



SIRKE MÄKINEN

Russian Geopolitical Visions and Argumentation

Parties of Power, Democratic and Communist Opposition
on Chechnia and NATO, 1994–2003



ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States (SNG Soobzhestvo nezavisimyykh gosudarstv)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	Congress for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DVR	Demokraticeskii Vybor Russii (Democratic Choice Russia)
EPItsentr	Tsentr ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh issledovaniy (Centre of Economic and Political Studies)
EU	European Union
FSB	Federalnaia sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service)
<i>gosudarstvenniki</i>	Advocates of Russian statehood
GUAM	Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development. Participant countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova. Uzbekistan was a member 1999–2005 (GUUAM).
IGRI	Institut gumanitarno-politicheskikh issledovaniy (Institute of Humanitarian Political Studies)
IMF	International monetary fund
INION RAN	Institut nauchnoi informatsii po obshchestvennym naukam Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk (Institute of academic information on social sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.)
KFOR	NATO-led Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
<i>Komsomol</i>	Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi (Communist Youth League)
KPR	Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossii (Communist Party of Russia)
KPRF	Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)
KPSS	Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soiuza (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
KRO	Kongress russkikh obshchin (Congress of Russian Communities)
LDPR	Liberalno-demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia)

MĀS	Ministerstvo po delam grazhdanskoi oborony, chrezvychainym situatsiiam i likvidatsii posledstviu stikhiinykh bedstviu (Ministry of Emergency and Civil Defence)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDR	Nash Dom – Rossiia (Our Home is Russia)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OVR	Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia (Fatherland-All Russia bloc)
<i>Partiia vlasti</i>	Party of Power
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PRES	Partiia Rossiiskogo Edinstva i Soglasii (Party of Russian Unity and Concord)
RHDS-ND	Rossiiskii Khristiansko-demokraticeskii soiuз–Novaia Demokratia (Russian Christian-Democratic Union – New Democracy)
RPRF	Respublikanskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Republic Party of the Russian Federation)
RSFSR	Rossiiskaia Sovetskaia Federativnaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika (The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic or Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic)
RTR	Russian state-owned television channel, nowadays called Rossiia
SDPRF	Sotsial-demokraticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation)
SPS	Soiuз Pravykh Sil (Union of Rightist Forces)
START II	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1993
<i>tselostnost</i>	Integrity
UN	United Nations
US	United States
<i>vlast</i>	Power, authority, executive power, those with formal or informal power

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research project might never have been realized if Vilho Harle and Pami Aalto had not invited me to join their research project *Identity Politics, Security and the Making of Geopolitical Order in the Baltic Region*. So my first and foremost words of gratitude go to my supervisors Professor Vilho Harle and Professor Pami Aalto; first of all for giving me the opportunity to start my research in their project in February 2002, and secondly and most importantly, for all the support and advice that I have received from them during this period. Pami has patiently commented on my texts again and again, be it for a seminar or a conference, for a scholarship application, or for the PhD. He has always found new perspectives and provided me with healthy and constructive criticism. It is also certainly true that without my supervisors' references I would not have received funding during my doctoral studies.

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I owe special thanks to my partner Jari, my parents Sirpa and Rauli, my sister Rita, my godmother Tuire, my great-aunt Annikki and to all my other close relatives for encouraging me to continue my studies. I would also like to thank all my dear friends, who know my gratitude for their encouragement and support even though I have not mentioned all their names here.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The Russian script is transliterated using the U.S. Library of Congress system. However, diacritics, that is, the soft ь (') and hard ь (") signs are omitted, except where used by a person her-/himself (e.g. Vladimir Gel'man). Moreover, if in the Western publications the author has used a different transliteration system, I have used the author's system when referring to her/him (e.g. Zassoursky, Yassen and not Zasurskii, Iasen).

NOTE ON TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN INTO ENGLISH

The examples of the primary data have been translated from Russian into English by the author unless otherwise stated.

ABSTRACT

This study deals with the field of Russian politics and, in particular, Russian political argumentation. It contributes to the knowledge of political parties and politicians, and to the discussions of geopolitics in the Russian context. The principal question asked is what is the content and structure of the public arguments expressed by the leading politicians of the parties of power (*partiiia vlasti*), the democratic and the communist opposition on Chechnia and NATO in 1994-2003? *Nash Dom – Rossiia* (Our Home is Russia), *Edinstvo* (Unity) and *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) represent the parties of power, *Iabloko* the democratic opposition and *Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) the communist opposition. Chechnia, especially separatism understood as an internal threat, and NATO, especially the eastward enlargement as an external threat, are focal points. Moreover, the interest lies in what we can say - based on these arguments - about the geopolitical visions of the political parties and about Russian political parties in general.

The primary data comprise Russian newspaper articles written by the politicians of the examined parties, their interviews, and party programmes. The data are analysed first using Gearóid Ó Tuathail's narrative tool called geopolitical storyline, then by Stephen Toulmin's model of argument and finally, by using the concept of a geopolitical vision.

The main argument is that there are varying views on the argumentation level and on the geopolitical vision level. These variations do not exist only between the political parties, but also within the parties. In addition to proving that there is no single Russian view concerning these two cases, it also shows that there is no single opposition in Russia and that the opposition is not a permanent position, but that it varies from one case and context to another. For example, we find that if we compare the parties of power with the opposition parties, there are significant differences in argumentation concerning the internal threat, but not as many differences in argumentation concerning the external threat. In addition, we have found that the justification for the claims and the solutions offered are very far from each other in the democratic and in the communist opposition. We can also argue that even though arguments change from one context to another, we can find traces of more permanent geopolitical visions, which can be constructed on the basis of public arguments. A common factor to all the political parties examined here is that all of them emphasize and speak for Russia's sovereignty and equal position in the world, and accuse the West of having double standards.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tutkimus käsittelee nyky-Venäjän politiikkaa ja erityisesti julkista poliittista argumentaatiota. Tutkimus lisää tietämystämme venäläisistä puolueista ja poliitikoista sekä venäläisestä geopolitiikasta. Työssä tutkitaan ns. vallan puolueiden (*partii vlasti*), demokraattisen ja kommunistisen opposition johtavien poliitikkojen julkisia argumentteja Tshetsheniaa ja NATOa koskien vuosina 1994-2003. *Nash Dom – Rossiia* (Kotimme on Venäjä), *Edinstvo* (Yhtenäisyys) ja *Otechestvo* (Isänmaa) edustavat vallan puolueita, *Iabloko* demokraattista ja *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Venäjän federaation kommunistinen puolue) kommunistista oppositiota. Tshetsheniaa koskien keskitytään separatismiin, joka voidaan ymmärtää sisäisenä uhkana, ja Natoa koskien Naton itälaajentumisen, joka voidaan ymmärtää ulkoisena uhkana Venäjälle. Lisäksi keskeisenä tutkimuskysymyksenä on, mitä näiden argumenttien perusteella voidaan sanoa tutkittavien puolueiden geopolittisista visioista.

Primaariaineisto koostuu tutkittavien puolueiden poliitikkojen kirjoittamista venäläisistä sanomalehtiartikkeleista, poliitikkojen sanomalehti- ja radiohaastatteluista, sekä puolueohjelmista. Analyttisinä työkaluina käytetään Gearoid Ó Tuathailin käsitettä *geopolitical storyline* (geopoliittinen kertomuslinja) sekä yksityiskohtaisempaan rakenteelliseen ja sisällölliseen vertailuun Stephen Toulminin argumenttimallia.

Sekä lähtöoletuksena että loppuargumenttina on se, että puolueet esittävät eriäviä näkemyksiä sekä argumentaation tasolla että geopolittisen vision tasolla. Eroja löytyy niin puolueiden väliltä kuin niiden sisältäkin. Sen lisäksi että tutkimus vahvistaa käsitystä siitä, ettei ole mitään yhtä yhtenäistä Venäjän tai venäläistä näkemystä esimerkiksi tutkittavaa kahta tapausta koskien, tutkimus osoittaa myös, ettei ole olemassa myöskään mitään yhtä yhtenäistä oppositiota. Oppositioasema ei ole pysyvä, vaan se vaihtelee tapauksesta ja kontekstista toiseen. Jos vertaamme vallan puolueita ja oppositiopuolueita toisiinsa, huomaamme, että suurin ero löytyy sisäistä uhkaa koskevasta argumentaatiosta; sen sijaan ulkoista uhkaa koskeva argumentaatio on hyvin samankaltaista. Lisäksi voimme todeta, että oppositiopuolueiden esittämät väitteiden oikeutukset ja ongelmanratkaisut eroavat toisistaan suuresti. Tutkimuksessa todetaan myös, että vaikka argumentit muuttuvat tapauksesta ja kontekstista toiseen, voidaan niiden pohjalta rakentaa myös pysyvimpiä geopolittisiä visioita. Mikä yhdistää tutkittavien puolueiden retoriikkaa, on Venäjän suvereniteetin ja tasavertaisen aseman puolesta puhuminen ja Lännen syyttäminen kaksinaismoralismista.

1 Introduction

Like other political communities, Russia is no homogeneous entity. Even though in the recent research literature it has been argued that in Putin's managed democracy there would not be any opposition to the Kremlin,¹ it would be an over-simplification to argue that no viewpoints other than those of President Putin, the presidential administration, or those close to the Kremlin exist, even though these opposing views do not get much publicity. The starting point in this study has been that Russia has multiple voices, not only of those in power (the ruling elite) and that of the 'public opinion'; other political actors also contribute to and reflect the prevailing discourses in Russian society, especially when looking at the period of this study 1994–2003.

Briefly, in this study I ask what is the content and structure of the public arguments expressed by leading politicians of the parties of power, the democratic opposition (*Iabloko*) and the communist opposition (*Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, KPRF) on Chechnia and NATO and, on the basis of these arguments, what we can say about the political parties' geopolitical visions. Concerning Chechnia, I particularly focus on separatism understood as an internal threat, and concerning NATO, on eastward enlargement as understood as an external threat. The main argument is that we can find varying views both on the argumentation level and at the geopolitical vision level. These variations are not only between political parties but also within parties (concerning the argumentation level). Moreover, the differences do not necessarily manifest themselves in the claims, and focusing only on them we would miss something more important, that is, how politicians justify the claims, i.e. what data is given to

1 On these claims, and especially their criticism, see Hahn 2002. Hahn mentions such examples of opposition action as the parliamentary actions and court challenges of *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (KPRF, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) and *Iabloko* and of some regional leaders. For example, the communists tried to block the adoption of the new Land Code and managed to get some changes to it; *Iabloko* organized demonstrations in defense of NTV and TV6 and of the accused spy Grigorii Pasko. Hahn also argues that "any muting in *Iabloko*'s opposition is a result of the Kremlin co-opting its economic prescriptions like the 13 per cent flat tax and business deregulation." Moreover, *Iabloko*, SPS and the communists presented a joint declaration in defense of TV6. More recently we have also witnessed more open actions of opposition, such as the actions of *Drugaiia Rossiia* (Other Russia; Garri Kasparov's and Kasianov's groups together with National Bolshevik Party of Eduard Limonov and *Avantgarde Kommunisticheskoi Molodezhi* [Avantgarde of the Communist Youth] make up *Drugaiia Rossiia*. Also some individuals from *Iabloko* and SPS participate but not their parties. However, Kasianov left this *Drugaiia Rossiia* in the summer of 2007.) and *Marshi nesoglasnykh* (Marches of those who do not agree [with Putin's policies, with the current regime]). It must be mentioned that these activities are supported by a very small part of the Russian population, perhaps only 2% (Korguniuk 2007, author's interview).

support the claim, which general rules are used in order to get from the data to the claim, and what backing is provided for these warrants (see Chapter 5 for these concepts). What we can also discover is that some politicians do not see any reason for justifying their claims or their assumption is that the audience should just trust in their expertise and respect their authority. Thus, these structural differences also inform us about the nature of political parties and the Russian party system.

In the 1990s there was very intensive political debate surrounding NATO enlargement, or Russia–NATO relations in general, and around the problems with Chechnia. Most of the political actors opposed NATO enlargement and Chechen separatism – Chechnia seceding from Russia proper – which is, of course, no surprise and common knowledge to all studying Russian politics. However, when studying political actors, Russian or any other, it is not enough to know whether they opposed or did not oppose, e.g. NATO enlargement, but instead what is interesting and more relevant to us is what they offered as reasons for their opposition and, how they justified their position, as I argued above. The reasons given and the whole argumentation around these ‘cases’ reveals to us what certain political actors in Russia see appropriate to argue publicly in certain contexts. They reveal something of the very nature of the political struggle that is going on.

As I argue here, these arguments constitute part of the discursive field in which there is a struggle for power to define Russia and the phenomena/actors threatening it, and thus also to define what should be done. It is the public argumentation of politicians that is studied here – arguments that are context- and time-bound. Politicians choose them at a particular situation and in a particular time. However, I do not deny that these arguments would not have any permanent grounds, too, that is, the ideas behind them – geopolitical thinking – that occurs relatively independently from context and time and the case being talked about. Consequently, in studying rhetoric it is a question both of continuity (in the form of ideas sometimes revealed in arguments) and situation- and time-bound momentariness (in the form of particular arguments). It is the interplay of these two that makes studying the arguments of Russian politicians over this period of ten years interesting. Situation- and time-bound arguments are here analysed by using *Stephen Toulmin’s layout for the structure of the argument*. Moreover, the cases are studied by using *Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s tool of geopolitical storylines*. Lastly, we can see whether there is any continuity in the arguments regardless of the time period or any other context, that is, can we find any geopolitical vision that would be present in most of the arguments? The approach to studying Russian political argumentation and geopolitical storylines will be introduced in Chapter 5 together with the primary data – newspaper articles written by politicians and their interviews published in Russian newspapers and party programmes.

Three assumptions thus underpin my study. The first is that relations between Russia and one of its subjects, the Chechen republic, regarding the conflicts in Chechnia, Chechen separatism and alleged terrorism, and the relations between Russia and NATO, the trans-Atlantic military organization, former adversary of the Warsaw pact, particularly with respect to its eastward enlargement and the concept of humanitarian intervention, are perceived by Russian political actors as somehow problematic. Thus, the first could be classified as an internal threat

and the latter as an external threat to Russia's statehood and citizens. The second assumption has to do with the different actors being studied, that these three groups, the party of power (parties of power, parties of the ruling elite), the democratic opposition and the communist opposition, represent different positions in Russian politics, and that their arguments differ from each other concerning the aforementioned cases and that we can find different geopolitical visions based on these arguments. Finally, the third assumption, which will be discussed to some extent in Chapter 5, concerns the wider relevance of the Russian politicians' and parties' public arguments in relation to public opinion. I take it for granted that arguments, discourse and public opinion are interdependent – that they all contribute to and influence each other. It has, for example, been argued that, in addition to upbringing and education, the media is the most important factor in shaping the public opinion and forming geopolitical representations.² Through the media, politicians also participate in shaping public opinion and the public opinion, in its turn, has a chance to affect the decisions taken.³ This third assumption forms a wider starting point for the study and is not under examination here. In fact, it would be impossible to study it directly using the primary data which I have. Moreover, it is doubtful whether this relationship can be properly examined in the empirical sense at all.

I will come back to the first assumption, and why I have chosen these two cases, in the introductions to the analysis chapters (see introductions in Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Here it suffices to say that the situation in Chechnia was/is taken as one of the most serious problems facing post-Soviet Russia and it was even perceived as an example leading to the collapse of the Russian Federation.⁴ Moreover, Russia–NATO relations constitute a part of Russia–Europe or Russia–Western relations – Europe or the West being the main referent when constructing Russian identity.⁵ In Russia, there had been a more or less positive image of the EU and its enlargement – at least until the Baltic states joined the EU. In contrast, NATO, and especially its enlargement to the East and actions in Kosovo (or the humanitarian intervention concept), has been seen as one of the main external threats to Russia's security during the 1990s. For example, according to the National Security Concept, "NATO's new strategy of using military actions outside its zone of responsibility and without the UN Security Council sanctions threatens stability of the whole strategic situation in the world".⁶ The National Foreign Policy Concept

2 Kolossov 2003, 123. In the Soviet Union, public opinion did not shape the decisions taken in the foreign policy, but in Russia the situation has changed to some extent. *Ibid.*, 122.

3 See on discursivity of the public opinion e.g. Jakobsson 1997. Jakobsson discusses the connection between communication and legitimacy. She calls the will formation discursive, because the will is formed through public argumentation. This public argumentation then produces legitimation. Jakobsson also discusses theoretically how discursively formed opinion is "channelled into the political system and transformed into actual policy".

4 During 1990–1993 the so called parade of sovereignties took place when several Russian republics or oblasts declared their sovereignty from the Russian Federation (or the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic) and Chechnia declared itself independent in November 1991. See e.g. Ross 2002 and 2005.

5 See e.g. Neumann 1996 and Kassianova 2001. Kassianova studies the relationship between Russia's national identity and foreign policy using the state level discourses as his data (National Foreign Policy Concepts and National Security Concepts).

6 *Kontseptsiiia natsionalnoi bezopastnosti Rossiiskoi federatsii* 2000.

emphasizes the importance of cooperation with NATO and, referring to the Founding Act of 1997, the importance of fulfilling its conditions: that is, abstaining from the use of force and from locating any conventional forces or nuclear weapons in the territory of the new member states.⁷ However, the Foreign Policy Concept stresses that Russia continues to oppose NATO enlargement. During the war in Kosovo in particular, NATO appeared as the enemy Number One for most Russians.⁸ The relationship with both these actors is crucial to Russia's future and reveals more about Russia than just their relationship with one of the federation subjects and with the other Other. These two cases (Chechnia and NATO) appear to be appropriate for my study because one represents what could be classified as 'internal geopolitics'⁹ and the other 'external geopolitics'. They have been at the centre of debates in Russia during the 1990s and 2000–2003, and continue to be so. I will present the case-specific research questions on Chechnia and NATO in Chapter 5.

Concerning the second assumption, during the period of this study the main opposition forces were the communists, the liberals and the democrats, represented by *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, *Soiuz pravyykh sil*¹⁰ and *Iabloko*, respectively – as Vladimir Gel'man has argued.¹¹ These political parties and parties of power, which each have had their representatives in the State Duma during 1994–2003, held varying views, for example, on such fundamental questions as first what and where Russia is and should be (geo-) politically and socio-economically. Secondly, they did not agree on which direction Russia should be heading in and what is threatening to prevent Russia from getting there. The collapse of the Soviet Union signified “the identity turn not only about who or what is Russian but also about what kind of power and what kind of geopolitics that Russia would pursue.”¹² As O’Loughlin argues, “parties and political leaders have expressed the elements of what Russia stands for, and what Russians want. [...]”¹³ I suggest that the party of power, the democratic opposition and

7 Kontsepsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi federatsii 2000.

8 See opinion polls e.g. <www.levada.ru/interrelations2.html>, the section *Rossiiia i NATO*.

9 Usually internal geopolitics is used to refer to studies on electoral geography. Yves Lacoste has written about *Géopolitiques des régions françaises* (Geopolitics (in plural) of French regions) in 1986. Later in 1996 he wrote the Introduction to the special issue of Hérodote entitled as *Périls géopolitiques en France* (Geopolitical Perils in France) and argued that internal threats such as regional secession movement in Corsica are far greater threats to France than foreign threats. (See Mamadouh 1998.) Here internal geopolitics refers to the relationship between the federation centre and one of its subjects, Chechnia, as to how the federation centre manages e.g. the territory within the federation. In internal geopolitics the borders of the federation are protected against secession, separatism from within the Russian Federation territory (or also from outside, if we are to believe that Chechens get their funding from abroad and that there are international terrorists in Chechnia). In external geopolitics, the borders are protected against offensives from outside the Russian Federation territory (and from within if we are to use the internal enemy concept, those 'fraternising' with NATO). As we can see external and internal geopolitics are fused. The main point is to show that geopolitics is not only a concept which should be used in relation to the foreign policy (policies) of a state but in relation to the domestic policy (policies) and different domestic policy actors, too.

10 Gel'man 2005, 7. *Soiuz pravyykh sil* (SPS) is here excluded for reasons later to be explained (see Chapter 4).

11 Gel'man 2005.

12 O’Loughlin 2001, 22.

13 On Eurasianism, see below Chapter 3.

the communist opposition represent three different positions – those in power and two groups in opposition.

Here we might ask why study Russian political parties at all? As Epstein wrote on parties in Western democracies in 1966, I also argue that parties are important in democracy-building “but not overwhelmingly important political agencies”¹⁴: that is, they are not a “sufficient condition for democracy”¹⁵. However, what holds true still today is that they are a “necessary condition since no modern democracy exists without parties”.¹⁶ This is not to say that in the future democracy would not be possible without political parties, this merely is a statement on the current situation. When studying democratization in post-communist societies, Thomas Carothers has noted that even though the transition paradigm, or democratization paradigm, does not hold true as such, the third wave of democratization, that is, (attempted) transitions to democracy since 1974, has had its successes too. Today, societies cannot do without elections; elections are at least used to legitimise the rule.¹⁷ Consequently, as the minimum function of parties is to structure the vote in the elections, we can draw a conclusion that if elections are a necessary condition for recognising a democracy, and so far there has not been any more efficient way of structuring the vote in the elections other than parties, then political parties can be seen as a necessary condition too. It is another matter whether these elections are being manipulated – i.e. political parties or the party system being manipulated by those in power – and whether we should refer to the situation in Russia as an imitation of democracy, as Lilia Shevtsova strongly argues¹⁸. Here again it holds true that there is a mutual interaction between parties and the political and social system,¹⁹ and that the “degree of organization is a response to the particular society and to the function which parties are to perform in its political system”.²⁰ Russian political parties are answers to the political system as created by Russia’s political leadership. More on the political context during the period of study, which mainly comprises the first two full sessions of the State Duma (1996–2003), as well as the years 1994 and 1995 concerning some of the parties, can be found in Chapter 4.

In the next chapter, Chapter 2 on the Research Agenda, I discuss the question of why geopolitics matters or why we should set these questions in the framework of geopolitics, and look for any geopolitical vision that is potentially expressed in their arguments. Geopolitics gives us the possibility to transcend the domestic vs. foreign policy divide, because geopolitical argumentation may be present both in talking about places, borders and identities both within state borders or outside them, as well as in ‘places in between’, such as Chechnia was in the 1990s.²¹ From a critical geopolitics point of view, as Klaus Dodds has argued, “Greater attention needs

14 Epstein 1966, 8.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Carothers 2002 and 2007.

18 See e.g. Shevtsova 2007.

19 Epstein 1966, 9.

20 Ibid., 15.

21 See also footnote 6 on internal geopolitics.

to be paid to the histories of geopolitics within non-western geopolitical imaginations and politics.²² Moreover, as O’Loughlin and Kolossov argue, “In Russia, the identity crisis has produced a louder and bitterer debate than elsewhere [in the post-Soviet space] [...] It is of little surprise that in today’s Russia, ideologists of different parties, academic scholars and journalists *attempt to evaluate Russia’s new position in the world*. Further, there is a wide *speculation in Russia about potential external threats to national security, actual and potential allies, and Russia’s possible relations with world powers and neighbouring states in order to generate new geopolitical codes* in the emerging world geopolitical order.”²³ Furthermore, Smith and Timmins argue that “geopolitical concepts and ideas have reached a wide constituency amongst opinion-formers and decision-makers in contemporary Russia.”²⁴ Thus, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inheritor of the Soviet Union according to international law, i.e. the Russian Federation and its citizens, have been searching for a new identity and Russia’s place in the world which would be congruent to this new identity. However, this is not something completely new without any ties to the past: “the population of post-Soviet Russia inherited important elements of the Soviet mentality – opposition to the outside world, fear of a ‘hostile environment’, strong mechanisms of group solidarity and appeals to symbols of ‘great powerness’ [*derzhavnost*] – as compensation for the many humiliations and the psychological damage suffered in the post-Soviet times.”²⁵ Contemporary Russian geopolitical thinking has been studied by many scholars in the recent years, e.g. Vladimir Kolossov and his Russian research team, John O’Loughlin, along with Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Alan Ingram and A.P. Tsygankov – just to name a few of those who publish in English. In Chapter 3 I discuss geopolitical thinking in Russia in more detail, and in particular, how Eurasianism has been touched upon by recent studies²⁶ and classified as gathering different features of Russian geopolitical thinking opposing the Westernizing or Atlanticist way of thinking. This study systematically examines Russian political parties and also reveals whether the classifications given in previous studies hold true concerning these parties if looking at them over a longer period of time and in two specific contexts – their argumentation on Chechnia and on NATO.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to mention that this is a study in the discipline of Political Science, but might also be classified as belonging to Area Studies, or Russian Studies, because here I presuppose that understanding Russia and Russian politics requires knowledge not only of the political aspect, but also of Russian geography, history and culture. Accordingly, I argue that when studying *any country/place/area* one should take into account the historical, geographical and cultural (including linguistic) *particularities* of the country in question. This is in no means any argument in favour of treating Russia as unique in all aspects. Rather, all

22 Dodds 2001, 471. This lack of study has to a certain extent been filled by the studies of Vladimir Kolossov, John O’Loughlin and Gearóid Ó Tuathail.

23 Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2002, 592.

24 Smith and Timmins 2001, 70.

25 O’Loughlin & Kolossov 2002, 589.

26 E.g. Clover 1999, Smith 1999, Ingram 2001, Tsygankov 2003.

countries/places/areas are unique in one (or some) aspect(s), but very similar to each other in other aspects. We may, and perhaps even should, use the same analytical and theoretical models from one context to another, yet we should also be culturally sensitive. We have to understand that models of one area might need some adjusting when applied to another. Moreover, not all concepts have the same meaning in different political cultures. If we accept as a fact that the meaning of concepts changes over time, we should also accept as a fact that concepts may change their meaning when taken from one place to another. So it is not only about the temporal context but also about the location. Moreover, there are also different interpretations and explanations as to what constitutes the 'political', or politics (regardless of place), and I would prefer seeing it as not only as belonging to the political institutions but as an aspect potentially prevalent in all aspects of human life.²⁷ However, it must be mentioned that in this particular study the actors studied are formal political actors (State Duma deputies and/or leaders of registered political parties) belonging to formal political institutions (the State Duma and/or registered political parties). The overall purpose of this study is to broaden the view of Russian politics and give a more heterogeneous picture of Russian (geo)political argumentation for non-Russian speaking audiences.

²⁷ See e.g. Palonen 1987.

2 Research Agenda

My general research questions will be presented in the last section of this Chapter. To make them more understandable I will first say a few words about the geopolitical tradition, concepts used in the field of critical geopolitics, and about previous research which has been done on Russian geopolitical discourses.

2.1 GEOPOLITICAL TRADITION

Rudolf Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist and conservative politician, was the first to coin the concept of ‘geopolitics’ in 1899. Kjellén’s main work *Staten som livsform* (State as an Organism 1916) was a study on the birth of the state and the growth of its geographic body, and thus belonged to the organic state theory.¹ In 1920 he formulated his idea of a political system (Foundations for a System of Politics 1920). According to Kjellén, the political system comprised *geopolitics, ecopolitics, demopolitics, sociopolitics, and kratopolitics*. Geopolitics was about studying the territory of a state (space, form and location of the state) and the entity of the state (state as a geographic individual).² It has been claimed that Kjellén represented the start of scientific geopolitics,³ but had no wider connections with later schools of thought in geopolitics.⁴ Studying geopolitics in the West was actually mostly practised by army officers and geographers, such as the zoologist and geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), naval officer Alfred Mahan (1840–1914), geographer Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), army officer Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) and political scientist (IR) Nicholas Spykman (1893–1943). Geopolitics, or especially German *Geopolitik*, was ‘contaminated’ with the claim of its connections with the Nazi ideology of the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, geopolitics is usually identified with the above mentioned scholars – whose body of literature might be classified as ‘classical’, ‘traditional’ or

1 See e.g. Harle & Moisisio 2000, 23.

2 Karl Haushofer took Kjellén’s concept of geopolitics and used it in building the German geopolitical school. See Ó Tuathail 1996, 44.

