty drew on a critical examination of contemporary psychology and physiology to argue for the primacy of perception. Throughout his writings, Merleau-Ponty (1907-61) sought ways to explore the body's primordial contact with the world prior to the impact of analysis. As Merleau-Ponty elucidates, it is our lived body itself, not an intellectual mind, that first perceives objects and knows its way around a room. In the unfinished manuscript *Le visible et l'invisible* (1964) he introduced the notion of flesh in a new attempt to explore perception in which the seer is caught up in what s/he sees. In addition to Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body,

Phenomenological Investigation of Improvisation in Music and Dance". Despite these phenomenological approaches, in which a phenomenology is used in various ways, one cannot refer to the "phenomenology of dance" as a generally known and accepted discourse, because as yet there exists no such thing.

1. Graham 1974, 135

this study draws on the work of David Michael Levin (b. 1939) and Michel Foucault (1926-84). Since Merleau-Ponty was concerned with analysing the body's primordial contact with the world, emphasising the idea of phenomenological description rather than critique, he passed over the body's social, cultural, political and historical aspects in his principal work, *Phénoménologie de la perception*. The present phenomenological approach to the body is expanded by taking up Foucault's disciplinary technologies and Levin's notion of the relation between the body and society. Developing a theory of the body as culturally and historically shaped, this study uses David Michael Levin's trilogy, which is concerned with the body's perceptual capacity for cultivating itself as a social and ethical subject.[1] Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger's, and Foucault's philosophy, Levin attempts to demonstrate that the Cartesian paradigm has radically changed the body's perception; emphasising vision and the sense of sight, this perception is connected to political economy and modern technology. Arguing that our ethical ideals and political principles require the realisation of our ways of perception and the body's communicative potentials, he seeks to demonstrate how a phenomenological theory of the body can contribute to self-awareness and communicative action.

Developing a phenomenological theory of the body which focuses on the analysis of movement, this present study attempts to outline in new terms the dancing subject in contemporary dance. Exploring cognitive aspects of the dancer's practice, it attempts to outline how subjectivity is constructed and can construct itself in contemporary dance. One purpose is to discuss the identity of the dancer, not as a mere producer of aesthetic objects, but as an identity in which a knowledge of the moving body and movement with its cultural, political and ethical aspects plays a central role. Although there exist the identities of the dancer as culturally and socially formed models, the identity of the artist is not stable or permanent but changing, since it reflects changes in culture. Individuals can influence the modification of the identity of the artist though their activity. Hence, the project of outlining a cognitive-centered identity of the dancing subject is not intended to produce a permanent and monolithic model, but a process, which is always

1. The trilogy consists of *The Body's Recollection of Being* (1985), *The Opening of Vision* (1988) and *The Listening Self* (1989).

culturally, historically and individually formed. This philosophical research offers, first of all, some tools, concepts, and a certain framework through which individual dancers can reflect on their decisions concerning dance practice.

Discussing the "dancing subject", it is essential to understand both how dancers and choreographers are made by culture and a dance tradition and how they make themselves. Here, individual artists are understood to become essentially artists and to modify their identity in and through artworks. Thus, analysing subjectivity in contemporary dance entails discussion of an "ontological" level of danceworks. "The ontology of artworks" here refers to a branch of art philosophy which examines the existence of works of art in the spheres of different art forms.[1] The ontology of danceworks differs from the ontologies of other arts like music, sculpture, film, literature, architecture in that dance artists rely almost exclusively on movement and the moving body, while a dance disappears the moment it has been performed.

Emphasising as it does a phenomenological theory of the body, this analysis of the dancing subject is called phenomenological, although other disciplines are brought into this approach to the dance. Being inherently "interdisciplinary", the method of this study brings together appraisals of Western dance history and aesthetics, Bourdieu's art critique and the cultural field theory, Foucault's discourse of the ethical subject, Merleau-Ponty's and Martin Heidegger's philosophies of art, and some studies of performing arts and theatre. Why has such a complex theoretical basis been chosen for this research? First, using mere dance studies, a mere sociology of art, or a mere philosophy of art, it is difficult to analyse the cultural, historical, social and aesthetic framework and precondition of dance practice. Few philosophers developing a philosophy of art and aesthetics have also discussed the art dance. And when they have they have done so, they have frequently ignored its historical, social and cultural context. Since one finds so few philosophical or phenomenological studies of dance practice, writings on dance history, dance aesthetics, dance education have been chosen in order to analyse the construction of a dancer's identity through Pierre Bourdieu's cultural field theory and phenomenological critiques of

1. During the twentieth century the ontology of artworks has become a regular and sustained topic of discussion among philosophers, Martin Heidegger and Roman Ingarden being the most prominent figures in phenomenology.

"pure aesthetics". The purpose is to analyse the aesthetic values of dance together with the function of the social dance field in order to understand how the dancer is constructed by the agents of a dance field. Later, discussing a dancer's possibilities to choose her/his projection concerning artistic production and life, Merleau-Ponty's notion of freedom and Foucault's 'practice of the self' are introduced. Developing an ontology of danceworks, the study draws on Heidegger's art philosophy and his notion of artworks. Heidegger's conception of the artwork as well as Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body assist in analysing a movement's capacity to bring forth a world as a choreography. In addition to theorists' voices, it is sought to bring to the fore the practicers' voice, introducing through interviews of dancers' and choreographers' notions on dancing. These would seem to be no other author who has used this interdisciplinary method to such an extent to analyse and to develop a new phenomenological theory of the dancing subject.

The discussion of 'dance' focuses on modern dance tradition and contemporary dance, addressing some well known European, American and also Asian dancers and choreographers. Most of those have been chosen as examples in the study because they have had an influence on Finnish contemporary dance culture. In defining 'dance' and its momentness in this thesis, particular pains were taken to address the concept of 'contemporary' in a new manner. 'Contemporary' means here that a single thing presents itself to us as achieving in its full presentness and its connectedness to the contemporary lifeworld. Although dancers and choreographers carry the heritage of the past as movement vocabularies or certain models and stereotyped identities as dance artists, 'contemporary' is constituted by the nature of 'being present'. If we understand 'contemporary dance' in a very precise sense, it means having been adapted in concurrence with the necessity and demand of the lifeworld. The study aims to give reasons for dancing and danceworks to rely on 'momentness', emphasising the value of momentness as such in art. Momentness does not necessarily ignore the continuity of art and tradition, but emphasises the disappearing character of artworks. It suggests the need to re-evaluate preservation as a central value in an artwork, stressing the meaning of embodied art, letting art die and disappear with its people, their mortal bodies.

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The thesis is divided into four chapters which address the following topics: a phenomenological theory of the body, the role of tradition and the dance field in producing the dancer, the dancer's own project in terms of life and art, and an analysis of an ontology of dance as a work of art. The first chapter focuses on an analysis of perception based on, in particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body and David Michael Levin's philosophy of the body and ethics. The chapter moves from a discussion of the Cartesian subject's body whose perception is restricted in vision to an analysis of the lived body's capacity for synaesthetical perception. The analysis of the lived body refers to the body as we experience it, emphasising it as the socially, culturally, historically and individually formed subject and with its communicative potential. As this study attempts to illuminate the dancing subject, the analysis of the body focuses on the body's capacity to learn movements, to remember them, and to have knowledge in and through movements. Also, the body's synaesthetical perception is interwoven with the body's memories, skills and knowledge. Emphasising the cognitive aspects of the body, an interpretation is offered of the moving body's potential to be communicative, based on Merleau-Ponty's concepts of the prepersonal, the precommunicative, the intersubjective, the flesh, and the chiasm, i.e. reversibility between perceiving and perceived. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the difference between the self and the other in bodily communication, while it approaches the very essence of dance art: the reversibility of the moving-perceived body, which takes place between the self and the other, i.e. between a dancer and an audience. Throughout, the concern is with how the dancer's identity is also modified through the other, the audience, who are involved in dance.

In the second chapter the purpose is to outline the role of dance tradition and the influence of the dance field as precondition for becoming a dancer and artistic production. The chapter begins by defining the context in which 'dance' is used here, introducing briefly a historical background of the Western art dance. Ballet and modern dance are treated here as separate historical traditions which function on the same art dance field. The dance field is defined using Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the cultural field and cultural production. The chapter

examines the function of the dance field without separating aesthetic values from body politics. Throughout, the concern is with the agents which produce the aesthetic frame for the dancing body, modifying the identity and the model of the dancer. Bourdieu's, but also Heidegger's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's critique of 'aestheticism' and 'pure aesthetics' are introduced where aesthetics is seen as an end in itself, setting its own limits on experiencing, understanding and evaluating art works. Through this criticism it is sought to construct a new basis on which to discuss an ethics of dance aesthetics. Although the dance field creates the precondition for the existence of the dancer, the dancer is not merely made by the aesthetic frame of body politics; s/he has techniques which influence this frame through the poetics of dance.

In the third chapter the analysis focuses on the body-self's own capacity to evaluate the precondition of the dance field, to ask its own motives and reasons in life and artistic production for direct dance practice. Introducing Merleau-Ponty's notion of freedom and Foucault's practice of the self, the inquiry explores the dancing subject's motives to create her/his own identity and self-development through and in the body's motility as an ethical subject and an authentic artist. The dancer's practice is considered here as an existential project, since dance production requires a certain way of life. Practising dance, the mover witnesses the constant changes in the body, the transformation of the body. The dancer can use body techniques for training the body to direct the process of its becoming expressive in a special way. In this chapter, the phenomenological theory of the body put forward in chapter 1 is extended to a body-centered understanding of the dance artist's project, which concerns the process of making choreography by using certain body techniques. Throughout, interest centres on the artistic work poetising meaningful movement in dialogue with the world; thus dancers and choreographers do not produce movements in a vacuum of pure aesthetics. The chapter ends by asking the performing artist's motives for artistic production, reflecting on Heidegger's concept *Sorge* and Merleau-Ponty's concept *manque*.

The fourth chapter begins with an introduction of Heidegger's notion of the artwork, the object being to outline an ontology of the dance as an artwork. The chapter examines the connection between an artwork and the artist: dance artists choreograph and perform a

dancework, but also the dancework makes dance artists. Choreography offers a mirror for dancers and choreographers to reflect on their own identity. According to Heidegger, the artist's intention is to let the work stand on its own for itself alone, posing its own *Gestalt.* Drawing on Heidegger's art philosophy, choreography and dancework may reveal the world through its world, worked out in bodily movements. This ontology of the dance as an artwork installs the lived body as the source and the core of the dance as a work of art, capable of bringing forth meanings of the world through movements. In a short introduction to the choreographic process, the purpose is to focus on collaborating aspects in making dances and bodily movements inseparable from other materials of the dancework. In this ontology of dance particular attention is paid to the temporality and momentness of the dancework as a performance. A dance disappears after it is performed, leaving behind little document. The chapter and the thesis conclude with a discussion of the reversibility of perception in a performance between the performer and the audience.

PART I
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE BODY

1. The Cartesian Gaze and the Objectification of the Body

In his "Meditations on the First Philosophy", René Descartes (1596-1650) argues that "when looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see is men." And he continues, "...what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines?"[1] Descartes reports what he sees, how he sees. He looks out at men with a mechanical eye, withdrawn from the flesh of the world, immobile, unmoved by all fluctuations of sense and sensibility, functioning according to the laws of strictly monocular rationality.[2] His vision is disembodied and essentially detached from any feelings and as he gazes he sees instead of human beings, the movements of automatic machines. According to Levin, Descartes' gaze is not a philosopher's fiction - it not only exists, but actually, in today's world, prevails as the "Cartesian gaze". Since Descartes stands at the beginning of the modern epoch, his way of seeing things inaugurates the epoch of modern science and technology.

This Cartesian mechanical eye observes the world outside, not involved in any place and time but existing as the disembodied mind. In the position of the absolute spectator, the Cartesian subject detaches things and other human beings, even the body, from himself/herself, scrutinising them as exterior objects.[3] While the sense of sight dominates our sensual world, we seem to forget that we are the whole sensual body, we are the embodied subject, because we do not *see* ourselves.[4] The

1. Descartes 1967, 155
2. Although Cartesianism is named after René Descartes, the term as used here has very little to do with Descartes' philosophy. Cartesianism refers here to *cultural Cartesianism* in the Western world, a dualistic attitude in which the *Cartesian subject*, the disembodied gaze, separates itself from the world outside.
3. Levin 1988, 96
4. See also Irigaray 1993, 169-170.

sight refers to the intellect, separated from the "lower", the non-intellectual senses: tactile, smelling, tasting and hearing. As the Cartesian subjects we hold in contempt the weakness of the mortal body, because we are prepared to live "as mind", "as cogito" with or without the body. Convinced of our superiority over other beings, things, as the centre of the universe, we actually expect that we *can not* die as a consciousness.

In the Cartesian subject's experience with vision, vision disembodied and essentially detached from the wholeness of other bodily senses, this gaze is concealed from us, because it has become pervasive and normative. Levin calls this 'theoretical-instrumental gaze' which takes an extremely critical position bringing forth a sort of consumption and an abundance of things.[1] Watching television or pursuing certain scientific research, we may find ourselves in the position of "voyeurs" peeping in at a private scene without any risk of being disturbed or discovered.

Martin Heidegger calls our modern epoch 'the age of the world picture', which does not mean a picture of the world, but the world conceived and grasped as picture.[2] The domination of the image in the present historical epoch causes the world to be reduced to its primarily visual re-presentation. Levin argues that the Cartesian gaze has directed the development of technologies of vision, producing, for instance, the television as our modern way of looking at the world. The Cartesian gaze has decisively altered our history as visionary beings.[3] Whatever the tragedy, however intense the pain, we can turn it into a picture - something we can show and watch without being touched, in that paradoxical medium of remoteness we call television.[4] Living in a world with others, we are inscribed into this social constitution of vision. Because we are sentient and responsive beings, beings whose visionary existence is always already inscribed into the intertwining of our being-with-others, a sense of response-ability is inherently conceded by the vision from the very first outset.

Observing the world outside, seeing exterior objects, the Cartesian subject is eager to control outer reality by his ego. He *has*, he

1. Levin 1988, 96-97
2. Heidegger 1977, 129
3. Levin 1988, 106
4. Levin 1988, 257

possesses, he *owns* objects, thoughts, ideas, other people, even *the body*. Gabriel Marcel remarks that in discussing the body, the expression we use is "having" the body rather than "being" the body. The body is understood as something that the self, the ego owns. The body is, in such a view, external to the self, something which the self can own, something which the self can control, something which the self knows by observing the body externally as a thing.[1] The body is characterised by saying that it is the instrument of action upon the world and it can be modified as it suits us. The body is the 'vehicle' of the power we exert upon the world. The body as a vehicle is trained and disciplined as if it were a well-organised machine.

In trying to verbalise about the body, we constantly face the distinction between "physical", "organic" and "the self", "consciousness", "mental", "psyche", "mind", "ego". The conception of the body merely as organic matter is closely connected to the image of the body constructed by the natural sciences, in particular medicine and biology. The body objectively known of physiology and anatomy has set the framework through which we describe the body in our everyday life. In kinesiology, for instance, the body is regarded as a moving organism - an object, capable of being completely understood by means of stimulus-response conditioning and neurological brain wave analysis. The body as objectively known is a corporeal entity, properly defined as a complex of brain waves, neural pathways and muscular fibres.[2] The body as organic material might exist for the physiologist, but this is not the body which I (as every human) experience in my lived experience as a unity with the world. The physiologist tends to conceptualise only the body as an organic thing, not the body which we are and live, and what we are. The body is treated as organic matter or as a machine, as it is in the natural sciences, but it is also posited as merely physical, an object like any other, in the humanities and social sciences.[3] Consequently, a potential wisdom in our bodily awareness is excluded and ignored, because the sciences have no tools of access to an experiential body.[4]

1. See Marcel 1976, 156
2. Schrag 1979, 156
3. (Grosz 1994, 8). Merleau-Ponty points out that modern science, including the humanities, is a faithful consequence of Cartesianism and dualism, a monster born from its dismemberment.
4. One of the main differences between Western and Eastern medicine concerns the procedures

The attention which we give to the body tends to be negative reinforcement, like as ascetic discipline, punishment and forms of drilling which are repetitive, mechanistic and uniform.[1] This notion of the body stresses its simplicity and permanence. In our everyday life, the body as a thing is seen receiving stimuli from the brain, moved by the orders of the brain, which is the place where the mind, thinking, intellect are situated.[2] We try to control the body to achieve the state in which the body's condition is "normal", "stable" and "healthy", as defined by physiologists. When the ageing process changes the body, the alteration is merely understood as the body's imperfection and weakness, when the body is no longer felt to be under our control.

In the Western lifestyle, organised today around the activities of producing and consuming, the body has become a product itself.[3] Controlled by the benefit of the economy, which can only survive through the uncontrolled growth of production and consumption, the body as a product represents diverse models, symbols and images. It is a fetishised commodity, an image, a collection of masks, something to be produced for, and consumed in, the spectacle of life. This reduces the body to its re-presentedness, its being seen, with the result that it only exists to be seen. This re-presentation pressures the body into self-alienation. When people have identified themselves with these produced models, they may experience them as unfitting and, if they accept them, as limiting their existence.

Also in contemporary humanistic discourse on the body, the body is reduced to its primarily visual re-presentation, but it has often figured as a writing surface on which messages, texts, are inscribed. The body objectified as a thing appears as a blank page, which might be written upon and inscribed. This metaphor of the textualised body asserts that

by which one obtains knowledge of the body. Western medicine acquires knowledge of the body based on visibility and optics: the body is opened with a scalpel in order that its function can be scrutinised. In Eastern medicine knowledge of the body is attained by touching and "listening" to the body, not penetrating into the organic body. In Eastern medicine the map of the body is drawn up founded on the knowledge which is acquired by "listening" to the body, its function and symptoms. For instance, meridians, which have a central role in Eastern medicine, are doubted to exist by Western medical scientists, since they are not visible subject matter inside the body.

1. Levin 1985, 229
2. Leder stresses that brain should be understood as the central nervous system, which weaves the threads of a unified body (Leder 1990, 114).
3. Levin 1988, 147-148

the body is a page or material surface, ready to receive, bear and transmit meanings, messages or signs, much like a system of writing.[1] The inscribed body - social, surgical, epistemic, disciplinary - marks bodies in culturally specific ways; by the writing instruments - pen, stylus, spur, laser beam, clothing, diet, exercise - the body ends to become a blank page. These writing tools create textual traces that are capable of being written over, retraced, redefined, written in contradictory ways, creating out of the body a text.[2] Producing the body as a text is as complicated and indeterminate as any literary manuscript.

This model may help explain how the body, once it is constituted as such, is transcribed and marked by the culture of consumption. But as an unmarked text, it cannot explain how engraving and inscription actively produce the body as such.[3] Discussing the body, contemporary humanistic theorists are not willing to explain what it is that produces the blank page, what the stuff of this page is "made of".[4] As Elizabeth Grosz reminds us, the body is not simply a sign to read, a symptom to be deciphered, but also a force to be reckoned with.[5] In other words, the "givenness" of the body is seen only as facticity, not a potentiality; as a state, not a process.

Summing up, in the position of the absolute spectator, the Cartesian subject detaches objects and other human beings, even the body, from himself, scrutinising them as exterior things. In objectification the body is detached from the self as an organic entity, it is reduced to an object of visual representation. The reduction of the body to a thing, and finally to a product to be inscribed, implies to the *reification* of the body.[6] Here, the reification of the body is a socially or culturally constituted phenomenon; it is never only an internal psychological experience, something which happens apart from processes of social

1. Grosz 1994, 117
2. Grosz 1994, 117
3. According to Elizabeth Grosz, the contemporary body discourse in the humanistic sciences as a surface of inscription is derived from Nietzsche, Kafka, Foucault, and Deleuze (Grosz 1995, 33).
4. Grosz 1994, 119
5. Grosz 1994, 120
6. Meditating on Descartes' discovery of the *cogito sum*, his "reification of consciousness" ("Verdinglichung des Bewußtseins"), Heidegger argues that we tend to reify phenomena to things in such expressions as 'life' or 'man' which are not for us but which we are (Heidegger 1927/1979, 45-46). Although he does not mention the body, in Cartesian culture consciousness is reified to the mind, while the body is reified to a mere organic entity.

interaction or cultural context. The reification of the body as a "mere organic" thing means that the modern world is built for disembodied, Cartesian subjects, not sentient carnal bodies, and not for the intrinsic "demands" of the human body.[1] Since the living body has ceased to be a centre of subjectivity, and become instead a machine, "mind" and "ego" are taken as the centre of subjectivity, as a disembodied consciousness surveying the world.[2] Similarly, gestures and actions have been resolved into subjective movements explicable in terms of nervous functioning. The body is reduced to an object which mechanically receives, transmits and reproduces qualities of the external world.

2. The Docile Body, Body Politics and the Social Body

Many physicians and human scientists, unable to overcome the Western Cartesian notion of the body as a thing, have treated the body as passive, as a docile object. This preunderstanding of the body as a docile object has set the framework in which the body is constantly researched. Michel Foucault, the early Foucault, is no exception, but his writings on body politics offer a fracture in the Cartesian subject's totality to discuss a body's propensity for gestures of resistance.

In Foucault's view, the body is manipulated, shaped and trained by disciplinary technologies. The aim of these technologies, whatever their institutional form, school, prison, army, hospital, is to forge a docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved. This is done in several related ways: through drills and training the body, through standardisation of actions over time, and through the control of space.[3] From its the very first moments, the body is constructed and controlled by society. According to Foucault, architecture, for instance, is not built simply to be seen or observed as external space but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control. In more general terms,

1. According to Levin, no other civilisation and no prior age has like this modern technologised world reified and endangered the human body in so many uncontrollable ways (Levin 1983, 91). Many traffic accidents are due to high speed and this power of the machine is fundamentally out of our control as bodies. We may produce safer and safer cars and aeroplanes, but as bodies without any hard natural shield we are very vulnerable in high speed.
2. Husserl 1950/1982, 3
3. Rabinow 1984, 17

architecture also operates to transform individuals: to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them.[1]

Disciplines proceed by organising individuals in space. The body enters a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. This disciplined body is *monadic*, as the body becomes isolated in its own behaviour even if, as in military drill, the body moves among others.[2] Disciplines "make" individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. The success of disciplinary power derives no doubt from the use of simple instruments: hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it - examination.[3]

Michel Foucault discusses *body politics*, how the body is formed, controlled and suppressed by the authority of institutions in society. In certain social practices, institutional or non-institutional, the techniques of power operate on the body to transform it, divide it, and train it to perform certain functions. The individual subject, the body, is produced through this operation of power; the body is *socially controlled*. Foucault's critique is crucial in terms of body politics, but Foucault seems himself to treat the body only as passive material, without any experience of power.[4.]

Foucault's discourse on the body excludes the lived body, i.e. the experiential body which takes a central position in Merleau-Ponty's discourse. The lived body, the body as felt experience, is inseparable from the self incarnated as flesh. The early Foucault's conception of the human body is reduced to either the condition of a passive, docile object or the subjectivity of the body whose agency is essentially a deaf-and-blind activity capable of expressing only irrationality and anarchy.[5]

1. Foucault 1977, 172
2. Frank 1991, 55
3. Foucault 1977, 170
4. Levin 1991, 47-8
5. Levin 1989, 93. Here, Levin seems to refer to the mid-1970s writings of Foucault's 'archaeological phase'. In his late works, Foucault returned to an idea of self-constituting subjectivity and an ethics of the self in the second and third volumes of *The History of Sexuality* (McNay 1994, 11; Dews 1995, 67). Later sections in this chapter deal briefly with Foucault's notion of practice of the self, which is a central concept in the late Foucault's ethics. In chapter three, discussing the artist's authenticity, a more profound account is given of Foucault's practice of the self applied to dance art.

Conceptualising the body as a passive object for the imposition of power or as a surface upon which social order is inscribed, certainly does not contribute to the body as a potential actor of resistance. If the body is totally imprinted by society and history, or if it can be totally imprinted, then revolution, and even gestures of resistance and gestures which refuse to conform, cannot be considered possible. The body-self cannot fight back if its identity is nothing but a product of social control. There is a need for a conception of the body as rooted in the body of felt experience: an intelligent body capable of self-reflection, a body capable of articulating its motives and reasons for action.[1]

Criticising Foucault, Levin rejects the belief that the only order in the human body is an order totally imposed by society, and this order is nothing but the accumulated historical effect of political controls.[2] When Foucault asks: "What kind of bodies does our society require?", Levin answers that the question must be coupled with another question: "What kind of society do our bodies need and require?" According to Levin, the full realisation of our humanity as bodily beings, our sentient and sensual existence, is not possible without the full support of a cultural, social and political context. But when the body as lived is denied, social change can operate only by engineering the social level. Individual bodies are supposed to live and are programmed by these social developments

The body is shaped by its society, our bodily way of being, with habits and routines, carries on the values and morality of society. The body is shaped in conformity with a specific vision, a specific image of the political. We live in a social world, we inhabit this world, but the world also inhabits us.[3] This means that as the gestures, postures and bodily attitudes of others gradually inhabit my own body, shaping me, I am absorbing cultural values and values in society through my body and in my body. I share a uniform, gendered *social body* with others. Obviously the rules, i.e. the behaviour, of the social body, as gestures and attitudes, are rarely reflected on, because they are not necessarily conceptualised but rather lived in the body.

Body politics refers to the collective embodiment of the targets of power, whether in the form of an entire population or a specific group

1. See also Schatzki 1997, 2-5.
2. Levin 1990, 36
3. Levin 1990, 38

of prisoners, school children, the insane, males or females, who are subject to specific types of regulation.[1] The social body is not only a sociological definition imposed from outside to define social groups or populations; an individual experiences in her/his body the limits of the social body by carrying various roles, masks and uniforms in everyday behaviour. Bodies are not *totally* determined, totally schematised, by socially imposed morality. Because the body has a propensity to resistance, it must be sensible of itself, consciousness must be incarnated in the body. In trying to incarnate consciousness, Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept tacit cogito by which he refers to a prethematic corporeal reflexivity. Merleau-Ponty says:

> The tacit *cogito*, the presence of oneself to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to any philosophy, and knows itself only in those extreme situations in which it is under threat: for example, in the dread of death or in the look of another upon me.[2]

The tacit cogito appears to us as a bodily awareness in its perceptual relation with the world. It is paradoxal that when this tacit reflexivity is expressed in language, it already becomes cogito. When the body responds to the world, through this response, it expresses its own attitude to things. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Levin, in turn, reminds us of the need to develop an ethical discourse which emanates from the sensibility of the body, the tacit cogito, rather than from the imperatives of the ego.[3] Since the body has its own cogito, a propensity to a prethematic corporeal reflexivity, it can contribute a very articulate "speech" to political discourse through its reflexivity, in particular its movements.[4]

The social body implies inherently an individual's tacit awareness

1. Hewitt 1991, 232
2. (PhP, 404). "Le *Cogito* tacite, la présence de soi á soi, étant l'existence même, est antérieur à toute philosophie, mais il ne se connaît que dans les situations limites où il est menacé : par exemple dans l'angoisse de la mort ou dans celle du regard d'autrui sur moi" (PhP-F, 462). According to Sallis, in *Le Visible et l'invisible*, Merleau-Ponty rejects the tacit cogito, since he comes to the conclusion that to have the idea of "thinking", it is necessary to have words (VI-F, 224-225; Sallis 1973, 67). Self-consciousness is founded, not on the tacit cogito, but on bodily reflection (Sallis 1973, 88). Although Merleau-Ponty criticises 'tacit cogito' as a term, he never rejects the idea of bodily awareness.
3. Levin 1988, 312
4. (Levin 1988, 312). Levin's remark raises the question of how performing arts, including dance, in which the body has a central role, join the political discourse, bringing to it the body's ethical and critical capacity. Discussing the changing image of the dancing body,

of a collective embodiment. When the social body embraces the individual as a member of the community, it opens a way to communication and individual participation in the social structure, but also offers a possibility of resistance. Using here the Heidegger's terminology, we live in *das Man*, as an average man, everybody, anybody. The requirements of a social unit are constituted by a kind of coexperiencing or reliving, like cofeeling, costriving, cothinking, cojudging. But the similarity never creates solidarity, because each can have only his sensations of agreeableness and his interests, no matter how many people there may be who have the same interests.[1] The whole range of degrees of normality of das Man indicate membership in a homogeneous social body, playing a part in classification, hierarchisation and the distribution of rank. Living as social bodies prohibits the self authentic encounters and blocks perceptions of otherness and difference. The body cannot allow the sheer presence of beings simply because its perception is modified through the uniform of the social body. The process which we call "growing up" is actually one of a "growing narrowness and frozenness" of the social body.

Social stereotypes and characteristics of family and culture are important determinants of body images. The socially formed image of the body is a kind of ideology or myth, in the general sense of a belief presented as a fact which is uncritically accepted. The body and the body image are manipulated in society in many subtle modes of disciplining practice. The normative social body image is easily interiorised to one's own body image, against which one's body perception is measured.[2] The physical aspect of the body and society's normalising forces may be cogent, but they do not determine a human's whole existence.[3] Levin says:

> I am arguing that the body-self has - is - an order of its own, an order that is not socially imposed. This order is not only structuring structure; it is also need and demand. The tired body-self *orders* sleep: that is to say, it

Sally Banes argues: "I do not want to deny that dancing bodies may at times reflect the way things are, but I want to emphasize that they *also* have the potential to effect change" (Banes 1994, 44). See also Foster 1995, 15.

1. Scheler 1973, 555
2. Tiemersma 1989, 228
3. Tiemersma 1989, 334

> structures, needs, demands, and organizes itself for, the coming of sleep. Similarly, the hungry body-self orders food: that is to say, it organismically structures-in needs, and demands something to eat. These are examples of very basic, organismically organized, structures, needs, and demands. But the human being, a body-self, has - is - many other kinds of needs and demands; there are emotional needs, spiritual needs, and many needs whose realization, recognition, or satisfaction directly bear on social and political policy.[1]

Because the body we live has an 'intelligence' of its own, it can tell us, sometimes very precisely, what it is we need from the present lived moment of our historical situation. There is *givenness* concerning embodiment and participation in nature, cultural and social fields. According to Levin, this givenness must be accepted - we cannot totally change nature or the body.[2] But we must also recognise that the givenness is indeterminate, capable of further determination, further development. To understand and analyse this givenness of the body in more detail and the body capacity to change itself, we may return to the philosophy of existence and a phenomenological discourse on the body.

3. Returning to the Philosophy of Existence

Edmund Husserl is undoubtedly the recognised founder of phenomenology, but he saw the task of transcendental phenomenology to be that of describing experience from the viewpoint of a detached observer, i.e. the transcendental ego.[3] In the *Cartesian Meditation* Husserl presents phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism, and hence as closely related to Kant's philosophy, although he is also keen to emphasise the difference between them. As the title suggests, Husserl draws attention in the *Cartesian Meditations* to some important parallels between transcendental phenomenology and Descartes' *Meditations.*[4]

1. Levin 1989, 100
2. Levin 1989, 133
3. Steward & Mickunas 1990, 64
4. As with most philosophers, his work developed and changed in complex ways through his lifetime; and, equally unsurprisingly, there is much argument about the identification of various 'stages' in his thought, the relationship between them. The central question here has been whether the best-known text of his 'final' stage, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, involved a radical break with the preceding stage represented by the *Cartesian Meditation* (Hammond et al 1991, 4).

As Paul Ricoeur has argued, all not phenomenology is transcendental phenomenology. He suggested that the phenomenology termed "existential" is not another division juxtaposed to "transcendental phenomenology"; rather, this phenomenology becomes a method and is concerned with questions of existence.[1] Although there are differences in the way various existential phenomenologists and existentialists have worked out basic themes, there are points of agreement which Ricoeur suggests can be grouped around the three following emphases: 1) importance of the body 2) freedom and choice 3) the theme of the Other.[2]

According to Ricoeur, in particular Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) and Merleau-Ponty emphasised the body's significance in human existence.[3] Before these existential phenomenologists, there had been philosophers who have perceived the need to understand the body as the subject itself. In the 1700-1800's Maine de Biran (1766-1824) was one of a few who attempted to evolve a theory of the body, in which the body as a subjective body plays a central role.[4] In the mid-19th century Ludwig Feuerbach's (1804-72) interest turned to bodiliness and the human's sensuous relation to the world.[5] Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) has references to corporeality and its significance in human existence. Only with the phenomenology of the 20th century, however, are there more than fragments of thinking conceiving the body as the subject itself.

Merleau-Ponty argues that the perceiver is not a pure thinker, a Cartesian mind, but must be a body-subject. The incarnate subject is already a perceiving, speaking, thinking subject situated and engaged with an already meaningful world. This is how the phenomenological 'comprehension' is distinguished from the traditional 'intellect'. Human subjects are understood not primarily as observing minds, but as living embodied subjects in a process of change, who, to some extent, make themselves. Merleau-Ponty clarifies his notions in his essay "La Philosophie de l'existence" ("The Philosophy of Existence") in 1959.

1. Ricoeur 1967, 203
2. Ricoeur 1967, 208-212
3. Martin Heidegger says virtually nothing about the body. Heidegger's *Dasein* appears to be a disembodied, almost abstracting existence, although Heidegger's Dasein's being toward death is obviously related to the notion of the human as flesh.
4. Henry 1975, 8
5. Laine 1993, 51-53

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes “the philosophy of existence” from “existentialism”. He considers that the later refers to the philosophical movement which arose in France after 1945, chief at Sartre’s instigation. Merleau-Ponty argues that philosophers like Henri Bergson and Gabriel Marcel may be grouped under the heading of the philosophy of existence.[1] He says:

> In reaction against philosophy of idealist type - both Kantian and Cartesian - the philosophy of existence is primarily explicable by the importance of a completely different theme, that of *incarnation*. In the first writings of Gabriel Marcel, his *Metaphysical Journal*, for example, this theme was presented in a striking fashion. In philosophy, the body, my body, is usually considered to be an object, for the same reason that bodies of others, animals, and, all told, even a table, are only exterior objects. I am mind, and opposite me there is, therefore, this body which is an object. What Gabriel Marcel maintained was precisely that this is not so, and that if I attentively regard my body, I cannot pretend that it is simply an object. In some respects it is me: ‘I am my body’, he said. Yet it is not only the body that intervenes, for through it a general aspect of the sensible world was put under the scrutiny of our mind.[2]

Merleau-Ponty wants to show that the body is not a mere object, but that we are bound to the world as bodily beings. Before we can reflect in the “mind”, we have been as bodies in the world; we are thrown into the world as bodies.[3] To be bodily is to exist in the world inhabited by other people. To be with other persons is at the same time to become aware of one’s freedom as well as its limitation, in that one must constantly take the other individual into account. In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology the question of the bodily subject is related to the questions of freedom and the Other, as Ricoeur addresses them in the general characteristic of existential philosophy. Ricoeur argues that existential phenomenology makes the transition between transcendental phenomenology, born of the reduction of phenomena to their appearing

1. PE, 129
2. PE, 132
3. Foucault distinguishes his archaeological, or archaeological-genealogical, method sharply from phenomenology. He criticises phenomenology, because it centres on the primacy of the subject in understanding knowledge and the world. To the early Foucault the subject does not refer to an origin of meanings, it is itself a product (Tiemersma 1989, 283). This Foucaultian body is disciplined by the power of society and this produces man, the subject, the soul.

to me, including the body, and ontology, which restores the question of the sense of being for all that is said to “exist”.

4. The Lived Body

What is the body as experienced? Each time we use language to answer this question, we construct the body according to the metaphysics implicit in language, for instance, in the terms of its the mechanism of a biological organism.[1] The living body as experienced is far from definite. People mostly experience their bodies in a vague and superficial manner. Only in special cases, for instance, when a disturbance prompts our attention, are parts of the body scrutinised. Since body experiences are dispersed, the body image of most people does not coincide with the picture produced by distanced and quantifying external observation.[2] Although the experiential body is not fully definite, phenomenologists have developed a theory of the experiential body, the body as we experience it, producing a relative core around which the many other possibilities are floating. The body always remains to some extent a secret to us; hence a phenomenologist can only illuminate certain aspects of its complexity.[3]

In so far as I live the body, it is *a phenomenon* experienced by me and thus provides the very horizon and perspective which places me in the world and makes relations between me, other objects, and other subjects possible. Demolishing the Cartesian dualistic attitude, Merleau-Ponty wishes to elucidate *the phenomenal body* (le corps phénoménal), the body as I live it, as I experience it, and as it shapes my experience. The term ‘lived body’ (le corps propre) refers here to the body as experienced, as a living subject itself. In other words, the phenomenological description of the lived body attempts to reveal the self as embodied subject, not separated from the world, from others,

1. Tiemersma 1989, 307
2. Tiemersma 1989, 307
3. Emphasising movement in this analysis of the body, this present study odes not concentrate on meditating, for instance the human´s capacity to speak or imagine in terms of the phenomenology of the body. For instance, in her study of sex/gender dilemma Sara Heinämaa discusses language and a relation between thinking and speaking based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body (Heinämaa 1996, 87-109).

somehow cut off from objects and space.[1] Therefore the lived body is in the world as the heart of the "organism": it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains inwardly, and with it forms a system. The perception of one's own lived body and external perception vary in conjunction because they are two facets of one and the same act. Thus, the phenomenological description of the lived body evades reifing the body and a human as a thing.

(i) The body-self

To overcome the body-mind distinction/connection requires an inherently inseparable unity of spirit and flesh, understanding the human body as conscious in itself. Therefore the starting-point should not be two substances, for which we search for a connection, but inherently one undivided unity. In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy this implies that the body is not an instrument of the mind, nor is it connected to it; it is not a vehicle for directed sensation. As Merleau-Ponty argues, I am not in front of my body, I am in it, or rather I am it.[2] In other words, the *body is the primary self*. I am not related to my body in an external way. The lived body does not constitute something, which I *have* rather it signifies who I am; I exist as a body. I am already an embodied subject at the very moment when I am trying to understand how things are arranged in the world.

The body becomes our 'point of view upon the world' instead of an object, since we experience the world as the body and through the body. Experiences and memories are not something we have, they are also something we are: they constitute how we exist humanly in the world. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body, Monika Langer argues that we carry our past with us insofar as its structures have become 'sedimented' in our habitual body. The enduring personality refers to the historic route of living occasions, the body's inherent memories of its own "historic route". Thus, body-self is a memorial-container, in itself a "place of memories". For instance, the skilful body, with a wide range of customs and habits, is essential to my survival in the world. The body-self as a historic route is the past in the

1. Grosz 1994, 86
2. PhP, 150

present. This body is temporalised; it is a synthetic unity of its past projects, not only "personal" but also including social and cultural history, while personal and cultural become sedimented in a general, anonymous structure. Thus, the body must be considered 'anonymous'', the other to some extent to itself.

