NINA TYNKKYNEN

Constructing the Environmental Regime between Russia and Europe

Conditions for social learning

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of
the Faculty of Economics and Administration
of the University of Tampere, for public discussion in
the Paavo Koli Auditorium, Kanslerinrinne 1,
Tampere, on April 4th, 2008, at 12 o'clock.

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
University of Tampere
Department of Regional Studies
Finland

Distribution
Bookshop TAJU
P.O. Box 617
33014 University of Tampere
Finland

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Fax +358 3 3551 7685
taju@uta.fi
www.uta.fi/taju
http://granum.uta.fi

Cover design by
Juha Siro

Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1301
ISBN 978-951-44-7269-5 (print)
ISSN 1455-1616

Acta Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 708
ISBN 978-951-44-7268-8 (pdf)
ISSN 1456-954X
http://acta.uta.fi

Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy – Juvenes Print
Tampere 2008

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Acknowledgements

Almost every PhD thesis on environmental policy published by the Department of Regional Studies begins with acknowledgements to the so called “umbrella”, the post-graduate seminar on environmental policy, which as a permanent institution and as a society of great, intelligent and creative individuals offers an inspiring and fruitful research environment. I would not dare, neither want to, break from this tradition. The “umbrella”, especially Professor Yrjö Haila as its cohesive power and my supervisor, deserve all the gratitude and plaudits one can express. Without you, the “umbrella people”, this thesis would never have got done.

The Department of Regional Studies, besides the “umbrella”, offered good facilities, both socially and materially, to go on with the work. The financial support for my work became from the Graduate School for Russian and East European Studies at the Aleksanteri Institute, in addition to the Emil Aaltonen and Wihuri Foundations. Besides the material well-being, the Graduate School provided me with indispensable social and intellectual capital, as it offered a forum to discuss Russian affairs that were not always the most topical at our department in Tampere. In particular, I want to thank Professor Markku Kivinen and Head of Research Training Ira Jänis-Isokangas who helped in many issues, and Dr Sari Autio-Sarasmo who not only was my predecessor from Tampere at the Graduate School and from that experience made my participation there a bit smoother, but also fed me with her brilliant and motivating ideas during the years.

There are some other academic institutions that I want to thank in this connection, too. The European University of St Petersburg, where I spent two terms (in 2000 and in 2002), is one of them. The staff and professors at the university never lost their patience, no matter the absurdity of problems that were met. Another such institution is the Södertörns University College in Stockholm with its Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) and the School of Life Sciences. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Michael Gilek, Dr Björn Hassler and Dr Magnus Boström, whose open-mindedness and dynamic attitude motivated me to finalise the thesis and to enjoy living in Stockholm in 2007. Thirdly, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs where I have been working since the beginning of this year: all the staff deserve full recognition for their support in the final stage of the process, but I want to thank my programme director, Dr Tapani Vaahtoranta, in particular.

I also want to express my gratitude to many individual colleagues that have in some way or other contributed to this thesis. My university career started at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland where I worked as a research assistant for Dr Lassi Heininen. I suppose Lassi is the person who is responsible for me ending up in an academic career. Besides, Lassi’s excursions to those very remote corners of Russia were so much fun! In Rovaniemi I also got to know Professor Monica Tennberg, who later became my second supervisor and trustee. Monica has given me valuable insights into the sometimes fuzzy world of International Relations, as has Professor Pami Aalto with whom I, among other projects, wrote a joint article included in this thesis. Additionally, last winter my colleague, Olli

Salmi, and I, who were both supposed to finish our theses, thought up writing a joint article that later turned out to become a firm part of my thesis. Writing together was a learning process indeed! Olli also helped in the formulation of the final conclusions of the overall thesis with his clever comments. Finally, Dr Christer Pursiainen and Dr Jonathan Oldfield who took the responsibility of pre-examining the thesis are also to be thanked, along with Erkki Seppänen, Louise Bolotin and Toby Archer who made an important contribution by proof-reading the manuscript at its different stages.

Besides the academic circles, I am deeply indebted to all the people in the different Finnish ministries, at the water and sewage utility of St Petersburg, and in environmental NGOs in St Petersburg who gave their time and attention as respondents in my empirical research. Above and beyond, I cannot salute enough my nearest friends, expecially Saija, Mari, Pauliina, Jarkko, Sirke and Terhi for giving me perspective and support even at times when I did not necessarily deserve it. The same applies to the men of my life: Konsta and Veli-Pekka in particular but also Isi, Samuli, Nestori and Seppo, and to my extended family—thank you!

Finally, I express my greatest gratitude and dedicate this work to the best mother on Earth, my very own äiti Irene, for all the reasons only she knows.

In Tampere on February 22nd 2008

Nina Tynkkynen

Summary

In this PhD thesis, I study the dynamics of environmental regime-building between Russia and Europe. I examine the processes through which the regime is constructed. I focus on the definitions of problems and their possible solutions in these processes and the reflections of the definitions on the practices of environmental cooperation. Moreover, I examine how different definitions and practices of cooperation condition social learning. My methodological approach derives from a problem and process-oriented approach to policy analysis that focuses on the examination of political processes and definitional struggles as the basis of these processes. In accordance with this methodology, I chose an idea-based perspective on cooperation that underlines the importance of shared meanings and identities as conditions for learning. While all separate studies follow the basic logic of this methodology with slightly differing methods of analysis, in the overall thesis I synthesise them by applying a method that builds on framing as a way to distinguish between different problem definitions and to analyse the interplay of these definitions with practice.

I examine the process of regime-building with the use of six separate studies. These focus on environmental aspects of the energy cooperation problematic; environmental non-governmental organisations in St Petersburg; multilateral cooperation aimed at the institutional development of the St Petersburg water sector; policy networks in environmental cooperation in the St Petersburg water sector and Kola Peninsula mining industry; the implications of a nuclear submarine accident, the Kursk case, for environmental cooperation; and on framing climate change as an international policy problem in Russian public discussion. As a context to these cases, I map the evolution of the Russian–European environmental regime from the early 1970s to the present.

As a result, I distinguish between five frames that have shaped Russian–European environmental regime-building from its early days to the present. This has involved the evolution of the environmental regime between Russia and Europe from one shaped mainly by a "common problems" frame, emphasising high-level diplomacy as the basic form of cooperation, to one of "environmental partnership" that, in turn, emphasises practical cooperation based on principles of reciprocity and shared responsibility. Currently, interdependencies based on the use of raw materials, trade and markets heavily affect the economic and political context of environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe. Russia has increased its power in the definition of issues, as the popularity of a frame I name "great ecological power" indicates.

The examination of the framings of cooperation reveals that definitions of problems and their possible solutions have often drawn on dichotomies such as "fall guys" and "do-gooders", "donors" and "recipients", or "teachers" and "learners".

These dichotomies have not shaped actors' identities in a way that would have produced shared meanings and identities. They have not encouraged cooperational practices that would have promoted social learning. Moreover, the results of the thesis indicate that the definitions of problems and the required solutions that the cooperation has been based on have been extensive. Russian–European environmental regime-building has been driven towards ever-wider practices that ultimately aim at the unification of environmental policy throughout Europe and Russia. As a conclusion of the study, I argue that the broadness of definitions on which large-scale projects are built adds to the complicated character of issues and politicises them, possibly creating and enhancing diverse dichotomies. The broadness of definitions and practices thus makes the achievement of problem closure, needed for the effective solution of problems, more difficult and hampers social learning. As a result of too-large scales of projects, the enforcement of "participatory methods" does not work, even though heavily stressed.

Consequently, the results of the thesis indicate that Russian–European environmental regime-building has largely been based on top-down thinking, which takes as its frame an analysis of the whole system. In this kind of thinking, the task has been to identify the worst threats and tackle them. I argue that this kind of thinking misses sensitivity to the spatial context and to the social and political situation. Neglecting the question of scale in defining the foci and forms of the cooperation can be said to have been the most significant constraint for social learning in Russian–European environmental cooperation. As an alternative, I propose a pragmatic bottom-up approach to cooperation that cuts up problems into more manageable pieces, focuses on specific situations, differentiates management practices and involves the relevant stakeholders by taking their practical experience into consideration, to be applied as a basis for environmental regime-building. In institutional terms, a pragmatic bottom-up approach implies stressing institutional pluralism: many different sorts of structures with different scale preoccupations.

Yhteenveto

Tutkin tässä väitöskirjatyössä Venäjän ja Euroopan välisen ympäristöyhteistyöregiimin rakentumisen dynamiikkaa. Tutkimus kohdistuu yhteistyöprosesseihin, yhteistyön käytäntöihin sekä erilaisiin tapoihin määritellä yhteistyön kohteena oleva(t) ongelma(t) ja ratkaisuvaihtoehdot. Tarkastelen myös, millaisia reunaehtoja erilaiset määritelmät ja yhteistyön käytännöt asettavat jaettujen merkitysten syntymiselle ja sosiaaliselle oppimiselle. Näin ollen ongelmakeskeinen näkökulma ympäristöpolitiikan tutkimukseen sekä poliittisiin prosesseihin kohdistuva politiikka-analyysi muodostavat tutkimuksen metodologiset lähtökohdat. Analysoin ja luokittelen erilaisia ongelman- ja ratkaisunmäärittelyitä sekä niiden suhdetta yhteistyön käytäntöihin pääasiassa kehysanalyysimenetelmän avulla.

Tutkimus koostuu kuudesta osatutkimuksesta. Osatutkimukset kohdistuvat Venäjän ja Euroopan Unionin välisen energiadialogin ympäristöaspekteihin, Pietarin ympäristöjärjestöihin, Pietarin vesisektorin kehittämiseksi tehtyyn monenväliseen yhteistyöhön, Pietarin vesisektorin ja Kuolan niemimaan kaivosteollisuuden modernisoimiseksi tehdyn ympäristöyhteistyön toimijaverkostoihin (policy networks), venäläisen Kursk-ydinsukellusveneen uppoamisen vaikutuksiin ympäristöyhteistyön kannalta, sekä siihen, millaisena kansainvälisen politiikan ongelmana ilmastonmuutos on kehystetty venäläisessä keskustelussa. Lisäksi valotan Venäjän ja Euroopan välisen ympäristöyhteistyön kehitystä 1970-luvulta nykypäivään siltä osin, kuin se osatutkimusten kontekstin ymmärtämiseksi on olennaista.

Tutkimuksen tuloksena erotan viisi kehystä, joiden rajoissa Venäjän ja Euroopan välistä ympäristöyhteistyöregiimi on rakentunut. Näitä ovat muun muassa ”yhteisten ongelmien” kehys, joka korostaa korkean tason diplomatiaa yhteistyön perusmuotona, ja ”ympäristökumppanuutta” korostava kehys, jonka mukaan yhteistyön tulee olla ennen muuta tasaveroisuuteen ja vastavuoroisuuteen perustuvaa käytännön tason toimintaa. ”Venäjä ympäristösuurvaltana” –kehyksen suosio puolestaan osoittaa, että Venäjän poliittisen ja taloudellisen vaikutusvallan kasvaessa Venäjällä on entistä enemmän valtaa ongelman- kuin myös ratkaisunmäärittelyssä.

Venäjän ja Euroopan ympäristöyhteistyöregiimin rakentumista muovaavien kehysten tarkastelu osoittaa, että ongelman- ja ratkaisuvaihtoehtojen määrittelyt ovat usein luoneet erilaisia uhkakuvia ja kahtiajakoja, kuten ”syntipukki” – ”hyväntekijä”, ”antajaosapuoli” – ”saajaosapuoli” tai ”opettaja” – ”oppilas”. Tämänkaltaiset kahtiajaot eivät ole olleet jaettujen merkitysten ja yhteisen identiteetin synnyn kannalta hedelmällisiä. Ne eivät ole edistäneet sellaisia yhteistyön käytäntöjä, jotka olisivat tuottaneet sosiaalista oppimista. Lisäksi väitöskirjatutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että ongelman- ja ratkaisuvaihtoehtojen määrittelyt ovat olleet ylhäältä alaspäin suuntautuvia ja erittäin laajoja. Pyrkimyksenä on ollut ohjelmallisten yhteistyökäytäntöjen soveltaminen, suuren

mittakaavan hankkeiden toteuttaminen ja viimekädessä Venäjän ja Euroopan ympäristöpolitiikan yhtenäistäminen.

Väitöskirjatyöni keskeinen päätelmä on, että ylhäältä alaspäin suuntautuvan toiminnan ja suuren mittakaavan suosiminen vaikeuttaa yhteistyötä ja estää oppimista, koska se väistämättä lisää intressitahojen ja -ristiriitojen määrää politisoiden yhteistyön kohteena olevan ongelman. Tällöin yhteisymmärryksen saavuttaminen on vaikeaa. Ylhäältä alaspäin suuntautuvan ajattelumallin lähtökohtana on järjestelmä kokonaisuudessaan, ja tehtävänä on tunnistaa pahimmat uhkat ja kohdistaa toiminta niihin. Päätelmäni on, että tällainen ajattelu ei huomioi alueellista kontekstia eikä poliittista ja yhteiskunnallista tilannekohtaisuutta. Näin ollen väitän, että ennen kaikkea se, että kysymykseen yhteistyön oikeasta ja kulloinkin tilanteeseen sopivasta mittakaavasta ei ole kiinnitetty riittävää huomiota yhteistyön kohteen ja toimintatapojen määrittelyssä, on rajoittanut Venäjän ja Euroopan välisen ympäristöyhteistyön tuloksellisuutta ja oppimista. Ehdotukseni on, että yhteistyössä tulisi noudattaa käytännönläheistä, alhaalta ylöspäin suuntautuvaa lähestymistapaa, joka korostaa konkreettisten toimijoiden, kokemusta omaavien asianosaisten, roolia ja toimintatapoja. Tämä merkitsee sitä, ettei kaikkiin tapauksiin sovelleta vain yhtä yhteistyön mallia tai instituutiota, vaan niitä on tilanteesta riippuen useita toiminnan eri tasoilla.

Original publications and manuscripts

This thesis is based on the following publications and manuscripts, referred to by their Roman numerals in the text.

I Aalto, Pami and Nina Tynkkynen. 2007. "The Nordic Countries: Engaging Russia, Trading in Energy or Taming Environmental Threats?" in Aalto, Pami (ed.), *The EU–Russia Energy Dialogue: Securing Europe's Future Energy Supplies?*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

II Tynkkynen, Nina. 2006. "Action Frames of Environmental Organisations of Post-Soviet St Petersburg", *Environmental Politics* 15 (4): 639-649.

III Tynkkynen, Nina. Forthcoming. "Environmental Cooperation and Learning: The St Petersburg Water Sector", in Lehrer, David and Anna Korhonen (eds.), *Western Aid in Post-communism. Effects and Side-effects*, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire.

IV Salmi, Olli and Nina Tynkkynen. 2007. *Environmental Governance in Russia: Changing Conditions for International Environmental Cooperation in the Case of the Murmansk Region Mining Industry and the St Petersburg Water Sector*. Submitted.

V Häyrynen, Nina. 2003. "Environmental security: The Case of the Kursk", *Environmental Politics* 12 (3): 65-82.

VI Tynkkynen, Nina. 2007. *Russia, a Great Ecological Power in Global Climate Policy? Framing Climate Change as a Policy Problem in Russian Public Discussion*. Submitted.

1. Introduction

1.1 The research setting

Russia and Europe are bound together by a variety of issues. Among these issues, the environment is one of the most important. First, there are global environmental problems, such as climate change, that cross borders and require unified activities. Second, as European actors tend to underline, the environmental "legacy" of the Soviet system extends its tentacles to many parts of Europe (Pavlinek and Pickles, 2000). According to estimates, nearly one-sixth of Russia's territory is severely polluted. Some of these polluted environments are so degraded that human presence is no longer possible there (Feshbach and Friendly, 1992; Peterson, 1993; Bridges and Bridges, 1996). Third, Russia strives, at least to a certain extent, to integrate into European structures and procedures, shaped largely by those of the European Union. In environmental terms this implies, first and foremost, governance that is in accordance with the principles of the environmental policy of the European Union. Finally, and this is often forgotten in Europe, Russia's environment has global importance. Russia is territorially the largest country in the world – slightly less than twice the size of the United States, covering one-eighth of the earth's inhabited land area. More to the point, Russia has the greatest number of nearly all natural resources in the world. For example, its forest resources account for 22 per cent of global forest resources, natural gas resources around 40 per cent of the global reserves, and coal reserves nearly 50 per cent of the global total (World Bank, 1997: 30). On top of that, there are more areas of untouched nature in Russia as anywhere else in the world (Kontratev et al., 2003).

These points give reason for Russian–European environmental cooperation. This cooperation originates from the 1960s and 1970s, from the period when Western societies were experiencing environmental awakening and the "new international order" in international environmental politics was born (cf. Caldwell, 1990). In the beginning, however, the Soviet regime's engagement with international environmental politics and cooperation remained rather limited and implicit. It was only in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986, as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost (openness) policy, that environmental issues gained greater political importance in the Soviet Union (Kotov and Nikitina, 1993; Peterson and Bielke, 2001). Exploding interest in environmental issues led to a boom in East–West environmental cooperation – a boom that began as a transnational environmental movement headed by Mikhail Gorbachev himself, but soon took the form of financial subsidisation from Western governments to the environmental sector of the Soviet countries. For several years after the dissolution

of the Soviet Union, the environmental sector was one of the most-supported sectors by the West in post-Soviet countries including Russia.

Consequently, governmental as well as non-governmental actors in various European countries have been more or less actively engaged in environmental cooperation with Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The cooperation has had its moments of intricacy especially at times when volatile economic and political conditions have shaped political priorities and conceptions of the environmental problems in Russia. Lately, environmental regime-building has been shaped by the growing economic and political importance of Russia for Europe, which has changed the nature of the cooperation. The ever-growing interdependence of economic, political, social and environmental issues has obviously made cooperation more complex and poses new challenges in the future.

It is meeting these challenges to which I aim to contribute in this thesis. Therefore, I have studied environmental cooperation—the construction of the environmental regime—between Russia and Europe from its early stages to the present, and evaluated it from the point of view of social learning. In this thesis, I aim at explaining how and why a Russian-European environmental regime has emerged in some issue areas, and, once the regime is in place, what explains the successes and failures of that cooperation. I compare six separate studies, each characterised by a different problem, in order to explore the dynamic nature of regime-building. I focus on the following dimensions of the dynamics:
the definitions of the problems and their possible solutions;
the relationships between different definitions and relevant actors;
the practices of cooperation and their relationship to the definitions of problems and their solutions; the ways in which the definitions and practices condition social learning.

The focus on regime-building underlines the importance of considering the temporal variation of definitions and practices. It also directs attention to the problematic of agency; in particular to the question of whose definitions are at play and who are to act.