3 Moisisio 2001, 15; also Moisisio 2003, 18–19.

4 Holdar 1992 in Moisisio 2001, 15.

‘orthodox’ geopolitics. More recently this way of thinking appears as ‘neo-classical’ geopolitics⁵ or ‘new’ geopolitics. In Finland, the works of classical geopolitics were introduced to the academic audiences in the 1950s, for example, by Kullervo Killinen.⁶ Classical geopolitics understands geopolitics as a state-centred philosophy and as historical concepts and theories developed by the above mentioned scholars in the early 20th century and applied today in a modified form e.g. in geostrategy (such as Land power and Sea Power, heartland and rimland).⁷

This Western geopolitical tradition has been re-examined by scholars in the fields of political geography and international relations and in particular by scholars who name their activity *critical geopolitics*.⁸ What is especially criticized in geopolitical tradition is a particular naturalist attitude, a philosophical approach to reality which is based on Cartesian perspectivalism, i.e. the idea of reality existing ‘out there’ – a neutral gaze in which the eye is witnessing, not interpreting.⁹ Moreover, ‘classical geopolitics’ is accused of advocating geographical determinism, imperialism and the superiority of a European or Western civilization and of a white race. Critical geopolitics has abandoned the sectoral definition of the political and the state-centred view of geopolitics.¹⁰ Scholars in critical geopolitics usually draw from post-structuralism, from the study of discourse, by referring to Derrida’s deconstruction and Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge (geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge; the interconnection of governmentality and geographical knowledge). After the end of the Cold War and together with ‘new geopolitics’ and critical geopolitics, the study of geopolitics has reappeared in academia.¹¹ Geopolitics has had its revival in Finland also. Scholars in the field of international relations and political geography, and to a lesser extent in political science, have engaged in studying geopolitics, especially as understood in critical geopolitics.¹²

5 See e.g. Mamadouh 1998. Virginie Mamadouh introduces a classification of contemporary geopolitical studies based on the “distance to the object of study” (whether to advise political actors or not) and the “position towards the state system” (whether states are the main geopolitical actors or whether attention is paid to the actors inside the state). The four approaches or schools are the following: *neo-classical geopolitics*, *subversive geopolitics*, *non-geopolitics* and *post-structuralist geopolitics (critical geopolitics)*. Mamadouh quite rightly mentions that the most distant from each other are neo-classical and critical geopolitics: scholars of the first usually share the positivist or realist paradigm and scholars of the latter the constructivist paradigm.

6 See Killinen 1958.

7 Harle & Moio 2003, 23.

8 See Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992, Ó Tuathail 1996, 2002. This is not to say that Agnew and Tuathail would have been the first scholars to recognize the ‘imperial heritage of modern geography’ and thus of geopolitics as well. These discussions were begun in the late 1960s and 1970s by scholars such as Yves Lacoste and others publishing in *Antipode*, a critical geography journal. See Ó Tuathail 1996, 58.

9 See e.g. Ó Tuathail 1996, 23.

10 Moio 2004.

11 In the Anglo-phone academia scholars such as John Agnew, Simon Dalby, Klaus Dodds, Joanne Sharp, Gearóid Ó Tuathail; on the Russian situation, see Chapter 3.

12 I am referring here to the works of Pami Aalto (international relations), Vilho Harle (international relations/political science), Mika Luoma-aho (political science) and Sami Moio (geography/international relations).

2.2 CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS CONCEPTS

Geopolitics (as well as any form of politics, with or without any prefix/es) is understood here as an *interpretative practise*.¹³ As O’Loughlin, Ó Tuathail and Kolossov argue “state leaders and political decision makers can never just ‘read off’ the interests of their state or the meaning of international affairs from the geographical location or objective structures delimiting their state in the interstate system [...]. Rather, foreign policy decision makers and elites *construct the meaning of international affairs and their state’s interests within the geopolitical culture of their state.*” Thus, politicians do not have any objective and neutral information on the issues they are talking about. Rather, what they argue is what they see appropriate and beneficial for their own purposes, or what they represent as interests of their state, in a given situation and in front of a given audience (or as addressed to a given audience).

Gearóid Ó Tuathail has developed a ‘critical theory of geopolitics’ according to which geopolitics comprises two levels which might be termed as ‘geopolitical cultures’ and ‘geopolitical discourses’ (narratives about foreign policy and public articulations). If we first have a look at geopolitical discourses, the studies are divided into formal geopolitics (e.g. studying the geopolitical tradition), popular geopolitics (studying the popular representations of world politics) and practical geopolitics.¹⁴ My study is closest to studying practical geopolitical reasoning: “Practical geopolitics concerns the daily construction and spatialization of world affairs and state interests by foreign policy leaders and elites within geopolitical cultures”.¹⁵ However, sometimes these divisions or categorizations are problematic because ‘practical’ may serve as ‘formal’, and ‘formal’ may have ‘practical’ grounds, etc. For example, how are we to classify the writings of philosopher and politician Aleksandr Dugin?¹⁶ Are they formal geopolitical theorizing or practical geopolitical reasoning? The answer lies in whether we want to classify Dugin first of all as a Eurasian philosopher, who has contributed significantly to the Russian geopolitical ‘tradition’ and draws from this tradition, or should we classify him as a politician (see below) who engages actively in geopolitical reasoning in public. That is, the limits of these categories are not fixed but fluid. For analytical purposes, however, this division is justified.

Geopolitical culture, which affects the nature of politicians’ geopolitical argumentation,¹⁷ can be defined as the “interpretative culture and traditions within which a state makes sense of its identity and its encounter with the world of states, and codifies a set of strategies for

13 See e.g. Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, Ó Tuathail 1996.

14 See e.g. Ó Tuathail 2002.

15 O’Loughlin et al 2004a, 6.

16 See below Chapter 3.

17 As e.g. O’Loughlin et al. have argued: “While there is never a strict one-to-one correlation between geopolitical traditions [referring to Trenin’s classification of geopolitical traditions] and geopolitical storylines, each of these traditions, as ready-made narratives of geopolitical meaning, identity and orientation, were drawn upon in the assemblage of Russian storylines responding to 9–11 and this response.” (O’Loughlin et al. 2004b, 285). More on this study below in the section 2.3.

negotiating that encounter”.¹⁸ Geopolitical culture can be divided into two classes: popular (ordinary) and practical (elite) geopolitics.¹⁹ That is, geopolitical cultures are characterized by “a series of antagonistic and competing *geopolitical traditions*”, these “formalized schools of thought [...] *that are drawn upon to help write similarly contending geopolitical storylines around foreign policy developments and dramas*”.²⁰ This is the elite level of the geopolitical culture. In Russian geopolitics those geopolitical traditions that make up the Russian geopolitical culture are usually named as the ‘school of Westernism’ and the ‘school of Slavophilism’ or today that of ‘Eurasianism’ (see below on sub-categories and the justification of this division). Dimitri Trenin, for example, introduces three options for Russia, and O’Loughlin et al. have drawn their conclusion based on these and argue that Russian geopolitical culture is characterized by three competing geopolitical traditions and orientations: a great Russia tradition, an anti-Western tradition and a European tradition.²¹

The popular geopolitics of a geopolitical culture comprises what John Ó Loughlin has termed ‘geopolitical imaginations’, that is, boundary drawing practises between inside/outside or us/them. Geopolitical imagination consists of the “prevalent images [...] and discourses amongst the general population”.²² If we follow this division into geopolitical cultures and geopolitical discourses,²³ then we may locate Gertjan Dijkink’s concept of a geopolitical vision within the geopolitical culture part. Geopolitical visions are visions of order, they are translations of national identity concepts in geographical terms or symbols.²⁴ Dijkink has employed this concept to the study of various countries and accordingly introduces various national geopolitical visions. However, here attention is paid to different visions offered by political parties within a country.

In critical geopolitics, studies on practical geopolitical reasoning have usually focused on the United States’ leadership,²⁵ but here the actors under examination are Russian political

18 O’Loughlin et al. 2004a, 5.

19 Ibid. Kolossov also uses the terms of ‘high’ and ‘low’ geopolitics, see Kolossov 2003, 125.

20 Ó Tuathail 2002 in O’Loughlin et al. 2004b.

21 Trenin, 2002 in O’Loughlin 2004b; For other classifications, see e.g. Tsygankov 2003 and Smith 1999.

22 O’Loughlin et al. 2006, 324. Trenin (2002, 191–193) does not talk about geopolitical traditions explicitly, but instead introduces three options or visions for Russia, that is, a European Russia (Putin’s pragmatic and then realist choice according to Trenin), the Russian tradition (a defence *tous azimuts*; Russia as a great power) and the option that calls for multipolarity action and strive to reduce U.S. world economy.

23 This division might be problematic too, especially, the divisions within these concepts, that is, into practical and popular, into traditions and imaginations, or into formal, practical and popular geopolitics. However, the main division into geopolitical cultures as something more persisting, as ideas traveling from a time to a time; and to geopolitical discourses constructed only in a given time, are of more analytical importance.

24 Dijkink 1996.

25 Excluding Ó Loughlin et al. 2004a, 2004b and 2006, see below. Ó Tuathail argues that within political geography there have been few detailed studies of practical geopolitics, but within International Relations ‘foreign policy analysis’ has a rich literature. Ó Tuathail divides this literature into four traditions: 1) The ‘objectivist’ tradition of realists, neorealists and orthodox geopoliticians: foreign policy making and state action are structurally determined by the interstate system. 2) The ‘rationalist’ tradition: individual human action is instrumentally rational; they stress the role of culture, ideas. 3) The psychological approaches tradition. Belief systems and psychological mechanisms perspectives are in the centre. 4) The social constructivist tradition (Ó Tuathail 2002, 604).

actors or, more precisely, the politicians of Russian political parties who have seats in the State Duma and the parties themselves (in the following chapters referred to as *parliamentary parties*). These actors have the power to announce their arguments in public²⁶ even though they are *not foreign policy decision makers*.²⁷ They have power to influence those who make decisions, as well as the public opinion. Consequently, it is still interesting “how they make sense of crisis” in Chechnia and of threats (like separatism, NATO enlargement or terrorism) and “how they construct stories to explain these, how they develop strategies for handling these crises as political challenges and how they conceptualize solutions to these”.²⁸

2.3 COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Questions on Russia’s post-Soviet place in the world, on Russian borders – both within and external to Russian territory – and on Russia’s identity, have been at the very centre of political discourse in post-Soviet Russia, and, as I implied in the Introduction, there is no one view on these questions. Therefore, writing a study on Russia in political science from a (critical) geopolitics’ perspective is well justified. Studying geopolitical storylines and geopolitical visions of Russian political parties based on their argumentation on both an internal and an external threat reveals a very significant part of Russian discourse and adds to our understanding of Russian politics. This study introduces an approach which, taking into account both political parties and politicians as political actors in Russian practical politics *and* as geopolitical actors contributing to geopolitical discourses in Russia, widens our understanding of what kind of actors the political parties are and how they see the world, how they construct the world – especially Russia’s place and future in it – and how they participate in the struggle for the right to construct the world in the way in which they see it (or in a way that is convenient for them).²⁹

Smith and Timmins have studied Russian geopolitical thinking and Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU.³⁰ That is, they have studied *official Russian foreign policy* in relation to NATO and the EU. These authors recognize two types of thinking in Russian geopolitics: a

26 This power or right might is restricted as well, both by the access to the media and by the audience, not interested in listening or reading their arguments.

27 The capability of the State Duma, not to mention the parties, to participate in the foreign policy formulation and decision making is low in Russia.

28 Ó Tuathail 2002, 603.

29 Usually when we read studies on Russian political parties, we get accounts on their creation, leadership, organization and overall ideology and usually these studies are based on the party programmes or election platforms or some statements of their leaders from a shorter period of time. We can rarely find any systematic analysis of the arguments that political parties’ politicians have used in public, in any particular context or on any particular case. There are, of course, exceptions like a very thorough study on *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* by Luke March (2002); and another by J. Barth Urban & V. Solovei (1997) and a PhD dissertation by Jin- Sook Ju and her working paper based on the PhD. There have not been too many studies on geopolitical discourses of any particular Russian political actors either.

30 Smith and Timmins 2001.

geopolitics of vulnerability and a geopolitics of opportunity. The former comprises a “fear of territorial assault and invasion” and the “possibility of Russia being effectively isolated and shut out of European affairs and denied its ‘proper place’ in deliberations about the future European military and economic security architecture”.³¹ The latter is based on “Russia’s pivotal position as the ‘Heartland’ state which [...] offers the country innate strengths and advantages across the board –whether Western leaders like it or not, Russia matters and its views must, therefore, be taken into account.”³² Smith and Timmins argue that views arising from geopolitics of opportunity “have had little impact on Russian policy-making”.³³ The geopolitics of vulnerability dominated Russia’s NATO policy during the 1990s.³⁴ However, the geopolitics of vulnerability and that of opportunity can also be seen as parts of the same continuum. Both seem to be based on the idea of Russia’s uniqueness – of Russia as a key player in international affairs. Vulnerability seems to be based more on ‘pragmatism’, ‘realism’, whereas opportunity seems to be based on idealism; the former on the imperative to cooperate (i.e. Russia would not cooperate if Russia was not ‘weak’), the latter on the will to revenge – to expand. In this connection, we might even talk about different degrees of Eurasianism if we were to follow the scholars introduced in Chapter 3.

In the field of critical geopolitics O’ Loughlin, Ó Tuathail (Toal) and Kolossov have been contributing to a research project titled *Russian geopolitical culture in the wake of 9/11*, within which they had published four articles at the time of writing this study. O’Loughlin et al. focused on analysing the relationship firstly between the *geopolitical storylines* of the political elite (and geopolitical traditions) and *public opinion* (practical and formal geopolitics vs. popular geopolitics), and secondly between the political leadership’s *geopolitical script and public opinion* (practical geopolitics vs. popular geopolitics).³⁵ In the first case, they examined “geopolitical storylines that developed amongst the Russian political class in the first six months after the September 11 attacks, and the attitudes of various socio-demographic groups in Russia to aspects of these storylines.”³⁶ The authors constructed three competing storylines of the Russian political elite, that of the ‘Common Enemy’, the ‘Sceptical’, and the ‘American Imperialism’ (see TABLE 1 for how the parliamentary parties of the party of power and the democratic and communist opposition have been placed within the classification of geopolitical storylines on 9/11).³⁷ Putin’s ‘Common Enemy’ storyline places Russia on the side of the West in the war

31 Ibid., 71.

32 Ibid., 72.

33 Ibid., 73.

34 Ibid., 81.

35 See below Chapter 5 on the definitions of geopolitical storyline, geopolitical script and the classification of geopolitics into formal, practical and popular geopolitics.

36 See also O’Loughlin et al. 2004a.

37 The authors studied the official Russian response to the events of 9/11, the declarations and speeches of President Putin, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov. Second, they analysed the positions of various political party leaders (Vestnik Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, Russian newspaper archives, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Lexis Nexis databases. Federal and regional newspapers: *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* and *Zavtra*. (O’Loughlin 2004b).

TABLE 1.
Study on geopolitical discourses:
geopolitical storylines on 9/11 and overall geopolitical orientations and parliamentary parties
(In accordance with the classification in O’Loughlin et al. 2004b)

POSITION	PARTY	STORYLINE/OVERALL GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATION		
		American Imperialism/ Eurasian & Statist	Sceptical/ Pragmatic liberal westernization	Common Enemy/ Pragmatic soft authoritarian westernization
Party of Power	<i>Nash Dom – Rossiia</i> <i>Otechestvo</i> <i>Edinstvo</i>	N/A	N/A X (X)	N/A X
Democratic Opposition	<i>Iabloko</i>		X	
Communist Opposition	<i>KPRF</i>	X		

against the Taliban. 9/11 is understood as an analogy of the terrorist acts in Moscow in 1999 and thus, the “American war against terrorism in Afghanistan is like the Russian war against terrorism in Chechnia”. The pro-American orientation is mainly justified by Russia sharing the same civilizational identity as the US and the West in general, sharing a ‘common enemy’, that is, a ‘global terrorist’.³⁸ The ‘Sceptical’ storyline was used by the ‘moderate opposition’ to Putin (e.g. *Soiuz Pravykh Sil*, *Iabloko*, *Otechestvo*). It differed from the ‘Common Enemy’ storyline by stressing multipolarity in Russia’s foreign policy (the “risk that Russia’s cooperation with the West becomes effective support for American global hegemony in practise”) and by not identifying the war in Chechnia with the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the critics of the Putin line acknowledged that there were also threats facing Russia other than just that of terrorism.³⁹ According to the authors, the ‘American Imperialism’ storyline was used by the Communist and national-patriotic opposition. The representatives of this storyline argued against Russia’s military involvement in the US war against international terrorism and claimed that “America was using 9–11 to impose its supremacy on the world.” They blamed the West for applying double standards to ‘good’ (Israeli extremists, Kosovars, Chechen separatists) and ‘bad’ (other

38 See O’Loughlin et al. 2004b, 285–287 and 290.

39 Ibid., 290–293.

Muslim) terrorists. In addition, they view terrorism as “a reaction to the promotion of US values”. The reasons of terrorism are inequality between the South and North and imperialism.⁴⁰

According to the authors, Trenin’s above mentioned three geopolitical traditions, European, Great Russia and anti-Western, “were drawn upon in the assemblage of Russian storylines responding to 9–11.” Moreover, O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Ó Tuathail note that there were “considerable levels of geopolitical support for Putin’s foreign policies and for some aspects of his post 9/11 storyline”. But there were also “considerable reserves of geopolitical scepticism among the Russian public towards the US-led ‘war against international terrorism’ and strong levels of suspicion about the motivations for US military actions close to the Russian Federation.” In another article, the authors study Russian geopolitical culture by comparing the public opinion with Graham Smith’s study on Eurasianism (see below).⁴¹ In this study ‘geopolitical orientations’ of the public were compared to the ‘Russian geopolitical tradition’, which is more or less taken as given. However, the authors adjust Smith’s classification of Russian geopolitical thinking on Eurasianism and claim that in the current situation the common nominator to geopolitical schools is no longer Eurasianism. Six different geopolitical orientations are found: Putin followers, a Westernizing group, a centrist position, supporters of the US war on terrorism, the Eurasianist orientation, and finally the ignorant. These are compared with the “more formalised traditions of Russian geopolitical culture”: Westernizers (*Soiuz Pravykh Sil*), Democratic Statism (the dominant geopolitical tradition: Putin, Edinaia Rossiia, Rodina) and Neo-Eurasianism and the neo-Communists (KPRF), of which Democratic Statism has the most popular support.

In the second case, O’Loughlin et al. focus on Putin’s script on 9/11 by mainly using President Putin’s and then Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s speeches and statements as the primary data. The authors construct Putin’s script again in accordance with an analytical tool introduced later in Chapter 5. President Putin’s script represented “the event [9/11] as a ‘global Chechnia’ [...] 9–11 provided the occasion for the development of an innovative geopolitical script that asserted the identity opposition ‘civilised/barbarian’ as a fundamental axis in world politics, (re)located Russia within the West as a ‘civilised power’ and gave Russian geo-economic interests priority over traditional territorial geopolitics.”⁴²

Studies of O’Loughlin, Ó Tuathail and Kolossov form a significant basis for the previously neglected studies on contemporary Russian geopolitics. However, following my research agenda, four points require to be addressed here. First of all, it must be taken into account that the survey data in the above introduced studies was gathered in April 2002, this was a one-time

40 Ibid., 293–298.

41 O’Loughlin, Toal and Kolossov 2006.

42 O’Loughlin et al. 2004a, 4. However, Putin “adjusted his geopolitical storyline in 2002 to take a more oppositional position against the US extending its ‘war against international terrorism’ to Iraq. Putin revived the idea of ‘multipolarity’ in maneuvering towards a common position with France and Germany on Iraq while bargaining pragmatically with the United States over Russian contracts, debt and the shape of a post-invasion Iraq.”

survey collection, and the same survey questions have not been used before or since, therefore, no comparative data exists from any other period of time. Furthermore, the politicians' statements have been collected over a very short period of time. Accordingly, this data does not allow us to raise questions on how argumentation has developed – be that of the 'public' or of the 'Russian political elite'. The above introduced storylines, scripts and public opinion are 'true' only for that particular context and at that particular time. As for this study, I have *systematically gathered and used the data from a longer period of time* and extensively from Russian newspapers. This enables us to see whether there is any coherent line of argumentation within a party, what the inner contradictions are, and *how (or whether at all) argumentation has changed during this time* (1994–2003). This allows us to answer to the question: What is the role of *continuity and change in the political parties' argumentation?*

Second, it might be problematic to compare the public opinion in 2002 (geopolitical orientations) with Graham Smith's understanding of different schools of thought (geopolitical tradition), because Smith constructed these schools on the basis of politicians' statements in the late 1990s. The comparison with the authors' revision of this classification might be problematic too. Comparing the public opinion of 2002 with geopolitical storylines of the political elite of the same period, however, seems to be well-grounded.

Third, there is a problem of 'geopolitical traditions', what they are and how they have been constructed. In general, the 'great danger' in trying to 'build' schools of thought must be recognized (the geopolitical tradition in the West has been questioned in critical geopolitics, see e.g. Ó Tuathail 1996, but to a certain extent taken for granted when referring to the Russian geopolitical tradition). Here, I will not begin from these ready made classifications, for example, Westernism or Eurasianism, or hypothesise that geopolitical arguments of the contemporary Russian political parties and their leaders could *automatically* be returned to these geopolitical traditions or schools of thought. Certainly, if we are to recall the schools of thought as they have been classified by Smith, Tsygankov, Trenin, O'Loughlin, Kolossov and Ó Tuathail, we surely can find similarities in these classifications and come to a conclusion that in Russia there exists at least a school that is anti-Western but not necessarily anti-European and a school which is pro-European but not necessarily transatlantic anymore and a school that claims to be neither but something 'pragmatic' and 'ideology-free' – safeguarding the interests of the state. The level of their Eurasianism might be further speculated on too. I will return to the question of geopolitical schools of thought in Russia in the overall conclusions. Based on the analysis of argumentation of Russian political parties on the two cases perceived as threats, Chechnia and its separatism and NATO and its eastward enlargement and humanitarian intervention principle, I ask whether we can make similar borders between the parties in their geopolitical thinking (potentially) expressed in their arguments and whether, after all, we can construct schools of Westernizers and Eurasianists.

The results of an attempt to generalize and construct geopolitical traditions or schools of thought depend on which actors we take under consideration: the leadership, the political elite as a whole (the definition of the political elite in Russia changes over time, too) or

public opinion. This has been taken into account in critical geopolitics by referring to formal, practical and popular geopolitics. For example, O'Loughlin argued in 2001 that there was a great difference between the public opinion and the political elite's geopolitical imaginations. However, in addition we must realize the impact which the period of time that we look at and the 'cases' or events in which context the arguments are given, has. This leads us to the fourth point, that, for my study, it is more relevant to look very closely at certain actors and their argumentation at a certain point in time and within a certain context than to try to 'grasp' the whole field of Russian geopolitics. Accordingly, I *pay special attention to the above-mentioned two cases* of Russo-Chechen relations and NATO and not to geopolitical argumentation in general. The actors whom I study are the political parties and their leaders, as discussed in the previous chapters. There is a lack of studies of this kind; there are not many studies which would *approach geopolitics by studying the arguments of political parties* (parliamentary parties) and their leaders. One of the few is Alan Ingram's study on *Kongress Russkikh Obshchin* KRO (the Congress of Russian Communities).⁴³

2.4 GENERAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on a reading of my primary data and Putin's statements, we can say that today's Russian foreign policy and the hegemonic geopolitical discourse seem to have borrowed and collected bits and pieces from former oppositional argumentation: from the communist and from the 'democratic' opposition.⁴⁴ But what are *these oppositional arguments and how they have changed?* Is there any difference between the argumentation of the alleged 'democratic opposition', the 'communist opposition' and 'parties of power'? *What was the connection of oppositional argumentation with that of the party of power at each time in question?* Here the party of power can be seen as representative of the hegemonic discourse. Thus, I do not compare the discourse of the opposition with that of those in power (*vlast*, the ruling elite)⁴⁵, but with that of the party of power, which is assumed as being closest to those in power. Still, I presuppose that

43 Ingram 2001b. Ingram argues that the KRO does not quite fit into Dugin's 'school' of neo-nationalist bolshevism or neo- Eurasianism, even though it supports the idea of expansion as well. The main argument of KRO is that Russians should be able to unite across state borders. For example, the Trans-Dnestr Moldovan Republic, Crimea, northern Kazakhstan, and northeastern Estonia or other areas with Russian population should be integrated into Russia. The KRO does not base its ideology on the idea of Russia as Eurasia or the synthesis of the Turkic and Slav peoples. (Ingram 2001, 205.) Former KRO leader Rogozin was for a while the leader of the *Rodina* party, a party spoiler, which had representation in the State Duma. Later Rodina was among the three parties that made up *Spravedlivaia Rossiia* (Just Russia; a rival party of power).

44 E.g. Luke March (2006, 448) argues that KPRF propaganda has found its way into Putin's rhetoric.

45 *Vlast* in Russian refers either to the executive power, or president and those close to him, or in general to the authorities or the ruling elite depending on the context. What is important in *vlast* is that it is opposite to 'us', to ordinary people, so *vlast* might also be some 'dark forces' who are actually in power, even though they would not represent any formal institutions. On other Russian political concepts see Kharkhordin 2006.

the hegemonic discourse in Russia is produced by those in power, that is, the president, the presidential administration, and depending on the situation, possibly some regional leaders, some ministers and some State Duma deputies.⁴⁶ As Allen argues, “the power derives from the politics of geo-graphing space, writing or representing it in ways that justify a particular group’s authority over a subject population.”⁴⁷ Those producing the hegemonic discourse have had the power to geo-graph space in a certain way: they have tried to “monopolize the right to speak authoritatively about particular places and regions”.⁴⁸ Putin and his party of power have tried to do this,⁴⁹ and of course, not only concerning “places and regions”, but in general, to restrict the right to speak.

As implied above, I am not interested in Russian political parties or the Russian party system *per se*, but in *parties and especially their leaders as (geo)political actors*. I focus on one side of their political action, that is, public argumentation and *what can be said of their geopolitical thinking (here referred to e.g. by the concept of the geopolitical vision) based on this argumentation on Chechnia (Russo-Chechen relations) and NATO (Russia–NATO relations)*. What is the ‘geo’ here? It has to do with Russia’s territory in the past, present and future, and safeguarding this territory against a threat from inside and outside. It is how Russian politicians represent this territory, draw its borders both mentally (connection with identity) and geographically. Or, as John Agnew has defined geo-politics (the study of geopolitics), it is the “study of the geographical representations and practises that underpin world politics” or, more specifically, the “examination of geographical assumptions, designations and understandings that enter into the making of world politics”.⁵⁰ Russian politicians safeguard (and construct) *Russia’s borders, territorial integrity, identity, sovereignty against an internal threat* (Chechnia, separatism, terrorism in general) and *against an external threat* (NATO enlargement and the concept of humanitarian intervention).⁵¹ When these party politicians define and describe these other (‘international’/‘national’) political actors and geographical areas/places, they also talk about Russia, Russia in relation to these actors/places and, in parallel, about Russia in the world – its place and identity. I do not study what geopolitics is or how the political parties and their politicians define geopolitics. Regardless of how the politicians studied here themselves understand geopolitics, I have chosen to study geopolitics as a discursive practise, i.e. how Russia’s relations with other entities are represented in discourse and how Russia’s place in the world is constructed and represented. This can be done by using the concepts of a *geopolitical storyline* and a *geopolitical vision*, the latter of which will be explained below, and the geopolitical storyline in Chapter 5.

46 This has to do with the nature of the political system in Russia (see Chapter 4).

47 Allen 2003, 102.

48 Ibid.

49 Introduction of self-censorship, new laws, refusal to participate in the TV debates before the parliamentary elections etc.

50 Agnew 1998, 2.

51 I do not comment on whether these have been/are/will be any real threats to Russia.

Accordingly, the first ‘macro-level’ research question here has to do with the geopolitical vision which the political parties and especially their leaders, express in their arguments. That is, what is Russia’s place in the world, who are its friends and enemies, what is its mission and which model should it follow (if any). Dijkink understands geopolitical vision as “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, informing feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy”.⁵² A geopolitical vision comprises justification of the naturalness of the territorial borders, a geopolitical code (the world around the state, friends and foes), a model to follow or reject, a national mission, and assumptions about impersonal (even Divine) forces such as modernization or globalization.⁵³ Here, I focus on friends/enemies, a model that Russia should follow or reject, and Russia’s national mission as components of the geopolitical vision. Moreover, I pay attention to the continuity and change aspect, i.e., whether we can find anything continuous in the argumentation of the political parties at this given time and in these given cases.

The second macro-level research question is what the content and structure of arguments can tell us about Russian political parties and about Russian politicians and on Russian politics in general within this period of study. That is, based on the analysis of the arguments on Chechnia and NATO, what can we say about the opposition in Russia and about the concept of the party of power, etc. (on these concepts see Chapter 4). I will present more detailed, methodology-driven research questions in Chapter 5 following an introduction to the primary data and research methods.

52 Dijkink 1996, 11.

53 Ibid., 12, 14.

3 Boom in (Eurasian) Geopolitical Thinking

In this Chapter, we will first look at the concept of modern geopolitical imagination, followed by an examination of geopolitics in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Russia, before moving on to today's geopolitics in the Russian Federation and how it has been studied.