Monika Langer reminds us that if we reject the notion that consciousness is a psychic entity encased in a machine, the body ceases to be a barrier to consciousness, and becomes, on the contrary, the lived body which makes us immediately present to others. Since the body-self is intimately related to what and who I am, my experiences radiate from this body.[1] This lived body is visible, and to some extent, my lived life can be seen in my body by the other.[2] The lived life is not inscribed on my body, but as lived through I carry the traces of it. This implies that my body reveals my lived life, my way of thinking, attitudes, even my dreams and prejudices about others. Thus, the body-self is perceived by the other and exists for the other. According to Merleau-Ponty, there is no "inner self", an entirely hidden 'property' separated from other people, but the body as a self is primordially expressive.[3]

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of existence draws our attention to the notion of 'incarnate subjectivity', showing it to be part of a continuous dialectical exchange with other things and incarnate subjectivities. Our relation with the world is not a thing but a dynamic, living dialogue in which the body-self as an experiential centre is interwoven with the worldly texture. Although we cannot entirely detach subjectivity from the human body, we may theorise the body as an organic thing. Clarifying this theorisation, Max Scheler makes the conceptual distinction between *lived body* (*der Leib*) and *thing body* (*der Körper*).[4] The thing body, the body objectively known, is the body known as an organic object. The reduction of the body to the thing is never the body which the body-self lives and experiences.

1. Schrag 1979, 155
2. The culturally, socially and historically formed lived body, which radiates meanings to others, is far too often simplified to the mere codes of *body language*.
3. PhP, xi
4. (Scheler 1973, 399). Husserl also marks the distinction between the physical-geometrical body and the body of a person or animal by the respective use of two terms 'Körper' and 'Leib' (Husserl 1970, 50). In Finnish phenomenological discourse on the body the difference is usually found in two different terms for the body: *ruumis* (the thing body) and *keho (the lived body)*. See Kuhmonen 1996, 173.

(ii) The objective body

This phenomenological analysis of the body aims to draw our attention to the lived body which cannot be exposed by the methods of biomedical science. This implies that the body as lived must be consistently contrasted with the thing body i.e. *the body as objectively known*. This objective body is a corporeal entity, properly defined as a complex of brain waves, neural pathways, circulation and muscular fibres. The lived body and the objective body are on different incommunicable levels of being, they cannot be reduced to one another.[1] According to Erwin Straus, the widespread search for the 'neurophysiological basis of mind' is, despite experiment and clinical observation, a kind of metaphysical exercise.[2]

It is clear that the objective body is not more fundamental than the lived body. On the contrary, before we know the body as an organism, we have been as bodies. The objective body, after all, is one reduction of the body, one manner of theorising the body. Research into the objective body brings, of course, a knowledge of the function of the body, but it can reveal only one horizon the understanding of embodiment. Thus this body as objectively known does not offer the 'basis' or the 'ground' on which the body is to be analysed. Merleau-Ponty says:

> ...the objective body is not the true version of the phenomenal body, that is, the true version of the body that we live by: it is indeed no more than the latter's impoverished image, so that the problem of the relation of soul to body has nothing to do with the objective body, which exists only conceptually, but with the phenomenal body.[3]

Although nowadays the phenomenal body is widely acknowledged as a legitimate construal allowing discussion of the body, the phenomenal body is not generally taken as a foundation in analysing various movement activities. As Cartesian subjects we have long persuaded

1. Marcel 1979, 165
2. Straus 1966, vii
3. (PhP, 431-2.) "...le corps objectif n'est pas la vérité du corps phénoménal, c'est-à-dire la vérité du corps tel que nous le vivons, il n'en est qu'une image appauvrie, et le problème des relations de l'âme et du corps ne concerne pas le corps objectif qui n'a qu'une existence conceptuelle, mais le corps phénoménal" (PhP-F, 493).

ourselves that we are composed of a consciousness and a mechanistic body-object, both being entirely clear-cut and self-enclosed yet somehow externally linked together, while the phenomenal body is considered to be too obscure and complicated as a basis of movement analysis systems. In movement analysis systems and books on dance technique the body as an object is located in a geometrical space, the coordinates of which define the moving body. Unable to formulate the phenomenal body as the principal standpoint, many dancers, in trying to describe their experiential body, pose their experience on the objectively known body schema. More clearly, the body is understood and "experienced" as an anatomical and neuro-muscular thing.[1] Individuals cannot experience their livers although they know that they have one, they can only imagine to feel the liver. Since the objective body has offered the theoretical frame for descriptions of the body's movements, the subject always moves as the phenomenal body, although a description of that process appears more complicated than a physiological report of it.

(iii) Perception and the sentient, sensuous body

In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of the body perception is neither a passive registering nor an active acquisition of sensations in the world. We *are bound to be connected* through the senses to the world, thus, we cannot refuse to perceive the world, although we may fail to understand it. Merleau-Ponty notes that the subject of sensations does not refer to a personal self which has opinions and makes decisions, rather it concerns the *prepersonal* living body. Before we have any 'opinions' we have been as bodies, we have already been in possession of sensory fields. Perception thus entails an anonymous open-ended field preceding personal will.

Since we are connected to the world through our senses, even in dreaming detached from the perceived world, the images of dreams have

1. For instance, in *Taking Root to Fly* Irene Down (a dancer and scholar) uses biomedical concepts in trying to describe the experiential body. Although Down writes about the objective body and the kinesiology, she tries to combine it into the phenomenal body. She unites the object body and the lived body together presuming that the biomedical known body is prior understanding and conceptualising the phenomenal body.

a sentient basis. In fact we cannot really what life could be like without the capacity of senses, existence without any sentient qualification. The whole signification of our life - from which theoretical signification is merely extracted - would be different if we were sightless or lacking a sense of hearing. We are bound to fleshly sensuous existence, unable to imagine an angel as a pure spiritual being, without outlining for it a sensuous body. The spiritual angel is represented to us as a sentient creature.

The Cartesian subject's reflection is bound up with idea that we really perceive only with our intellect, which is connected to gaze and sight. "Sensuous abstraction" inhabits in our perception as a "natural attitude", constituting an abstract entity: atomic, discrete, isolated, separated from all contextual distractions. The process of sensuous abstraction is an extension of an ability which, to some degree, we all develop and enjoy, without much effort and thought, in the course of everyday life.[1] The process of abstraction discriminates, separates and isolates a sensuous essence. Most of the time we constitute a sensuous abstraction in order to acquire a better knowledge of the object.[2] Attention to the necessary abstraction for its own sake is typically a procedure necessary for aesthetic appreciation. Sensuous perception without the reduction of abstraction through the natural attitude constitutes a contextual entity which is more synaesthetic, more holistic, more deeply rooted in our embodiment. We can constitute an object which is more comprehensively situated in its relational field, and it also becomes more comprehensible as an entity.[3]

The visual world is not the real world without the other senses: touching, hearing, smelling and tasting. Therefore, what makes the visual world the real world also makes this world accessible to me by all my other senses. That which I see is also that which I can touch, hear, see and smell. Visual experience pushes objectification further than does tactile experience, presenting us with a spectacle spread out before us at a distance. Tactile experience adheres to the surface of our body;

1. Levin 1989, 82
2. "The father of aesthetics" Baumgarten still claimed that aesthetics has to be a science of sensuous knowledge. Aesthetics is to be in the domain of sensuousness and feeling what logic is in the realm of thinking. Thus aesthetics is the logic of sensuousness (Kockelmans 1985, 25).
3. Levin 1989, 83

thus, we cannot unfold it before us, and it never quite becomes an object.[1]

All the senses interact so that the contribution of each becomes indistinguishable in the total configuration of perception. Thus *perception concerns the whole sensing body*.[2] A theory of the body is, then implicitly a theory of perception.[3] The unification of the senses comes about through their ongoing integration into that *synergic system* which is the phenomenal body itself. This synaesthetic system rules our perception, but we are unaware of it only because of the mechanistic belief that we perceive the world through the separated channels of perception: seeing by eyes, hearing by ears, etc. We have learned how to see, hear, and generally speaking, perceive reducing perception as the physician might explain it.[4] We could return to synaesthetic perception if we rejected the formalism of consciousness and made the body the subject of perception. My gaze, my touch and all my other senses are together integrated in the body's perception into the same action.[5]

The blind person's world differs from the seeing person's, not only by the quantity of material at her/his disposal, but also by the structure of the whole. A blind person knows quite precisely through her/his sense of touch what branches and leaves, or an arm and fingers are. But after an eye operation s/he marvels that there is such a difference between a tree and a human body.[6] What we are dealing with is the unity of the senses, which transfigures the object. Missing the capacity of the sight, the other senses in the synaesthetic structure form a unity of perception, and in trying to replace sight, the rest of the senses become more sensitive.

In spite of certain organic deviations in the human body, which influence the whole unity of perception, the synaesthetic body appears as a complicated unity since it is closely linked to an individual lived life and sensuous memories. Although the structure of perception is quite similar in "normal" persons, every individual has unique synaesthetic experiences, because of her/his unique situation in the

1. PhP, 316
2. PhP, 326
3. PhP, 206
4. PhP, 229
5. PhP, 318
6. PhP, 224

world and personal lived life. The synaesthetic body is connected to personal memory: smelling an odour can inspire a vivid memory of a place almost as if one were factually in that place.

Langer reminds us that hearing colours or seeing sound is no more - and no less - mysterious and miraculous than the collaboration of the two eyes in vision.[1] Cézanne declares that a picture contains within itself even the smell of the landscape. According to Merleau-Ponty, he meant that the arrangement of colours on a thing (and in a work of art, if it catches the thing in its entirety) signifies by itself all the responses which would be elicited through an examination by the remaining senses: a thing would not have the colour had it not the shape, these tactile properties, the resonance, the odour.[2]

As in other art forms, the synaesthetic body has a central role in dance both for dancers themselves and the audience. Listening to music, dancers transform a sound to a motion in their moving bodies, or vice versa, flamenco dancers tapping the floor with their heels transform a motion to sound. If audience members give up their attachment to the pure Cartesian gaze, they are able to perceive dancing through the synaesthetic body. Watching the movements through their synaesthetic bodies, the audience members may also have images of touching, smelling, tasting in kinaesthetic experiences. They may find meaningful movements through synaesthetic experiences, be touched by the movement because of a coincidence of heard and seen. The body's synaesthetic perception may be more clearly understood with the account of Merleau-Ponty's concept of reversibility given later in this chapter.

(iv) Temporality and spatiality

Heidegger's term for the human being, *Dasein* implies both temporality and to some extent spatiality; the Da ("here", "there") of Dasein ("being-there", "existence") has a meaning which is both temporal and being-in-the-world.[3] Temporality sets the necessity of time as the limit of human existence, and spatiality brings co-ordinates of place, space and

1. Langer 1989, 78
2. PhP, 319
3. Dufrenne 1973, 242

locality as its modes.[1] According to Merleau-Ponty, true temporality is not something which we conceive or observe; it is the process of living our lives. As body-subjects we do not possess time, the body sets limits to our time of being-in-the-world.[2] All of the projects of the body and its orientations are permeated with temporality. Time is not a sequence of 'external events' but rather, a chain of interlocking 'fields of presence'. As Langer argues, primary temporality is a dynamic unity whose dimensions overlap one another without coinciding. The future is an impending present which will become past in due course; in consequence past, present and future compose an indivisible project.

Despite the flux which we are, measurable time is a time which we have and by which we control, by which we are controlled. The time measured by clocks and calendars objectifies lived, subjective time. We are controlled by the measured time of various institutions which can be called *time politics*. This is a time which has us, since, by knowing ourselves as objects, we inscribe ourselves within this time and take our place among its events.[3] By losing the sense of time, we mean that we lose the sense of objective, measured time.

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of the body aims to awaken us to notice that our awareness of our body is inseparable from the world of our perception. The things which we perceive, we perceive always in reference to our body. Merleau-Ponty stresses that the body is not a lifeless object which somehow rests within an order of objective time, it is not an object which rests like other objects in Euclidean space.[4] Spatiality, which we live - the lived spatiality - differs from the schema of empty Euclidean geometric space. Geometric space refers to homogeneous, uniform and neutral space based on mathematics. Euclidean space, constructed from outside, measures things in terms of

1. According to Heidegger, temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) characterises the Being of Dasein (Heidegger 1927/1990, 38). See also Martin Heidegger: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* translator's appendix pp. 333-337.
2. We may believe in a life after death, but this carnal presence, this body-self as flesh ends with death, whether or not some new, transformed "life" comes after death. Whatever afterlife we believe in, being as the body-self is unique; it is located only in this historical situation. Since the lived body does not occur in time but exists as time, the unity of the lived body as a synthetic whole is not achieved until one's own death. As Heidegger reminds us, the limits of time are a mode of existence which involves the task of assuming some kind of existential attitude toward one's own death.
3. Dufrenne 1973, 246
4. Schrag 1979, 162

their size, length or height. Measuring does not reveal the contents and sensuous aspects of a thing or the meanings of a thing, only the proportions of a thing.

Geometric space is one possible reduction of space, but as many of phenomenologists have pointed out, the Euclidean conceptions of space familiar from Newtonian physics, has been in our culture a powerful way to understand the essence of space.[1] When the Euclidean conception of space reached a wider population, people not only took these explanations for granted, but also tended more and more to "see" the natural world according to these geometric rules.[2] Concerning the "experiential", the crucial question is, whether we have admitted theoretical knowledge of space so profoundly that we perceive (and experience) the world only in the frame of that theoretical knowledge. However much the modern technology of building is based on the Euclidean conception of space, it is after all, only one modulation of space among many other equally coherent, equally possible formations.[3] Merleau-Ponty says:

> ...the alleged transparency Euclidean geometry is one day revealed as operative for a certain period in the history of the human mind, and signifies simply that, for a time, men were able to take a homogeneous three-dimensional space as the 'ground' of their thoughts, and to assume unquestioningly what generalised science will come to consider as a contingent account of space.[4]

Homogeneous three-dimensional space as the 'ground' has influenced our experience of living in a spatial world. Geometric space and pure movement - both lacking any internal relationship to objects - have replaced our lived experience of space and motion. According to Levin, we even begin to experience our own bodies as mere 'furniture', mere

1. (PhP, 394), (Husserl 1954/1970, 22-28), (Straus 1966, 32), (Levin 1985, 340), (Grosz 1995, 94).
2. Levin 1988, 160
3. Levin 1985, 340
4. (PhP, 394). "...la prétendue transparence de la géométrie euclidienne se révéle un jour comme transparence pour une certaine période historique de l'esprit humain, elle signifie seulement que les hommes ont pu pendant un temps prendre pour < sol > de leurs pensées un espace homogène à trois dimensions, et assumer sans question ce que la science généralisée considérera comme une spécification contingente de l'espace" (PhP-F, 451).

objects in space and lose touch with our experience of embodiment and lived, experiential space.[1] If we wish to present the primary lived experience of space, then we must emancipate ourselves from the concepts of space prevailing in physics and physiology.[2] New conceptions of space are needed in interrogating phenomenological space.

Fundamentally we may understand the concept of space because *we are space*, our body is spatial matter. Merleau-Ponty argues: "...je ne suis pas dans l'espace et dans le temps, je ne pense pas l'espace et le temps; je suis á l'espace et au temps, mon corps s'applique à eux et les embrasse."[3] Through the capacity of the moving human body we understand closeness, separation, distance and direction. As the spatiality of human existence embraces closeness, separation, distance and direction as modes of existence, experiential distance refers to a relation, it is not relevant to express it in geometrical terms.[4] Bodily spatiality, inherently dynamic, is the very condition for the coming into being of a meaningful world. Distance is ambivalent; sometimes we want to preserve it, sometimes to eliminate it. Experiential space is disclosed simultaneously in the fundamental project of the body as a living synthetic unity.

The movements of the body always occur within a correlated complex of lived space and lived time.[5] Space is existential, we might simply answer that existence is spatial, that is, that through an inner necessity it opens onto an 'outside', so that one can speak of a "mental" space and 'a world' of spatial meanings.[6] This implies that our evaluation of abstract things also tends to yield spatial metaphors. In other words, describing a value or a meaning of abstract matter, we use spatial expressions like high, low, depth, surface, dimension, level, etc.

As bodily beings we take space and a place by the body sharing space with other people. Foucault discusses disciplinary technology which operates through the control of space called *space politics*. We 'respond' by our bodily attitudes and movements to space politics,

1. Levin 1985, 345
2. Straus 1966, 32
3. (PhP-F, 164). "...I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them" (PhP, 140).
4. (Straus 1966, 152), (Relph 1985, 26).
5. Schrag 1979, 161
6. PhP, 293-4

behaving differently in public facilities such as the police station than we do at home. Signboards may tell us how to behave, but more than that through our tacit cogito we experience dwelling in those places differently. We do not necessarily read the meanings of places as semiotic signs, but rather the meanings of places concern experiential differences in dwelling places. Exploring the controlling elements of space power, we need various tools to describe and analyse lived space with its the social and cultural dimensions of dwelling in those places.

Dancers seemingly work with experiential space and space politics, while a certain space/place influences manners of moving and also perceived movements. Nevertheless, movement notation systems[1] seem to be based mostly on the idea of neutral, homogeneous space. Rudolf Laban (1879-1958) was obviously aware of the idea of lived space and lived body, but in order to construct a system of movement notation and movement analysis, he adhered to the Euclidean geometry and body observed as a moving thing.[2] In the Laban analysis systems, in particular Labanotation, movements and moving body are understood from the outside, using concepts of Euclidean space, not from an experiential, synaesthetic, experiential body's perspective. The analysis defines the quality of the movements, setting the body's co-ordinates in space, while it inherently observes the body's behaviour from the outside, drawing its attitude from behaviourist psychology.

(v) Motility

The hand as it is constructed by anatomy and physiology is not the same as the hand experienced as a part of my body, since it is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body.[3] Thus, I do not *use* the hand, I experience my hand in relation to the world. Tactile impressions result from motion; we feel the smoothness of a surface by

1. There are numerous dance and movement notation systems, two of the best known being Benesh and Laban notations.
2. In his book *The Mastery of Movement*, which is partly written by Lisa Ullman and originally published in 1950 under the title *The Mastery of Movement on the Stage*, Laban first presents lived experiences of the moving body, but later, developing a movement analysis system and notation, he objectifies the body as a moving thing which may have mental expressions in movement. See Laban 1992, 1-22; 23-189.
3. PhP, 106

letting our fingers glide over it. An intimate interpenetrating of the sensorial and the motor is expressed in such words as “handling”, “fingering”, “thumbing”, “groping”, “grasping”. The hand has, it seems, an insight of its own.[1] The hand is itself a delicate structure, with which together the body’s upright position makes hands free for various activities. It is no exaggeration to say that the human hand with its delicate structure has had a central role in the development of the whole human culture.[2]

In examining the five senses of the body, the motility of the body is classified as the tactile sense. But instead of categorising motility as tactility, we might say that we have a kinaesthetic sense. Since the kinaesthetic sense belongs to the synaesthetic body, the lived movement is immanent to the exercise of each of our senses, vision, hearing, tactility, taste and smelling.

Motility is already there when we are born into the world - we are *moving* bodies. Already in a mother’s womb a child moves itself, kicking and stretching and convincing the mother that it is alive, while the movement personalises the child to the mother, making it a unique human. Motility is not dependent on the ego’s will, the ego does not make the body move, but rather like perception motility has a foundation on the prepersonal body. Because of the mechanistic notion of the body, the body’s motility is underestimated as a central factor in our existence. The capacity for motility is a channel whereby we have a knowledge of the world and understand the world through the dimensions of the moving body. To move one’s body is to aim at things; it allows one to respond to their call, which is independent of any representation.[3]

In everyday life, the difference between lifeless movement and lived movement is extremely meaningful, since one of the most important characteristics of living *intentional* beings are living movements. Descartes doubted whether he could make a difference between a man and a machine clothed in a coat and a hat; nevertheless, one of the primary differences which we try to make is the difference between livings being and lifeless objects, whether they *move* themselves or *are moved*. For example, in crossing a dark field at night, we suddenly

1. Straus 1966, 151
2. According to Immanuel Kant, the hand is an outer brain of the human. Quoted in PhP, 316.
3. (PhP, 139). Representation refers here to act of portrayal, picturing, or other rendering in visible form.

perceive something huge, black and moving ahead, but we are unable to recognise what it is. We may be shocked at first if we presume that it moves by itself. But a wave of relief passes over us when we notice that it cannot move by itself, it is only a tree moved by wind.[1]

The body's motility has been mostly studied by anatomists and kinesiologists in terms of the objective body. In that discourse the body's musculature directed by the nervous system manipulates and controls the skeleton and so produces movement. In psychology motility is also studied externally, as movement behaviour; it assimilates itself to physiology corresponding to the connections between sensory and motor centres. The more we conceive moving itself as a mere muscular function, the less we are able to realise the internal relation between the sensation and movement and these visible image.[2]

Anatomy and kinesiology are not interested to reveal the movement as a *gesture* which carries individual, social and cultural meanings.[3] 'Gesture' refers to meaning-bearing movements, intended to communicate with specific figures of meanings. Gesture usually alludes to behaviour of the upper limbs of the body, the expressiveness of the face, and our organs of speech, which are intended to be communicative; in this present context, however, gesture concerns the whole body, even the combination of moving bodies.[4] Discussing Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of the body, Martin Dillon remarks that gesture is intrinsically meaningful, but it is not limited to one meaning.[5] Thus gestures always mean something, but, depending upon the context, can mean several things. To be sure, various movements, postures, positions, dispositions and attitudes of the body have meaning-bearing compartments in the cultural and social context. One may recognise a certain movement as meaningful without knowing its specific meaning. Perceiving meaningful movements usually extends over the cultural boundaries, since we expect that movements carry meanings.

We perceive a gesture as we perceive colour qualities, always through our individual lived life and cultural background. Although we

1. Straus 1966, 49
2. Straus 1966, 41
3. Kleinman 1979, 178
4. Levin 1985, 93
5. Dillon 1988, 188

may fail to understand the gestures of animals or even of people belonging to a different culture, belongingness to the world offers us opportunities to understand otherness. Monika Langer stresses that perceiving the moving body, the meanings of movement are understood directly when the communication of a gesture is achieved through the establishing of a reciprocity between the other's intention and my own. Neither his intention nor mine is thematised; in both cases it 'inhabits' our body.[1] The body-self comprehends the movements of the other in a direct way, by means of the body schema and the synaesthetic body. Similarly, Douwe Tiemersma also insists that there is a direct understanding of the other's movements which is a grasping of the motor meaning of the acts based on shared corporeality.[2] This does not mean that two individuals would understand some movement in exactly same way, even if they had the same social and cultural background. Our interaction involves neither a mechanical process nor intellectual operation. What we have here is a prereflective dialogue. This prereflective incarnate intentionality allows body-subjects to participate actively in cultural life.

In many cases, the communicative aspects of movements are linked to socialised motility and the social body. Socialised motility is increasingly fixed into a typical pattern of movements, tending to be organised as the sedimentation of habituation and stereotypes. The morality of a society is closely linked to the social body's movements and gesture, as the uniform of the social body. Awareness of the embodied social rules is not necessarily articulated, because one learns this behaviour by observing the other bodies. Heidegger's concept das Man manifests our tendency to absorb an unnecessarily narrow, needlessly restricted field of motility. Although Heidegger hardly mentions the body and embodiment, his description of das Man's inauthentic being also concerns the restricted capacity for motility of the social body.[3]

The motility of the child's body is progressively more socialised to society. The child's body is shaped by the images of culture, images such as regulated social conventions, gender, ethnic identifications and different social roles. Culturally and socially formed manners are

1. Langer 1989, 61
2. Tiemersma 1989, 231
3. Klemola 1990, 122-124

sedimented and fabricated within the prepersonal body. There is, therefore, a "subject" for which the world has existed before any identity of the self is formulated, and which has marked out my place in the world, although we can never take that "subject" as such under scrutiny. The prepersonal body does not refer to a momentary body but a system of anonymous functions which draws every particular focus into a general project.[1]

According to Levin, the full realisation of our humanity, fully understanding experiential being as bodies, is attainable only through sentient and sensuous existence: through the culturally formed the social body and prepersonal body.[2] The body's motility consists in a capacity which is a hidden potential to be understood only sensing and listening to one's own body in motion, in other words, through our tacit cogito. In Levin's view, motility has a special significance for the path of self-realisation. He says: "This means that I must take the phenomenological articulation of our embodiment-as-it-is-experienced to be, in part, a problem in communicative praxis."[3]

In Merleau-Ponty's view, in order for there to be communication, there must be a sharp distinction between the one who communicates and the one with whom s/he communicates. But there is initially a state of *pre-communication* wherein the other's intention somehow plays across my body while my intention plays across her/his.[4] The projection of my lived body is intrinsically pre-communicative, which means that my lived body is an *act of communication*.[5] This is to say more than that the body is the standpoint, the centre, in communication. The body always reveals something, which means that the body is not under total control, and this renders it adventitious to the communication process

1. PhP, 254
2. Levin 1985, 114
3. Levin 1985, 32
4. CRO
5. Should all bodily movements be taken as communicative? If all movements are interpreted as communicative, then the other may notice a meaning in my movement although I have no intention of conveying any. By the same token, I may have a clear vision of my movement as communicative, but the other does not recognise it. No "body language" is necessary as the code of movements which could be easily interpreted, because the lived body is already pre-communicative. Using the terms "body language" or "non-verbal communication" may simplify the communicative and pre-communicative body as a system of non-verbal and bodily signs. See also Henlay 1977, 24.

itself.[1] The refusal to communicate, however, is still a form of communication.[2] In other words, I can turn away from the social world, but I cannot cease to be situated relative to it. We are always in a plenum, in being, just as a face, even in repose, even in death, is always doomed to express something.[3]

One reason why the bodily aspect of existence plays an important role in communication lies in the fact that the body has its own knowledge of the world; it has its own awareness and intentionality, its own abilities and skills. It is the body which provides the first opening to the world and the first sense-giving.[4] Bodily communication is not a system of signs which I could totally control and use, since the meanings of bodily movements and posture are never totally fixed as a body language. In particular when the body is concerned, we do not experience things with an analytic attitude.[5]

(vi) Bodily knowledge

Merleau-Ponty says: "Mon corps a son monde ou comprend son monde sans avoir á passer par des < représentations >, sans se subordonner à une < fonction symbolique > ou < objectivante>."[6] Merleau-Ponty stresses that we usually understand a thing as we understand a new kind of behaviour, not, that is, through any intellectual operation of subsumption, but by taking up our own account of the mode of existence through which the observable sign adumbrates before us.[7] In order for the body to be able to identify a movement, there must be body memory, through which the body 'understands' because of its acquisition of habit.

In every directed movement the body has to 'know' the position and measures of the parts of the body in order to move and act successfully. The ability to type is knowledge in the hands, which is

1. See also Bernard 1986, 171.
2. PhP, 361
3. PhP, 453
4. Tiemersma 1989, 236
5. Tiemersma 1989, 261
6. (PhP-F, 164). "My body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 'symbolic' or 'objectifying function'"(PhP, 140-1). The sentence is not translated word by word.
7. PhP, 319

forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort.[1] This knowledge does not involve anything conceptual and explicitly known to a rational consciousness, but has more the character of feeling and prepersonal familiarity.[2] When the body is skilled at a movement pattern, it has an understanding of it, it simultaneously also possesses the art of making new movements in an adaptive way.

Merleau-Ponty emphasises the bodily, prethematic way of understanding, which is prior and basic to intellectual interpretation and explanation. This prereflexive understanding has its place in the context of operational intentionality. Children have learnt things through and in their bodies before they are able to reflect on what they have learnt. Bodily skills like standing and walking might be treated as skills natural a to human being, but still those skills take time for the child to learn. When a baby's leg muscles are strong enough, which means that the baby has "exercised" its muscles, after many failed efforts finds it for the first time balance on two legs without external support. It may fall almost immediately, but it has recognised the technique of balance on two legs. In the second effort it is able to stand a second longer, to "use" this recently discovered *technique*.[3] Discovering that technique, it is not called a baby any longer but a child. By exercising the child has been acquiring knowledge through and in its body about how to stand on the legs without falling over. The bodily skills, like standing, walking, running, jumping, belong to the huge "body of knowledge", which most of us carry in our body. These bodily skills are culturally, socially and individually formed, casting the background on which a formal education begins.[4]

Michael Polanyi examines human knowledge setting on from the fact that *we know more than we can tell*.[5] This knowledge, which is not conceptualised but underlies linguistic rules, he calls *tacit knowledge*. Tacit knowing operates on an internal plane that we are quite incapable of controlling or even feeling in itself. Perception and bodily awareness

1. PhP, 144
2. Tiemersma 1989, 317-318
3. See also Mauss 1935/1979, 114-117.
4. When a child has some organic reasons in the physical body which render it unable to move its own body in a certain way, it is not, of course, an obstacle to learning and understanding things.
5. Polanyi 1966, 4

plays a central role in tacit knowing. Polanyi says: "We recognize the moods of the human face, without being able to tell, except quite vaguely, by what signs we know it."[1] We are able to recognise or identify a human face without being able to tell quite how, or on the basis of what, we do this. By the same token, we can distinguish the taste of wine from the taste of coffee or the different blends of tea, but we are unable to tell how we make the difference between them. The body carries knowledge of these differences. Tasting, like other modes of sense, smelling, touching, hearing and seeing belong to the tacit dimensions of knowledge, which are always personally formed.

We certainly have the tacit dimension of knowledge, which is interwoven with bodily awareness and perception. The body is itself capable of a knowing that is closely related to a corporeal intellect or tacit cogito.[2] Here use the expression 'bodily knowledge' is used rather than 'tacit knowledge', since tacit knowledge is included in all kinds of ways of knowing underlying 'know how'. Bodily knowledge refers more specifically to knowing in and through the body which has a direct connection to bodily awareness and perception. Bodily knowledge concerns all kinds of movement skills which we have acquired in everyday life or by active study.

Both tacit knowing and bodily knowledge are individually formed. To become an expert wine-taster one has to acquire a knowledge of innumerable different wines by tasting and studying them. Sensitivity to recognise differences between wine qualities is not merely a physiological matter, though there might be physiological differences between individuals; but it means to become *bodily sensitive* to this subject matter. The wine-taster has acquired a bodily knowledge, which is his personal knowledge. He is able to share it with another, but he is unable to deliver this embodied knowledge to someone else.

In order to acquire bodily knowledge in a certain domain means inherently becoming bodily sensitive to this certain subject matter, tasting in the case of the winetaster, and in the case of the dancer, becoming sensitive in terms of the kinaesthetic sense and motility. The dancer's bodily knowledge in terms of movements means that movements do not take place coincidentally but that the dancer has certain techniques to produce movements in her/his body, which have

1. Polanyi 1966, 5
2. Dufrenne 1973, 337

the desired form and meaning.[1] Studying and training the body's movements, dancers acquire techniques and the kinaesthetic knowledge to move their bodies, which make them *skilful* movers. Although movement skills may disappear because of an accident or the ageing process, dancers have still bodily knowledge: they have an understanding of a movement in their bodies, although they cannot perform it any more. This implies that they can teach the art of movement, convey a knowledge of moving body to another person, although they are unable to execute those movements themselves.

One can examine one's own body without having explicit anatomical or physiological knowledge, although some of that knowledge may play a role in that examination. Listening to bodily movements and the body's answers in a movement pattern, various dimensions emerge from the same movement. For instance, raising the right arm can have various movement qualities depending on speed, effort, and uniting breathing together with the rising arm one can find dozens of modes of rising-arms. Raising the arm takes place always in a social place and space politics, which influence the experience of the movement and direct its quality. Raising-arm is a movement which at the same time in most cases yields a relation, a communion. The movement may be understood as a gesture and a sign depending its the context and quality: encountering a friend, an arresting situation, at a Nazi meeting, or in the yoga class. One simple movement can gather experiences and meanings which one may seek to describe by words, but never entirely, because categories of language are not fully adequate for this task.[2]

In Polanyi's views, all skills are exhibited in the structure of tacit knowing.[3] All knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.[4] Every intellectual understanding, cognition and interpretation develops directly or indirectly on the basis of bodily knowledge.[5] In understanding a text, even in its textuality, personal bodily knowledge

1. Susan Leigh Foster says: "Still, those who make and study dancing have developed certain knowledges of the body as a representational field and certain skills at viewing and interpreting human movement that offer crucial insights for a scholarship of the body" (Foster 1995, 15).
2. Tiemersma 1989, 261
3. Sanders, A. 1988, 10
4. Sanders, A. 1988, 3
5. Tiemersma 1989, 329

is indispensable.[1]

As we have seen, perception and cognition are closely related.[2] It follows that they are not only an experience of my body, but an experience of my body-in-the-world, and this is what gives a motor meaning to verbal orders.[3] We may understand an abstract thing, but even the most abstract matter, imagination, is connected to our corporeal being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty stresses that in order to perceive things, to understand them deeply, we need to live them.[4] For example, I may understand what snow is by reading about it or seeing it on television, but if I do not have any experience of snow, walking on snow, touching its coldness, being in the midst of a snow storm, the idea of snow remains for me only a story or an abstract picture. To know a thing deeply means to be bodily involved in it.

Nevertheless, the traditional Western paradigm of knowledge presupposes that it requires the pure objectivity of a disengaged, an unmoved observer and the exclusion of all feelings. This conception of knowledge excludes or overcomes its relationship to our sensibility, even if it originates in sensation. It must detach itself from the passivity or receptivity of sensuous awareness, must abstract itself, from the body of felt experience, it must overcome all sensuous passivity through an active reworking of the material it is given. As Levin remarks, the patriarchal conception of knowledge is logocentric, it is detached, abstract, universal and totally committed to the ideal of objectivity. It tends to be hierarchical and is built on a foundation of unquestionable propositions.[5]

This mode of knowledge based on propositions obtains without any surrounding field of meanings and context. According to Levin, propositions represent a static reality, a stable state, and their truth is one which always simply says what it says and is what it is in perfect clarity and distinctness.[6] “The propositional looking” which can be associated with the correspondence theory of truth tends essentially to see from only one perspective and one standpoint. Scientific discourse is assumed to be rational, with propositional truths, i.e. value-neutral,

1. Tiemersma 1989, 311
2. Parsons 1992, 73
3. PhP, 140
4. PhP, 325
5. Levin 1988, 287
6. Levin 1988, 433

dispassionate, disinterested; thus the subject who enunciates a scientific law is, they tell us, irrelevant, bodiless, morphologically undetermined.[1] In logocentric culture, scientific discourse is the paradigm of proper discourse, legislating the correct way to *use* words.[2] Related to the verbal mode, knowledge tends to become a form of having, rather than being.[3]

(vii) Body memory and recollection

In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of the body, the subject who remembers is not a brain; neither is it a consciousness where single data follows each other in physical time.[4] The subject of remembering is the body-self who, living in time, experiences her/himself in a state of becoming, builds his/her life history in an ever changing continuum. To sharpen the issue, there is no memory without *body memory*. According to Edward S. Casey, we could not remember in any of the forms or modes without having the capacity for body memory.[5]

Body memory consists in a memory that is intrinsic to the body, to its own ways of remembering: the way we remember in and by and through the body.[6] The body memory is located in the lived body, the phenomenal body, not the objective body as a neuro-physical structure. A movement is learnt when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its 'world'.

The body is a memorial-container, as itself a "place" of memories. Many body memories need not be accompanied by consciousness in any explicit form. They arise spontaneously without premeditation, but inferential, not in need of further evidence. In the question of body memory we should speak of immanence rather than of intersection between past and present. The body has immanence of the past in the

1. Irigaray 1993, 133
2. Levin 1988, 437
3. Dufrenne 1973, 375
4. Modern neuroscience as well as public opinion regard the brain as an information processing device that sends messages back and forth, asking help, obeying and volunteering. Examining the function of the objective body, neuroscience addresses the brain as the centre of remembering. The map of remembering presented in the phenomenology of the body differs greatly from that offered by neuroscience. See also Varela 1991, 49-50.
5. Casey 1987, 176
6. Casey 1987, 147

present and immanence of the present in the past.[1]

In the realm of body memory almost everything is marginal from the very start. Although the lived body is the center of our active experience, as remembered it is continually being displaced into a dim hinterland of apprehension.[2] The paradox is that body memory is rarely *of the body*; since we are inherently bodies, body memories cannot have a clearly articulated focus. Marginality means that most body memories come to us in felt quality, as bearing a highly specific gravity, in such qualities as opaque, involuntary, inarticulate. The body memories do not lend themselves easily to verbalisation.

Habitual body memory involves an active immanence of the past in the body. In such memory the past is embodied in actions, rather than being contained separately somewhere in the mind or the brain. Habitual body memory is an active immanence of the past in the body that transforms present bodily actions in an efficacious, orienting and regular manner.[3] Habitual memories liberate us from the necessity of constant reorientation. In the case of swimming, I remember, the body remembers, how to swim immediately when I dive into water. I do not need to reflect first in the mind how to swim. Habitual body memory functions at a deeply prepersonal level, which is why it occurs without premeditation or particular preparation.

Acquiring such habits is neither a matter of intellectual analysis and reconstruction nor a mechanical recording of impressions. Learning to play the piano keyboard makes this evident. It is a question, rather, of the bodily comprehension finding the keys without 'thinking in the mind' the position of the fingers. Merleau-Ponty says of typewriting: "The subject knows where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where one of our limbs is, through a knowledge bred of familiarity which does not give us a position in objective space."[4] As we have seen, we must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time. If my hand traces a complicated path through the air, I need not, in order to know its final position, add together all movements made in the same direction and subtract those made in the opposite direction.[5]

1. Casey 1987, 168
2. Casey 1987, 165
3. Casey 1987, 149
4. PhP, 144
5. PhP, 139-140

Body memories manifest themselves as continually vanishing into the depths of our corporeal existence - and just as continually welling up from the same depth. This is particularly evident in the case of habitual body memories, which arise from and disappear into the dark interiority of our own bodies.[1] They tend to situate themselves on the "periphery" of our lives so as not to preoccupy us in the present. But such memories are not peripheral in importance, on the contrary, they are of quite central significance: we could not be who we are, nor do what we do, without them. Being marginal, they belong to the latent or tacit dimension of our being.[2] Their meanings are not articulated.

'The person', 'the personal identity', which is almost the same as an individual's life history, is ultimately rooted in body memory. The enduring personality is a historic route of living occasions, the body's inherent memories of its own "historic route". Thus body memory is not something we have, it is something we are: it constitutes us as we exist humanly in the world. What we have experienced is, and remains, permanently ours, in the same way as in old age a person is still in contact with his youth.[3]

The body retains memories of pleasures as well as of pain. We remember moments of pleasure and painful memories, living them through and in our bodies. Many body traumas remain threatening to us even, or rather precisely, as remembered. The return to the initial trauma that bodily remembering entails brings with it an at least minor trauma of its own, which may in turn have to be defended against.[4] Therefore some traumatic body memories never lose their painful and even devastating sting.