In a geographical sense Russia is, in part at least, a European country, but I use the term “Europe” here as a generalisation and to nominate a group of those European actors that are partners of Russia in environmental cooperation. This group cannot be termed “the European Union” because it includes individual actors as well as institutions and also countries, Norway most importantly, that are not members of the Union. Naturally, the European Union is an important actor in the field as most of its member countries engage themselves in environmental cooperation with Russia only through EU policies. To a certain extent, EU policies also guide the activities of individual member countries. More to the point, the main EU policy shaping environmental relations between the Union and Russia, the Northern Dimension, has since 2006 genuinely been a common policy involving not only the EU, but also Iceland, Norway and Russia (see article I and Chapter 4). However, cooperative processes studied in this thesis are not all linked (only) to EU-policies. The thesis has its emphasis on the northern Europe for many reasons. I have consciously put an emphasis on Finland as a case study, firstly because I am a Finn myself and, secondly, because I believe Finland, as a country sharing a 1,300

kilometre-long border with Russia, is more committed to environmental cooperation with Russia than many other European countries geographically distant from Russia. Besides, Finland has in actual fact been in the forefront of engaging in such cooperation (see Chapter 4). For historical reasons, Finland has a special relation to Russia, which has affected the interaction of the countries in environmental issues, too (see article I).

The term regime-building, in turn, I use for practical reasons to indicate the development of the Russian–European environmental cooperation. The concept of regime demonstrates that the cooperation is not tied to any (single) administrative structures or decision-making procedures but consists of simultaneously ongoing processes based on certain agreed-upon principles and rules. The term regime-building thus underlines the dynamic aspect of the cooperation. Consequently, my application of the concept of regime is somewhat looser than that of neoliberal regime theorists (see section 3.1).

I examine the process of regime-building through the use of six separate studies. These studies explore the dynamics from different angles and at different levels. The reason behind choosing cases as different from each other as the six studies are is that I believe that examination of diverse cases and settings helps to explicate dynamic characteristics of cooperation that recur from case to case (see Chapter 2.1.; cf. Haila and Dyke, 2006). The individual studies are described in Chapter 2 and reported in articles I-VI. Chapter 4 sets these studies in the context of the relatively long history of environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe. The individual studies focus on the environmental aspects of the energy cooperation problematic (I), environmental non-governmental organisations of St Petersburg (II), multilateral cooperation aimed at the institutional development of the St Petersburg water sector (III), policy networks in environmental cooperation in the St Petersburg water sector and Kola Peninsula mining industry (IV), the implications of a nuclear submarine accident, the Kursk case, for environmental cooperation (V) and finally, framing climate change as an international policy problem in Russian public discussion (VI).

1.2 Russia – more different than most? On methodology

One of the aims of my thesis is to elaborate a methodological contribution to studying environmental policy in the context of Russian studies. In this respect, the topic of the study is characterised by two challenges: variable and cross-cutting temporal, spatial and social scales associated with environmental problems, and the geographical focus on Russia, a challenge no less complex by nature. In addition, the topic of the thesis is linked to the basic questions that International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline addresses. Thus, IR forms a significant point of reference to the thesis, too. In consequence, my methodological task is to address these challenges and find a way to transcend interdisciplinary squabbles, be they environmental policy versus IR, environmental policy versus Russian studies, or IR

versus Russian studies. Even though this primarily is a thesis in environmental policy, and hence, detailed reflection of theoretical IR debates is not provided, I hope this thesis will still help both students of environmental policy and students of International Relations who focus on the problematic of international environmental politics in their theoretical and methodological choices, so that they do not get as lost in the "conceptual jungle" as I sometimes have.

There are only few studies that focus on environmental cooperation with Russia (e.g. Darst, 2001; Hønneland, 2003; Hønneland and Jørgensen, 2003; Oldfield et al., 2003; Tennberg, 2005, 2007a and 2007b). These studies are valuable for their substantive contribution, but, with the exception of Hønneland (2003) and Tennberg (2007b), do not explicitly discuss the methodological problematic. In this respect, published studies have not been of particular help in my methodological "agony". Luckily, the "agony" has been alleviated by the research tradition of my department, the Department of Regional Studies at the University of Tampere. Research at the department has been based on the underlying idea that because the "environmental question"[1] is so sensitive to spatial and temporal variety, no grand theory can be established to apply on its study.[2] Thus, research on environmental policy should be problem-oriented by character. Obviously, this does not imply research without theoretical orientation, or research focusing merely on the search for solutions to practical policy problems. Instead, it means that sometimes one story makes more sense, and sometimes another; the applicability of certain theoretical concepts follows (or does not follow) from the specifics of the case at hand (cf. Wendt, 1991: 392). Accordingly, the approach highlights that a careful analysis of similarities and divergences between cases that vary by their temporal and/or spatial scales helps to understand the general dynamics of environmental policy (Haila and Dyke, 2006; cf. Wendt, 1999, 70). In addition, understanding the specifics of different cases benefits the planning of concrete activities here and now. This approach is in line with a policy analysis approach that focuses on the examination of political processes and definitional struggles as the basis of these processes (Hajer, 1995; Hajer and Wagenaar (eds.), 2003), and approaches that put an emphasis on practice (Laffey and Weldes, 1998; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny (eds.), 2001; Mol and Law, 2002; Neumann, 2002).

In consequence, this kind of an approach draws on social constructivism, which I consider as a specific position in the philosophy of social sciences rather than a uniform theory. I believe a constructivist-inspired approach to IR and, more to the point, to Russian studies systematises empirical work and has the potential to counter tendencies towards excessive specialisation in area studies, that is, tendencies to know more and more about less and less (cf. Christiansen, Jørgensen

[1] I draw here on the research group of the Department (Haila and Jokinen (eds), 2001: 309) who define the term "environmental question" as an aggregate that reaches beyond individual environmental problems. The "environmental question" is based on the idea that the environment as a basis of human life is endangered and that this poses certain prerequisites for action.

[2] This is commensurate with the constructivist approach to the study of International Relations; it draws on the notion that since the world is so complicated, no overarching theory of IR is possible (Guzzini, 2000).

and Wiener, 2001: 3-4). Moreover, the idea of social construction is significant for environmental policy. A change in the environment becomes an environmental problem only after it is defined as a problem (Haila and Levins, 1992). Problems can be defined in several, often contradictory ways, which usually implies that a struggle over the "right" definition of the problem takes place. Policies planned and performed to solve environmental problems are dependent on these definition struggles as well. This makes it logical to apply a problem-oriented approach to environmental policy analysis and to look at problem definitions when the dynamics of environmental policy and cooperation is analysed.[3]

My research setting emphasises the concepts of problem definition and problem closure, identity and interest, practice and social learning. The significance of these concepts stems from the social constructivist-inspired idea that before actors can cast themselves into cooperation, they need to choose a course of action by defining the situation. They need to define what the problem is and how to solve that problem. The definition does not exist "out there" but is based on the identities and interests of actors and also on what actors think others will do. In consequence with this, problem definition and also problem closure are important concepts for understanding the dynamics of environmental policy formation. The solution of an environmental problem implies a certain definition of the problem. To put it another way, problem closure assumes that the definition of the problem needs to be based on the same criteria as the definition of the proposed solution. Furthermore, problem definitions are linked to actors' interests. Interests shape the repertoire of possible solutions to the problem the actor can think of enforcing. Interests, in turn, are not "given". They are constructed in historically specific circumstances in a dialectic relationship with actors' identities. Identities are formed intersubjectively. This indicates that the construction of interests and the definition of problems and their possible solutions are also bound to interaction. In other words, interests, identities and definitions of problems and their solutions are internally related and produced and reproduced through the practice of actors. People negotiate the world (both social and physical) by acting upon it. Finally, the practice of actors produces new identities and, thereby, new interests and problem definitions, through a logic that can be called social learning. In social learning, shared meanings and new understandings of self and other are produced. Thus, social learning changes our conceptions of who we are and what we want. In sum, in this thesis I look at how different ways of defining problems and their possible solutions produce (or do not produce) shared meanings and identities, and how these definitions encourage social learning in environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe.

[3] Constructivism was introduced into the discipline of IR only in the late 1980s and has since then risen rapidly to disciplinary prominence. One advantage constructivism has is that the possibility of rapid, radical change is one of its central tenets and, therefore, it has been able to explain the end of the Cold War perhaps more coherently than conventional IR theories (Sterling-Folker, 2006: 115). According to constructivists, the end of the Cold War showed that international relations are not fixed and do not exist independently of human action and cognition. Hence the international system is a system whose rules are made and reproduced by human practices. Only these intersubjective rules, and not some unchangeable truths, give meaning to international practices (Guzzini, 2000: 155).

1.3 The structure of the thesis

In the following chapter, I report briefly on the six separate studies. In Chapter 3, in turn, I describe the theoretical concepts used in the thesis as well as their methodological implications. In Chapter 3, I also discuss what kind of conceptual tools International Relations as an academic discipline has to offer for the study of environmental cooperation and how the "environmental question" challenges these tools.

Chapter 4 sets the individual studies (articles I-VI) in their historical context. The chapter does not aim at reporting the history of environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole, but concentrates on processes which are relevant for understanding the phenomena described in the individual studies. The purpose of Chapter 5, in turn, is to illustrate the problem definitions and practices of Russian–European environmental cooperation. In other words, in Chapter 5 I explore the dimensions of the dynamics of regime-building, specified in section 1.1. Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss the main conclusions of the research in terms of the main research task and the methodological challenge.

2. The individual studies

2.1 About the selection of the research topics

This thesis consists of six separate studies that are independent from each other in the sense that each has its own research setting. This indicates that methods of analysis also vary from case to case. Nevertheless, all these studies illuminate the problematic of environmental regime-building, although from different angles. They are bound together by the general research questions of the thesis I explicate in the preceding chapter. All separate studies also draw on the same social constructivist and problem-oriented methodology on which I have based my thesis (see Chapter 3). The aim was not to use the separate studies to present the whole history of Russian–European environmental cooperation. Instead, the aim of the separate studies is to explicate certain dynamic characteristics related to environmental policy and cooperation that recur from case to case (cf. Haila and Dyke, 2006).

The individual studies focus on different instances of Russian—European environmental regime-building. I choose these examples by first mapping the process of Russian—European environmental regime-building from the early 1970s to the present. (A concise version of this mapping is presented in Chapter 4 as the context of the individual studies.) To do this I familiarised myself with literary material such as annual reports and policy papers, interviews with Russian and Finnish actors (see Appendix I), and previous studies presented by authors such as Heidi Hiltunen (1994), Vladimir Kotov and Elena Nikitina (1995), Robert Darst (2001), Christer Pursiainen et al. (2001), Geir Hønneland (2003), Jonathan Oldfield et al. (2003) and Geir Hønneland and Anne-Kristin Jørgensen (2007).

The mapping of the process of Russian–European environmental regime-building brought out the most significant developments of the process. On the basis of the mapping it seemed to me that besides using the severity of an environmental problem as a criterion for the selection of study objects, the overall research setting required a focus on instances with a variety of actor compositions. In addition, I was interested in studying cases in which environmental aspects were a part of a larger problematic (such as the environment in military activity). One criterion for the selection was also the feasibility of the study: I excluded objects that would have required extreme effort – such as getting to a military base in north-west Russia, for instance – to study.

In addition to the initial mapping of Russian–European environmental regime-building, the selection of study objects was reshaped by the research process itself. I began with the separate studies from the case that focuses on the St Petersburg water sector (articles III and IV). Initially, I also had an intention to study some cases parallel with the St Petersburg water sector, for example the cooperation aimed at

the improvement of the hazardous waste management utility close to the city of St Petersburg. Having completed the St Petersburg case I realised, however, that studying a parallel case would most probably just duplicate the results of the St Petersburg case. Accordingly, I decided to extend the scope of my research above and below the regional level; to the non-governmental sector (article II), and to global climate policy (article VI). I think it was crucial to include climate policy in the study, as it is absolutely the most significant process of international environmental politics at the moment.

In 2004, I was asked to participate in the project that produced the book, The EU–Russia energy dialogue and prospects of Russia's European integration. In this project, I studied Finnish policy narratives for engaging Russia in dialogue with the European Union. The study focused substantially on the interdependence of environmental and energy issues. Even though I did not originally consider including this study in my thesis, once the study was finished I realised that it offered an important contribution to the overall setting of my thesis (see section 2.2). Accordingly, the study represented by article I was chosen for the thesis somewhat accidentally. The Kursk case reported in article V, in turn, is based on the study I had already conducted for my Master's thesis in 2001. In many respects, not only substantially but also methodologically, it forms a basis for this doctoral thesis, which is why I chose to include it here.

One could probably question the logic of choosing such a heterogeneous array of individual studies as I have done in this thesis. As I wrote earlier, I initially had a different preliminary plan, but the process of the work took me beyond the original scope of the study. I argue that this was only for the good, as the disparate nature of the individual studies actually provides for the identification of dynamic similarities in the cases. Consequently, the individual studies as they stand now illustrate the different sides of the dynamics of regime-building that otherwise might have remained undercover. The individual studies vary also in that I use differing materials and methods across the studies. I found this kind of triangulation useful, too, as it brought about new trajectories to follow and contributed to the creation of an extensive and many-sided picture of the problem.

In the following section, I describe the separate studies in a nutshell. At the end of each section, I also discuss in brief the significance of each case for the overall research setting.

2.2 The Nordic countries: engaging Russia, trading in energy or taming environmental threats? (article I)

The study reported in article I (together with Dr. Pami Aalto) elucidates the northern European regional level of the European Union–Russian energy dialogue. As the article title indicates, environmental aspects are closely linked to the subject matter. While the Nordic states are unified by their strong legacy of historical ties and subsequent Nordic cooperation since the Cold War era, their relationships with the EU and Russia differ from each other, in energy policy issues in particular. The

Nordic countries are all bound to EU energy policy either through the European Union or membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). In addition, they also cooperate among themselves on energy questions.

The mix of the Nordic countries' mutual ties and their differences in relation to the European Union, and their energy cooperation and its links to the Union's Northern Dimension policy, evokes questions on the extent to which they are in tune with the strategic level objectives of the EU–Russian energy dialogue. All Nordic states emphasise the principle of sustainability in this dialogue, leaning on their tendency to promote the sustainability principle in both bilateral and multilateral forums. In this context, the aim of the study is to examine whether the Nordic actors manage to introduce any specific building blocks for a regional level interface to the EU–Russian energy dialogue or if their insistence on sustainable development in energy issues in some ways makes dialogue more difficult.

In the study, the ability and desire of the Nordic states to engage Russia in dialogue, their patterns of trading in energy and their actions and motivations in taming the associated environmental threats were analysed in a comparative manner. Furthermore, because Norway and Finland represent the extreme ends in the energy question – Finland is highly dependent on Russian energy imports while Norway is a major energy exporter – we chose them as foci of a more detailed analysis. In this analysis, we explicated the policy narratives used by Norwegian and Finnish actors to justify their actions in the energy field. I was responsible for the Finnish case and Pami Aalto for the Norwegian case. The material I analysed for outlining the narratives consisted of interviews with civil servants in the Finnish Ministries of the Environment (7), Trade and Industry (1) and Foreign Affairs (2) (see Appendix I), as well as of relevant policy documents and speeches of Finnish actors. I conducted the study mainly in 2005.

The results of the study suggest that Finland, Sweden and Denmark remain somewhat ill-shaped actors in EU–Russian energy dialogue. Instead, Norway's resources, its state-bound companies and the mix of competitive and partnership ties they are developing with the Russian parties make Norway a much more significant actor. Norway shares many of the interests and problems that the EU is experiencing vis-à-vis Russia, but simultaneously conducts its own energy dialogue with Russia. With regard to the sustainability principle, Norway's focus on the Barents Sea can make an important contribution to the realisation of the principle in northern European energy policy. For Finland, the question of the security of supplies is relevant in the same way as for most EU members today. While Finnish energy companies conduct their business "as usual" with their Russian partners, on the political level the desire is to be less dependent on Russia in terms of energy imports. This amorphousness is at least partly explained by the threat-centred narrative that has directed Finnish policies towards Russia. The article shows that the main Finnish narrative about the engagement of Russia is constructed around the idea of Finland having to combat threats, mainly environmental, posed by Russia towards it. Facilitating cooperation between the EU and Russia in all possible sectors is seen as one instrument for combating these threats. In this light, it is evident that Finnish actors stress the interdependence of actors and issues, perhaps best crystallised in energy issues, in order to have the idea of cooperation accepted

as a general principle. Simultaneously, Finland has high hopes of facilitating environmental cooperation in the energy context, too. At the moment, it is not satisfied with the current state of the EU–Russian energy dialogue nor with the Union's overall engagement with Russia.

All in all, the results of the study suggest that Nordic actors confuse and question the EU–Russian energy dialogue more than facilitate it. As long as the Commission lacks a full mandate for external energy issues, and adequate resources, the Nordic cases suggest that it would be advantageous to listen to the member countries and engage them more firmly in the dialogue. While the Commission is needed to facilitate the dialogue at the highest political level, member countries and regional actors already experienced in cooperating with Russia on energy issues remain best placed to bring concrete form to the cooperation, such as regional approaches, small or medium-sized projects, and public-private partnerships.

The study reported in article I is important for the general setting out of my thesis especially as it sheds light on the interdependence of economic, political, environmental and also cultural and historical aspects of Russian–European relations. By taking into account diverse actors at a variety of levels, it underlines the importance of these actors in the formation of dialogues and policies. In addition, the study demonstrates the interplay of material and politico-normative considerations in policy formation: in the Finnish case, the interference of politically constructed perceptions of threat concerning energy dependence dissolves the image of materialistically and technically conducted energy policy. In a similar way, politically and culturally constructed perceptions shape problem definitions, policy formation and implementation in other sectors of cooperation as well. Accordingly, the study opens up the problematic related to the relationship between problem definitions, motivations and identities (see Chapter 3), which is important to understand when analysing the process of cooperation from the point of view of learning.

2.3 Action frames of environmental organisations in post-Soviet St Petersburg (article II)

In the study to which article II is devoted, I examined the collective action frames of environmental non-governmental organisations acting in St Petersburg. The focus of the study was on the environmental movement organisations of St Petersburg. I looked at the collective action frames of the organisations and the consequences of those frames with respect to the action space of the organisations. The data of the study consists of 19 interviews I undertook with members of the organisations in spring 2004.

I examined collective action frames in order to explain why the St Petersburg environmental organisations seem to have to cope with very different opportunities for action although their external opportunity structures look quite similar. Collective action frames enable or constrain action by shaping the definition of problems and their possible solutions (for framing and problem definition see also

section 3.4). I followed the frame analysis method suggested by Snow and Benford (1988). According to their definition, collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities of a social movement organisation. There are three core framing tasks. The first task is called diagnostic framing and implies diagnosing an event or aspect of life as problematic and in need of alteration. Diagnostic framing also includes attribution of blame. The second task, prognostic framing, involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem and the strategy and tactics to strive for the solution. The third task is motivational framing, which provides a rationale for engaging in ameliorative action.

As to the diagnostic framing among the St Petersburg environmental organisations, I found that there is a consensus on the identification of problems: the main problem is the lack of adequate environmental policy in Russia. This implies, above all, weaknesses in environmental legislation, insufficient control of the existing legislation and rigidity and instability of administrative structures. However, there is a great diversity with respect to the attribution of blame. I indicated five distinctive sets of attributes that the interviewed representatives of organisations articulated. I called these sets the frames of "hegemony", "inactive civil society", "information", "mentality" and "economic situation" in accordance with what they define as the blame. As to the framing of the prognosis, I delineated four frames and named them as "education", "participation", "cooperation" and "hopelessness". These names reveal what the proponents of each frame offer for solution and strategy. Motivational frames are less varying, because the main motivation for the activity of almost all NGO members in St Petersburg is to scrape a living and/or the professional background of the organisation members.