3.1 MODERN GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION

The British scholars Smith and Timmins have argued that “over the past century, Russians have contributed comparatively little to the evolution of geopolitical thinking. Geopolitics is, essentially, a *Western* concept. It has been developed and refined mainly by British, German and American thinkers and policy-makers.”¹ This might well be a correct statement if we are to think about geopolitics as a discipline (even though this will be contested by closer examination, see below). However, long before anyone used the term ‘geopolitics’² or there was any academic discipline called geopolitics,³ there was a geopolitical way of thinking, both in the ‘West’ and in Russia.⁴ John Agnew calls this way of thinking the *modern geopolitical imagination*, which was given birth to by the capitalist world economy and the growth of the European territorial state.⁵ The first ‘fundamental’ for modern geopolitical thinking – formed during the Age of Discoveries – was a global vision. There would not be any world politics if there was no sense of a world-as-a-whole.⁶ When the world is presented as a whole, the observer is separated from the observed world, that is, the subject from the object. The observer presents the picture of the world as it exists, i.e. the picture or representation of the observer is the world – objective and natural. It represents a *view from nowhere*.⁷ The observer does not engage in representation or interact with the world. Moreover, in the modern geopolitical imagination the geographic location determines the ‘fate’ of the state and the nation.⁸ Different areas of the globe

1 Smith & Timmins 2001, 71. Italics added.

2 Kjellén used this term (*geopolitik*) for the first time in 1899 to signify the study of the territory of the state.

3 Mackinder could be taken as the first scholar in this field, even though he never considered himself a geopolitician.

4 See Agnew 1998.

5 Agnew 1998, 3.

6 Ibid., 8.

7 Ibid., 11.

8 Ibid., 26.

are organized hierarchically according to religious, 'racial', climatory or civilizational factors. The divisions are drawn between the Self and the Other: the globe is divided into known and unknown places, friendly and dangerous places.⁹ In particular the borders were drawn between Europe and the Other, or in geopolitical literature between the Land and Sea Powers – which was the basis for the American Anglophile General Alfred Mahan's argumentation.¹⁰ Probably the most famous geopolitical picture of the world, however, was drawn by British geographer Halford Mackinder, whereby the world is seen as consisting of the pivotal area (or later the heartland) and an inner and outer crescent.¹¹ The heartland represented the continental power, Russia or Eurasia – an idea shared later by Russian émigré philosophers of the Eurasian movement. The best known attempt to re-visualise the world in the post-Cold War globalized world¹² has been Samuel Huntington's claim that the world is divided according to civilizations based on different cultures.¹³ Huntington believes that post-Cold War conflicts are no longer fought between states or ideologies but between different civilizations. The most likely conflict will emerge between Western civilization and other civilizations. What connects or disconnects civilizations is language, history, religions, habits/manners, institutions and self-identification, of which the most important is religion. There are differences within civilizations too, for example Western civilization has two variants: Europe and the United States, and the Islamic civilization has three types: the Arab World, Turkey and the Malaji world. Civilizations are dynamic: they are borne, they die, they become divided and they merge.¹⁴ Huntington names seven main civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American civilization and, potentially, African civilization.

The second characteristic of the modern geopolitical imagination, according to Agnew, is the "translation of time into space".¹⁵ That is, different places or regions in the world are seen to represent a certain period of time – they are located at different levels of historical 'development'. Accordingly, places are named either 'developed' or 'primitive', or 'modern' or 'backward'. In this discourse, Europe and the United States represent the ideal to which other areas are compared.¹⁶ Other areas have the potential to develop, to lift themselves to a higher level in history, only by imitating their model or becoming like them. This idea of other places or regions being at different levels of development, their belonging to a different period of time, laid the ground for the idea of Europe being superior, and thus also provided justification for imperialism. Agnew argues that imperialism continues its existence even after colonialism

9 Agnew 1998, 12; Today on drawing borders based on terrorism, see e.g. Bankoff, Greg. (2003) *Regions of Risk: Western Discourses on Terrorism and the Significance of Islam*. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26, 6, 2003, 411–426.

10 See Mahan 1890.

11 Mackinder 1904, 421.

12 See Ó Tuathail 1996 and Agnew 1998, 29.

13 Huntington 1993, 22–25, the rest of the paragraph.

14 Cf. civilization theories of e.g. Arnold Toynbee and Lev Gumilev.

15 Agnew 1998, 33.

16 In the Russian case, Russians themselves compared Russia to Europe (Europe as a model to follow or reject; see Neumann 1996), but also the areas to which the Empire expanded, were compared to Russia (Russia as a model to follow).

because the Western path of development is still taken as an ideal to which all the others are compared.¹⁷ What is also typical to the modern geopolitical imagination is to describe an area by referring to one single feature, i.e., to *essentialize*, for example, the caste system referring to India or the mafia referring to Italy. Moreover, it is typical to focus on the differences between different areas as the only criterion in their comparison, i.e., to *exotize*, and to change relative differences into total differences, i.e., to *totalize*.¹⁸

The third characteristic of the modern geopolitical imagination is the state-centric understanding of the spatiality of power. The world is made up entirely of states or territorial actors opposed to other forms of polity.¹⁹ Agnew refers to this with the concept of the *territorial trap*.²⁰ Firstly, in state-centric thinking, the state is understood as having an exclusive power within its territory (state sovereignty).²¹ Secondly, the borders of the state determine the borders of society and thirdly, external and internal state affairs (domestic vs. foreign policy) are seen as completely separate, i.e. within the state there is room for culture and political debate, but outside the state there is competition between states and their interests. Following this line of thinking, the gains of one state result in losses to another. Power in this state-centred thinking is a state's force, or *power over*, instead of the *power to*.

The fourth characteristic is the idea that "pursuit of one state's interests or security" is relative to those of all others: that is, power is perceived as something relative.²² Between states there is competition for primacy and each state must pursue the leadership and avoid suppression.²³ This pursuit for primacy is "necessary for personal ontological security."²⁴ One state's economic and social well-being is dependent on the state's coercive capacity in relation to other states. Only by acquiring the primacy can the state guarantee that order and peace within the state are maintained and chaos remain outside the state borders.

3.2 GEOPOLITICAL THINKING IN RUSSIA/SOVIET RUSSIA

Let us now turn to Russian geopolitics and Russian geopolitical thinking. Russian scholar Irina Isakova traces the geopolitical thinking in Russia back to the year 1510 and the Pskov

17 Agnew 1998, 32–33.

18 Ibid., 33.

19 Ibid., 9.

20 Ibid., 49–51, 53.

21 This thinking has its roots in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

22 Agnew 1998, 68–70.

23 It is interesting that the anti-fascist youth movement NASHI, initiated by deputy head of the presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, the father of the idea of sovereign democracy, uses a similar idea in its manifesto. That is, the development of the world is about competition of peoples (*konkurentsia narodov*). You cannot step aside from this competition, because if you do, you will vanish from the history. The name of the game is that you are either a leader, a ruled subject or a victim.

24 Agnew 1998, 9.

monk Philotheus [Filofei], who formulated the concept of Moscow as the third Rome,²⁵ or to Ivan the Terrible as the “first practitioner of geopolitics”.²⁶ Even if we were to deny Philotheus’ imperialistic agenda, we might agree that, as Isakova argues, the key geopolitical priorities for Russia were formulated during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. That is, it was outmost important for Russia’s development to gain access to the neighbouring unstable areas of the former enemies and to the oceans.²⁷ More widely it is argued that Russian geopolitical thinking was created in the 19th century. Finnish historian Alpo Juntunen stresses that the birth of Russian geopolitics is tied to imperialism.²⁸ Accordingly, Czech historian and political scientist Milan Hauner argues that Russia’s imperialistic thinking was implicitly geopolitical, even though the word geopolitics was usually not used.²⁹ Russian political geographer Vladimir Kolossov agrees and mentions that many geopolitical ideas deriving from the Russian Empire have been revived in the discussions of contemporary geopoliticians: ideas from *Zapadnichestvo* (Westernizers), *Slavianofilstvo* (Slavophiles), *Evraziistvo* (Eurasianists) and *Panslavizm* (Panslavists). In addition to ideas from these schools of thought, the ideas of the geographer V.P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii (1870–1942) were important in building the Russian Empire – he has even been called the ‘founder of the Russian geopolitical school’.³⁰ Semenov-Tian-Shanskii argued for strengthening the centre of the Russian Empire by establishing new centres of culture and economy there. This would have diminished the threat of the Asian part of the Empire being conquered by the ‘Yellow race’ and thus keep the Empire whole.³¹ Semenov-Tian-Shanskii’s thinking was influenced by Halford Mackinder and the Russian geographer accepted the idea of Russia’s leading role in Eurasia.³² According to Juntunen, Russian geopolitics has always had its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ line, or domestic and foreign line, that is, those who have emigrated and those who have worked in Russia/the Soviet Union.³³ The above mentioned V.P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii was the first one of the internal line. L.I. Mechnikov (1839–1888), who examined the importance of rivers on the birth and development of cultures and countries, was the

25 In her research on Igor Shafarevich, Krista Berglund (2006) argues that monk Philotheus using the expression Russia as a third Rome had nothing to do with Russian messianism or an imperialistic agenda. She refers to Shafarevich who has argued that Philotheus used this expression meaning that “Russian sovereignty will endure forever if it remain true to Orthodoxy”. Accordingly, Berglund stresses the historical context in which Philotheus used the expression, that is, in the situation of Catholicism gaining strength and the threat of Muslim Ottomans. Accordingly, Philotheus wanted to stress “responsibility [of the Orthodox Russia] before God”.

26 Isakova 2005, 11.

27 Ibid., 11.

28 Juntunen 2003, 18. After Russia had been victorious in the war against Turkey (1877–1878), Russia was forced to withdraw by Western-European powers. Russia then targeted its foreign policy towards Asia (Juntunen 2003, 21).

29 Hauner 1989, 3.

30 Juntunen 2003, 19.

31 See e.g. Kolossov 2001, 155–156.

32 Juntunen (2003, 20) referring to Semenov-Tian-Shanskii’s book from 1915. In his book from 1928 Semonov-Tian-Shanskii, according to Juntunen, lists the tasks and goals of geopolitics. For example, for Russian geopolitics it was important to carry out a territorial-political analysis of the country, taking into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of the country to find out what regions would be most suitable for immigration in order to guarantee Russia’s territorial-political greatness.

33 Juntunen 2000, 87, see also Juntunen 2003.

first one of the external line. By emigrating to Southern Europe in 1858, Mechnikov started this duality in the Russian geopolitical school.³⁴

Isakova recognizes two phases in the development of Russian geopolitics as ‘an area of study’, the first at the end of 19th century and the second in the beginning of 20th century. The first had to do with scholars S. Soloviev, B. Kluchevskii, A.P. Shapov, B.N. Checherin and I.L. Solonevich.³⁵ These scholars studied topics such as the climate and its influence on the labour patterns and on the national character of the local population (Soloviev), or performed comparative analyses of geography, climate and levels of individual freedoms in Russia and in the United States (Solonevich). In addition, there was the Eurasian School of thought (see below) and the pan-Slavic ideas of, e.g., Nikolai Danilevskii.³⁶ Isakova argues that Russian geopolitics was a conservative political trend and mentality (except some pan-Slavic ideas).³⁷

After the revolution, émigrés especially continued Russian geopolitical thinking. Geographer Petr Savitskii, the Prince and philologist Nikolai Trubetskoi, historian G.V. Vernadskii and theologian G.V. Florovskii founded a Eurasian movement in the 1920s.³⁸ The main idea of Eurasianism was that Eurasia (Russia or the Soviet Union) forms a geographical, economic and historical entity, which differs from both Europe and Asia.³⁹ It is an independent continent, as Savitskii argued, because it has been under the influence of both European and Asiatic-Asian cultures.⁴⁰ Vladimir Kolosov has argued that Eurasian geopolitics operates with Mackinder’s heartland theory, which stresses the importance of the continental pivot of Eurasia.⁴¹ In addition, using one of the main concepts of Eurasianism, that is, *mestorazvitie* (literal translation: place development), makes Eurasianism very close to the ‘organistic’ school of the German geopoliticians such as Ratzel and Haushofer.⁴² The socio-political environment and its territory appear as a homogenous (integrated) whole, a ‘geographical *Landshafi*’. This serves as a connective origin of Russia-Eurasia, which otherwise is nationally, racially, religiously, culturally, linguistically and ideologically heterogeneous.⁴³ Trubetskoi labels the Eurasian people as *Turan*, which comprises the Finno-Ugric, Samoyed, Turkic, Mongol and Manchurian tribes.⁴⁴ What unites them is not linguistic or genetic relationships but that they form a particular psy-

34 Juntunen 2003, 309.

35 Isakova 2005, 12.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 13.

38 Dmitrii V. Slapentokh (1997) has written on the origins and development of this Eurasianist movement, and reprints of the publications of the founders of Eurasianism can be found, for example, in *Rossiiia mezhdū Evropoi i Aziei: Evraziiskii soblāzn*. Antologija. Russkie istochniki sovremennoi sotsial’noi filosofii. 1993. Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk. Institut filosofii. Moskva. Nauka.

39 See e.g. Trubetskoi 1927.

40 Savitskii 1925.

41 Kolosov 2000, 25.

42 Kolosov 2002, 157.

43 Ibid., 158.

44 Trubetskoi 1925a, 59–60.

chological type. However, even though the multi-ethnicity of Eurasia is emphasized, Trubetskoi mentions that the Russian nation is *the first among equals*.⁴⁵

Eurasianists stress the importance of the *national culture* and uniqueness of Eurasian culture. Russian national culture is unthinkable without the Orthodox faith. Small peoples are better off with others, Eurasianists seem to suggest, as they argue that if there is no national culture, state independence is meaningless.⁴⁶ Eurasianists oppose universal understanding of culture as this may lead, for example, to making a boundary between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized'.⁴⁷ Europe appears as an antithesis to Russia, it represents individualism and egoism: for example, Trubetskoi blames Roman Germanic culture for ego-centrism (and its striving to make Russia a colony) and the rest of Europe for Eurocentrism.⁴⁸ Actually, Russia should head a universal anti-European movement.⁴⁹ Trubetskoi stresses that Eurasianism has nothing in common with the two ideas which have dominated Russia since Peter the Great, namely of Russia as a European great power or Russia as implementing progressive ideas of European civilization such as democracy or socialism. Instead, Eurasianism *advocates changing the culture* (the self-identification and self-respect of the Eurasian people) because without it, changing the political regime or political ideas is insignificant. Cultures include political ideologies in Eurasian thinking.⁵⁰

In contrast to the 19th century geographical determinism, in Stalin's era geographical factors were totally denied.⁵¹ Bolsheviks wanted to liberate the human being from the chains of geographical determinism.⁵² *Homo Sovieticus* was able to survive anywhere and in any conditions.⁵³ Officially, geopolitics was classified as a pseudo-science and associated with fascism until the Gorbachev period.⁵⁴ However, geopolitics as an interdisciplinary practise existed in the Soviet era as well.⁵⁵ An example of geopolitical thinking was the Brezhnev doctrine according to which the Soviet Union must not allow any pro-Western regimes to emerge in the neighbouring (to the Soviet bloc) countries. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979 seemed to follow this doctrine. As an independent field of study, geopolitics started to develop at turn of 1990s.

After 1985 some Soviet historians, political scientists, geographers and economists studied the foundations of the geopolitical order connected with the 'new political thinking', better

45 Trubetskoi 1927, 90.

46 Trubetskoi 1921, 43.

47 Savitskii 1925, 105.

48 Trubetskoi 1921, 36. Trubetskoi refers here to the First World War and that this task of making Russia a colony had not yet succeeded. He is very pessimistic that Europe would help emigrants to save Russia from the hands of Bolsheviks and is quite convinced that the whole-world revolution would be the only thing that could save Soviet power from destruction or being suppressed by bourgeois governments of the West.

49 Kolosov 2002, 160.

50 Trubetskoi 1925b, 79–80.

51 Hauner 1989, 217.

52 Ibid, 148.

53 Ibid., 217.

54 Kolosov 2000, 20. See also the definition in the *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, in which geopolitics is equalled e.g. to Nazism, imperialism.

55 Ibid., 8, 20.

relations with the West, the prospects of solving global problems together and building of an all-European home. Soon, however, a new task was ahead: thinking about Russia's place in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union within the circumstances of ideological confrontation inside Russia.⁵⁶

3.3 GEOPOLITICAL THINKING IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: WESTERNISM VS. EURASIANISM?

In contemporary Russia “geopolitical concepts and ideas have reached a wide constituency amongst opinion-formers and decision-makers”.⁵⁷ Studying geopolitical arguments is essential, as according to Andrei Tsygankov⁵⁸, “the Russian majority shares the premise that both Russia's domestic problems and the conflicts on the country's periphery [such as the Russo-Chechen conflict] are largely geopolitical in nature [...]”. We can find ‘evidence’ from popularity and the meaning of geopolitics in Russia from a number of textbooks on geopolitics published for university students, for example, *Vvedenie v geopolitiku* by K.S. Gadzhiev (2000); *Geopolitika i politicheskaia geografiia* by V.A. Kolossov and N.S. Mironenko (2002); and *Geopolitika* by V.A. Dergachev (2004) – to name just three. There are also other books published on geopolitics (in addition to those of today's politicians), for example, two volumes of *Classic of Geopolitics of the 19th century* and *Classic of Geopolitics of the 20th century* introduce texts of both Russian and foreign philosophers who are defined as belonging to the ‘classics of geopolitics’, such as Petr Chaadaev, Friedrich Ratzel, Alfred Mahan, Nikolai Danilevskii, Halford Mackinder, Nikolai Trubetskoi, Karl Haushofer, Nikolai Ustrialov and Petr Savitskii.⁵⁹ Studies on geopolitical thinking in Russia from the late 18th until early 20th century can be found in *Geopolitika v Rossii mezhdu vostokom i zapadom* by I.V. Alekseeva, E.I. Zelenev and V.I. Iakunin.⁶⁰ Moreover, some Russian academic journals like *Polis*, *Politiia* (*Politeia*) and *Pro et Contra* have published articles on geopolitics.⁶¹ Probably the best-known Russian scholar in the West in the field of geopolitics has been the above mentioned Vladimir Kolossov, the Director of the Centre of Geopolitical Studies at the Institute of Geography (Russian Academy of Science), and the whole Centre of Geopolitical Studies research group. Kolossov's work comprises publications in Russian⁶², English⁶³ and French.

56 Ibid., 21.

57 Smith and Timmins 2001, 70.

58 Tsygankov, 2003, 102.

59 *Klassika geopolitiki XX vek & Klassika geopolitiki XIX vek*, 2003.

60 Alekseeva et al. 2001.

61 Like the special number *Dilemmy i kazusy geopolitiki* POLIS 1/1995.

62 Edited books or textbooks *Geopoliticheskoe polozhenie Rossii: predstavleniia i realnost*. Moskva. Art-Kurer.2000, *Geopolitika i politicheskaia geografiia* by V.A. Kolossov and N.S. Mironenko (2002).

63 Articles: Kolossov, Vladimir and Rostislav Turovsky: Russian Geopolitics at the Fin-de-siecle. *Geopolitics* Vol 6/1, 2001; ‘High and ‘Low’ Geopolitics. Images of Foreign Countries in the Eyes of Russian Citizens. *Geopolitics*. Vol. 8/1, 2003 Special Issue; Loughlin, J. and V. Kolossov: Still not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier: the geopolitics of

Russian geographer and historian Lev Gumilev (1912–1992) and his theory of *ethnogenesis* and ethnic cycles has had a great impact on the development of Russian geopolitical thought, especially on the ideas of some geographers in St. Petersburg (in addition to Dugin), even though Gumilev did not directly touch upon geopolitical themes in his writings.⁶⁴ Following Gumilev's thinking Russians should be understood as a unique ethnos, which has been formed on the basis of the integration of Slavic and Turkish groups. A people, nation or state is born due to *passionarnost*, which represents biological and spiritual energy. When this passionarnost decreases, an ethnos degrades. Western civilization is in the last stage of ethnogenesis in contrast to Russia or Eurasia, which is a young ethnos.⁶⁵

The ideas of Eurasianism of the emigrants introduced above appeared extremely appealing in the 1990s.⁶⁶ In the field of critical geopolitics, Graham Smith studied the relationship between geopolitics and national identities in Russia, with a focus on the emergence of Eurasianism within geopolitical discourse.⁶⁷ He argued that competing representations of Russia were bound up with Eurasia. In the late 1990s the most prominent and influential geopolitical discourses in Russia were those of the New Right, Eurasian communists and democratic statist (Eurasian statist).⁶⁸ What was common to their argumentation, according to Smith, is that they shared an unease about Russia emulating the West. The difference between them can be found in how much they emphasize Russia's place within Eurasian civilization: is Russia a bridge between Europe and Asia or should it be an alternative to both? The New Right explained the world as a geopolitical struggle between two civilizations: continental and maritime. Mondialism is taken as the main threat to Eurasianism and Russia should unite all anti-mondialist forces.⁶⁹ Eurasian Communists cherished Soviet homeland nostalgia and combined class politics with nationalist rhetoric – the goal being a communist Eurasia and Russian hegemony.⁷⁰ Democratic Statists, for their part, argued for strong state and Western-style democracy and combined liberalism and neo-nationalism. Russia should function as a bridge between Europe and Asia and should have pragmatic cooperation with the West.⁷¹ For Smith, Aleksandr Dugin

the Kosovo war 1999, *Political Geography* Vol.21, Issue 5, June 2002, 573–599; Kolossov, Vladimir and Andrei Treivish: The political geography of European minorities: past and future. *Political Geography* Vol. 17, issue 5, June 1998, 517–534; Kolossov, Vladimir: Ethnic and political identities and territorialities in the post-Soviet Space, *GeoJournal* 48/2, January 1999, 71–81; Kolossov, Vladimir: Political polarization at the national and the intra-urban levels: the role of Moscow in Russian politics and socio-political cleavages within the city, *GeoJournal* 42/4, August 1997, 385–401. Kolossov, Vladimir: New borders for new world orders: territorialities at the fin-de-siecle, *GeoJournal* 44/3, January 1998, 259–273; Kolossov, Vladimir: After Empire: Identity and Territorialities in the Post-Soviet Space in Agnew, John, Katharyne Mitchell and Gerard Toal (Eds.): *A Companion to Political Geography*. Oxford. Blackwell.2003.

64 Kolossov 2001, 166.

65 See *Ibid.*, 167.

66 See Christer Pursiainen's article on Eurasianism of 1920's and 1930's, on Lev Gumilev and neo-Eurasianism of Panarin, *Eurasian historia, nykyisyys ja jälkimoderni*.

67 Smith 1999.

68 *Ibid.*, 483.

69 *Ibid.*, 485.

70 *Ibid.*, 486.

71 *Ibid.*, 487.

and Vladimir Zhirinovskii represented the Russian New Right and Gennadii Ziuganov the Eurasian communists. The circle around Eltsin was a fairly loose grouping representing democratic statism/official Eurasianism. New Eurasianism framed itself in relation to both Western liberalism and Atlanticism. Westernism stands for arguing for cooperation with the West as an equal partner and returning to civilization.⁷² Likewise A.P. Tsygankov defines Eurasianism not as a homogeneous school, but as highly diverse and varying “from West-friendly versions to those that are openly isolationist and expansionist” and divides Eurasianism into four different schools: expansionists, civilizationists, stabilizers and geoeconomists. In addition to these four approaches, Tsygankov also recognizes a school of Westernizers.⁷³ What characterizes Westernizers’ thinking is that Russia is a European country, Western civilization is the only viable and progressive civilization and there cannot be security without the West.⁷⁴ Geoeconomists, for their part, stress the role of geoeconomic factors and interdependence in world politics. They see that threats are of a geoeconomic nature.⁷⁵ Those arguing for stabilizing Eurasia see that Russia’s security mission is in Eurasia: however, their arguments are not anti-Western. There cannot be stability without Russia, a Great Power. Stabilizers are critical of Soviet foreign policy and use of force.⁷⁶ Lastly, both civilizationists and expansionists represent Russia as an anti-Western state. For civilizationists, the main security goal is in Eurasia, but expansionists see Russia as an empire which expands ever further. The United States is seen as the main threat to Russia’s cultural identity.⁷⁷ Tsygankov claims that Iabloko would support geoeconomists and westernizers, Edinstvo geoeconomists, Otechestvo civilizationalists and stabilizers, and the Communist Party expansionists.⁷⁸ John O’Loughlin, Irish American geographer, stresses the division between Westernizers and Eurasianists, who differ from each other “not only in geopolitical theories and codes but also in their views of the nature of Russian civil society and social organization.”⁷⁹ O’Loughlin introduces a classification of New Eurasianism very similar

72 Ibid., 482.

73 Tsygankov 2003a. Tsygankov has used the following volumes in his classification: A. Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki. Myslit prostranstvom.* (Arktogeia-tsentr.Moskva.2000) as an example of expansionists; G. Ziuganov, *Geografua pobedi: osnovy rossiiskoi geopolitiki.* (Unknown publisher. Moskva.1999) and N.A. Nartov, *Geopolitika* (Iuniti.Moskva.1999) as the examples of civilizationists; K.S. Gadziev, *Vvedenie k geopolitiku* (Logos.Moskva.2000) as an example of stabilizers; V.A. Kolossov & N.S. Mironenko, *Geopolitika i politicheskaia geografua.* (Aspekt press.Moskva.2001) as an example of geoeconomists; and D. Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization.* (Carnegie Moscow Centre. Moscow.2001) as an example of westernizers. Tsygankov focused on responses to four categories of conflict :ethnically based domestic and international military conflicts (Caucasus, Moldova, Tajikistan, Chechnia), economic conflicts over the Caspian Sea, competition for energy resources and of energy dependence (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), political conflicts, human rights (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan), instability and terrorism in Central Asia and Caucasus, instability of borders illegal immigration, drug trafficking (Sino-Russian, Tajik-Afghan borders). Analysing the responses, he has made this division of geopolitical schools. Tsygankov’s study could be classified as studying formal geopolitics (and practical geopolitics).

74 Ibid., 106–107.

75 Ibid., 107.

76 Ibid., 108.

77 Ibid., 109–110.

78 Ibid., 112.

79 O’Loughlin 2001, 23.

TABLE 2.

Study on geopolitical culture:
Geopolitical schools/traditions and Russian parties according to previous studies

Position	Party	SMITH 1999			TSYGANKOV 2003				O'LOUGHLIN ET AL. 2006			
		Eurasianism			Eurasianism				Westernism	Westernizers	Democratic Statists	Neo-Eurasianists and Neo-Communists
		New Right	Eurasian Communists	Dem. Statism	Expansionists	Civilizationists	Stabilizers	Geoeconomists				
Party of Power	<i>Nash Dom - Rossia</i> <i>Orechestvo Edinstvo</i>	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	X		X		X	N/A	N/A	X* X*	N/A
Democratic Opposition	<i>Iabloko</i>			X				X			X	
Communist Opposition	<i>KPRF</i>		X		X							X

*Edinaia Rossia

to Graham Smith's (or Charles Clover 1999) and names them 'hard-line' and 'moderate' Eurasianism. The former is "not part of the mainstream foreign policy discourse since it espouses a world-view that is fantastic for most ordinary and elite Russians and is closely associated with the extreme-right national patriotic front".⁸⁰ Russian scholar Dimitri Trenin (Carnegie Centre) introduces three competing geopolitical traditions and orientations: a great Russia tradition, an anti-Western tradition and a European tradition.⁸¹ Trenin argues that until September 2001, Vladimir Putin had not made a choice between the three geopolitical traditions. However, "after September 2001 Putin made a 'strategic choice' in favour of the West motivated by his underlying desire to lead Russia towards Europe".⁸²

See TABLE 2. which summarises Russian geopolitical traditions (geopolitical culture) and places the parliamentary parties under examination here into these traditions.

3.3.1 Aleksandr Dugin as an example of extreme New Eurasianism

The main forums for geopolitical debates in the early 1990s were nationalistic journals, especially *Den* (nowadays *Zavtra*). A key figure in these debates was Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962), who started to publish geopolitical journal *Elementy: evraziiskoe obozrenie* and established a publishing house *Arktogeia*. Together with Eduard Limonov, he created the National Bolshevik Party in 1993 (but left the party in 1998): formerly he was also a member of Pamiat.⁸³ Dugin established the Eurasian Union in 2001, the International Eurasian Union in 2003, and most recently, in 2005 he created the Eurasian Union of the Youth. Moreover, Dugin is the rector of his own university the *New University* (functions as a discussion forum), gives lectures at MGU and has his own TV 'show' *Vekhi*, a geopolitical programme on the TV channel of the Orthodox Church *SPAS*. For a while Dugin was also advisor to the then State Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev (then KPRF).

In 1997, his book *Osnovy geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii*, which is probably the best known of Dugin's publications in the West, he combined the ideas of classical Western geopolitics such as the eternal struggle between the Land and Sea Power – maritime (*talassokratiia*) and continental civilizations (*tellurokratiia*) – with the ideas of the emigrant Eurasianists of the 1920s and 1930s (see above) – such as Russia being not just one of the countries of the Eurasian continent, but *the* Eurasia, the heartland, a unique civilization. According to *Osnovy geopolitiki*, continentality and empire-building are the Russians' destiny, and Russia

80 Ibid., 24.

81 Trenin 2002 cited in O'Loughlin et al. 2004b, 285. As argued above, Trenin does not name these geopolitical traditions but introduces three different options for Russia.