Casey categorises most memories of pleasure in the erotic body memory. Exposing erotic body memories, it is difficult to draw any strict dividing line between myself-as-being-touched-by-other and the myself-as-touching-other. The touched and the toucher are merged in a phenomenon of interpersonal reversibility. Erotic body memories can be divided into those that are present and those that are more remote. Present erotic memories often still resonate and "tingle" in us: no extra

1. Casey 1987, 166
2. Casey 1987, 163
3. PhP, 393
4. Casey 1987, 157

revival is needed.[1] It is as if an entire recent episode were still happening. Long-term erotic memories tend to lack such specificity and sometimes emerge as stereotyped images. Describing these memories in spoken or written language, we tend to formulate them as stories in order to store them, while making a painful observation that the immanent bodily experiences are disappearing "from the skin", receding into pictorial memory.

Being as the body, an individual has a particular perspective and position in the world, not only a point of view but *a* physical *place* where s/he is situated temporarily or permanently. The embodied existence opens onto place, indeed takes place. Casey indicates that there is a direct relationship between memory and place. The lived body puts us in touch with the psychical aspects of remembering and the physical features of place. We find ourselves to be familiar with a particular place in which we are located. There is a close tie between body memory and the memory of place, their becoming virtually indistinguishable in many lived experiences of remembering. In visiting a foreign culture, the world answers in a nonhabitual manner to the body's movements, we may become uncertain how to dwell in the new culture feeling, homesickness, missing familiar smells, tastes, movements, gestures and sounds. Our remembering bodies are ineluctably place-bound; they are bound to be in a place, whether this place is a temporary or a permanent to us. Things are manifesting of place as well as in space.

It is the body's capacity to learn and remember movements which makes dancing possible to perform as a structured choreography. After rehearsing a choreography, the dancer can only trust that the body will remember movements in the performance situation without the mind's reflection. Recollection of movements take place as a "path" on which the body "wanders" during the performance. The choreography, to be danced and lived through movements, emerges from the body without any special reflection in the mind.[2]

1. Casey 1987, 161
2. Sondra Fraleigh describes the body's inherent ability to move and remember movements without reflection in the mind: "The body is not something I possess to dance with. I do not order my body to bend here and whirl there. I do not think 'move', then do move. No! I am the dance; its thinking is its doing and its doing is its thinking. I am the bending and I am the whirling. My dance is my body as my body is myself" (Fraleigh 1987, 32).

5. The Body in the Process of Change

In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of the lived body temporality is not something which we could conceive or observe; it is the process of living in which our present is not only this moment or this week, but our entire life. There is neither a mechanistic causality nor an intellectual synthesis of time, because time is quite simply the project which we ourselves are. No existence is determined in-itself, definitively, rather we are constantly in the process of change, projecting into the future. Our decisions and choices in life mould us, we become who we are through the choices we make. Therefore, the process of change in the body involves not only biological changes, but the lived body's process of change.

The Cartesian subject has an essentially fixed identity: a timeless self, the disembodied self, the self without real history, culture and place. *The embodied self*, on the contrary, lives an identity which is in the process of change: the self is opened to changes in itself; the self which changes in response to changes in the lifeworld; the self capable of changing the conditions of its world according to need.[1] We find ourselves in the process of becoming, thus, what matters, what makes all the difference, is how we are able to reply to the process. Some can grow with it, enjoying the fulfilment, the sense of deep contingency, that comes from going into the process as a way of living. But most people shut their eyes to the possibilities which the process offers, breaking into their consensually validated and settled world.[2] Most people go through life more or less comfortably settled into the "normal" and "fixed" patterns of experiencing. Sondra Fraleigh describes the body-self as it is formed through its lived life, its habits, work and entire way of life:

> I create my body through my choices and my actions, in this I also create myself. My entire lived experience determines my body; my choice to be athletic or sedentary, my habits of walking, talking, eating, and even dreaming, result in what I may call at any moment - for that moment - by body. My body is mutable, changeable, living substance. It is continuous with my mind, which is no less subject to temporal change, mutability,

1. Levin 1988, 19
2. Levin 1988, 381

> growth, and decay, and no less a product of my exercise of choice and free will."[1]

Fraleigh presents here rather far-reaching assumptions as to the capacity of humans to control their bodies, ignoring entirely the social and political structure which also produce our bodies. Nevertheless, bodies are not formed at random, what they are in certain historical and political situations. Body-subjects can also direct themselves, and to some extent, make the bodies which they are, what they will become. The crucial matter is that the embodied self can choose only *one* body, which identifies her/him after the lived life. As we have seen, the self is not "inside"; the lived life, to some extent, is matter visible to others. The life, which I have lived, is in and as my body, the visible lived body.

Because the body has a capacity to transform - as such it is in the process of change - one can find *techniques of the body* which are an active means of directing, shaping and moulding the body. Physical education and other bodily disciplines, including dance education, mould the body by using technique, for instance reiterating a certain movement in a certain manner for a definite period in order to produce a certain result. Sometimes the target of a body technique consists in purely visual goals as in body building or in dance aesthetics. But body techniques also yield experiential transformation in the body-subject, although such change might not have been envisaged. A long-term training and body techniques shape, not only the appearance of the body, but a person's habitual body memory, body schema, and even worldview. Thus the consequences of body techniques are more fundamental than aesthetic; they also project existence.

Foucault's concept *practice of the self* in self-forming activities entails the conception that an individual needs her own exertions and efforts "to become what s/he is."[2] The human has a potentiality for self-transformation and moral sensibility. Thus, practice of the self is based on the notion that I can direct the project which I am. This means a search for one's own identity in questioning body politics, the social

1. Fraleigh 1987, 17
2. Foucault introduces practices of the self in *The Use of Pleasure*, the second volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault 1992, 25-37).

body's stereotypes and living in das Man.[1] Practice of the self, as the body-self's ethical project, should not be understood as forms of self-absorption and self-indulgence, forms of narcissism. Practice of the self does not detach the self from society and withdraw it from social responsibility; rather there is a need to develop practices of the self, in which the essential intertwining of self and other, self and society are understood. The social body cannot be cured by curing only the individual, nor can individuals authentically develop without a corresponding transformation of society.

6. Flesh and Reversibility

The Cartesian subject purports to put us into direct contact with an intelligible realm of truths in themselves, neglecting even to mention that *the world* sustains and conditions it from start to finish. Prior to any philosophising, there is a comprehensive, prepersonal experience in which the body-subject comes into being by simultaneously grasping the world and itself.[2] Merleau-Ponty as other phenomenologists stress human belongingness to *the world*. Concretely, there is no other world, no other earth, where humans could live for the time being. We need air for breathing, and nourishment, which exist, according to contemporary knowledge, only on this earth. Belongingness means not only that the world is for us, but w*e*, as mankind, are born from the world. The body-subject is born both of the world and into the world.

We are inherently historical beings. Dasein always finds itself, as Heidegger says, already thrown, already cast, into an historical world which is not of its own making. As soon as we become aware of history, we find that we have already been shaped by its forces. This implies that our understanding of life, and our vision of reason, are historically situated. It also means that our visionary capacity, our visionary endowment, is historically conditioned.[3] Because we always inevitably find ourselves 'thrown' into the world, the world is not of our own

1. Practice of the self will be taken up later in discussing of the dance artist's project as practice of the self.
2. Langer 1989, 121
3. Levin 1988, 35-36

making but precedes our existence. The world exerts its own demands on our bodies: we must learn to adjust to its requirements, to orient ourselves according to its gravitational pull, and orient ourselves to the language, customs and needs of other worldly inhabitants.[1] A human is inscribed in the world; what s/he feels, what s/he lives, what the others feel and live, even her/his dreams and illusions are not islets, isolated fragments of being.[2] Merleau-Ponty says:

> *Je suis donné*, c'est-á-dire que je me trouve déjà situé et engagé dans un monde physique et social, - *je suis donné à moi-même*, c'est-à-dire que cette situation ne m'est jamais dissimulée, elle n'est jamais autour de moi comme une nécessité étrangère, et je n'y suis jamais effectivement enfermé comme un object dans une boîte.[3]

Although living in cultural Cartesianism has made us think that objects are separated, existing in space and time, we do not conceive the world as a sum of things, nor time as a sum of instantaneous 'present moments', since each thing can offer itself in its full determinacy only if other things recede into the vagueness of the remote distance. Consequently, each present can take on its reality only by excluding the simultaneous presence of earlier and later presents, since a sum of things or of presents makes nonsense.[4] Therefore the world is constituted of meanings to us, not a sum of objects or moments. The world is a tissue of meanings, of references, and a visible thing is a strait between exterior and interior horizons ever gaping open. Reality is a wild, dynamic Being, not chaos, but a fabric of meanings.[5] Merleau-Ponty argues: "Because we are in the world, we are *condemned to meaning*, and we cannot do or say anything without its acquiring a name in history."[6] The world is not an object such that I have in my possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, a field for, all my thoughts and all

1. Dillon 1990, 24
2. VI, 63
3. (PhP-F, 413). "I *am given*, that is, I find myself already situated and involved in a physical and social world - *I am given to myself*, which means that this situation is never hidden from me, it is never round about me as an alien necessity, and I am never in effect enclosed in it like an object in a box" (PhP, 360).
4. PhP, 333
5. Tiemersma 1989, 296
6. (PhP, xix)."Parce que nous sommes au monde, nous sommes condamnés au sens, et nous ne pouvons rien faire ni rien dire qui ne prenne un nom dans l'histoire" (PhP-F, xv).

my explicit perceptions.[1] As a sensing and moving being, I am one and the same person, and it is as such a person that I look into my world, which is *one* world.[2] Thought, subjectivity, body and the world are therefore mutually implicated; they form a single comprehensive system.

Edmund Husserl used the term *lifeworld* (Lebenswelt) to describe this comprehensive system. He emphasises that there is no longer any justification for the 'natural world concept'; the thematisation of the world as experiential accesses simultaneously organic nature, physical objects, all human culture and historicity. Stars in the sky are remote suns as 'physical objects', but simultaneously they are to us cultural objects, which belong to human culture, as the sources of stories or as the objects of scientific research. All knowledge, conceptions, beliefs about the stars are our insight into them. While the stars are 'for us', they are so only as 'in-themselves' for us. And what they are entirely 'in-themselves', that is beyond human knowledge.

The lifeworld is always already there, existing in advance for us, as the 'ground' of all praxis, whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is pregiven to us, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the field of all actual and possible praxis. The lifeworld as such is non-thematised by the very statements that describe it, for the statements as such will in their turn be sediments within the lifeworld. The statements will be comprehended in the lifeworld rather than existing separate from the lifeworld as such. Therefore the lifeworld *as such*, in itself, cannot be described or understood. Although the lifeworld is already constituted, it is never completely constituted, by our choices we exert an influence on the lifeworld to change it.

Stressing the human's belongingness to the world, Merleau-Ponty has used the term *flesh* (*la chair*) to convey the notion that the human body and the world originate from the same source. For Merleau-Ponty, "flesh" designates a dimension of us as embodied beings in which all individual lives are inseparably intertwined. In the dimension of flesh, things pass into us as well as we into things. Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things, but because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things are an annex of my body, they are encrusted on its flesh, because the world is made of the same

1. PhP, xi
2. Straus 1966, 40-1

"stuff" as the body.[1]

Our body, limbs and organs are no longer our instruments, on the contrary, our instruments and tools are detachable organs. Merleau-Ponty puts it thus: "My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'".[2] Space is no longer how a geometrician looks over it, reconstructing it from outside, but rather a space reckoned by starting from me the zero point: I do not see it according to its exterior envelope; I live in it from inside; I am immersed in it. My body is made of the same flesh as the world, and moreover this flesh of my body is shared by the world, the world reflects it, encroaches upon it and it encroaches upon the world.[3]

Trying to justify the underlying unity of the world as flesh, Merleau-Ponty asks, where are we to place the limit between the body and the world.[4] Where does the body end and the otherness begin? While I inhale air into my lungs, at which moment does the air transform into the body-self? The limit between otherness and the body does not take place on the skin; in the case of the lived body there is no exact boundary between the self and otherness.

'Flesh', as Merleau-Ponty uses the term, has no name in traditional philosophy. Obviously the concept of flesh in Merleau-Ponty's thinking does not refer merely to 'concrete flesh' as the tissue of the human body or other living beings, since this flesh is a phenomenological not a biological or physical concept. To designate it we might need the old term 'element'. Flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.[5] In general, it is not a fact or a sum of facts, "material" or "spiritual". It is not the case that there is some pervasive stuff out of which all things are carved. It is rather that there is "a general manner of being" in which all things participate in the various ways articulated through the vicissitudes of reversibility.[6]

The function of "flesh" is twofold: it offers Merleau-Ponty a definitive overcoming of modern subjectivism and solipsism, and at the same time introduces alterity into the very definition of subjective

1. EM, 163
2. PhP, 235
3. VI, 248
4. VI, 138
5. VI, 139
6. Dillon 1990, 25

"selfsameness".[1] The sentient body is interwoven with perceivable, sensible objects, but the body and objects do not vanish into "sameness". There is a gap which separates the self and otherness. But where is the gap or the limit located, since as the example of breathing shows, there is no exact moment at which the inhaled air transforms into the body-self. In addition, even the body-self to some extent is other to itself. The body-self is the *other* also to itself, since the body-self is never totally known and perceived by itself.[2]

When I touch my hand, I am both the toucher and the touched. I can transfer my awareness of the toucher and touched on the hand. There is an abyss, a gap, that separates the *In Itself* from the *For Itself*. My left hand touches my right hand even as it is touched by the right, and this relation of touching - being touched can be, in the next instant, reversed. The toucher and the tangible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which touches and which is touched. 'The point' where they interweave Merleau-Ponty calls *le chiasme* .

There is no coinciding of the toucher with touchable or the seer with visible. Touching something means that I am already tactile. There is a basic connection between touching and being touched; a reversibility between touching and being touched, there is a lateral synergy and concordance. This means that there is a generality of touching and tactile, of seeing and visible.[3]

Although the visible is cut from the tangible, Merleau-Ponty argues that every tactile being is in some manner promised to visibility, and there is encroachment not only between touched and touching, but also between tangible and visible.[4] There is double and crossed situating of visible in tangible and of tangible in visible, since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world. Yet tangible and visibility are not merged into one. This is the way the synaesthetic body functions, how the senses are separated and together at one and the same time.

1. Johnson 1990, xxiv
2. PhP, xii
3. Tiemersma 1989, 233
4. Merleau-Ponty says: "Il faut nous habituer á penser que tout visible est taillé dans le tangible, tout être tactile promis en quelque manière à la visibilité, et qu'il y a empiétement, enjambement, non seulement entre le touché et le touchant, mais aussi entre le tangible et le visible qui est incrusté en lui, comme, inversement, lui même n'est pas un néant de visibilité, n'est pas sans existence visuelle"(VI-F, 177).

Reciprocity always takes place in an asymmetrical sense. The chiasm, reversibility, emerges from the idea that every perception is doubled with a counter-perception. In a sense it is *the same* who touches and is touched, sees and is visible, not the same in the sense of ideal, nor of real identity, but in chiasm with the other. Reversibility of touching and touched, seeing and seen, seeing and touched do not coincide with each other easily, rather they escape each other in what Merleau-Ponty calls a 'divergence' '*écart*'.[1] There is always a gap, an abyss, between touching and touched, seeing and seen, seeing and touched.

A dialectics of reflexivity takes place in the intertwining of subjectivity and the world: my eyes which see, my hands which touch can also be seen and touched. For Merleau-Ponty, flesh is a 'mirror phenomenon', the medium of the subject-object mirroring. Flesh is the formative medium of the subject and the object. In the depths of the medium the subject and object are simultaneously coemergent: forever unified, continually mirroring, echoing one another.[2] Mirroring and reflexivity is dialectic.

The phenomenon of the reversibility of perception also concerns the dancing, moving body.[3] When a dancer moves, setting her/his body and limbs in motion, simultaneously the dance is perceivable, visible, audible to the other. The *dancing is danced*, the dancing body can be simultaneously seen by the other. According to Kozel, seeing-seen, touching-touched, dancing-danced are different manifestations of the same ontological phenomenon of reversibility.[4] But this reversibility in perception contains an abyss, since there is an *écart* between the moving body and its perceived movement.

1. "- Ce n'est pas davantage, donc, s'atteindre, c'est au contraire s'échapper, s'ignorer, le soi en question est d'écart, est *Unverborgenheit du Verborgen* comme tel, qui donc ne cesse pas d'être caché ou latent -"(VI-F, 303).
2. Levin 1989, 158
3. In his article, "Sens et fiction, ou les effets étranges de trois chiasmes sensoriel", Michel Bernard develops a theory of the chiasmic function of the senses for dance art based on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, in particular *Le visible et l'invisble*. He distinguishes three different types of chiasmas in corporeality. The first is 'intra-sensoriel', "interior sensation", which refers to a chiasma of seeing-visible or touching-tactile. The second is also "interior sensation", but it refers to a chiasma between different senses as seeing-tactile. The third chiasma is 'para-sensoriel', "parasensation", which designates articulation between perceived thing and expressed thing, in other words, an interval between the action of expression and the action of perception (Bernard 1993, 57-59).
4. Kozel 1994, 238

The abyss, *écart*, in chiasm takes place in at least two different manners: (1) in the dancing body itself and (2) between the moving body and the one who perceives it. An abyss in a dancer's experience of movement means that the dancing as experiential is never the same as it is "moved", as it is visual. There is always an *écart* between moving and moved (visual) to the dancer her/himself. This implies that a certain body movement may look strange when it is seen by the dancer on the video. By the same token, I never really hear my own voice as I hear the voices of others, for I hear it internally, it is not the same as a voice to be heard in acoustic space.[1] There is a *dérobade incessante*, an "incessant escaping" which takes place between the voice I am producing and the voice heard by me. At the heart of reversibility I am always on the same side of my body.[2] The inability to isolate my own movements or voice merely as seen or heard is not a failure, for there is always an escape, *échappement* and a divergence, *écart*, this precisely because I hear myself from the inside and the outside at the same time, only never entirely outside my body. Because of this "incessant escaping", movements are never totally under the control of the dancer. Dancers, in order to express meanings through movements experientially lived, have to study the abyss between the experiential movements and their visual appearance, the moving-moved. How are their lived movements perceivable, since their experiential body is never totally visible to the other? What do their movements actually reveal? Are they the same as they experience doing them?[3]

Although, from the point of view of dancers, they have successfully united the purpose of movement and how they factually move, there is reversibility, with its gap, between the moving body and the body perceived by the audience. This means that there is an "incessant escaping" between the self and the other. When a dancer moves, setting her/his body and limbs in motion, simultaneously the audience sees her/his dancing. Despite reversibility between the dancer's movement and the audience's perception of it, this moving-

1. Merleau-Ponty says: "I do not hear myself as I hear the others, the sonorous existence of my voice is for me as it were poorly exhibited; I have rather an echo of its articulated existence, it vibrates through my head rather than outside. *I am always on the same side of my body*; it presents itself to me in one invariable perspective"(VI, 148).
2. Kozel 1994, 217
3. See also Bernard 1993, 59.

perceived carries an *écart*, an abyss which is located in the difference of the self and other.[1] A watcher's experience escapes from a performer's experience of movement, although the audience and also the dancer may pursue a shared experience of dance.

Nevertheless, reversibility is not complete until it is extended to other living beings with whom we share the world. Not only one hand touches the other, it touches another person and is in turn touched by the other.[2] As Dillon reminds us, shaking hands with the other is not the same as shaking hands with oneself. There is reversibility in both cases, but a person's experience of my right hand as object is inaccessible to me in a way that my left hand's experience of my right hand is not.[3] Reversibility manifests the intertwining of my life with other lives, of my body with visible things, by the intersection of my perceptual field with that of others. This engagement with the other occupies a central place in Merleau-Ponty's thought; he insists that reflection is motivated by the intertwining of my life with other lives, and that it is the task of philosophy to account for the embodied self and how it exists in the world among others.[4] The reversibility of perception concerning the performer and the audience will be reverted to in the last chapter of this thesis. To understand this reversibility more profoundly, it is necessary for the end of this section to discuss the difference between the self and the other.

7. The Self and Otherness

My body and its embodiedness constitutes my bond with the world rather than one among many perspectives seen from some ideal standpoint outside the world. I cannot detach myself from my body, hence, I can neither take up various perspectives on it nor dislodge it from my perception. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, our body is permanently present to us, despite our never being able to observe it

1. CRO, 135
2. Kozel 1994, 226
3. Dillon 1988, 166
4. Merleau-Ponty says: "Mon accès par la réflexion à un esprit universal, loin de découvrir enfin ce que je suis depuis toujours, est motivé par l'entrelacement de ma vie avec les autres vies, de mon corps avec les choses visibles, par le recoupement de mon champ perceptif avec celui des autres, par le mélange de ma durée avec les autres durées" (VI-F, 74).

like an object, since the angle from which we perceive it is unalterable. Yet this permanent and invariable presence of our body is what enables us to perceive objects.[1] Moreover, without subjectivity, the body-self, there is neither the lifeworld nor experience of it.

Individuals' views of things and of themselves are, therefore, fundamentally *limited*: it is the embodied perspective, within a place and time.[2] As Cartesian subjects we have an attitude wherein we observe the world from outside, from outer space, not involved in any place and time, but existing in a non-bodily way eternally as observing minds. Merleau-Ponty's study of behaviour shows that we must discard the assumption of the external observer and embrace a notion of apprehension in which things reveal themselves to us in inherently limited human perception, since we are embodied beings.[3] As an individual can never experience the world from two perspectives simultaneously, the lived body and its location is central to her/his understanding of the world.[4]

There is 'an individual world' as an experiential perspective in the body corresponding to every individual person.[5] Thus every human is *an individual*, a unique autonomous being, distinct from all others.[6] Speaking of an individual, we must not understand it in the context of a *privatisation* process in which individuals are treated as merely privatised, independent economic subjects.[7] This process produces monadic bodies, which comprise a totally different mode of individuality. In contrast to privatisation, individuality excludes neither the reality of both collective embodiment and individual thinking nor the moral consequences of these assumptions. The development is not the extinction of the individual person and its personality but rather their extension into the *shared flesh*, where their identities as inseparably intertwined.

Nevertheless, the Cartesian tradition compels us to define the goal of moral development exclusively in terms of independence and privatisation, and fails to understand the importance of relationship and

1. Langer 1989, 36
2. Tiemersma 1989, 259
3. Langer 1990, 122
4. Gerber 1979, 183
5. Scheler 1973, 393
6. Scheler 1973, 508
7. Scheler 1973, 510

interaction even for the achievements of mature individuation. Independence essentially isolates an individual standing alone, in opposition to all other individuals. The institutional authority of science and technology has successfully effected a reduction of human beings to the dual status of subjectified, privatised egos and subjugated, engineerable objects. The Cartesian subject, by detaching us from our body of lived experience, nullifies the validity of personal experience, and undermines our trust in what we actually experience.[1]

The very distinction between 'inner' and 'outer', and between 'subjective' and 'objective', is often the instrument of social domination, in so far as this duality is used ideologically as a way to discredit, privatise and derealize the potentially subversive authority of individual experience.[2] Much of the so-called 'inner life' is really nothing but internalised social control, as it is explained that the only domain which an individual can rule is the "inner life". But it is certainly essential to understand that not all forces of subjection are simply and directly imposed on the body by society. The self is a place of rest, but not a place of escape from the world enclosing it from the outside. Rather it is an intermediate area of experiencing, to which the body-self's experiences and others' action both contribute, keeping the self and outer reality separate yet interrelated.

We are from the outset individual bodies even though individuals and their identities are constituted through the social shaping of bodies. Rather than being essentially isolated from others, which is how we see ourselves as separated objects, we are, as bodies, joined inseparable, inseparably bound, to others. In the essay "The Child's Relations with Others", Merleau-Ponty argues that human beings are not self-contained, self-sufficient subjects, contingently and externally related to one another, but beings who are formed, from the very beginning, in and through their social interactions, the other.[3]

The community is not a simple collection of individuals existing outside and alongside one another, but a synthesis of individuals and their shared corporeality.[4] This we-synthesis is confirmed by an empathic, common horizon; one of those horizons is language, which

1. Irigaray 1993, 143
2. Levin 1989, 98
3. CRO, 116-117
4. Tsai 1989, 214

combines people together. Just as an individual discovers an experience against the cogiven background of a stream of such experiences, so also a movement and act is given to the individual in self-experience as a member of a community of persons which encompasses her/his.

We 'understand' the others if we understand the meaning of their gestures, and this is only because we share the same social and cultural world. Through this social world, movements, gestures and attitudes have common, shared meanings in a cultural community. So we can understand the another person's gesture if it is already familiar in such a way that we can identify it.[1] But even the customs of an unfamiliar culture may appeal to us, for we notice they carry a meaning, although we cannot locate it in any familiar "vocabulary". There is 'cultural intersubjectivity' which makes possible mutual understanding concerning the body's movements and gestures in a certain community. But cultural intersubjectivity does set the boundary to our capacity to understand otherness, since the human world and corporeality cross the borders of states, societies, ethnic and religious communities, genders and subcultures. We are capable of understanding another person with an entirely different cultural background as long as we have belonged to a human community. Despite cultural intersubjectivity, which offers a shared ground to understanding and forming an identity, there is always a gap between me and otherness. I cannot ever experience the other's body like as s/he experiences it, however intimate friends we are with common cultural and social roots.

Otherness must be found; the constitution of the other as other must be motivated. This is the insight that inspires Emmanuel Levinas.[2] Our relations with others comprise here primarily relations with other human beings, but because an ontology is at stake, we must also refer to our relation with nature and with things.[3] The Cartesian subject has forced 'the other' into a position of object. The new critical paradigm after colonialism has strengthened the ethical importance of recognising and

1. Diprose 1994, 109
2. For Emmanuel Levinas, the crucial focus and central concern of his own work is the priority of 'otherness', a radical alterity that demands our ethical responses. This radical alterity is the call of the Infinite, a transcendence that already inhabits all human encounters. He speaks of the encounter with the face of the Other as the ultimate summons to validate the existence of another human being who cannot be totalised or recovered into the self.
3. Johnson 1990, xvii

respecting *the difference* that makes the other. Sameness and sharing identity with a gender or/and with an ethnic or religious community play a role in determining our moral comportment toward the other, but respect for differences is no less important. Even if I and the other had a common background, I would never "know" the body of the other as s/he lives it, because the other will never exist for me as I exist myself.[1] The other is inherently an individual, with a unique own lived history, and unique experiences. The other remains, fundamentally, a mystery to me, however close we are to each other.

Thus, there is always the self and otherness, a gap, an abyss, between me and otherness. The difference between the self and otherness is mainly the consequence of an individual's unique carnal situation in the world: one's own lived life, personal history, cultural and social background. Temporality as one's own limited time, living toward-one's-own-death, opens an abyss from the self to otherness, when I comprehend that the otherness does not die with me. Grasping one's own death sets a strict line between the self and otherness, I and the other person. But if we detach ourselves from the conception of the Cartesian subject as separated from the world, the shared flesh as intercorporeality brings a consolation for the dying human, since s/he shares the living intercorporeality even after her/his death.

Humans neither find a meaningful living in their "inner selves", nor can they find out who they are without the other. In other words, the self cannot become itself, identify itself, without the other. Infants begin life as a part of an undifferentiated unity (with parents); the issue is not only how we separate from otherness, but also how we connect to and recognise others. The issue is not how we become free of the other, but how we actively engage and make ourselves known in relationship to the other, since this is *a channel to have knowledge of both the self and the other*. An individual identifies her/himself through a relationship to another being. S/he comes to feel that "I am the doer who does, I am the author of my acts", by being with another person who recognises her/his acts. As Ann Cooper Albright says, this interaction must find a delicate balance of recognising an other and being recognized as a self, which calls for "mutual recognition".[2]

As I cannot have direct access to the psyche of another, I must

1. PhP, 432
2. Albright 1991, 95

grant that I grasp the other's psyche only indirectly, mediating on the person's acts by that person's bodily appearance. *I see, perceive the other as the body*. The lived body of the other reveals the perceivable horizon of lived life, the past, thinking, habits, labour, prejudices, even dreaming. This self is not inside, but to some extent, a visible matter to others. I cannot know, as the other knows, what s/he is thinking, but I can suppose it, guess at it from facial expressions, gestures, and words - in short from a series of bodily appearances which I am witnessing.[1] Thus, it is in the other person's conduct and speech, in the manner with which the other deals with the world, that I am able to discover that consciousness.[2] At the same time the other who is to be perceived, is not a psyche closed in on itself but rather a conduct, a system of behaviour that aims at the world, submitting itself to my intentions. This conduct, which I am able only to see and perceive, I live somehow from a distance. Reciprocally, I know that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of the other's intention.[3]

Solitude and communication are not two horns of dilemma, but two 'moments' of one phenomenon.[4] My experience is in a way present in me to other people, since otherwise I should speak of the totality of solitude and consider other people as inaccessible. To see and touch the other, I must be visible and touchable. To understand and to be understood as the embodied subject, I have to be touched and moved by the living, immanent other. So there is reversibility between consciousness of one's own body and perception of the other.

This mirror image itself makes possible contemplation of the self. The human body is sensible to itself, but also it is unknown to itself, since the self *also contains otherness*.[5] Because our relation to ourselves is not one of sheer coincidence but contains otherness, we must also simultaneously speak of personal identity and difference.[6] I am no longer what I felt myself, immediately, to be; I am also the image and impression of myself that is given to me by the other person.[7] The other is a mirror to me, it reflects and it may distort what I am. Nevertheless,

1. CRO, 114
2. CRO, 117
3. CRO 118
4. PhP, 359
5. Dillon 1988, 9
6. Johnson 1990, xvii
7. CRO, 136

the other person's impression of me gives me a knowledge of what I am, since I am also constantly other to myself.

In order that the other can reflect an image of myself, I must learn to find a communion with otherness and a reciprocity through which I can identify myself, while I can also learn about otherness, since I am fundamentally a limited embodied perspective. There is an incessant escaping between me as I feel myself and me as I see myself. Furthermore, there is an 'incessant escaping' between me and the other: how I see myself and how the other defines me, which produces conflicts between me and the other.[1] But through those conflicts I can locate and admit the crucial difference between me and the other, constructing my own identity. The other body has a different 'view' into the world because of her/his unique embodied situation in the world. Through a communion with its conflicts, the otherness may reveal itself to me, but reciprocally, my own image is reflected on the other, it brings to me knowledge of myself.

What is being suggested here is that the reversibility of perception, concerning the connection of the dancing body and the audience, might offer a special occasion for the reciprocity of the self and the other. Performing might be a place in which the difference between the self and the other is obvious, while it offers an opportunity to learn to understand the other and construct one's own identity. This issue will be taken up again in the last chapter, but in the next chapter the purpose is to outline the discourse and the context in which dance and the dance artist are discussed here.

1. CRO, 137

Part II
THE ROLE OF DANCE TRADITION AND THE DANCE FIELD

1. Dancing as a Living Bodily Heritage

In Western culture there has been a particular emphasis on the significance of verbal language. Although there is growing suspicion of this logocentric world view, written language has been conceived as a central component in culture.[1] The body of knowledge of the culture is preserved in written form in libraries and in visual form in museums. Whenever we need to use that knowledge, we can easily acquire it by reading upon it. Interpreting old texts and even newer ones, reading those texts, is dependent on a historical period and also a cultural corporeality, through which the texts were written. In order that we can understand correctly a written text, we must acquire a knowledge of the society and its corporeality, the manners and morality of that historical period.

Corporeality not only emerges in semiotics as a haunting specter, as Julia Kristeva has argued, but it also conveys a cultural heritage from one generation to the next.[2] Levin points out that cultural gestures echo from one generation to another, passing on the life of a culture with the transpersonal body, a living body of cultural tradition. We are not just individual bodies, private, personal bodies; there have never been any monadic bodies, the human body belongs to history, to culture, and the individual body, rooted into the transpersonal. A body belongs to its ancestors as much as to its contemporaries.[3] This transpersonal embodiment offers a vessel wherein bodily knowledge of the different activities of cultural life is passed from one generation to the next.

Because of the lack of written tradition in African culture until recent decades, the body of knowledge of those cultures is transmitted

1. See Polhemus 1993, 3-4
2. “There is a specter haunting semiotics. It is the body.” Quoted in MacAloon 1995, 32.
3. Levin 1989, 272

by oral/aural tradition, which is preserved by means of the human body itself - by gestures, dancing, singing, storytelling. This oral/aural tradition can exist only through a vivid bodily communication and its ability to transmit and sustain meanings in its own way. According to Alphonse Tiérou, the African "memory" exists in varied forms; it is impossible to recognise the exact meaning of one part without reconstructing it wholly.[1] This means that "knowledge" as cultural heritage is impossible to translate into a written formula without losing meanings which are bound to physical objects, places and nature, in short, the whole lifeworld as it exists.[2] Nevertheless, in Western culture, the notion of knowledge emphasises an objective mode of knowing: knowledge expressed as written text. This differs vastly from the African conception of knowledge which also underscores "media" or "form" as a relevant matter in knowing.

Although in Western culture the body of knowledge is founded upon the written language, there are traditions in the West - one of these is the art of dance - whose existence and continuity are mainly based on the bodily heritage: movement vocabularies, body techniques and bodily knowledge.[3] This implies that dance activity calls for its background corporeal intersubjectivity, since a dance is never invented by an individual without another who shares this intention. A dance tradition develops not only on the "horizontal level" from one individual to the other, but also on the "vertical level" from one generation to the next. Movement vocabularies emerge gradually from dance practice, while practising dance produces a knowledge of the moving body. Knowledge of dancing can be passed on from one individual to another only *through* the dancing, moving body, and this implies that a dance teacher must possess bodily knowledge and methods to pass on knowledge to students. When living bodies carry knowledge of dance, this mode of knowledge cannot be imposed on a written formula to be stored for decades in archives, libraries and museums, without losing

1. Tiérou 1992, 9
2. Using Merleau-Ponty's words, we may say that the matter is pregnant with the form. This implies that 'sense-content' of a certain thing is already pregnant of the meaning (PhP, 152, 291).
2. Susan L. Foster remarks that traditional dance studies, replete with the same logocentric values that have informed general scholarship on the body, have seldom allowed the body to generate its own ideas (Foster 1995, 15).

some of its essential element. Although videos, script, texts of dance may bring a complementary understanding to dance practice, the essence of dancing lies in living immanent bodies.

In order for a dance tradition to be established, there has to be an education system which sustains the continuity of dancing.[1] Although the movement vocabulary of a dance tradition is introduced as a doctrine, an individual is needed to pass on movement skills through her/his own body. Teachers hand on knowledge of a dance *through their own individual bodies*. Dancing as a bodily heritage demands a mutual personal relation, a bodily dialogue between dance teacher and student. Teaching dancing, the teachers must know in their bodies how to move while they must have pedagogical skills to pass on their knowledge to students. Edward Goodwin Ballard has pointed out that there is a distinction between "knowledge of" and "knowledge about".[2] The former is practical knowledge, the latter refers to conceptual understanding. Dance knowledge consists of both the *knowledge of dance*, which means knowledge *in* the body, and *knowledge about dance*, which means dance knowledge as conveyed in written texts and pictorial documents. It seems that dancers need both modes of knowledge to develop as artists and to modify their identities.[3]

Using the terminology introduced earlier in the phenomenology of the body, the body is not only an organic entity, it reflects cultural and historical changes, and it has also a capacity for self-transformation to some extent. Because the body is culturally and historically shaped, dance vocabularies are often slightly modified although individuals may insist that they teach a new generation in the same manner as they were taught. The process of intersubjective corporeality, i.e. the alteration in bodily habits, customs, dressing, the morality of society, also influences the aesthetics of dance vocabularies.

1. Compared to the "performance art", the Western art dance is dependent on bodily knowledge that is passed on by a dance teacher to a dance student. The performance art does not form any bodily continuity, like the systems of methods and techniques, although a history of performance art can be constructed. See also Goldberg 1993, 19.
2. Ballard 1989, 237
3. Discussing manners of aesthetic knowing Bennett Reimer argues that it is a common error to think that people are aesthetically educated to the degree they have a great deal of conceptual knowledge about art, so that education *about* art in the sense of verbal learnings about art replaces education *in* art (Reimer 1992, 42).

(i) Tradition

In everyday language 'dance' is used as a broad term which may embrace Western ballet, modern/contemporary dance, social dances, European folk dances or various dance phenomena and dance rituals outside the Western world. Since 'dance' is a highly general term, theoretical approaches evidence widespread concern with a definition of dance.[1] In this present context 'dance' refers to more or less separated dance phenomena or dance traditions with their movement systems formed by individuals, a society, a cultural and historical situation producing a social field with its own concept of dance.

According to Francis Sparshott, dance traditions develop movement systems in the form of repertoires of steps and positions, together with rules for combining them.[2] But dance traditions not only develop through these movements systems. It is essential to emphasise continuity as a central characteristic feature which defines dance traditions, a dance tradition as the chain of generations. A 'dance tradition' whose origin is obscure is like a 'stream' from the past to the future with established practice or movement vocabulary which are passed on in the chain of generations of dancers. Thus 'tradition' does not refer to 'old dance' and the past but also to contemporary situations in dance culture. A dance tradition embraces all agents of dance practice such as dancers, choreographers, teachers, education methods, body techniques, schools, established movement vocabularies, various styles, buildings and places for dancing, the language and terminology of dance, the institution of criticism, research, etc. In point of fact, it is impossible to collect all elements which constitute a dance tradition, since it varies culturally. Stressing continuity, the tradition entails the notion that a dance cannot be an individual's own invention, not under her/his control, although simultaneously individuals make the tradition, it is not determined by "faceless social agents".

Deborah Jowitt has studied alterations in the dancer's image since

1. The aesthetician Francis Sparshott's book *Off the Ground* is an attempt to use an analytical system to define "what is dance" covering a wide range of dances and dance-like activities (Sparshott 1988). The anthropologist Judith Lynne Hanna's purpose is to look for a universal definition of dance in order to separate dance behaviour from other human behaviour (Hanna 1979, 19). Concerning Western theatrical dance, the dance historian Selma Jeanne Cohen has reflected on definitions of ballet and modern dance (Cohen 1983, 339-354).
2. See also Sparshott 1995, 140-141.

the beginning of the nineteenth century. She indicates that even in twentieth century ballet the changes in the dancers' bodies are remarkable. If Anna Pavlova were set dancing before us, we could consider her dancing technique "inferior" to that of a member of the New York City Ballet's corps today.[1] Dance traditions, their movement vocabularies and aesthetics respond to immense social, political, scientific and technological change in culture, while certain movement conventions, costumes or choreographies can persist for even hundreds of years. Western classical ballet as a dance tradition has a certain movement vocabulary and a classical repertoire, which must be mastered in order to become a ballet dancer. The five fundamental feet positions of ballet and the principle of turned-out legs were set by Pierre Beauchamp in the seventeenth century.[2] Ever since, the basic positions in ballet have been handed down to our days, although turned-out legs are opened wider in ballet nowadays than in the seventeenth century, from 90° to 180°. Nevertheless, ballet as it was known in the that century at Louis XIV's court differs radically from ballet today.