The analysis indicates that because the environmental organisations of St Petersburg orient their activities according to an extensive variety of collective action frames, the movement organisations remain without a unifying ideology and are rather fragmented. The framings reflect how the organisations see their opportunities to act. This, in turn, affects – constrains or enables – these opportunities (see section 3.3). For example, the frames that define the diagnosis so that the situation appears relatively desperate and immutable by civic activity, or the frames that define the prognosis in a way that there are not many solutions to the problem, make the judgement that their action space is very limited. Luckily, there are also frames that make the situation look a bit brighter, too.

Although the study links the frames to their material, historical and cultural contexts and points out their effects on framings, it underlines that the main constraint of civic activity in St Petersburg seems to be the fatalism deeply rooted in Russian culture: problems are framed so cataclysmically that ameliorative actions seem highly unlikely to work. More to the point, the study concludes that there are possibilities for environmental NGOs to act in Russia, if one just believes that the situation is not inevitably gloomy and that individuals can contribute to the altering of the situation, not only alongside with the authorities but also by making claims.

The significance of the case for the overall thesis is, first and foremost, that it widens the scope of the study to include non-governmental actors also. The role of non-governmental actors in environmental regime-building cannot be emphasised

too much: non-governmental actors are a significant (and critical) force in the formation of environmental action in a country where state environmental policy is still seeking its form. The study also demonstrates that NGOs in Russia can have possibilities to act and that cooperation with them would thus be reasonable. Second, the case elaborates the methodological contribution of my thesis. It illustrates how frames relate to action through problem definitions and definitions of the possible solutions to problems, and how framing processes act as a mechanism for collective identity construction. These are important themes for the research setting of my thesis (see section 3.3).

2.4 Environmental cooperation and learning: the St Petersburg water sector (article III)

The third study examines multilateral cooperation aimed at the improvement of the St Petersburg water sector. The overall scope of the cooperation is large, extending to the year 2015, so I chose to examine one part of it, the Corporate Development Support Programme, which was carried out between 1998 and 2001 to support institutional development of St Petersburg's Vodokanal water and sewage utility. The Corporate Development Support Programme was conducted as a cooperation between St Petersburg Vodokanal and four foreign partners. Following completion of the programme, the utility is now more systematic and cost-efficient in its functions than it was beforehand. The utility is no longer dependent on federal and city subsidies, from which it follows that it has achieved reliability that further facilitates foreign investments. I chose this programme as the focus of analysis because it has been relatively successful. In addition, its size and timeframe were manageable for a case study. Moreover, I focused the study on the Finnish partner because of its prolonged engagement with St Petersburg Vodokanal – uninterrupted since 1991 – thus giving ground also to evaluate the importance of continuity for learning. For this study, I interviewed 29 key persons: 11 were Russians working at Vodokanal, five were Finns working for Helsinki Water and the rest were representatives of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment. I worked on the study mainly in 2002 and 2003.

In the study, I analysed conditions for social learning in the case by describing the cooperation process and how different ways of speaking about the nature of cooperation figure with practices and material conditions of cooperation. I delineated two different ways of speaking, which I named the "partnership" speech and the "besserwisser" speech. These nominations summed up the views participants of cooperation had on the nature of their mutual relations. On the one hand, participatory methods and work on an equal basis were underlined by everybody. On the other hand, there was a clear dichotomy between foreign and Russian parties, the first mentioned as acting in the role of "teachers" and the last mentioned in the role of "learners". From this, it followed that sometimes foreign partners are seen as "besserwissers" and sometimes they also enhance this image by underlining their know-how.

The concept of social learning I leaned on in the study emphasises practice, interaction, participation and open communication rather than training or educating as methods to achieve learning. The results of the study, especially the existence of the "partnership speech", indicate that the approach emphasising participation was strongly encouraged in the cooperation under the programme. Long association and less formal small-scale practices, such as twinning between Vodokanal and Helsinki Water, were applauded for their empowering effect. Nevertheless, the "besserwisser speech" supported another, less democratic view of the cooperation. Accordingly, the realisation of the participatory approach succeeded only partly, thus anticipating that the achieved outcomes resulted more from adaptation than learning.

It is evident that this ambiguity is a consequence of the institutional setting of cooperation, which enhances both the material and social imbalance between cooperating parties. This imbalance formed barriers, mental in particular, to open communication and interaction. For instance, as was demonstrated in the article, terms and concepts used in the course of the cooperation were unfamiliar to most of the Vodokanal staff, who kept silent in project meetings.

In conclusion, the case shows that the challenge of learning in multilateral cooperation is how to change the material and practical conditions of cooperation, institutional arrangements and the distribution of resources so as to enable and facilitate full participation and open communication that enable learning. As I proposed in the article, this challenge could be addressed by applying flexible, small-scale, interactive and relatively informal forms of cooperation, such as twinning and other day-to-day joint activities. Looking from this perspective, the long association of partners may also turn out to be more productive and have a greater multiplicative effect than large-scale projects selected on the basis of competitive bidding. Other questions critical for learning are: What are the underlying premises of cooperative programmes? Who controls and how? What is the scale of projects? Who sets the tasks and goals, why and how?

This study is significant for the overall thesis, first and foremost because it introduces the concept of social learning and examines its constraints in the context of a concrete case of cooperation. Furthermore, the improvement of the St Petersburg water sector with the help of European partners is one of the biggest environmental projects carried out in Russia. Thus, it forms a significant part of environmental regime-building between Europe and Russia.

2.5 Environmental governance in Russia: changing conditions for international environmental cooperation in the case of the Murmansk region mining industry and the St Petersburg water sector (article IV)

The fourth study I conducted together with Olli Salmi in 2006-2007. The study focuses on two cases of environmental cooperation in Russia: the case of the St

Petersburg water sector and the case of the Murmansk region mining industry. Both cooperation projects have their roots in the early 1990s and are continuing today. The cases differ from each other in that the case of the St Petersburg water sector embodies a municipal service provider whereas the Murmansk region case pertains to extractive industry. In addition, the St Petersburg water sector case has been successful in terms of the cooperation, while the case of the Murmansk region mining industry has experienced failures. These disparities do not, however, make their examination in a comparative manner groundless; on the contrary, their examination is valuable for the identification of dynamic similarities. Because the part for which I was responsible in this study focuses on the St Petersburg water sector, I took advantage of the interviews I had taken earlier for the fifth case study. Because of the different research setting, the material naturally needed to be analysed anew.

The study aimed to evaluate how changes in environmental governance in Russia have conditioned environmental cooperation. We explicated the processes through which the cooperation has evolved and applied the concept of a policy network to analyse the process of cooperation in relation to the changing governance.

The case studies revealed two rather different processes of environmental cooperation. The St Petersburg water sector case can be considered one of the few success stories of international environmental cooperation in Russia, whereas the Murmansk region case was less successful as the cooperation partners were caught in the midst of the privatisation process of not only Russian industry but of Russian environmental policy as well. The cooperation in St Petersburg has helped the city's water and sewage utility to become a powerful local and regional actor in environmental management. In the case of the Murmansk region mining industry, in turn, few of the achieved environmental improvements can be credited to international cooperation, as a great deal of the investment for the Pechenganikel restructuring came from the company itself.

The policy networks in the two cases differ significantly from each other. In the case of the St Petersburg water sector, the parties – the management of the utility, foreign partners and the authorities – shared a common interest in solving the water-related problems in the city of St Petersburg throughout the cooperation. Moreover, they perceived the underlying environmental problems in a rather congruent way, which helped in the negotiation of the goals of the cooperation. The central idea of the cooperation was widely shared: to develop the utility according to European standards of water and waste-water management. In addition, the members of the policy network were allowed to negotiate and define the desirable means and goals for the cooperation without much steering from above: the relative financial and administrative self-sufficiency of the St Petersburg water utility allowed it to act independently of federal, local and regional authorities and subsidies. By contrast, in the Murmansk region case the problems in the cooperation originated partly from the unclear status of the federal government's role and partly from the partners' different perceptions of the severity of the environmental problems in and around the Murmansk region. The environmental objectives of the company differed from those of the foreign counterparts and environmental authorities. While the latter focused on the improvement of the ecological situation in the Barents region at a

low cost – a reasonable objective for any government's environmental policy – the company experienced market pressure that forced it to trade off emission reductions for production increases. In the absence of an administrative body, the cooperation with purely environmental objectives had a poor chance of success. Accordingly, the network members in the Murmansk region case held conflicting views over the means and goals of the cooperation and had covert opportunistic interests, which significantly reduced the potential for successful project implementation.

In the conclusions of the study, we argued that general changes in environmental governance in Russia have conditioned environmental cooperation in a very context-specific and congruent way. The federal government has shown little interest in resolving environmental problems at the regional level and has handed over most of its policy-making power to policy networks consisting of regional and local level actors. This progress has opened up "windows of opportunity" and enabled direct cross-border contacts. In other words, changes in environmental governance have enhanced the autonomy of local actors solving practical problems and improved the possibilities for local stakeholders to participate in environmental projects. At the same time, cooperational success has become very dependent on local actors' interests and commitment. Accordingly, identification of the relevant policy networks, which vary from case to case, has become critical for successful environmental cooperation in Russia. In other words, the weakness of administrative structures defining the frame of environmental cooperation in Russia implies that no universal model to be applied in cooperative projects exists. Instead, the ideal form of cooperation is shaped by the cases themselves.

The fourth study is relevant for the overall thesis especially because it illuminates the development of environmental governance in Russia and its implications for environmental cooperation, thus attaching Russian–European environmental regime-building to the context of Russian environmental policy. It also reveals how the perhaps not always so conscious decentralisation of authority in environmental policy in Russia has, in fact, opened up "windows of opportunity" for environmental activities, and enabled learning. As such, these are important results for the research setting of my thesis.

2.6 Environmental security: the case of the Kursk (article V)

In this study, I set the question of how the environmental impact of military activity could be addressed politically: could the concept of environmental security offer a solution and what then would be the role of public discussion and environmental movements in addressing these problems? I used the sinking of the Russian nuclear-powered submarine, the Kursk, and the Russian public discussion following it as a prism through which to look at the issue. My main research question was how different conceptions of security and the environmental threat were constructed and interpreted in Russian public discussion concerning the Kursk accident. For the study, I followed the discussion intensively from August 2000 to April 2001 –

during this period, the Kursk was in the headlines daily. First, I collected all news about the accident published in two Russian newspapers, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Segodnya in that period. I examined 261 mentions altogether. Second, I collected further material from other newspapers to support and contest the themes and arguments I had listed from Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Segodnya. In analysing the arguments, I applied the methodology of argumentation analysis (new rhetoric) developed by Chaïm Perelman (e.g. 1982), paying special attention to unproblematised cultural premises on which the argumentation was based.

I found out that the security-related themes of the discussion varied as time went on. The first days after the accident were filled with concern for the fate of the crew of the Kursk. Later on, the themes of the security debate were merged into more general themes regarding the character of security threats, the object of security, who is responsible for providing security and the instruments of security policy. Environmental threats were discussed more sporadically: first, the main environmental aspect in the discussion was the immediate environmental effect of the accident, and then the environmental risk caused by raising or not raising the wreck. Environmental aspects were also connected to more fundamental issues about security.

The results of the study indicate the change in the conceptions of security in Russia since the days of the military confrontation during the Cold War, and security is, at least partly, understood within a broadening frame. In other words, unconventional, non-military threats were, in the discussion, considered even more relevant to the security of the state and its citizens than conventional military threats. Russia was seen to be more threatened by, for example, ageing technologies than by the possibility of military aggression. Moreover, the discussion supported reliance on international cooperation, despite the threat of military secrets being revealed in the course of cooperation. However, as I concluded in article V, the change in the conceptions of security appears not to be so evident on a more abstract level. By this, I mean that the discussion showed clearly that cultural patterns of thought stemming from the Cold War era, such as conceiving security in terms of dichotomies such as “us” versus “them” and accusing enemies of posing security threats, are still very much present. Furthermore, the provision of security was, in the discussion, seen as a duty of the state authorities while the role of citizens was considered less important. Instead of these kind of dichotomies, however, unconventional threats embody the view that people can contribute to their prevention together. I argued also that concern for the environment was rather implicit and superficial in the Kursk case because other military-related problems and environmental risks – which are many in the region – were to a great extent excluded from discussion. The accident attracted so much attention that it offered the potential to draw other military-related environmental problems of the Kola Peninsula into the discussion, too. This potential was not exploited, however, except for the European Union, which made its offer of help to raise the wreck of the Kursk conditional on Russian acceptance of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme (MNEPR), aimed at the radioactive clean-up of the Kola Peninsula. Russia did not agree to this condition.

As the result of the study, I consider discussing environmental problems in security terms as a relatively unfruitful basis for environmental protection and environmental policy in Russia, where the state of civil society as well as democratic institutions in general still remains questionable. More to the point, the concept of security seems to carry connotations, such as the strong role of the authorities. This indicates that labelling non-military problems as security issues might hamper citizen activity. In addition, security rhetoric can also be used to legitimate dubious decisions. Accordingly, a real danger of the militarisation of non-military issues appears. I concluded the article by suspecting that taking environmental issues out of the realm of "low politics" and raising them to the agenda of "high politics" to be handled under security issues might actually be counterproductive, as it might marginalise grassroots activity.

The question of the appropriate level and scale of activities is closely linked to the overall setting of my thesis and, even if substantially differing from other cases, the Kursk case has actually contributed to the final form of this thesis in an impressive manner. Since this study was the first I conducted (in 2001), it forms the basis for the further studies and opens up the way to the question of scales as well as to that of problem construction, which are pondered in more detail in further studies.

2.7 Russia: a great ecological power in global climate policy? Framing climate change as a policy problem in Russian public discussion (article VI)

In the sixth study, I focused on Russian participation in global climate policy. I examined how the issue is discussed in main Russian newspapers during the period 1.1.00–31.12.04. The research question was: in what ways is climate change as an international policy problem, and Russia's role in alleviating that problem, defined in the main Russian newspapers? The aim of the study was also to look at how these definitions are reflected in the conduct of Russian policy. The material for the study consisted of 394 newspaper articles published in five major Russian newspapers – Kommersant, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Izvestiya, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Moskovskii Komsomolets.

In the analysis, I used frames to narrate the relationship between a view of the problem and a sense of what should be done in order to tackle the problem. I differentiated between three frames in relation to how they view the main dimensions of the problem, what they suggest should be done about the problem and how they reason why to act. The first frame, which I nominated as the "mission" frame, views climate change as a political, rather than an environmental problem in the first place. Accordingly, it leaves the essence of climate change as an environmental problem without much discussion. Instead, the mission frame links the problem of climate change to the wider context of international relations. It sees Russian participation in global climate policy as a chance to enhance the international image of Russia and to restore its Great Power status. The mission

frame draws on the idea that Russia has a great reserve of natural resources, forests in particular, that are of global importance for fighting climate change. In addition, it underlines that Russia managed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the 1990s. The frame insists that because of this environmental "progressiveness", Russia is a do-gooder in global climate policy, a "great ecological power" as the argument goes. The frame is widely supported by a variety of actors; surprisingly also by nearly all foreign actors figuring in the Russian newspapers.

The second frame, which I named the "discrimination" frame, leans on the diagnosis that, on the one hand, the impact of human activity on climate change is not scientifically proven. On the other hand, the frame diagnoses, research indicates that Russia as a northern country with harsh climatic conditions would in fact benefit from global warming. The discrimination frame pinpoints Russia as a global do-gooder in environmental terms, drawing on the same arguments as the mission frame. However, the discrimination frame insists that because of Russia's environmental progressiveness, the conditions of the Kyoto Protocol are not fair on Russia. In fact, they are discriminatory and, as it stands, the Kyoto Protocol should not be ratified by Russia. The frame is supported in particular by some politicians who are trying to gain concessions for Russia in the Protocol. Moreover, the discriminatory frame is favoured by certain geographers of the Russian Academy of Science. They participate actively in the definition of climate change as a policy problem in Russia and are thus supposed to be in a rather central position for the formation of public attitudes towards climate policy.

The third frame is best characterised by the term "duty". It more or less shares the problem definitions that the current formulation of global climate policy is based on and thus agrees with the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. While the two other frames emphasise the positive role of Russia for the global climate, the duty frame admits that Russia is a part of the problem, not necessarily a solution. According to the frame, Russia is not a very advanced country in environmental terms and, moreover, it has delayed the global climate policy process by not ratifying the Protocol. Thus, it is the duty of Russia (as well as other countries) to join the Kyoto Protocol and do its best in order to alleviate the problem of climate change. The duty frame also makes the point that fundamental changes in economic and societal structure are needed in Russia in order to combat climate change. It is important to note that neither of the other two frames makes specific domestic proposals on what to do to alleviate the problem of climate change. The duty frame is supported by environmentally aware actors, such as the former minister of the environment, and also by the ex-president, Mikhail Gorbachev.

The examination of the frames illustrates the confusion over Russia's position in world affairs. The three frames take differing standpoints to whether it is environmental supremacy, economic status or the way Russia fulfils its duties to its own citizens and the rest of the world that makes Russia "great". The duty frame argues that this is the way that Russia fulfils its international obligations, whereas the mission and discrimination frames lean on Russia's natural reserves and geopolitical status as the basis for the greatness. Thus, the mission and discrimination frames draw on the idea of Russia as a great ecological power. This idea is very much in line with the development of state environmental policies that

have recently emphasised natural resource extraction rather than their protection, and neglected pollution abatement needs. As a conclusion of the study, I argued that since the great ecological power does not pay particular attention to environmental defects taking place in Russia, not to mention that it would make suggestions for domestic environmental policy improvements, the idea fails to serve interests in the long run. More to the point, European actors should probably constrain themselves from caving in on the rhetoric provided by the idea of Russia as a great ecological power, which is what they largely do at the moment. There is a danger that by leaning on this idea and rhetoric Russia will be given some extra leeway in international environmental politics, notably because Europe is dependent on energy exports from Russia and is therefore also careful in its other moves. It may turn out that the European tactic of resorting to wooing Russia with the "great ecological power" rhetoric will embolden Russia to conduct more impudent environmental policies, especially on the domestic stage but also internationally.

The relevance of the sixth case study for the overall thesis lies no doubt in that it demonstrates how the idea of Russia as a great ecological power has entered the discussion on Russia's role for the global environment. It also indicates the implications the idea may carry for Russia's participation in international environmental politics and in regional regime-building. At a more abstract level, it sheds light on the methodological problematic of the thesis by discussing the relationship between framing, practice and identity-building. Moreover, climate change as the greatest challenge of international environmental politics cannot be excluded from a study that focuses on Russian–European environmental regime-building. The study illuminates the complexity of this challenge and the interdependence of its economic, political and environmental aspects.