82 Trenin 2002 cited in O'Loughlin et al. 2004b, 285.

83 About Dugin's personal history see Shenfield 2001, 191–194. In 1978 three groups joined together to form the Pamiat society; in 1985 Dmitrii Vasilev became its secretary. "Pamiat was to serve as the seedbed out of which numerous Russian nationalist groups of either a reactionary or a fascist type were to emerge in the late 1980s or the 1990s." (Shenfield 2001, 41)

should therefore expand and acquire a new continental Eurasian Empire consisting of all those who have a common enemy, i.e. Atlanticism, mondialism⁸⁴, the market-based economy, liberalism, and the foremost power that advocates all of these, the United States. In one of his more recent writings, Dugin refers to determinism by saying that the “geographic location of Russia dictates in itself the course of foreign policy”.⁸⁵ Furthermore, Dugin’s thinking draws on the writings of the European New Right (Jean Thiriart, Alain de Benoist). Following the ideas of Lev Gumilev, Dugin argues that the new Eurasian empire would re-unite the peoples of the forests and the steppes; it would extend from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The Russian Orthodox faith and ideocracy⁸⁶ should be among the main components of the new empire.⁸⁷ Stephen D. Shenfield recognizes five main elements in Dugin’s thinking: conservative revolution, geopolitical model, national-bolshevism, Ariosophy and Christian Eschatology. Shenfield argues that “in Dugin’s worldview, even geopolitics is built on mystical foundations.”⁸⁸

Alan Ingram has studied Aleksandr Dugin and the relationship between formal geopolitics (referring to Ó Tuathail 1999) and neo-fascism. In a sense, Dugin can be considered a neo-fascist,⁸⁹ because he “draws upon familiar fascist and neo-fascist themes”: the organic nature of Russian community (an organic natural unity based on ethnic and geographical syntheses: the synthesis of Finno-Ugric, Slavic and Turkic-Mongol elements and of steppe and forest); absolute opposition to liberalism (liberalism originates from the West and expresses its interests); and references to mysticism and occult forms of knowledge (combining Russian Orthodoxy of the Old Believers’ type with a ‘pagan understanding of the natural order of the elements to establish the sacred status of Russia’s geopolitical identity and mission’).⁹⁰ He cannot be, however, be accused of direct racism, according to Ingram. Another scholar, Marlène Laruelle, however, claims that “Dugin does not hide his attraction to fascism and appreciates its corporatism, its socialist orientations, the cult of the leader and the exaltation of romantic heroism and the taste for death.”⁹¹ She continues that Dugin can be classified within the new right movement by his traditionalism and his admiration for German geopolitical thought. She also defines Dugin as a follower of the “Conservative Revolution” and states that Dugin hopes “to go beyond the modernity and the democratic political principles.” Furthermore, Laruelle argues that Dugin’s determinism is “exclusively ethnic and biological [...]: A person is what they are [...] because they belong to a racial collectivity they cannot reject, which is superior to them. Without this racial community, the person has neither reality nor meaning”. Stephen Shenfield has also

84 Mondialism is a term frequently used by and representing the main threat to those classified as New Eurasianists in the 1990s, such as Dugin or Ziuganov. It refers to a combination of globalisation, cosmopolitanism and liberal and socialist internationalism, see Smith 1999.

85 Dugin, 14 December 2002, *Izvestiia*.

86 Dugin 1997 (1999), 87. Dugin defines *ideocracy* as a form of government in which the state is created top down and led by the class of spiritual leaders. It opposes democratic and liberal ways of government.

87 See Dugin 1997.

88 Shenfield 2001, 196.

89 Ingram 2001, 1034.

90 *Ibid.*, 1046–1047.

91 Laruelle 2004.

classified many features in Dugin's thinking as fascist (such as the conservative revolution and admiration for Tradition, Ariosophy, Christian Eschatology).⁹² Along with the labels 'neo-Eurasianism', the 'new right', 'conservatism', 'traditionalism' and 'neo-fascist', Dugin's thinking has also been called Neo-National Bolshevism because Dugin tries to bring into a synthesis the idea of the conservative revolution, a theory of the continental bloc and Neo-Eurasianism.⁹³ Dugin might as well be classified as an orthodox nationalist.⁹⁴

As for the question of how fascism can be defined and interpreted within the Russian context we can find some answers in Shenfield's book 'Russian Fascism'.⁹⁵ He defines fascism as an "authoritarian populist movement that seeks to preserve and restore premodern patriarchal values within a new order based on communities of nation, race, or faith."⁹⁶ I will not go any deeper in this as it is not the topic of this study. However, it must be mentioned that, as with some Western geopolitical thinking, there are features in Russian geopolitical thinking that can be connected to fascism or racism – or at least there is a tendency to stress the uniqueness and superiority of one's own nation or ethnos and at the same time, at least implicitly, refer to the inferiority of any other nations or ethnic groups. We can surely find "a deep attachment to the essential values of pre-modern eras" in, for example, Dugin's thinking, which "is the most important of the characteristics that mark fascism off from its main ideological rivals both on the left and the right."⁹⁷ Fascists interpret "the processes of modernization as the deliberate destructive work of conspiratorial racial and religious sects." Shenfield connects to this "the view of the history, held by contemporary Russian Eurasianists, as a millennia-long struggle between secret orders of Eurasianists and Atlanticists."⁹⁸ What must be mentioned also is that "fascism has never been committed to the principle of the nation-state." Instead, "its ideal has

92 See Shenfield 2001, 194–198.

93 Kolosov 2001, 163–164.

94 The ideology of orthodox nationalists focuses on the principal enemy, that is, the Anti-Christ, and on those enemies subordinate to the Anti-Christ: Jews, Catholics, the West and the New World Order. Orthodox nationalists must be "distinguished from nationalists for whom Orthodoxy is overwhelmed by the ideological demands of ethno-nationalism and those who use Orthodoxy as a populist symbol of national identity", such as KPRF and LDPR (Verkhovskiy 2004, 128). For Orthodox nationalists, though, religious identity is more important than ethnic identity. They reject democratic and liberal values and support the idea of a national dictatorship as a means of returning to an absolute and Orthodox monarchy. At the centre of their thinking is Holy Russia and Moscow as the Third Rome (Ibid., 130). They see the "world Jewry as the primary enemy of Russia and the Church, the Jew stands visibly or invisibly behind all other adversaries." Jewry, the West and the New World Order are all servants of the Anti-Christ. (Ibid., 131) Orthodox nationalists can be divided into 1) Eurasian: the Russian Empire is based not only on Orthodoxy but on Islam, too (see Ibid., 133–135) and 2) the more radical Orthodox nationalists, for whom the Russian kingdom can be only Orthodox and all other faiths should be tolerated only as long as they do not encroach on the Orthodox nature of the state. Islam is seen a false religion (Ibid., 135–136) The clash between the West and the world of Islam is interpreted by most Orthodox nationalists as artfully staged. Islam is just a "blind element that can be used by the other two forces in their own interests, in their struggle with each other." (Ibid., 140) The liberal represent pure evil. Islamism is their main instrument. (Ibid., 143).

95 Shenfield 2001.

96 Ibid., 17.

97 Ibid., 9.

98 Ibid., 11.

been a multiethnic empire”, in which “one particular nation was to occupy the dominant position”. This idea of the superiority of the Empire versus nation-state for Russia has been quite dominant within the Russian Federation.⁹⁹

3.4 IMPACT OF (EURASIAN) GEOPOLITICAL THINKING

It is difficult to measure what the weight of Dugin’s or other Neo-Eurasianists’ ideas have had within the Russian political elite; but, for example, Ingram claims that Dugin’s prominence has increased during Vladimir Putin’s presidency, “Russia’s official Eurasian orientation has been consolidated”, and *derzhavnost* has become “a genuine component of official discourse”.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Ingram claims that “aspects of Dugin’s vision match elements of official policy and elite consensus” and “elements of his Eurasianism have found their way into public discourse.”¹⁰¹ However, as Shenfield notes, there is “no evidence that Dugin’s ideas have had any palpable influence on the general public [the statement made in 2000], [...] his language is too esoteric, his work not easy to popularize. However, it is Russia’s present and future intellectual and political elite that Dugin has always regarded as his priority target audience.”¹⁰² Hence we must not take his influence as insignificant.¹⁰³

What then is the relationship between the ideas of Eurasianism and the discourses of the political elite with Russian public opinion? These matters have been studied by O’Loughlin (2001) and O’Loughlin, Ó Tuathail and Kolosov (2004a, 2004b, 2006). John O’Loughlin claims that “public opinion in Russia cares little about geopolitics or foreign affairs and a major gap has emerged between the geopolitical priorities of the elites and the day-to-day concerns of ordinary Russians”; here it must be mentioned that Russians are no exception in this regard. O’Loughlin continues, “for the vast majority of Russians only events inside the Russian Federation [including Chechnia], in the near abroad and the fate of ethnic Russian outside Russia’s borders command broad public attention.” However, he stresses that “geopolitical codes have to attract popular support from the public in democratic and quasi-democratic societies if they are to be implemented through foreign policy actions.”¹⁰⁴ More generally on the impact of Eurasianism it has been argued that “Putin’s accession to power gave Eurasianism a boost” (referring to Boris Rumer), “the current ideologists of Eurasianism are adapting it to fit in with the new president’s statist views.”¹⁰⁵ It has also been argued that President Eltsin’s key adviser at the beginning of the 1990s, Sergei Stankevich, would have “distilled the essence of Eura-

99 Ibid., 16.

100 Ingram 2001, 1032.

101 Ibid., 1048

102 Shenfield 2001, 198.

103 Ibid.

104 O’Loughlin 2001, 18.

105 Isakova 2005, 26.

sianist arguments into a number of related propositions [that is, concerning Russia's foreign policy].¹⁰⁶ Stankevich argued that "Russia's geopolitical position endowed it with a special 'mission' in the world. This mission was to act as a kind of bridge between the civilizations of Asia and the West."¹⁰⁷

According to Isakova, geopolitics have had a great impact on current foreign policy decision-making – the thinking of either a Westernism, Eurasianism or Neo-Eurasianist model or a pragmatic geopolitical model.¹⁰⁸ In the late 1990s the pragmatic model prevailed, but today during Putin we have witnessed the revision of the Eurasianist spirit and policy, Isakova claims.¹⁰⁹ This stresses Russia's unique geopolitical position and Russia as a bridge state. Isakova argues that "in the twenty-first century more than ever before Eurasianism became a version of the engagement strategy for Russia."¹¹⁰

Some scholars have argued that adopting a Eurasianist line of thinking reveals more or less the weakness of Russia. Kerr argues that the reasons why these ideas have been welcomed is a "perception of territorial vulnerability in the east of the country" and a need to control strategic and political developments within the states on Russia's eastern borders.¹¹¹ Russia has, in a way, pushed to the east because after the collapse of the Soviet Union it lost its allies in the former Eastern Europe.¹¹² The Eurasianist policy is only a second best option for when Russia has problems in relations with Europe and the US.¹¹³

106 Smith 2006, 39.

107 Ibid.

108 Isakova 2005, 14.

109 Ibid., 18.

110 See Ibid.

111 Kerr cited in Smith 2006, 40–41.

112 Kerr in Smith 2006, 41.

113 Smith 2006, 41.

4 Political Context and Parliamentary Parties

In this chapter I will introduce the political context in which the political actors under examination struggled during 1994–2003; the changes that occurred and the continuity that has pertained. That is, what factors, to a certain extent, limited or enabled their actions – including the argumentation level of their actions. My intention is not to study political parties as such,¹ or to give a definition to the Russian party system,² but rather these studies serve as valuable background information and can be used partly to explain certain features in the parties' argumentation. The main argument is that despite the limited role of political parties in Russian politics, their arguments do spring from somewhere and they do reflect ideas and mindsets, which are present in Russian society as a whole, especially within the Russian political elite. This relationship is, of course, not one-way, as one can also argue that the arguments of the leading politicians of political parties expressed in public have some impact on Russian society and, in particular, on the discourses (and policies) of the political elite.

The study covers the period of the last six years of Eltsin's reign and the first four years of Putin's presidency. As mentioned previously, even though many things have changed there is a lot that has remained the same. If we are to interpret the political situation as Lilia Shevtsova from the Moscow Carnegie Centre does, what has changed in the 'domestic policy' is that if during Eltsin the rule was based on agreements, it is now based on the Law (or the argument is that it should at least be based on the Law).³ If Eltsin's main goal was to stay in power, Putin has been able to focus on building his vertical of power; and if Eltsin's time might be characterized as a period of balance of power between democratic institutions, regional leaders, oligarchs, political parties in the State Duma and the media, during Putin all of these different sources of power have been under attack. I refer here to the federal reforms of 2000–2005⁴, the introduction of self-censorship to the media after the Dubrovka terrorist act⁵, closing down of or changing the leadership of certain TV channels (attacks on oligarchs in other fields as well) and

1 Studies such as March 2002 and 2006 or Hale 2004 and 2006.

2 Studies such as Rose, Munro and White 2001 and White 2006.

3 Shevtsova 2002.

4 E.g. the reform of the Federation Council, governors nominated instead of elected; introduction of seven Federal districts; harmonisation of the constitutions of the subjects.

5 Rebels kept 850 people as hostages in a theatre in Dubrovka area in Moscow in October 2002. The special forces used gas to tame the rebels and 129 hostages died.

the changing the party and election legislation⁶. Shevtsova names the current political system in Russia as the Russian System, which is a system based on power personified legitimized by elections.⁷ The elite structure has also changed during Putin: Eltsin inherited the Soviet elite, which was reinforced by some liberals, but during Putin this elite is being replaced by that of St. Petersburg security service staff and St. Petersburg liberals.⁸ What has persisted from Eltsin to Putin is the conflict in Chechnia and an inability to solve the problems in that republic.

The period, which Shevtsova describes as having a balance of power between the various democratic organizations, Aleksei Zudin, Head of the Department of Political Programmes at the Centre for Political Technologies, calls a *poly-centrist system*.⁹ The federal centre weakened significantly after the presidential elections (the support of the media, the business elite and regional leaders enabled Eltsin's victory) and furthermore, moving to elections for the heads of regions ruined the 'vertical of the executive power' and started the autonomization of the regional elite. The media went to the control of the business elite and regional leaders. In March 1998, Viktor Chernomyrdin was removed from the position of Prime Minister. The coalition of the elites, on whom the party of power, Nash Dom – Rossiia had relied on, collapsed. Later, in August and September 1998, the Russian economy collapsed. As a result of all these events, the opposition was able to name their candidate to Prime Minister, that is, Evgenii Primakov. His support came from the State Duma, which was in opposition to the president. The then party of power collapsed and the electorate moved to support Moscow mayor Luzhkov; the Kremlin became isolated. Also, the poor health of Eltsin had a negative effect and consequently the State Duma had good reasons to start the impeachment process.¹⁰

What was new in the election campaign and results of 1999 was the more active role of regional leaders and organizations. After gaining control of the local mass media (and partly the local economy), the regional elites started to strive towards creating their own party of power, Otechestvo. However, the Kremlin struck back, first by launching an offensive against

6 The new law on parties, the new law on elections to the State Duma, that is moving to a proportional system, raising the threshold to seven per cent, allowing only 'federal' parties from 2007 parliamentary elections etc. On the federal reform see e.g. Ross 2006.

7 Shevtsova 2003, 96. See Shevtsova 2006.

8 Ibid. See also Treisman 2006 on the concept of silovarchy (siloviki with economic power).

9 Zudin 2002, 2.

10 Zudin 2000. The impeachment of a president is a very complicated process in Russia. According to the Constitution, Article 93, the President of the Russian Federation may be impeached by the Council of the Federation only on the basis of the charges of high treason or another grave crime, advanced by the State Duma and confirmed by the conclusion of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the presence of the elements of crime in the actions of the President of the Russian Federation and by the conclusion of the Constitution Court of the Russian Federation confirming that the rules of advancing the charges were observed. The decision of the State Duma on advancing charges and the decision of the Council of the Federation on impeaching the President shall be adopted by two thirds of the votes of the total number of members of each chamber and on the initiative of not less than one third of the deputies of the State Duma and with the conclusion of a special commission set up by the State Duma. The decision of the Council of the Federation on impeaching the President of the Russian Federation shall be adopted not later than three months after the State Duma advanced the charges against the President. If a decision of the Council of the Federation is not adopted during this time, the charges against the President shall be regarded as rejected. (Source: www.kremlin.ru)

the government and the State Duma. It was therefore the state apparatus that was the key player in the parliamentary elections of 1999.¹¹ Executive power was re-integrated, that is, the presidential administration, along with ‘oligarchs’ Boris Berezovskii and Vladimir Gusinskii, led a campaign against Evgenii Primakov, in which they used all available administrative and media resources. Soon Primakov was replaced by Sergei Stepashin (then potential candidate for presidency). Consequently, the main competitor for the alternative of the party of power was robbed of its main resource – power.¹² In the elections, the victory was taken by Edinstvo, the bloc of governors of the regions that are heavily dependent of the Centre, over Otechestvo, the bloc of governors of the donor regions. Decentralization was weakened and the elections of 1999 started a new era: an era of finding ways for cooperation between the Centre and the regions.¹³ The executive power became under the control of the presidential political clan – the Family (Eltsin, his daughter Tatiana Diachenko, Aleksandr Voloshin, head of the presidential administration; leader of the company *ES Rossii* Anatolii Chubais and oligarchs Roman Abramovich and Boris Berezovskii). This new regime sought to have total control over all federal financial sources in one centre, to re-divise property in favour of representatives of the business elite who had close contacts with the political clan of Eltsin, and to keep (political) power in the hands of the ruling elite.¹⁴ The party system weakened drastically and there was no real opposition; the parties had actually become auxiliaries of the executive power.¹⁵ Powerful elite coalitions marginalized the genuine political parties (KPRF and Iabloko) that sought to place issues at the centre of the campaign.¹⁶

Putin’s presidency has led to even more concentration of power; Russia has moved close to what Zudin has called a *mono-centrist system*.¹⁷ This system was, at least in the beginning, based on the rating of Putin and the belief in his ability to create stability and order.¹⁸ Shevtsova has described Putin’s regime as a “hybrid political regime”, which “guaranteed calm in Russia; it was the means to link past and present, conservatives and modernizers. It was an instrument to neutralize conflicts [...]”¹⁹ Later, Shevtsova has argued that manipulation of the presidential election in 1996 marked the end of the Liberal Project; the year 2003, with the Lukos case, signified a turn to bureaucratic capitalism; and the year 2006 finished the building of the [Russian] System.²⁰ According to Shevtsova, Russia’s regime consists of bureaucratic authoritarianism.²¹

11 Aksenov 2001, 21.

12 Zudin 2000.

13 Kholodkovskii 2000, 48–51.

14 Zudin 2000.

15 Ibid., 22.

16 Sakwa 2000, 93.

17 Zudin 2002, 4.

18 Ibid.

19 Shevtsova 2003, 223.

20 Shevtsova 2007.

21 Shevtsova 2006.

Concerning Russia's foreign policy, even though the first Eltsin years' foreign policy has been classified as exclusively pro-Western or Atlanticist or having been "rooted in the liberal internationalism",²² some scholars, like Smith, argue that the "Russian government displayed a distinct interest in Asian matters in the beginning",²³ too. It could be said that "a political reaction against Kozyrev's liberal democratic foreign policy began as early as mid-1992"; "The Russian foreign policy debate quickly became polarized along liberal and nationalist lines"²⁴ and "at first, this debate suggested that the main foreign policy options facing Russia were mutually exclusive. That is, Russia should either choose the primacy of the West [...] or opt for its own primacy within the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], seeking to establish Russian dominance [...]"²⁵. However, this was not the case for Russian diplomacy, which was not so unilateralist and anti-Western during these years as suggested by some scholars.²⁶ There were actually strong lines of continuity between these putatively 'liberal' and 'realist' foreign ministers,²⁷ that is, Kozyrev and Primakov, and no radical shift from Western-oriented to Eurasian-oriented foreign policy.

Multipolarity has been key in Russian foreign policy and this becomes evident when reading official documents, such as the National Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)²⁸ and the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)²⁹. These documents stress Russia's position as a great power (*velikaia derzhava*) and as a desirable partner, who seeks cooperation in all geographical directions. In comparison with the Cold War period, today cooperation within the economy, politics, technology and ecology is more important than any military factors. Despite stressing multipolarity, there has in fact been more discussion on Russia's relationship with the CIS (geographically the priority is given to the CIS countries in the National Foreign Policy Concept) and the 'West', than on the relationship with the 'East' or 'South' (other than the CIS). Relations with Europe and the United States, and especially with the two significant Western organizations/communities, NATO and the EU, have been if not dominant, then at least a constitutive part of Russian foreign policy discussion.³⁰ Unlike the EU, NATO has been taken as the main external threat to Russia. Since the late 1990s and especially in 2001, the perception was that the main threat to Russia's security was not anymore springing from an easily defined geographical entity or any one organization like NATO, but, as many politicians argued, the threat was (international) terrorism. This, of course, was linked to the situation in Chechnia (as well as the situation in Kosovo).

22 Lynch 2002, 164.

23 Smith 2006, 40.

24 Lynch 2002, 165.

25 Ibid., 165.

26 Ibid., 166.

27 Ibid., 169.

28 *Kontsepsiia vnesheinei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii.*

29 *Kontsepsiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii.*

30 Concerning Russo-American relations there has been a lot of discussion on the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (finally in 2002 the United States declared they will withdraw from the Treaty)

However, during Putin, “Russia’s diplomacy [...] had undergone serious evolution”. In the beginning it was “aiming at constraining the West and first of all U.S. dominance. But it gradually became an instrument in building a more constructive partnership with the West.”³¹ 11 September 2001 meant the start of a “new phase in relations between Russia and the United States”, where Russia “recognized the hegemony of another state and voluntarily chose to play junior partner”;³² “For the first time, Putin had gone against advice of the political class and taken an independent position.”³³ However, already in 2001 and early 2002, “almost everyone who was anyone among the Russian elites tried to outdo the rest in great – power sentiments and, especially, anti-Americanism.”³⁴ Still there were those who were against this pro-Western policy, especially “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense remained bastions of conservatism.”³⁵ Shevtsova argues that “Putin’s multivectored approach differed sharply from Primakov’s multipolarity – Putin demonstrated that the West is the priority.”³⁶ However, “Russia’s turn to the West was made in the same old undemocratic way – without any attention to society, without any effort at explanation.”³⁷

4.1 CREATING THE PARTY SYSTEM: THE RUSSIAN AND SOVIET LEGACY AND THE POLITICAL ELITE’S DECISIONS

In this section I argue that even though the Russian and Soviet political cultures of the past have influenced the contemporary political culture in the Russian Federation, they cannot alone be held responsible for the current situation. Consequently, structural explanations (the Soviet legacy, Russian history and culture, poorly defined socio-economic cleavages) are not enough to explain the current system.³⁸ Moreover, there are different ways to interpret the meaning of the Russian and Soviet past for the current political system in general, and on the party system in particular. Let us look at one of these interpretations; academic Aleksei Kara-Murza, later a member of the Union of Right Forces political council, criticizes two myths: the myth of Russian democracy and the myth of Russian totalitarian path.³⁹ Kara-Murza argues

31 Shevtsova, 2003, 204.

32 Ibid., 205.

33 Ibid., 206.

34 Ibid., 211.

35 Ibid., 242.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 See McFaul 2000, 18–19.

39 Kara-Murza 1998. Kara-Murza does not deny that Russian political culture would not have been more authoritarian than in the West. The bourgeois estate was weak; independent corporations (free university, free towns, independent professional guilds), which were the socio-cultural and organizational resources for the multi-party system in the West, did not develop in Russia (Kara-Murza 1998, 10). There was no religious reformation and thus, the ‘Individual’ did not emancipate him/herself from the traditional communal ways and no prerequisites for the free, individual political self-determination were created. The political monopoly of the ‘sacred Power’ (Vlast) was unconditional and therefore, any reforms, any new discoveries were taken as ‘anti-system’, or ‘anti-Vlast’ by political elites, and not as ‘subcultures’. Even

that the significance of the short pre-revolutionary ‘multi-party’ period of 1905–1917 should not be over-emphasized. The first parties were openly anti-system parties or even totalitarian sects (radical Marxism, anarchism etc.), whereas the bourgeois parties (*cadets, oktiabrists* etc.) were created to function as a counterbalance to this extremism. Above all, this party pluralism did not lead to any reformation of power in the direction of democracy. Actually this coincided with even less control over the Imperial court (then the party of power according to Kara-Murza) by other actors in society.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the communist period should not be ‘demonised’ either. If the pre-revolutionary party system had some authoritarian features, so did the authoritarian rule comprise some ‘party system’ features.⁴¹ Kara-Murza argues that all effective governing also embodies a tendency towards diversification of the political sphere.⁴² Moreover, during communist rule the party itself, *Komsomols*, and the trade unions represented a field of stark conflict between different interests and the main opposition to the communist system emerged from within these structures.⁴³

Kara-Murza defines two Russian approaches to the past and accordingly its significance to the current system: first is the logic of the optimists, or *progressive logic (stadialnaia logika)*, and the other approach is the logic of the pessimists, or *civilizational logic (civilizatsionnaia logika)*.⁴⁴ Optimists stress that some kind of liberal political culture already exists in Russia and that pluralism and socio-political modernization are linked together. Thus, strengthening the first will automatically lead to development of the latter.⁴⁵ This logic carries a supposition of Russia’s backwardness from the ‘Western models.’ In contrast, pessimists argue that Russian political culture derives from the authoritarian type both, in the pre-revolutionary imperial model and in the communist-totalitarian model. According to pessimists, Russia belongs to a different kind of civilization than the West and, therefore, no party system and especially no multi-party system could exist in it.⁴⁶ To conclude, Kara-Murza stresses that the roots of the contemporary multi-party system should not only be looked for in the ‘golden age’ of the

if the revolutions in Russia had been made top-down, the legitimate rulers, such as Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great, had to start their political reforms as ‘anti-Vlast’.

40 Ibid., 11–12.

41 Ibid., 14.

42 Referring to the ‘two-party system’ in the cabinet of the Alexander II (reformers vs. conservatives), to proto-party (expressors of corporative interests) struggles, especially in times of turmoil (*smuta*) (Kara-Murza 1998, 14–15).

43 Ibid., 16.

44 One can argue that these two extremes also represent the two overall approaches to Russian statehood and society and thus, also to the questions concerning geopolitics and identity, the first one Westernism and the second Slavophilism or Eurasianism. Furthermore, these partly coincide with Andrei Riabov’s definition of political subcultures in the 1990s: that of social-traditional subculture, representatives of which mainly vote KPRF and who cherish the myth of the ‘golden age’ of the Russian history, that is the Brezhnev era and that of democratic political subculture, which has been built on the myth on the contemporary western democracy and market economy as the social ideal. (Riabov 2001, 3–4.) Moreover, Riabov argues that the third political subculture’s myth is that the power is always right: “you should obey the power”. Therefore, this group voted for Gorbachev, then Eltsin, then the ‘party of power’.

45 However, e.g. multi-party system, elections and a democratic constitution have not led to the democratization of Russia.

46 Kara-Murza 1998, 8.

beginning of the 20th century, but also in the tendencies of self-development of the communist regime, from which the contemporary politicians have come.⁴⁷ When a new generation, which has no connection to the Soviet past, enters the political arena, the system can change – in this respect Russia is now living a transitory period.

Let us now briefly turn to the institutional developments of 1989–1993, to which Karamurza also referred to as features of an emerging pluralism and democracy in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. In 1988, the Conference of *Kommunisticheskaia Partiaia Sovetskogo Soiuzu* (KPSS; Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the CPSU) began a political reform which was to remove the main source of political power from the party to a new organ, the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. In March 1989, the first multi-candidate elections in the Soviet Union were held to this new organ. The Soviet Congress had 2250 seats, 750 of which were elected from the Communist Party, *Komsomol*, the trade unions and other organizations close to the Communist Party. The Congress elected a bicameral Supreme Soviet from its deputies and Mikhail Gorbachev became the head of the Supreme Soviet. Later, the Congress also elected Gorbachev president of the Soviet Union. In March 1990, the monopoly of the Communist Party was removed by the reformulation of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution.