Here, a crucial question is how we see a *continuity* from Louis XIV's court to NYCB's corps today or should we understand them as different and separated dance phenomena, although they are both called 'ballet'? This question concerns interpreting dance history as the link between the court ballet of Louis XIV and contemporary NYCB. Written dance history tends to present the tradition as a mode of "story", a chain of causes and consequences. The "continuity" of a tradition includes an ideological emphasis in the way the story of the past is told and written down. This ideological emphasis affects contemporary practice of dance, the conception of dance, and the identity of the dancer. Thus if there is a certain continuity in ballet from the Italian Renaissance to ourday, we face the question of how to interpret this continuity. Discussing continuity, there is a danger of seeing "development", "progress" or "evolution" in understanding Louis XIV's court's ballet as "undeveloped-developed" or "in-progress-towards" ballet compared to the ballet of NYCB's corps. Taking a sharply critical look at the construction of modern art history, John Roberts argues that in mirror-image of Hegel's universal history, interpretation of art history becomes

1. Jowitt 1988, 10
2. Sorell 1986, 164

easily a succession of necessary evolution.[1] This explanation, based on the notion of evolution, is not only teleological but carries an ideology of the superiority of contemporary aesthetics over of the past.

Avoiding the ideological expressions of continuity, i.e. "development", "progress" or "evolution" in ballet tradition, we can discuss *alteration* in ballet tradition. Ballet tradition changes in relation to changes in the lifeworld, in culture and society. *Change* is not accidental but rather an essential character of the project of a dance tradition, although in studying dance tradition we freeze it as an object, because it is difficult to study a phenomenon in process. Alan Read defines Western (drama) theatre as a forum, which resists the definitive nature of that conception of theatre, since it is a continually transformative project which does not freeze life at an eternal interval, a duration, but suggests a beyond, a 'movement' to something better, always possible but often difficult to achieve.[2]

Alterations in society influence dance traditions, but not in merely mirroring manners. *The dance tradition has a projective power of its own*. Some customs are sustained in a tradition, although they disappear elsewhere in society. Some movement patterns and choreographies endure in dance traditions, though the background of these movements has disappeared in the lifeworld. The dance tradition has also its "own logic" projecting to the future; determined by dance politics and authorities in the dance field. Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out. Rather the dance field with its institutions, discourses and procedure direct the projection of dancing to the future.

Art sociologist Janet Wolff reminds us that different traditions and areas of culture are more or less responsive to social change, and some will change more slowly than others.[3] In a society where the project of a dance tradition has tended to be highly ritualised, leaving little room for innovation of form or the introduction of new or radical content, then the potential impact of art is obviously severely restricted. In a society where culture is restricted to a very small minority, or to the dominant group, then again its transformative power is extremely

1. Roberts 1994, 13
2. Read 1993, 36
3. Wolff 1981, 72

limited, whatever the aesthetic conventions prevailing.[1]

(ii) A narrative of modern dance

Ballet historians usually locate the *origin* of the ballet tradition in the high Renaissance of Italy, while later in the 17th century France became the centre of the ballet.[2] The search for the beginning of a dance tradition gives a reason for formulating a dance history, while there are also ideological interests to formulate a "story" of historical events for current dance phenomena. The ballet spectacles of Louis XIV differ greatly both socially and aesthetically from the choreographies of Ballet Russes at the beginning of the 20th century. Despite the differences between these two dance phenomena, ballet history as a tradition is elucidated as a continuity from the dance spectacles of Renaissance Italy to ballet today.

The origin of modern dance, in turn, is usually placed in Germany (or Central Europe) and in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, coming forth simultaneously.[3] The German dance was established primarily through the endeavours of dancers, choreographers and teachers such as Rudolf Laban, Mary Wigman, Kurt Jooss, Harald Kreutzberg, Gret Palucca. The new "dance phenomenon" in Central Europe was variously called *Moderner Tanz*, *Absoluter Tanz*, *Freier Tanz*, *Tanzkunst* and *Bewegungskunst*, but the name which remained is *Ausdrucktanz* used by Wigman. Ausdrucktanz is translated as 'expressionistic dance' or 'expressive dance', which associates the whole movement with Expressionism in the visual arts.[4]

In the States the modern dance was associated with Martha Gra-

1. Wolff 1981, 80
2. For instance, the authors of *Ballet. An Illustrated History,* Mary Clarke and Clement Crisp note: "The seed of ballet is to be found in Italy, the Italy of the high Renaissance"(Clarke & Crisp 1992, 1).
3. The title of this chapter "A narrative of modern dance" refers to one possible way to tell the story of modern dance developments. As a very general account and with rather broad strokes it attempts to draw a historical context for a philosophical discourse on contemporary dance production. Since this study does not concern reflection on perspectives interpreting Western theatrical dance history, it presents modern dance developments through rather well-known American and European modern dancers and choreographers. For instance, Finnish dance history still awaits its researchers and writers; thus, evaluation of Finnish dance developments in the wider European context appears too complicated a task in this research.
4. Preston-Dunlop 1990, 2

ham, Doris Humphrey, Charles Weidman, Hanya Holm, Helen Tamaris. The term 'modern dance' was introduced by an American dance critic, John Martin at the end of the 1920s.[1] Martin used the term 'modern dance' referring to a new American dance phenomenon to distinguish it from ballet and the Denishawn school dance style established by Ruth St. Denis and Ted Shawn, and Isadora Duncan's style. 'Modern dance' has at least different two meanings: a general term for dance modernism in this century and on the other hand dance phenomenon and dance aesthetics in the States from the 20's to the 50's.[2] From the very beginning the modern movers and ballet dancers were compared to each other as rivals. During this century modern dancers are seen to be inferior in their technical skills to ballet dancers. To become appreciated dancers, modern dancers have had pressure to achieve the level of technical virtuosity of ballet dancers.

The mentioned modern movers were not forerunners in the search for a new way of dancing. At the turn of this century Ruth St. Denis, Loïe Fuller and Isadora Duncan rejected the codified movement vocabulary of ballet. Borrowing techniques from physical education and popular entertainment and relying on improvisation as a fundamental working method, these dancers rejected the virtuosity and opera-house spectacle that had framed the ballerina as sylph and swan.[3] In the United States the search for new vocabularies of dancing and a new ideology of dance other than ballet was rooted in the women's bodily liberation and physical exercise called Delsartism. Delsartism developed out of the work of the French music and drama teacher François Delsarte (1811-1871). In Delsartism less restrictive clothing - particularly for a woman - was recommended for freedom of movement, breathing and better health.[4] Isadora Duncan (1877-1927) among others was influenced by Delsartism, criticising the contemporary ballet of her own time, because it restricted the female body's "natural

1. McDonagh 1974, 58
2. As many dance historians have pointed out, the term 'modern dance' is rather misleading because it implies a uniform system, whereas one of the most striking features of its development was that of a diversity of forms. With Ramsay Burt the term 'modern dance' is used to cover both the earlier pioneering modern dance and subsequent work that continues within that tradition. Thus 'modern dance' is the mainstream modernist dance tradition that made up, and still largely constitutes, the repertoires of the larger mainstream European and North American modern dance companies (Burt 1995, 3).
3. Manning 1993, 1
4. Ruyter 1979, 26

movements".[1]

The emergence of modern dance is often situated opposite to ballet, but there are cultural, ethical and social reasons rather than purely aesthetic reasons for this opposition. In modern industrialised society the movement vocabulary based on European court behaviour and aristocratic manners was no longer coherent to men, but in particular to modern women, their position in the society, their identity, way of thinking and lifestyle. A shift of experiencing/understanding the body, i.e. a cultural transition concerning embodiment demanded a new dance form, with a new understanding and notion of dancing. Duncan explained this by saying that she knew that there were other ways of dancing and understood dance to be different from ballet, and she was "about to enter in it" as if she had found "a proper key".[2] Duncan's notion of "new dance" was not her own invention, but she championed the individual body as the site of creative development of dancing. There was an intersubjective basis, which indeed Duncan herself also modified through her own dance activity.[3] Duncan, and many dancers after her, have described their dance as "natural movements" erupting from their bodies.

The cultural transition and interest to experience and understand embodiment in new terms seem to be central reasons for the break-through of the new dance phenomenon, which we know now as 'modern dance'. Thus this new dance phenomenon is related to cultural embodiment, cultural communication and the whole shift in the Western lifeworld at the beginning of the 20th century. Susan A. Manning says:

> In rejecting the ballet vocabulary, early modern dancers gave up its transnational legibility, transnational in the sense that audiences across Europe and North America were familiar with the ballet vocabulary and could decode its conventions. Without recourse to this internationalized vocabulary, early modern dancers had to fashion alternate referents for their idiosyncratic movement styles. In other words, they had to find new ways to connect their individual bodies to the collective body of the audience. One way was to heighten and thus to essentialize the attribute

1. Duncan 1969, 55-6
2. Duncan 1928/1988, 22
3. Duncan had a strong feeling that 'dance' was already in her, when she was a child, and because of the spirit of her mother, it was not stifled (Duncan 1928/1988, 22).

> the dancer shared or possibly shared with the spectator - body consciousness, gender, nationality.[1]

According to Manning, the emergence of modern dance was integrated with the situations of certain nations and their communities, which offered a necessary background for the dancers' search for new bodily communication and movement vocabularies. Movements, attitudes and gestures of dances were indirectly (not mimetically) linked to their contemporary lifeworld and communal and cultural embodiment.

Martha Graham has said: "Movement in the modern dance is the product not of invention but of discovery - discovery of what the body will do, and what it can do in the expression of emotion."[2] Carrying forward Graham's conception into the philosophical consideration of dance, Sondra Fraleigh among other dance theorists emphasises individuality as a central aspect of modern dance, an individual's discoveries in the moving body. She indicates that the aspect most typical of the modern dance forms that demarcate this continuum, providing a definitional tie among them, is *discovery*. To discover by uncovering, revealing and creating something not seen before; or to discover in the sense of inventing out of one's own bodily being. Fraleigh stresses that the various periods of modern dance are linked through this open aspect of method. At the same time, such freedom has resulted in many and widely varied styles.[3] Fraleigh emphasises the freedom aspects in modern dance, while she ignores the social and cultural framework, which, according to Manning, sets a standpoint for modern movers' dance development. In her interpretation of modern dance, Fraleigh excludes the point which Manning considers a central idea in modern dance: modern dance is connected to a cultural and shared corporeality.

Although the idea of freedom to create one's own movements might be overestimated, the central difference between the ballet dance and the modern dancer is that modern and contemporary dancers have no permanent vocabulary.[4] Reasons for this lack are not to be found in

1. Manning 1993, 29
2. Stodelle 1984, 56
3. Fraleigh 1987, xxxii-xxxiii
4. Sally Banes points out, that ballet education is built on a bodily canon and movement vocabulary that demands homogeneous standards of perfection (Banes 1994, 31).

any lack of enterprise to standardise the basic movements of modern dance, but rather "new generations" question and reject previous generations' vocabularies. The "generation", in this context, refers to a cultural transition, which means that a new generation is estranged from the previous movement vocabularies: they are no longer coherent in a new situation, in the historically, socially or culturally altered lifeworld. Since embodiment is also a historical matter, in the altered lifeworld, individuals no longer experience/understand their bodies in the same manner as the previous "generation".

During this century dancers and choreographers have invented new words to define their movement styles in order to withdraw themselves from the previous generation's idea of dancing and possibly to establish a new dance movement with or without manifestos. Dancers and choreographers themselves have frequently taken a new word to signify a new idea of dance when they try to make a difference between their dance and that of the previous generation. On the other hand, researchers have sought to identify separated periods and phases in modern dance by naming them with new, purposeful terms. Despite the attempts to define a certain historical or cultural phase by using a certain term, the terminology of western art dance history has been in general obscure, causing much confusion. Terms like 'natural dance', 'new dance' or 'postmodern dance' are likely to lead to mis-understanding, if they are defined in a formal manner without a specific cultural, social and historical context.[1] "New dance" is a widely used term referring to a new style or "new generation" appearing suddenly in the dance field. "New dance" thus has no content itself, it merely indicates the change, the relation to the past. Doris Humphrey called her dance and her contemporaries "new dance"[2], and in the 1980's there was again discussion about a "new dance movement" in Europe.[3]

The established conventions of a tradition are regarded as standing in need of defence against the changes brought with a new generation.

1. In American dance discourse the term "postmodern dance" came into use in the early 1960's, when Yvonne Rainer and other emerging choreographers used it to differentiate their work from that of the preceding generation - modern dance. But in the 70's and in the 80's, according to Banes, the term has referred to quite different dance developments (Banes 1994, 301-310).
2. Cohen 1974, 144-149
3. See, for instance, Judith Mackrell's interpretation of British dance in the 70s and 80s and the definition of 'new dance' (Mackrell 1992, 1-3).

The tradition is understood as *a thing* rather than *a field*, or a *stable* matter rather than *stream* and *process*; thus "new" seems to surprise us and cause confusion in the structure of the established dance institution. According to Alan Reid, the dialectic between the conventions of tradition and the challenges of contemporary work is what characterises the theatre's dynamic. Each of these traditions and conventions has given rise to the radical experiments that depart from them. Speaking of the theatre 'now', 'contemporary' theatre, as well as using words which at different times have meant the same thing, 'modern', 'contemporary' and 'new', reminds us that innovation is always contingent upon a boundary waiting to be transgressed.[1] However much change is an intrinsic part of the dance phenomenon, there are risks in interpreting dance tradition as "progress" and "evolution", particularly in retrospect, afterwards, in writing a history of dance. Manning criticises reading dance modernism as a progressive ideology and evolution concerned to champion some particular choreographer or choreographic school at the endpoint of succession.[2]

During this century the history of modern dance has constantly been re-written. Interpretations of the history of dance are varied, not only though interpretation of subject matter, but in terms of the perspectives in which the history is written. Dance histories written by researchers in Central Europe, England and America hardly mention any modern dance developments in Scandinavia, Finland or Southern Europe - to say nothing of non-Western developments - since those areas are treated as receivers rather than givers in terms of Western art dance. In the United States modern dance development is discussed from the perspective of New York. Moreover, the European modern dance is less known, less researched than American modern dance developments. To answer the question what is modern dance and how it is developed, depends on the person who poses the question and where s/he asks this question. Despite the fact that modern dance and ballet as traditions have passed cultural and national barriers, proving able to establish dance practice in a new culture, they have had to transform their practice to some extent. Modern dance tradition is fragmented in different nations, countries and cultures, yielding distinctive cultural and social fields.

1. Read 1993, 6
2. Manning 1993, 19-20

Modern dance has an international dimension, but as a social activity it is located in a certain place with its cultural roots and cultural bodily communication. While discussing modern dance or contemporary dance in the general sense, a researcher is still located, s/he has a perspective into the dance from a certain local dance field. Thus, the researcher cannot avoid treating modern dance and contemporary dance in a cultural and social context to which s/he is bound; therefore, also philosophical argumentation regarding dance is situated in a historical, cultural and social context.[1] Nevertheless, we should reflect carefully as to the artistic and social activity of contemporary dance, when cultural and national borders can be considered the borders of philosophical reflection in terms of dance art.

2. Autonomous Art Field

(i) Objective art and pure aesthetics

As marked above, 'aesthetically good' is usually considered as one of the most important values in danceworks. When a dancing body is evaluated in "merely aesthetic" terms, the aesthetic appreciation means experiencing a dance as a matter of taste, in which the criterion of the dance is defined by standards and criteria of that dance tradition. In aesthetics the claim is often presented that art need not serve any purpose but creates its own reality. For this so-called *aestheticism*, aesthetic experience is an end in itself, worth having on its own account. This implies that the connection between a work of art and the world in which it originates, is to be dissolved: aesthetic consciousness itself is the experiential center from which everything considered to be art is to be measured. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted (its original context in life, and the religious or cultural function which gave it its significance), it becomes visible as the 'pure work of art'.

This is the process of abstraction in the arts which Gadamer calls

1. The philosophical subject, like the body-subject, is historically situated. This implies that the philosopher is limited in her/his enquiries, and that philosophy is never-ending process (Hammond et al 1991, 269). As a Finnish dance researcher and philosopher, the present author reflects on modern and contemporary dance from the perspective of Northern Europe. Although Finnish contemporary dance has its own characteristic features intertwined in Finnish culture and this cultural embodiment, it has its roots in Central European, British and American modern dance developments, not forgetting Asian influence.

aesthetic differentiation.[1] This abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness performs a task that is in a sense positive: it shows what the work of art is, and allows it to exist in its own right. Gadamer insists that through aesthetic differentiation the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs insofar as it belongs to the aesthetic consciousness.[2] The artist, too, loses her/his place in the world, because, according to aestheticism, the true artist must create out of free inspiration. It is only the universal form of aesthetic culture that unites artists and audience. At the same time the artist begins to bear the burden of having a 'vocation': s/he becomes a secular saviour in a culture that has fallen away from its religious, moral, political and cognitive tradition. In this manner the artist is conceived as a witness to the disintegration which gradually began to take place in our modern world.[3]

According to Bernstein, understanding art as "merely" aesthetic, where 'aesthetics' has come to mean the understanding of beauty and art in non-cognitive terms, an object of taste remains outside "truth" and morality.[4] In his view, there is a source of dread in this for two reasons: first, because part of our experience of art is becoming only a matter of taste; secondly, because as such, art and aesthetics appear to be outside truth, knowledge and morality.[5] The experience of art as aesthetic is the experience of art as having lost or been deprived of its power to convey "truth" - whatever truth will mean when no longer defined in exclusive ways. This loss, no matter how theorised or explained, Bernstein calls it 'aesthetic alienation'; it implies art's alienation from truth arising when art is treated as mere aesthetic, a process which seems to be fully completed only in modern societies.[6]

As mere aesthetics art is alienated from any capacity to discuss cognitive and moral issues by being isolated into a separate autonomous sphere. Consequently, the only way for art to preserve its existence is by remaining mere aesthetics.[7] In Western theatrical dance this appears as an emphasis on "movements as themselves", a movement vocabulary with its own correct and incorrect movements, its technique, addressing

1. Gadamer 1960/1975, 76
2. Gadamer 1960/1975, 78
3. Kockelmans 1985, 66
4. Bernstein 1992, 3
5. Bernstein 1992, 2
6. Bernstein 1992, 4
7. Gablik 1984, 20-21

its own 'visual ideology'. If a work of art is independent, a world of pure creation which has its own meaning, an audience exists only for committed aesthetics.

Merleau-Ponty argues that it is "natural" for Western people to "keep alive", by recalling the creative power of expression which sustains "objective art", or "classical arts" like "classical music" and "classical ballet", although we no longer live through them.[1] When aesthetics is the end itself, permanent standards of beauty sustain in particular "classical" art forms like European art music. In the world, which changes with increasing speed, (even if it is *us* who change it) "objective art" gives a feeling of permanence, allowing the spectator to escape from the everyday chaotic world (which is of *our* own making). Focusing on "objective art" we can, at least for a while, close our eyes to the contemporary lifeworld.

According to Heidegger, the arts have become a form of property; we habitually refer to "art treasures". The destination of art in modern society is collection, private or public. This hoarding represents the victory of petrifaction over life, of timelessness over history, of objects over people. Art collecting is the product of a civilisation which loses itself in a multitude of fetishist fixations. The most innovative works tend, with time, to produce their own audience by imposing their own structures, through the effect of familiarisation, as categories of perception legitimate for any possible work. The spread of the norms of perception and appreciation they were tending to impose is accompanied by a banalisation.[2] Pierre Bourdieu argues that the social ageing of a work of art, the transformation which push it towards the classic, is the result of a meeting between an internal discourse, linked to struggles within the field provoking the production of different works, and an external discourse, linked to social change in the audience, which sanctions and reinforces the loss of rarity.[3]

Despite the ideology of the permanency of 'classical ballet', there are alterations in the ideal ballet body, the ballet movement vocabulary and in ballet aesthetics. Arts interact with the social environment. A movement vocabulary can be preserved almost the same from one generation to the next, as for instance Bharata Natyam has been handed

1. ECD 1973, 147
2. Bourdieu 1996, 253
3. Bourdieu 1996, 254

down for two thousand years now; nonetheless, alterations in cultural background, in the lifeworld, affect the modes of reception of this art. Gadamer points out that the alterations in culture and lifestyle may externalises and objectifies an art form. The function of art is not the same epoch after epoch, and the function of art varies enormously from one society to another. It may either reflect, reinforce, transform or repudiate, but it is always in some necessary relation to the lifeworld. There is always a correlation between a society's values and art.[1] What we call significant art is significant only in a certain culture. A significant art needs a communion, it exists in its full sense in a certain historical time and place among living people.

When an aesthetics becomes an end itself, any interrogation arises from the tradition, from a practical or theoretical mastery of the heritage which is inscribed in the very structure of the field, as a state of things, which as such delimits the thinkable and the unthinkable and which opens the space of possible questions and answers.[2] Bourdieu points out that one must then possess a practical and theoretical mastery of this history and of the space of possibilities in which it occurs. In the artistic field in its advanced state of evolution, there is no place for those who do not know the history of the field and everything it has engendered.[3] A work of art, which ever-increasingly contains reference to its own history, demands to be perceived historically; it asks to be referred not to an external referent, the represented or designated 'reality', but to the universe of past and present works of art.[4]

In contrast to the case of an individual who is not art educated, and to such an individual's attitude to art works, an academic art education makes possible an appreciation of art which draws upon concepts and rules. Bourdieu considers that this tends to produce an intellectual and scholastic love of art. Those who are dependent upon rules and concepts to legitimate their taste, may become 'affected', bookish' or 'studied'.[5] While considerable artistic knowledge and specific competence can, it is true, be developed through education, Bourdieu remarks that the aesthetic disposition cannot be acquired through institutionalised learning because it presupposes a tacit

1. Gablik 1984, 51
2. Bourdieu 1996, 243
3. Bourdieu 1996, 244
4. Bourdieu 1986, 3
5. Codd 1990, 147

dimension of taken-for-granted awareness gained through repeated contact with legitimate culture and cultured people. The academic knowledge of art provided by the school system can make available conceptual schemes for the analysis and classification of art works, but it cannot provide the special competence of the connoisseur, which can only come from a deep-seated and prolonged familiarity with works, artists and art critics.[1]

Bourdieu's philosophy and sociology of art calls into focus the meaning of "pure gaze" in perceiving and evaluating art works in Western societies. The pure gaze in aesthetics is a historical invention linked to the emergence of an autonomous field of artistic production, that is, a field capable of imposing its own norms on both the production and the consumption of its products.[2] This 'pure' gaze in art has not been able to develop without cultural Cartesianism, the Cartesian pervasive gaze, the observer detached from the body, a disembodied subject without time and place. The pure gaze - like "pure" painting and "pure" movement to which it necessarily corresponds and which is made to be beheld in itself and for itself, as painting and as choreography, as a play with forms and colours, meaning independently of any reference to transcendent meanings - is the result of a process of purification.[3] Like the 'pure' perception of pictorial, musical and dance works, the work of art requires a 'pure' reading, and critics and other professional readers tend to apply to any legitimate work as the notion of a social institution which is the end result of a whole history of its respective field of cultural production.[4] Bourdieu argues that the autonomy of the art field produces the pure writer - and the pure consumer whom the field helps to produce. Pure production produces pure reading, and ready-mades are just a sort of limit case of all works produced for commentary and by commentary. The field gains autonomy, writers feel themselves increasingly authorised to write works destined to be decoded.[5] The pure gaze implies a break with the ordinary attitude towards the world, which, given the conditions in which it is performed, is also a social separation.[6]

1. Codd 1990, 147
2. Bourdieu 1986, 3
3. Bourdieu 1996, 299
4. Bourdieu 1996, 302
5. Bourdieu 1996, 305
6. Bourdieu 1986, 4

(ii) Art as a social field

Pierre Bourdieu uses the concept of field (*champ*) to describe differentiated, relatively autonomous domains in society. According to Bourdieu, any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organised series of fields like the economic field, the educational field, the political field, cultural fields. Each field is defined as a structured space with its own laws of functioning. The 'art field' (Bourdieu uses term cultural field) refers to the specialised social field constituted by the network of the relations of artists, art works, critics, art specialists, theorists, art schools, buildings for art, art journals etc. In its institutionalising and professionalising processes each art tends to be a relatively closed field, with its own discourse.

The source of the value of the work of art is not the artist but the field of production as a universe of belief which sets the value of the work of art as a fetish by producing the belief of the creative power of the artist. The work does not exist as a symbolic object endowed with value unless it is known and recognised by spectators, critics and the science of arts. It must therefore take into account not only the artist of the work in its materiality, but also the ensemble of agents and institutions which participate in the generating the value of the work. Therefore among the producers of the value of art are included critics, art historians, audience, members of instances of consecration like academies, juries etc. and the whole ensemble of political and administrative authorities competent in matters of art who may act on the art market, either by verdicts of consecration, whether accompanied or not by economic benefits, or by regulatory measures, not to mention the members of institutions which work towards educating dance artists i.e. production of producers and towards educating a dance audience i.e. the production of consumers capable of recognising the work of art as such.[1]

Bourdieu stresses that 'cultural field' differs from Arthur Danto's

1. Pierre Bourdieu and art sociologists like Janet Wolff call the artist the 'cultural producer', the work of art the 'artefact', and the audience 'consumers', stressing the notion that artistic production does not differ from other cultural production, all being under the control of economics (Wolff 1981, 138). This sociological terminology of the arts may be coherent in criticising the artist as a unique creator and genius, but it also strengthens the power of the economic terminology which has encroached on the discourse of almost every field in society.

'artworld', since 'artworld' overlooks the historical and sociological analysis of the genesis and structure of the institution of the artistic field.[1] Danto is inclined to consider that the basis of difference between works of arts and ordinary objects is none other than an institution, the 'artworld'. The artworld is constituted by the criteria that permit us to discriminate art from what is not art. In exploring the artworld, Danto ignores the social aspects of artistic production, stressing mainly how the concept of art is defined by arguments expressed through works of art or by voices of theoreticians. The central point is that the foundation of the work of art can only be found in the artworld, that is, in a social universe that confers the status of art work for aesthetic appreciation.[2]

The art field involves social and institutional functioning and various agents of the field which produces the artist. The social institution of arts plays a central role in producing artists, i.e. *who* becomes an artist, *how* s/he becomes an artist, how s/he is able to *practise* art, and how the produced, performed work of art is *made available* to the public. Furthermore, judgements and evaluations of works and schools of art, determining their subsequent place in art history, are not simply individual and 'purely aesthetic' decisions, but socially enabled and socially constructed events.[3] The philosophy of art cannot be given its own object of study unless traditional art history, but also the social history of art, are taken into account.

Bourdieu argues that in any given field, agents occupying the diverse available positions (or in some cases creating new positions) engage in competition for control of the interests or resources which are specific to the field in question.[4] While each art protects itself from the outside and preserves itself from within, practitioners and theorists within each cultural field conduct their own interplay.[5] Internal relations, authorities, hierarchies of institutions rule the interplay of the field. The art field constructed by position and dispositions is a matter of prestige, reinforcing or questioning personal authority in a leading role in the field.

In order to occupy a position, the artist has to "build a career"

1. Bourdieu 1996, 287
2. Bourdieu 1993, 254
3. Wolff 1981, 80
4. Bourdieu 1993, 6
5. Read 1993, 9

within the art field; thus, the professional artist does not have a 'life' worth telling, or celebrating, but rather a career, a well-defined succession of honours. Building a career, the dance artist struggles between positions and dispositions, between the effort to make the post and the necessity to make her/himself suitable for the post, with the requisite successive adjustments.[1] Professionalism is in most cases total devotion to the building of a successful career, successful in terms of merits supplied in the art field. In many cases grants and awards are dependent on how critics evaluate an artist's work. If the background for evaluating and appreciating an artist's work is constituted by the art field itself, the aesthetic judgement of a critic is based mainly on art history and current aesthetic trends in the field. A vicious circle is thus set up in which an art work was being created for the values established by the various agents of the art field.

Reflecting on the ethics of theatre, Read argues that theatre alienates everyday life in this institutionalising process. Huge theatres, opera houses, museums and other art establishments are already art communities in themselves, functioning with the conditions of their social relations which yield certain politics and customs for each organisation. For instance, celebrating its memorable day, an art establishment usually produces its own history by publishing a book. The new employees of an art community are soon socialised to the customs of the institution and its internal discourse and politics. Working years in an art establishment as an employee, an artist's life may revolve around a more or less limited purpose, institutionally centered and separated from everyday life.[2]

Because of the autonomy of art fields and the isolation of art communities, the artist is seen as standing outside society, marginal, eccentric, and removed from the usual conditions of ordinary people by virtue of the gift of artistic genius.[3] The artist is more likely to be alienated and isolated from society today than in any earlier period; moreover, the subject-matter of her/his work is necessarily a fragmented and inhuman society.[4] Wolff argues that the specific conditions of

1. Bourdieu 1996, 269
2. Read 1993, 49
3. Wolff 1981, 10
4. Wolff 1981, 12

contemporary capitalist society are hostile to artistic work.[1] Artistic work comes under the general law of capitalist production, and comes to be regarded as merchandise; many artists will work as wage-labourers, and the rest have resort to the art market to sell their work. Artistic work becomes increasingly like work in general under capitalism, it too becomes alienated, unfree labour.[2]

Bourdieu's project demonstrates that artistic perception is located within a social field, while every work of art exists as such only to the extent that it is perceived by socially-situated agents.[3] The object of analysis for a sociology of art is the social field, whether of the artist or the spectator, and the struggles for power, both economic and symbolic, which always accompany acts of creation and appreciation.[4] Bourdieu is less concerned with the nature of art than with the social conditions in which works of art acquire meaning and value, that is, with the whole field of symbolic production. Within Bourdieu's sociology of art, the artist is a cultural producer occupying a position within the social field.

Pierre Bourdieu's discourse on art as social and cultural production is not applied here without some modifications. One of the first and foremost axioms of modern sociology is that it is difficult to approach the modern world from an individual's point of view, since this world usually ignores other values of being a human except being a citizen.[5] In other words, in the social sciences the individual is usually treated merely as the subject of the state, the citizen. Nevertheless, an individual cannot be reduced to the social person without ceasing to be a unique individual. Even if the artist's work is understood as cultural production, it is difficult using procedures from the sociology of art to outline the meaning of making an art work from an individual artist's perspective (which of course carries cultural and social values) only by studying art as social production. The importance of the sociology of art, however, lies in its critique of the ideology of timelessness and value-freedom, which characterise certain art theories and aestheticism in the modern world.[6] But using only the concepts and tools of a sociological discourse

1. Wolff 1981, 10
2. Wolff 1981, 18
3. Codd 1990, 151
4. Codd 1990, 153
5. Bertilsson 1991, 311
6. Wolff 1981, 143

on art, it is difficult to illuminate the body-self's point of view regarding the arts. This point i.e. the artist's existential project in the arts will be taken up in the next chapter, but before that we must analyse more closely the agents of the Western art dance field and the body politics in the dance field which always define dance artists.

(iii) The dance field

Each art form (literature, film, drama theatre) comprises its own social field within its own art discourse. Although historically and ideologically modern dance and ballet are interpreted here as separate traditions, they function in a same cultural field, the art dance field. In most cases dance students are taught the whole variety of modern dance and ballet, i.e. a range of Western art dance styles, to be disciplined in various movement qualities. The dance field consists in the relations and interplay of various agents (dance artists, educators, critics, dance theoreticians, etc.) and their function in dance production. Consequently, architects, for instance do not share a discourse with dance artists, because they both have their own specific questions and interplay in their own universe.

Signs of the autonomy of the dance field include the emergence of an entire set of specific institutions which are necessary conditions for the functioning of the economy of cultural goods. These specific conditions prerequisite to the dance field are places of performing (theatres, studios), institutions of consecration or sanction (academies), instances responsible for educating artists and art audience (art schools), specialised agents (producers, critics, dance historians, collectors, etc.). The movement of the dance field towards a greater autonomy is accompanied by a process of differentiation of the modes of artistic expression and by a progressive discovery of the form which is suitable for each genre, beyond the exterior sign, socially known or recognised, of its identity.[1] This relatively autonomous field is, of course, also relatively dependent, notably with respect to the economic and the political fields.

The dance field brings into play all the producers of works

1. Bourdieu 1996, 138

classified as artistic, whether great or small, famous or unknown, as well as audience, critics, administrations - in short, all those who have ties to art and who, living for art or living off art, confront each other in the competitive struggle over the definition of the meaning and value of the work of art.[1] Any legitimate work tends in fact to impose the norms of its own perception, while it tacitly defines the only legitimate mode of perception, the one which brings into play a certain disposition and a certain competence.

Practising dance as a profession, having an identity as a dancer, and acquiring a position in the dance field, the dancer has to be recognised by the other agents in the field. 'Technical' competence depends fundamentally on social competence and on the corresponding sense of being entitled and required by status to exercise this specific capacity, and therefore to possess it.[2] One can never entirely escape from the hierarchy of legitimacy. The very meaning and value of a dance performance varies according to the system of objects in which it is placed; this will determine, for example, whether strip-tease is associated with mere pornographic or avant-garde dance.[3] Nevertheless, Bourdieu reminds us that "an artist's capacity" is also inseparable from a more or less strong feeling of being competent, in the full sense of the word, that is, socially recognised as entitled to deal with political affairs, to express an opinion about them or even modify their course.[4]

3. The Body Politics of Dance Field and Dance Aesthetics

All social institutions perform a double function in the lives of individuals: they supply the precondition for activities but simultaneously restrict the possibilities of social and aesthetic control. The dance aesthetics prevailing in the dance field are based on body politics and its ideological statements, posing a frame for moving bodies. Thus, the dance field with its body politics and aesthetics establishes a

1. Bourdieu 1996, 295-6
2. Bourdieu 1986, 409
3. See Bourdieu 1986, 88. For instance, a German dancer, Valeska Gert (1892-1978) and Japanese butoh dancers in the 60's, performed in cabarets and night clubs, never drawing a line between avant garde and showdance and leaving the audience perplexed as to how they were supposed to react to these dance performances.
4. Bourdieu 1986, 399

framework for the dancers' social and artistic project, offering the precondition but also restricting their possibilities. Body politics is intertwined with the functioning of all agents in the dance field, artists, educators, critics, audience, and the movement vocabularies with their aesthetics and space politics. Thus, dance students not only learn movement skills with their aesthetics, they will also be socialised by the ideologies of dance aesthetics.

The expression dance politics in this context refers to hierarchies and authorities and the ideological discourse of the dance field, its objective being to sustain the position of the dance institution in society and the cultural field. In other words, dance politics as an entity external defends the institution of art dance, its aesthetics and position and status in the cultural field, while internally it attempts to reinforce and control the situation in the dance field, which promotes the status of the institution in society. For instance, on ITI's international dance day the announcement, written every year by a well-known dancer, praises and affirms the great value of any dance form in culture. Concerning internal dance politics, dance critics through the interpretations of danceworks shape, directly or indirectly, technical and aesthetic criteria of dance artists. Various agents of the dance field have different interests concerning dance politics, prosecuting their aims. Dance politics influences and directs artistic work, but it cannot dictate artistic work. On the contrary, the work of art has a capacity in its artistic sense to resist the politics of the dance field.

In this section the purpose is to illuminate how "pure gaze" has operated in Western art dance and how the body politics of dance aesthetics frames a dancer's artistic work and moulds dancers' bodies and their identities as dancers.

(i) The frame of movement aesthetics

Heidegger uses the term Enframing (*das Ge-stell)* to designate our tendency to pattern phenomena beforehand, by enframing, positioning or positing that fixates, pins down, secures and holds phenomena constant.[1] The ordering of everything as standing-reserve, objectifying itself, is a manifestation of this predetermining. This framing ignores

1. Heidegger 1977, 19

what is left outside of the frames by regarding it as incorrect or meaningless.

A dance movement vocabulary with its aesthetically correct and incorrect movements can be seen as a mode of Enframing. A movement vocabulary with its aesthetics and body politics sets a frame for the moving body. Without this framework there cannot be a dance tradition, since prescribing a structure for the moving body and movement techniques makes intersubjectivity possible in dance practice and ensures continuity of tradition. But when a dance vocabulary becomes increasingly stable, it comes to be treated as an end in itself, the frame and its body politics are no longer questioned.

In the "European court dance", the ballet vocabulary is formed by the etiquette of the court producing its own universe. Sally Banes remarks that ballet is built on a bodily canon that demands homogeneous standards of perfection.[1] The ballet movement vocabulary has proffered an autonomous aesthetics, independent of geographical placement or cultural differences, although there exist various styles or schools of ballet. In other words, ballet aesthetics has produced its own universe with its standards of skills crossing over but also ignoring national borders and cultural differences. Thus these standards concern all dancers, regardless of individual differences or cultural embodiment which are located outside the frame of ballet aesthetics. Ballet aesthetics produces a purified body, defined by its own standards and the agents of that universe. Acknowledging the standards of technical skills and the aesthetics of the ballet vocabulary, the dancer lets her/his body be objectified in terms of these standards.

Early modern dance was taught using dance techniques that were being evolved from the movement styles of particular dancers/choreographers. In the early years, techniques and dance education in general were invented by the choreographers who created the modern dance in the 20's and 30's. Rejecting the ballet vocabulary, early modern dancers had to establish a new training system for modern dance. Doris Humphrey and Martha Graham were merely practical in dance education: they developed dance techniques to train dancers for their choreographies. Humphrey and Graham put their efforts, into the kind of skills dancers should possess, transmitting choreographic ideas in dance works, in

1. Banes 1994, 31

other words, how dancers' bodies should be moulded to achieve the aesthetics of their personal choreographic views. The bodies of dancers were moulded into a new modern dance aesthetics. When a dancer-choreographer's movement style had been developed, classified and refined, this personal movement style become a codified 'dance technique'. It trained individual bodies to perform this particular dancer's choreography with clarity and skills in terms of that technique.

Indeed, early modern dancers who worked with Graham or Humphrey absorbed the basic arguments of early modern dance through the movements, which were inherently linked to the early modern dance choreographer's lived body movements and the motifs of choreographies.[1] For example, if students were schooled by Graham's style (technique), with its predominantly strong, grounded, sharp movement qualities, this formed their major reservoir of kinaesthetic sense. The so-called 'Graham technique', Martha Graham's movement vocabulary, was rooted in Graham's lived body. Graham's principles, "contraction" and "release", were dependent upon breathing, stressing the abdomen and the pelvic areas as the starting-point of bodily movements. In Graham's early career the motifs of choreographies and her experience of the American cultural climate in the 30's influenced her movement vocabulary.[2] Martha Graham's vocabulary was based on her body structure and proportions, which mean long Achilles tendon, wide turnout and strong back, torso and thighs. Because of Graham's extraordinary flexible object body, her movements were in most cases beyond the reach of many dance students.[3] In particular, male dancers were caused pain by some of Graham's movements, e.g. Graham's swastika position, in which one needs very flexible hipbones.