3. Theoretical background

3.1 The challenge of studying environmental cooperation

3.1.1 IR perspectives on the study of environmental regimes

As the question of cooperation is one of the central themes of International Relations as an academic discipline, it is worth looking at different perspectives from which environmental cooperation is approached in the IR literature. Environmental cooperation has been studied from the viewpoint of the formation, implementation and effectiveness of international environmental policies on global environmental issues such as ozone depletion, marine pollution or climate change (Young, 1989; Haas P., 1990; Liftin, 1994; Young (ed.), 1999; Harris (ed.), 2003). Another bulk of research focuses on how the internationalisation of environmental politics has affected domestic political institutions and policy-making processes (Schreurs and Economy (eds.), 1997).

The concept of regime is a common nominator for most studies of international environmental cooperation (in particular Young, 1989; Haas P., 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Haas, Keohane and Levy (eds.), 1993; Young and Osherenko (eds.), 1993; Underdal and Young (eds.), 2004). In Stephen Krasner's (1982: 186) widely accepted definition, regimes are described as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations". While some international institutions are broad and encompassing, most regimes are functionally and geographically limited. International environmental regimes regulate activities concerning global climate change, the dumping of oily wastes at sea, trade in endangered species and trans-boundary air pollution, to name but a few (Oshenrenko and Young, 1993: 2). Krasner sees the power of regimes in their ability to allow the establishment of cooperation in issues where diverse problems cross national borders. Regimes are formed to overcome collective problems through the coordination of activities. Accordingly, the importance of natural resource and environmental regimes plays an increasing role in structuring international relations as trans-boundary pollution, the protection of biodiversity and other environmental issues have come to the attention of policy-makers and the public.

Gareth Porter, Janet Welsh Brown and Pamela Chasek (2000: 16-20) summarise major views on how and why international regimes arise. Similar typology is offered by Hasenclever, Rittberger and Mayer in their comprehensive review of

regime formation (1997: 1-7; see also Young and Osherenko, 1993). They divide the different approaches to regime study roughly into three approaches: power-based, interest-based and idea-based.

Looked at from the power-based perspective, cooperation emerges largely due to hegemonic distributions of power, in cases when a dominant state is able to use its power to create and enforce the institutional rules necessary to sustain between states (Reus-Smit, 2001: 211). Hegemonies, or groups of leading powers, establish cooperation that serves their interests and then impose upon others to participate. International institutions, including issue-specific regimes, are thus structured by and reflect the interests or preferences of the dominant member(s) of the international system (cf. Osherenko and Young, 1993: 9). These interests are not formed by the interests of whatever groups control the administrative structure of the state, but states are like persons and have their own interests. States behave in accordance with these interests and are essentially egoists. Moreover, states cooperate only when their expected gains are greater than the gains for the other relevant parties. This follows from the focus on the balance of power (Brown, 1997: 33-34; 51). Because of this egoism, cooperation is exceptional and instrumental, as an alliance against an enemy, not an end in itself (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999: 83).

According to the interest-based perspective, rational actors enter cooperation to achieve joint gains regardless of power distributions (Barkdull and Harris, 2002: 67). Actors cooperate insofar as they make absolute gains for their interests. As long as they are satisfied with their own situation, they are not worried about how well other states are doing (Keohane, 1984: 67). However, cooperation remains difficult to achieve, because even when states have interests in common the lack of a central world authority deters them from incurring the reciprocal obligations that cooperation demands. Without such authority, the prisoner's dilemma or the risk of cheating and free-riding may hinder cooperation (Brown, 1997: 50). Both the power-based and interest-based perspectives on regimes draw on rationalist assumptions. According to these assumptions, actors are capable of finding the most effective way to realise their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter. Moreover, actors' interests are exogenous to social interaction, indicating that actors enter social relations with their interests already formed. In this context, society is understood as a strategic realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their predefined interests (Reus-Smit, 2001: 213). In actual fact, most of the empirical work that has emerged in recent years dealing explicitly with environmental issues and international relations discusses regime formation and effectiveness from the interest-based viewpoint (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999: 107). This literature focuses on epistemic communities (Haas P., 1990, 1992 (ed.))[4]:

[4] Peter Haas, who introduced the concept of epistemic communities to denote the importance of highly specialised technical and scientific experts as international pressure groups, rationalises the idea of epistemic communities in the argument that "control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination" (Haas, 1992: 3). As an alternative to the interest-based perspective, the notion of "epistemic community" can also be introduced as a way of looking at influences on the conduct of International Relations that move beyond interests into the realm of ideas (Brown, 1997: 183).

neoliberal regime theory[5], treaty design in explaining successes and failures in international environmental cooperation efforts (Haas et al., 1993) and the role of interests and leadership as determinants of the effectiveness of environmental cooperation (Keohane and Levy (eds.), 1996). Rational choice approach and game theory have also been applied in analysing environmental cooperation, although to a lesser extent (Carraro (ed.), 1997; Hassler, 2003).

The idea-based perspective on cooperation, drawing largely on the constructivist heuristics, views the process of cooperation as constitutive. Accordingly, regime-building is a process of constructing shared ideas and meanings, of internalising new understandings of self and other; not just a process of creating external constraints on the behaviour of exogenously constituted actors. As Alexander Wendt, perhaps the most prominent IR constructivist, argues, "the process by which egoists learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms. Over time, this will tend to transform a positive interdependence of outcomes into a positive interdependence of utilities or collective interests organized around the norms in question" (Wendt, 1994: 87). By this, Wendt indicates that even if egoistic reasons were the starting point of interaction, the process of cooperating tends to redefine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments. This occurs through a logic Wendt calls social learning. I will return to the concept of social learning in more detail in section 3.2.3.

The idea-based perspective is critical of rationalist (both power-based and interest-based) perspectives, as these take ideas into account only insofar as they have effects beyond effects of power, interest and institutions. Instead, the idea-based perspective draws on the notion that ideas have constitutive effects on power and interest themselves and that only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material. According to Wendt (1999: 114-115), the material force constituting interests is human nature and the rest is ideational: schemas and deliberations that are constituted by shared ideas or culture.

3.1.2 The "environmental question"

In this thesis, I draw on the idea that, while having their basis in the material environment, environmental problems are socially constructed: a change in the environment becomes an environmental problem only after it is recognised and defined as a problem (Haila and Levins, 1992). The problem definition usually

[5] Neoliberal regime theory developed out of the complex interdependence model of international relations of the 1970s (see Keohane and Nye, 1972, 1974 and 1977). One of its basic assumptions is that states (and other actors) are rational egoists operating in an anarchical system. Why these actors want to cooperate is that there are absolute gains from cooperation (Soetendorp, 1994: 112). The mainstream regime theory is concerned about how states can benefit from international exchange and simultaneously maintain as much autonomy as possible. Therefore, the problem of dealing with the commons is "the management of interdependence in a system of sovereign states lacking the kinds of central authorities which are assumed to be providing order and regulation within domestic societies" (Vogler, 1996: 8, cited in Tennberg, 2000: 126).

embodies scientific inquiry, but inevitably also public recognition (Hannigan, 1995; Haila, 2007). People perceive environmental problems subjectively. This implies that problems can be defined in several ways and that sometimes a struggle over the "right" definition of the problem takes place (see Hajer, 1995). What is more, policies aimed at the solution of environmental problems are constructed through a struggle over right definitions as well.

Problem definition and policy formation are made intricate by certain characteristics of environmental problems, attributes such as "complex", "uncertain" and "global". Complexity implies that a change in the environment, leading to an environmental problem, is usually caused by a combination of different factors. In addition, its effects vary in time and space. Thus, the perception of the problem entails holistic understanding and, still, is context-specific. From this follows uncertainty concerning the character, meaning and probability of environmental problems. Because of the uncertainty embedded in environmental degradation, the evaluation of environmental risks and threats takes place intersubjectively, through the above-mentioned definition struggles.

The attribute "global" also characterises environmental problems. Environmental problems reach from the local to the global level. On the one hand, there are problems that are global by nature. In this case, the offending activity has "universal" impacts from which no state can exclude itself, no matter where it is located or how powerful it may be. These problems are deeply woven into the production systems of modern economies (Ruggie, 2004: 509). On the other hand, through these very same systems, problems originating from the local or regional level can have international impacts. The paradox environmental problems create is that often those suffering from environmental degradation most are those who have least to do with the emergence of this degradation in the first place. Ultimately, this concerns future generations.

In consequence, the complex, uncertain and global character of environmental problems leads to fundamental questions about equality, justice and participation[6] (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft (eds.), 1996). These questions are closely associated with decision-making structures, their centralisation and decentralisation both nationally and internationally. Thus, the question is not only about whether or not to act, but there are important questions such as what the "right" level of actions is, who the relevant actors are, what normative imperatives should inform policy-making and what the appropriate forms of political practice are (Hajer, 1995: 15).

In unpacking these questions, the concept of scale is useful. Scaling in environmental policy terms betokens the idea that processes in nature and society

[6] The so-called critical IR approaches extend the environmental problematic from studying regimes and cooperation to the exploration of questions about equity and justice, the importance of "social forces above and below the state" (Thomas, 1993: 4), and the negative synergies between militarism and environmental degradation (Elliott, 2004: 226). They draw on a range of theoretical interventions to contemplate more normatively driven and politically nuanced ways of understanding environmental change. A detailed investigation of those approaches that is termed "green theory" in IR and that more or less coincides with ecoradical approaches to environmental policy (e.g. Dryzek, 1987), is offered by Laferriére and Stoett (1999). I do not discuss critical approaches here in detail, because, while recognising the need for radical change in the world order, they are beyond the scope of this research.

have their characteristic spatial and temporal domains (Haila, 2002). First of all, there is the scale of the physical impacts of a given activity on natural processes and how these impacts appear in space and time. Impacts can be confined to a limited area or be widely dispersed. They can be wide-ranging or short-term. The appreciation of the scaling of physical impacts of environmental changes is not yet sufficient for understanding scaling in the social constitution and resolution of environmental problems. There is also the scale of social structures, practices and understandings that these physical impacts affect. Social impacts and impact scales are mediated through culture, economy and politics. This means that in different economic and political contexts physically similar environmental changes may lead to quite different societal effects. In addition, the human activity that causes these changes is part of a social practice and thus embedded in a broader system of socio-ecological interaction (Meadowcroft, 2002: 172-173).

James Meadowcroft (2002: 173-174) reminds us that "it is impossible – on an a priori basis – to determine in advance just which social scales will be relevant as an environmental problem takes physical form: for the scales will be partly determined by the understandings of the actors themselves, and by their interactions as they construct the problem and delimit the possible solution-space. (…) The tracking of the scale of a given problem is possible only if one takes this problem as a starting point and considers the way physical impacts affect the perceived interests of particular societal groups; the character of the practice with which the impacts are associated and how this is embedded within the larger socio-ecological formation; and the distribution of social power resources and the character of the institutional frames within which solutions are to be worked out."

3.1.3 The "environmental question" and the perspectives on regimes

The "environmental question" as a complex, uncertain and global issue challenges both the power-based and interest-based perspectives. Because of the basic idea that cooperation is exceptional, it is evident that the power-based perspective better explains the absence of environmental cooperation than the formation of environmental regimes in the first place (cf. Laferriére and Stoett, 1999: 103). If, however, applied to the analysis of environmental regime-building, the power-based perspective departs from the notion that environmental issues matter only insofar as they affect the balance of power in one way or another. As possible sources of conflict, overpopulation and insufficiency of natural resources are such issues (see article V; Homer-Dixon, 1999). In the case of "minor" problems, the balance of power explains environmental regime-building: the stronger state (or a group of states) may presumably deter the weaker state (or a group of states) from polluting air or water or from depleting fish stocks (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999: 104). The means of deterrence may be economic or political. For example, Robert Darst (2001: 16) who discusses East–West environmental cooperation also in the context of the international distribution of power maintains that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the newly independent states, suddenly almost prostrate in their

dependence upon the West, were compelled to respond positively to Western environmental concerns and proposals for environmental cooperation lest the (political, economic) support from the West be disrupted.

The power-based and interest-based perspectives alike draw on the rationalist notion that environmental, economic and political costs and the benefits of environmental efforts can be weighed on grocer's scales. In other words, environmental policy and regime formation are treated as linear processes of problem-solving on a rationalist basis. But rationalism in environmental policy is ostensible due to the complex, uncertain and global dimensions of the "environmental question". More to the point, both perspectives rarely move beyond state-centric and, even, authoritarian, response levels to problems (article V; Laferrière and Stoett, 1999: 103). The interest-based perspective takes non-state actors into account as they focus on institutions, but treats them mainly as secondary players (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999: 107). It thus neglects the explicit discussion about equality, justice and participation inherent in the "environmental question". There is, however, growing interest in the influence of non-state actors, including international organisations, multilateral corporations and international non-governmental organisations in policy formation (e.g. Lipshutz and Conca (eds.), 1993; Princen and Finger, 1994; Keohane and Levy (eds.), 1996).

While the power-based and interest-based perspectives draw on the logic that environmental regime-building is motivated by autogenous and objective rationalist interests and that the process of cooperation is shaped by the rational choice of actors, the idea-based perspective departs from the notion that motivations of cooperation – be they based on economic calculation, pursuit of power or common values – are intersubjective phenomena. Motivations shape the proposals for the forms of cooperation and the suggested solutions to the environmental problems the cooperation aims to address. Suggested solutions, in turn, reflect the definitions of the environmental problem at hand. In consequence, the process of cooperation is shaped by the reconstruction of these motivations in terms of shared understandings.

With this logic, the idea-based perspective manages to catch the dynamics of the "environmental question" that crucially affect environmental cooperation and regime-building. Consequently, I lean on the idea-based perspective in my study on environmental regime-building between Russia and Europe. For this perspective, the concepts of problem definition and problem closure, identity, interest, practice and social learning are important. It is the examination of these concepts in more detail that I turn to in the following sections.

3.2 Analytical tools of the study

3.2.1 Problem definition and problem closure

Problem definition is an important concept for understanding environmental policy and environmental regime-building. As I argue in section 3.1.2, environmental

policy is about definition struggles: struggles over the right definition of a problem and over its potential solution. These definitions are dialectic. In other words, as Maarten Hajer (1995: 15) suggests: "Policies are not only devised to solve problems, problems also have to be devised to be able to create policies".

Problem definition embodies the diagnosis and prognosis of the problem. In other words, it embodies a diagnosis of what the "problem" is, the "thing" that needs to be addressed, and what the cause of it is. It also embodies a prognosis of what can be done about this problem (see section 3.3). It is important to note that diagnosis and prognosis are dialectical – definitions of problems and their possible solutions are thus defined in a circular movement. Problem closure is the end point of this circular movement. At this point, the dimensions of the problem become fixed in such a way that the problem and its potential solution can be identified using the same criteria (Haila, 2007). Or, to put it bluntly, the problem and its potential solution become defined in a congruent way. It is evident that the wider the spatial and temporal scales of the problem are, the more constituencies are involved and the more different motivations, or interests if we want to call them that, of actors there are at play, the more difficult the achievement of closure is.

3.2.2 Interest and identities

In my interpretation, problem definitions (both those leading to problem closure and those not) are inevitably linked to actors' motivations. Namely, these motivations, or interests, shape the repertoire of possible solutions to the problem the actor can think of enforcing. These interests are not "given"; they cannot be calculated with the help of a rational logic – they are constructed in historically specific circumstances and dialectically with actors' identities.

Wendt (1999: 231) explains the relationship between identity and interest as follows:

"Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests. (…) Identities by themselves do not explain action, since being is not the same thing as wanting, and we cannot "read off" the latter from the former. (...) Without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction."

A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards other actors on the basis of the meanings that these actors have for them. Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about Self – by participating in such collective meanings (Wendt, 1994: 80). In other words, identity is a relational subject position (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 106, cited in Valve, 2003: 17): it is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world. Identities are constituted historically and materially and they are constituted in relation to the significant Other. There representations of Self and Other are the medium by which actors determine who they are, what they want and how they should behave (cf. Wendt, 1999: 332). This indicates that interests, too, are constituted in relation to the significant Other. The character of international life is

thus determined by the beliefs and expectations that states and other actors have about each other.

Consequently, interests are constructed in historically specific circumstances and on the basis of actors' intersubjectively constituted identities. This implies that a successful regime-building process, i.e. a process by which actors learn to cooperate, is at the same time a process of reconstructing actors' interests in terms of shared meanings. In this process, actors redefine their interests by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments.

3.2.3 Practice and social learning

Interests, identities and problem definitions are mutually constituted through the practice of actors (e.g. Laffey and Weldes, 1997). People negotiate the world (both social and physical) by acting upon it. Thus, practice is a central strategy through which actors gain knowledge about the Self and the Other, and about the world in general. In international relations, practical activity is one of the most important sources of change, although the concept of practice has largely been neglected in the IR literature on cooperation (Kratochwil, 1989: 61). Vincent Pouliot recently suggested that the old Roman saying, "If you want peace, prepare war", should be replaced with a more appropriate adage: "If you want peace, practice it". Referring to Russian relations with the Atlantic security community, Pouliot showed that instead of unsuccessfully trying to impose their norms (e.g. democracy) or identity (e.g. Western values) on Russia, Western actors would better serve the cause of peace by systematically practising diplomacy and turning it into the self-evident practice in mutual dealings (Pouliot, 2006: 28).

Practice, as Hajer and Wagenaar (2003: 20) note, is a notoriously difficult concept to grasp. "Practice is more a theoretical perspective than a single concept. It is an attempt to develop a unified account of knowing and doing. It expresses the insight that knowledge, knowledge application and knowledge creation cannot be separated from action; that acting is the high road to knowing. Yet it would be wrong to see the concept of practice as merely a synonym for action. Practice theory integrates the actor, his or her beliefs and values, resources and external environment, in one 'activity system', in which social, individual and material aspects are interdependent. The focus in such activity systems is on the way the different elements relate to each other rather than on the elements themselves."

The practice of actors produces shared meanings (and thus reshapes identities, interests and problem definitions) through a logic that can be called social learning.[7] Basically, social learning occurs when actors acquire new identities and preferences through interaction with each other in broader institutional contexts. "This type of learning needs to be distinguished, analytically, from the simple sort, where agents acquire new information, alter strategies, but then pursue given, fixed interests," argues Checkel (2001: 53). Jane Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991: 58) augment this

[7] For social learning in environmental policy, see Glasbergen, 1997, and Valve, 2003, in particular.

by noting that social learning is never simply a process of transfer or assimilation, but learning, transformation and change are always implicated in one another. Learning is a process that takes place in a participation frame, not in an individual mind. This means, among other things, that it is mediated by the differences of perspective among the co-participants.

Ernst Haas (1990) differentiates between learning and adaptation. For him, the difference between the two is whether underlying implicit theories and original values are examined and questioned by actors. In learning, the ultimate purpose of action is redefined and means as well as ends are questioned, whereas in adaptation the purpose and ends of action are not questioned. Learning changes the learner's understanding of what they are trying to accomplish together. Ernst Haas (1990: 17) refers to the conditions for learning in international cooperation by noting that "collective problem solving among states of widely different cultural commitments and with divergent historical memories would seem to depend on the ability to transcend cultural and historical boundaries, to establish trans-cultural and trans-ideological shared meanings."