The first elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialistic Republic (RSFSR), that is, the Russian parliament, were held in June 1990. The Russian Congress consisted of three different 'parts': the democratic intelligentsia, party leaders and old party cadres. There were 1060 deputies, only 85 of whom were members of the CPSU (in contrast to the Soviet Congress with a quota of 750 Communist Party, *Komsomol*, etc. members). In parallel with the first meeting of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the RSFSR, the constitutive meeting of the Russian Communist Party (the RCP) and the XXVIII conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took place. It was at this conference, that Eltsin declared his resignation from the Communist Party. An open conflict between the Union centre and the Russian Republic was to follow. The Russian parliament became the centre of the democratic opposition with Eltsin, who was elected the first president of the RSFSR in June 1991.⁴⁸

Even though it was possible to form and register parties after 1990, parties (excluding the Communist Party) did not participate in the elections for the Congress of Peoples' Deputies or in the presidential elections. These elections gave birth to 'platforms', such as the Democratic Russia movement, which was established in autumn 1990, and to pro- and anti-presidential blocs in 1991. However, *the basic subjects of the political struggle were the institutions of power: the Soviet and Russian state structures, and then the institution of presidential power and the Supreme Soviet. Blocs and movements were only tools in the bipolar struggle between the institutions of the old and new regime. They mobilised people to pressure the power and to participate in the elections. The first factions were formed in the Soviet and Russian parlia-*

47 Ibid., 16–17.

48 See e.g. Aksenov 2001 on the developments of this period.

ments, but the outcome of the political struggle was decided within the institutions of power as argued above. This was a period when institutions appealed directly to the people and acted independently of any party platforms. Political pluralism emerged top-down within the intellectual elite.⁴⁹ The elections “served to polarize politics rather than to bring closure to the struggle between opposing actors in redefining the new rules of the game for the Soviet and Russian regimes”.⁵⁰ It is well known what happened in this struggle for power: the failed coup attempt in August 1991, the banning of KPSS (the CPSU), the signing of the Belovezha agreement and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Eltsin did not arrange any parliamentary elections or a referendum on the new constitution until December 1993. In April 1993, Eltsin did, however, organise a referendum and asked for support for the government’s socio-economic policy and for organizing a new presidential and parliamentary election. In this referendum, Russians expressed their support for Eltsin and his policies.

Before the referendum on 20 March 1993, President Eltsin decreed a special regime by Ukase No. 1400 *On Gradual Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation*. The ukase dissolved the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies and suspended operation of the old constitution. The Congress did not approve this and appointed Aleksandr Rutskoi as the new president. This led to the use of force against the Congress on 3–4 October. Right after this, the ‘Law on Elections’ was published by a ukase of the President, No. 1557 *On the Conditions of the Elections of the Peoples’ deputies of the Russian Federation*. It decreed an electoral system often referred to as a mixed member majoritarian system,⁵¹ which consisted of a party list proportional system on the federal level according to which 225 mandates were to be elected and of a system of simple majority in the 225 single member districts.

By 1993 there were three broad party coalitions: *Demokraticheskaia Rossiia* (Democratic Russia), which could have been called the ‘party of reforms’, *Front natsionalnogo spaseniia* (the National Salvation Front) which worked as the ‘party of restoration of the former order’, and *Grazhdanskii Soiuz* (the Civic Union) as the ‘third force’. *Grazhdanskii Soiuz* represented a ‘different kind of reform’, so it acted between Eltsin and the anti-reformers. What was typical of all the parties of this period was that they appealed to the whole elite and to the whole of society and did not try to raise their own, narrower base of support. Moreover, these parties were not ready for the real democratic elections. New parties were created for the first Duma elections of 1993.⁵²

On 12 December 1993, together with the parliamentary elections⁵³, there was a referendum on the approval of the new constitution of the Russian federation (*Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*). 58.43% of the vote was for the acceptance of the Constitution but this represented

49 Makarenko 2000, 3.

50 McFaul and Petrov 2004, 27.

51 See, for example, McAllister and White 1999, 1.

52 Makarenko 2001, 4. For a more comprehensive description of this period of party formation, see also for example Gordon M. Hahn 1994.

53 Defined also as a ‘founding election’ for Russia’s new political system, see McFaul and Petrov 2004, 37

only 30.7% of the total electorate. The constitution set up a 'super-presidential regime', whereby the President is the head of the state and consequently governs foreign policy, nominates the Prime Minister, forms the presidential administration, submits bills to the State Duma, may veto any bill and may also issue decrees, which have the status of law.⁵⁴ According to the Constitution, the bicameral Federal Assembly (*Federalnoe sobranie*), which consists of the lower chamber the *State Duma (Gosudarstvennaia Duma)* and of the upper chamber the *Federation Council (Sovet Federatsii)*, still wields the main legislative power.

Both Thomas F. Remington and Michael McFaul, American scholars, stress the importance of decisions taken by key actors and constraints on their actions when basic institutions are established.⁵⁵ Remington for example argues that the "mixed electoral system [...] solved a collective –action dilemma for would-be party leaders [...] and allowed them to serve political goals besides those strictly concerned with their influence over national policy. [...] The new electoral and parliamentary arrangements of 1993 traded off institutional solutions to two different dilemmas: Eltsin satisfied his demand for a preponderance of control over policy making, in return for meeting the politicians' need for incentives with which to build the partisan following and compete for elective office."⁵⁶ Thus, many of the decisions were made because the situation required them in order to enable the leaders to maintain power (and carry out the reforms). These decisions created a regime with a strong presidency and a lesser role for the legislative, but also gave a small chance to parties with a partly proportional electoral system (the constitution, decree and then law on elections).⁵⁷ These laws then had a direct impact on party development.⁵⁸

The new electoral law, *The Federal Law on Election of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*, was finally adopted by the Duma on 11 May 1995 and in the form that the Duma had suggested (225 seats from both the party lists and single-member districts), even though the Federation Council had declined it twice. According to Makarenko, the 'second period of the party formation' (1993–2001) was determined by this law on elections.⁵⁹ The parties concentrated on passing the 5% threshold in the party lists, because success in the lists enabled the party to form a Duma faction. This system also created parties, which tried to separate themselves not from the parties in direct opposition but from

54 This is the right, which President Eltsin was compelled to use more often than President Putin as we discussed in the introduction.

55 Remington 1998, 203. McFaul 2000, 19.

56 Remington 1998, 217.

57 McFaul 2000, 19.

58 Ibid., 20.

59 The new law on elections was passed in 2005 (Law on Elections of Deputies to the State Duma – Federal Law of 18 May 2005 No. 51–F3). Beginning with the State Duma elections in December 2007 all 450 Duma members will "be elected on party lists in a single nationwide constituency under proportional representation (Art 3). The threshold to win seats is 7 percent of the total vote, provided that at least two parties win seats and the combined vote of these parties is more than 60 per cent of the total vote. Only political parties registered as such under the parties' law of 11 June 2001 are allowed to put up candidates, although up to 50% of each list can be made up by candidates who are not members of the party concerned. Formation of blocs of parties is no longer allowed. (Art. 7)". (www.russiavotes.org)

the parties near to them.⁶⁰ Richard Sakwa has called this system a 'hybrid electoral system', which has encouraged the development of hybrid political parties: parliamentary parties concerned with winning seats in the Duma and presidential catch-all groupings concerned with maximizing support for potential contenders.⁶¹ The system prevented parties from developing effectively in either direction. It has been claimed that the effect of the electoral law has contradicted the intention of the lawmakers; the proportional system has actually resulted in the predominance of the largest parties, as the majority system has guaranteed the representation of small parties.⁶² That is, larger parties have been able to get their representatives to the State Duma from the federal-level party lists and smaller parties from single-member districts.

Until 2001, there was no functioning law on political parties in Russia, and therefore the law on public associations, passed by the Supreme Soviet in October 1990, was applied to political parties. President Eltsin tried to introduce a law on political parties, prepared by the Ministry of Justice, to the Duma in 1994 but the Duma deputies did not pass it.⁶³ In 2001, President Putin initiated a law on political parties and the Central Electoral Committee prepared the bill. 'Putin's' bill suggested that the parties register their organizing committee in advance. The organizing committee presents the party programme and regulations to the Ministry of Justice. If the Ministry finds any anti-constitutional elements in these, the party will be banned. In addition, the law prohibits the existence of regional parties. Thus, there would be no possibility for parties to exist only at a regional or local level and participate in the regional or local elections. In addition, the bill suggested that the party has to have at least 10,000 members, with at least 100 of them in each federation subject. The parties would get financing from the state according to the election results.⁶⁴ The bill came to the second hearing in the almost original form with some minor adjustments, such as the required number of members of the party in the federation subjects remained 100 in 45 subjects, but decreased in the rest to 50 members.⁶⁵

60 Makarenko 2001, 5.

61 Sakwa 2000, 109.

62 Kagarlitskii 1996, 118. This observation is especially important now when President Putin introduced the bill and the Duma took this bill for the new electoral law based purely on proportional representation. Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia) is the largest party and might benefit even more from this new law.

63 It came to the Duma again in December 1995. This time the Duma passed it, but the Federation council turned it down.

64 Andrusenko, 7 February 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*; Rodin, 22 May 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. Mainly Soiuz Pravykh Sil, Iabloko and Regiony Rossii proposed corrections to the bill, but they were not taken. For example, the law did not comprise the suggestions by the alternative bills to form the government by the party which wins the elections or that the ministers could be Duma deputies.

65 Lysenko 24 May 2001 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*; see also Rodin, 22 May 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

4.2 ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

Russian parties have played a major role in forming the parliamentary elite. Moreover, some of the Duma deputies have later acquired positions in the executive power, even though, in general, the executive power members are not recruited on a party basis. It must be stressed that Russian political parties do not fulfil the functions that parties do in established democracies. First of all, they do not form the basis for competition for the executive power. Secondly, the party membership does not mean access to the executive power positions at the federal nor regional or local level, as mentioned above. There are, of course, some exceptions. For example, the Communist party has actively participated in the presidential and governor elections. Communist governors have also nominated their party members to the government, but not strictly on the party basis.⁶⁶ However, we can say that political parties exist and have some meaning in Russia as long as they structure the vote in the elections.

Russian parties are usually created top-down,⁶⁷ from the leader to the sub-elite, and they do not 'emerge' from civil society⁶⁸. The party leadership tightly controls the formation of programmes and the nomination of leaders. In addition, the parties are free from any responsibility for their programmes and promises, as they cannot fulfil them anyway because they do not participate in the formation of the executive power.⁶⁹ Despite all these shortcomings, Makarenko still argues that *parties do serve as expressers of citizens' interests and as agents to institutionalize citizens' political participation*. Moreover, Andrei Riabov argues that in the 1990s, political parties represented political subcultures (democratic, social traditional (or communist) and nationalist). This was the main reason for the strengthening of the multi-party system, which was also relatively stable during 1993–2003. For example, the same parties were able to win

66 Makarenko 2001. The whole paragraph refers to Makarenko.

67 Makarenko argues that the main features in the party formation have been the inter-party discipline, creation of regional structures and processing the electoral legislation (Makarenko 2001, 7). I.B. Levin argues that the only model of political party has been the CPSU and its cult of organizational work. This has led to this situation, when the party formation has been seen just as creating organizational links, which enable to widen and discipline the 'members' mass'. (Levin 2000, 51.)

68 There is a massive body of literature (see e.g. Evans, Alfred B. Jr, Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh-Sundstrom. 2005. *Russian Civil Society. A Critical Assessment*. M.E.Sharpe.) on whether Russia has civil society and if it does, what kind of civil society it is.

69 Makarenko 2001, 2.

seats from the party lists (KPRF, Iabloko, LDPR⁷⁰, and DVR/SPS⁷¹) in the State Duma elections in 1993, 1995 and 1999.⁷² Hale has also discovered that Russian parties have “established reputations for stands on important issues”⁷³ and in general, “party reputation is an efficient way for politicians to communicate policy stands to citizens”⁷⁴.

There have obviously been many attempts to classify Russian political parties and to define the Russian party system, which emerged after the 1993 parliamentary elections. Authors have paid attention to ideological differences between parties as well as to the (in)stability of the system or the functions that the parties (should) fulfil. If first looking at the ideological dimension, for example, Sarah Oates has coded the party platforms of 1993 and 1995 and found “three possible axes for ideological spectrums for Russian parties: pro-market versus state control of the economy; Slavophile versus those that favoured a broader distribution of rights; and those that favoured warlike policy versus those that sought more peaceful relationships”⁷⁵. According

70 *Liberalno-demokraticeskaja partiia Rossii* LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) was the first party to be established after the dismissal of the monopoly of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1990 (the name was Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union until the collapse of the Soviet Union). The party had approximately 200,000 members in the late 1990s. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has been the leader of the party ever since its foundation. He has been a candidate for president in 1996 and 2000. It has even been argued that “conservative Soviet forces sought to use Zhirinovskiy as agent provocateur with the aim of discrediting the very idea of multiparty democracy” (Hale 2006, 67). There have also been accusations of Zhirinovskiy’s links with the KGB (Hale 2006). In the 2003 election campaign the LDPR agenda argued for creating a police state, to get ex-Soviet republics to ‘pay’ for mistreating ethnic Russians (Ibid., 70). LDPR is the only party in addition to the KPRF which has had representation in all Duma sessions so far.

71 *Soiuz pravyykh sil* (Union of Rightist Forces) was founded in August 1999 as an electoral association for December 1999 Duma elections. This liberal democratic coalition consisted of *Pravoe delo* (Just Cause) led by Boris Nemtsov, *Anatolii Chubais*, *Boris Federov* and *Egor Gaidar*; *Obshchee delo* (Common cause) led by *Irina Khakamada*; *Novaia sila* (New Force) led by *Sergei Kirienko* and *Golos Rossii* (Voice of Russia) led by the governor of Samara Region, *Konstantin Titov*. Liberals had planned this kind of coalition for the whole of 1999 and the original idea was to form a coalition under *Sergei Stepashin* after his dismissal from the prime minister post. There were even some negotiations on *Nash Dom – Rossiia*’s joining (or the governors in the regions who supported *Nash Dom – Rossiia*) in the coalition. However, the governors were not interested in the Duma elections and *Stepashin* joined *Iabloko*’s list, but not the party itself. (*Novoe Vremia* 35/99, 8–9) This coalition became a public political organization in May 2000 and a political party in May 2001. It had a regional organization in 84 federation subjects and some 14 000 members. The leader of the Duma faction was *Boris Nemtsov* (former governor of the *Nizhegorod oblast*, former deputy Prime Minister, former Vice-Speaker of the Duma) and he was also the chair of the federal political committee of the party. Co-leaders of the SPS were *Egor Gaidar*, former Prime Minister, *Irina Khakamada*, Vice-Speaker of the Duma, *Anatolii Chubais*, Minister for the management of state property in 1991, and *Sergei Kirienko*, former deputy Prime Minister and later President’s representative in the *Volga federal okrug*. They labelled themselves ‘liberal democrats’ (*Nemtsov, Novoe Vremia* 23/2001, 12–17). On 18 March 2002 SPS was registered by the Ministry of Justice as a political party. It did not pass the five per cent threshold in the 2003 election.

72 Now when coming to the 21st century, this stability was broken by the marginalisation of the opposition (*Iabloko*, SPS and to certain extent also KPRF).

73 Hale 2006, 92.

74 Ibid., 5.

75 Oates 1998, 76. In 1993 the LDPR scored highest on the pro-Slav index and on the ‘hawk’ index and lowest, together with KPRF, on the pro-market index. *Iabloko*, *Vybor Rossii* and *PRES* scored highest on the pro-market index. In 1995, the KPRF and *KRO* had passed the LDPR on the pro-Slav index, as *Iabloko* was also more pro-Slav than in 1993 and not too far from *Nash Dom – Rossiia*. The LDPR was also more pro-market than in 1993. (Oates 1998, figures on pages 85 and 89). *Remington* argues that the State Duma in 1994–1995 and 1996–1998 could be divided to the left and right and that the position over property relations was the major marker between them (*Remington* 1998, 209).

to this analysis (if focusing on the parties under examination here), KPRF was the most anti-market party and Iabloko and Nash Dom – Rossiia were the most pro-market and less pro-Slav than KPRF, which is, of course, not surprising. For his part, Neil Robinson characterizes the Russian party system until 1998 as very polarized – one divided into anti-system and pro-system parties.⁷⁶ Anti-system parties had two blocs: that of communist successor parties headed by the KPRF and a bloc of nationalist-patriotic forces headed by the LDPR.⁷⁷ The pro-system parties all supported the democratic developments and market economy but were divided by their support or non-support for the government of the day. Therefore, the first bloc, the parties of power, supported and/or had origins in the government.⁷⁸ Robinson also concludes that even though KPRF has done well in the parliamentary elections, it has not been able to translate this into ‘decisive anti-system legislation’. As Robinson argues, for many Russian actors parties are irrelevant – there are other ways of getting access to power.⁷⁹ In the early 1990s when the Russian political system was created, “policy making was dominated by elite groups”, there was no “need to create access to politics via consolidated party development”.⁸⁰ Riabov also stresses the fact that the political elites did not need parties; instead parties were seen as obstacles for serving the interests of the elites. The negative consensus between power and society was characteristic. The institutions controlled by the elites declined from any responsibilities in front of society, but also from interfering in the sphere of private interests. It was fine for the state that its citizens did not pay taxes. As for society, it had for a long time dreamt of state’s decreasing pressure and now received full freedom from any responsibilities in front of the state, and so society agreed not to interfere in the business of the power institutions.⁸¹

In contrast to Riabov’s argument of a relatively stable party system in Russia in the 1990s and Kholodkovskii’s evidence from the 1993 and 1995 elections⁸², Rose, Munro and White argue that Russia has a *floating party system* where the parties competing for popular support change from one election to the next, thus making accountability difficult. Voters can neither

76 Robinson 1998, 161. Robinson compared the Russian system with Sartori’s classification of multi-party systems in Western Europe and concluded that the Russian system does not correspond with any of Sartori’s types of multi-party system. (Korguniuk comes to the same conclusion in 2007, author’s interview). Russian system is characterized by both centrifugal and centripetal drives.

77 Ibid., 161.

78 Ibid., 164.

79 Ibid., 161.

80 Ibid., 173.

81 Riabov 2001, 2.

82 Kholodkovskii argues that from the 1993 to 1995 elections there was a movement towards stability and more party affiliation: in single member districts two thirds of the deputies were independent candidates in the first elections, in 1995 only 78 out of 225 (35%). Three of the parties, which succeeded in getting seats from the party lists, were represented in the first Duma as well (KPRF, LDPR and Iabloko). There were also fewer cases in which the voter would have voted a different party in the lists than in the single member districts. However, this strengthening of the party system and move towards a more Western style political life was crashed by the election campaign of 1999. In 1999, the number of independent deputies increased and the more or less ideological parties were beaten by “administrative nomenclature formations”. They received 37% of votes, when the party incumbents received 45% (if SPS is taken as an incumbent, because DVR is a part of it). Only 166 deputies out of 450 renewed their seat. (Kholodkovskii 2000, 46.)

reaffirm nor withdraw their support from the party they voted for at the previous election as parties disappear and change their names etc.⁸³ The empirical evidence, which the authors display as proving that the Russian system is not stable, is as follows: firstly, parties do not nominate candidates nationwide, in the 1999 election only two of the six parties who won list seats – the Communists and Iabloko – nominated candidates for half the single-member districts.⁸⁴ Secondly, independents were the biggest party representing single member districts in 1999.⁸⁵ Most parties are short-lived⁸⁶ and there is a dual system of representation, while nominally recognized parties necessarily monopolise representation in the list seats, independents predominate in single-member districts.⁸⁷ Thirdly, there is a “big disjunction between electoral parties and Duma parties/factions.” Rose, Munro and White discovered that:

The party affiliation of candidates is often different from the party affiliation that candidates take when they initially enter the Duma, and their party affiliation can change yet again during the life of a Duma. For example, between the election day of 1999 and the first meeting of the Duma on 18 January 2000 a total of 147 Duma seats, one third of the membership, changed hands without a single popular vote cast. Two new parties – People’s Deputies and the Agro-Industrial bloc – were created, and Russia’s Regions, a group consisting mostly of independents in the 1995–1999 Duma, was re-created. There were 88 Duma members elected as independents who joined newly formed Duma parties of convenience or ‘came out’ as supporters of a party winning list seats.⁸⁸

Furthermore, theories on how people choose which party they will vote for, do not seem to be valid in Russia. The socio-economic situation of the voter and the party they vote do not correlate, and thus the theory that social and economic structure will lead to the creation of a stable Russian party system representing stable interests is unlikely.⁸⁹ In addition, the theory according to which people would choose the party they vote according to the values they have adopted does not hold true either; the link between political values and voting for list parties is also restricted.⁹⁰ Rose, Munro and White conclude by saying that the “floating party system of Russia can be interpreted as a failure of political elites to create stable political organizations. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as showing the success of Russian elites in insulating them-

83 Rose, Munro and White 2001, 420.

84 Ibid, 421.

85 Ibid., 422.

86 Ibid. 423.

87 Ibid., 424.

88 Ibid., 425. Especially in the parties of power, many deputies in their factions are not members of the party (like Primakov of the former Otechestvo was the chairman of the faction, but not the member of Otechestvo). Furthermore, in 1993 only 43% of LDPR deputies were members of the party (in contrast to 93% of the KPRF). In addition, many candidates on the list of the party of power have no intention of becoming deputies in the State Duma, even if they win a seat. They have no intention to leave their positions in the executive power.

89 Ibid., 432.

90 Ibid., 433.

selves from accountability to the mass electorate.” This would also support McFaul’s, Riabov’s and Robinson’s argument that it is in the interest of the political elites that political parties in Russia are weak.

If we compare the Russian party system to Western European systems, the Russian system indeed seems to be a floating system. However, if compared to some other post-Soviet systems, it appears to be the most stable one among them. Ishiyama and Kennedy have reached this conclusion when comparing the party systems in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in relation to ‘superpresidentialism’. Against the thesis that the level of party development should be lower in systems with more powerful presidencies, the evidence does not support this contention.⁹¹ As the most superpresidential country (along with Kyrgyzstan), Russia’s indicators showed the highest rates in party development. One of the indicators applied was the continuity of parties. According to the authors, continuous parties are parties which won seats in both elections (1993, 1995) and held enough seats to form a parliamentary faction in the legislative session following both of the first two post-Soviet elections. The three continuous parties in Russia were Iabloko, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party. However, the trend seems to have moved towards non-continuous parties: in 1999, these three gained only 33.8% of the seats.⁹²

In the floating system, we can still recognize some features of continuity and stability up until the 2003 parliamentary elections. That is, two of the parties under examination here, KPRF and Iabloko (and also the party of power as an idea if not the same organization) have managed to get their representatives to the State Duma in each of the first three parliamentary elections (1993, 1995 and 1999). Actually, Henry Hale has argued that by 1999 “Iabloko was on the verge of a breakthrough to becoming one of Russia’s system-defining parties”;⁹³ however, it made some serious mistakes and faced a defeat in the 2003 parliamentary election (due to problems between relying on ideational and administrative capital). In addition, two of the parties, KPRF and Iabloko, have had their candidates both on the party lists and in most of the single member constituencies. Moreover, we can argue that political parties have a connection to society as a whole through political subcultures. What probably has been a growing tendency in the elections is the use of the administrative resources, the manipulation of the elections to a certain extent (media campaigns against those who oppose the ruling power) and the creation of parties (parties of power and spoiler parties) by the power.

91 Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001, 1185.

92 In 2003 there were only two continuous parties: KPRF and LDPR and their share of the vote diminished. Of course, Edinaia Rossiia is an inheritor of Edinstvo and Otechestvo and in that sense a continuous party.

93 Hale 2004, 996.

4.3 RUSSIAN POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Before moving on to an introduction of the parties under examination, let us look at the classification of the Russian opposition as represented by Vladimir Gel'man, Russian scholar from Saint-Petersburg State University, as his classification gives further support for the choice of parties in my study. Gel'man writes that many scholars argue that there is not any systemic or nonsystemic opposition in Russia.⁹⁴ He considers all explanations for why opposition forces had begun to 'die out' as inadequate. Firstly, the analyses have dealt with the supply side, for example, speculations about a coalition of Soiuz Pravykh Sil and Iabloko that never takes place.⁹⁵ Secondly, the explanations concerning the demand side have been based on sociological determinism: either they have explained the non-existence of an opposition by Putin's popularity and the improving economy (the situational explanation)⁹⁶ or have explained that "Russia is incapable of building effective democratic institutions because of a "wrong" (i.e. undemocratic) political culture that combines features of statism and anarchism" (the fundamental explanation).⁹⁷ Yet sociological determinism is neither empirically nor theoretically sound, since:

It implicitly proceeds from the assumption that, given the existence of at least partially free elections, a political regime or at least a party system serves only as a reflection of public preferences. In reality, both political regimes and party systems have their own logic of development that does not depend on mass values and precepts, and as a result, they also process a certain autonomy with respect to the masses.⁹⁸

So Gel'man explains something that is surely true of the Russian situation:

*The actions of politicians and the rules of the game (institutions) that they create define the vector of mass preferences and determine the patterns of development of both the political regime and its characteristic opposition. [...] The masses have only as much political significance as the elites allow.*⁹⁹

Thus, relying on Rokkan (1977) and Sartori (1990), Gelman has noted that the demand not necessarily determines the supply, but rather vice versa. In Russia, political movements and

94 Gel'man 2005, 5.

95 In 2005–2006 the situation has somewhat changed. Iabloko and SPS had a common list to the Moscow City Duma election, their youth organizations were cooperating. White (2007) mentions that one of the reasons, but certainly, not the main reason (managed democracy according to White) to the electoral decline of Iabloko might have been its inability to form a coalition e.g. with SPS.

96 Gel'man refutes this explanation by referring to the situation in France in the mid-1960s.

97 Gel'man 2005, 6.

98 Ibid., 7.

99 Ibid. Italics added.

especially political parties have not emerged bottom-up from civil society, but instead they have to a significant extent been created by politicians in leading positions and other influential political actors – as I pointed out in the previous section by referring to, e.g., Andrei Riabov. However, my own view would not be as pessimistic and deterministic as this as I see that the situation can change, even though Gel'man's statement certainly is correct concerning the past and current situation.

Gel'man classifies opposition forces first according to their goals and secondly according to their means. Thus, when thinking about the goals of the opposition, it can represent either a principled opposition (that is, it can achieve its goals only if it acquires full power and can radically change the regime), a structural opposition (fighting for a change of the regime), a non-structural opposition (willing to change individual aspects of the political course) or semi-opposition (willing to join the government without bringing significant changes not only to the regime but sometimes only to its political course). As to means, the opposition can be disloyal to those in power, and use violence or other illegal means in opposing the regime, or can be semi-loyal or loyal to those in power.

I will not go through the different stages of opposition in the Russian Federation, it is suffice to say here that in the 1990s and very early 2000s the three segments of the Russian opposition were the Communists (KPRF) and the liberals (SPS), defined as a semi-opposition, and the democrats (Iabloko). The communist and democratic opposition are under examination here and Gel'man's analysis of their opposition position is presented below. The situation gradually changed when Putin came to power:

the achievement of a 'forced consensus' created elite integration while diminishing elite differentiation. [...] *The ruling group had established its complete and unconditional dominance.* [...] Oppositional political actors were either being incorporated 'into power' and thus ceasing to be an opposition or thrust to the periphery of the political process.¹⁰⁰

According to Gel'man, the opposition either became part of the power (*vlast*) or it lost its status of anymore being a political actor.