During Graham's life-time the Graham movement vocabulary was transformed; she obviously lost touch with her movement vocabulary created in the 30s. There is a transformation process in her dance vocabulary, although she used the two principal concepts, "contraction" and "release", through out her career.[4] Her own purpose in later years

1. Anna Sokolow says that *Primitive Mysteries*, in which she danced, led her towards the career of choreographer and the creation of religious dances (Horosko 1991, 46). See also Helpern 1991, 11.
2. Franko 1995, 40
3. de Mille 1993, 96
4. Marian Horosko's book *Martha Graham The Evolution of Her Dance Theory and Training 1926-1991* presents the transformation process of Graham's movement vocabulary using

was to make her vocabulary all-embracing.[1] Detaching from her early starting-point, the vocabulary was influenced by ballet, having more fluid and soft qualities in movement. One of the reasons for this transformation was that she was becoming an institution herself. She took and she was given a position of authority position in the American dance field. Therefore her vocabulary was taken for granted, losing the idea that it was her personal discovery connected to historical and social time and place and its cultural corporeality, not any universal principle as such.

When Graham's movement vocabulary is taught today, its historical and social background of the 20s and the 30s is ignored, as is the whole transformation process in the vocabulary. As far as the Graham technique is still taught, it is understood as a dance style, where some things are right and others wrong. Teaching the 'Graham technique' or the 'Cunningham technique' a teacher is not usually concerned with how the movements are linked to a certain place, historical time and a certain human's world-view; the movements are taught as a formal movement vocabulary.[2] Obviously Martha Graham's purpose, in her later years, was to develop an educational system to teach dancers the 'movement vocabulary' as the Graham technique to strengthen her personal status. In fact, the 'Graham technique' was designed and registered as an official trademark in the 70s.[3]

The Graham technique and its developments show how enframing functions in modern dance, passing from personal discoveries and one's own lived body in most cases towards a formal, "global" movement vocabulary and dance exercises. Until the 70's dance techniques developed mainly by choreographers' movement vocabularies and personal styles were considered to be unique. In contemporary modern dance there are no longer personified vocabularies which as such set the frame for the dancing body. Contemporary dancers may train in several movement vocabularies, including sport exercise, without personified styles of choreographers, while dance teachers may use

comments and interviews of Graham's dancers.

1. See de Mille 1993, 99
2. According to André Lepecki, Graham's radicalism and her political role in American culture in the 1930´s lies in her technique, the use of the feminine body as a body of strength and firm, powerful gestures. This radicalism is completely forgotten and denied (Lepecki 1995, 49).
3. de Mille 1993, 403

various methods to teach skills of movement. Nonetheless, despite this diversity the dance field is constantly setting standards for professional dancers concerning dance aesthetics and the technical competence.

Contemporary choreographers do usually not develop a new technique to support their choreographic goals, but instead encourage dancers to train in several existing movement techniques.[1] Many contemporary free lance dancers take a diversity of classes in ballet, contact, aikido and yoga as well as their individual exercise program including jogging, swimming, weight lifting, etc. The criteria for this training program is more and more shaped by the sport and physical education specialists, who reduce the body to the principle of physics measuring the heart rate, general level of strength and flexibility and muscular tonus.[2] The image of these dancer's bodies produced by various body techniques is coming to be called the 'rubber body'.[3] The rubber body is slim but muscular, pliable muscles with flexible joints capable of moving fast making clear movements. Contemporary choreographers' desire to produce and consume the rubber body also addresses some characteristic features of the aesthetics of contemporary dance.

(ii) Dance technique and technical competence

In the dance field the technical competence of any professional dancer in every epoch is addressed by the requirements of dance education curriculums, the movement vocabularies of danceworks and the aesthetic judgements of critics. The artistic competence of the professional dancer has been far more difficult to demonstrate. Nevertheless, the education of dance artists is always based on a conception of the 'good dancer' or 'good choreographer'. There are always various conceptions of 'good', while different aesthetic, philosophical or ideological arguments are advised to convince us why something is considered 'good'. Indeed, there is always a philosophical and an ideological argument justifying whichever educating system is built on, whether this is unconscious or explicit. Philosophical here

1. Foster 1992, 493
2. Foster 1992, 494
3. Foster, in her article "Dancing Bodies", calls it as the "hired body".

refers to arguments and reasons upon which a dance educating system is founded and which can be questioned and criticised. Ideological refers to authorised collective and individual beliefs, myths and rules of dance aesthetics, which are considered necessary to explain the existence of the dance institution itself and its position in the cultural field and in society. ZiZek reminds us that the paradox in the case of ideological is that the stepping out of what we experience as ideology is the very form of our enslavement to it.[1]

The so-called dance technique classes are regarded as the basis in dance practice for making a "good dancer". The term 'dance technique' is frequently used, but it is rarely clearly explained what one means by it. In fact, 'dance technique' collects different connotations depending on the context in which it is used. In modern dance, for example in the Graham technique and the Limón technique i.e. these movement vocabularies, the usage 'dance technique' seems to refer simultaneously to three different aspects: *method, skill and style.* Consequently, dance technique means teaching and learning a certain movement vocabulary and its style by reiterating the teacher's movements and becoming a skilful dancer in terms of this movement vocabulary. In other words, the skilful dancer is skilful in terms of a certain movement aesthetics and its movement style. The dancer's technique controls the body in keeping with that aesthetics. Moreover, (dance) 'technique' may refer to the mere 'instrument' of the dancers, when they are controlling their body's movements. As a consequence such a 'technique' is not supposed be loaded with any aesthetics or ideology as such.

There are numerous books in the dance literature which belong to a genre called 'dance technique'. For instance Gertrude Shurr, the author of *Modern Dance: Techniques and Teaching*, says of the modern dance technique:

> Dance technique is used solely as a means of obtaining body coordination and a larger vocabulary of dance patterns for creative dance. In dance technique the technical exercises have no particular dramatic content to colour the movement; however, expert performance projects a feeling or quality of creative dance that is directly related to the personality of the performer.[2]

1. ZiZek 1994, 6
2. Shurr 1980, 16

Shurr presents modern dance exercises in which she addresses certain fundamentals in learning modern dance. She regards exercises and movements themselves as pure movements, with no style, meaning and content as such. According to Shurr, the meanings and personal interpretation are brought to these movements by their performers - dance technique as such is merely an instrument through which the dancer controls the body's movements.

Dance technique books in ballet and modern dance typically consist of a short introduction to a particular dance, illustrations of dance exercise series, and linguistic descriptions of movements, rhythm and music used. The style of illustrations in these books is almost typically identical. Dancers are usually dressed in tights so that the lines of their bodies are clearly seen. They are mostly depicted face-on or obliquely. The whole body is in the picture, usually an anonymous person, whose motion is depicted within several pictures of the different points of an exercise series. A striking feature is that the body is depicted in a geometrical space, sometimes with no floor or ground underneath. The movements are not gestures, they do not take place in relation with the environment, they do not communicate with anybody, they exist in pure space and time. In fact, the most interesting feature in technique books is what is missing: relationships to other dancers, the moving body's relationship to the environment, the content of dancing, the purpose of dance, since these matters are not included in the dance technique. The body is located in geometrical space showing the correct movements as a purified and objectified thing.[1]

Discussing dance education, Jan Ellen van Dyke argues that training in technique classes is done mostly through repetition, which is at once the quickest known way to train muscles developing dancers whose bodies always want to respond in the same way with learnt movement sequences.[2] The dance field lends itself easily to a technical

1. DV8's director Lloyd Newson has complained that he cannot find dancers for his works, because the training of dancers does not develop skills and movement qualities which he looks for in his works. In working with actors he has found performers with technique, but not technical performers. He says: "With some of the actors, their bodies and their way of interpreting is so unique. Most dancers, I can find a way to make things work for them through illustration, but these actors, their ability to change personalities is extraordinary. Because they haven't been trained like dancers, I can't even imitate them, let alone find the truth within their movements" (Carter 1993, 9).
2. Van Dyke 1989 , 89

orientation; many dancers and dance educators see professionalism quite unproblematically, while young dancers are hungry to move and increase their physical mastery. The dominance of technical skills in training may result in the training becoming an end in itself.[1] Dance students are not encouraged to ask why, but how, the emphasis is on executing movements, with little talk. Thus dance teachers, who tend to rate themselves according to how professionally successful their students become, often concentrate on training the dancer in order to reach the technical level of the dance field rather than educating the whole person.[2]

In the schedule of dance technique classes there is usually no place and time for discussion and reflection on one's own training and the dance project; the reasons are the technical competence in dancing and dance techniques themselves. Knowledge about dance, i.e. dance history and anatomy, is taught outside of dance studios. Knowledge about dance as an external part of dance education is formulated in such a way that one can study it without any experience of dance practice. Dance education for work or career is oriented towards movement skills while neglecting individual philosophical questions concerning the meaning of the movements or broader cultural perspectives on dance practice. Moreover, in the industrial societies cultural activities like dance and dance education come under the laws of economics. Private dance schools, which are in general subject to the law of the consumer society, produce dance classes, but they must also yield some profit. Because of the pressure towards profitable business at dance schools they many times create a commercial atmosphere; they bring the image of a factory producing dancers rather than art.

Despite the emphasis on the 'technical' in dance training, every educator and dance critic admits that 'technical' does not suffice to make a 'good' dancer. Dance as a work of art cannot be made based on the knowledge which is produced only in dance technique classes. Good dancers do not dance 'technically', they live or interpret movements; thus the movements required of them should become their other nature.[3]

1. Adair 1992, 83
2. Van Dyke 1989, 86
3. Rosella Hightower says of ballet technique: "In classical dance there's strict discipline that the dancers must adhere to. However, many dancers remain imprisoned in this discipline and never go beyond it. Perhaps many of them just want the technical challenge and aren't

Therefore achievement of the technical level required of the dancer concerns very deeply the body-self. Dancers, who do movements with an impersonal attitude, are criticised as 'superficial' or 'dollish'. Therefore the dancers' inner and outer control of the bodies are not a question of their careers and dancing as a labour; dance concerns their intimate bodies. Choosing the dancer's career means choosing the embodiment that one way or the other conducts the whole rhythm of living. Thus, dance practice raises existential questions concerning an individual's whole identity. Chapter 3 addresses the question of how it is possible to outline the dance artist's project in dance without separating "technique" from other dance knowledge and skills. But now we may revert to the framework for making a dance artist through the dance field and its social interplay.

(iii) Dancers as material

According to Julia Buckroyd, the hierarchical and autocratic mode of behaviour has become deeply embedded in the culture of dance, although the world has changed great deal. Ballet companies have retained the rigidly hierarchical social system of their progenitor, the court of Versailles. Even modern dance, which was born into a very different social and political environment, has inherited some of these ballet values. The Western art dance field is criticised as hierarchical and oppressive because of its legacy.[1] Modern and contemporary dance, in particular contact improvisation, have sought to disestablish the hierarchy of dance companies and authoritarian attitudes in dance practice.[2] Nevertheless a common structure of dance is built around an autocrat (teacher or choreographer) and a group of disciplines.

Traditionally the ballet corps with their own schools have formed tight "families". To become a professional dancer, a child has to begin ballet classes at an early age. Gradually a young ballet student is absorbed into a "ballet family", which is based on an strictly hierarchical

interested in anything else. Others never manage to reach the technical demands made on them and spend their lives running after them. There must, however, come a point in the dancer's life when he conquers the technique and DANCES" (Dupuy 1994, 17).

1. See Van Dyke 1989, 125-6.
2. See Novack 1990, 11.

system. Male directors or male choreographers usually lead ballet companies, while solo dancers are the next in the hierarchy, then chorus and at the bottom ballet students, who form hierarchical system according to their ages and class levels.[1] Attending dance classes, rehearsing, performing, students spend a great deal of their waking time in this art community. Learning ballet discipline, a student both absorbs the movement vocabulary and is socialised into the values and the conventions of the ballet tradition. The "ballet family", establishing close personal relations, tightly binds a young generation to traditional values and manners.

Both modern dance and ballet are silent, above all, a speechless area of interaction, over which one neither verbally nor rationally accounts for oneself.[2] Dancers have traditionally been trained not to think and speak, and, on the whole, have been led to believe that movement study is the only investment they need to make.[3] One reason for the lack of discussion and analysis of one's own project of dance might be found in the exclusive stress on the dancer's physical abilities in dance. But also consensus in the dance field is constituted by silence and lack of discussion, unquestioned values, uncritical attitudes toward one's own doing. The hard work, repetition and structure of the daily class frequently produces uncritical dancers, trained to accept unquestioningly the professional requirements.[4] This has produced a stereotyped idea of dancers as persons who have no ability to express their own thoughts verbally and thus gives the impression of 'dumb' persons whose art is often seen as being without substance. The stereotyped idea of the dancer is in most cases unjust, since choreographic work usually requires from both dancers and choreographers highly intellectual reflection on movement. But concentrating only on developing movement abilities, dancers have difficulties to see dance activity in the cultural and social context; thus, also discussing it with a non-dancer is a difficult task to them.

1. Nowadays many ballet companies have abandoned nominating leading female dancers as prima ballerinas; nevertheless, through performing classical ballet repertoire the hierarchy of different dance roles prevails.
2. Ostheeren 1993, 17
3. (Van Dyke 1989, 121-2). It should be pointed out that working on bodily movements may be a highly intellectual activity developing as a whole an individual's thinking. Therefore, the criticism here refers to attitudes and methods of teaching and learning dancing.
4. Adair 1992, 15

The dancer's position in the hierarchy of the Western art dance institution has been under the dance teacher and the choreographer, the dancers frequently being treated as "material" by both.[1] Dancers' bodies are trained to be disciplined and obedient instruments, skilled at following directions, accustomed to taking correction, working silently to become a vehicle for another person's ideas. Moreover, dancers rarely choose their choreographer, or indeed, the kind of choreographer who is suited to work with them. The director of a company chooses the choreographer; the choreographer uses the dancers for her/his choreographic ideas. Decisions are in many cases made on the behalf of the dancer, by a teacher or a choreographer.

Martha Graham used to say that she didn't choose to be a dancer - she was chosen. When a student asked Graham whether she should be a dancer, Graham answered, "If you have to ask, then the answer is no".[2] The *real*, *chosen* dancers do not pose questions concerning their dancing; they do not have any doubts about their identity. The chosen dancer knows inside that s/he *is* dancer, thus the decision is made subconsciously. In other words, a dancer who doubts and questions her/his doings has probably chosen the wrong career. Graham's attitude has been quite effective in preventing discussion regarding the choice of this particular the career and questions concerning the dancer's identity. The myth of the chosen dancer has been handed down to this day. The chosen dancer is a part of the structure of the hierarchy of the dance field; dancers are supposed to be passive material, *chosen by* teachers, choreographers or company chiefs.

The education process includes socialising the values of the dance field and the politics of dance aesthetics. Discipline and obedience are high on the list of values instilled in dance students. In particular, female dancers begin training at an early age, before they have developed any sense of self-awareness, and they grow up in dance, adopting the values of the field as their own.[3] Male dancers, in contrast, begin training later in life, when their identities are more developed. Students are taught to be obedient and silent, not to question authority or to object to what is being asked of them. The discipline of the movement vocabulary and

1. See for instance Koner 1969, 77; Abra 1987-88, 34; Van Dyke 1989, 130; Van Schaik 1993, 10.
2. Graham 1992, 5
3. Van Dyke 1989, 127

obedience to the teacher are rarely questioned, since a dance student's criticising movement aesthetics easily focuses on the teacher as a person, not the body politics of dance aesthetics in general. The hierarchical order and the ideology of dance aesthetics are hidden in the everyday routines of dance classes, for instance, in space politics and movements themselves, even in cases when movements are supposed to be "pure" dance aesthetics.

In Western culture dance is regarded as the profession of youth; thus young dance students under pressure to begin training at a very early age and devote themselves relentlessly, exclusively and with extreme discipline to the perfection of their own body. The art of dance is comparable rather with competitive sport - which likewise needs, uses and consumes human beings as material.[1] To reach technical competence and the perfect body ideal takes years of training. And this "peak time" is short, since having achieved technical mastery, the object body begins gradually to lose its speed and flexibility in the ageing process. To sustain the peak time as long as possible demands constant training.

If dance education is focused mainly on training the objective body and mastering a certain dance vocabulary, individual differences in bodies may well be ignored and dancers become material to the educator. Dance studios were filled with mirrors allowing direct comparisons between students both by teachers and by the students themselves. Comparison may be due to the competitive situation between students. When the whole atmosphere in dance classes is competitive, the rivalry influences personal relationships between students. Evaluating the student's object body and talents compared to standards of aesthetics, dancers are settled willingly or unwillingly as rivals. They are not encouraged to support each other and "dance together" at dance classes. Therefore, dancers may treat each other as competitors, whereas in fact confidential friendships would help to keep this aspect of the situation in perspective.

Competition in dance is not restricted to dance classes, since there is competition for places and scholarships in the best schools, for jobs in companies, for roles and premieres. By the same token, the silence of the dance student continues into professional life. Most well trained

1. Ostheeren 1993, 17

dancers do not question authority. Van Dyke remarks that being "professional" includes putting one's person aside in order to work.[1] Inconsequence of the fierce competition and fear of losing position in the company hierarchy and in the dance field, dancers tend to hide their pain and injury.[2]

Van Dyke points out: "Learning to speak in a unique and authentic voice, they say, involves abandoning or going beyond the systems provided by authorities and creating one's own frame. This is part of maturation, and this is what dancers must do to grow beyond technicians into artists."[3] The dancers who are educated as "material", have difficulties in responding to new challenges. This is necessary to the development of one's own voice as an artist, and one's need for cultivation and stimulation, exposure to ideas, and faith in one's own ability to know the truth. As Van Dyke points out, dancers who are educated as "material" attain, a long process of striving, to trust themselves and their ideas, at the same time slowly unlearning the externally imposed standards absorbed in formal training.[4]

(iv) Dancing for pure gaze

As remarked above, the style in the illustrations of the dance technique books presents the moving body in geometrical space, showing correct movements purifying and objectifying the body. Although one can disagree with their correctness and the aesthetic value of these movements, the illustrations show how natural to us it is to purify the dancing body, purify a movement and posture, detaching it from personal, social, cultural and political meanings towards pure dance aesthetics. It shows how easily in western art dance one can objectify movement for the pure gaze. According to Bourdieu, this pure aesthetics is indeed the rationalised form of an ethos: pure pleasure, pleasure totally purified of all sensuous or sensible interest, perfectly free of all

1. Van Dyke 1989, 90
2. For instance, the former ballet dancer Emelyn Claid tells of hiding her injury: "When I was eleven I actually developed arthritis in my toe joints and never said anything about it...By the time I got to the ballet company in Canada, I was limping, but I never accepted it as an injury" (de Marigny 1993, 6-7).
3. Van Dyke 1989, 128
4. Van Dyke 1989, 108

social or fashionable concerns and conspicuous consumption.[1]

The illusion upon which artistic legitimacy depends is, in large part, the belief that the 'pure gaze' is the only appropriate aesthetic attitude, objective, with which to behold works of art. In Adair's view, this implies a disinterested, detached, indifferent disposition towards the object of aesthetic appraisal which asserts the absolute primacy of form over function and the separation between the artist and the audience.[2] For instance, the space politics of the theatre building, the separation between the auditorium and the stage sets the audience in the role of voyeur for the performer.[3] Sitting in the dark of the auditorium the spectator is offered the body endlessly remote as it might appear on the screen.[4] The difference between the screen and the stage, a picture and a living performance, is not necessarily significant for 'pure' gaze, while from the performer's perspective the difference is crucial.

Detached from the audience, in the objectification of the body for pure gaze, the dance artist learns how to present her body for the pleasure of the audience.[5] The audience's feedback to performers usually falls into two categories: admiration or sanction. To begin training, in particular ballet, one should have an objective body which matches the ideal body of ballet aesthetics, certain body measures, weight, stretchness, flexibility. In ballet the selection committee searches for bodies that can be moulded into the classical ideal, although the ideal body is no guarantee of success. Throughout training, dancers confront their body shapes in every class as they dance before walls of mirrors. In particular for females, who are socialised to pay a good deal of attention to their appearance, this daily confrontation usually results in a dissatisfaction with themselves and a constant battle for perfection which frequently includes dieting.[6] Advertisement and the fashion industry, but also ballet and modern dance aesthetics itself, show us the image of the perfect body. Dancers are supposed to be thinner than average persons. Female dancers are particularly susceptible to pressure to achieve the idealised norm, reflected in the images of the women

1. Bourdieu 1986, 493
2. Codd 1990, 143
3. Adair 1992, 72
4. Adair 1992, 79
5. Adair 1992, 71
6. Adair 1992,16

surrounding them.[1]

The dominant ideal image of the body does not control dancers from outside, individual dancers control their own bodies. When dancers have admitted the body image deeply enough, they even start to believe that the pursuit of it is their own free choice, not something imposed from without. Moreover one problem is that such individual solutions are within the social structures. They do not challenge these by interrogating them.[2] If the body does not fulfil the requirements of the ideal, one can use techniques to mould the body to achieve it. Gelsey Kirkland, a ballerina with NYCB, led by George Balanchine, describes the strains of her life as a dancer, including diets and operations in her efforts to achieve a perfect body. "Radiant immanence of a grace" was proved in Gelsey Kirkland's case, acquired by constant training, diets and operations.[3] Although in modern dance there is not such a strict image of the body as in ballet, modern dancers are under the same cultural pressures to physical perfection.

According to Ann Cooper Albright, a performer - especially, but not by any means exclusively, a female performer - can be appreciated for her talents, but still be treated like an object.[4] She argues that the conventions of large proscenium stages encourage an unequal relationship where the audience becomes the desiring subject and the performer is related to the desired object. The performer can disturb this convention by refusing to acknowledge the audience in the customary manner. Discussing feminism in modern dance Albright presents female dancers' strategies of performing, among others those of Isadora Duncan and Yvonne Rainer, their trying to prevent the objectification of the dancer's body by the audience. Dance works can subvert the objectifying gaze in an effort to articulate a kinaesthetic attentiveness which can present us with an alternative way of seeing bodies in dance.[5] For instance, in an attempt to equalise the power in a performance situation, many contemporary choreographers try to establish a more interactive relationship with their audience.

Although performers may have strategies to prevent them from

1. Adair 1992, 70
2. Adair 1992, 54
3. Kirkland 1988, 58
4. Albright 1991, 10
5. Albright 1991, 10

becoming the mere object of the audience, performers, whatever their motives are, seek their way into the focus of the other's perception. Motives for performing can vary from the exhibition of a performer's body to reciprocity between performer and audience. Discussing the body's objectification to mere representation, Levin argues that people in Western culture suffer from narcissistic disorders, everything is to be seen in terms of power: the power of image and the image of power. Levin argues that narcissism is a pathology of the will to power, a pathology in which this will is totally trapped inside the images it has projected.[1] Narcissism is not only an individual pathology; narcissistic disorders are deeply rooted in the culture of the Cartesian subject, which has risen to power through the character of its visionary being. The prevailing social conditions tend to bring out the narcissistic traits that are present, in varying degrees, in everyone. The dominance of the power of image in our culture produces a widespread narcissism, for it means, in effect, the visual cut off from the "one's own experience". When an individual becomes totally identified with the image, s/he is dispossessed: s/he belongs only to the other's gaze, alienated from her/himself.[2] In other words, the being of the individual becomes totally identified with the being of the image, and loses touch with her/himself. At the very heart of the culture of narcissism, dancers will find a painful relationship in their body to the power of the image. In this self-destructive relationship to their own image dancers are constructed of strength, energy, effectiveness, vitality, ease, independence, status, recognition, admiration, achievement, mastery, control, glory, success and beauty.

The world mirrors, it reflects our visual presence in the other's gaze and glance, the way we are present, the way our awareness is present, the way we are emotionally open or closed to things as they are and appear.[3] Although the other has an image of me and it reflects in the other's gaze, I also bear responsibility for the image that the other has of me.[4]

1. Levin 1988, 130
2. Levin 1988, 129
3. Levin 1988, 377
4. PE, 138

4. Towards Ethical Reflections on Dance

We find ourselves in a world structured by rules and institutions not of our own making. Dance traditions and the body politics of the dance field supply a precondition for dance activity, but simultaneously restrict the possibilities by social and aesthetic control. Dancers may have various strategies to in handling the body politics of dance aesthetics; thus, they cannot entirely ignore the power of it, since a long-term training shapes their lived bodies and their whole life. In order for dancers to be able to rule their life, they must to find techniques and a movement vocabulary through which they can fulfil their potentials as moving bodies. Justifying their own artistic production, dancers and choreographers have reasons to reflect on the body politics of dance aesthetics, but also the social body of society and its body politics. Every individual artist has to reflect on her/his own decisions at the threshold between the past of a dance tradition, in the contemporary situation of the dance field, in order to direct her/his dance project to the future.[1]

Everyday life and the lifeworld may pose ethical and political conflicts with the aesthetics and the body politics of art dance. A certain movement vocabulary suggests conduct which may sometimes be crucially against an individual's own moral behaviour concerning sexuality, ethnicity or religious doctrine. In other words, the individual notices through tacit cogito that the habitual body struggles against the required movement expression. As Merleau-Ponty has pointed out, tacit cogito knows itself usually in extreme situations in which it is under threat. In executing a movement, an individual may encounter her/his own normative behaviour and normative conduct; consequently, dancing may challenge her/his norms of moral behaviour in society. But forcing into a movement may also numb one's own bodily awareness in terms of oneself ethical behaviour. Thus, an ethical reflection on dance is not an abstraction, but concerns the lived body's ethical choices in realising its own acts through tacit cogito. Listening to this bodily awareness, the body sometimes responds in rather complicated manner to the body politics of society and individual needs.

Michel Foucault, in his late philosophy, drew a distinction between *morality* as a set of imposed rules and prohibitions and *ethics* as the

1. See Bloch 1988, 50

conduct of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are advocated for them and ethics. He defines morality as the behaviour of people in relation to rules and values recommended to them: the word thus designates the manner in which individuals comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct. No moral conduct calls for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject and practices of self that support them.[1] Ethics, on the contrary, refers to the manner in which individuals obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of values.[2] In addition, Levin insists that the bodily awareness, tacit cogito, has a central role in realising rules of body politics and finding acts, movements and gestures to resist this behaviour.[3] As an ethical subject, the body-self performs, not to resist a given rule, but to attempt to transform itself, to change itself in the singular being into the ethical subject of behaviour i.e. to develop its own *ethos*.[4] The criteria for the transformation of the ethical subject cannot be presented in the form of universal law, because this is interwoven in one's own bodily awareness.[5] While an ethics of the body-self embodies a limited attitude, it addresses itself to a critical examination of the process in which individuals come to understand themselves within society and culture.[6]

Discussing the ethics of Western theatre, Read criticises ethical argumentation itself, arguing that it has had very little bearing on ethical acts, as in the case of academic philosophers who merely discuss Ethics.[7] Dealing with ethical issues, philosophers can separate their personal life from the work of philosophy, in the same way as a dancer can use her/his body as just an instrument. In search of an ethical life, an ethos, philosophers come face to face with the question of the relation between developed ethics and their own life. In the case of the embodied subject, her/his values and perspective on the world are necessarily embodied; therefore ethical here is not merely an intellectual or emotional consideration but something interwoven with the embodiment, the individual and social body. Thus, a dancer's ethos

1. Foucault 1992, 28
2. Foucault 1992, 25
3. Levin 1990, 37
4. Foucault 1992, 27
5. See also Foucault 1992, 250.
6. McNay 1994, 154
7. Read 1993, 89-90

refers not merely to artistic production, but contains the artist's worldview, her/his lifestyle, the techniques of arts, and the philosophical basis of the artistic work, together with the dancer as an agent in cultural and social embodiment. In a way this releases us from the polarity between what is considered morally acceptable and what immoral behaviour in art. Ethos opens up a venue for ethics which is not a conceptual anchor, simply 'good' and 'bad' with all the power relations such statements imply. Rather it makes ethics always individually shaped and intertwined with a person's bodily conduct.

Although the dancer's ethos does not only concern the mere production of danceworks, the critical power of different art forms appears through the very poetics of artworks. Difficult and disturbing art acts disrupt our habits of thought, moral behaviour and standard of conduct. By being subversive of perception, an artwork can break through stereotyped social reality and open new horizons prompting both the artist and the audience to reflect on the lifeworld. A subversive dancework, which, for instance, may contemplate the body politics of society through movements, addresses the question of a dancework's capacity to discuss a certain issue through the moving body. For instance, in *Kinjiki (Forbidden Colors,* 1959) the Japanese dancer and choreographer Tatsumi Hijikata presented a striking image of homosexuality inspired by Yokio Mishima's novel. In the short dance without no music a young man (Yoshito Ohno) enacted sex with a chicken squeezed between his thighs and then succumbed to the advances of an older man (Tatsumi Hijikata). Kinjiki showed, without using any familiar softened symbols, the desires or fantasies of sexuality, making them flesh on the stage. Despite the fact that these fantasies might be familiar to some of us in our own imagination, when represented directly to an audience in Tokyo in 1959, the audience was shocked by the performance. *Kinjiki* caused a scandal in the Japanese art dance community and as a result, Hijikata was closed from the Japanese dance field, while butoh dance developments have remained an underground dance art in Japan to this day.

Contrary to the case of Hijikata, sometimes subversive danceworks tend to formulate their own standards in the dance field, becoming gradually "classical dance", "pure aesthetics" or a "common movement style". For instance, Yvonne Rainer's *Trio A* (1966) can be considered a

subversive dancework in American dance culture at the end of the 60's. The entire four-and-one-half-minute series of constant changes in motion was performed as a single phrase giving the appearance of a smooth, effortless surface, while the movements were carefully dissected, quite complex and strenuous. By this Rainer created a paradigmatic statement of the aesthetic goals of American post-modern dance.[1] Probably it would not have been subversive for the same reasons, if it had performed in Finland in the late sixties in the different cultural context.

A dancework rarely becomes subversive accidentally, without a dancer's or a choreographer's own intentions; in other words, without her/his ethos seeking to meditate and express a certain issue in and through movements to an audience. Nevertheless, subversion is not considered here as the aim of danceworks as such; rather dancers and choreographers reflecting on a question through movements expose a certain striking image, which while emerging from a cultural and historical soil may communicate straight to an audience, although the audience may deny the power of it.

Summing up, ethical reflections on dancing here refer to the manner in which individuals obey or resist the body politics of a dance or/and the values of society; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of values not only by argumentation but also by their ethos and through artworks.[2] Since criteria for the ethical subject cannot be formulated in terms of universal law, dancers and choreographers have to reflect on their ethos, including their artistic production, concerning prevailing dance aesthetics and the cultural and historical situation of the lifeworld. The moving, dancing bodies as themselves have a power to resist normative body politics through the poetics of danceworks.

1. Banes 1987, 45
2. In traditional aesthetics 'morality' and 'ethics' in arts are understood quite differently. Although Immanuel Kant in his philosophy of art tries to establish the autonomy of the aesthetic, its independence of desire, of moral duty, of knowledge, he argues that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good (see Beardsley 1975, 210). He wants to say that we cannot understand aesthetic experience except by relating it to our moral nature as followers of universal principles. This Kantian idea of linking the aesthetic will with the morally good differs from many twentieth century aestheticians' conception, since the aesthetic domain is not necessarily logically connected with morality, for it constitutes an autonomous realm of its own.

Part III
THE DANCER'S PATH

Dance traditions and the aesthetic and social control of the dance field supply preconditions for dance activity, but the dancers are not made solely by the body politics of the dance field. Reaching beyond the notion that dancers are only made by the agents of the dance field, we must discuss dancers' own power to affect their own bodies' modification and artistic decisions. This chapter focuses on to a discussion of the development of a dancer, in which dance practice is not considered as a ready-made model but as an individually chosen path, the path of transformation and the path of knowledge, also led by the body itself. In this discourse both dance tradition as an interpersonal practice with its body politics and individual choices in artistic production are treated as necessary aspects in understanding the construction of the dancing body.

1. Existential Project
(i) Givenness, freedom and choosing oneself

In his article on the art of painting, "Cézanne's doubt", Merleau-Ponty discusses Cézanne's choice becoming an artist. According to Merleau-Ponty, the choice was not made through deliberation, he was pushed by one passion, to paint, to make visible how the world touches us.[1] It was objects and faces themselves as he saw them which demanded to be painted, and Cézanne "simply" expressed what they wanted to say. Merleau-Ponty argues that looking back on Cézanne's life, we can find hints as to why he painted the way he did. His life was the projection of his work, although by analysing his life we cannot explain his work. Merleau-Ponty comes to the conclusion that *a certain work to be done called*

1. CD, 20

for the certain life. This implies that an artist's projection and her/his artistic production are inseparable from a certain mode of living.

In Cézanne's case the pressing conditions and a certain "personality" as *givenness* seem to "order" this artistic project. However not every artist's commitment to art from the very outset is as self-evident as it might sound in Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Cézanne's art and life. It is necessary to avoid the determinism inherent in conceiving that artists are "chosen" from the very beginning, that their life is determined from childhood or they know at an early age that they will devote themselves to the career of artist.

The fact is, neither an artist's project nor the existence of any individual is determined beforehand; on the contrary, through choices individuals are making themselves and the lived bodies to some extent. However much individuality is partially constituted through choices we make, our life is always based on a certain givenness.[1] The subject is always already in a particular context with others, including diverse social groups, institutions and historical events. We are involved in the world and with others in an inextricable tangle. According to Merleau-Ponty, this embodied situation rules out absolute freedom at the source of our commitments, and equally, indeed, at their terminus.[2] There is no determinism and never absolute choice, I am never a thing and never bare consciousness.[3] Our freedom, as Merleau-Ponty has put it, is either total or non-existent, but always situated.[4] My lived life, however short it is, my temperament, and my environment are therefore true, provided that they are regarded not as separate contributions, but as moments of my total being. The significance to which I am entitled makes itself explicit in various ways, without its ever being possible to say whether I confer their meaning upon them or receive it from them. This certain significance of nature and history which I am, does not limit my access to the world, but is on the contrary is my means of entering into communication with it.[5]

According to Heidegger's phenomenology, the subject has a *projection* in the world, from a certain embodied situation, a personal,

1. PhP, 455
2. PhP, 454
3. PhP, 453
4. PhP, 454
5. PhP, 455

cultural, historical background s/he is projecting her/himself, and as long as s/he lives, it is projecting.[1] This body-subject has in every case already projected itself upon definite possibilities; and in such an existential project it has also projected its own mode of being, and Being itself. In other words, body-subjects are making themselves and their own mode of being through the process of projection, although they cannot totally control their projects. Since they are not only randomly who they are, the body-subjects are responsible for their mode of projection as ethical subjects.

To make individuals question their own conduct, watch over and give shape to it, Michel Foucault introduces *practise of the self* as an attempt to project the self as an ethical body-subject.[2] Practice of the self refers to procedures through which individuals could form themselves as the subjects of their actions, in cultivating devotion to the self which could enable them to evaluate social rules and give purpose to their existence.[3] In addition, practices of the self as self-forming activities and disciplines entail to the notion that individuals need their own exertions and efforts "to become what they are".[4] The human has a potential for self-transformation and moral sensibility. Thus, practice of the self is based on the thought that I can direct my project towards potentials which I am. This implies that the search for one's own identity reflects and questions the body politics, the social body's stereotypes and living in das Man, in order to find "authentic being of the body-self". Practice of the self and self-forming activities imply that individuals need their own exertions and efforts to make flesh their potentials.

1. Heidegger uses the term 'Entwurf', 'entwerfen' which literally means 'throwing' something off or 'away' from one. These concepts are usually translated as 'designing' or 'sketching' some project, or simply 'projection' (see translator's footnote, Heidegger 1927/1990, 185). Heidegger describes projection: "Das Entwerfen hat nichts zu tun mit einem Sichverhalten zu einem ausgedachten Plan, gemäß dem das Dasein sein Sein einrichtet, sondern als Dasein hat es sich je schon entworfen und ist, solange es ist, entwerfend. Dasein versteht sich immer schon und immer noch, solange es ist, aus Möglichkeiten" (Heidegger 1927/1979, 145).
2. Foucault 1992, 25-32
3. Foucault 1988, 95
4. Foucault introduces the notion of practice of the self in *The Use of Pleasure*, the second volume of the History of Sexuality (see Foucault 1992, 25-37). Introducing the concept, he focuses on studying pleasure and sexual activity in classical Greek culture, using texts of philosophers and doctors of the fourth century B.C. In this context this historical aspect may be disregarded, assuming that by practice of self Foucault introduces his conception of the human's possibilities to become an ethical subject.

Foucault emphasises techniques and exercises by which subjects make themselves objects to be known, and practices that enable them to transform their own mode of being. By 'exercises' Foucault means also the cultivating of the body. Exercise is regarded as the actual practise of what one needs to train for; it is not something distinct from the goal to be reached. Through training, one becomes accustomed to the behaviour that one would eventually manifest by one's mode of being.[1] Practice of the self is not a formal pattern, but rather an elaboration of a form of relation to the self that enables us to fashion ourselves into subjects of ethical conduct.[2]

Understanding one's own limits of time and being-towards-death gives individuals courage to choose their projects and justify their own decisions. Understanding being-towards-death encourages the individual to resist prevailing body politics which do not give space to the diversity of being human, but sets a stable frame of behaviour. Living in das Man, projecting its morality, we constantly compare ourselves with other people, struggling to achieve the standards of the normal being, whatever they are.[3] Practice of the self questions das Man's standards and values in order to outline the body-self's own identity and authentic being.

Foucault's ethics of the self also involves a certain notion of aesthetics. When Foucault argues that the self is not given to us, he suggests that we are able to create ourselves as a work of art.[4] With this latter conception Foucault refers to an aesthetics of existence, by which he protests against instrumentality in the arts: "What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?"[5] Foucault's notion of an aesthetics of existence is criticised, understood as a stylisation of daily life tantamount to an amoral project for privileged minorities. The aesthetic emphasis in Foucault's ethics does not necessarily signal a retreat to a form of elitism. Rather, Foucault aims to rethink the non-

1. Foucault 1992, 74
2. Foucault 1992, 251
3. Heidegger 1927/1990, 311
4. Rabinow 1984, 351
5. Rabinow 1984, 350

productive quality of art and ethical action which escapes the instrumental rationality or utilitarian logic that also structures the artist's production.[1] Foucault attempts to promote art not related to objects but to individuals or to living as such. Although a dance artist's production is understood here in relation to the human body and its movements, 'embodied individuals' and 'their life', in any dance art there also exist 'objects' and 'artworks'. In other words, dancing is not merely an aesthetics of existence, but the production of 'objects' which are not the same as the artists themselves. Thus, what Foucault calls the creation of the self as a work of art concerns solely the self, but artists' production is not only for the artists themselves; the work of art requires a witness, an audience, to exist.