By being bound to practice, learning is limited and constrained through the development of a "sense of reality" in which the natural and the social worlds correspond. "This crucial dimension of practice defines what is discussable, what is realistic, what is natural, without the recognition of the arbitrary foundations on which these judgments are based. The 'taken-for-granted, the self-evident and the unconscious' are essential for doing in concrete situations. Practice is regulated through the institutionalisation of these habits of thought", argue Laws and Rein (2003: 179). In order to break this "sense of reality", to achieve reframing of "the reality", conflict is needed. To put it otherwise, conflict is necessary to detect error and to force corrections. A conflict may be triggered when an existing order, its institutions, rules of appropriateness and collective self-understandings are challenged by new experiences that are difficult to account for in terms of existing conceptions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 103, cited in March and Olsen, 2004: 16). Actors are also likely to learn from disasters, crises and system breakdowns: these "situations of disorientation, crisis and search for meaning" compel actors to rethink who and why they and others are, and may become; what communities they belong to, and want to belong to, and how power should be redistributed (Checkel, 2001: 54; March and Olsen, 2004: 16). In other words, learning becomes possible when the status quo is persistently perturbed, either because it is inherently uncertain or unstable or because it is consistently upset by the actors involved; and when actors become involved in a joint exploration of the limits of understanding and of common ends that prompts a reconsideration on the part of the actors involved of "views of self, the world, and interests arising from both" (Sabel, 1994: 138-139 and 144-145, cited in Laws and Rein, 2003: 204). To this list of possible sources of learning can be added creativity, the invention of new ideas from within a culture (cf. Wendt, 1999: 188).

In my interpretation, creativity is important here. It brings about the possibility of change, it is what makes the constructivist approach to regime-building an optimistic one. That is to say, it contains a notion that learning in international cooperation may also be intentional. Actors can do things together even if all (or any

of the) parties do not initially have the identities that those practices will eventually create. They may engage in policies for egoistic reasons, for example, but if sustained over time such policies may erode egoistic identities and create collective ones (Wendt, 1999: 342). To put it another way, learning can develop out of even antagonistic relationships where a background of uncertainty highlights interdependence in repeat interactions (Laws and Rein, 2003: 205). Learning can also take place even if one party was more enthusiastic and the other more reluctant to cooperate in the first place. Actors just need to engage in the practice in congruent ways (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 21). Under this process, definitions of problems and the repertoire of possible solutions can become reframed and reshaped, and problem closure may also be achieved.

To hold back excessive optimism, however, Wendt (1999: 188) reminds us that actors act on the basis of beliefs they have about their environment and others. This, in turn, tends to reproduce those beliefs: because of this, culture is a "self-fulfilling prophecy" and social systems can get "locked in" to certain patterns by the logic of shared knowledge, adding a source of social inertia or glue that would not exist in a system without culture. The more deeply the culture is internalised by actors, the stronger homeostatic tendencies will be.

3.3 Methodological underpinnings

The approach, leaning on constructivist-inspired use of the concepts of problem definition and problem closure, identity and interest, and practice and learning, naturally has implications for how to conduct an empirical study. By choosing these analytical tools, I committed myself to a problem-oriented policy analysis approach that focuses on the examination of political processes and definitional struggles as the basis of this process. "(Environmental) policy-making is in fact to be analysed as the creation of problems, that is to say, policy-making can be analysed as a set of practices that are meant to process fragmented and contradictory statements to be able to create the sort of problems that institutions can handle and for which solutions can be found" (Hajer, 1995: 19). This kind of a policy analysis approach is commensurate with the methodological underpinnings of constructivist approaches to cooperation that put an emphasis on practice (see Laffey and Weldes, 1998; Pouliot, 2006: 25).

My research task – to examine the process of Russian–European environmental regime-building and conditions for learning – is well in line with the process-oriented policy analysis suggested by Hajer and Wagenaar (eds., 2003). In order to analyse the process and to map constraints for social learning in this process, I concentrated on the analysis of problem definitions and practices of cooperation. The analyses are based on the material that consists of altogether 54 in-depth interviews of relevant actors, hundreds of newspaper articles in addition policy documents, speeches and reports. Interviews form the main material for the individual studies II, III and IV, while the studies I, V and VI draw mainly from newspaper articles, speeches and policy documents. While a list of the interviewees

can be found in Appendix I, at this point it can be noted that about half of the interviewees were Russian. In Chapters 4 and 5 I refer to all interviews I took for the individual studies (see Appendix I for the numbering). In Chapter 4, secondary literature is also used. The methods of analysis I have used differ from one study to another, but are all based on qualitative and interpretative, mainly linguistic, analysis methods focusing on discourse and practice. All these methods aim to explore the dynamics of problem definition and the practices of cooperation.

To make sense of the dynamics of the process of Russian–European environmental regime-building as a whole, I use the concept of frames. While frames and framing have been used in a variety of ways (see articles III and VI), my approach to framing is guided by the idea that frames serve as a basis for both discussion and action. Framing is a particular way of representing knowledge and "the reliance on (and development of) interpretative schemas that bind and order a chaotic situation, facilitate interpretation and provide a guide for doing and acting" (Laws and Rein, 2003: 173). Originally, the concept of frame came from Erving Goffman (1974: 21), who defines it as a schemata of interpretation that enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large. In this thesis, I follow the example of Laws and Rein (2003) and use frames to narrate a relationship between a view of the problem and a sense of what should be done in order to tackle the problem. "Actors express beliefs through these normative-prescriptive stories (frames) that interpret an uncertain, problematic, or controversial situation into a policy problem that names the phenomenon and implies a course of action," argue Laws and Rein (2003: 174) and continue: "These problems mediate the interaction between groups and the interplay between thought and action in policymaking. They define the boundary between evidence and noise, and shape views about what counts as progress. The stories wed fact and value into belief about how to act." According to Gamson and Meyer (1996: 287), overestimation of the degree of opportunities actually stimulates actions that change opportunities and make the frame a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In Chapter 5, I describe a variety of framings that have shaped the process of Russian–European environmental regime-building. I draw the framings on the basis of the individual studies described in articles I-VI, and their context described in Chapter 4. These framings are analytically divided into diagnostic and prognostic framings in order to shed light on the dynamic of problem closure (i.e. the interdependence of the definition of problems and their possible solutions). Diagnostic framing indicates the diagnosis of the problem, that is, what is the essence of the problem and the attribution of the blame. Prognostic framing indicates the suggested solution, strategy and tactics. The framing process is also dynamic in character and the examination of frames captures the social and political contexts in which diverse definitions are made. Therefore, I do not treat frames as stable objects or tools used by actors to command action and influence the distribution of resources, but rather as systems of belief that intertwine with identity and social action (cf. Laws and Rein, 2003: 174). Thus, the examination of framings catches not only the different problem definitions but reveals how problem definitions mingle with identities of actors and thus enable or constrain the creation of shared meanings – that is, enable or constrain social learning.

In addition to, and as a constitutive part of, the framings, I consider looking at the practices of cooperation important in order to understand the process of cooperation. As I maintained in the preceding section, practice is important so that problem definitions, interests and identities are mutually constituted and social learning takes place (or does not) through the practice of actors. Similarly, frames become institutionalised in habits of thought and action in practices (Laws and Rein, 2003: 179). Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) also stress the importance of looking in detail at the specific practices through which meanings (and thus frames) are produced and transformed. The same applies for the study of aid and cooperation, which often contain specific practical realities that are at odds with the rhetoric (cf. Crewe and Harrison, 1998). In accordance with this, I analyse the practices of cooperation in Chapter 5 largely from the point of view of how these practices figure with different framings, thus focusing on the dialectics of different elements of social practice (see also article III).

The examination of the framings and practices captures the social and political contexts into which different definitions are linked. It reveals how different problem definitions may affect identities of actors and thus enable or constrain the creation of shared meanings – that is, to enable or constrain social learning. Learning is reframing the problems: in case existing frames constrain learning, reframing the issue may perhaps lead to learning.

4. Building up the environmental regime between Russia and Europe—the context of the individual studies

The aim of this chapter is to serve as a context for the individual studies reported in articles I—VI. I do not aim to cover the complete history of the Russian—European environmental cooperation, but to map, in a chronological order and organised according to different phases, the parts of the process of the regime-building that appear relevant to the case studies. The mapping is based on secondary literature and interviews done for the individual studies I, II, III and IV (see Appendix I). At the end of the chapter, I briefly evaluate the effectiveness of this regime in environmental and institutional terms.

4.1 Environmental cooperation with the Soviet Union

4.1.1 The phase of scientific cooperation and conventions

The United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 was a watershed in international environmental politics. The conference took place in the middle of the Cold War, and even though the Soviet Union participated actively in the preparatory process, it and its allies were absent from the conference itself. As a result of the Stockholm Conference, environmental ministries and agencies were established in more than one hundred countries, which was a key requirement for carrying forth the results of the conference (Engfeldt, 2002). In the Soviet Union, 1972 has been identified as a key date heralding a new stage in the development of environmental legislation (Kostenchuk et al., 1993; Mazurov, 2004). Thus, the outcome of the conference had an impact on Soviet environmental policy and environmental thinking.

The Stockholm Conference and its influence on national environmental policies boosted international activities, first and foremost the negotiation of environmental agreements. The Soviet regime applied a cautious approach to international environmental agreements and cooperation, but participated in some international and regional processes. The so-called Helsinki Convention, the Convention on the

Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, is perhaps the most significant of these. The roots of the cooperation aimed at improving the St Petersburg water sector (articles III and IV) go back as far as the signing of this Convention. The Helsinki Convention was signed in 1974 by all littoral states of the Baltic Sea, and was the first international agreement to protect the marine environment from all sources of pollution, including land-based sources, pollution from ships, oil and chemical spills, airborne pollutants, offshore dumping, and exploitation of the seabed (for details, see HELCOM 2007). In 1980, when the convention had been ratified by all countries around the Baltic, a governing body, the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was established to implement it. HELCOM permitted increased East–West specialist interaction, which had begun already in 1968 with the establishment of a Working Group on the Protection of the Gulf of Finland, established under the aegis of the Finnish–Soviet Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in 1968 (Kivinen and Sutela, 1999, 13; interview 2, see Appendix I). Thus, HELCOM created a community of specialists and environmental officials "armed with ever-greater knowledge about the causes and consequences of Baltic marine pollution" (Darst, 2001: 53-54). Consequently, HELCOM cooperation has formed an important basis for further cooperation on the protection of the Baltic Sea (see articles III and IV).

The formation of the trans-boundary air pollution prevention regime forms a part of the context of the article IV. In the case of trans-boundary air pollution, an initiative was put forward by the General Secretary of the CPSU,[8] Leonid Brezhnev, and led to the conclusion of an international agreement, the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention, embracing all of Europe and North America, in Geneva in November 1979. Robert Darst (2001: 3) maintains that without Brezhnev taking the initiative, the agreement might not have come to pass. The LRTAP Convention did not immediately establish targets or deadlines for emission reductions, which were to be established in later protocols to the convention (for these, see UNECE, 2007) but it established an organisational mechanism within which subsequent bargaining could take place. LRTAP activities also stimulated the participating states to develop national research programmes to determine the environmental effects of trans-boundary air pollution. According to Darst, Soviet participation in international efforts to reduce trans-boundary air pollution was enthusiastic and far-reaching: in no other issue area, prior to the perestroika period, did the Soviet government agree to concrete targets for reductions in its internal emissions and in no other area did the participation of the Soviet Union in international environmental cooperation represent so great a shift in its internal environmental priorities (Darst, 2001: 95; see also article IV).

To understand the context of the cases I, III and IV it is important to note that Finland, sharing a border of 1,300 kilometres with Russia, was among the first and the most active partners of the Soviet Union and Russia in environmental cooperation. The Framework Agreement on Environmental Cooperation was signed by the Finnish and Soviet governments in 1985.[9] In the agreement, the parties

[8] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This post was reserved for the leader of the Soviet Union.

[9] An agreement of similar contents was signed with Russia in 1992.

recognised that trans-boundary pollution needs to be combated through mutual cooperation. The agreement did not contain any obligations to reduce pollution but, nevertheless, facilitated opportunities for future cooperation (interviews 8 and 9, see Appendix I). A joint commission for environmental cooperation was established to implement the agreement. In its second meeting in 1988, the commission began discussing concrete reduction targets concerning air pollution and, in 1989, a bilateral Action Programme for Limiting Air Pollution in Areas Near the Common Border was launched.[10] In the programme, both parties committed to decreasing total emissions of sulphur by 50 per cent from the 1985 levels by the end of 1995. In addition, the parties agreed on reducing emissions of nitrogen and heavy metals. In reality, the agreement required only activities by the Soviet Union; Finland had already reduced its sulphur emissions by 50 per cent by the end of the 1980s (interviews 2 and 8, see Appendix I; Hiltunen, 1994: 36-38).

4.1.2 Perestroika and environmental cooperation

The period of the greatest enthusiasm for environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe obviously occurred in the second half of the 1980s, at a time when East—West economic integration had yet to proceed beyond a scattering of small joint ventures and when the authoritarian Soviet political order was still firmly in place (see also Darst, 2001). The aftermath of the accident in Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986, growing public interest in environmental issues in the Soviet Union and the political environment created by Mikhail Gorbachev's[11] "new political thinking", the radically revisionist view of international relations from 1985 onwards, enhanced possibilities for Russia—Europe environmental cooperation. Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk in 1987 is often referred as a starting shot for real East–West environmental cooperation, particularly in the Arctic region, and sowed the seeds of the Northern Dimension of the European Union (Tennberg, 2000; Hønneland and Stokke, 2007: 2). In his famous speech, Gorbachev declared: "Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace" (Gorbachev, 1987). Gorbachev proposed a six-point programme for talks on limiting and reducing military activity in the Arctic region, the most central scene of the Cold War. He also proposed drafting a comprehensive environmental protection plan for the Arctic. The signal that the Soviet authorities would welcome more extensive cooperation with Western states was quickly heeded: for instance, several scientific communities reintroduced an earlier plan for a circumpolar body to foster greater cooperation among Arctic scientific organisations (Hønneland and Stokke, 2007: 2).

Encouraged by the example of Mikhail Gorbachev himself, Soviet advocates of environmental protection experienced a dramatic increase in their ability to share environmental information freely with their Western counterparts (Darst, 2001: 27). This led, first and foremost, to the explosion of environmental cooperation on the

[10] A respective action programme was signed in 1992 to limit water pollution in the nearby areas.
[11] Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

level of experts and also at the grassroots level (see article II). Fed by the growing public awareness of environmental problems created by the Soviet system, the environmental movement became a vehicle for general oppositional forces until the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Jancar-Webster (ed.), 1993; interview 51, see Appendix I).

As context to the study concerning the environmental non-governmental organisations of St Petersburg (article II), the emergence of the environmental movement in Eastern Europe has been the focus of many studies. The emergence of the environmental movement in Eastern Europe has been the focus of many studies (e.g. Jancar-Webster (ed.), 1993; Pickvance, 1998; Zdravomyslova and Tysiachniouk (eds.), 1999; Yanitsky, 2000; Tsepilova, 2002). One of the vehicles for the emergence of such a powerful environmental movement in the Soviet Union and its successors was no doubt increased East–West interaction. In its initial phase, this interaction occurred on a more informal and reciprocal basis than later in the 1990s, when a clear donor–recipient relationship shadowed interaction. Explicitly, Oleg Yanitsky, a Russian environmental sociologist who has conducted an extensive study on the environmental movement in Russia, argues that because of the economic recession in the early 1990s, Russian environmental NGOs were forced to reorient from self-production of resources to the search for western financial aid (Yanitsky, 2000: 78). The lion's share of material resources held by Russian NGOs has, since the collapse of the Soviet system, come in grants from foundations such as Soros, the MacArthur and the ISAR.[12] In 1992-1998, USAID alone delivered US$92 billion to support the non-governmental sector in Russia (Petter, 1997; article II). Europe has been less active than the US in supporting non-governmental organisations in Russia (e.g. interviews 42, 47 and 51, see Appendix I).

After the democratic upsurge, citizen activity in Russia more or less died down. Accordingly, grassroots-level cooperation faded or turned into a patron–client relationship in which goals and strategies of cooperation were defined externally, from the interests of European partners, and did not always meet other than the economic interests of the recipients (interview 51, see Appendix I). Furthermore, a growing amount of finances was allocated to other than civic organisations – towards the new millennium, large-scale projects focused on the improvement of environmental infrastructure and management became a general trend in East–West environmental cooperation, and environmental education and information, i.e. tasks taken care of mainly by environmental NGOs were somewhat left aside (e.g. interviews 2 and 38, see Appendix I).

4.2 Environmental cooperation with Russia

The individual studies reported in articles I, III and IV illustrate the change in the basic form of environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe that took place

[12] Institute for Soviet and American Relations: Resources for Environmental Activists was founded in 1983 to encourage citizen diplomacy and facilitate exchange between the Soviet Union and the US.

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave way to a more decentralised political and economic decision-making system and the number of actors and levels of action involved in environmental cooperation multiplied in Russia. Robert G. Darst (2001: 32) lists the four main forms Russia—Europe (East–West) environmental cooperation took after the dissolution of the Soviet Union:

technical assistance and other forms of capacity building;

the promotion of NGOs;

the promotion of market reforms designed to bring about the more efficient use of energy and other inputs;

the direct subsidisation of specific measures designed to reduce trans-boundary environmental threats;

Darst comments that these strategies were viewed as mutually reinforcing, so that an assistance programme typically displayed a mix of several or all of these forms (Darst, 2001: 32). By the end of the 1990s, Western governments had disbursed billions of euros to the environmental sector in the former Soviet Union in the form of direct grants and low-interest loans. The main governments that allocated environmental subsidisation to the environmental sector in Russia were Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United States, Japan, Germany and Great Britain (Pursiainen et al., 2001: 29). By the end of the 1990s, Finland, for example, had delivered some €110 million to the environmental sector in East European countries. From this sum, about one-third was directed to Russia[13] (Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 2003).

The main form of subsidisation by governments is financial assistance through joint investment projects. In addition, technical assistance, for example training, scientific and educational cooperation in environmental issues, is given. The investment projects are implemented through cooperation between companies, institutions or municipalities, with the recipient organisations assuming the main responsibility for the projects and their financing. Cooperation rarely stems from altruism only: for example, the conditions for environmental grant assistance by the Finnish government include the requirement that assisted projects need to reduce trans-boundary pollution in Finland and to promote the use of Finnish technologies. In addition, the grant is almost exclusively allocated to a Finnish project partner, thus avoiding the potential lack of financial transparency in projects and guaranteeing local counterparts' more serious commitment to projects (cf. Pursiainen et al., 2001: 30-31). This strategy, however, usually rules out NGOs, as they rarely meet the financial requirements (articles I, II, III and IV).

The St Petersburg water sector case, reported in articles III and IV, demonstrates the move from small-scale bilateral towards large-scale multilateral programmes and projects, such as was experienced in the Russian–European environmental cooperation from the mid-1990s onwards. This move was due to changes in the operating environment such as the expansion of the European Union, and also to the further institutionalisation of environmental politics in Russian–European relations.

[13] In 1991-2005, Finnish financing of the environmental sector in Russia amounted to €38 million for investments and €15 million for technical assistance projects, totalling €53 million (Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 2006).

During the 1990s, environmental regimes in northern Europe strengthened and tied Russia more closely to the development of common environmental policies. These include regimes formed by the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which was established as an overall political forum for regional intergovernmental cooperation in 1992, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), a forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Barents Region established in 1993, and the Arctic Council, a "high-level forum" for cooperation on common Arctic issues including the environment established in 1996 (see e.g. Hønneland and Stokke, 2007).