The communists hovered between a principled opposition and a semi-opposition. They moved "zigzag from disloyal opposition" (1991–1992) through an "ambiguous semiloyalty" in the power conflict of 1993 to a loyal opposition during the election and in parliament (even as it retained elements of semi-loyalty at least in rhetoric.)¹⁰¹ As Gel'man argues, "institutional factors affected the political strategy". The party needed to mobilize its activists, so it had to present itself as a real opposition, for example, by denouncing the Belovezha Agreement and by attempting to impeach the president in 1999. "The communists could not win a presiden-

100 Gel'man 2005, 13. Italics added.

101 Referring to Gel'man (2005, 15–17) in the whole passage unless otherwise stated.

tial election because the ruling group reacted strongly and because of their own radicalism". According to Gel'man, in August 1996 the KPRF leaders decided to "grow into power"; they nominated members to government and regional administrations and they were bargaining with the ruling group on a number of current political issues. However, the main goal was to preserve the status quo, that is, to keep Eltsin as the president and his people in the government. March has called KPRF as a 'cosmetic' opposition, a junior partner to power.¹⁰² Gel'man also notes that KPRF's attempt at being a junior partner did not work and they then tried to "resurrect the voice strategy by objecting to a number of government bills". However, the party was punished for its misbehaviour: "In the spring of 2002 the United Russia called for a redistribution of positions in the Duma and succeeded in removing the Communists from their committee chairmanships [...] Some Communist leaders like Gennadii Seleznev who had demonstrated complete loyalty to the ruling group were expelled from the party". Gel'man defines "the crushing defeat of the Communists in 2003–2004" as a "logical outcome of this process". The Communist party was the "main target of the Kremlin" in the 2003 election campaign. After the elections, it continued "its previous strategy of neglect" by reinforcing the status quo. Gel'man sees KPRF's future as very pessimistic: "The party is in essence deprived of the prospects of 'voice.'" It can use an exit strategy and become a "small if not marginal party".¹⁰³ March agrees and says that its decline is irreversible.¹⁰⁴

The democrats, that is, Iabloko, moved from a principled opposition to a semi-opposition. Unlike the liberals, "the democrats declared themselves a principled opposition from the outset, criticizing not only the government's course but also the regime as a whole".¹⁰⁵ During 1993–1995, when the State Duma was fragmented, Iabloko was often able to influence the adoption of laws and present alternatives. If Russia had a parliamentary system, "such a relatively moderate party could have become an attractive partner within a government coalition". However, in Russia's superpresidential system opportunities for coalitions were limited: "The vast ideological distance between the left and right wings meant that an alliance with the Communists could be only a tactical agreement on individual issues, based on negative consensus." In contrast, an "alliance with the ruling group and/or with a semi-opposition carried the risk" that Iabloko might be absorbed by either by the party of power or by SPS. The democrats could remain in the principled opposition only by systematically refusing to "choose between two evils". This resulted in that the party no longer having any effect on the regime's decision-making: "As with Iabloko's other human rights and general democratic initiatives, the point was to attract public attention to the party's position." Iabloko did not encourage its member to join the government, and if they became ministers they had to leave the party. However, this position was a dead-end and therefore, "on the eve of 1999 Duma elections, the party leadership was changed, the party list supplemented with politicians with status and administrative

102 March 2006, 435.

103 In the opinion polls from June 2007, KPRF has a seven per cent support, see www.fom.ru.

104 March 2006, 431.

105 Referring to Gel'man (2005, 21–23) in the whole passage unless otherwise stated.

experience”¹⁰⁶. But this did not help, as during 2000–2001 Iabloko went into crisis: “It was abandoned by several well-known Duma leaders and regional activists, it lost its main sponsors and, after the state-mandated replacement of the NTV leadership in the spring of 2001, it found itself almost completely cut off from national media outlets.”¹⁰⁷ In response, according to Gel’man, Iabloko now wanted to represent itself as loyal to the power and in the Third Duma “it limited itself to criticism of individual aspects of the government’s course, supporting the Kremlin initiatives for the most part and noticeably softening its positions with respect to the president and the regime as a whole”. Yet moving from a principled opposition to semi-opposition was not possible because “first, that niche was already occupied [by SPS]; second, the ruling group needed them even less than it needed the liberals; and third, by that time Iabloko could no longer influence decision making or attract public attention [...] The crisis surrounding Lukos [...] dealt the final blow.” The party’s failure in the 2003 elections proved to be a legitimate consequence of its “change of orientation”. Again Gel’man’s forecast is truly pessimistic, he believes that “the further course of events – the boycott of the 2004 presidential elections, the appointment of several Iabloko members to government posts (Igor Artemev became the head of the Federal Antitrust Service and Vladimir Lukin the parliament’s human rights ombudsman) and the party’s failure in elections of regional legislatures – indicate that Iabloko has probably exhausted its potential. A return of the democrats to the path of principled opposition will probably help preserve the party, but not necessarily as a significant actor in Russian politics”. It remains to be seen whether the 2007 parliamentary elections sink the party for good and whether it can still find a way to the federal political arena.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, Iabloko’s youth organization has recently gained strength and it is not known whether this can serve as a new point of departure for the party itself.¹⁰⁹

106 Gel’man is referring here to Sergei Stepashin and Nikolai Travkin.

107 Also White mentions the lack of resources as one of the reasons for Iabloko’s electoral decline.

108 The support level for Iabloko in the opinion poll of July 2007 is really modest, only three per cent of potential voters would vote for Iabloko, if compared to thirty-four per cent for Edinaia Rossiia. Of course, it must be mentioned that twenty-eight per cent of the potential voters do not yet know which party to vote for. The situation must change when coming closer to the elections, and especially when president Putin announced on 1 October 2007 that he will head the list of Edinaia Rossiia in the election to the State Duma in December 2007.

109 It seems that the revolutions in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia gave rise to the youth movements in Russia, too. Some journalists even talked about a baby-boom in Russian politics and argued that the status of youth organisations has risen strongly: they have been taken to ‘big politics’. The first manifestations of the power of the youth movements were the National-Bolshevik Party of Eduard Limonov and the actions against changing the social security system in the winter/spring of 2005. However, Tatiana Stanovaia from the Centre of Political Technology (*Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii*, Moscow) argues that most of the Russian youth is still apolitical. According to Vladimir Golshev, only 2–5 per cent of the youth are politically active. Stanovaia classifies Russian youth movements according to their attitude towards the power (*vlast*) and their political orientation. Thus, we can divide youth organizations to “Loyal to the Kremlin Patriots” (Rightist Patriots), “In Opposition to the Kremlin Patriots” (Leftist patriots), “Loyal to the Kremlin Liberals” and “In Opposition to the Kremlin Liberals”. The loyalists thus comprise both conservative and ‘patriotic’ movements working in the interests of the power, such as *Molodaia gvardiia* (formerly *Molodezhnoe Edinstvo*), that is, a youth movement very close to Edinaia Rossiia; Nashi of Vladimir Iakemenko, initiated by Vladislav Surkov from the presidential administration. The opposition organizations are either leftist such as *Soiuz Kommunisticheskoi Molodezbi*, and *Avantgard*

4.4 RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES

The first requirement for selecting the parties that I study is that a political party is understood as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office”¹¹⁰ or as any group seeking votes for a labelled candidate(s).¹¹¹ Thus the main criteria are that a group has a label and that it structures the vote. There does not need to be any large group of follower and nor do the parties have to conduct government (as they do not in Russia). So a “party can be said to exist as long as it structures the vote even though it does nothing else”.¹¹² Accordingly, I use a minimal definition of a political party. These groups have been formed as electoral associations or blocs (*predvybornoie obiedinenie*, *predvybornyi blok*) or as political public associations (*politicheskoe obschestvennoe obiedinenie*) or as political parties (*politicheskaiia partiia*). Whether the group is officially an association, bloc or party is not that important as long as it *has participated in the elections and managed to get its candidates to the State Duma*. This definition rules out the parliamentary factions that have not participated in the elections.¹¹³ Independent candidates have formed these factions and they usually have no intention of developing their faction into a party and participating in the elections.¹¹⁴ As stated in the introduction, I focus on parliamentary parties at the federal level and ignore any regional-level party actors.¹¹⁵ As I will explain in the chapter outlining my data and methods, the actors whose arguments I have chosen to study represent the party faction in the State Duma, that is, they are deputies in the State Duma.¹¹⁶ I will, of course, start with the hypothesis that there are many argumentation lines represented within the party, but here I will concentrate on the argumentation offered by the leaders of the party and prominent Duma deputies. In addition, I will balance their arguments with those proposed by the official party programmes and electoral platforms.¹¹⁷

Secondly, as mentioned above, an important criterion is that that the parliamentary parties selected represent three different positions in the State Duma: one should be a representative of a party of power, one of the ‘communist opposition’ and one of the ‘democratic opposition’. Allegedly, the ‘opposition parties’ are political parties which would offer alternative, opposing

Kommunisticheskoi Molodezhi or rightist such as *Oborona* and *DA!* (Demokraticheskaiia alternative, a movement headed by Maria Gaidar, daughter of Egor Gaidar).

110 Sartori 1976, 63.

111 Epstein 1967, 11.

112 Ibid., 77.

113 Here it must be remembered that the study covers the period 1994–2003 when the new electoral law was not applied and that until 2001 there was no law on parties either.

114 For example, *Narodnyi Deputat* (People’s Deputy) in 2000–, *Regiony Rossii* (Russian Regions) in 1996–1999, 2000–. However, now these factions are part of the *Edinaia Rossiia* party. It will not be possible to run as an independent to the State Duma in the 2007 parliamentary elections anymore: therefore, it will not be possible to form deputy groups either. Instead, parties are the sole actors which can form a faction in the State Duma.

115 On Russian political parties on the regional level, see e.g. Derek Hutcheson. 2003.

116 However, if the leader of the party is not a Duma deputy, but a representative of the executive power, his arguments will still will be examined.

117 More on this in Chapter 5.

voices to the president's and government's line. If referring to the studies introduced above and looking at the situation in the 1990s, we can say that there was an anti-system party (the KPRF) and two pro-system parties (the party of power of the day and Iabloko; however, Gel'man argued that Iabloko represented principled opposition and would thus not be classified as a pro-system party), or that there was one anti-market and two pro-market parties. Of course, the situation has changed when coming to the 21st century. For example, Boris Makarenko talks about a 'wide centre' when looking at the State Duma in 2000–2003 compared to the bipolarity of 1996–1999.¹¹⁸ Moreover, if we follow Hale's classification, there is one clientelist party (or actually three parties of power: Nash Dom – Rossiia, Otechestvo and Edinstvo), one programmatic party (KPRF) and one ideational party (Iabloko).¹¹⁹

Thirdly, there is the continuity factor: the 'opposition' parties had to have had representatives in all three Duma sessions which I study (1994–1995, 1996–1999, 2000–2003) in order to have continuity, thus enabling the possibility to search for potential changes in argumentation. The organization and the label of parties of power change from one Duma session to another, but there is continuity in their idea (safeguarding the interests of the executive power in the legislature).

Let us first look at the concept of a 'party of power' and then at the parties under examination.

4.4.1 'Parties of Power'

When studying Russian politics, especially the party system, one of the key concepts is the 'party of power' (*partiiia vlasti*). Understanding the meaning of this concept, which is used both in the media and in academic writings, is essential for understanding Russian politics in general. Even though the concept has been used in referring to parties like the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico or the Indian National Congress in India, the concept in the Russian context has had a somewhat different meaning. I will use the concept 'party of power' mainly in its institutional definition, i.e. it is a political party or movement created by the ruling elite, which plays the role of the main expresser of its interests in the public political arena.¹²⁰ So when this party of power takes the institutional form of a political party, it becomes part of the Russian multi-party system and as such, it (they) will be studied here. There is continuity in the party of power, as the same politicians might move from one party of power to another when the former is dissolved and the latter established. However, the meaning of a party of power can also be understood as a broader, wider concept – as the new political elite in Russia at the federal, regional and local level. The political elite is able to influence the development of

118 Makarenko 2001b.

119 Hale 2006.

120 Riabov 1996, 4, see also Golosov and Likhenstein 2001.

the political process, the preparation and making of the most important decisions, and control the functioning and activities of political parties, movements and electoral blocs regardless of any institutional changes.¹²¹

Golosov and Likhtenshtein have studied the reasons behind the creation of a party of power in Russia.¹²² The first reason is that the ruling elite did not have any party base. The democratic side was fragmented and the elite could not use any inheritor parties either. The elections to the State Duma in 1993 required political organizations which were able to *legitimize the ruling group and strengthen its position by creating a loyal group in the parliament*. In this sense, the party of power can be seen as a strategy of the elite for the adaptation of the elite to the new institutional circumstances. Secondly, Russia's presidential-parliamentary system (or super-presidential as described by many scholars, see above sections) creates additional motives for establishing a pro-presidential majority in the parliament. The distribution of power is not effective and leads to an unstable system: the probability of changing the government is often high and there is a permanent threat of the parliament being dissolved. *To decrease the instability of the presidential parliamentary system* the government agrees to set up presidential control over the parliament by creating a 'party of majority'. This enables the president to affect the decision making process (the bills initiated by the president or the government will then be easily accepted), in order to discipline the parliamentary majority.¹²³ As Knox et al. argue, the party of power or "political formations representing the ruling group [...] has been a consistent feature" in post-Communist Russia and this helped Eltsin to "distance himself from any specific political party, remaining "above politics".¹²⁴

As Golosov and Likhtenstein argue, ideally the party of power should be defined as the party of parliamentary majority which functions as a support for the president in the parliament and in the elections. If the concrete party of power corresponds to the definition above, and is successful in forming a party of the majority in the parliament, this party might also be used in the future to serve this function. Consequently, the benefits of keeping this organization alive will be greater than the costs of creating a new one.¹²⁵ Until 2001 the party of power did not coincide with the *party in power* or the party of the majority in the legislative. *Vybor Rossii* (Russia's Choice) and Nash Dom – Rossiia (NDR, Our Home is Russia) did not have a majority in the State Duma. Many governors did not want to present themselves as

121 Riabov 1996, 4. The new Russian elite of 1990s derived its core from the previous party and economic nomenclature. They managed to change their power status into property rights. The other source of the new elite was the social layer that emerged during the democratisation of the political system and the development of market economy. This part of the elite was incorporated into the first part. In Russia the change of elite was only partly tied to the first relatively free elections in 1989–1991. The insurgency of August 1991 abolished the need to seek for electoral support. The president determined the political and administrative leadership and the new elite did not differ much from the old one, seventy per cent came from the old nomenclature. (Kryshtanovskaia and White 1997 cited in Golosov and Likhtenstein 2001, 9.)

122 Golosov and Likhtenstein 2001, 6.

123 Ibid., 8.

124 Knox et al. 2006, 5.

125 Golosov & Likhtenstein 2001, 12.

NDR candidates, so NDR had very weak candidates. In addition, leaning on the administrative elite damaged the ideological identity of NDR. Edinstvo (Unity) did not get the majority either after the 1999 elections. However, gradually more and more deputies moved over to the Edinstvo faction and finally, when Edinstvo and Otechestvo merged in 2001, the majority was acquired. Now Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia) has an absolute majority in the State Duma: in September 2006 it had 309 seats out of 450. Knox et al. defined the 2003 Duma elections as the “first victory for the ‘party of power system’”.¹²⁶

However, as Golosov and Likhtenstein stress, *the parties of power impede the mass democratic participation and totally different kinds of parties would be needed*. The parties of power, however, seem to belong to the transitional character of Russian statehood. The low level of change of the elites has led to many phenomena, which are not democratic in content, but serve as the authoritarian elites’ way of adapting to the new institutional conditions.¹²⁷ *Therefore, the party of power may also transform into a normal party, which is adapted to democratic society.*¹²⁸ Moreover, Knox et al. argue that “in the post-Soviet Russia the state appears to be using ‘parties of power’ to fill the space normally filled by political parties made up of active agents of civil society” and that parties of power represent “vested bureaucratic or other institutional interests, not the interests of the wider citizenry”.¹²⁹ “Russia’s experience with parties of power suggests that civil society and broad democratic political participation are hindered.”¹³⁰

There are different views on which parties should actually be classified as parties of power. For example, the status of *Vybor Rossii*¹³¹ (or *Democraticheskii Vybor Rossii* DVR [Democratic Choice of Russia]) as a party of power is disputed by Riabov and Korguniuk. Therefore, even though DVR (and PRES, Party of Russian Unity and Concord¹³²) were formed by the ruling elite, the President and Prime Minister refused to associate themselves with these parties. In addition, the federal and regional leaders refused to support DVR and PRES in the Duma elections.¹³³ Iurii Korguniuk argues that DVR was never a marionette of the executive power, even though it had cooperation for a while with the ‘party of power’ (party of power understood as

126 Knox et al. 2006, 7.

127 Golosov and Likhtenstein 2001, 13.

128 Ibid., 14.

129 Knox et al. 2006, 5.

130 Ibid., 12.

131 *Vybor Rossii* (Choice of Russia) was established as an electoral bloc in September 1993. Acting as official founders of the Vybor Rossii movement were: *DemRossiia* (Democratic Russia), *Partiia demokraticheskoi initsiativy* (Party of Democratic Initiative) and *Krestianskaia partiia Rossii* (Peasants’ party). *Democraticheskii Vybor Rossii* (Democratic Choice of Russia) as a party was established in June 1994 by the initiative of the Duma faction. Vybor Rossii as a movement continued to function and it had many disagreements with DVR. The party and faction was headed by Egor Gaidar, Prime Minister from 1991 to 1993. In 1998 DVR was first establishing ‘Pravoe Delo’ and then in 1999 it was one of the founding parties of *Soiuz Pravykh Sil* (SPS).

132 *Partiia Rossiiskogo Edinstva i Soglasii* (PRES, Party of Russian Unity and Accord) was headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai and Aleksandr Shokhin, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for external economic and financial affairs and Konstantin Zatulin, leader of Entrepreneurs for a New Russia. The party was established in October 1993.

133 Riabov 1996.

the elite as such).¹³⁴ In contrast, VR was established based on the democratic movement and the representatives of the local and central administration supported it as individuals.¹³⁵ On this basis, I have chosen to study Nash Dom – Rossiia, Edinstvo and Otechestvo¹³⁶ as parties of power.¹³⁷

4.4.1.1 Nash Dom – Rossiia

According to Vladimir Ryzhkov (leader-to-come of Nash Dom – Rossiia’s parliamentary faction) the reason for the creation of Nash Dom – Rossiia (Our Home is Russia, NDR) was that Vybor Rossii was divided and “there was no organized force to oppose communists. Communists and liberal democrats (*zhirinovtsy*) might divide the parliament up among themselves”¹³⁸. Eltsin announced his plan for the creation of a right-centrist (and a left-centrist party) in April 1995 and immediately that Nash Dom – Rossiia (NDR) was created; the constitutive meeting of the electoral bloc was held on 12 May 1995.¹³⁹ Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was elected as the chair of Nash Dom – Rossiia, and the deputy chairs were Oleg Soskovets (first deputy prime minister of the government) and Konstantin Titov (the governor of Samara oblast). In his address at the constitutive meeting Chernomyrdin said that “Nash Dom – Rossiia is a choice in favour of stability and progress, democracy and patriotism, confidence and order”. The main principles were “dynamic development, security of the citizens and society, and stability”¹⁴⁰. Sergei Beliaev, then leader of the parliamentary faction, defined the status of the party: “We have already been christened as a presidential faction... Of which I and my colleagues are even proud of. To be a presidential faction in the State Duma means to be in charge of the adoption of those laws which will enable Russia to move on the path of reforms, to be professional. And in no situation [should we] play with those forces which are ready to take Russia back, to the Procrustean bed of communist dogmas.”¹⁴¹ Vladimir Ryzhkov

134 Korguniuk, 1999, 225.

135 Ibid., 244.

136 Otechestvo is significant because many of its deputies are now deputies of Edinaia Rossiia or otherwise prominent political figures such as Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow and Primakov, former Foreign and Prime Minister.

137 I abandoned the idea of studying Vybor Rossii because, firstly, it existed for such a short period of time, secondly it split into different factions so early and thirdly because there is so much disagreement on whether it can be called a party of power. Moreover, Nash Dom – Rossiia, a ‘real’ party of power, was already established in May 1995.

138 Ryzhkov, 8 October 1997, *Literaturnaia gazeta*. Ryzhkov argues that three groups “independently of each other wrote to Eltsin and urged for the creation of pro-governmental electoral association. One of the writers was [Sergei] Shahrui, the second Aleksei Golovkov and the third Viacheslav Nikonov. This happened in March 1995.” They all wanted to form an electoral association, of which the leaders would be Chernomyrdin, who would get the centrist votes, Chubais, who would get democratic votes, and Rybkin, who would get the left-centrist votes. (Ryzhkov, 8 October 1997, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.) Ryzhkov says that he himself offered the name Nash Dom – Rossiia. Shahrui’s suggestion was *Otchizna* (ibid.).

139 The following organizations or movements joined Nash Dom – Rossiia: *Soiuz neftegazopromyshlennikov*, *Soiuz zemlevladeltsev*, *Assotsiatsiia investorov i eksporterov Rossii*, *Assotsiatsiia inzhenernogo obrazovaniia Rossii*, *Assotsiatsiia rossiiskikh vuzov* and *Sportivnoe obschestvo Spartak*. Korguniuk 1999, 246, mentions that PRES was also part of NDR for a short while, and so were the deputy groups *Stabilnost* and *Rossiia*.

140 Chernomyrdin quoted in 13 May 1995, 1, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

141 Beliaev, 30 March 1996, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

described Nash Dom – Rossiia as a party which has the idea of “bringing together liberal and patriotic values. What CDU/CSU does [in Germany]. [...] NDR is a project, which tries to glue together two things: liberalism and patriotism. [...] Nash dom – Rossiia – it is patriotic. However, at the same time we are reformers – supporters of the reform.”¹⁴² The programme of NDR in 1995 set the goals of creating a democratic civil society, a strong rule of law social state, and representing the interests of all Russia, all peoples and regions yet strengthening the unity of Russia. Like Iabloko, NDR also argued for strengthening *gosudarstvennost*, democracy and human rights.¹⁴³

The regional network of the electoral bloc was created in less than 20 days, in many regions the ruling elite established its organization and then this served as a basis for NDR’s regional organization. At the time of registration at the Ministry of Justice, NDR had 78 regional organizations.¹⁴⁴ According to the information provided by the party itself and forwarded by a *Nezavisimaia gazeta* journalist, in May 1996, that is, a year after its establishment, NDR had over 10 million members, 85 regional organizations and 600 local or city organizations.¹⁴⁵ This would have made Nash Dom – Rossiia the largest party in Russia. Here we will have to take into account the ‘administrative resources’, that is, if most administrative personal at the federal, regional and local level were made/pursued to join the party. In addition, Iurii Korguniuk, a researcher from the INDEM foundation, mentioned that most of the members in this count were actually members of 32 associations that were collective members in NDR. Korguniuk characterized Nash Dom – Rossiia as the first political association that completely coincided with the concept of the party of power.¹⁴⁶ He defined Nash Dom – Rossiia as a decoration to conceal the political activity of the bureaucracy and executive power.¹⁴⁷ Civil servants and politicians joined Nash Dom – Rossiia merely as a sign of supporting Eltsin. Also, Vladimir Putin, as the first vice-chairman of the government of St. Petersburg, was a member of Nash Dom – Rossiia and so was Sergei Shoigu, the longest standing minister in the government – he has been the minister of emergency situations since 1990.¹⁴⁸ However, Prime Minister Putin has stressed that he was never an active member of NDR. He explained that NDR functioned as the party of power and that governors and their deputies were automatically members of NDR. Putin was the first deputy of the governor and, therefore, he belonged to NDR.¹⁴⁹ In St Petersburg more than 200 delegates confirmed the founding document of the regional organization of NDR. Vladimir Putin, the first deputy mayor, was elected its leader.¹⁵⁰

142 Ryzhkov, 8 October 1997, *Literaturnaia gazeta*. CDU/CSU is usually classified as a conservative party and not a liberal party as Ryzhkov does here.

143 *Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia “Nash Dom – Rossiia”* 1995.

144 National news service www.nns.ru/elects/izbooyed/ndr.html.

145 Nevezhin, 15 May 1996, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 2.

146 Korguniuk 1999, 246.

147 Ibid.

148 Uchreditelnyi sezd dvizheniia “Nash Dom – Rossiia”. 12 May 1995. PartArkhir database. [www document](http://www.document).

149 RosBiznesKolsalting. *Novosti*. 12 August 1999. PartArkhir-database. [www document](http://www.document)

150 Batygin & Shcherbakov, 12 August 1995, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

Due to internal conflicts, the NDR parliamentary faction changed its leader many times: first Sergei Beliaev had to leave in August 1997 due to disagreements with the head of the executive committee of the movement Vladimir Babichev, who also was the Deputy Prime Minister and the leader of the apparatus of the government of Russia. Beliaev was replaced by Aleksandr Shokhin. Later in December 1998 Vladimir Ryzhkov replaced Shokhin.¹⁵¹

Already in the spring of 1997 Nash Dom – Rossiia tried to rebuild its image, for example, by overcoming the image of being a ‘refugee of the government’. It made demands to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin about the cabinet members. In August 1997, the new deputy chair of the NDR faction Aleksandr Shokhin made the pro-governmental line of the party conditional: “We are a pro-governmental party only in that sense, in which the members of the government share our ideology.”¹⁵² In March 1998 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was dismissed from his post, which was a hard blow to the party. After Kirienko’s short post, Eltsin again nominated Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister, but the Duma did not approve this nomination. This harmed the image of the party even more. In September 1998 Nash Dom – Rossiia officially became the opposition, when Aleksandr Shokhin left his post as deputy prime minister in the Cabinet.¹⁵³ Having lost its status as the ‘party of power’, Nash Dom Rossiia failed to pass the 5% threshold in the party lists in the 1999 elections and merged into Edinstvo after the elections.¹⁵⁴ In February 2001 Chernomyrdin announced that Nash Dom – Rossiia would not participate in elections anymore; in the last meeting of NDR the decision on the abolition of NDR was taken. Chernomyrdin said that the NDR leadership had recommended all their members to join Edinstvo.¹⁵⁵

151 See e.g. Korguniuk 1999, 247.

152 Mulin, 18 April 1997, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 1.

153 Sadchikov, 29 September 1998, *Izvestiia*.

154 Vladimir Ryzhkov claims that the NDR was suggested for a key role in the new pro-governmental bloc before the parliamentary elections of 1999 in a meeting, which was attended by Prime Minister Putin, the head of the presidential administration Aleksandr Voloshin, minister Sergei Shoigu, Novgorod governor Mikhail Prusak and Vladimir Ryzhkov. However, the “formula of the alliance was not found”. Furthermore, Nash Dom Rossiia was the party of the old *ârime* minister and Eltsin; Edinstvo was an antagonist of the former political elite. (Ryzhkov 16 April 2000, *Novoe Vremia*, see also www.polit.ru 4 October 1999). Nash Dom – Rossiia and Vpered – Rossiia! formed an electoral bloc for the 1999 election. The first four names on the list were Chernomyrdin, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Dmitrii Aiatskov (governor of Saratov oblast’) and Boris Fedorov.

155 After the elections Sergei Shoigu invited Ryzhkov and Chernomyrdin to join Edinstvo faction and they did so on 17 January 2000. However four months later Ryzhkov claimed that the Edinstvo faction was not at all interested in them, so it was a mistake to join (Ryzhkov 16 April 2000, *Novoe Vremia* & Interfaks 25 February 2001 PartArkhiv database www document).

4.4.1.2 Otechestvo

Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia obshchestvennaia organizatsiia "Otechestvo" (All-Russian political public organization "Fatherland") was established by the mayor of Moscow Iurii Luzhkov in December 1998. He was supported by Sergei Iastrzhembskii, then deputy chair of the Moscow government, Andrei Isaev, leader of the Labour Union (*Soiuz Truda*), and by the Federation of independent trade unions (*Federatsiia nezavisimykh profsoiuzov*) led by Mikhail Shmakov. The NTV (and Media-MOST) TV Centre was also close to the Moscow mayor.¹⁵⁶ Otechestvo had the support of 10 governors and 19 Duma deputies and of the 'Moscow clan' (some industrial and financial groups).¹⁵⁷ Otechestvo and *Vsia Rossiia*¹⁵⁸ formed an electoral bloc (OVR) before the 1999 elections. In October 2001 Otechestvo was transformed into a political party.

First, Evgenii Primakov chaired the OVR faction. However, he did not want to join the party and therefore he resigned from this position.¹⁵⁹ Primakov was re-placed by Viacheslav Volodin. The deputy chairs of the Duma faction were Konstantin Kosachev, Farida Gainullina and Valerii Riazanskii. In July 1999 Otechestvo had 230,000 members and altogether 972,000 members in associations that were its collective members.¹⁶⁰

Otechestvo is classified here as a 'rival' party of power. During the election campaign of 1999 it was in direct opposition to the government headed by Vladimir Putin and competed with Edinstvo, the 'real' party of power. For example, deputy editor of *Novoe Vremia* Tatiana Kamoza called Otechestvo not a 'party of power', but a 'party to seize power'. After this task was completed, the party would be dissolved. Otechestvo was a party which did not have access to the central organs of power. In addition, the regional leaders who created Otechestvo, did not have any shared interests except for their fight against the centre.¹⁶¹ Otechestvo has also been classified as the 'party of donor regions', just as Edinstvo was described as a 'party of recipient regions', regions which were dependent on the federal centre. However, Otechestvo did not actually succeed in seizing power (at least not alone), because it did not manage to convince the electorate and the federal and regional elites that it would become the future party of power.¹⁶² Otechestvo-*Vsia Rossiia* managed to achieve 13,1% of the party list vote in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The main argument of Otechestvo in the 1999 campaign was the critique

156 Orlov, *Novoe Vremia* 29/99, 8–9.

157 Makarenko 2000, 155.

158 *Vsia Rossiia* (All Russia) was established and first led by the president of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev and then by St Petersburg Governor Vladimir Iakovlev. The Agrarian Party split and one part joined the Fatherland–All Russia and the other Aleksandr Podberezkin's Spiritual Heritage. Also *Kongress rossiiskikh obshchin* (Congress of Russian Communities) and *Derzhava* joined this bloc. The other electoral bloc formed by the regional leaders was *Golos Rossii* (Voice of Russia) led by Konstantin Titov, governor of Saratov, but this bloc later joined Otechestvo-*Vsia Rossiia* (Fatherland-All Russia).

159 Volodin, 7 September 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

160 Korguniuk 1999, 364.

161 Kamoza, *Novoe Vremia* 17/18 1999, 9.

162 Makarenko 2000, 156.

of Eltsin and his 'Family'. However, soon after the elections this changed and in 2001/2002 Otechestvo merged with Edinstvo.