(ii) The dancer's projection and practice of the self

When an individual chooses to become a professional artist, the project of dance not only concerns the artistic production but it intertwined with the artist's whole life. Choosing dance is always choosing a certain way of life. The project of dance can be based on clear thoughts about the motives of an artistic work and commitment to a certain movement practice. But equally the project of dance and a dancer's projection might be constituted by any available jobs related to dancing. In both cases, embodiment, the self and the mode of living are shaped through the training of movement aesthetics and dance production. A certain work to be undertaken calls for certain life. In other words, a certain movement activity and dance aesthetics demands a certain way of life.[2] Dancers have already projected themselves upon definite possibilities; and since it is a question of an existential projection, they have also projected their own mode of being. The dancer is making her/himself and mode of being to some extent through the chosen movement aesthetics.[3] This also means a certain long-term dance practice has

1. McNay 1994, 148
2. For instance, the movement vocabulary and aesthetics of Bharata Natyam demand from a dancer a certain devotion not only to discipline in the technique but also to make flesh the whole religious philosophy on which Bharata Natyam is based.
3. To make myself entirely is as impossible as lifting myself up from the ground by my hair. The project of making oneself has a danger to play god, creating oneself, to change

already habituated the body and way of life. Anna Halprin says: "Everything we do in dance somehow or other usually relates to who you are as a person, and this affects how you see things and feel things and relate to people."[1]

There is always an existential level in professional dance practice, since training not only shapes the appearance of the body as an instrument, but fashions one's existence, an existential manner of being in the world and world-view.[2] Directing one's own project of dance means that the individual also resolutely faces the reasons and the consequences of having made that prior decision.[3] Moreover, there is repetition of a mode of movement training in the continued acceptance of a personally projected goal as the determining motive for action. A dance artist's projection, here, is not comporting self towards a plan that has been thought out or a result of the projection could which be known in advance, but a path with "turning-points". These turning-points comprise fractures into this motives of the project. Turning-points in one's own project of dance usually take place in crisis situations: injuries, failures, critique, the ageing process of the body or being frustrated by dance aesthetics or body politics. A dance artist may begin to reflect on her/his project and the motives of this project and of dance production. When dance artists ask the leitmotifs, reasons and meanings of the project of dance related to the limits of their life, the quality of their living, and the significance of dance work in the lifeworld, they basically confront dancing as an existential issue. In this existential interrogation they ponder the reasons for devoting their own time to a certain artistic project, bearing in mind that the chosen project is in long run modifying their whole being.

Here, practice of the self refers to the project of dance through which dancers and choreographers identify themselves as the subjects of their actions, finding devotion to the body-self that could enable them to evaluate social rules, give a purpose to their existence and finally through artistic production convey this to the audience.[4] Although the

completely the physical form by plastic surgery and exercise and retain this physical form in order to attain immortality.

1. In an interview of Anna Halprin by Vera Maletic (Maletic 1979, 130).
2. See also Köhne-Kirsch 1989, 171
3. Kaelin 1970, 91
4. Choreographer Carol Brown has researched feminist choreographic practices and formulates Foucault's practices of the self as a way to deconstruct stereotyped images of being woman,

self is a process rather than an object, an individual intensifies the relation to the self taking her/himself as an object of knowledge and a field of action.[1] In this sense, the self is not given to us, we have to create ourselves - as a work of art as Foucault has it - but above all *through a work of art*. This cultivation of the self in the case of the art of existence is dominated by the principle of care of the self, which differs from both narcissism and self-sacrifice.[2] Through practice of the self a dance artist directs the project towards potentials which s/he is.[3] In search of their own identity dance artists confront body politics, the social body's stereotypes and living in das Man, in order that they can outline their own identity.

Awareness of one's own limits of time and being-towards-death encourages dancers to direct their projection towards their own potentials as individually formed techniques of the self. Since a dancer has no time to discipline several movement vocabularies, s/he must choose from various possibilities, while in choosing s/he projects her/his living a certain direction. The body may have various skills, but to discipline the essence of a movement vocabulary takes time and effort, of which an individual has a limited resource. In addition, my life is always only one projection despite how my living might be dispersed in various duties, roles and pursuits. Understanding the limits of time and being-towards-death gives courage to dancers to choose their path and justify this decision despite the projection of a dance tradition and body politics in the dance field. In this project dancers face a lonely task, asking about their own identity with or without the agreement and understanding of other people. Choosing their projections in a dance means stepping out of the frame of body aesthetics, and therefore, sometimes paradoxically, also freeing the public to communicate more freely.

According to Mikel Dufrenne, the depth of a work tends to assimilate to the human quality of its creator.[4] Dufrenne notes that the

remodelling a woman's own identity. The Finnish philosopher Timo Klemola, who has studied martial arts through Heidegger's phenomenology, uses the term *itsen projekti*, 'the project of the self', which refers to movement practice through which a human strives for authentic being. See Klemola 1990, 91-114.

1. Foucault 1988, 42
2. Foucault 1988, 43
3. See also Heidegger 1927/1979, 221-22.
4. Dufrenne 1973, lxiv

work of art is meaningful in its unique way only if artists are authentic: it says something only if they are fused with the saying of the work.[1] Then artists not only produce new artefacts, they have a direct, embodied relation to their production: they live them through.

2. Path

Rather than creation, everyday artistic production is simply work; in the doing of it, it teaches the maker, carrying her/him in a certain direction. The concept 'path' is used here to describe this characteristic feature of the artistic work as a process and the unity of the person and the artist. In the artistic process of executing a work of art, any invention brings with it new thoughts and questions, and a desire to develop this invention further. As an artist completes one work, a new one is usually being evolved from thoughts and questions which the previous work brought along. One work leads to another, forming a unique path of artistic production. The artist's personal knowledge and skills have been acquired through a path; we may say that knowledge and skills *are* a path. The artist's path is regarded as an individually chosen project, which is always a unique one; a path does not exist before an artist has made it through artistic production. Because being is always being-with-others, such a path and artistic production are influenced and directed by other people and the lifeworld.

Moreover, the process of listening to the moving body in dancing and working on a choreography carries a dancer in a certain direction, offering possibilities, evoking new ideas and thoughts, and offering new solutions for the work. The process of the work may lead the dance artist to "a place" where no-one has been before. As the process of the work proceeds in a direction which the audience members find difficult to understand, they may react aggressively toward it, protesting "But this is not dance!"

1. Dufrenne 1973, lxii

(i) The transformation of the body

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body suggests that an individual's entire lived life, profession, relations to other people, hobbies, physical exercise, illnesses, losses, childbirths, eating habits, worldview, even dreaming, mould her/his body, producing a lived body, which s/he is. The lived body is conditioned through the use of various "everyday life body techniques", i.e. activities which shape and produce being in the body. The anthropologist Marcel Mauss has pointed out that sleeping is one of the everyday life body techniques, the manners of which varies culturally.[1] Although we "use" these techniques - we are accustomed to them - we are not necessarily aware of their function or their consequences. The everyday life body techniques influence an individual's life and embodiment, although we are rarely willing to think or take responsibility for their consequences. Moreover, these techniques are not merely individual, deliberate choices; the body is controlled, moulded into shape by society. Therefore body politics is constituted of everyday life body techniques which as a certain mode of living in a society are set by the moral values of that society. The body in its "natural condition" is already the result of various such techniques, producing a way of living, a collective thinking and the social body.

The theatre practitioner and theorist Grotowski argues that in daily life we have a tendency to a balance, a normal life which we might call 'easy', easy because it has been incorporated since childhood.[2] Maintaining the routines in daily life, everyday life body techniques produce tenacious habits, customs and manners which are easy to an accustomed body, but inconvenient to an unpractised body. Eugenio Barba remarks:

> Our social use of the body is necessarily a product of a culture: the body has been incultured and colonised. It knows only the uses and perspectives for which it has been educated. In order to find others, it must be detached

1. According to Marcel Mauss, the notion that sleeping on a bed is something natural is totally inaccurate. The techniques of sleeping are multiple and culturally formed. Mauss mentions a few developments: sleeping standing up in the mountains as the Masai can, or as the ancient Mongols did, sleeping on a moving horse (Mauss 1935/1979, 113).
2, Grotowski 1991, 236

> from its models...It is precisely this path which makes performers discover their own life, their own independence and their own physical eloquence.[1]

Barba makes a distinction between "everyday life body techniques" and "extra-daily techniques", the latter of which refers to techniques used by educators and performers themselves. The performers alter their daily behaviour through training, change their habitual way of being. The "extra-daily techniques" operate on a completely different level than "everyday life body techniques": the former are used in order to have certain results and effects in the body. By listening to the results of extra-daily techniques, the performer receives a knowledge - bodily knowledge - of the functioning of those techniques. Body techniques can be treated by educators or performers as purely instrumental techniques to effect certain changes in body aesthetics or in the functioning of the object body. But as Barba remarks, "extra-daily techniques" should be understood as "the practice of the self" through which "performers discover their own life, their own independence and their own physical eloquence".

According to Barba, there is a 'myth of technique', something which, it is imagined, it is possible to acquire, possess, and which would confer mastery of the body without the efforts of the subject.[2] But the "extra-daily" techniques do not offer a system which one could simply use mechanically and then become an artist. The effects of body techniques vary from one person to another because of differences in lived bodies. An individual's own reflection and thought are needed in order to understand the effects of techniques on the lived body and to steer the project of dance. In other words, training can only be individually formed, because there is no common method.[3] In listening to one's own body in the training process and listening to other persons' experiences, one can find proper methods and daily training rhythms to the purpose in individually chosen projects of dancing.[4]

1. Barba 1991, 245
2. Barba 1991, 244
3. Barba 1991, 244
4. Merleau-Ponty says of the techniques of painting: "The truth is that no means of expression one mastered, resolves the problems of painting or transforms it into a technique. For no symbolic form ever functions as a stimulus" (EM, 175).

In butoh dance a great deal of emphasis is placed on the transformation process in the dance artist. Transformation refers *both* to the body's purpose to re-identify itself and to find its own identity in the dominant body politics of society *and* an ability to use certain body techniques in expressing, revealing certain things and images in performing (i.e. metamorphosis). This implies that in butoh discourse the transformation of the body concerns butoh dancers' artistic project but also their existential choices of life and living as body. Influenced by Jerzy Grotowski's thinking, Tatsumi Hijikata (1928-1986), the most influential figure in butoh dance in the 60's and 70's, thought that the social body and roles and habits of everyday life are limited by the manner in which we inhabit our bodies and the manner in which we understand the body.[1] The transformation of the body is a way to sublimate the meaning of the body, which is lost in the social body and its stereotyped mode of being.[2] Hijikata describes butoh dance as a necessity at individual and cultural levels which breaks the shell formed by social habits and roles.[3] Another leading figure in butoh dance, Kazuo Ohno says:

> I don't believe that the body can transform itself, unless it undergoes the fundamental changes of life and death. Therefore, when I try to prove my own existence, it is impossible not to follow the thread of my memories until I reach my mother's womb: for it is there that my life began. So I try to carry in my body all the weight and mystery of life; and I believe dance is born of this experience."[4]

Transformation as a body technique, i.e. metamorphosis, constitutes a central aspect both as a motif in butoh choreography and as a dancer's

1. The emergence of butoh dance occurred in Japan at the beginning of the 60's. According to Hijikata, because of the rapid modernisation of Japanese culture, traditional Japanese dance forms were no longer capable of communicating the contemporary situation, while Western modern and ballet were not able to root in Japanese embodiment and culture. Butoh dance seeks a connection with Japanese embodiment and searches for solutions to the crisis where the body lives in the technological world. Hijikata's project was to find "healing" procedures for the Japanese broken identity of the body in search of new bodily identities which emerge from the self and cultural roots. See Stein 1986, 115; Holborn 1987, 9; Sanders, V. 1988, 145.
2. Viala 1988, 17
3. Viala 1988, 64
4. Viala 1988, 41

expressive technique. Hijikata studied the techniques of transforming the body especially with Yoko Ashikawa.[1] Hijikata's idea of transformation of the body is to assume "the other's being", not only the otherness in humans as babies and dwarfs, but to merge into essences of creatures of nature: stones, winds, cats, butterflies, flowers, etc., even imaginary characters like giants and witches. Ashikawa mastered the techniques of metamorphosis, disciplining a thousand different "images" in Hijikata's movement vocabulary. She tells of a period of collaborating with Hijikata:

> He choreographed for me dances that were based on puppets or babies, for bodies that were not yet mature. Looking back, I understand that his training was not designed to mimic puppets or babies, but to enable the dancers to really experience, not just as a training routine, but to realize their bodies like a baby, through touching, feeling, or exploring. This was the basis of his choreography.[2]

Summing up, in the project of intensive bodily training a dancer passes through a transformation process, a dance education which causes both experiential and visible changes in the body. This process of transformation of the body produces skills and knowledge of the moving body and also visible changes in embodiment. Without this process in the artist, the body has only its socially formed behaviour and the lived body shaped by lived life. Dance students alter their daily behaviour, change habitual ways of being in the transformation process becoming performers. This fundamental change in identity calls to into question the direction of this project. In order to direct it and take a prior responsibility for the techniques used, dancers have to evaluate the culturally formed everyday life body techniques in which they are involved, and find proper methods of using extra-daily techniques.

1. Ashikawa tells of her collaboration with Hijikata "For almost ten years our daily routine began with his drumming on a small drum stretched with animal hide, rather like a Buddhist drum, and with his words, which he uttered in a stream like poetry. When we danced, the images were all derived from his verbal expression. Without the words we could not dance, so it was like following a poem. He very much liked to number and classify his movements according to images" (Holborn 1987, 16).
2. Holborn 1987, 16

(ii) The dancer's knowledge and skills as a path

Michael Polanyi, in his theory of 'personal knowledge', argues that personal knowledge concerns the way the subject possesses knowledge and skills. According to Polanyi, acquiring knowledge, a person is not making but *discovering* it, and this mode of knowing claims to establish contact with reality. The effort of knowing is thus guided by a sense of obligation to the world and its reality. Since every act of personal knowing appreciates the coherence of certain particularities, it also implies submission to certain criteria of coherence. But we cannot in terms of personal knowing divest ourselves by setting up objective criteria of verifiability, falsifiability or testability. In this sense all personal knowing appraises what it knows by a standard set to itself.[1]

If there is no common method of learning dance, even in terms of a certain movement vocabulary, then the project of learning and practising dance is individually formed. By movement exercises and listening to the moving body, a dancer acquires a knowledge of dancing which cannot be known by any other means such as, for instance, reading books on this domain. The dancer's bodily knowledge of dance is personal knowing, in other words, this "body of knowledge" is individually formed.[2] I carry my knowledge of dancing in my body, although I may possess methods to transmit that knowledge to another person, i.e. teach another person. The dancer's personal knowledge contains the use of certain body techniques, personal movement skills and other acquisitions concerning the whole process of creating choreography and performing it. If we adopt Polanyi's account of knowing, dancers' and choreographers' knowledge comprise tacit knowing; they cannot necessarily articulate what they know, for it is too self-evident and complicated to express in words. Although personal knowing appraises what it knows by a standard set by itself, a dancer's knowledge concerns the moving body of which we all have some knowledge. Thus 'a personal knowledge of the body' is necessarily connected to the intersubjective aspects of the body, which we can also to some extent evaluate.

A dancer and a choreographer acquire knowledge of movement

1. Polanyi 1962, 63
2. Polanyi 1962, 64-65

gradually in the process of doing dance work; thus, they cannot possess knowledge and skills of the moving body immediately, only through the path of practising dance. This implies that the dancer's personal knowledge is a path, developed and formed gradually during her/his career. As a path, the dancer's knowledge is also a personal choice, a project to learn a certain movement vocabulary and to habituate the body to this vocabulary, studying and living through it. If there are several movement vocabularies, also personal discoveries, the standards of 'good' and 'inferior' in terms of different dancers disappear as systematised criteria. For instance, a butoh dancer's skills and her/his individually formed body techniques are not comparable with a ballet dancer's skills and body techniques. They cannot be related to each other, since they share no common criteria as regards the skills of the moving body. Each has its own personal knowing and path of knowledge. An individually chosen path as practice of the self leads to the development of one's own personal abilities and interests in terms of the moving body.

Although a dancer may already have had a long professional education, daily training and perpetual study inherently belong to the dance practice, since the body is in a constant process of change and constantly requires cultivation. The project of dance requires daily training to maintain bodily skills and a propensity for "attuning oneself" as a dancing and performing body. For instance, a pause in continual training quite soon alters the body's condition. Listening to the body in the training process, an individual finds proper body techniques to develop her/his project of dance. Thus, listening to the body, its tacit cogito, an individual knows how the training influences the body, how the body responds to that training. Therefore a dancer's own reflection and thinking is needed, in order to be able to can understand the consequences of techniques used in the lived body. The development of a proper training system and body techniques forms an essential part of the dancer's personal knowledge of the moving body. "Listening to the body" means an ability to be sensitive to embodiment, the ability to perceive differences in movement qualities and alterations in the body. When speaking of a dance artist's bodily knowledge, we are implicitly discussing how to be sensitive in the body, susceptibility to notice various qualities of the moving body. It means much the same as

kinaesthetic intelligence as an aspect of skilful dancing.[1]

The body is transformed in the training process, capable of performing movement qualities, expressing in the moving body exact meanings and images. When acquiring skills and knowledge concerning movements in and through the body, a dancer has to have the right "attunement" both to sustain the skills and develop them further. "Attuning oneself" refers to dancers' ability to sustain a certain trained body condition and their identities as performing artists.[2] "Attuning oneself" is a philosophical term, not a psychological one, so it differs from techniques of "concentration" and "warming up", by which the dancer prepares for a performance.[3] Individual dancers have to find a proper rhythm in their lives, balancing everyday life and performing in such a way that they can deal with the shift between performing on the stage and living everyday life. Since a professional dancer not only chooses the dance project but a certain way of life, everyday life and the project of dance must be in balance or in controlled chaos.

In addition, attuning refers to the dancer's bodily identity. In other words, identifying oneself as a dancer one must sustain a certain "bodily mood". In daily training dancers, listening to the body's response in motion, find alterations and also stable conditions in the body. As a result, the dancers know their bodies and they have confidence in them in performing. During a long pause in training and performing the body becomes "stiff" and "strange": everyday life techniques begin to take effect in it. A dancer may lose a certain "bodily mood", thereby divorcing gradually from dance practice and her/his identity as a dancer.[4]

1. Fraleigh 1987, 26
2. Heidegger considers that Dasein has always a "state-of-mind" or some "mood" in being-in-the-world. Dasein's state-of-mind must be conceived as an existential attribute of the entity which has being-in-the-world as its way of Being (Heidegger 1927/1979, 134). 'Mood' is translated from Heidegger's words *die Stimmung, das Gestimmtsein*. *Die Stimmung* originally means the tuning of a musical instrument, and it is usually translate as 'mood'. The term '"attuning oneself" is used here to indicate a bodily condition and a way of living in which the dancing body is tuned by itself in the training process and through the project of dance.
3. Valeska Gert says: "A piece that seems to be tragic today may be tragicomic tomorrow. The outcome always depends on my mood. On days when I am cheerful my dances or spoken pieces lose the edges that they had on days when my soul was bitter. No matter how carefully I rehearse a dance, once I perform it on stage it might look completely different from what I had expected" (Preston-Dunlop 1990, 15).
4. It may be recalled that a pause in training and performing (caused by injuries, for instance),

As we have seen, the dancer's knowledge is a tacit knowledge; this body of knowledge cannot be clearly articulated and analysed as a whole. Thus dancers know and can do without being to able to explain what it is or how they know it.[1] In addition to bodily knowledge such as body techniques or personal movement skills, they possess a knowledge concerning the whole process of making choreography and performing. In modern dance tradition most choreographers have a background as dancers. A great deal of the knowledge of the choreographer is acquired through the dancer's practice, but in addition to bodily knowledge of movement skills, the choreographer needs many other skills to direct the choreographic process. Making a dancework, a choreographer needs not only knowledge of movement, but skills and knowledge to construct the artwork: developing an idea, obtaining money for it, concentrating on a long rehearsing process, collaborating with musicians, costumiers, set designers, light designers etc. Despite collaboration, a choreographer must have some knowledge of designing settings, costumes, lighting, etc. In addition, the dancer and the choreographer need social skills, since dance is inherently a social activity. The social skills pertain, for instance to how to choose the "right" persons for a certain dance project and building a working relationship between people involved in the project. A choreographer's ability to transform an idea to movement and to find a communion with the dancer may have an enormous effect on the final choreography and its performing.

The process of a dance project brings with it new knowledge and experiences that direct and cast the background for a new work. Although the dance artist is a "perpetual beginner", earlier works affect forthcoming dancing and choreographies.[2] Knowledge of making dances is formed gradually, constituting a path with artistic beginnings, endings and turnings. A crucial event in life can question the whole body of knowledge and movement skills concerning dancing, while it may open a totally new starting-point to approach the whole artistic work. New ideas concerning artistic work may emerge casually, unexpectedly,

in giving up routinizes may drive to evaluate dance practice, while one may invent new ways to approach to dance practice. Consequently, it may open new possibilities and re-direct one's own path.

1. Blom and Chaplin 1982, 5
2. According to Merleau-Ponty, the philosopher is a perpetual beginner, which means that s/he takes for granted nothing that men, learned or otherwise, believe they know (PhP, xiv).

without a logical connection but seldom entirely without earlier experiences and a particular background as an artist.

(iii) Dialogue with the world

> Thus snow invites us to press it together, a mountain invites us to carve it, the sea invites us to plunge into it. The pleasure of swimming probably stems from that dominion which I exercise not only over myself in adapting to a new milieu...but over the very thing which I make support me when it should be engulfing me.[1]

Here, Dufrenne describes a human's embodied relation with the natural and cultural world. This relation is not based on the ego's will and desire but "the world's invitation": the world invites the prepersonal body to a communion with it. This connection brings, not only knowledge and understanding of the sensuous world, but also *pleasure* in being in touch with different sensuous elements in the world through the sensuous body. Although the world reveals its essential sentient quality in the human's embodied communion with it, it still remains secret to the human, yielding new challenges to us meditating on its essence. Merleau-Ponty describes further this dialogue with the world in the painter's work:

> He is a man at work who each morning finds in the shape of things the same questioning and the same call to which he never stops responding. His work is never completed; it is always in progress. One day, life reveals itself; the body is written off. At other times - and more sadly - the question scattered through the spectacles of the world ceases to be heard. Then he is not a painter any more, or he is an honorary painter. But as long as he paints, his painting is always open onto things.[2]

According to Merleau-Ponty, the painter's intention through the painting is "revealing" the world. The whole process of painting is searching for an embodied communion with things and their essence to reveal it in the art work. One day this work leads to revelation, but next day may not. The artist's work as a continuous process is 'asking', 'interrogating'

1. Dufrenne 1973, 83
2. IL, 67

rather than merely ‘depicting’ or ‘representing’.

Merleau-Ponty’s description of the painter’s work as “revealing” through embodied communion with the world might be useful to overcome the notion of a dance artist’s work understood as “interpreting”, “representing” and “portraying” or “expressing”, and even “self-expressing”. Here, a dancer is not understood as the mere interpreter of movements and a choreographer as the producer of movements; choreographing and dancing are treated as an art of revealing the world through the moving body. As we have seen, dancers and choreographers cannot trust that any given movement vocabulary itself carries “meanings”; they have to listen to their own body and their embodied relation with the world both in everyday living and in artistic production in order to be sure, that a movement has an experiential/visible meaning-bearing character in that artistic work.[1] The world is given to humans beforehand; therefore, the understanding of movement patterns in choreography emerges from a relation with the lifeworld, not from the standardised movement vocabulary as such. The lifeworld, the culture and communal embodiment, cast the background against which the dancer as well as the audience identify meanings of movements. On this background ‘meaning’ is given to both dancing and receiving dance, since understanding always pertains to the human’s being-in-the-world as a whole.[2]

If we consider that the meanings of movements are not permanent and universal, studying cultural, historical, natural aspects of the world, dancers and choreographers search for an embodied relation with the lifeworld to reveal certain aspects of it in a new light through the moving body and movement.[3] As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, we are condemned to meanings, also the meanings of the body, which stem from the embodied dialogue with the world. Through this dialogue the moving,

1. Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker says of developing the movement vocabulary of her company “Rosas”: “I think the vocabulary we have generated together with Rosas, always is kind of - not necessarily consciously - concerned with the idea that dance can only be looked on as real, with a very close relationship to the very reality we live in. If you want the body to speak, there must be some kind of relation to the very reality we live in” (Spångberg 1995, 49).
2. Kockelmans 1985, 102
3. Dufrenne points out: “...a certain vital relation of man to the world, and when the artist appears to me as the one through whom this relation exists, not because he brings it into being but because he lives it” (Dufrenne 1973, 106).

sensing body "explores" the world in order to reveal meanings which may emerge through an exact method or/and by chance. To be concrete, in an improvisation situation, for instance, a dancer is invited to move by the music or a fellow-dancer's movement, and the dancer answers this invitation through the body's movement.[1] "Dialogue" evolves from that relation, yielding movements and a certain communion between two (or more) dancers or/and a dancer and the music. Pleasure of moving stems from letting the body lead, sense and understand itself and the otherness in this communion; in addition, through this dialogue the moving body "discovers" the meanings of movement.

Producing movements in this relation, for instance in improvisation, a dancer cannot be sure that the meanings of the movements are visible in the same manner as that in which the body becomes aware of them. There exists an "incessant escaping", a gap, between bodily awareness of the body schema and the visible appearance of this schema.[2] As Merleau-Ponty argues, there will always be a distance between me and what I see, between me and what I do.[3] Bridging the gap between bodily awareness and the visible image of it also profiles *the dancer and the choreographer as separated assignments* in making danceworks. In other words, in making the work of art the gap between bodily awareness and the body's visible appearance produces two perspectives in a dance, the dancer's and the choreographer's, as distinct professions and usually also different persons. The choreographer has a perspective into meanings of movements as their visible appearance, while the dancer interrogates meanings of movements in the body's awareness.[4]

In order to communicate through movements, the dancer and the choreographer need a dialogue to understand the abyss and the escape

1. See, for example, Louise Mathieu's description of music-dance duet improvisation (Mathieu 1984, 109-114).
2. 'incessant escaping', see p. 66
3. PE, 136-7
4 In discussing the power of the visual in Western culture, Copeland argues that early modern dance choreographers praise tactile or kinaesthetic experience in making choreographies, in opposition to male ballet choreographers, who emphasise the purely "visual" aspects of the choreography. While male ballet choreographers visually "survey" their work from a distance, female modern dance choreographers rarely "stand outside of" their works. As the early modern female choreographers were usually also dancers, unlike male ballet choreographers, in modern dance female choreographers have been concerned with the moving body, both its bodily awareness but also its visual image (Copeland 1990, 8-9).

between moving-moved. In the dialogue with the world, they search for accurate experiential-visible meanings of the moving body. The dancer listens to the body in motion; one day, the world reveals itself through movements, next day there are merely movements. Expression is not self-expression; the dancer can never say - since the distinction has no meaning - what comes from her/him and what comes from the world. Trying to render the motif of the work visible, the choreographer needs a constant reflection of the ways movements reveal the world.

A dialogue with the world, inventing meanings through movements which have an intersubjective basis does not entail a mimetic counterpart with the lifeworld. Moreover, meanings are not understood in terms of linguistics but adhere to the body's capacity to be the communicative and pre-communicative subject. The body, as communicative and pre-communicative, not only re-presents the world but rather, by making dance and receiving it, may produce new meanings of the world. This is called here *poetising*.

(iv) Poetising meanings through the moving body

Thinking related to language operates with concepts; it draws boundary lines, makes distinctions and creates relationships, but it does not create new "things", unlike, for instance, danceworks. It changes the world indirectly, always through the intermediary of an activity which involves the human body or a tool that improves its efficiency. Also language, the direct creation of thinking, would not be a reality without the contribution of the body, which turns it into spoken words and signs.[1]

According to Heidegger, each art form is in its own way a special form of poetising; all art is essentially poetising.[2] Poetising is not the art of poetry, but rather that in which all forms of art find their essence. Yet poetising is not an aimless wandering and imagining of totally arbitrary oddities; nor does it consist in a mere imagining and fancying which just drifts away into what is unreal and sheer fiction. Poetising comes-to-pass in each case within the clearing of beings which has already come-to-pass in language or in perception in a manner that has

1. Zuckerkandl 1976, 274
2. Heidegger 1950/1971, 74; Kockelmans 1985, 187

remained unnoticed.

Heidegger attempts to go beyond thinking understood as the abstract cognitive activity of a pure ego, when he accounts for handiwork as the origin of thinking. He reminds us:

> Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element. All the work of hand is rooted in thinking. Therefore, thinking itself is man's simplest, and for that reason hardest, handiwork, if it would be accomplished at its proper time.[1]

Making art works, handiwork and bodily skills usually play a central role. A painting is not conceived within the mind and transferred onto canvas by the artist's hand; rather the artist's hand is involved in the process of the work. Indeed, painters can often entrust their hands with doing all the work, let themselves be guided by the hand. The painters do not think *with* their hands, but they think *in* the hands; their own hands are for them full of surprises: the "hands" solve their problems.[2]

By the same token, a dancer's body is not moved by the mind. Dancers do not order their bodies to move in a certain way, rather the movements erupt from the body, without special effort of the mind. Moreover, a dancer does not move, then impose a message on it. But form comes out of that to which it is related.[3] Working on a choreography dancers and choreographers "recollect" and develop movements, finally making the motif of the choreography visible through the movements. The moving body reveals the motif visible, perceivable, but at the same time the movement is not exterior to the dancer but experiential in the dancer's sentient body. Therefore, as a moving body the dancer thinks through the movements, making the very motif of the choreography visible. The motif can be understood on the grounds of intersubjectivity, although a dance artist's idea may differ from an audience member's impression, since bodily movements are not a systematised language and every individual has a unique perspective in the world.[4]

1. Heidegger 1954/1968, 16-17
2. Zuckerkandl 1976, 276
3. Holm 1979, 77
4. Mikel Dufrenne says: "The creative act is not necessarily the same for the creator who

Each art form is and remains independent and has its own mode of revealing meanings; in the case of dance art it is movement and the moving body which form the mode of poetising. The moving body is comprehensive only because it has its own understanding which does not function on linguistic plane, although both making dance and receiving it also require linguistic reflection.[1] According to Levin, meanings of movements do not arise from linguistic concepts but through the synaesthesis of bodies. Since our motility is deeply in touch with the five senses and their respective fields and zones (vision, hearing, tactility, taste and smell), at the level of synaesthesia, the stratum of "intertwining", there is the potential for a sensuous awareness.[2] The moving body's inmost capacity to communicate cannot be entirely reasoned, only perceived.

Bringing forth meanings through the moving body there is no direct counterpart for a movement in words, nor mimetic relation to reality.[3] If movements in dance remain too close to daily life, it reminds us of mime; if it is too abstract, all connections with the lifeworld disappear.[4] In a dialogue with the world the dancer and choreographer can interrogate and investigate the world in motion and also the essence of movement. With a knowledge of the moving body and movement the dancer and the choreographer try to bring forth meanings that are hidden, concealed, or suppressed in everyday life.[5] This implies that poetising is a way to point toward and to reveal those meanings that exist for us but are hidden and concealed from us in everyday life because of body politics.

When language operates with concepts, it draws boundary lines, make distinctions, offers meanings in explicit terms. In poetising meanings through the moving body, movements can defy the logical

originally performs it as for the spectator who imagines it through the work" (Dufrenne 1973, xlvi).

1. William Forsythe says: "A dance grows out of the releasing and provocation of unknowingness in the body" (Odenthal 1994, 34).
2. Levin 1987, 263
3. Dufrenne argues: "Art, even the most realistic, communicates this character of *otherness* to the objects represented, which are nevertheless part of the world" (Dufrenne 1973, 88).
4. Viala 1988, 22
5. Kazuo Ohno describes this by saying: "Our bodily wounds eventually close and heal. But there are always hidden wounds, those of the heart, and if you know how to accept and endure them, you will discover the pain and joy which is impossible to express with words. You will reach the realm of poetry which only the body can express" (Viala 1988, 176).

connectivity of words to open up a field for new meanings coming forth. Meaning in a choreography is not derived from some paradigmatic propositional linguistic discourse.[1] Truth as correctness, truth represented in the discourse of statements, assertions, propositions, cannot do justice to the interactive process essential to poetising meanings through movement. Bringing forth meanings, bodies let movement, sound, light, colour and sense play in the interplay of presence and absence, identity and difference.

3. *Sorge* and *Manque* as Existential Reasons for Artistic Production

The work of art is not completed until it enters an intersubjective field. As an art form choreography obtains its essence through an intersubjective field, when it is witnessed by the other, an audience. As we have seen, the intersubjective aspects of movements do not necessarily adhere to the rules of a systematised dance vocabulary, but to a culturally and individually formed kinaesthetic sense and the synaesthetic body.[2] Since the moving body is always culturally formed, the meanings of the moving body are not universal but are connected in their communities and cultural fields. Bodily communication and gestures, to some extent, although never entirely, are rooted in their cultural community. Communication, communion and community are closely tied together and rooted in embodiment.[3] The tie between communication and community means that as humans we belong inherently to the world, sharing corporeality which offers a potential key to find a connection to otherness. As we have seen, the moving body may communicate with the other despite cultural differences since the other may find movements meaningful, although s/he does not understand their meanings.

1. Foster 1995, 9
2. Kockelmans points out: "All human beings live in communities; in some form or other they belong to a people; and each people has its own language, its mother-tongue and, perhaps even, its own set of dialects. Poets and thinkers have a special concern for language, i.e., for the language *of* and *by* Being (*logos*) as well as for the language which as members of a people they themselves speak. Thinkers and poets bear great responsibility for the life of the community to which they belong; but this they share with other members of the community" (Kockelmans 1985, 201).
3. Tiemersma 1989, 110

One of the dancer's crucial dilemmas concerns "sharing" the work of art with the other, because the dancer's lived body produces the very essence of dance as the art work. Working on a choreography, making a work of art, dancers and the choreographer as the authors of the work possess their production, expressing their thoughts through it. But the choreography as performance is not possessed by its authors any longer, since the performance inherently forms the shared situation with the audience. The performance yields a communion (with conflicts), in which the line between a 'producer' and a 'receiver' blurs. The performer is thrown into a situation in which that body is the heart of the art work and as such is shared with the audience.

The expression of the performer usually stresses nakedness and defencelessness, exposing the self to the other without knowing in advance the other's reactions to this exposure. Locating oneself in this situation - being exposed to the other - raises the question of the motives, interests and purposes of the artist in seeking to be in the centre of attention. As to the motives for performing; the answers might be found between two extremities, narcissism and self-sacrificing, but those explanations lead to situations where the performing act merely builds the artist's personal career. Exposing oneself to the other is not treated here as a mode of "self-expression", but refers to a concern to bring forth questions and issues through one's own body. "Anxiety" and "caring" as reasons for artistic production require to be introduced here through the discourse on the philosophy of existence.

Rather than being essentially isolated from others, which is how we see ourselves as separated objects, we are, as bodies, joined, inseparable, inseparably bound to others sharing our corporeality. Despite this sharing, there is always a gap between the self and otherness. Levinas emphasises that the Other, pure otherness, separated from the self, is also my concern, I have a responsibility for the Other that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other.[1] Heidegger also comes to a conclusion that the human cannot avoid the question of otherness; it rises constantly as care (*Sorge*) in human existence. According to Heidegger, being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordial and constantly whole. This structure manifests itself as care, anxiety for

1. Levinas 1996, 131

the human.[1] Heidegger refers to food, clothing and the nursing of the sick body as examples of 'solicitude' in the existential manner.[2] *Sorge* concerns the human existential caring, not only for the self, but through their belongingness to the world, also otherness.

If we admit that narcissism and self-sacrifice are not the only motives for performing, but that the artist's reasons for exposing the self to the other can be found in caring, So*rge*. To be more concrete, the artistic work emerges from an anxiety to bring forth the issues through the "media" of each art form, in the case of dance, through movement and the moving body, to express certain images or issues. In the performing arts pointing out a certain thing to the audience is not necessarily the main purpose; particular importance may attach to the immanent, moving body as such. This implies that caring in the dance artist's case is connected to encountering the audience, the other, being present and representing as the body.

Sorge as an existential manifestation of artistic production, is interlaced to the other concept, *manque*. Merleau-Ponty writes:

> The eye sees the world, sees what inadequacies [manques] keep the world from being a painting, sees what keeps a painting from being itself, sees - on the palette - the colors awaited by the painting, and sees, once it is done, the painting that answers to all these inadequacies just as it sees the paintings of others as other answers to other inadequacies.[3]

Merleau-Ponty uses the word 'manque' to describe a painter's desire to create a work of art through which the invisible becomes visible. The term describes the painter's intention to reveal an aspect of the world which exists but is hidden. In Susan Kozel's view, *manque* has a central role in all artistic creation, also in dance practice. *Manque* is what drives the artist to create, and it is the desire which infuses the interrogation of the world.[4] *Manque* contains all the connotations of loss, lack, missing, longing, anguish, and the most important, desire. It is a *gap* or *distance* which is prerequisite to striving.

1. Heidegger 1927/1979, 231
2. Heidegger 1927/1979, 121
3. EM, 167
4. Kozel 1994, 264

There is a distance implied between the world, art and the other. Instead of the experience of belongingness to the world, we experience it by missing and longing, *manque*. Artistic creation arises from a manifestation of *manque*, while *manque* is supporting the whole human interaction; it is what drives one to create, and to find the connection with otherness. Thus *manque* can be understood as a force which generates art and a web of human interaction. *Manque* is fundamental to our rapport with others and the world, since there is a distance between me and the other, I desire the other but it always escapes me, there is constantly a gap or a distance, which is necessary to sustain in striving. Kozel says: "I reach out towards the world in order to illuminate it, but it draws back from me, thereby nourishing my sense of manque, my desire to bridge the gap, and to understand the world."[1] In addition Kozel emphasises that the sensation of longing and the act of bridging the gap make the experience of *manque* more than a static emptiness. It is instead a dynamic rapport where *manque* can be seen chiasmically as a constant outflow and a constant inflow, never dwelling at the endpoints of complete loss or complete satiation.

Here, the dancer's and the choreographer's *manque* concerns making the invisible visible through the moving body, bringing forth a certain idea or issue through movements and other materials of dance work. In dance as an art work the moving body, assisted by other elements like music, lights, costumes and settings, attempts to reveal the hidden as visible, presenting it to the other. The dancers in dialogue with the world listen to the hidden, lost, forbidden inadequacies in the world, in order to reveal it through bodily movements and the lived bodies. Movement and the moving body itself expose a silent aspect in the world, bringing forth meanings that are not based on those of spoken and written language. Indeed, movements and their compositions reveal meanings which are temporarily lost in our visible and conceptual world. The dancer may bring forth meanings that question stereotyped images shaped by body politics. But this project of poetising meanings through the moving body can also be understood as an effort to break the totality which is structured by reality on the basis of spoken and written language.