With the entry of Finland and Sweden into the European Union in 1995, the political importance of Russia for the Union grew. This resulted in the establishment of the Northern Dimension of the European Union, which creates the context for article I. The Northern Dimension was established first as a Finnish Initiative in 1997 and later as a jointly decided EU policy. It aims at "strengthening dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its member states, the northern countries associated with the EU and the EEA (European Economic Area which includes the non-EU countries Norway and Iceland) and the Russian Federation" (European Commission, 2007). In more practical terms, the Northern Dimension addresses the special regional development challenges such as cold climatic conditions, long distances, wide disparities in living standards, environmental challenges including problems with nuclear waste and waste water management, and insufficient transport and border-crossing facilities. In addition, the Northern Dimension takes advantage of the rich potential of northern Europe in terms of natural resources, economic dynamism and a rich cultural heritage. The Northern Dimension is implemented within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia, issued in 1997, and the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, issued in 1999 (article I; Sutela, 2001). The Tacis and Interreg[14] programmes have been concrete instruments for EU–Russia environmental cooperation under the Northern Dimension (see Pursiainen et al., 2001: 27-28). In 2003, cooperative processes between Europe and Russia were reinforced by creating four "common spaces" in the framework of the PCA. The common spaces include a common space for freedom, security and justice, a space for cooperation in the field of external security, a space for research and education, and a common economic space that also covers environmental issues, the Kyoto Protocol and nuclear safety (European Commission, 2007).

As article I demonstrates, the environment is an important sector for the European Union to address with all the instruments of EU–Russia cooperation. Perhaps the most significant instrument from the environmental point of view is, however, the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), established in the framework of the Northern Dimension policy in 2002 and administered by the EBRD. The NDEP's environmental programme consists of sixteen priority projects, with the costs set to climb to €2 billion in total. These projects aim to deliver

[14] Tacis is an acronym for Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia. It was launched by the European Union in 1991. Interreg, in turn, is a European Union "Community Initiative" designed to encourage harmonious and balanced development across national borders. It is financed by the European Regional Development Fund (see European Commission, 2007).

environmental solutions to north-west Russia in the areas of district heating, solid waste management, waste water treatment and energy efficiency (article I; NDEP, 2007) Moreover, the Northern Dimension policy was renewed in autumn 2006 with the launch of the new common Northern Dimension policy (see European Commission, 2007). The new Northern Dimension forms a tool for the implementation of the road maps concerning the EU–Russian Common Spaces. Moreover, it changed the "ownership" of the Northern Dimension so that it is now a genuinely common policy involving the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia, not only a policy of the European Union. This implies that the renewed Northern Dimension will enhance not only EU–Russian cooperation, but European–Russian cooperation in general.

Consequently, during the late 1990s, governments previously engaged in bilateral environmental cooperation with Russia redirected their activities to these multilateral channels. Finland, for instance, reoriented her strategy of neighbouring area cooperation towards more multilateral means in 1996 and 2001, respectively, so that at present, most cooperational activities between Finland and Russia are carried out in the framework of the European Union and the above-listed Baltic, Barents and Arctic cooperation programmes. Activities are financed together with international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the EBRD, Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) and Nordic Environmental Financing Company (NEFCO) (article I; see also Häyrynen, 2003). In other European countries associated with Russia in the environmental sector, the tendency seems to be similar (article I; interview 18, see Appendix I).

4.3 Processes shaped by international environmental politics

4.3.1 Climate policy

Simultaneously with the bilateral and multilateral regional processes of environmental cooperation reported above, the development of international environmental politics, in particular climate policy as the most significant of international environmental policy processes at the moment, has shaped environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe and thus forms part of the context for the overall study (see article VI).

Reflecting the "environmental boom" of the beginning of the 1990s in the former Soviet Union, Russia's participation in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was active. Russia supported Agenda 21 as well as principles of rational use, conservation and utilisation of forests. It signed the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change that the conference produced (see Kotov and Nikitina, 1995; Oldfield et al., 2003). The Framework Convention on Climate Change was supplemented by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto

Protocol extends the commitments of the Framework Convention and sets targets for future emissions by each developed countries. These countries should commit to the reduction of their collective emissions of six key greenhouse gases by an average of at least 5 per cent. National emissions targets must be achieved by 2008–2012. The Kyoto Protocol also sets the so-called flexibility mechanisms on how to make and measure the reductions.

Russia signed the Kyoto Protocol among other industrial states in 1997, but ratified it only in October 2004. The ratification was preceded by prolonged foot-dragging, economic and political calculations and scientific discussion. The withdrawal of the United States from the protocol made the ratification a political and economic means of extortion for Russia, because without the United States the enforcement of the protocol depended on Russian participation. Russia has been said to have taken full advantage of the situation and negotiated the protocol as very beneficial for herself (article VI; Oldfield et al., 2003: 164-165). For instance, it succeeded in negotiating rather benign terms in relation to compensated carbon sinks.[15] As it stands, Russia should be able to receive the reduction target – which is zero for Russia, implying that Russia's greenhouse gas emissions should not exceed the level of 1990[16] in the first commitment period of 2008–2012 – with little difficulty. Because of the decline in industrial production during the 1990s, Russia's emissions are currently about one-third less than in 1990.[17] Experts on climate policy have estimated that Russia could economically benefit by about US$10 billion from the protocol through emission trade, joint investment projects and increased foreign investments (Kotov, 2002).

In the process that preceded the Russian ratification, Europe put pressure on Russia and tried to make it ratify the Protocol by using both persuasion and blackmail (see article VI; Tynkkynen, 2005). The ratification was a "hot" topic in European–Russian relations for quite a long time. It appeared not only as an issue of environmental policy, but an issue in which political and economic factors were also at play. It will be interesting to see in which directions Russian–European dialogue develops in the future when negotiations for climate policy "after the Kyoto Protocol" catch fire.

4.3.2 Nuclear safety

The issue of nuclear safety in north-west Russia offers the context for cooperation in the Kursk case (article V). In response to a Norwegian initiative, a declaration regarding the desirability of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) programme aimed at facilitating radioactive waste

[15] Soil and trees act as natural sinks for carbon. Each year, hundreds of billions of tons of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide are absorbed by oceans, soils and trees.

16 1990 is set as the year of comparison in the Protocol.

17 This counts as 17% of the total emissions of industrialised countries in 1990 and only 6% of the total in 1999 (EIA, 2003).

management, spent nuclear fuel security and reactor safety in north-west Russia was signed by then-US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, and the European Union Commissioner for Foreign Policy, Hans van der Broek, at the March 1999 meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Norway. Negotiations for the agreement took four years and were speeded up by the case of the Kursk (article V), the accidental sinking of a Russian nuclear-powered submarine that occurred in the Barents Sea in August 2000. Soon after the accident, the European Union tried to impose the agreement on Russia by linking its aid to the raising of the wreck with the Russian acceptance of the terms of the MNEPR (article V). However, the agreement was signed in Stockholm only in May 2003, after Russia had dropped its demands regarding taxation (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

The agreement was signed by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, the EU and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). As it stands, the agreement is the first general framework agreement covering European nuclear assistance projects in Russia. It deals with environmentally sensitive nuclear issues such as the dismantling of nuclear submarines, nuclear reactor safety and the handling of radioactive waste. It addresses a demanding problem: north-west Russia has the world's highest density of nuclear reactors and nuclear materials, constituting a significant environmental threat (article V; see also e.g. Heininen and Segerståhl, 2001; Hønneland, 2003). The MNEPR is also extremely significant because only with its conclusion can nuclear projects (the so-called nuclear window of the NDEP) be undertaken under the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership.

4.3.3 Oil and gas transportation safety

Finally, cooperation on energy-related environmental issues is worth discussing here, as it appears as a central topic in article I. The article shows that energy-related environmental issues, the question of oil transportation safety in the Baltic Sea in particular, have become topical during the last ten years: between 1995 and 2005, the volume of Russian oil transportation in the Gulf of Finland grew from 20 million tonnes per year to 100 million tonnes (Hänninen and Rytkönen, 2005). This development has given rise to concerns about the safety of new Russian terminals and transports in the Baltic Sea littoral states, as article I indicates. The entry into force of the MARPOL double-hull standard[18] for oil tankers and the establishment of a mandatory ship reporting system for all vessel traffic in the Gulf of Finland (GOFREP) between Finland, Russia and Estonia in 2004 have been important steps towards the improvement of oil transportation safety.

[18] The MARPOL Convention is the main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. It is a combination of two treaties adopted in 1973 and 1978, respectively, and updated by amendments through the years. The amendment concerning the double-hull standard was adopted in December 2003 (IMO, 2007).

Oil transportation has also caused grudges among the littoral states. Russia was reluctant to accept the designation of the Baltic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In fact, it officially opposed the designation. Before the designation, Finnish and Swedish actors very actively lobbied the EU Commission to put pressure on Russia on this issue. In addition to them, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were among the countries that supported the Baltic PSSA. However, the EU Commission remained reluctant to discuss the issue with Russia in any particular manner. In 2004, the Baltic Sea, with the exception of Russia's territorial waters, received this status, protecting it from increased shipping and illegal oil dumping. The PSSA designation requires ships to take special care when navigating. In December 2005, the IMO assembly supplemented the PSSA by accepting specific regulations for navigation in the area (article I; Hänninen and Rytkönen, 2005; IMO, 2007).

In addition to oil transportation, the ambitious Russian–German project to build the 1,200 kilometre-long North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) beneath the Baltic Sea has also evoked environmental concerns, especially in Sweden. In autumn 2006, the Swedish then-prime minister, Göran Persson, warned that the project could trigger an environmental tragedy. According to him, the pipeline risks disturbing the waste dumped in the Baltic Sea over the decades, including possible mines on the seabed. These concerns have not put the project on hold, however: onshore construction work has already begun in Russia and the whole pipeline is scheduled to come into operation in 2010.

It is likely that the discussion about oil (and gas) transportation safety will become more heated in future as the dependency of Europe on Russian energy exports increases and new transportation routes are found. Moreover, energy dialogue between Norway and Russia and their related interests in the Barents Sea will evidently disperse energy-related environmental concerns in future (see article I). As such, energy-related environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region forms an interesting case to be studied in more detail in future.

4.4 Assessing the effectiveness of Russian–European environmental cooperation

The environmental effectiveness of international environmental cooperation is difficult to evaluate. There are many intervening factors and time lags that intricately point out explicit connections between regime-building and its environmental effects (Tennberg, 2000: 7). Accordingly, the effects of environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe are perhaps better evaluated in terms of changes in the meanings attached to the environment, and in terms of institutional development (cf. Tennberg, 2007b) than in terms of direct improvements in the state of the environment.

Some cooperational processes can certainly be praised for having had a direct positive contribution to the state of the environment. Cooperation aimed at the improvement of the state of the Baltic Sea is perhaps the most famous of these

processes. The completion of the St Petersburg South West Wastewater Treatment Plant in 2005 as the result of this cooperation brought about a concrete reduction in the pollution load of the Baltic Sea (see articles III and IV). Similarly, the investment subvention given by Europe to Russian industrial utilities has contributed to immediate pollution abatement in many places, and also to the adoption of environmental management systems in industrial companies (e.g. OECD, 1999). True, there have also been other significant drivers, such as market and stakeholder pressure, that have encouraged these improvements (see Salmi, 2007).

Cooperational processes are also expected to have an indirect environmental influence, as they direct attention to environmental issues and, therefore, nourish environmental concerns at diverse levels of society, both in Europe and Russia. In its earlier phases, environmental cooperation facilitated the development of science in particular. For instance, the Soviet Union's participation in HELCOM in the early 1980s had a significant impact on the development of Baltic marine science in the Soviet Union (Darst, 2001: 59-63). In the late 1980s, citizen activity in Russia was successfully encouraged by environmental cooperation with European actors and had a multiplicative effect with the extension of the environmental movement. However, although indirect influence is even more difficult to evaluate than direct influence, it can be noted that indirect influence has not been revolutionary. Environmental issues are not listed very high on Russia's political and economic agenda (see Oldfield, 2005; Tynkkynen, 2005). Furthermore, there have been malpractices in terms of compliance with international environmental obligations and also in terms of national implementation of international environmental agreements in Russia (e.g. Kotov and Nikitina, 1995). Moreover, citizen activity in environmental issues has faded (article II).

The moderate influence of Russian–European environmental cooperation on environmental attitudes also manifests itself through the considerable reluctance of Russian actors to engage in environmental activities internationally and regionally. In many occasions, negotiations over environmental agreements and cooperative projects have been complicated and held back by Russia (see above; also articles IV and VI). Negotiations have been exacerbated because Russian actors have been politically weak and responsibilities for environmental protection have been unclear (interviews 3 and 8 in particular, see Appendix I). In addition, persistent political and economic instability in Russia has made it difficult for European actors to identify the right Russian partners (article IV). In many cases, other than environmental concerns have been at play. Robert Darst (2001: 3) calls East–West environmental cooperation a confrontational form of "smokestack diplomacy" and maintains that to the extent that Russia and other newly independent states have undertaken deliberate efforts to reduce environmental risks, they have done so only when Western governments and international lending institutions have agreed to foot a considerable part of the bill.

Russian–European environmental cooperation has also had unintended consequences (article III; cf. Tennberg, 2007b). In some cases, the imperative to search for foreign financing has affected both the priority areas and preferable forms of operation, especially in the non-governmental sector (article II). This has led to

distancing from local concerns that are quite different from the agendas of European partners (for these concerns see Karjalainen, 2006). The system in which donors administer limited funds through grant competitions has forced non-governmental organisations and also industrial companies into a competitive relationship with each other and weakened intergroup solidarity and cooperation (article II; Yanitsky, 2000: 78; see also Henry, 2001; Mendelson, 2001; Henderson, 2002). More to the point, in some cases environmental cooperation, especially financial subsidisation of industrial companies, has encouraged environmental risk-taking: the extension of the life spans of industrial utilities and nuclear power plants (Darst, 2001: 6). For example, the service life of the Kola nuclear power plant was extended as a result of technical improvements made in cooperation with Norwegian partners.

In consequence, it seems that the effectiveness of the environmental regime between Russia and Europe has been fairly modest both in environmental and institutional terms. In the theoretical framework of this thesis, modest effectiveness can be interpreted as not always having attained problem closures and social learning. In the next chapter, I analyse the framings and practices of cooperation in order to explain and understand why the effectiveness has been so modest and why problem closure has often remained unattainable—in other words, to explain and understand conditions for learning through cooperation.

5. Framing the Russian–European environmental cooperation

In this chapter, I study framings that have shaped Russian–European environmental regime-building in order to illustrate how the regime is constructed. I also examine how these framings figure with practices of cooperation. The examination demonstrates how the regime simultaneously constructs and is constructed: the process of construction is both active and passive.

The framings are analytical categorisations that I have formed on the basis of separate studies, the overall mapping (see Chapter 4) and the information (given in interviews 2, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 38, 44, 51, 52 and 53 in particular, see Appendix I) that I had to exclude in the reporting of the separate studies, as the form of peer-reviewed article significantly limited the scope of the studies. I derived the frames by explicating different diagnoses and prognoses (see section 3.3) that this material offered about the nature of the cooperation. In other words, in order to distinguish the frames I examined each phase (Chapter 4) and each case (articles I–VI) of cooperation from the point of view of how actors defined the problem and its solutions. Moreover, I examined how diverse practices of cooperation reflected these definitions. On the basis of this examination, I was able to establish five categories into which different definitions and practices could roughly be divided. There categories are presented here as the frames of cooperation. The frames are analytical simplifications and thus overlapping and, even though there have been times when certain approaches have distinctly dominated, the frames cannot necessarily be fixed in time. Neither can the frames be fixed to certain actors or groups of actors, even though in some cases it can be said which actors support a particular frame.

I name the five sets of diagnoses and prognoses (frames) as “common problems”, “crisis”, “modernisation”, “great ecological power” and “partnership”. Diagnostic framing indicates the diagnosis of the problem, that is, what are the essence of the problem and the attribution of blame? Prognostic framing indicates the suggested solution, strategy and tactics. The significance of analysing diagnostic and prognostic frames is that it emphasises the dialectic relationship between the definition of problems and their solutions, and the association of these definitions with the identities and practices of actors. Frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate different activities. I also examine in what kind of activities and practices of cooperation these frames have materialised in each approach. Practices shape and reshape framings, too, not only vice versa.

5.1 “Common problems”

Diagnosis

The main problems the frame identifies as first-priority problems for environmental cooperation are global or regional by nature. The focus is on the kind of global and regional environmental problems that lead both Russian and European parties to cooperate. The diagnosis thus defines out-of-focus local problems that are not shared by parties to cooperation. For example, the pollution of the Baltic Sea is an example of such a wide-ranging problem.

The attribution of blame in this diagnosis is very moderate. The way the diagnosis is framed is careful about pointing out any particular “fall guys”, leaving the origins of problems implicit. In particular, it avoids putting the blame on the Soviet Union/ Russia. In this way, the diagnosis defines through discussion a wide set of problems that could be defined as “common”. Sometimes the attribution of the blame can be bypassed by the diagnostic logic of the frame that emphasises the “commonness”. For instance, the frame would nominate the problem of nuclear safety, no doubt on the European scale originating from the Russian side, as resulting from the Cold War bipolar setting, which does not blame Russia or the Soviet Union only.

Prognosis

The frame follows the logic of commonness also in prognostic framing: solutions to common problems require cooperation, not competition. The prognosis suggests high-level diplomacy, international and regional agreements and programmes as suitable forms of cooperation. As such, the frame is extremely state-centric and underlines the importance of governmental activities, as problems are so wide-ranging and thus beyond “everyday politics”. However, scientific cooperation is encouraged in order to produce more comprehensive knowledge on the nature of problems under solution.

In conclusion, the “common problems” frame is diplomatic and moderate, focusing on simple and easily manageable issues that do not raise special political passions. For instance, climate policy in its current form is ruled out from the framing because it is way too political to be dealt with within this framework.

The frame and the practice of cooperation

As it appears on the basis of the processes of cooperation examined in Chapter 4, the “common problems” frame was most popular during the 1970s and 1980s. It guided activities such as the establishment of the Helsinki Commission and formed a basis for bilateral Finnish–Soviet environmental cooperation. The frame is moderate by nature, which can be explained by the political conditions in which the frame was formed, especially by the widely shared desire to preserve the fragile East–West détente that emerged in the early 1970s. In these conditions, environmental cooperation was considered to be a relatively easy field of interstate

cooperation and was used as a way to project an image of "cooperativeness" and to elicit cooperation in non-environmental areas of greater interest in East–West relations (see Darst, 2001).