4.4.1.3 Edinstvo

Mezhregionalnoe dvizhenie Edinstvo, MeDuEd (Inter-regional movement Unity) was established as an electoral association on 3 October 1999. Formally, it was created by some 'low-status' socio-political associations, for example, *Narodno-patrioticheskaia partiia*, *Rossiiskaia khristiansko-demokraticheskaia partiia* and *Refakh*.¹⁶³ The real instruments in creating Edinstvo were the structures of MČS (the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters), other *silovye organy* (FSB, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, militia, the army structures etc.), and the structures of regional executive power.¹⁶⁴

Edinstvo was led by Minister for Civil Defence, Emergency Situations and Natural Disasters Sergei Shoigu, and the first three names on the party list in the 1999 elections were Shoigu, Aleksandr Karelin (Olympic winner in Greco-Roman wrestling) and Aleksandr Gurov (Major General in the militia). The electoral technique employed by Edinstvo succeeded: it avoided being identified by the party of fading power (Eltsin etc.), this status was given to Nash Dom – Rossiia, or as the party of the Moscow leaders, this status went to Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia.¹⁶⁵ What mainly produced the victory of Edinstvo in 1999 was the strengthened rating of Putin and the 'electoral technologies' employed to make use of this rating. The rating of Putin was a result of the general atmosphere in society: primarily of the entire requirement for stability, predictability of power, and for the strengthening of *silovye* and law enforcing structures. These were the requirements of all the elites (federal, regional, business). In addition, the public also demanded "order" (*poriadok*). The image of Putin represented determination, energy, youth, decency and respectability and the will to make the country flourishing and great. Behind the demand for order and security were two 'Others': the enemy was Chechnia (Chechen terrorists, separatists, bandits), and the other 'Other', not yet an enemy, was the West or the United States in particular. According to some analysts, Edinstvo represented 'pragmatism', the other parties (or Edinstvo as a pseudo party) had an ideology of some kind, but Edinstvo was freed from any kind of ideological tones.¹⁶⁶

163 Refakh was created in 1998 for expressing the interests of Muslims and native small peoples in Russia. It got five representatives to the State Duma from the Edinstvo list in 1999 elections (and one from single member districts). In March 2001 Refakh left Edinstvo and on the basis of it established the Eurasian party of Russia. (Lampsi 28 March 2001 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*). According to Makarkin (2000, 144), these political associations would not have gained more than one per cent of the votes in the elections without the support of the Kremlin.

164 Kholodkovskii 2000, 46–47. A year after the elections Boris Berezovski made a claim that Edinstvo had received funding for its election campaign from some Swiss companies. Liubov Sliska denied this. (*RIA "Novosti"* 16 November 2000) Moreover, Sergei Shoigu denied that Berezovski had anything to do with the creation of Edinstvo (*Interfaks* 30 November 2000).

165 Makarkin 2000, 148.

166 Kholodkovskii 2000, 48–51.

Edinstvo transformed into a political public association in February 2000 and into a political party in June 2000. At the meeting of Edinstvo in February 2000, Prime Minister Putin said that Edinstvo should not become a 'party of civil servants' even though its leaders came from the executive power.¹⁶⁷ In the same meeting Sergei Shoigu argued that Russia needed a proper party of power. In November 2000 the leader of the parliamentary faction, Boris Gryzlov, stated that "We are not a party of power in the sense in which Nash Dom – Rossiia and Demokraticheski Vybor Rossii were. They were organised from above (top down) [...] We are struggling for the title of the ruling party."¹⁶⁸ In the beginning of the electoral period Gryzlov defined the mission of Edinstvo very clearly: "Our Edinstvo faction is pro-governmental. [...] The first of our tasks is to enable constructive work between the Duma and the government."¹⁶⁹

In December 2000 the party had approximately 220,000 members and had regional organizations in all 89 subjects of the federation and more than 2500 local organizations.¹⁷⁰ The leader of the Edinstvo faction was Boris Gryzlov until March 2001 when he was nominated to Minister of the Interior. This was claimed to be a sign of confirmation of the status of the party of power.¹⁷¹ The first deputy chair was Liubov Sliska and the new leader of the faction was Vladimir Pekhtin, Chair of the Duma Committee for Property. In 2003 Gryzlov gave up (or was removed from) his position as Minister of the Interior and he became the leader of Edinaia Rossiia and the Chair of the State Duma.

4.4.1.4 *Edinstvo-Otechestvo* –> *Edinaia Rossiia*

In April 2001 the negotiations on merging Edinstvo and Otechestvo started. Consequently, a coordinative council between the Duma factions of Edinstvo, Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia, *Narodnyi Deputat* (People's Deputy) and *Regiony Rossii* (Russian Regions) was established. In July 2001, a union between Edinstvo and Otechestvo took place. There are different versions of whose idea the establishment of Edinaia Rossiia was – whether it was that of political consultant Gleb Pavlovskii, the deputy head of the presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, the head of the presidential administration until the autumn of 2003 Aleksandr Voloshin, or the future head of the general council of Edinaia Rossiia Aleksandr Bepalov, who is also a member of the Federation Council.¹⁷² On 1 December 2001, the constitutive meeting of the new party Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia) was held and on 18 December it registered as a political party in the Ministry of Justice. The Duma factions of Edinstvo and Otechestvo continued to exist separately but worked closely in the coordinative council.¹⁷³ In December 2001 the new party

167 28 February 2000, *Interfaks*.

168 Gryzlov quoted in 31 November 2000, *Vek*.

169 Gryzlov, quoted in 2 March 2000, *Versty*.

170 21 December 2000, *ITAR-TASS*.

171 Pugachev, 29 March 2001, *vesti.ru*

172 Vinogradov and Sadchikov, 30 July 2002, *Izvestiia*.

173 As Edinstvo and Otechestvo existed as separate parliamentary factions, I will to a great extent deal with their arguments separately.

had 23,000 members.¹⁷⁴ In February 2002, the last meeting of the Otechestvo was held and the final decision on the liquidation of the party was made. It has been claimed that Otechestvo's leaders had no other possibility but to join Edinstvo if they did not want to lose face: a significant part of the regional elite gradually moved to Edinstvo after the elections.¹⁷⁵ In his speech in the last meeting of Otechestvo Iurii Luzhkov stressed the fact that Edinstvo-Otechestvo was a "presidential party, a party, which with President builds a new Russia – flourishing, free and great". It should be able to "express the interests of the majority, and not only to express, but to educate the majority".¹⁷⁶ Edinaia Rossiia should not be called a party of power,¹⁷⁷ like its predecessor Edinstvo, because "it has a negative content. [...] Instead of the "party of power" there should be a ruling party (*praviashchaia partiia*) in Russia, that is, a party, which would get the support of the majority of the voters in the elections and participates in implementation of power through the parliament, formation of the cabinet etc."¹⁷⁸

Boris Makarenko (2002) is doubtful whether Edinaia Rossiia (or any other 'party of power' so far) can be called a party, because it could not survive in the opposition (the power cannot be transferred from the party of power to another party). Its existence depends solely on the relationship with the president. Edinaia Rossiia can only develop into a dominant party (like the Indian National Congress or the Japanese Liberal Democrats). Now, after the 2003 State Duma elections, Edinaia Rossiia has reached the dominant position in the State Duma.

4.4.2 Iabloko

The Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc was established in autumn 1993 by *Tsentr ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh issledovanii* (EPItsentr, the Centre for Economic and Political Research) headed by Grigory Iavlinskii¹⁷⁹ and members of the *Institut gumanitarno-politicheskikh issledovanii* (IGRI, the Institute of Humanitarian Political Research) headed by Viacheslav Igrunov. In addition, foreign policy specialists like Vladimir Lukin were among the founders of this bloc. One of the founding members of the Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, Iurii Boldyrev, former inspector of the Russian Federation in *Glavnoe kontrolnoe upravlenie*, broke away from Iabloko

174 In 2003 they claimed to have 257,000 members (see White 2006 quoting *Nezavisimaia gazeta* 13 January 2003). In 2007 the web site of Edinaia Rossiia claims that the party has 1,490,000 members, www document.

175 Kamyshov, 22 May 2001, *Kommersant-Vlast*.

176 Luzhkov, 9 February 2002, party document.

177 On the list of Edinaia Rossiia for the State Duma elections there were 29 leaders of the regions and three federal ministers. A writer in the nationalist journal *Zavtra* asks what is then the 'party of power' if not this one. In addition, with the help of Edinaia Rossiia governors Valentina Matvienko (Saint Petersburg) and Viktor Kress (Tomskaia oblast) got to power. (Savin, 26 November 2003, *Zavtra*).

178 Luzhkov 1 December 2001, *Trud*.

179 In the early 1990s Iavlinskii was known for the '400 Days of Reliance' programme, which was a plan to reform Soviet economy. Iavlinskii has twice been a presidential candidate. He was elected the chair of the Russian Democratic Party Iabloko in the 10th meeting of the Association/Party until 31 December 2004. There were no other candidates, but 6,53 % voted against him (Iabloko press reliz 23 December 2001, www document).

before the 1995 elections. In addition to these prominent figures, three parties participated in the creation of the electoral association: *Respublikanskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (RPRF, Republican Party of the Russian Federation)¹⁸⁰, *Sotsial-demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (SDPR, Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation) and *Rossiiskii Khristiansko-demokraticheskii Soiuz – Novaia Demokratiia* (RHDS-ND, Russian Christian Democratic Union – New Democracy).¹⁸¹ On 11 November 1993 Iabloko became a registered electoral association. One and a half years later, on 5 January 1995, the Iabloko Association (*Obshchestvennoe obedinenie 'Iabloko'* until 1998, when the word 'political' *politicheskoe* was added to the name) was established and it was registered in December of the same year. Already in 1996 the goal was to transform the association into a political party, but this was not achieved until 22 December 2001 in the 10th meeting of the association/party, when Iabloko officially became the Democratic Party of Russia, 'Iabloko' (*Demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii Iabloko*). Iabloko had also been registered according to the requirements of the new law on political parties (2001) on 25 April 2002. The name was changed to United Democratic Party of Russia Iabloko in 2006.

Iabloko started to build its regional network during 1994–1995. In May 2001, it had 58 regional and 18 local organizations (and in 1998, it had 69 regional and 12 local organizations). In 2002 Iabloko had 14,000 members (after the 10th meeting and after the transformation from an association to a party) in 80 federation subjects. It had 69 regional organizations, 56 of which had more than 100 members, and in addition there were five local organizations.¹⁸² In 2003 Iabloko's history writer Oleg Manikhin claimed that the party had 20,000 members and 74 regional or local organizations.¹⁸³

Grigorii Iavlinskii leads the Iabloko Party and has previously led the Duma faction. The deputy chair of Iabloko had been Vladimir Lukin since the first meeting of the association in 1995. He was the chair of the Duma Commission for International Affairs during the first two Duma sessions. In the third session he was elected Deputy Speaker of the Duma. The second deputy chair of Iabloko association was first Iurii Boldyrev (in 1995), then Sergei Ivanenko (on the work of the Duma faction) and Viacheslav Igrunov (on party construction); since 1999 it has been Sergei Ivanenko, Sergei Mitrokhin, Igor Artemev and Aleksei Arbatov. Deputy chairs of the Iabloko faction were Sergei Ivanenko, Valerii Ostanin and Igor Artemev. One of the most well-known members of Iabloko, Mikhail Zadornov joined the government as Minister of Finance in November 1997 and then was briefly the first deputy prime minister, after which he was a representative of the president on international financial organizations. In 1999 he re-joined the Iabloko Association and was a deputy in the Iabloko faction in the third Duma. He was elected in the 2003 elections from a single member district. Moreover, Oksana Dmitrienko

180 In summer 1994 this party split into two groups: RPRF headed by V. Lysenko left the Iabloko parliamentary faction, but *Demokraticheskaia alternativa* stayed with Iabloko.

181 For information on these parties see the history of Iabloko: Manikhin, Oleg, 2003, 11.

182 *Rossiiskaia demokraticheskaia partiia Iabloko* 2002, 2.

183 Manikhin 2003, 78–79.

made a short appearance in the government (May–August 1998) as a minister of Labour and Social Affairs.

In 2001, Viacheslav Igrunov, the key author of the Iabloko ideology, left the party but stayed in the Iabloko faction. As Igrunov argued in an interview concerning his resignation from the party, there were and had been serious conflicts in Iabloko between Iavlinskii and other leaders. They disagreed, for example, on ideology and the procedures; with which factions or parties to cooperate; what kind of issues to raise and advocate in the election campaign and on participation in the government. Igrunov stated that others would have taken Iabloko to government and would have presented Iabloko as a ‘party of *gosudarstvenniki* and patriots’ in 1999. Most of the party members supported Igrunov’s policy but there could not be Iabloko without Iavlinskii, for Iavlinskii also had all the financial resources.¹⁸⁴ In February 2001, Elena Mizulina also left the Iabloko party. She said that the reason for her departure was the disagreement with Iavlinskii, who did not agree to Mizulina’s idea of self-dissolution of Iabloko and creation of an organization uniting all democratic forces – including SPS and Iabloko.¹⁸⁵ The party branch in Iaroslav had suggested unification of the party with SPS, whereas some others had demanded the ending of cooperation with SPS. Iavlinskii himself would have rather seen a coalition of two strong parties.¹⁸⁶

Iabloko was founded as a party of alternative strategy, of other reforms, that is, arguing for reforming Russian political system and economy, but not by using the strategy of Eltsin and Gaidar.¹⁸⁷ Iabloko claims to be a liberal and social democratic party.¹⁸⁸ It argues for less state control in economy but also social responsibility of the state over its citizens (free education and health care and other social benefits must be provided by the state). Moreover, it is worried about the state of human rights and ecology in Russia.¹⁸⁹ Iavlinskii claims that Iabloko is a ‘systemic opposition’: disagreeing on how the elections are organised, the position of the mass media, reform of the army, oligarchic system.¹⁹⁰ The main problem in Russia is the strengthening tendency to build an imitation of democracy, the core of which lies in the bureaucratic authoritarianism.¹⁹¹

184 Igrunov 2001, 14. However, Manikhin (2003, 73) claims that Igrunov resigned due to disagreements between him and Sergei Ivanenko. Ivanenko stressed parliamentary faction’s leading role as Igrunov insisted on building a strong party structure on the local level, based on party discipline.

185 Iabloko Press reliz 27 February 2001 www document.

186 Iavlinskii, 14 December 2000, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

187 See Manikhin 2003, 10, and e.g. Iabloko’s programme *Reformy dlia bolsinstva*. 1995.

188 See e.g. Manikhin 2003, 48. Also Korguniuk (1999, 229) defines the party as a representative of social liberalism.

189 See e.g. Deklaratsiia 1995 or Politicheskaia programme in *Reformy dlia bolsinstva* 1995. Main directions of the work in the third Duma (1999–) had to do, firstly, with the economic legislation (it has prepared an alternative budget since 1994 and Iavlinskii claims that the government used this alternative budget in 2001 when the price of oil decreased. Since 1994 Iabloko has demanded a reduction in income tax to ten per cent) and secondly military reform (e.g. arguing for a professional army). The government signed the Agreement on the allocation of production. It means that production is dealt with in three parts – the state, region and investor – according to an agreement made between these parties. Iabloko had been preparing this legislation since 1994.

190 Iavlinskii, 27 December 2001, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

191 Iavlinskii, 20 June 2001, *Moskovskie Novosti*. This is exactly what Lilia Shevtsova from the Carnegie Centre argues.

Since 1999, it has been crucial for Iabloko to differentiate itself from Soiuz Pravykh Sil (SPS).¹⁹² However, there was a lot of discussion on the unification of these two parties, at least by the media.¹⁹³ Sergei Mitrokhin, Iabloko party secretary on ideology, described the differences between parties by starting from a definition of parliamentary parties in Russia. He stated that the traditional labels of parties on the ‘right’ and on the ‘left’ were not appropriate in Russia. For example, communists were actually supporting the Great Power (*velikaia derzhava*) idea, as SPS was ‘internationalist’. Consequently, the differences between parties could be found in their position towards the contemporary political regime in Russia: parliamentary parties could be divided into *communists*, *bureaucrats* and *democrats*. Communists advocate a different (undemocratic) structure of society. Bureaucrats (Edinstvo and people close to Edinstvo) are *a priori* dependent upon the power (bureaucratic) structures. Bureaucrats did not oppose the democratic basis, but they wanted to ‘correct’ democracy so that while its façade would be preserved, it would be transformed into a centralized bureaucratic system (managed democracy, *upravliaemaia demokratiia*). Democratic parties were represented by SPS and Iabloko. They both respected individual freedom, private property and the market economy. The difference between these parties was that SPS argued that these goals had already been reached in Russian society during the previous ten years. However, Iabloko did not agree. SPS was orientated towards the orthodox liberalism of the 19th century – denying any interference of the state in the economy and not having among its goals a social state (the American model). Iabloko was orientated to the ‘renewed liberalism’ of the 21st century – acknowledging responsibility of the state for the creation of a ‘society of equal opportunities’ (the European model). Accordingly, these parties had a different kind of electorate (those who had gained from the reforms, ‘big

192 EPItsentr, 2001.

193 Iurii Shein, press secretary of Iabloko, denied that Iabloko would have had any such intentions (May 2002, author’s interview). However, a month after the interview of Shein on 5 July 2002 Iabloko and SPS announced that two parties had agreed on “mutual support of sole agreed candidates in the single member districts in the State Duma elections [...]” and “carry out consultations on preparing one common democratic platform in the presidential elections” (Zaiavlenie Obedinennogo Politicheskogo Soveta Politicheskikh partii “Soiuz Pravykh Sil” i “IABLOKO” Gorod Moskva 5 Iulia 2002 www document) Commenting on this Irina Khakamada informed that two parties had already agreed on candidates in 40–45 single member districts and that they are negotiating on having one candidate in the presidential elections. SPS was more in favour of having one candidate, as Iabloko wanted to discuss the platform first. The initial goal was, however, unification of SPS and Iabloko, to have one list in the parliamentary elections. This goal was not reached. (Briefing sopedsedatelya partii “Soiuz pravykh sil” Iriny Khakamady i pervogo zamestitelya predsdatelya Rossiiskoi demokraticeskoi partii “IABLOKO” Vladimira Lukina po okontsanii zasedanii Obedinennogo Politicheskogo soveta partii SPS i “IABLOKO”. Moskva 5 iulia 2002. www document) After the announcement and meeting, there was immediately disagreement between two parties on what had actually been agreed on. SPS stressed the agreement on having one candidate in the presidential elections in 2004, as Iabloko wanted to concentrate on working one platform for the elections (Chernov, 6 July 2002, *Vremia MN*; see also Rodin, 8 July 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*). In January 2003, in a letter addressed to Boris Nemtsov and Irina Khakamada Grigorii Iavlinskii and Sergei Ivanenko announced that there would not be a Iabloko and SPS bloc in the Duma elections, but suggested, for example, agreeing on candidates in single member districts. As we know now, neither of the parties was able to pass the 5% threshold in the party lists in the State Duma elections of 2003.

business' voted for SPS; in contrast, those who had not gained from the reforms and 'small business' voted for Iabloko).¹⁹⁴

In addition, to Iabloko's own failings (no coalitions, satisfaction with the limited electorate or elitism), David White blames the system of managed democracy (marginalization of programmatic opposition, no access to the media and decreasing resources) for why Iabloko did not get any representation from the party list to the State Duma in the December 2003 elections.¹⁹⁵

4.4.3 Kommunisticheskaia Partia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (KPRF)

The origins of the current communist party, established as Kommunisticheskaia Partia Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki (the Communist party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, CP RSFSR) in June 1990, lie with the conservative communist opposition to the Gorbachev reforms and the creation of this communist party in 1990.¹⁹⁶ Kara-Murza argues that the Communist Party is a continuous organization as it represents the largest fragment of the former absolute 'party of power'.¹⁹⁷ The members of the Communist Party still feel that they are 'the power' – 'true power' – where the country is currently under the 'false, unjust power' – under a 'temporary occupation regime'. This is the connection of the 'leftist' communists to national-patriotic rhetoric (which will be discussed in the next chapter); both represent 'true Russia'. Therefore, the Communist Party cannot be classified as either 'leftist' or 'rightist', the Communists represent either the whole of Russia or are against 'non-Russia', an 'anti-Russia', which has temporarily captured power over the body of Russia but not over its soul.¹⁹⁸

One of the founders of the party, General Valentin Varennikov, was one of the leaders of the August 1991 coup and Ziuganov was an author of the manifesto of the putschists.¹⁹⁹ In November 1991 Eltsin banned the Communist Party and all the party structures were dissolved. However, after a court decision at the end of 1992, which argued that the "ban on party's higher organs had been legal, but not the dissolution of the party's lower bodies",²⁰⁰ the organizational committee of the party was re-arranged.²⁰¹ The initiative committee (the founding committee) gathered on 14 November 1992. The party congress, or the Second Extraordi-

194 Mitrokhin, 23 June 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. See also Manikhin 2003, 68–74 and 123–141.

195 White 2007, 209–211.

196 Ishiyama 1996, 149; also Sakwa 1998, 131.

197 Kara-Murza defines the party of power as the ruling elite as such.

198 Kara-Murza 1998, 13.

199 Sakwa 1998, 130.

200 Ibid.

201 The former Communist Party fragmented before the removal of the ban: Russian Communist Workers Party by Viktor Anpilov in November 1991, All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in November 1991, Socialist Party of Labour led by Anatoli Denisov and Roy Medvedev (Ishiyama 1996, 149–150).

nary Revival-Unification Congress, took place on 13–14 February 1993 and made the decision on founding *Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (KPRF, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation). It declared itself the inheritor of the Communist Party of the Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of Russia and its property.²⁰²

The party was registered by the Ministry of Justice on 24 March 1993. The party congress on 13–14 February 1993 nominated Gennadii Ziuganov²⁰³ as the Chair of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, the governing organ of the party. Ziuganov has been the leader of the party ever since. As March states, Ziuganov was “re-elected almost unanimously at every party congress despite electoral defeats in 1996 and 2000” and despite all the criticism towards him within the party.²⁰⁴ His deputies were first Valentin Kuptsov, Svetlana Goriacheva, Mikhail Lapshin, Ivan Rybkin and Viktor Zorkaltsev and later Kuptsov and Shabanov, the latter was then replaced by Ivan Melnikov.²⁰⁵ Gennadii Seleznev, a secretary of the KPRF Central Committee until May 1996, was the State Duma Chair from 1996 until 2002. However, in the summer of 2002, he broke up with the party and he and two other prominent members were discharged from the party. Seleznev created a new party *Vozrozhdenie Rossii* (Re-Birth of Russia) in November 2002.

The Communist Party has been referred to as the ‘only genuine political party’ in Russia with a mass membership, regional representation and programmatic structure.²⁰⁶ The Communist Party was the largest party in Russia in the 1990s; it had more than half a million members (according to the leadership of the party there were 570,000 members in March 1996).²⁰⁷ Its regional organization also covers the whole federation.²⁰⁸ It had the ‘most developed nationwide party structure’ before Edinaia Rossiia had built its own structure.²⁰⁹ However, the KPRF “derived its organizational strength mainly from its Soviet-era organizational blueprint, rather than its adaptation to post-Soviet political conditions”.²¹⁰ So a successor party such as KPRF had the advantage of having a clear collective identity and organizational skills inherited from the Soviet period.²¹¹

202 See e.g. Korguniuk 1999, 177.

203 He also participated in the National patriotic front, which became the National Salvation Front, *Front natsionalnogo spaseniia*. Ziuganov has been a candidate in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000. In 1996 he received more than 30% of the vote during the first round and about 40% in the second round. In 2000 he received approximately 30% of the vote

204 March 2002, 148.

205 Korguniuk 1999, 181.

206 Sakwa 2000, 109.

207 However, out of half a million membership only 20 000 were not ex-CPSU members in 1994 and only 70 000 still in 1998. (March 2002, 141). In 2003 the claimed membership was 500,000, *Nezavisimaia gazeta* 13 January 2003 in *White* 2006. In 2006 March (2006, 437) finds that the party membership has gone down to 180,000 or even to 85,000.

208 According to March (2002, 136) KPRF has local structure in 88 federal units, because St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast organizations have been amalgamated.

209 March 2006, 433.

210 March 2002, 131.

211 *Ibid.*, 133.

It has been argued that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union comprised four different parties, one of which was the ‘patriotic party’, the party of the Empire, which offered a spiritual alternative to the West. According to the ‘members’ of the patriotic party, including Gennadii Ziuganov, Marxist internationalism was a product of the West.²¹² There has actually been a lot of discussion on whether the KPRF, headed by Ziuganov, can be labelled a communist party at all. For example, Richard Sakwa has argued that in the 1990s the CPRF was the “largest of the successor organizations to the CPSU and one of the leading *conservative* parties”.²¹³ Be it a conservative or a communist party, what is certain is that KPRF is not a homogenous entity, but instead, comprises various ‘parties’ within. For example, according to Urban’s classification, in the 1990s there were three different lines within the party: the Marxist-Leninist revivalists, the Marxist reformers and the left-wing nationalists.²¹⁴ The Marxist-Leninist revivalists, including Lukianov, probably corresponded most closely to the views of the rank-and-file membership. Marxists reformers, such as Kuptsov, advocated a modernized communism and intra-party democracy and wanted to “recover a purer socialist tradition, condemning the centralised party-state of the Soviet years”.²¹⁵ The leader of the party represented the third line, that of the left-wing nationalists, or national communists or, as Richard Sakwa has labelled them, *statist-patriotic communists*.²¹⁶ They are statist (*gosudarstvenniki*) because “their allegiance is more to the Russian state than to the ethnically defined Russian people (Rossifiers rather than Russifiers). They are patriotic rather than nationalist because of a residual commitment to supra-ethnic internationalist principles and a belief in Russia as a multinational state with equal rights to all.”²¹⁷

Shenfield instead refers to a classification made by researchers from the Panorama Centre (1997), according to which the Communist Party could be divided into “Ziuganov’s inner cabinet”; a group of pragmatist central and regional party officials with good connections with commercial structures and the state apparatus, like Kuptsov; a group of Duma deputies (half of them) who by and large support Ziuganov but want the party to take a stronger line against the executive branch; a group of radical Russian nationalists, such as Makashov; and a group of relatively orthodox Marxist-Leninists, such as Avaliani, Astrakhankina and Kosolapov.²¹⁸

As for the current situation March argues that until December 2003 KPRF dominated the Russian left but now the decline of the KPRF is irreversible.²¹⁹ However, there would be “opportunities for a revived non-communist left”,²²⁰ because there is a strong basis for left

212 See Ianov, 5 March 1996, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

213 Sakwa 1998, 128. Ishiyama labels KPRF as a conservative party, too.

214 Urban in Sakwa 1998, 138.

215 Sakwa 1998, 139.

216 Ibid.

217 Ibid. Also Shenfield (2001, 52) defines the Communists as representatives of state nationalism.

218 Shenfield 2001, 56–57.

219 March 2006, 431.

220 Ibid.

politics in Russia.²²¹ Iurii Korguniuk, however, does not believe in the demise of the KPRF – it is the number two party in Russia.²²² KPRF has now faced the challenge of a ‘patriotic’ president,²²³ who actually uses many of the themes previously advocated by KPRF. Actually Ziuganov can be defined as a “successful propagandist: his favourite themes have moved to the mainstream into the crisis of liberalism in the 1990s”. What Putin and Ziuganov share is respect for historical traditions, ending revolutionary radicalism and safeguarding a strong integrated statehood. Putin’s patriotism includes post-Soviet and neo-Soviet elements, such as Soviet era symbols. Also, Prokhanov (chief editor of *Zavtra*) and Aleksandr Dugin have become more established figures.²²⁴ The party platform has moved leftwards in 2003–2004, but in practise, KPRF has been ineffective in its aim of becoming the workers’ vanguard – its emphasis is still on state patriotism.²²⁵

221 Ibid. 432.

222 Korguniuk 2007, author’s interview.

223 March 2006, 436.

224 Ibid., 448.

225 Ibid., 446. Riabov (2007, author’s interview) argues that KPRF has an agreement with Putin that it will not raise social problems in its agenda but leaves these problems to be dealt with by *Edinaia Rossiia* and instead focuses just on anti-Americanism, anti-globalisation, anti-imperialism etc.

5 Data and Methods

In this Chapter I will first introduce the primary data which I have collected for my rhetorical and narrative analysis of the arguments on Chechnia and on NATO. I present the reasons why I have chosen newspaper articles and party programmes as my primary data and explain some difficulties that I have encountered in the data collection. I will then proceed to explain the approach used to analyse the arguments. Firstly I look at the arguments from a critical geopolitics point of view, that is, I present a geopolitical narrative which found from each party under analysis. Secondly, I look at the structure (and content) of the arguments and what this reveals of each politician's argumentation on the two cases mentioned above.