1. Kozel 1994, 268

TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF DANCE AS A WORK OF ART

1. Martin Heidegger's Conception of the Work of Art

Kazuo Ohno writes in the manuscript notes to his choreography of *the Dead Sea*: "Did I create this piece or did this piece create me? When I look at this composition, I'm unsure of its origin. I have to calm my pounding heart."[1] Watching his own work, Ohno is surprised at the result of his own piece. The work looks quite different from what he intended. Presumably, artists are not able totally to control the work of art by their will. The wholeness of the work of art is never the sum of its parts, it also brings forth meanings which are not intended. Since artists are never totally known to themselves, the work has its own character which is to some extent strange to its creator. When the work's createdness responds to the creator, as a mirror it draws a picture of its author, while the author, looking at it, may reflect on her/his identity. Consequently, the work's createdness also moulds its creator, shaping the creator's identity, while the work's createdness directs the artist's projection. Also, the audience member's impression of the work is a mirror to the artist through which s/he faces the work and herself/himself.

Martin Heidegger discusses the connection between the artist, the art work and art in his principal text on the philosophy of art, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" ("The Origin of the Work of Art"). Heidegger says that the work of art is dependent upon its creator, but also the creator is dependent upon the work. The work makes the artist, for only the work lets the artist appear as the master of her/his art. The artist is the origin of the work and the work is the origin of the artist.[2] The one can never be without the other. Heidegger is led to the following

1. Viala 1988, 183
2. Heidegger 1950/1971, 17

conclusion: *the artist* lets the work spring forth, *the work* lets the artist spring forth, and *art* is that from which both the artist and the art work spring.[1]

The work cannot be entirely explained through its creator; it has its own being. According to Heidegger, modern subjectivism is a misunderstanding of creation, taking it as the self-sovereign subject's feat of genius. All creation, because it is such a drawing-up, is a *drawing*, as of water from a spring.[2] The emergence of createdness from the work does not mean that the work is to give the impression of having been made by a great artist. The point is not that a created work is certified by a capable person, so that the producer is thereby brought to public notice.[3] The work of art is not there to explain but to reveal its creator.[4] An artist's intention is to let the work stand on its own for itself alone. The work is to be released by the artist to its self-subsistence.[5] In Heidegger's view, the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge. Though the work's createdness has a relation to creation; nevertheless both createdness and creation must be defined in terms of the work.

Difficulties may arise when one tries to read Heidegger's essay on the origin of art in the light of our entire Western "aesthetic" tradition.[6] Heidegger's essay does not speak about art works in terms of matter and content; it does not mention the concept of genius; the term 'aesthetic experience' is never used; there is no theory of judgement and taste. Furthermore, he does not explicitly speak the place of art in our contemporary world. Heidegger's philosophy of art and art work is provisional, incomplete and in many respects still ambiguous. This ontological conception of art should be developed further by means of specifications for the various forms of art, including the art of dance. In particular, according to Kockelmans, Heidegger's claim that poesy occupies a privileged position among the arts because of its close

1. Kockelmans 1985, 90
2. Heidegger 1950/1971, 78
3. Heidegger 1950/1971, 67
4. Dufrenne 1973, 98
5. "Das Werk soll durch ihn zu seinem reinen Insichselbststehen entlassen sein" (Heidegger 1960, 38-39).
6. Kockelmans 1985, 78

affinity to language, should be examined critically.[1]

In this essay Heidegger tries to show that art is an inherent element in the effort of the human to come to self-understanding. Heidegger argues that aesthetic experience does not show at all how a work "works".[2] The work does not refer to something else as a sign or a symbol does, it presents itself in its own Being and invites the beholder to dwell with it. Each work opens its own world; standing by itself the work opens a world.

The work of art is a "thing" which is made of materials, but it is not merely a thing. The work of art sets up a world. Setting up it, a world belongs the artwork. When a work is created, brought forth out of materials (stone, woods, metal, color, language and sound) we also say that is made, set forth out of it. The work as a world, in its presencing, is a setting forth, a making. But what does the work set forth if the work of art is merely a thing or equipment and the work of art is only the artist's product? In order for one to be able to understand the very Being of the work independently of the subjectivity of both the artist and the beholder, Heidegger introduces art work as the making present the tension between the *earth* (die Erde) and the *world* (die Welt).[3] The earth refers to the material of the work of art, such as wood, stone, color, tone, and word. It itself is present in such a way that it gives the earth (materials) the chance to be present as what it really is.

The creation of a work requires craftsmanship. Heidegger distinguishes between bringing forth as creation from bringing forth in the mode of making. In fabricating equipment, material is used, and used up. It disappears into its usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable the less it resists perishing in the equipmental being of the equipment.[4] The sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way, but the sculptor does not use it up. The poet also uses the word - not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word.

A work is brought to the fore out of some material that it is made

1. Kockelmans 1985, 210
2. When Heidegger reflects on thing, space, time, language, the genuine riddle is always how the things beg (dingen), how space makes room for (räumen), how time temporalises (zeitigen), how language speaks (sprechen) (Kockelmans 1985, 83).
3. Heidegger 1950/1971, 49; Kockelmans 1985, 67
4. Heidegger 1950/1971, 46

of it, it is produced out of it. As long as the earth is used for something, it is not present as what it truly is. The earth is thus not primarily material and source and resources, but that out of which everything comes for us humans and into which everything eventually returns. The unity of earth and world comes about only by way of a conflict between the two. World and earth do not fit together in easy harmony, on the contrary, the world-meaning is able to erect itself and the material is able to reveal itself as material only in the form of a dynamic strife (*Streit*). This is an event (*Ereignis*) which overturns and upsets what is common and ordinary, and in which a world opens itself which without the work would not have been present. The world grounds itself on the earth and the earth towers up through the world.

Heidegger comes to the conclusion that the setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential features of the artwork. This unity accounts for the self-subsistence of the work.[1] The world, while resting on the earth, strives to surmount it; as essentially self-opening and self-disclosing it cannot allow for and endure anything that is closed. On the other hand, the earth, as both sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself, and keep it there hidden and concealed.[2] Truth establishes itself as a strife between world and earth in a being that is to be brought forth only in such a way that the strife is opened up in this very being, and this being itself is brought into the fissure. The strife which in this way is brought into the fissure (*Riss*) and set back onto the earth, is now determinate and made stable. As such it has become *Gestalt*. For a work to be produced artistically thus means that the truth has been fixed in the work's *Gestalt* in a stable manner. The Gestalt is the structure in whose shape the fissure becomes formed and moulded.[3] The fissure so ordered and structured becomes the ordered pattern in which the truth (*aletheia*) shines forth.[4]

Heidegger argues that art's essential significance is revealing truth through the work of art.[5] In exposing how truth can emerge from a work, Heidegger does not refer to representational art, as if the 'truth' a matter

1. Heidegger 1950/1971, 48
2. Kockelmans 1985, 154
3. The term *Gestalt* does not at all mean what formalists call "form"; nor does the concept of *Gestalt* play the same essential part which the concept plays in formalist theories (Kockelmans 1985, 178).
4. Kockelmans 1985, 174
5. Kockelmans 1985, 178

depicted by the artist or 'truth' the experience of the beholder. The truth which the work of art reveals in this way is a finite truth. By truth Heidegger does not mean the correctness of a proposition; truth is unconcealment. In depicting some being or beings, a work reveals the truth of the whole of those beings by opening up the world while reposing it in the earth.[1] That both the artist and beholder can let truth come-to-pass is ultimately due to the fact that being addresses itself to them in and through the world in which they stand.

Heidegger has several examples of this coming-to-pass of the truth at work: a Greek temple, Van Gogh's painting of a peasant's shoes, the sculpture of a god, a votive offering to the victor in the athletic games, and the linguistic work, a Greek tragedy. Heidegger stresses that a building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. The temple, in standing there, gives to things, animals and plants their look and to humans their outlook on themselves. In standing on the rock, the sky, plants, animals are revealed through and with the temple. According to Heidegger, the truth happens in the temple's standing where it is. This does not mean that something is correctly represented and rendered here. By the same token, Van Gogh's painting of a peasant shoes does not mean that something is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes, that which is as a whole - the world and earth in their counterplay - attains to unconcealedness.[2] The sculpture of the god is not a portrait whose purpose is to make it easier to realise what the gods look like. It is a work that lets the god itself be present and thus *is* the god itself. In the tragedy nothing is staged or displayed theatrically, the battle is being fought. The Greek tragedy, originating in the speech of the people, does not refer to this battle; it transforms the people's saying so that now every living word fights the battle and puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what great and what small.[3]

Is it possible to interpret and understand contemporary dance and its works through Heidegger's philosophy of art? Heidegger's conception of art is based on the idea that the work of art is a 'thing', not a living 'thing' like the human body, but it has an inorganic character

1. In Heidegger's view, art is one way in which truth happens. He mentions other ways: founding a political state and a thinker's questioning.
2. Heidegger 1950/1971, 56
3. Heidegger 1950/1971, 43

(even in speaking of the performance of the Greek tragedy). The performing arts are excluded in Heidegger's meditation on art. Sally Banes has sought to extend Heidegger's reflection of art to dance, focusing on the unique, essential materials of dance practice: *movement*.[1] She uses Heidegger's concepts of art in interpreting Yvonne Rainer's choreography *Trio A*.[2] The attempt to interpret directly a contemporary choreography through Heidegger's ambiguous philosophy of art, involves a risk of simplifying the terms Heidegger uses. Rather than reading a certain choreography through Heidegger's philosophy of art, here, movement as the 'material' of an art work is examined.

Dance as a work of art differs from music, sculpture, literary art, painting, film, even dramatic art. Whereas other art forms may use movement or motion in their art work, dance artists rely almost exclusively on bodily movement and motion.[3] This implies that danceworks have their own way of existing; they have an ontology of a work of art of their own, differing from musical pieces, novels, films, paintings, drama theatre performances. According to Heidegger's philosophy of art, making a work of art, choreographers do not use movement as movements are used in everyday life; they do not use them up like the body's movements in everyday routines or physical exercise. In everyday routines the body's movements disappear into their usefulness. Dancers and choreographers work with movements in order to create a structure or a wholeness of the body's movements that is a setting up of a world. If movement belongs both to the 'earth' and the 'world', it has the capacity in such a way to reveal "truth" through this essence of movement. In the work of art, dancers and choreographers try to open a window onto movements which are treated as merely equipment in everyday life. There is no pattern of movements which can be called 'authentic' as such, the artist's work is studying

1. Banes 1987, 49-50
2. Banes says: "The achievement of *Trio A* is its resolute denial of style and expression, making a historical shift in the subject of dance to pure motion. Not even posture or architecture enter into its projection of what dance finally is, at rock bottom. In its neutrality, complexity, fleetingness and ongoingness, *Trio A* sets up a world of thoughtful activity that sets forth the earthly, intelligent body" (Banes 1987, 54).
3. Mary Wigman says: "Certainly, bodily movements alone is not yet dance. But it is the elemental and incontestable basis without which there would be no dance" (Wigman 1966, 10).

movements to understand their capacity in certain situations to uncover which Heidegger calls revealment.

Dancers and choreographers are struggling with the tension between "earth" and "world", where the movement's capacity towards revealment dwells. Movements which have only "earthly" character, remain 'closed' to us without a capacity to reveal meaning. Movements which have only a "worldly" character constitute a representational counterpart to everyday bodily communication, movements of any instruments, movements of nature or familiar movement patterns in terms of a certain movement vocabulary. As something merely representational, a dance work is only an artifice which presents to our eyes a projection similar to that which things themselves in ordinary perception do inscribe in our eyes.[1] An art work, which makes creative strife between the 'world' and the 'earth', in poetising movements, finds a way, not to introduce the artist but to bring the 'earth' into the open without violating it.[2]

According to Heidegger, the artist makes the work of art exist and the work of art lets the artist exist. The artist's intention is to let the work stand on its own, not to introduce herself or himself. The work of art is to be released by the artist to its pure self-subsistence. And this obviously also concerns performing arts, including dance, although choreography is more closely related to the living human body than any other art form, so that, pure self-subsistence is impossible in the same manner as in painting or architecture.

2. Beyond Pure Dance Aesthetics

Aesthetic interpretation of dance alludes here to the dance discourse in which the dance is treated merely in the framework that the dance and its history as such have set. It was sought in the second chapter to outline this discourse by focusing on the body politics of the dance field and the frames of movement aesthetics with their correct and incorrect movements. Here, the purpose is to try to develop a discourse in which the dance has not set its own limits and values by itself but has a relation with the world, breathing together with the world. This interpretation

1. EM, 172
2. Banes 1987, 50

of an ontology of danceworks is based on Heidegger's notion of art and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body. Emphasising the bond between a dance as art work and the world, concepts are introduced for this discourse which are needed to define dance in this context: wholeness, a work as a world, and authenticity.

(i) Wholeness and the work as a world

Wholeness or 'whole' is essentially different from the totalisation of a totality. A totality can be mastered, dominated, controlled; it can be grasped and possessed; it can be fixed and secured; it can be known with certainty; it is absolutely complete. A whole has its own completeness, but this completeness remains open. A painting, a conservation, a sunset: each of these has a beginning and an end, a certain unity, coherence, and completeness.[1]

In order to achieve "wholeness", a dance as a work of art need not be presented on the stage; the wholeness means a certain duration in a certain place forming a unity, coherence and completeness. For instance, in one of Sankai Juku's outdoor performances, "hanging event" four male dancers in white body makeup and loincloths are hanging upside down by thick jute ropes from the roof of a building. Over a half-hour time span they are lowered slowly to the ground. Since its 1982 Paris debut, the event has been performed several times from the roofs of temples, museums and office buildings.[2] The work is not constituted by the choreography and its movements as such, but moving bodies gather together the whole surrounding and its soundscape which bring forth the wholeness of the work. However much the choreography is the same, the wholeness is varied depending on the place of performance.

On the stages of theatres and studios wholeness can be created from the very beginning, and accidental aspects of the surroundings invading a work can be minimised. In the "hanging event" in Seattle in 1985, one of the ropes gave way. The dancer fell eighty feet to the ground and died instantly. The audience did not react; they actually did not know what to expect. Perhaps flying was part of the performance and the rope would bring him back up. Screaming and tears broke out

1. Levin 1988, 79
2. Stein 1986, 64

as people began to realise what had happened. The people of Seattle held an impromptu vigil on the site, lighting candles and bringing poems to the mourning dancers.[1] The leader of Sankai Juku, Ushio Amagatsu, stressed that he did not do that on purpose; it was not their intention for it to happen. However the accident interrupted the performance, it was in a brutal way a part of the wholeness of the performance. The border between reality and art is obscure, when a choreography is interwoven with a certain place and its surroundings. Meditating on Heidegger's words, the movements and moving body may bring forth the surroundings and some building in a new light. Concentrating on the extremely slow motions of the bodies, butoh dancers turn an audience's focus as much on bodily movements as surroundings and place.

Wholeness does not preclude continuity; such works are open to further enrichment or development, different completions. The difference between a whole and a totality cannot be understood by reductively calculative rationality; it can only be understood in an experience grounded in our sensibility.[2] Seeing the wholeness does not mean seeing every detail in a summed totality, rather it is a matter of a certain capacity to feel and sense the whole significance of the work.[3]

According to Heidegger, the work belongs, as a work, uniquely, within the realm that is opened up by itself.[4] A choreography, to be a work of art, simply means to set up a world.[5] A "world" is an organised ensemble of movements and other materials which is "closed" in a sense, but which, strangely, is representative of all the rest, possesses its symbols, its equivalents for everything that is not itself.[6] A "world" is more than singularities of content. Thus, a choreography can arouse meanings that do not "contain" movements as such.[7] Inasmuch as we encounter a dance as a work of art in the world and a world in the individual work of art, this does not remain a strange universe. Rather, we learn to understand ourselves in it, and this means that we preserve the discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of our existence.[8]

1. Stein 1986, 64
2. Levin 1988, 79
3. Levin 1988, 457
4. Heidegger 1950/1971, 41
5. Kockelmans 1985, 145
6. VI, 223
7. VI, 199
8. Gadamer 1960/1975, 139

Though every dance as a work of art has its own world, this does not mean that when its original world is altered, it has its reality in an alienated aesthetic consciousness. Architecture is an example of this, for its connections with the world are irredeemably part of it. Buildings and architecture give shape to the environment; architecture is making the environment where we live.[1] Architecture embraces all other art forms, including the art of dance.

As a world, a sensible structure, dance as a work of art can be understood only through its basis in the body. A dancework as a world is a dimensional "world", located in a certain place and surroundings, creating a wholeness which is more than its parts. Therefore it is never a result of calculation. Dance as a work of art is a three-dimensional event, unlike films or some paintings which might yield an image of three dimensions but are actually two-dimensional. Dimensions in a dance as a work of art do not refer merely to geometrical aspects; dimensional implies the sensuous world with its colors, sounds, smells, touchable elements. The art work has a depth horizon which extends from earth (materials) to the world. Materials alone do not produce a world, to create a world demands knowledge, talent and sensitivity to develop materials to create a wholeness and to yield a G*estalt*.

According to Heidegger, art sets a truth into the work which establishes itself in the work's *Gestalt*. *Gestalt* is a whole that does not reduce itself to the sum of the parts. In dance as art work, *Gestalt* refers to an instantly constituted "image" and "attitude" of wholeness. It constitutes a signification which is not merely made by its creator; *Gestalt* is the "attitude" of the artwork that is, to some extent, as its wholeness, strange to its creator. The flesh of *Gestalt* is a system; it is ordered about a central hinge, and so is bound and not a free possibility.

The *Gestalt* of choreography offers a mirror for dancers and choreographers to reflect on their own identity, only not any in direct way. Since performers cannot see the artwork they are making, as for instance painters can, an audience, a beholder, has a central role in the process by which the dancework will exist. In other words, dance artists need an audience, the other, through whom the dancework exists and through which they may reflect on their own identity and the very artwork.

1. Gadamer 1960/1975, 139

To sum up, the wholeness creates a world. This world is in the world, and yet is nothing but the world. We may speak of a world of the work of art. There is nothing but *the* world, and yet the work of art is pregnant with a world of its own.[1] Creating a world through a work of art, the artist is creating a *Gestalt* which has its own character and "attitude", which is strange to its creator.

(ii) The call to authenticity

Heidegger's philosophy of art aimed to overcome the traditional Western aesthetics and to develop a non-aesthetic way of thinking of art. Taking a standpoint radically different from that of traditional aesthetics, Heidegger reminds us that art is no longer for us the place in which the "truth" of who and how we are and of how 'things' are for us occurs.[2] According to Gadamer, truth as experienced through a work of art, which we cannot attain in any other way, constitutes the philosophic importance of art asserting itself against all reasoning. Hence together with philosophy, the experience of art issues addresses a pressing challenge to the scientific consciousness.[3]

Using only Heidegger's or Gadamer's terminology, it is difficult to conceptualise the potential capacity of movements and moving bodies to set up a world, and through this world to reveal the world. If "truth" is not a matter of representation in terms of movement, then we must turn to the lived movement and its connection with the world.[4]

Kimberly Dovey is concerned with the authentic and inauthentic being of objects in our everyday life. He examines *authenticity* in environment, design and architecture. There is, he claims, a growing prepon-

1. Dufrenne 1973, 149
2. Bernstein 1992, 73
3. Gadamer 1960/1975, xiii
4. In contemporary aesthetics authenticity may refer to two different aspects of art: (1) a relation in which a performance of a work (of music or dance) stands to the work itself or (2) a feature of attitude or personality which a work of art can embody or express. The latter implies not just "honesty" but an artist's personally formed style and unique perspective, avoiding prevailing stereotypes and the predictable pattern of a work of art (see Cooper 1992, 27-33). This notion of authenticity has come to the fore in ethical discourse of authentic being in phenomenologists' and existentialists' writings, above all, in Heidegger's philosophy.

derance of places, buildings and things that are commonly called *fake* or *inauthentic*. According to Dovey, authenticity is a property not of environmental form, but a process and relationship. As a *process* it is characterised by appropriation and an indigenous quality. As a *relationship* it speaks of a depth of connectedness between people and their work.[1] Authentic meaning cannot be created through the manipulation or purification of form, since authenticity is the very source from which form gains meaning.

To clarify the nature of authenticity, Dovey exposes it through examples: a household fireplace, false window shutters, and an artificial beach. When the heating function is usurped by modern technology, the intangible need for a centre in fireplace and hearth persists and often leads to representation - the fireplace is a mere show or cannot be used at all. In another example, in contemporary architecture window shutters have been transformed from the use-based meaning of "shutting" to the image-based meaning of "decorating." An artificial surf beach built in Phoenix Arizona looks like a beach, but still it differs from an original one. On the artificial beach there is no smell of salty ocean crabs, no sharks, undertows, tide lines or driftwood.

Dovey stresses that there is nothing inherently bad about fakedness, artificial things and places, as long as there is no deception. But in most cases synthesised substitutes are designed from stereotyped and purified images of the original. When we grow up in such places and spend lot of time in them, they become part of our everyday world, our "home". Their forms become anchors for our self identity.[2]

We may also find examples of what Dovey calls the transformation of the original meaning to "decoration" in dance culture. Though the European court etiquette has vanished from the contemporary world as a lifestyle, the way of thinking and conduct, simply as a worldview, the ballet world and the performance of classical ballet choreographies carry the heritage of that worldview in its transformed movement vocabulary. This transforming process of movement vocabulary from its origin (court behaviour) may be understood in the same sense as Dovey refers to the household fireplace becoming a mere show. In a sense the aesthetics of ballet has become an end of itself. There is nothing inherently bad in shows of ballet or "fake" and "artificial" things in

1. Dovey 1985, 33
2. Dovey 1985, 41

ballet and dance. We may accept all kinds of fake things, for example the sugarplum fairytales of ballet, and perhaps even learn love them. When we grow up or spend lot of time with them, they become a part of our everyday world, gradually shaping our identity, to some extent constituting us. These images of ballet are becoming the very standpoint from which we begin to evaluate ballet itself, contemporary dance, and even the lifeworld in general.

No one wants to be deceived - not by people, places, things, materials or bodily movement. Despite their isolation from the design process, most individuals desire to know about their world at depth. They can accept all kinds of fake things and perhaps even learn to love them as long as they are not deceived by those things.[1] Though a certain fakedness belongs to the theatre world, for example in settings and facades, the call to authenticity concerns here the credibility of the audience's impression regarding the world of a work, the connection between the world and that of the work, but *not* in a representational sense.

Dovey stresses that the concept of authenticity is a truly ambiguous one, yielding to varying interpretations. Nonetheless, the ambiguity is a problem only when one insists upon locating authenticity as a condition to be found in the physical world. Authenticity refers to a property of connectedness between the *perceived* and the *believed* world.

Dovey addresses the three aspects through which we may recognise "authenticity". The first is *a connection between the form of a phenomenon and the processes that produce it*. For instance, wood cannot be authentic except as the product of the process of growth in a tree. The second is *a connection between the surface and the depth of the world*. This link implies a kind of spatial integrity, where if one were to penetrate the surface appearance, then the depth horizon would be not different from the kind that is disclosed. The third is a *temporal connection*, the time from the past to present or from present to future. For instance, a part of the meaning of wood that is cut or carved is that it will carry certain loads and gain a certain patina with time. These three aspects of authenticity are never separated, and together they identify different kinds of connectedness between the everyday world

1. Dovey 1985, 40

and those deeper realities and processes that created it and those consequences which flow from one's engagement with it. In this sense authenticity is indeed a property of connectedness between the perceived world and the believed world.[1] When this connectedness is not a perceptual phenomenon its deeper significance lies not in its connection to the appearance of reality, but in the way it connects people to their world. Authenticity is then a way of being-in-the-world, enriching our world with its experiential depth.

Concerning danceworks we may use expressions like 'credible', 'deep', 'touching', and 'substantial' in evaluating authenticity of the world of a performance. The authenticity of that world is not compared to the world in the representational sense but as a relation between that world and the world, thus, the world of a work is in a sense "rooted" in that of which it is speaking. Moreover, authenticity concerning art works is not a matter of aesthetic judgement, because it is called for a basis on which we are making these judgements.[2]

While Dovey meditates on trees and wood in formulating the three aspects of authenticity, we may reflect on authenticity in studying the lived body in the dance as a work of art, the lived body as a horizon of depth and connectedness to the world. Dovey sees a connection between the form of a phenomenon and the processes that produce it. The body, both the body object as mere organic and as the lived body, has a temporal structure which also creates the connection between the form of phenomenon and process that produces it. In fact, the lived body has been formed through its temporality and there is a connection between its behaviour and how it is lived: the body diffuses and radiates meanings of its lived life.

One question of authenticity in the dancework concerns the way we hinder or help the lived body's ability to radiate meanings through it

1. Dovey 1985, 47
2. Authenticity involves the question of how a dancework make us believe its world. Authenticity is discussed here in terms of modern and contemporary dance, thus, for instance, in a Bharata Natyam dancer's performance 'authenticity' takes a different context. When the audience of Bharata Natyam not only judges its aesthetically correct or incorrect qualities while watching the performing, it may ask the credibility of the performer's expression in terms of Indian cultural, religious and philosophical heritage. Nevertheless, 'authenticity' is not treated here entirely as a culturally relativistic concept, although it varies culturally.

both as communicative and pre-communicative subject.[1] When the choreographer imposes the dancer's body on a certain character without taking into account its pre-communicative meanings which radiate in the lived body, the body's depth is concealed. The body has been shrunk to the framework of an image, representing something which is not its essence. Moreover, a long-term training process might have been imposed on the body to produce a certain image in which its own potential identity is denied. Thus it may have lost its ability to radiate any pre-communicative meanings and has become a "doll-like" thing which points at a character that it represents.[2] This implies that the body is a produced object which is not permitted to change or reveal its lived life, but only its made past. Depth as authenticity refers essentially to the self, to the plenitude of one's own being and how this is allowed to emerge from a work of art.[3] In a sense, the credibility of the world of a work relies on the lived bodies and their capacity to be communicative and pre-communicative, for the lived body usually reveals more than it is intended to do in the dancework.

Examining authenticity, Dovey finds a connection between the surface and the depth of the material world. This link implies a kind of "spatial" integrity where if one were to penetrate the surface appearance, one would find as much as a rich version of reality under the surface as on the one which is disclosed. This connection can be found between the lifeworld, the artistic and social process of making a choreography, and performing the choreography. The process of developing the motif of a choreography and its relation to the world where dance artists live is integrated into the final product. There is an "organic" development of theme and materials in a manner which makes the audience believe in its world. Nonetheless we may also enjoy finding all kinds of fake

1. Choreographer Anne Theresa de Keersmaeker points out: "Sometimes just by looking people, how they move and dance during rehearsal one can perceive a sense of personality, and I have to trust that this immanent content will indicate itself at a certain point" (Spångberg 1995, 49).
2. Russel Maliphant says of his dancing ballet vocabulary: "This always set off a conflict in me, a confusion: my body was doing one thing and my face another. I tried to keep it up for a while but it never felt natural, organic: it's a mask, it's nothing to do with authenticity. I believe the root of the problems is the way the 'Art of Performing' is taught" (Gradinger 1996, 43).
3. In performing a body-self does not, of course, present herself or himself. Using body techniques, the skilful body can pose another character, bringing an image of it but always through her or his own lived body.

combinations in a choreography which does not integrate things "organically" but unites them with no coherence. We may enjoy it, because we notice that it plays with our notion of authenticity.

The third aspect of authenticity refers to the temporal connection, the time between present and future, a connection between perception and action. In as much as we must act in everyday life on the basis of the perceptual surface, authenticity renders this world both *reliable* and *trustworthy*. Making a dancework, a dance artist asks intersubjectivity of movements through which the dancework can be understood by the other. S/he can trust that a certain pattern may awaken a certain impression because we share a common world. The world of the work is not only my imagination, the other may understand the work as I do, although s/he is totally ignorant of my impression. There is a common ground, a shared world, from which the work emerges. The dance artist trusts that the work created is not her/his mere imagination but communicative to the other, however her/his impression of it might be different from the audience's.

3. Dancework

Introducing the concepts 'wholeness', 'the work as a world' and the 'authenticity of movements', the foregoing has sought to elucidate how a dancework emerges from the world when it is not treated merely as an aesthetic object. A dancework never consists in mere bodily movements, for choreographing bodily movements implies spatiality, it is situated in a place with acoustic qualities, while light and lighting make movements visible to us. Those necessary elements, which make bodily movements exist, are not a neutral background, their diversity of possible qualities influences the bodily awareness of the moving subject and the moving body as seen. Creating a wholeness, a "dancework", refers to choreographing a wholeness of bodily movements reflecting on possible elements of the work in order to create a world with its "meanings". Choreographing is not merely the choreography of bodily movements, because perception concerns all five senses, i.e. the synaesthetical body; thus, the moving body gathers

primarily seeing, hearing and touching experiences but also tasting and smelling in both creating a dancework and perceiving it. Necessary and possible elements of a dancework imply spatiality and the place of dance, i.e. stage, studio or any surroundings; soundscape and music; cloths, masks and costumes; lighting; settings, props, videos, films, dia slides, etc. as integrated to bodily movements, yielding a certain meaningful wholeness.[1]

A choreographer and a dancer must be fully aware of the nature of the elements of dance so that they may best judge how to select, refine and combine them. Jacqueline M. Smith-Autard compares a dance artist's knowledge in making dance as a work of art to the making of an aircraft, a piece of furniture, a building. This knowledge is usually shared among many people, each concerned with a small part of the work of art, but considered collectively, the nature of the elements is fully understood before such things can be produced.[2] The choreographic process does not necessarily develop linearly from beginning to end, it may grow outwards from the centre. Making choreography is a dynamic, organic, growing process which even at the premiere has not reached its final form.

(i) Theme

Merleau-Ponty says: "But, it is not merely a question here of confronting ideas but of incarnating them and of making them live, and in this respect we cannot know what they are capable of except by trying them out. This attempt involves a taking of sides and a struggle."[3] Merleau-

1. It might be noted that 'wholeness' here does not refer to an idea of "Gesamtkunstwerk" or "total theatre". Different elements integrated to movements can be used variously depending on the motif of dance. Moreover, economics also govern the using of materials of dance works. Sally Banes argues that in the post-Reagan era, when grant money is evaporating and companies are shrinking, the contemporary dance in the United States is moving into minimalism, using improvisation, music and dancing without fancy costumes, lights, setting etc. (Banes 1994, 347). This does not mean that shortage of funds would be seen in the artistic quality of danceworks. For economic reasons, in the 20's and the 30's American early modern dancers began to use lighting instead of settings to create a proper atmosphere in their choreographies (McDonagh 1974, 60).
2. Smith-Autard 1996, 4
3. IPP, 27

Ponty speaks here in terms of philosophy but his words are worth reading in terms of the work of art. Making a dancework is an attempt to incarnate a certain idea and make it alive as a performance. Meditating on the motifs of a dancework, dancers and choreographers cannot know whether they can be incarnated before they try to make them visible through the moving body.[1] Merleau-Ponty argues that the world is not what one thinks, but what one lives through.[2] Choreography as an act is a mode of living through certain issues while it is being presented as an artwork to the other.

The theme of a choreography entails to a question or a motif which dancers and choreographers take under scrutiny, incarnating it as an artwork. If the process of making an artwork is not merely wandering without a purpose, the theme of a dancework is not a randomly selected motif from the stream of images but an issue or a question which emerges from artists' embodied dialogue with the world.[3] Dealing with a certain theme is connected here to 'manque', absence, lack of a certain subject in the world that the artist tries to make visible through movement.

In producing a dance work, one may start with either literal or nonliteral material, while working on movements and creating variations upon them, a final dancework is constructed as a nonliteral form understandable without the support of any literal text.[4] In other words, a dancework constitutes its own world, its own Gestalt, while as sometimes discernible it does not need the assistance of explaining texts. When bodily movements constitute the very substance of an artwork, then a theme or a motif of performance, inherently corporal, cannot be translated into written form. Any source can offer an inspirational standpoint, but the nonliteral character of dance results from how one develops it through the moving body.[5]

Concerning modes of expression, one must reflect whether bodily movement offers the medium by which a theme can be revealed in a

1. Humphrey 1959/1977, 34
2. PhP, xvi-vii
3. In theory books of dance composition like as e.g. in Lynne Anne Blom's and L. Tarin Chaplin's book of choreography, the theme or the motif of choreography seems to have small interest in teaching choreography (see Blom and Chaplin 1989, 12-13).
4. The program of a performance may, of course, include hints, words like poems, stories, or keywords which may help introduce the work to the audience.
5. Turner 1971, 23

clear manner. Movement has its weakness and its strength as a medium of expression. This does not exclude a certain group of issues but rather underscores the moving body's capacity to communicates a certain issue. The moving body may instantly bring forth a meaning which demands of a writer enormous exertion to describe it even of vaguely. To some extent, particular bodily meanings appear to be understood at once, in immediate experience.

The choreographic process is not usually an undeviating line from the idea to the final result, but a process in which there are paths with dead-ends and rejected issues constantly developing movements defining their quality proper to that choreography. We can say that the choreographic process is a path, a journey; thus, its result cannot be known in advance.[1]

(ii) Choreographic process and collaboration

Today technological, economic and social structures frequently sever finished products from the processes which produced them. In the technological system the finished production does not comprise traces of the production process and the inscription of the producer. Technological production is founded upon powerful thinking producing by automated systems things with low production costs. Meditating on art and technology, J. M. Bernstein argues that the artistic process is not reducible to a mechanical process, though modern technical progress stressing the mechanical attitude has affected the manner of artistic production.[2] Paul Valéry has pointed out that originally sense art is that *quality* of the way of doing, whatever the object may be. Art as a quality of the way of doing is breaking through the surface of the routine, revealing doing as thinking. People are trained in modern bureaucratic societies to carry out monotonous routines. An individual whose whole life is spent performing a few repetitive tasks becomes mechanised as a body, hardly ever breaks through the surface of her/his routine. This sort of collective trance, with its automatic and reflex responses, usually

1. William Forsythe says: "Today, when I dance or create a dance, it's only a kind of journey, a very compressed journey, a very concentrated search for an informative situation" (Odenthal 1994, 36).
2. Bernstein 1992, 213

remains constant. The artistic work, like the choreographic process, remains outside the automation and mechanisation project, although technological production ideals bring pressures to bear upon the artistic work, demanding productivity also in the economic sense.[1]

In choreographic practice the relationship between the dancer and the choreographer may vary from a mere instrumental attitude to the dancer's body to a mutual collaborating process as an intimate embodied dialogue. Blom and Chaplin argue that the choreographic process must start from and be based on a respect for the different ways individuals move, respond, and feel about movement.[2] If individual differences, i.e. differences in lived bodies are the very resource of dance, then these differences should be encouraged rather than thwarted. This implies that both the dancer and the choreographer must overcome the instrumental attitude to the dancer's body in order for a mutual interaction to be built between them.

The relationship between a dancer and a choreographer directs the choreographic process, while it may also affect the movement patterns of the final choreography. Pina Bausch's method is to present questions and notes to which the members of the Wuppertal Tanztheater respond with movements and games, both spoken and sung.[3] The choreographer's questions and the dancer's subsequent responses give birth to a choreography, so to speak, that grows in the course of rehearsal; that is to say, the almost formless assumes a form with this process. In this choreographic process the choreographer does not create movements in advance and then teach them to dancers.[4] Rather this mode of choreographing develops a dancework in question-response-dialogue between the choreographer and the dancers. The choreographer and the dancer are first and foremost involved in making dance, rather than the dancers simply interpreting the choreographer's movements. The choreographer does not invent new movements but by rehandling extant

1. This does not mean, of course, that an artist could not use computers or other devices as tools in artistic production.
2. Blom and Chaplin 1989, 137
3. Servos 1984, 22, 235
4. There are as many ways of choreographing as there are choreographers. For instance, de Mille describes Martha Graham's manner of choreographing: "She never explained to them [dancers] what she wanted. Indeed, she very likely didn't know. She never explained the projects of the problems. She never talked. They just waited and watched" (de Mille 1991, 139).

material, directs dancers' motion in ways that give form to the inquired issue and theme.

The choreographer and the dancers work together intuitively while carefully selecting materials which make movement sense. The choreography, which results from this intuitive process with its unexpected discoveries, does not follow a preconceived pattern or plan.[1] Moreover, in direct relation to the movement, dancers and choreographers do not translate meaning from movements, because in this context symbolic meaning would break the tissue of artist and movement. Dance as a work of art is unencumbered by considerations of literal reality and intellectual logic, since dancers and choreographers produce a work that communicates directly to the senses and is not necessarily related to a specific message or story.[2] When movement phrases are consistently related to the theme and movement structure of a work, they produce a dance that has an organic and structural unity.

As we have seen, a movement does not serve as an end in itself. Body positions or movements themselves might have precise meanings, but meanings of moving bodies as an art work are also achieved through sequences of movements and combinations of movements with other elements of the dance work: music, speech, lightning, props, settings, etc. As a result choreographing involves not only the composition of movements; it brings forth a wholeness as Merleaupontian *chair* and *Gestalt*.[3] Movements and their relation produce their own meanings which have no word correlates, although we might successfully name the moods and the meanings that we derive from the dance.[4]

Doing work as a group dancers and a choreographer gradually develop an intersensitivity in a way that fosters the creativity of the group as a whole.[5] Bausch's choreographic work is intended to manifest itself as a collective body, as the release to trace back the divided self to the figure of an original unity. If the dancers are only observed through

1. Turner 1971, 25
2. Turner 1971, 31
3. An example of this choreographing wholeness in terms of Merleaupontian "flesh" are Pina Bauch's danceworks. Kay Kirchman describes Bausch's work by the term 'the collective body". "The collective body" also includes the total stage presentation in which the performer's body, lighting, setting, music and also the auditorium are bound up in a unity, a body that bears the name, < piece by Pina Bausch > (Kirchman 1994, 42)".
4. Fraleigh 1987, 73
5. Blom and Chaplin 1989, 173

the functions of the separate parts of the body, the essence of the body with its relation to other bodies and thereby the human being itself is fundamentally betrayed.[1] The specific function of each dancer within a work can be only understood be referring to the form of the company. The individual is neither alien (a role or an instrument) nor person, but rather common, a cell in the organic whole of the body of the performance and the company. Selves and collective do not operate antipathetically; neither is the latter the sum of the former. The collective embodiment of the company is an interplay of an empathetically responsive ensemble, a constellation of relations, whereby the differences, the individuality of each member of the ensemble, are not seen as divisive but as belonging to the collective body, and thus made to bear fruit.[2] The author's name may disappear, since the work is produced through relations; however, a production is not the collectively produced view; a choreographer/director is still the leader of the work.