The "common problems" frame gained strength after Mikhail Gorbachev's Murmansk speech (see section 4.1.2). The speech attracted attention to a new set of problems – such as nuclear safety – which had previously been totally left out of the diagnosis. At that point, the prognostic framing took a moral tone, especially on the Soviet side. Gorbachev's new paradigm essentially included the idea of the Soviet Union (and the same line of argument was followed in the early years of Russia, too; see article VI and Tynkkynen, 2005) as a new model great power concerned with global economic, environmental and nuclear security in a community of democratic states. According to Gorbachev's new paradigm, interests in world affairs were to be promoted through multilateral cooperation and participation in international institutions (Gorbachev, 1988; Adomeit, 1995: 42). This change in the rhetoric did not have much effect in practice, even though it then contributed to subsequent initiatives for different institutional arrangements, such as Arctic and Barents cooperation regimes (Hønneland and Stokke, 2007: 7). These regimes reflected the "common problems" frame in their state-centricity and appliance of moderate diplomatic practices – an elegant expression but often without content in practice.

The first formulations of the policies of the European Union towards Russia in the mid-1990s reflected the "common problems" frame to a certain extent, too. In the beginning, the Northern Dimension was merely a policy recommendation with no additional funding from the European Union. The first Action Plan for the Northern Dimension (2000–2003), accepted at the Santa Maria de Feira European Council meeting in 2000, underlined the cross-border nature of environmental problems and interdependence in northern Europe. At the same time, it was very cautious about the attribution of blame. Problem definitions were extensive including, among other issues, the environmental impact of energy production, nuclear safety, air and water pollution concerns and biodiversity concerns. However, proposed solutions remained implicit. The list of concrete actions in the environmental sector was short and fragmented. Emphasis was put on more efficient coordination of existing funding programmes, which would result in larger-scale programmes implemented in collaboration with several financiers (article I; Council of the European Union, 2000). Moreover, the first Action Plan for the Northern Dimension, as EU policies in general, was very much based on top-down thinking and did not take the role of NGOs and participation into closer consideration.

After 2000, the "common problems" frame has again enjoyed popularity. Russia has regained economic and political importance and re-emerged as an equal partner after a couple of years as an "aid recipient" and the source of an environmental "crisis". This has quieted down European voices, at the official level at least, that attributed the blame for environmental problems on Russia.

Throughout the years, the "common problems" frame as the guiding way to see the essence of environmental cooperation has been highly favoured, especially in Russia, understandably because it leaves the attribution of blame unarticulated. At times of ostensible "détente" in Russian relations, it has been popular also on the

European side. The frame is elitist in that it is focused almost exclusively on the state level and high diplomacy. Furthermore, this exclusiveness partly results from the conditions in which the frame evolved: the centralised, hierarchical system of the Soviet political system blocked sub-state actors from environmental cooperation with the West. As such, it appears understandable that the frame has never been strongly supported by non-state actors, such as NGOs.

5.2 "Crisis"

Diagnosis

In contrast to the "common problems" frame, the "crisis" frame is constructed on the notion that environmental risks originating from Russia threaten the wellbeing of the whole of Europe. The diagnosis of the frame presents the Russian environment as one huge disaster (Feshbach and Friendly, 1992; see also Oldfield, 2005), thus focusing exclusively on environmental degradation in Russia. In the centre of the diagnostic framing is the Russian environmental crisis, associated with an extensive military-industrial complex and technogenic failings. The attribution of blame lies in both the mental (moral degeneration, ignorance of environmental values and the lack of democratic structures) and physical (polluting industries, outdated technologies) heritage of the Soviet system.

Prognosis

Framing the problem in terms of total "crisis" leads to the definition of the prognosis in a demanding and extensive way: in order to overcome a crisis, fundamental changes are needed. In so far as the reason for the crisis is the Soviet heritage, its abolition and replacement by European values is the solution. Accordingly, the prognosis of the "crisis" frame sets wide-ranging and ambitious tasks aimed ultimately at the change of societal order in Russia. The framing underlines the importance of sub-national actors, especially individuals, as initiators of some sort of an "environmental revolution" in the country. As such, the frame implies a practical, bottom-up approach to environmental cooperation: raising environmental awareness on the grassroots and community levels spills over and accomplishes more profound change (see articles II and IV).

The frame and the practice of cooperation

The "crisis" frame evolved, and was very popular, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The Gorbachev years revealed the environmental flaws inbuilt in the Soviet system, and the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 evoked public concern in its full scale, both in the Soviet Union and in Europe. Thus, at that time the frame was equally popular in Europe and in the Soviet Union. As article II and Chapter 4 demonstrate, the "crisis" frame manifested itself first in an explosive

expansion of East–West contacts between environmental advocates and then in a subsidisation boom. As the most important actor group for the frame was the sub-national actors, the frame faded away with the grassroots activity in the mid-1990s, when economic problems laid rest to environmental concerns in Russia (article II; interview 51, see Appendix I). In the European political rhetoric, the expression "Russian environmental crisis" was replaced by smoother expressions as soon as Russia regained its political and economic prominence and needed to be treated not only as a source of diverse threats, but on a more equal basis. In some occasions, however, the "crisis" frame has reappeared. One such occasion was connected to the Kursk accident in 2000 (article V). The Russian public discussion that followed the accident underlined the Russian "crisis" and technogenic risks the military-industrial complex creates, and encouraged Russian leaders to launch cooperation with foreign partners in order to avert these risks. The public thus required changes in political and security priorities, which have traditionally listed military aspects at the top. As soon as the accident was forgotten, however, the "crisis" frame as a basis for European–Russian cooperation was replaced by other frames also in the Russian public discussion.

5.3 "Modernisation"

Diagnosis

The "modernisation" frame focuses on environmental degradation in Russia and not on "common problems". It does not, however, question the basic values and functions of society, as the "crisis" frame does. Instead, it maintains that environmental degradation is a management problem. Thus, the frame focuses mainly on environmental degradation caused by industrial procedures and blame is attributed to outdated technologies and inefficient industrial procedures. In accordance with this, the situation is not alarming but can easily be improved. The frame assumes that economic growth and the resolution of environmental problems can be reconciled.

Prognosis

The "modernisation" frame leans on the prognosis of a "react and cure" formula and offers industrial modernisation as the basic solution to the problem. Accordingly, it encourages economic–technical cooperation as the strategy for environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe. In my interpretation, the "modernisation" frame for environmental cooperation between Europe and Russia differs from the concept of ecological modernisation widely supported in the West in that it encompasses less-profound actions than ecological modernisation. Because of the low starting level in Russia, even relatively small steps bring about significant improvements in terms of environmental protection. Besides, the frame assumes, the

situation is anyway predisposed to change allied to industrial modernisation and associated falls in the country's pollution load (cf. Oldfield, 2005: 4).

The frame and the practice of cooperation

The "modernisation" frame is clearly shaped by the overall transition discourse and represents a general trend of ecological modernisation that emerged over the second half of the 1980s in different countries and international organisations, such as the United Nations, the OECD, or the European Union (see Hajer, 1995). Similar to the "crisis" frame, the "modernisation" frame has been substantiated in a subsidisation boom. In contrast to the "crisis" frame, however, the "modernisation" frame has encouraged the subsidisation of industrial bodies in technical terms, not the subsidisation of non-governmental actors in informational terms.

Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 summarise the "modernisation" frame in practice: nearly all cooperative activities between Russia and Europe supported by governmental bodies in the 1990s reflected the frame. The Finnish actors that were establishing governmental neighbouring area cooperation with Russian regions adjacent to Finland reasoned their application of the strategy of "modernisation" in the following way: in the volatile economic, political and administrative conditions of the early 1990s direct contact with industrial enterprises and their subsidisation was the only strategy that could be used in Russia. At the same time, it was realised in Europe that Russia offers good ground for markets in environmental technology, and environmental cooperation can thus be used as a way to encourage European exports to Russia, too (interviews 1, 4 and 9, see Appendix I).

During the 1990s, the "modernisation" frame continued its triumphal march as the main approach of Russian–European environmental cooperation. Kotov and Nikitina (1995) explain this by stating that environmental issues became depoliticised and more independent of other goals in Russia, which implied that they were redefined as technical and managerial problems in the first place. This redefinition was reflected in the gradual weakening of federal environmental administration in Russia, too, which in turn made cooperation between Russian and European administrative bodies more difficult. The activity of NGOs also weakened. Thus, direct subsidisation of enterprises and companies in terms of "modernisation" as an approach to environmental cooperation was a practical – and perhaps sometimes also the only – choice.

The "modernisation" frame has been supported by governmental and business actors in particular. Russian counterparts may occasionally have framed the diagnosis in a slightly differing way: for them, the main problem has been the low production capacity, whereas for European partners the main problem has been pollution (see the Pechenganikel case in article IV). As the St Petersburg case demonstrates (articles III and IV), differing framings do not necessarily disturb cooperative process, if prognoses are commensurate and goals can be achieved simultaneously by one and the same measures. This is often the case for pollution prevention – it pays.

5.4 "Great ecological power"

Diagnosis

The "great ecological power" frame confines the diagnosis of global environmental problems. It ignores local problems; either they are not significant or, at least, their solution does not require international cooperation. The attribution of blame is on the non-Russian side, as the framing draws on the idea that Russia is the world's leading ecological power possessing large natural reserves and managing significant emissions declines (article VI; Tynkkynen, 2005).

Prognosis

The diagnosis and prognosis of the "great ecological power" frame are rooted in the idea of Russia as a great power, dating back to the myth of the third Rome in the sixteenth century. According to the myth, the Muscovites believed they were the chosen nation, a New Rome, which had a special role and mission in world politics (article VI; Tynkkynen, 2005). Russia's special mission in the world is now taking the form of "environmental do-gooder". This idea follows from the notion that Russia has a large amount of natural reserves, forests in particular, which contribute to the prevention of climate change and other environmental problems. This implies that Russia is rather a part of the solution than a part of the problem. How actively it should behave in order to contribute to the solution of global environmental problems evokes differing opinions: some (mainly European counterparts) maintain that the "great ecological power" should recognise its responsibility and join political efforts to protect the global environment, others (some Russians) argue that Russia's role as a great ecological power discharges it from the liability to act. In European–Russian regime-building, the "great ecological power" frame implies that when formulating policies and programmes, the terms are formulated to be as benign as possible for Russia.

The frame and the practice of cooperation

The "great ecological power" frame has emerged in the discussion shaping environmental cooperation quite recently (see article VI; Tynkkynen, 2005). It is linked on the one hand to the reformulation of the Great Power ideology through the presidency of Vladimir Putin, who has stated that Russia should encore as a velikaya derzhava, a Great Power (e.g. Anikin, 2002: 4). On the other hand, it reflects the growth of interdependence of issues and actors, and also Russia's increased political importance for Europe. Furthermore, the participation of Russia was decisive for the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol (article VI). In these circumstances, European leaders lean on the rhetoric of the "great ecological power" as a means of persuasion. For example, the EU commissioner for the environment framed the diagnosis and prognosis in terms of the "great ecological power" when trying to appeal to the sense of generosity of the Russian audience in climate policy (article VI). And because the Russian negotiators appealed to the very same rhetoric

and emphasised the positive impact of Russia on the global environment, they managed to negotiate quite benign terms in the Kyoto Protocol for Russia.

Even though foreign counterparts have taken advantage of the frame, it originates from Russian academic circles (see article VI; also Oldfield et al., 2003). As I write in article VI, eminent geographer N.N. Klyuev of the Geographical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences brings in the idea of Russia as a ”great ecological power” (ekologicheskaya derzhava) in an article he published in 2002. He links the concept of great power to the basis of environmental policy in Russia by arguing that “the weight of (the ecological potential of Russia) will grow in international relations along with the inevitable growth of the importance of environmental aspects” (Klyuev, 2002: 15; translated by Nina Tynkkynen). This is allied to the argument that Russia should strive more actively for the creation of a global compensation system for ecological services it offers on the global scale (Kontratev et al., 2003: 12-13). The “great ecological power” frame is in balance with the recent trend of Russian environmental policy to put an emphasis rather on natural resource management than environmental regulation (see article IV; Tynkkynen, 2005).

Taking all this together, the frame resembles diplomatic bargaining in which environmental issues are just one pawn in the game. Therefore, it is favoured more by Russian policy-makers and Russian and European environmental diplomats, responsible for the negotiation of environmental agreements and framework programmes, than by actors engaged in cooperation at the sub-national level. As such, it is the most state-centric of all the frames that have shaped the regime-building categorised here.

5.5 “Partnership”

Diagnosis

The starting point of the “partnership” frame is the intertwinement of political, social, economic and environmental issues. In particular, the dependence of Europe on Russian energy resources and the environmental issues linked to energy policy complicate cooperation. Another example of the complexity is nuclear safety, in which civil and military interests mingle. Moreover, the operational environment of cooperation is Russia, which makes the picture even more intricate. Thus, the frame sets the attribution of blame on Russia, even if it simultaneously tries to remain cautious about attributing blame: Russia is too powerful to be blamed for problems alone. Instead, the frame tries to emphasise the common responsibility to act.

Prognosis

The prognosis of the frame underlines the importance of equality as the basic principle of regime-building. Cooperation needs to be based on a partnership in

which all parties to cooperation have equal decision-making rights. The establishment of partnerships also empowers the "recipient" party to define goals and strategies of cooperation, because it includes the idea that funding for the cooperation comes from all partners. The prognosis stresses the role of private companies, as the share of public funding is inevitably limited. According to the prognostic framing, the creation of partnerships should be encouraged at all levels from general policy planning to concrete projects. The prognostic framing encompasses the notion of spillover effects: the solution to problems in one sector contributes to the solving of problems in some other. As article I puts it, "it is hoped that in the future, the economic potential of Russia's natural resources and the energy sector will solve the 'environmental game' that is considered the primary concern of Finland in its relations with Russia". The prognostic framing emphasises the need for multilateral cooperation, following from the logic of complex diagnosis.

The frame and the practice of cooperation

The "partnership" frame gained high popularity in the late 1990s with the growing multilateralism in Russian–European environmental cooperation. The period of transnational subsidisation of environmental protection in Russia came to its end. As the Russian share of the funding for cooperation grew, the power balance of cooperation was inevitably changed. The "partnership" frame has been evident in the cooperation aimed at the improvement of the St Petersburg water sector (article III). Article III reveals the difficulties of the realisation of the participatory approach in practice and maintains that it too often remains merely at the rhetorical level. There are certain practices that contribute to the creation of partnerships, such as twinning and low-profile activities carried out on a day-to-day basis, but it has not always been possible to pursue them.

The "partnership" frame is also widely supported in energy policy cooperation (article I), for instance. It has been emphasised that now that the Kyoto Protocol has entered into force, energy sector cooperation will have an even more environmental overtone. This underlines the intertwinement of diverse sectors of cooperation, which directs parties to avoid conflicts of interest. This is thought to succeed best by promoting the partnership approach to cooperation (article I). The new Northern Dimension draws on this notion (see section 4.2.2). It emphasises that the Northern Dimension is a policy for all European countries, not only a regional initiative of the European Union. More to the point, it notices that Russia should be engaged in the policy as an equal partner (see article I). The new Northern Dimension highlights the role of diverse actors, the question that remained implicit in the first formulations of the Northern Dimension. Accordingly, the "partnership" frame embodies actors at diverse levels, not only those at the state level. More to the point, it emphasises the role of actors other than states, especially when calling for private funding for cooperation.

6. Conclusions: environmental regime-building between Russia and Europe and social learning

6.1 The frames, problem closures and social learning

The development of the frames that have shaped Russian–European environmental regime-building is, to a certain extent, linked to the development of general assumptions about the character of the "environmental question" and its appropriate solution in the Western world (e.g. Weale, 1992). In the 1970s and 1980s, environmental problems were largely understood as a by-product of industrial development and the focus of environmental policies was on cleaning up accumulated contamination, "end of pipe" solutions to continuing discharges and regulatory mechanisms focused on air, water or land pollution control (Meadowcroft, 2002: 175). By the mid 1990s, however, the emphasis shifted to "integrated pollution control" and to the integration of environmental considerations in other policy sectors under the umbrella of "sustainable development" and ecological modernisation (see Hajer, 1995) .

Despite affinities with the general environmental policy development, the frames of Russian–European environmental cooperation have also been shaped by special characteristic of Russian–European relations. These, in turn, have been heavily affected by political and economic developments in the Soviet Union and Russia as well as in Europe. Even though the frames cannot be fixed in time, they are in constant change and reflect the changes in the world and context. Some of the frames include elements that sound peculiar, even naïve or otherwise somehow "unsuitable" now. At some other point, however, these frames were the only obvious way to view the situation. That is why I do not aim to evaluate the effectiveness of the frames, or list them in any order of superiority. I think that the task would be impossible: each frame consists of elements that, as such, cannot necessarily be compared with those of other frames. However, what I think is possible to do is to pick up some of these elements and look at them from the point of view of problem closure, identity formation and social learning, as my research setting presupposes.

"Common problems" is a fruitful frame in the sense that it does not point the finger of blame at anybody. Thus, it does not bolster dichotomies of "us" and "them", as for example the "crisis" frame does. Instead, the "common problems" frame stresses that every party is a part of the problem as well as a part of the solution. As such, it helps to create "we-ness", which may lead to shared problem

definitions, even common identities. The main disadvantage of the "common problems" frame, however, seems to be that according to it the focus of cooperation is wide – often a large set of problems, as in the Arctic and Barents cooperation. In addition, its strategy of action is top-down, emphasising activities at the governmental level. Actors other than states are largely ignored. As my case studies (especially article I and article VI) demonstrate, environmental policy issues often become too complex to handle if taken to the highest political level. Therefore, environmental cooperation framed in this way manages to tackle mainly those problems that are reducible to technical solutions. More to the point, at that level the local voices representing those who are most affected by environmental problems the cooperation aims to solve often remain unremarked.

The "crisis" frame, for its part, suffers from the intense attribution of blame on the Soviet heritage. As a guideline to activities, the frame emphasises that solutions come from "us", that is, from the "West". According to this logic, cooperation with Russia takes place firmly on the basis of "Western values and principles". In this way, the frame underlines the dichotomy between "us" and "them", which does not facilitate the creation of shared understandings, not to speak of shared identities, in the cooperation. Furthermore, the "crisis" frame can sometimes lead to the definition of the situation so cataclysmically that ameliorative action seems highly unlikely to work, thus leading to hopelessness and inactivity (cf. article II). Or, by underlining the salience of urgent reconstructive measures, the frame may lead to oversized project goals (such as the "democratisation of Russia") and large-scale projects beyond realisation. In these situations, problem closure remains out of reach because either the definition of the problem or its solution, or both, are too broad. In the case of a serious catastrophe, however, the "crisis" frame would probably be viable. In a situation serious enough, this kind of framing would possibly lead to expeditious action and to the evolving of "we-ness" instead of deepening dichotomies. As a general frame of environmental regime-building, however, it constrains rather than facilitates learning.

Cooperation shaped by the "modernisation" frame is effective because in modernisation projects the goals of cooperative partners often match with sub-state policy priorities and the interests of commercial actors (article IV). At the same time, the approach can be criticised for encouraging, citing Darst (2001: 13), "instrumental manipulation of trans-boundary environmental degradation". It implies seeking external financing for economic development, energy production and the resolution of internally generated environmental problems that could, in principle, be addressed through strictly domestic measures. Sometimes it includes hard bargaining and recalcitrance, even extortion to manipulate the interests of cooperative partners.

Article III reveals the drawbacks of the "modernisation" frame from the point of view of learning. "Modernisation", if comprising financial subsidisation from one party to another, strengthens the dichotomy between cooperating parties by dividing them into "donors" and "recipients". Mentally, the frame divides cooperational parties into "teachers and learners". Modernisation models almost always come from the "West" (as the whole concept of "modernisation" implies adaptation to "Western" structures). I suppose the problem is not in these models as such; they

can and should, naturally, also be applied in Russia if they appear as most suitable for the situation at hand. But their application should not proceed without careful accommodation, without looking at the specific character of the situation. Without such accommodation, problem closure may be difficult to reach, as in the case of the Kola Peninsula mining industry (article IV), or the process of learning may be delayed, as in the case of the St Petersburg water sector (article III). Without questioning both the prevailing definitions and practices of environmental cooperation based on the "modernisation" frame, cooperation may result in nothing more than wasted money (e.g. Wedel, 2001). What is more, cooperation without decent accommodation of local conditions may have unintended consequences. It may, for example, strengthen certain flaws in the system, as was the case for the St Petersburg water and sewage utility. The hierarchical structure of the utility became more rigid as a result of the cooperation project (article III).

The "modernisation" frame is problematic in that it also supports the technological approach to environmental protection and does not imply societal change. Neither do "end-of-pipe" solutions engage local constituencies. Russia has a tradition of expressing such technocentric environmental managerialism even without support from the West: conquering nature through massive transformations was a way of symbolising the power of the Soviet system (e.g. Huckle and Martin, 2001: 125). Moreover, environmental technology import may harm the development of Russia's domestic environmental technology[19] and bolster the economic structure based on extractive industry and primary production only.

The "great ecological power" frame is refreshing in that it stresses the importance of Russia for global ecosystems, and takes attention away from Russia as an environmental "fall guy". However, the frame may also support misleading conclusions. The framing draws on the diagnosis that by being a great power in terms of natural resources and ecological reserves, Russia is supreme to other states and actors and deserves to be treated as an ecological leader. In this way, it is based on a dichotomy which does not encourage the creation of shared meanings and identities. More to the point, the mission of the great ecological power is not seen in environmental terms but rather as a task to promote Russia's role in world politics. In this way, the rhetoric of "great ecological power" is easily used to manipulate other political goals and does not set the scene for the achievement of problem closures. There seems to be a discrepancy (gap) between the positive environmental image projected onto the international stage and the ineffectiveness of prevailing domestic policies: the increasingly utilitarian activities of the Russian government under Putin in areas of natural resource appropriation and the gradual downgrading of environmental functions within the administrative structure are suggestive of a relatively limited concern for environmental issues on the domestic agenda of the "great ecological power." Consequently, the most serious drawback of the frame is perhaps that, according to its basic logic, Russia does not need to take any measures at all in environmental policy terms (article VI; see also Tynkkynen, 2005; Oldfield, 2005: 136).

[19] This argument was actively presented by opponents of Russia's commitment to the Kyoto Protocol (see article VI).

As far as the essence of Russia's great power is conceived by most Russians in the way it is today – best crystallised probably in a recent study showing that most Russian respondents link the notion of Russia as a great power to the proposition that good leaders are more important than good laws – the "great ecological power" frame fails to work. The kind of Great Power ideology that seems to sell best in today's Russia underlines the divine nature of the supreme authorities and builds on preserving the status quo. Local-scale problems related to the wellbeing of localities are not defined as problems for the great power. More to the point, the frame does not encourage citizen activity as it emphasises the role of the authorities and state leaders (articles V and VI; Tynkkynen, 2005). At the international level, framing Russia's role in environmental cooperation in terms of being a "great ecological power" encompasses a danger that, as was accused of happening with human rights issues concerning Chechnya, Russia will be treated with kid gloves. Yet the sustainability of the "ecological greatness" of Russia would best be ameliorated by not giving licence to a free ride but by encouraging activities that contribute to this sustainability and to the assumption of responsibility.

The "partnership" frame reflects the ideal of cooperation created by the so-called "participatory turn" in development assistance and international cooperation (e.g. Crewe and Harrison, 1998). By emphasising the role of sub-state actors and the participation of cooperative partners on an equal basis as the main tactics, it supports practices of environmental cooperation that spark learning. While this looks good on paper, it has, however, turned out to be very difficult to live up to in practice. As article III points out, despite many efforts to promote "partnerships", the material and practical conditions of cooperation often lead to the relative failure of learning, also in cases that in principle draw on the "partnership" frame. The imbalance of power rooted in these conditions forms barriers, mainly mental, to open communication and interaction. Therefore, participation on an equal basis remains often merely rhetorical. The challenge of cooperation shaped by the "partnership" frame is, as article III concludes, how to change the material and practical conditions of cooperation – institutional arrangements and the distribution of resources – so as to enable and facilitate full participation and open communication that enable learning. This would imply questioning the underlying premises of cooperation and applying the "partnership" approach in a comprehensive manner – not only to single projects to polish their image, but in a way that assures the participation of all relevant stakeholders and the recognition of local voices.

6.2 Conditions for successful cooperation and learning

The individual studies reported in articles I-VI, as well as in Chapters 4 and 5 based on these studies, reconstruct the evolution of the environmental regime between Russia and Europe. During the years of cooperation, the picture has become more complex; the question is no longer one of international subsidisation to tackle "common problems" or environmental threats originating from Russia. All growing

interdependencies based on the use of raw materials, trade and markets heavily affect the economic and political context of environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe. European and Russian political, economic and environmental interests are currently very much intertwined and Russia has increased its power in the definition of issues, as the popularity of the "great ecological power" frame indicates. During its thirty years of existence, the Russian–European environmental regime has brought about only modest improvements in both environmental and institutional terms (see section 4.4). Cooperational processes have been shaped by contentions and other difficulties. This indicates that the problem closures achieved are few and social learning is, for the most part, incomplete.

The idea-based perspective of cooperation I have chosen underlines the importance of shared meanings and identities as the condition for learning. Examination of the frames of cooperation reveals that existing frames—the ways they define problems and their possible solutions—have done little to advance shared identities and learning. Definitions of problems and their possible solutions have often drawn on dichotomies such as "fall-guys" and "do-gooders", "donors" and "recipients", or "teachers" and "learners". In particular, article III that addresses the cooperation on the St Petersburg water sector demonstrates this. These dichotomies have not shaped actors' identities in a way that would have produced shared meanings and identities. They have not encouraged cooperational practices that would have promoted the interplay of different views, which is required for social learning in order to correct errors and achieve problem closures. Instead, the dichotomies have been augmented by favouring certain practices of cooperation that have deepened the juxtaposition between the Self and the Other. By shaping the self-images of actors or affecting power balances these practices have, in some instances, encouraged even the disregard of environmental concerns in domestic contexts and enhanced hierarchal structures and inertia. The framings of cooperation also reveal the fact that in many instances the cooperation is shaped by intense threat pictures (articles I and V in particular). Threat pictures rarely serve as a solid basis for any reciprocal activity and may also hinder finding mutually acceptable solutions to the problems that the cooperation aims to solve.

Perhaps the biggest problem for the achievement of problem closures and, thus, effective cooperation is as examination of the frames indicates that the definitions of problems and the required solutions are extremely broad and also top-down. In many instances situations are also defined rather cataclysmically. This is perhaps best illustrated in articles I and II. In accordance with that, Russian–European environmental regime-building has been driven towards ever-wider practices that ultimately aim at the unification of environmental policy throughout Europe and Russia. Large-scale programmes and policies, such as that of the Northern Dimension of the European Union, and massive projects that follow a European format have been favoured, especially in recent years. This is understandable: there has been a need to gain symbolic weight for environmental concerns in Russian–European relations (cf. Haila, 2007).

However, as James Meadowcroft (2002) argues, the multiplicity of spatial and temporal scales typical of environmental problems makes the "unification" task nearly impossible. The reality of the environmental cooperation between Russia and

Europe demonstrates the difficulty of this task. Developments in environmental collaboration have added to the diversity and complexity of the environmental problematic. They have not replaced national regulation and initiatives but generated a complicated system of governance, which actors often find difficult to cope with. The modest results of the various cooperative efforts indicate this. More to the point, because European and Russian political, economic and environmental interests have become extremely intertwined, it has become more difficult to achieve consensus – to establish shared meanings – on the foci and forms of the large-scale programmes. There are (too) many diverse interests and interest groups intertwined. In other words, the broadness of definitions on which large-scale projects are built adds to the complicated character of issues and politicises them, possibly creating and enhancing diverse dichotomies. I have demonstrated in this thesis, especially in articles V and VI, how great power politics enters the game on the "high politics" level and easily subordinates environmental goals. The broadness of definitions and practices thus makes the achievement of problem closure more difficult and hampers social learning. As a result of too-large scales of projects, the enforcement of "participatory methods" does not work, even though heavily stressed (see article III).

The synthesis based on the individual studies of the thesis indicate that Russian–European environmental regime-building has largely been based on top-down thinking, which takes as its frame an analysis of the whole system. In this kind of thinking, the task has been to identify the worst threats and tackle them. This thinking leans on the idea that "an unambiguous and universal standard can be found against which all phenomena in nature and society can be reflected" (Haila, 2002: 59). In other words, this thinking ignores the question of scaling. As I argued in Chapter 3, environmental problems are defined in relation to particular processes that unfold in their specific physical and social scales. If different scales of the problems are not consciously taken into account in environmental cooperation, the right constituencies are not necessarily involved in the practical work. Furthermore, the sensitivity to spatial context and the social and political situation may be missed – this is what has happened in many cases of Russian–European environmental cooperation. Neglecting the question of scale in defining the foci and forms of the cooperation can thus be said to have been the most significant constraint for social learning in Russian–European environmental cooperation.

What, then, would be the scale of activities on which conflicting interests can be overcome? What would be the scale of activities on which problem closure can be achieved? What of the scale of activities that encourages identification rather than emphasising dichotomies such as "do-gooders" and "fall guys"? Based on my study and illustrated by article IV in particular, my suggestion is that a pragmatic, bottom-up approach to cooperation that cuts problems up into more manageable pieces, focuses on specific situations, differentiates management practices and involves the relevant (and only the relevant!) stakeholders by taking their practical experience into consideration, would be needed (cf. Haila, 2007). In institutional terms, a pragmatic, bottom-up approach implies stressing institutional pluralism: many different sorts of structures with different scale preoccupations, as Meadowcroft (2002) suggests. To cite him (2002: 178), "if such arrangements appear 'untidy' and

'disjointed', so be it. For such a fractured institutional mosaic corresponds with the actual ('untidy' and 'disjointed') character of social–ecological interactions." This presumes that there does not exist a united model of ideal cooperation that could be applied in all cases of Russian–European environmental cooperation. On the contrary, the form of the appropriate model would be shaped by the situation itself. The approach leans on the basic idea that environmental policies are formed in definition struggles in which stakeholders define the problem and its possible solutions from their subjective positions. Therefore, the suitable model of cooperation cannot be found apolitically on a rational basis, but should be constructed according to the specific needs of each case of cooperation and as a result of deliberation

In sum, a pragmatic, bottom-up approach to environmental cooperation between Russia and Europe would emphasise established contacts between actors that solve practical problems. In addition to this, obviously, regular dialogue among the political leadership and, moreover, open-minded dialogue within and between both governmental and non-governmental actors, are needed. In some of the existing cases of Russian–European environmental cooperation, this kind of an approach has been applied, either consciously or as the only possible approach. Articles III and IV demonstrate how the turbulence and confusion in Russia opened up "windows of opportunity" for successful cooperation projects, because it empowered local actors to establish contacts abroad, ignoring the rigid and slow bureaucratic apparatus. As the cooperation has become more institutionalised and multilateral, however, spontaneity and local character have often been missed. Participatory methods have not succeeded because project structures and practices have been based on framings that do not lean on the analysis of specific situations and managerial practices, but rather on institutional arrangements of the European party. Consequently, while the pragmatic, bottom-up approach was applied in some cases of cooperation in the early 1990s, in future it should be consciously applied to concrete cases of cooperation.

Finally, while this thesis has focused mainly on activities in northern Europe, and of Finland with its peculiar relation with Russia in particular, these conclusions should be applicable to environmental cooperation with Russia in general. As the conclusions emphasise the bottom-up approach and the need to base cooperative activities on the analysis of specific situations, instead of drawing on some general model, they apply to any partner engaging in environmental cooperation with Russia.

6.3 Perspectives of research

The thesis draws on the social constructivist approach, emphasising the importance of shared meanings and identities in the formation of regimes. In Chapter 3, I categorised this perspective as idea-based, in comparison to the power-based and interest-based perspectives. The results of the study demonstrate that explaining the process of environmental regime-building between Russia and Europe merely on the

basis of interests or power relations would undermine the complexity of the "environmental question" and leave many interesting features of the problematic uncovered. Thus, it is possible to conclude that while interests and power may explain certain dimensions of the regime-building, the dynamic character of regime-building as an ongoing process is best captured from the idea-based perspective.

The conclusions of the study suggest that a pragmatic, bottom-up approach, focusing on specific situations as the level of analysis of cooperation, encourages the application of smaller-scale practices that facilitate shared meanings and, accordingly, problem closures, identification and social learning. In other words, it advances effective cooperation. These conclusions are not confined to the environmental sector only. In actual fact, there are perhaps lessons to learn on the basis of these conclusions for other sectors of cooperation, too, as well as at a more general level in Russian–European relations. The conclusions demonstrate that both Europe and Russia should pay attention to practice and basic philosophy in their relations and consider what the cooperation practices are based on and whether they help to produce shared meanings and social learning (cf. Pursiainen, 2006: 115). As has been noted, this has not always been the case. For example, efforts to "democratise" Russia from outside have often been counterproductive: "Continuing missionary criticism and the Russian counter-reaction contribute to the Othering of Russia," estimates Morozov (2002: 409). In other words, there are similarities between frames that have shaped the environmental regime-building and frames of cooperation in other sectors. Reframing – overcoming categories of the "other" – becomes possible by changing the practice of cooperation into one that takes the problematic of scaling seriously and involves relevant stakeholders in the process. Again, as in environmental regime-building, this practice is encouraged by an approach to cooperation that takes specific situations and practical problems as the starting point. The focus on specific situations pays attention to the practice of cooperation instead of negotiation and normative considerations about "democratising Russia".

What methodological implications does this have for studying environmental policy in the context of Russian studies and International Relations, and also more generally on Russian studies? First and foremost, the identification of specific situations and practical problems becomes part of the research problem. Hence, a problem-oriented approach is justified. This kind of approach underlines the importance of focusing on concrete cases. The comparison of concrete, different cases helps to understand the dynamics of environmental policy in general. This is based on the notion that generalisations across time and space can be done, provided that the essential features of the relevant kinds are preserved (Wendt, 1999: 70; Haila and Dyke, 2006).

Finally, to conclude in terms of the methodological task I set myself at the beginning of this research process, I do not agree with the idea that Russia is "more different than most" (cf. Kangaspuro, 2000) in the sense that Russian studies need theoretical concepts and methods of their own. On the contrary, I believe that theoretical concepts and methods developed in the "West" can, and should, be utilised in Russian studies, too, but, following on from the first point, this needs to be done according to the conditions of the specifics of the situation and phenomena

under study, and by emphasising spatial and temporal scales (see also Kotilainen, 2004). I believe it is only through concrete phenomena that the adequacy of theoretical constructions can be evaluated. I agree with Christer Pursiainen (1998: 4) who argues that "although I reject the argument of Russia's sui generis nature as a motivation for theoretical and methodological self-sufficiency – rather I see it as an empirical challenge to the existing social science theories – I believe that scholars of Russian studies should nonetheless continue to pay attention to the particularities of the field also from theoretical and methodological angles." A subtle paradox this argument includes can, in my view, be evaded by emphasising the problem-oriented approach, as I have aimed to demonstrate in this thesis, and by focusing on concrete cases as manifestations of a variety of societal phenomena that take place in Russia.

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Appendix I

The list of interviews used in the study is provided below. The list includes all interviews I took for the individual studies, although in the articles the numbering of interviewees differs from the numbering presented here. I took all the interviews personally. Respecting the wish of the majority of the interviewees, I do not indicate their names.

Interview 1. Civil servant, Finnish Consulate in St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg, Russia 18 June 2002

Interview 2. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Helsinki, Finland 11 June 2002

Interview 3. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 13 May 2002

Interview 4. Former civil servant, Finnish Ministry of the Environment
St. Petersburg, Russia 26 September 2002

Interview 5. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 12 June 2002

Interview 6. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 23 August 2002

Interview 7. Civil servant, Finnish Institute of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 23 August 2002

Interview 8. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 13 May2002

Interview 9. Former civil servant, Finnish Ministry of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 25 June 2002

Interview 10. Civil servant, Finnish Institute of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 24 March 2003

Interview 11. Civil servant, Finnish Institute of the Environment
Helsinki, Finland 24 March 2003

Interview 12. Representative of Helsinki Water
Helsinki, Finland 12 March 2003

Interview 13. Representative of Helsinki Water
Helsinki, Finland 12 March 2003

Interview 14. Representative of Helsinki Water
Helsinki, Finland 21 March 2003

Interview 15. Representative of Helsinki Water
St Petersburg, Russia 22 November 2002

Interview 16. Representative of Helsinki Water
Helsinki, Finland 7 February 2003

Interview 17. Representative of a Finnish consulting agency
Helsinki, Finland 28 May 2003

Interview 18. Representative of a British consulting agency
St Petersburg, Russia 5 December 2002

Interview 19. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 15 December 2002

Interview 20. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 10 December 2002

Interview 21. Representative of SpB Vodokanal management
St Petersburg, Russia 17 December 2002

Interview 22. Representative of SpB Vodokanal management
St Petersburg, Russia 22 November 2002

Interview 23. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 5 December 2002

Interview 24. Representative of SpB Vodokanal management
St Petersburg, Russia 23 January 2003

Interview 25. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 22 November 2002

Interview 26. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 4 December 2002

Interview 27. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 17 December 2002

Interview 28. Representative of SpB Vodokanal middle management
St Petersburg, Russia 10 December 2002

Interview 29. Representative of SpB Vodokanal staff
St Petersburg, Russia 22 November 2002

Interview 30. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 17 December 2003

Interview 31. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 16 December.2003

Interview 32. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 26 February 2004

Interview 33. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 3 March 2004

Interview 34. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia March 2004

Interview 35. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 1 March 2004

Interview 36. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 2 March 2004

Interview 37. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 18 December 2003

Interview 38. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 10 December 2003

Interview 39. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 2 March 2004

Interview 40. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia March 2004

Interview 41. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia December 2003

Interview 42. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 10 December 2003

Interview 43. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 10 December 2003

Interview 44. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 27 February 2004

Interview 45. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 15 December 2003

Interview 46. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 1 March 2004

Interview 47. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 15 December 2003

Interview 48. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 19 December 2003

Interview 49. Representative of an environmental NGO of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 2 February 2004

Interview 50. Representative of the City Ecological Committee of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia 26 February.2004

Interview 51. Researcher, St Petersburg State University
St Petersburg, Russia 26 February 2004

Interview 52. Representative of the City Ecological Committee of St Petersburg
St Petersburg, Russia January 2003

Interview 53. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry for Trade and Industry
Helsinki 16 June 2005

Interview 54. Civil servant, Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Helsinki 16 June 2005