While a choreographer operates in all phases of the choreographic process - conceiving, selecting, evaluating, refining, and relating the work to its source, dance as a work of art is the result of several artists' knowledge, skills and views, not only choreographer and dancers.[3] For successful collaboration, a choreographer needs to create an atmosphere within which all participators in the work of dance are willing to work in a most passionate and subtle manner. The process which produces an open cooperative atmosphere among dancers might also enable them to sustain self-scrutiny of the entire performance.[4] Depending on the elements used in dance work, the collaborating process concedes the knowledge of artists in different art domains. For instance, a lighting designer has knowledge both of lighting itself with its limits and possibilities but also usually a view and knowledge of lighting bodies in motion on the stage. The relation of moving bodies and lighting may obtain in several forms from mere natural lighting, like moon or sun shining, to an intensive communication between lighting sources and moving bodies playing an outstanding role in performance. Possibilities in experimenting with methods and different solutions in dancework depend on individual artists' interests, skills and resources. For

1. Kirchman 1994, 43
2. Kirchman 1994, 43
3. Turner 1971, 6
4. Foster 1986, 194

successful collaboration, in which all participants understand the inherent idea of the work in process, light designers, like other persons from other art domains, must apply their knowledge to a particular dancework. Artists in other domains usually perceive dance differently from dance artists themselves, through their own art media. This may cause contradictions during collaboration but may also enrich the dancework.

(iii) Intertwining bodily movements, space/place, and other materials of dancework

According to Heidegger, the work of art is not necessarily the same when detached from its relation to the place it belongs. He says: "But does the work still remain a work if it stands outside all relations? Is it not essential for the work to stand in relations? Yes, of course - except that it remains to ask in what relations it stands."[1]

A place sets limits for performance, but it also offers possibilities to build a choreography which exploits its special qualities. Because space is more a complicated phenomenon than its geometrical proportions, then the lived space in its complex meaning brings with it elements important for choreography. When the body is trained to be highly sensitive to its own movement dimensions, it can through its kinaesthetic bodily awareness be sensitive to a place as surroundings, its spatiality and space politics. Mary Wigman experienced and understood space as an active element, sometimes as an opponent. She went even further, actually defining dance as motivated tension in space and as a creator of space.[2] But the lived space is not only experiential to dancers and a choreographer, it is revealed as visual experience to the audience.

Meditating on the place and space of a performance, dancers and choreographers may listen to its special qualities in its historical, cultural and political aspects. The space of a performance may also direct the choreographic process, offering new possibilities to a choreography, while a chosen place influences the wholeness of dance as work of art. A certain choreography as a "movement composition" can reveal a certain place and its spatiality in a new manner. Institutionalised

1. Heidegger 1950/1971, 41
2. Blom and Chaplin 1989, 31

performing places, the stages of theatres and opera houses, differ greatly from other possible places for performing such as stations, city squares, forests, etc. Choosing a site for a performance is related to themes or issues which are dealt with in a dancework, while it modifies the dancework and the interaction between performers and audience. Building a performance on a certain place, the place as such yields a strong *Gestalt* in the artwork.

Indeed, a place where a choreography is performed may influence the wholeness of the work and the interaction between performers and audience. Institutionalised performing places like the proscenium stage with its appropriate technology offer opportunities to create a world from the very beginning. The stage as space and place can be created and manipulated very substantially compared to natural places. But at the same time, the proscenium stage emphasises the separation of audience and performance by situating the action on the stage in a different realm from that of the viewers.[1] Boxlike stages require an audience to look in on the action. This also implies a single perspective from which the dance is to be viewed and a hierarchy of optimum viewing locations in the auditorium.[2] The theatre as a social place extends from the stage and the auditorium to the backstage, performers' dressing rooms, lobby and the entrance to the building. Both performers and viewers before entering the performance space have been attuned to the atmosphere of the theatre building, which always frames the expectations of the performance. A place is never pure space, but loaded with meanings. This also concerns the stages of the theatre, despite the idea that a stage is "empty" space, without any meaning in itself, empty space for any kind of performance.

A dancework, setting up its world, is an organic unit that must be experienced as a whole. Dance as a work of art is constructed of various materials in such a way that it evokes an awareness through different qualities of the work like "color-meaning" or "sound-meaning". Merleau-Ponty reminds us that the woolly red of a carpet would literally not be the same red if it were not the red of a carpet.[3] This implies that in perceptual experience, a colour is not a free-floating quality independent of the other properties and of the thing whose colour it is.

1. Foster 1986, 60
2. Foster 1986, 61
3. PhP 4-5

In the same way, the spatial elements of movements can be altered by the use of lighting, the size of the auditorium and stage or the colours and qualities of costumes and settings, which are some of the variable factors that produce changes in a perceptual wholeness.[1]

Martha Graham was one of the first modern dance choreographers who integrated costumes and settings to movements to weave a wholeness.[2] In the 1930's Graham began to design costumes for her own choreographies, using, new cloth materials, wool jersey and tricots. Her purpose was not only to *use* materials but to integrate costumes of cloths inseparable in bodily movement.[3] In *Lamentation* (1930), which was Graham's solo piece, she wore a long tube made of elastic cloth sitting on a small bench with only her face, hands, feet showing. The motions were angular inside the tube, indicating an ability to stretch inside one's own skin. She rocked from side to side, listening for the step of someone who did not come. Sometimes she tilted on her bench, as if she were trying to wrench herself apart. The pull of one part of her body against another, away from her heart, created diagonal folds of tension in the fabric. In *Lamentation* Graham was studying the movements of grief and pain which were made visible through elastic cloth.[4]

A few years later Graham began to collaborate with the sculptor Isamu Noguchi, who designed settings for many of her choreographies. Noguchi says that art should disappear into its surroundings, should not be looked at as being separate, but should be a part of the environment; Noguchi's idea of art was to make sculpture part of living. Graham made Noguchi's sculpture seem as if everything had been made expressly for her, since her actual choreographic manipulation of the forms he devised came after the set was constructed. Embracing them as though they were living counterparts of herself, she adapted them to her movements and

1. Turner 1971, 24-25
2. Diaghilev, the leader of the Ballet Russes, brought together visual artists and designers for ballet or dance theatre. Diaghilev discovered and engaged Benois and Bakst, Roerich, Picasso, Matisse, Larionov, Gontcharova, Derain, Braque, de Chirico and Rouault, but only in a few cases did a creative partnership in artistic co-operation between choreographer and designer come about within Diaghilev's troupe (Koegler 1994, 18).
3. Graham called it the period of "long woolens" (McDonagh 1974, 148).
4. Graham recounts that after one performance, a woman entered her dressing room to express her thanks and had obviously been crying a great deal. She had recently seen her son killed by a truck before her eyes. She was unable to cry until she watched *Lamentation* (Graham 1992, 118).

conversely adapted her movements to their counterparts.[1] The settings were an extension of the dancer's body. Graham regarded them as living things, she made them an integral part of the choreography and bodily movements.

Discussing bodily movements intertwining with other elements, dancing is also understood as an art form independent of music. In the choreographic process there are numerous possibilities to find a relation, combination or correlation between music and movement.[2] Music from various periods, styles and cultures can be related, encircled, struggling with the moving body. Or music can coincide in movement, communicate with movement, or meld together with dance. For instance, in Pina Bausch's choreography *Bluebeard* (1977), the very opera is played with breaks on the cassette player, which is on a transferable table in the middle of the stage. In the choreography a male dancer occasionally rushes to push the button on and off, playing and stopping the music. In addition, the soundscape of the work consists in noises of strewn leaves on the floor, when dancers shuffle along on the stage with their other voices, breathing, screaming, singing and speaking.

Instead of merely speaking of music as accompanied with dance, we may discuss the soundscape of dance as a work of art. In contemporary danceworks movements are located in a soundscape or movements bring forth a soundscape, even if this soundscape is silence. Music may play a central role in patterns of movements, but usually the whole soundscape with its different sounds constitutes an elemental part of the choreographing movement. Words and sounds uttered in choreography may be explored for their meaning, sound, symbolic significance or poetic value. Since dance as a work of art is a synaesthesia, it is not only a visual wholeness; one can hear and smell it in equal degrees. According to R. Murray Schafer, we are always at the edge of visual space, looking into it with the eyes. But we are always at the centre of auditory space listening out with the ear. Thus, visual awareness is not the same as aural awareness. Visual awareness is directionally forward; aural awareness is omnidirectionally centered.[3]

1. Stodelle 1984, 157
2. The time is past when a new dance piece also meant a new piece of music, identification of a choreography with a particular piece of music, and the direct relationship of dance to musical accompaniment (Feuchtner 1993, 37-38).
3. Schafer 1985, 94

According to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of flesh, the organic way of being of the world of a work does not arise from the parts of its wholeness but from the unity of its elements. In the case of a dancework, neither music nor props nor scenery are simply used, wrenched to an alien purpose, but rather brought as a means of entry to the growth process organically, and advancing it.[1] From the lines of music through the props to the movements, all elements produce a unity in multiplicity. This implies a functional interdependence: the fact that subject and object, figure and ground, movement and space, form and field, self and other are always interdependently co-emergent and co-functional. This is essentially equivalent to Merleau-Ponty's concept of 'intertwining' and flesh. This is interrelated to the other thing: nothing is inherently permanent or essentially substantial, all things that come to appearance in our world are in relation in order for it be understood that there is nothing eternal and immutably substantial underlying them.

For the moving subject organs are no longer instruments; on the contrary, our instruments are detachable organs.[2] Space is no longer a network of relations between objects, such as would be seen by a witness looking over it and reconstructing from outside. I do not see it according to its exterior envelope; I live in it from the inside; I am immersed in it. Nor is it a question of speaking of space and light; the question is to make space and light, which are there, speak to us.

Concerning dance as a work of art, the qualities of things radiate around them forming a wholeness as flesh and *Gestalt*; this is because the sentient subject does not posit them as objects but enters by movements into a sympathetic relation with them. The dancer is bodily attuned to place, space and the environment with its objects, responsive to its network. A connection s/he makes out of the experience, s/he happens to feel it by her/his rootedness in the lived sense of the intertwining of the things. This closest intimacy, hearing the space, other people and objects, elicits a response from the body's felt awareness in motion. One cannot say any longer when the body is moving or when it is moved.

1. Discussing the relation between choreography and music in contemporary dance, Feuchtner argues that if everything is material to a choreographer, material requires processing. He says: "We have to be familiar with this material, for it does not always lend itself unconditionally to design - it asserts its own rights" (Feuchtner 1993, 37).
2. EM, 178

4. Performance

> When we perform, we like to imagine that each of us is a fresh fish which was just caught and is on the cutting board. The fish intuits that somebody will eat it. No room to be coquettish. This fish's body is tight, shining blue, eyes wide open. No way to escape.[1]

Eiko and Koma, New York-based dancers/choreographers who emerged from the butoh school, describe the actual performance situation as putting oneself in extreme tension. Irini Nadel Rockwell comes close to Eiko's and Koma's experience and notion of performing. She describes performing as "being on the spot". In the focus of the other's perception the performer feels vulnerable, naked. Every movement is instantly visible to the other. Rockwell says: "There is no place to hide and if you seek a place to hide, then that is what shows. So there is no escape. This is at once the magic of performance and the terror of it. It is both what attracts us to it and what puts us in an extremely agitated state when a performance rolls around."[2]

When a dance as a work of art is finished, performing it makes the work alive; performing choreography, the dancers live it through. In the rehearsal process the choreography is usually learnt by the dancers so that they do not need to recollect the movements; the choreography is in their body memory. In other words, the choreography, to be danced and lived through movements, emerges from the body without special reflection in the mind. The body's capacity to learn and remember movements makes dancing possible to perform as a structured choreography. Recollecting movements and sometimes developing new ones as improvisational phrases, a choreography appears as a "path", on which the body "wanders" during the performance. The body remembers the choreography, movement by movement, carrying the action of wholeness in interaction with other dancers, music, lighting, etc.

Although the choreography and the dancework is planned carefully in every detail, every performance is different in consequence of timing and the mood of the dancers and audience members. Every

1. Quoted in Sanders, V. 1988, 150.
2. Rockwell 1989, 194-5

performance reveals the choreography in a new light. Moreover, a choreographer may ask the dancers to change the performing of a choreography in a certain manner. This implies that remembering movements is not mere automation; the body-self may also respond to its body memory in a creative way.

(i) Momentness and nonproductivity

Despite the enormous work to be done in choreography, when it is planned and rehearsed, the dance disappears the moment it has been performed. Merce Cunningham says of dance as performance: "...it gives you nothing back, no manuscripts to store away, no paintings to show on walls and maybe hang in museums, no poems to be printed and sold, nothing but that single fleeting moment when you feel alive."[1] Nevertheless, Cunningham among other choreographers has refused to allow their choreographies to be notated.

The movement notation systems are developed to sustain choreographies, in order that these could be performed later. One purpose of the project of developing movement and dance notation systems has been to establish the status of art dance in the art field and the society.[2] The bodily art form, which disappears the very moment it is performed, is not highly appreciated in capitalistic society. It is easier to notate music than to formulate human movement and body in motion to written form. The documentation of dance as artwork brings with it many of its own problems. Dance as a work of art is a complex wholeness bound to time and place; however much movements as such can be notated, an interpretation later might be difficult, since the cultural and social body undergoes constant change. In terms of notating, movement's relation with the lifeworld remains in the domain of unwritten negotiation. Whilst living in the contemporary world casts the background for understanding meanings of the work, it is problematic to notate bodily movements in a specific way. When a choreography has been notated and re-presented, the world-connection, the whole background on which the work of art was based, and which

1. Cunningham 1979, 90
2. See Youngerman 1984, 101.

gave meaning to both dancing and receiving dance, has vanished. Thus the first question concerning the notation of a certain choreography is always why: if a choreography is bound to a certain historical situation, certain people and their bodies, why should it be frozen and re-created again?[1]

Like certain other dancers and choreographers, Erick Hawkins emphasises the value of the momentness of dance itself. He says: "For me the momentness of dance is one of its most precious gifts. Actually only the nowness of ourselves really exists; that true seeing of time; in the quiver; in the inside of our seeing and not on the outside horribly on the face of a clock."[2]

According to Peggy Phelan, one value and an ontological aspect of performance *is* its presence and disappearing character. In other words, momentness and nonproductiveness belong to the ontology of the performing arts.[3] A performance's only life is in the present. A performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance.[4] The elements of time and duration are present in performance - the "use" of time, as well as time as subject matter - more prominently than in traditional forms of art. In Erick Hawkins' words: "But dance, more than any other art, still exists only in the "now" and no place else. This might make it less attractive and less profound to our world so bent on hanging on to each hard complacent thing (even though our dying would never understand)."[5]

When performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and depletes the promise of its own ontology. Performance's

1. It is not the intention here to neglect movement notation systems themselves but to emphasise the value of momentness and disappearance of dance. Discussing reconstructing dances, Sali Ann Kriegsman poses crucial questions: (1) Why do we want to reconstruct a dance? (2) To what purpose? (3) For whom? (4) What dances do we wish to see again? (5) Who is the "we" who determines which dance and whose dance gets resurrected from the dust? Thinking about the methods of reconstructing dances, Sali Ann Kriegsman is concerned with a few essential things: What is the context of the dance we are reconstructing, and what was its contemporary environment, and who can best restore it, teach it, perform it? How can it be reanimated so that it comes alive for us and how do we locate and embody its authentic spirit? (Kriegsman 1993, 15).
2. Hawkins 1979, 95
3. Performing arts refers here to dance, music, theatre, and so-called performance art.
4. Phelan 1993, 164
5. Hawkins 1979, 95

being becomes itself through disappearance.[1] The pressures brought to bear on performance to submit to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous. According to Phelan, only rarely in this culture is the "now" which performance addresses in its deepest meaning valued. The "now" is already supplemented and supported by documenting camera, the video archive, and movement notation systems. When it is performed again, this repetition itself marks it as "different". The document as a performance is understood as only a spur to memory, an encouragement is memory to become present.[2] Heidi Gilpin argues:

> Within late twentieth-century culture, everything is reaccessible. We can continually repeat, continually go to have the same thing, we can play packman forty times, listen to the same CD over and over, watch forever the same video, we can see the same movie again and again: our access to repeated experiences gives us the illusion that we can control the future and perhaps, the past. This is an illusion we deeply crave.[3]

Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance one ignored art in capitalistic society. The production and reproduction of visibility is a part of the labour of reproduction of capitalism. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulating of capital.[4] Performance honours the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time and space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. According to Phelan, performance's independence of mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength.[5] In Gilpin's view, the act of disappearance is the most enabling, fascinating, difficult, and unavoidable performance we can enact or witness. The act of disappearance can be witnessed only by the moment of its passing, at the threshold between presence and absence, between birth and death.[6]

A painting or a sculpture may last thousands of years, with proper

1. Phelan 1993, 164
2. Phelan 1993, 164
3. Gilpin 1996, 110
4. Phelan 1993, 148
5. Phelan 1993, 149
6. Gilpin 1996, 109

care, but a performance as something ephemeral may last only seconds or minutes. Time usually raises the value of an artwork in the economic sense and artworks, which are transferable things, can easily be exposed for sale in art the market. Heidegger criticises this technological tendency to objectify art works as mere property or research objects. This implies that in almost every country certain official institutions and agencies are responsible for the custody and maintenance of artworks. After artworks have been produced, they stand and hang in museums and exhibitions. The works of art are made available so that people can appreciate and enjoy them. Critics occupy themselves with them and art dealers buy and sell them. Art historians make these works of art the objects of their scientific research. The entire art industry is concerned only with the object-Being of the work.[1]

According to Heidegger, just as a work cannot be without being made by the artist who produces it, in the same way, what is produced cannot itself come into being as what it is without those who preserve it, i.e. beholders. Even if it were the case that a work does not find those who are willing to preserve it, or that the work does not immediately encounter people who are able to respond, those works of art can be as works without preservers. An art work remains tied to those who are willing to preserve it, even and particularly at times when the work is still only waiting for preservers.[2] According to Heidegger, even the oblivion into which the work can sink is not nothing; it is still a preservation.[3]

Paintings, sculptures, buildings, films, novels can wait for preservers, await their beholders, but performances cannot. Performance needs a response immediately, because its essence is presence. The performance takes place between performers and audience; that is where a communication takes place. Performance as a shared moment forms a reciprocity between the self and the other in which the "owner" of the dance performance is no longer clear. While the written signature is conventionally associated with authorship, performances are less clearly signed because they are based on an indeterminate dialogue between the performer and audience. Moreover, choreographies and dance performances are extreme examples of a fluidity of authorship, since it

1. Kockelmans 1985, 139
2. Kockelmans 1985, 181
3. Heidegger 1950/1971, 69

is virtually impossible for a choreographer to transpose exactly her/his movement onto another body.[1]

(ii) Reversibility of perception in performance

Merleau-Ponty says: "...every perception is a communication or a communion, the taking up or completion by us of some extraneous intention or, on the other hand, the complete expression outside ourselves of our perceptual powers and a coition, so to speak, of our body with things."[2] If perception is a communion, a beholder does not hold herself or himself aloof at a distance from a dance as a work of art but in communion with it. The real emphasis of the communion, the act of sharing, lies ultimately on what is performed and recognised and it is not a question of choice.[3] We perceive the moving body 'immediately', 'directly' as itself, but this instant perception requires further mediation of us; thus, we usually need methods to analyse and open our experience of a work.

Watching a film in a dark cinema may occasionally form an intensive communion, almost as if the watcher were living with the people in the picture. After the film is finished, it is difficult to withdraw from this communion, for the watcher inhabits this communion. The visible otherness (the film), which also touches the watcher, the tactile otherness, which also sees the watcher, is missing, thus *reversibility* as an immanent sense of moving-tactile does not take place in this communion. Reversibility as the immanent manner, as the chiasmatic asymmetrical relation, takes place in 'momentness art' like dance, where both performers and audience are present. Nevertheless, reversibility in communion is always asymmetrical, because performer and audience are on different sides of the artwork. The asymmetry of reversibility is the consequence of the different locations of the performer and the audience when they are forming their communion. Because they have different locations, the communion forms a chiasm between moving-perceived, performing-perceived.

1. Albright 1991, 47; Brown 1995, 212
2. PhP, 320. See also Matsuba 1996, 380.
3. Gadamer 1960/1975, 117

Indeed, watching the immanent dancing body there is constituted a reversibility in communion between the dancing body and the audience, the perceiver. The moving body and its work, with its synaesthetic power, touches my lived body, I am not touched "intellectually" but on a preobjective level, through the synergetic body.[1] Purely intellectual meanings do not reach the whole embodied subject, including the sensual, lived body, the body's memories, loves, pains, grief, losses. The relation which emerges from the moving body and the one who begins to watch it, may create an intense communion. Our perspectives merge into each other in this asymmetrical chiasm and we co-exist through a common world. In the present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person's thoughts are certainly her/his; they are not of my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them.[2] Despite the abyss, there must be a common ground on which the other and I can reach each other, still remaining in some degree opaque to each other, the other's world and mine are ambiguously the same and different.[3]

The reciprocity of self and other in the performing situation provides a useful standpoint from which we can radically re-think the performer/audience relationship. Studying feminist choreographing, Ann Cooper Albright sketches the dynamics of performer/audience interchange.[4] According to Albright, the body-self becomes fully realised in the midst of a shared synaesthetic dialogue, in the communion of reversibility. A performance creates the possibility for a performer to extend her/his own self in the presence of the other. This intersubjective mode assumes the possibility of a context with others in which desire is constituted for the self. It thus assumes the paradox that in being with the other, I may experience the most profound sense of the self.[5]

Asymmetrical reversibility of perception in terms of the self and

1. According to Copeland, while watching dance - any form of dance - we participate to a greater extent than we do while watching the performance of a play or an opera. "Dance is heralded as the most participatory of the arts, even if that participation remains virtual rather than actual" (Copeland 1993, 29).
2. PhP, 354
3. Dillon 1990, 16
4. Albright bases her view on Jessica Benjamin's theory of intersubjectivity which comes close to Merleau-Ponty's idea of the development of a child's identity.
5. Albright 1991, 96

the other offers potentials for knowing the self profoundly, (whether 'the self' is understood here as the performer or the audience member) while the communion of a performance contains contradictions and tensions between the self and the other. Such communion is also a place for conflicts - as such it offers a place for conflicts. The conflicts define the identification of the self and its difference from the other. Speaking of the performer, arguments against her/his work define a difference between the performer's idea and audience members' conceptions of the very same thing.[1] This difference is a gap, but also a reason, which may bring the self and the other into communion, to *force* and drive them into a communion.

Because of the chiasmatic structure of the body - the abyss between moving and moved - dancers are no more capable of seeing their dancing than writers are able to read their own works. Dancers ask a witness to the work of art not only for communication but also to know the very work of art and themselves more profoundly. In this communion a dancer exposes her/himself through the work of art, letting the work exist, while s/he shares her/his own body with the other. The body and the world of the work are revealed to the audience member, but the dancer cannot see or hear her/himself. Mirroring the audience, s/he and the world of the work is outlined to her/himself that s/he can understand it in this encountering otherness i.e. the audience. The audience for its part desires (or because s/he is "forced") to behold dance, to join and create communion in order to understand or be perplexed by the corporeality which the dancer can reveal through her/his body. Although beholders can move, they cannot perceive their own movements, but they can share motion with the dancer's moving body in reversibility of perception.

The other's work makes me think because s/he creates within me an other than myself, a divergence in relation to what I expect.[2] However, there is a distance between the self and the other, between the dancer and the audience, both the dancer and the beholder have a desire to strive for the gap or distance to understand and to share the meaning of the work. The gap is necessary for striving although the other always escapes me, by the reason of the essential difference between the self

1. In Nigel Farndale's view, watching a live performance is proactive as such because the audience shares the same time and place as the performer (Farndale 1990, 18).
2. VI, 224

and the other.

Dance as performance is especially effective for breaking through the one-dimensional reality maintained by operational (objective) thought, bringing forth a sensuous world with is meanings. That is not to say, of course, that one has to be dance-educated in order to understand a dance. The power of movement is that it communicates through the kinaesthetic sense which we all have.[1] As an audience we need to listen to our body's felt sense, how we are faring in the various situations of life in which we find ourselves, but also we need to learn a listening which listens with this bodily felt sense.[2] We need to cultivate a listening that is deeply rooted in our body's felt sense. According to Heidegger, not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work. For a work is in actual effect a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own nature itself to take a stand in the truth of what is.[3] Gathering together into a performance, the essential difference of the self and the other and the desire to understand and share a work are always present. The existence of performing arts reveals the desire for this communal interaction, but performing also necessarily carries the gap between the self and the other, and its power of reversibility.

Between the self and the other, there are echoes and resonance: extremely deep reverberations that carry energy. 'Listening' to a dancework teaches us the essence of reversibility: to listen to another is to learn what the world is like from a position that is not our own; to listen is to reverse position.[4] The echo is radically deconstructive, subversive, even anarchic: it sets in motion countless vibrations of uncertainty; it refuses to be controlled, it cannot be possessed by analysing it.

1. Adair 1992, 62
2. Levin 1989, 219
3. Heidegger 1950/1971, 77
4. Levin 1989, 193

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PhP Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *The Phenomenology of Perception*. Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge, 1989. (Phénoménologie de la perception, 1945.)

PhP-F Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *Phénoménologie de la perception*. Paris, Gallimard, 1990 (1945).

VI Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *The Visible and the Invisible*. Ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1980. (Le visible et l'invisble, 1964.)

VI-F Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *Le visible et l'invisible*. Ed. Claude Lefort. Paris: Gallimard, 1990 (1964).

IPP Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *In Praise of Philosophy*. Trans. John Wild and James M. Edie. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963. (Éloge de la philosophie, 1953.)

PE Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "The Philosophy of Existence". In *Texts and Dialogues.* ed. Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry Jr., trans. Michael B. Smith et al. New Jersey, London: Humanities Press, 1992. (La philosophie de l'existence, 1959.)

CRO Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "The Child's Relations with Others". In *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie trans. William Cobb. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. (Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant, 1960.)

CD Maurice Merleau-Ponty."Cézanne's Doubt". In *Sense and Non-Sense*, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. (Sens et non-sens, 1961.)

EM Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "Eye and Mind". In *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie, trans. Carleton Dallery. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. (L'oeil et l'esprit, 1961)

ECD Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "Expression and the Child's Drawing". In *The Prose of the World*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. John O'Neill Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. (La prose du monde, 1969.)

IL Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "The Indirect Language". In *The Prose of the World*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. John O'Neill. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. (La Prose du monde, 1969.)

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Suomenkielinen yhteenveto

LIIKKUVIA JA LIIKUTETTUJA KEHOJA
Fenomenologinen analyysi tanssivan subjektin muotoutumisesta ja tanssitaiteen tiedollisista ja eettisistä arvoista

Mitä ja miten tanssija tietää? Miten tanssitaiteen eettisiä, poliittisia ja moraalisia arvoja voidaan tarkastella? Tutkimuksen pyrkimyksenä on ollut kehittää sellaista esittävän tanssin filosofista diskurssia, jonka kautta voidaan keskustella tanssin tiedollisista ja eettisistä arvoista. Maurice Merleau-Pontyn kehon fenomenologia näytti tarjoavan hedelmällisen lähtökohdan tarkastella sekä tanssijan tiedon luonnetta että kehon liikkeen kykyä luoda ja välittää arvoja ja merkityksiä. Oletin, että kehon ei tarvitse olla vain väline, jota käytetään moraalisten tai poliittisten viestien välittämiseen, vaan eettinen subjekti itsessään. Koska Merleau-Pontyn mukaan kehona oleminen luo edellytykset ja määrää subjektiviteetin muotoutumista ja sen ilmaisua, tutkimus kohdistui siihen, miten tanssijan subjektiviteetti hahmottuu kehon fenomenologian pohjalta, kun tanssijaa ei kohdella vain esteettisenä objektina vaan tiedollisena subjektina, joka on kykenevä tekemään valintoja ja valitsemaan eettisenä subjektina myös “itsensä” ja tanssinsa.

Merleau-Pontyn havainnon fenomenologian, David Michael Levinin kehon eettisten pohdintojen ja Michel Foucault’n kehopolitiikkaa koskevan filosofian kautta hahmotin tutkimuksen ensimmäisessä luvussa kehon fenomenologista teoriaa pyrkimyksenä kuvata ennen kaikkea kehon yksilöhistoriallista, kulttuurista ja sosiaalista ulottuvuutta. Merleau-Pontyn havainnon fenomenologian mukaisesti keho hahmottui kokemuksellisen kehon perspektiivistä käsin. Tämä eletyn kehon fenomenologinen analyysi keskittyi erityisesti liikkeeseen ja liikkuvaan kehoon. Analysoin eletyn kehon aistien yhteisvaikutteisuutta, liikkeen kautta ilmenevää kehomuistia, kehon taitoja, kehollista tietoa ja sitä miten liike kommunikoi ja välittää merkityksiä. Erityisesti Merleau-Pontyn kiasmaattisuuden eli käännettävyyden periaate osoittautui valaisevaksi

analysoitaessa liikkuvan kehon kommunikaatiota.

Merleau-Pontyn mukaan keho näkevänä tulee nähdyksi, jolloin näkevä ja nähdyksituleminen ovat kiasmaattisessa suhteessa toisiinsa. Saman periaatteen mukaan keho koskevana on kosketettavissaoleva. Merleau-Pontyn mukaan voidaan löytää edellisten kaltainen epäsymmetrisesti toimiva käännettävyyden periaate myös kosketettavissaolevan kehon ja näkyvän kehon välille. Koska eletyn kehon liike on välittömästi näkyvä liike, oletin, että voidaan löytää käännettävyyden periaate liikekokemuksen ja näkyvän liikkeen välille. Toisin sanoen tanssijan eletty liike on näkyvä toiselle, vaikka tanssijan liikekokemus poikkeaa sitä katsovan kokemuksesta. Liikkeen muuttuminen tanssijan kinesteettisestä kokemuksesta toiselle ihmiselle aistein havaittavaksi ja merkityksiä välittäväksi kokemukseksi sisältää aina kuilun, joka aukeaa itsen ja Toisen välille, vaikka liikkuvan ja havaitun kiasma luo juuri yhteyden ja kommunikaatiosuhteen. Tarkastelin ensimmäisen luvun lopuksi itsen ja Toisen eroa ja yhteyttä Merleau-Pontyn fenomenologian pohjalta. Tämä olisi johdantoa tutkimuksen viimeistä lukua varten, jossa palaisin pohdintaan esiintyjän ja katsojan, itsen ja Toisen käännettävyyden periaatteesta tanssitaiteessa ja sen vaikutuksesta tanssijan subjektiviteetin muotoutumiselle.

Tutkimuksen toisen luvun alku hahmotti sitä tanssitaiteen historiallista ja kulttuurista taustaa, johon tutkimuksen filosofinen diskurssi rajautui ja johon se yritti pureutua. Puhuessani ‘tanssista’ viittasin modernin tanssin perinteeseen, jonka historiallista kehitystä esittelin lyhyesti muutamien tanssinhistorioitsijoiden näkemysten pohjalta. Tulin johtopäätökseen, että baletin ja modernin tanssin perinteet ovat tämän vuosisadan aikana jatkuvasti kietoutuneet yhteen muodostaen yhteisen taidetanssinkentän. Kuvasin tanssitaiteen sosiaalisen kentän muotoutumista Pierre Bourdieun kenttäteorian ja estetismiä koskevan kritiikin kautta. Tanssitaiteen eri tekijöiden toiminnan kenttänä tanssitaide muodostaa oman diskurssinsa ja autonomisen vaikkakaan ei taloudellisesti riippumattoman kentän, tanssin ammattilaisineen, harrastajineen, asiantuntijoineen ja taiteen kriteereineen. Johtopäätökseni oli, että tanssiliikkeistöt erilaisine vaatimuksineen ja tekniikoineen sekä tanssikentän toimijoiden seurauksena syntyvät tanssin estetiikan kriteerit asettavat tanssijat aina johonkin kehon estetiikan puitteeseen. Tanssin historiallinen tarkastelu osoitti, että puitteen vaatimukset eivät ole pysyviä

vaan kulttuurisesti ja historiallisesti muuttuvia. Tarkastelin myös sitä, miten tanssitaiteen esteettiset arvot ovat kietoutuneet yhteen kentän sosiaalisiin käytäntöihin ja kehopolitiikkaan ja miten ne paljastuvat tanssin diskurssissa. Kuvasin sitä, miten tanssitaiteen autonomisuuden vaatimus aiheuttaa eettisiä ongelmia, silloin kun tietyt kehon estetiikan vaatimukset muuttuvat itseisarvoiksi sinänsä. Luku päättyi pohdintaa tanssin etiikasta. Kuvasin lähinnä Merleau-Pontyn kehon "mykän" cogiton ja myöhäis-Foucault'n etiikan pohjalta, kuinka tanssitaiteilija saattaisi toteuttaa eettistä projektiaan teostensa kautta.

Toisen luvun tärkein johtopäätös oli, että yhtä paljon kuin traditio ja tanssinkenttä luovat edellytykset tanssijan syntymiselle, ne samalla rajoittavat esteettisen puitteen takia tanssijan mahdollisuuksia. Tässä tutkimuksessa tanssijan subjektiviteetin muotoutumisen analyysi perustui oletukseen, että tanssijaa ei ainoastaan tehdä, vaan hän myös tekee itsensä. Tutkimuksen kolmas luku kuvasi tanssitaiteilijan tietä, hänen mahdollisuuksiaan valita itsensä ja taiteellinen työnsä. Lähtökohdan tähän keskusteluun tarjosi Merleau-Pontyn käsitys vapaudesta, hänen taiteenfilosofiansa ja myöhäis-Foucaut'n ajatus ihmisestä eettisenä subjektina, joka on velvollinen "itsen kehittämisen" kautta nostamaan esille oman minuutensa samalla kyseenalaistaen häntä kulttuurisesti ja sosiaalisesti määrittävät stereotypiat. Oletin, että tanssitaiteilijan koulutus tähtää kehon transformaatioon. Tämä tarkoittaa, että käyttämällä erilaisia kehon tekniikoita tanssitaiteilija uudelleenmuokkaa kehoaan ja omaa olemistaan joko tietoisesti valittuun tai sattumanvaraiseen suuntaa. Toisin sanoen tanssija myös valitsee itsensä ja taiteellisen projektinsa valitessaan tietyt kehon tekniikat, joiden kautta hän muovaa kehoaan. Merleau-Pontyn taiteenfilosofian ja Michael Polanyin tietoteorian pohjalta tarkastelin tanssitaiteilijan työtä, hänen taitojaan ja tietojaan "polkuna". Taiteellinen tuotanto ja siihen liittyvä jatkuva kehon harjoittelu muotoutuu taiteilijan poluksi sisältäen myös yksilöllisesti muotoutuvat tiedolliset ja taidolliset valmiudet. Merleau-Pontyn ja Martin Heideggerin fenomenologian pohjalta kuvasin, kuinka tanssitaiteilijan välittömän kehollisen maailmasuhteen kautta voidaan ymmärtää "merkitysten runoileminen" liikkuvan kehon kautta, toisin sanoen liikkeen merkityksen syntyminen tanssiteoksessa. Lopuksi tarkastelin lyhyesti, sitä miten taiteilijan motiivit esittäjänä ja yleisön kohtaamisena voidaan ymmärtää Heideggerin Sorge-käsitteen (huoli) ja Merleau-Pontyn

manque-käsitteen (puute) kautta.

Viimeisessä luvussa kuvasin tanssitaideteoksen ontologista ulottuvuutta, toisin sanoen niitä tanssiteoksen piirteitä, jotka erottavat sen muiden taideteosten olemisesta. Heideggerin mukaan taideteoksen alkuperä on taiteilijassa, ja kääntäen: taiteilija syntyy vasta teoksen/teosten myötä. Heideggerin filosofian pohjalta tulin johtopäätökseen, että tanssiteos ei koskaan palaudu täysin sen tekijöiksi samoin eivät tekijät teokseksi. Tanssiteos synnyttää oman *Gestaltin* (merkityksellisen asenteen ja hahmon), joka itsessään voi toimia poliittisena ja moraalisena eleenä tarvitsematta tuekseen sanallista selitystä. Näin voidaan myös olettaa, että taideteoksen vastaus *Gestaltina* on taiteilijalle peili, jonka kautta hänen identiteettinsä ihmisenä ja taiteilijana muovautuu. Valottaakseni tanssiteoksen ontologiaa tarkastelin lyhyesti tanssiteoksen koreografista prosessia ja aineksia (materiaa) ennen kaikkea eletyn kehon liikettä, joista teos muodostuu. Heideggerin näkemyksen mukaan taideteoksen aineksista syntyy maailma, joka on itsessään kokonaisuus, vaikka se elää Maailmasta. Tanssiteoksen keskeisin elementti on liike, liikkuvat kehot, jotka elettyinä kehoina ovat myös kulttuurisia ja historiallisia kehoja. Merleau-Pontyn lihan käsitteen kautta kuvasin tanssiteoksen kokonaisuuden muotoutumisesta, teoksen eri elementtien yhteennivoutumista ja teoksen tekijöiden osallisuutta teokseen, pyrkimyksenä kyseenalaistaa välineellistä asennetta tanssijoihin ja muihin teoksen osatekijöihin. Ontologisessa mielessä tanssiteoksen erityisyys esittävänä taiteena on sen katoavuus ja hetkellisyys. Heideggerin näkemyksen mukaan taideteos vaatii katsojan, Toisen, tullakseen olemassaolevaksi. Esimerkiksi romaanit tai maalaukset voivat odottaa “todistajaa” toisin kuin hetkelliset tanssiteokset, jotka vaativat välittömän ja suoran suhteen läsnäolevasta yleisöstä.

Tutkimus päättyi pohdintaan esiintyjien ja katsojien havainnon käännettävyydestä eli esiintyjän ja katsojan kiasmaattisesta suhteesta. Merleau-Pontyn kehon fenomenologian pohjalta tulin johtopäätökseen, että koska tanssija ei koskaan näe omaa liikettään ja itseään, Toinen eli yleisö muodostaa hänelle “peilin”, jonka kautta hän voi saada tietoa, kuka hän on ja mikä on Toinen, löytäen rakennuspuita oman identiteetin hahmottamiseen. Samoin katsoja, kykenemättä liikkumaan ja tietämään, sitä mitä tanssija tietää, tulee näin katsomalla osalliseksi teoksesta, (katsominen puolestaan on yhteydessä hänen koko synesteettiseen kulttuu-

riseen ja yksilölliseen kehoonsa,) tanssijan liikkeen taidosta, tiedosta, yksilöllisestä ja historiallisesta kehomuistista. Näin itse ja toinen, tanssija ja yleisö, joiden keskiössä teos elää, muodostaa tanssitaiteen alati ristiriitoja kytevän ytimen.