5.1 NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND PARTY PROGRAMMES AS PRIMARY DATA

Let us first look at why I have come to use Russian newspaper and journal articles written by politicians of the parties under examination – their interviews published in newspapers, and party programmes and election platforms – as my primary data. My research questions and methodological approach have led the way to the chosen primary data. In addition, I have had to take into account research economy. As my purpose is to study the public arguments of the parties of power and the communist and democratic opposition, and to concentrate on two 'cases' – one on 'internal' geopolitics (Russia-Chechnia relations) and the other on 'external' geopolitics (Russia-NATO relations) – my goal has been to find texts in which the politicians of these parties have publicly written or spoken on Chechnia or NATO. I study the arguments of those parties that got their deputies into the State Duma in the December 1995 (Nash Dom – Rossiia, Iabloko, KPRF) and December 1999 elections (Edinstvo, Otechestvo, Iabloko, KPRF). I look more closely at two Duma sessions, 1996–1999 and 2000–2003, except for the democratic (Iabloko) and communist (KPRF) opposition, for whom I have primary data beginning from autumn 1994 – from the beginning of the first war in Chechnia (or the period exactly before that) until the end of 2003. The first party of power, Nash Dom – Rossiia, was created in the spring of 1995 and therefore I have data on that party and its politicians from this date. As for Otechestvo and Edinstvo, they were formed in 1998 and 1999 correspondingly.

I am interested in arguments made in public because in studying argumentation and rhetoric, my assumption is that arguments made in public contribute to (geopolitical) discourses

in Russia, have an impact, or reflect wider discourses. They can have an effect on the public opinion or the elite discourse, which in its turn can have an impact on Russian policies. I am interested in the argumentation that these politicians use in front of a Russian audience, both the general public, fellow politicians and the Russian leadership in the executive power. I am not dealing here with *zakulisnye diskussii*, behind the scene discussions, but in arguments that are used in front of the electorate, in arguments to which, at least in principle, all Russians would have access to. Furthermore, I am also interested in continuity and change within the period of (1994)1995–2003, thus data from this whole period is required. For these reasons, I have chosen to use *naturally occurring data* as my primary data. This means that the data is not made specifically for research purposes but exists independently of the researcher. Therefore, the researcher has not had any possibility to influence the data in *collecting* it, unlike in interviews if the researcher is the interviewer and where the interviewer and the interviewee work in interaction and both produce the data. Moreover, interviews are not really suitable, since I am studying a certain period of time and am interested in the argumentation of that period, not in what politicians would say about that period in retrospect.

5.1.1 What naturally occurring data is available?

If we think about texts that politicians and their parties produce in public, we can at least list several sources. Firstly, there is all the material produced by the State Duma, that is, public discussions and speeches, statements by deputies or their factions, bills proposed by factions, etc. Secondly, there is data produced for or by the media: press releases, articles and newspapers. Thirdly, there is the material published by the party, such as the different statements of the party, party programmes, platforms, and websites. Fourthly, there are books authored by politicians. I have chosen to concentrate on two bodies of primary data; first, newspaper and journal articles and interviews, and second, party programmes or other relevant documents produced by the party. I have ruled out other possible data in order to have a balance between the different parties and politicians in the primary data; to get more comprehensive argumentation and due to research economy.¹

¹ I excluded the data produced in the State Duma for two reasons; first of all, the wide audience does not follow discussions in the Duma and the most important discussions are reported by the newspapers, radio and TV (of course, here the media already makes their choice on what to report). In addition, one has to take into account research economy, that is, getting the transcripts of discussions in the State Duma could have been difficult (some of them are nowadays available on the internet but not for the whole period of study) and it would have taken a massive amount of time to go through all the discussions on Chechnia and on NATO. Secondly, I ruled out the books written by the politicians, because political party leaders such as Gennadii Ziuganov (KPRF), Aleksei Arbatov (Iabloko) and Vladimir Lukin (Iabloko) have written books on foreign or security policy explaining Russia's place in the world, Russia's identity etc., but the representatives of the parties of power have not produced any books of this kind, so this would create certain unbalance in the data. Thirdly, I decided to rule out TV interviews from my data even though the television is the medium that reaches the largest part of the Russian population. This is made based on two reasons: first, the interviews shown on TV are usually only fractions of larger interviews and lasting just for some seconds (for example, in the news and documentaries). There

Why have I chosen newspaper articles as my data? Using newspapers gives me at least the possibility to search for ‘real discussion’ – texts with arguments and not just two sentence statements (see below on Toulmin’s definition of an argument). In a newspaper article or interview a politician has the possibility to evolve his/her argument and to offer evidence, claims, counterarguments, etc. Furthermore, when using newspaper articles and interviews it is possible to examine the argumentation for a certain period of time and continuity and change in the argumentation. Moreover, if compared to the TV as a medium, newspapers and internet sites can more freely also publish alternative positions. This holds true especially now when state has strengthened its hold on the TV channels. Why have I not used Internet on-line media (other than Internet versions of paper publications)? I made some ‘tests’ of the following internet services: <Gazeta.ru>, <Lenta.ru>, <Polit.ru> and <Vesti.ru>, but noticed that they offer mostly news and commentaries.² Furthermore, concerning the use of Internet sources, even though the number of those using the Internet is growing all the time, especially among the young people and people living in the biggest cities,³ the size of the Internet using population is still low if compared to Western Europe or the United States. In 2004 18 per cent of Moscovites had access to the Internet,⁴ and 10 per cent of the whole population;⁵ the number is growing yet is dependent on age, income, education and professional status.⁶

From newspaper and journal articles I use mainly the articles which have been written by a member of the parliamentary faction or party concerned, or the articles in which they have been interviewed. I have avoided using news, commentaries or other secondary material

are of course ‘talk shows’ and in-depth interviews as well, but the second reason for not using TV interviews is the difficulty in getting transcripts of these interviews (or tapes) from such a long period of time if I could not have said exactly which specific interviews I was interested in. This holds true concerning radio interviews, too (excluding Ekho Moskvy and Golos Rossii, which I have used; transcripts of their interviews are available either from the internet or the Integrum database). Excluding TV interviews from my data does not mean that I do not realize that TV has the central role in the Russian media system and that newspapers have an increasingly weaker position. (See Vartanova 2002, 24 and Pietiläinen 2002, 148.) National newspapers are still quite widely read, especially in big cities. The audience for print media was 80 per cent of the population in 1999, of TV it was 95 per cent (Vartanova 2002, 25). The overall audience of the *national* press is approximately 20 per cent (Ibid.). Moreover, we must remember that only 11 per cent define national newspapers as reliable; however, as Vartanova states “although the role of the Moscow political dailies has declined, their presence in regional geographical markets is still visible. Often they fulfil an agenda-setting function for the local press and considerably influence the public opinion of regional decision makers and journalists”. (Ibid., 29.)

2 <Gazeta.ru> only has the archive from 2001 and between 2001–2003 I could only find two interviews of the politicians under examination: one of Sergei Shoigu and the other one of Grigorii Iavlinskii. <Lenta.ru> does not comprise interviews or speeches of politicians. <Polit.ru> has the archives from 1998, that is, from the year when the site was set up. There could be some relevant material under the section *Publichnie leksii* (Public lectures), but this section has only materials starting from 2003. When testing this section, I could not find, e.g. any lectures from Aleksei Arbatov (Iabloko), Grigorii Iavlinskii (Iabloko), Boris Gryzlov (Edinstvo/Edinaia Rossiia), Sergei Shoigu (Edinstvo/Edinaia Rossiia) or Gennadii Ziuganov (KPRF) until 2005. <Vesti.ru> has a section *Interviu/Mneniia* (Interviews/Opinions) which comprises interviews of different politicians. These interviews are mainly of the representatives of the executive power but also, for example, of Ziuganov and Iavlinskii. However, the archives cover only the period starting from 2002.

3 See Zassoursky 2004.

4 Pietiläinen 2004, 159.

5 Zassoursky 2004, 191.

6 Pietiläinen 2004, 160.

(articles in which there are only references to the sayings of the members of the faction or party, such as “Grigorii Iavlinskii stated that... According to Sergei Shoigu ...”) in my primary analysis. Data of this kind does serve as background information and in some cases, due to a lack of ‘proper’ data, I have used press releases and some commentaries (indirect speech). My requirement has been that articles must have been written by a member of the faction or the party. Still, I do not discuss here the origin of the text or start to speculate on who has actually written the text and how it has been edited in the paper. I have to start with the hypothesis that the authors have at least approved the use of their name in the text in question. Thus, what is important is to know who has given his/her consent to write something on his behalf, with his name or the name of the party. The whole term author (auctor) has been called into question, for example, in the communication sciences: “In reception-oriented theories it is the reader who ‘makes’ the meaning”.⁷ Here I take the concept ‘author’ for granted and assume that there is an author and that this author is the one mentioned in the text. Moreover, I do not look at reception of the arguments in this study.

5.1.2 Data collection

When I had decided to use newspaper articles and party programmes as my data, I had to decide on how to collect the data. A very small part of the data for the Doctoral thesis was already collected for my Master’s thesis⁸ and for a related article⁹. On the basis of my period of study, 1994–2003, and the five chosen parties – the parties of power, the democratic and communist opposition – it can be established that these five parties get their texts published in different newspapers. Thus, I could not restrict myself to one or two newspapers and therefore could not use the time-consuming way of collecting the data individually from each paper. One option would have been to go through all the issues, say, of *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, *Parlamentskaia Gazeta* and *Novaia gazeta* during this period; but even browsing just those five newspapers would have taken a considerable amount of time. I did not want to select a more specific period and then look at all the issues of a particular week, for example just after the war begun in January 1995, after Lebed’s peace negotiations and the presidential elections in 1996, or just after the new war started in 1999, etc. (see Chapters 6.1 and 7.1), because this would have impeded studying the change and continuity factor in argumentation over a longer period of time. As I wanted to make sure that I had the pos-

7 Bal 1997, 11.

8 Mäkinen 2001.

9 Mäkinen 2003. This data was mainly collected by going through the paper copies of the newspapers *Moskovskie Novosti* (a weekly), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (five or six issues a week), the journals *Novoe Vremia* (a weekly) and *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’* (a monthly journal) from the period of 1993–1998 in the Slavonic Library of the University of Helsinki Library and the Library of the Institute of Russian and Eastern European Studies and browsing the website of Iabloko.

sibility to find most of the columns written by these politicians on Chechnia or NATO (their columns or interviews not necessarily published just during the weeks I would have chosen to browse), I first turned to the websites of the parties and then to two commercial databases.

5.1.2.1 *Websites of the parties*

For finding the proper data, from both newspaper articles and party programmes, I first used the websites of the parties: Iabloko <<http://www.yabloko.ru>>, Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia <<http://www.ovr.ru>>, the Otechestvo faction in the Duma <<http://www.otech.ru>>, the Edinstvo faction in the Duma <<http://www.duma.edin.ru>> and Kommunisticheskaia Partia Rossiiskoi Federatsii <<http://www.kprf.ru>>. As Nash Dom – Rossiia no longer existed when I gathered the materials (in 2002), their website did not exist either. From the Iabloko website it is possible to find most of the articles written by Iabloko members and published in the Russian media (and international media). Moreover, key party documents are also available on the website. Articles related to Chechnia and Russia-NATO relations were not difficult to find, and thus concerning Iabloko it was almost enough to just browse their website.¹⁰ From the websites of Otechestvo and Edinstvo it was a bit more difficult to find the articles and documents as they were arranged in a chronological order and had to all be surveyed in order to find any relevant material. Particularly from the Edinstvo website, it was quite difficult to find any articles related to the questions I was interested in.¹¹ Thus, if judging by the website of Edinstvo, the questions of Chechnia or NATO were not at the top of their agenda in 2002. During 2003/2004 the KPRF website comprised documents starting from 2002 and interviews starting from 1999 (mainly from Ekho Moskv). Articles and interviews are classified by themes¹², but there was no search command available and texts were only displayed in a chronological order and not listed by authors. For the above mentioned reasons, it was better to turn to databases.

10 While doing my Master's thesis I had already collected a lot of material by browsing newspapers and the website. In addition, I had received some materials from the Iabloko office in St. Petersburg. Moreover, when visiting Moscow in May–June 2002 I received a lot of material from the Iabloko representatives themselves (Aleksei Melnikov and Galina Mihaleva).

11 Most of the articles were discussions on the party formation, or who had joined the party, who had left the party, who were the competitors of the party, who were the potential allies of the party, what were the goals of the party, the relation to the executive power, or the issues mostly related to questions such as corruption, domestic economic problems, mass media, the relationship between the executive and legislative power, elections, election results.

12 For example, *Orkuda ishodit ugroza mira. Stati o mezhdunarodnykh delakh i problemakh globalizatsii* or *Za derzhavu obidno. Stati o vnezheinei politike Rossii*.

5.1.2.2 Databases

PARTARKHIV98

In order to find more relevant articles and documents, and moreover material on the parties which no longer exist, I used a commercial database called PartArkhiv98. This database is maintained by *Tsentr prikladnykh politicheskikh issledovani* "INDEM" and the chief editor of the database is Iurii Korguniuk. The database contains almost all the official documents of the parties in question¹³ and a lot of news material, press releases etc., but few articles from newspapers or journals. While compiling my data in the autumn of 2002, it was not possible to use a *search* command in this database, but one had to go through all the materials in the section chosen (for example, Nash Dom – Rossiia, all the documents starting from today back to the day it was founded). I was able to find many useful party documents in this database but in order to find the newspaper and journal articles this database was not really relevant.

First I tried to use the electronic versions of Russian newspapers and their archives, but I was faced with the problem that the archives were defective, or that the newspapers charged for using them. Therefore, I turned to a commercial database called *Integrum* (first in the premises of the library of the Institute of Russian and East-European Studies and then at the library of the University of Tampere). This is a database from which it is possible to find almost all the articles published in Russian newspapers and journals in Russian. I used the Russian version of the database.

INTEGRUM search and problems encountered

In the first search in the autumn of 2002 at the Library of the Institute of Russian and Eastern European Studies I used only the 3–5 names of the party members (Vybor Rossii¹⁴, Nash Dom – Rossiia, Otechestvo, Edinstvo), that is, usually their nominal leaders (Chairs of the party) or the leaders of the parliamentary factions. I looked for materials only in the section *SMI:tsentralnye gazety*, because I tried to find both the interviews and columns written by the members. However, from only this section the search results produced approximately 3,000–17,000 articles per search. Back then it was not possible to produce a command to make it possible to find only the interviews of these people rather than the articles in which their name would appear.¹⁵ Because of this I abandoned the initial idea of finding the interviews

13 In 2002 I had not yet gathered materials on KPRF.

14 In the very beginning my plan was to study the differences between parties of power and liberal and democratic oppositions and to include Vybor Rossii and Demokraticeskii Vybor Rossii and then also Soiuz Pravykh Sil in my primary data. However, I changed my focus and included KPRF as a representative of the communist opposition and excluded VR, DVR and SPS as representatives of liberal opposition.

15 Sirpa Sulkava from the Library of the Institute of Russian and Eastern European Studies helped in forming the commands suitable for the Integrum database. According to the information provided by Integrum today, it is possible to search for interviews of certain people. However, when I tried this command, I did not receive a comprehensive list of interviews which I had found by searching in a more difficult way (name appearing in the text), therefore, this command was not reliable.

for a while and searched only the articles in which the authors were the members of the parliamentary factions or parties in question. So by limiting the search to the articles in which the members of the parties had been authors, the number of the search results became significantly lower. In this way it became possible to also search the sections *SMI:zhurnaly* and *SMI:tele-radio*. I did not search for articles in regional newspapers, even though some of the articles found from the websites of the parties were from the regional press.

Two examples of the command used in the very first search:

```
(/ДТ(01.01.1995–31.12.1999!Д))/(АВ("Владимир Рыжков" или "Виктор Черномырдин" или "Александр Шохин" или "Лев Рохлин" или "Сергей Беляев"))  
(НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или "чеченская война" или "Европейский союз"  
или Ичкерия или Косово или "Североатлантический союз" или Европа или Запад  
или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))
```

```
(/ДТ(01.01.1999–31.12.2001!Д))(НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или (ЕС или  
Европейское:сообщество) или Афганистан или 11.9.2001)/(АВ(«Юрий Лужков»  
или "Вячеслав Володин" или «Константин Косачев» или "Евгений Примаков"))
```

Now the search results were in hundreds, not in thousands, of articles it was more manageable to go through them all. The database was not 100% reliable, because the same commands might give a different result (a different amount of articles found) for each search. As I did not have the possibility to go through the articles properly when performing the first search, I noticed later when reading them that I would need some more data on Nash Dom – Rossiia, Otechestvo and Edinstvo. There either was not enough data or the material was mostly indirect speech. Therefore, I decided to first go back to the original idea of searching both interviews and articles written by these politicians and secondly, to expand the list of people to others than that just the leaders of the party and additionally took some chairs or deputy chairs of the Duma committees etc. Moreover, I adjusted the research questions in 2003/2004 and included *Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* in the study.

Finally I chose the politicians selected for searches on the following criteria: 1) their official position in the party or in the State Duma faction (chairs, deputy chairs), 2) their position in the Duma (chair or deputy chair in a committee, member of a committee like that of international affairs, of security, of defence, of nationalities, of geopolitics) and also 3) the media coverage (I could previously find their articles in the websites of the parties, so I decided to search for some more from the database; they were experts in these fields, so their writing were published in the printed media).

Here again it must be stressed that the leadership of the party and the parliamentary faction are not necessarily the same, for example in Nash Dom – Rossiia, Edinstvo and Otechestvo the formal leaders of the party were not Duma deputies. According to the Constitution, ministers

cannot be Duma deputies simultaneously (except for a transition period during 1993–1995, hence Egor Gaidar and Sergei Shahrain were deputies during the first Duma session.). Concerning the politicians of parties that were represented in more than one Duma session, I tried not to select politicians who were candidates in only one Duma session (and did not have any position in the party otherwise). Therefore, I did not include from Iabloko such well-known politicians as Travkin and Stepashin, who were Iabloko candidates in the 1999 election, even though they were very important in the 1999 campaign.¹⁶ There are very few women on my lists, but this is due to the low percentage of women both in the Duma (and thus in any parliamentary faction or Duma committee) and in the leadership of the parties. Irina Khakamada of SPS is an exception among Russian party leaders. The percentage of women in the State Duma was 13.5% after the 1993 elections, 9.8% after the 1995 elections, 8% after the 1999 elections and 8.8% after the 2003 elections.

An example of a final command (the KPRF search):

(/ДТ(01.01.1994–01.01.2004!д))(/ТТ("Геннадий Селезнев" или "Геннадий Зюганов" или "Валентин Купцов" или "Виктор Зоркальцев" или "Виктор Илюхин" или "Игорь Братищев" или "Евгений Красницкий" или "Иван Мельников" или "Сергей Глазьев" или "Александр Куликов" или "Владимир Волков" или "Светлана Савицкая" или "Александр Михайлов" или "Анатолий Лукьянов" или "Леонид Иванченко" или "Юрий Маслюков" или "Альберт Макашов" или "Герман Титов" или "Владимир Казаковцев" или "Сергей Будажабов" или "Валентин Варенников" или "Светлана Горячева" или "Николай Бенедиктов") или /АВ("Геннадий Селезнев" или "Геннадий Зюганов" или "Валентин Купцов" или "Виктор Зоркальцев" или "Виктор Илюхин" или "Игорь Братищев" или "Евгений Красницкий" или "Иван Мельников" или "Сергей Глазьев" или "Александр Куликов" или "Владимир Волков" или "Светлана Савицкая" или "Александр Михайлов" или "Анатолий Лукьянов" или "Леонид Иванченко" или "Юрий Маслюков" или "Альберт Макашов" или "Герман Титов" или "Владимир Казаковцев" или "Сергей Будажабов" или "Валентин Варенников" или "Светлана Горячева" или "Николай Бенедиктов")) (НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или "чеченская война" или "Европейский союз" или Ичкерия или Косово или Кавказ или Сербия или Босния или терроризм или террорист* или Афганистан или "11 сентября 2001 г." или "Североатлантический союз" или Европа или Запад или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))

It has to be remembered that using the commands on the Integrum database, or using the database in general, restricts the data. Accordingly, I was able to find texts in which the politi-

16 Furthermore, in 2002 the database listed the same articles under different headings, so the same articles were listed for example under *Moskovskie Novosti* and *Arkhivnye materialy 1*, but not all the *Arkhivnye materialy 1* were listed under *Moskovskie Novosti*, so I had to go through them in any case. In 2003–2005, this problem no longer persisted. In addition, Integrum did not find all the articles written by e.g. the Iabloko members, which I had found on the website of Iabloko.

cians *explicitly* referred to Chechnia, NATO, or Kosovo etc.¹⁷ The politicians might (or probably) have referred to these implicitly in some other texts. However, as I am interested also in the changes that occurred during the three Dumas, I did not want to take into examination a period of just one or two years as already argued above. In addition, I did not want to concentrate on articles published by only three newspapers, but rather get a 'wider view'; therefore, using the web pages and database was the best option in contrast to going through the annual volumes of two or three newspapers. I further restricted the amount of articles on the basis of the number of articles found in each newspaper on each party and also according to the size of the national newspaper. That is, I chose to collect articles from 10 to 17 newspapers per party depending on how difficult or easy it was to find articles from the particular party (less newspapers = easier to find articles). The list of the newspapers and journals used can be found in APPENDIX 2.

As an example of the difficulties encountered when using a database, I could also mention that there were some problems connected to very common names; that is, you get research results which are not related to person that you are looking for but of a totally different person. For example, some of the Communist Party's Duma deputies have the same name as other well-known persons, e.g. Aleksandr Mikhailov is a very common name and therefore the database finds articles in which the head of the PR centre of FSB, General Aleksandr Mikhailov or the actor Aleksandr Mikhailov are mentioned, but not really articles in which Aleksandr Nikolaevich Mikhailov, a Duma deputy from KPRF, is mentioned. There is no benefit in using the patroname in the command because they are rarely mentioned in newspapers anymore, and it would restrict the search so that the database would only find the words "Aleksandr Nikolaevich Mihailov" when they appear together. Another common is Vladimir Volkov – the same name is shared by the director of the Institute of Slavistics and Baltology of the Russian Academy of Science, Professor Vladimir Volkov, and the Duma deputy from KPRF, Vladimir Nikolaevich Volkov.

In addition to interviews published in the newspapers, I also looked for some TV and radio interviews, especially from Edinstvo when it was difficult to find any material concerning these cases (primary data). The interviews have mainly been collected from the *Ekho Moskvy* radio channel, but also a couple of interviews from RTR *Parlamentskii chas* or *Podrobnosti* have been used. In addition, I looked for some additional material from the Golos Rossii radio channel, the archives of which are available on the internet. There are between 36 and 84 articles/interviews per party in my 'dataset'.¹⁸

17 See APPENDIX 1 for the lists of politicians selected for searches and for the commands used in Integrum.

18 50 articles from Nash Dom – Rossiia, 41 from Otechestvo, 36 from Edinstvo, 60 from Iabloko and 84 from KPRF. This figure comprises those articles to which I have referred to in the analysis chapters. In addition, there are other articles which I have browsed. Some of the articles to which I refer contain only a couple of sentences of direct speech from the politicians under examination. Some are full articles (e.g. columns) written by the politicians. In Ziuganov's case (KPRF) sometimes the same article has been published twice, in two different newspapers.

It must also be mentioned that there were some further restrictions in collecting the data by the help of Integrum because the archives were incomplete. The archives comprised articles of *Kommersant* from 1991; *Krasnaia zvezda*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Moskovskaia Pravda*, *Pravda*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* from 1992; *Vek* from 1993; *Izvestiia*, *Moskovskie Novosti* and *Nezavisimaia gazeta* from 1994; and *Zavtra*, *Obshchaia Gazeta* and *Segodnia* from 1995. Therefore, there were fewer articles available from 1994 or 1995 than from 2002 and 2003. However, at the beginning of the data collection period, there were enough newspapers, so that politicians from different parties would have 'equal' representation. Thus, even though the archives of different newspapers were not complete, there were enough different newspaper titles available.¹⁹

In addition to the restrictions in using a database for collecting newspaper articles, there are also problems connected to using newspaper articles written by politicians. The problems, which became evident when collecting the data (some of which could be predicted in advance), were that some politicians did not write to the newspapers or did not write or give interviews on the topics in which I was interested, or they did not get their texts published/were not

19 In order to make my 'sample' representative and equal, I collected articles from different newspapers (newspapers of different groups). For example, in 1999, approximately in the middle of my research period, Berezovskii published *Kommersant* (117,340 copies), *Kommersant-Vlast* (73,100 copies), *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (42,280 copies) and *Novye izvestiia* (102,000 copies); the Kremlin published *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (433,893 copies) and *Vremia-MN* (55,000 copies); Vladimir Gusinski or his Media-Most company published *Segodnia* (51,600 copies); the City of Moscow government published *Vecherniaia Moskva* (300,000 copies), *Moskovskaia Pravda* and *Versty* (40,000 copies); MK-Publishing group published *MK & MK-region* (2,137,755 copies); Vladimir Potanin and Gruppa INTERROS published *Izvestiia* (367,000 copies) and *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (652,000 copies); Rem Viakhirev and Gasprom-media published *Raboshaia tribuna* (162 460 copies) and *Trud* (676,850 copies); *Argumenty i Fakty* published *Argumenty i Fakty* (2,840,000 copies); KPRF published *Zavtra* (100,000 copies) and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (300,000) (*Pravda* turned into *Pravda-5* in the late 1990's and for a while was not issued; *Pravda* of Viktor Linnik was re-named to *Slovo*; *Pravda* of the KPRF member Aleksandr Ilin was issued every now and then; nowadays both *Pravda* and *Pravda KPRF* are issued); Publishing House Sovershenno Sekretno published *Versii* (217,000 copies) and *Sovershenno Sekretno* (2,300,000); Vladimir Evtushenkov and AFK Sistema published *Metro* (400,000 copies) and *Literaturnaia gazeta* (49,073); *Obshchaia Gazeta* published *Obshchaia Gazeta* (288,168 copies) (this did not formally belong to the Gusinskii group, but existed thanks to his financing; the newspaper ceased to exist in May 2002); *Novaia gazeta* published *Novaia gazeta* (157,254 copies; a newspaper very near to *labloko*); *Moskovskie Novosti* published *Moskovskie Novosti* (118,000 copies); in addition, *Vedomosti* was financed from abroad (nowadays part of the Finnish owned Sanoma Magazines International). Concerning journals: Berezovskii published *Ogonek* (50,000 copies); Gusinskii had *Itogi* (85,000 copies) and also *Radio Ekho Moskvy* (6 million listeners in 45 cities); MK Publishing Group published *Delovye liudi* (40,000 copies). All this information from Deeva et al. 25 August 1999, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*. It might also be mentioned that of weeklies *Argumenty i fakty* reaches 42 per cent of the audience, *Ekonomika i zhizn* 33 per cent, *Trud* 17 per cent (*Zhurnal* 3/2000, pp.34–35 in Vartanova 2002, 33). Of dailies in Moscow *Moskovskii komsomolets* reaches 13,6 per cent of the audience, *Metro* 4,5 per cent, *Sport-express* 3 per cent and *Komsomolskaia Pravda* 2,8 per cent (*Social and Demographic Description of Daily Newspapers Audience. Moscow, March–July 2001* in Vartanova 2002, 34). Yassen Zassoursky (2002, 89–94) confirms the information given in the *Moskovskii Komsomolets* in 2002 on the ownership and financing. However, he does not mention any exact figures on circulation except for *Komsomolskaia Pravda* 1.4 million and for *Trud* 1.44 million. In addition, he lists the most popular dailies: *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Izvestiia*, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, *Segodnia* and *Kommersant Daily*.

interviewed. For example, Viktor Chernomyrdin (Nash Dom – Rossiia) was Prime Minister for the most part of the period of study (1995–1998) and probably did not have any need or time to write any newspaper columns. He did give some interviews to the newspapers, but the material which I found in the newspapers was mainly secondary material based on the press releases or interviews of the information agencies, of the type “Chernomyrdin said that.....”, “he commented that...” etc. (the same was also true for Sergei Shoigu and Boris Gryzlov). As I study argumentation (not only the claims but their justification too), this indirect speech material is not the most suitable for my purposes. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that in cases like that of Chernomyrdin, he must be taken firstly as a representative of the Russian government, of the Russian *vlast*, or of the Russian Federation, and only secondly as that of the Nash Dom – Rossiia party. Concerning Edinstvo, the problem was (or according to the leader of Edinstvo, their advantage was) that they did not have any ‘real’ politicians in the party, and accordingly many Edinstvo representatives did not seem to have much to say on Chechnia or NATO, at least not in public in the newspapers.

Furthermore, we must acknowledge that the texts published in the newspapers are written by individual politicians and do not always represent the official party position. However, this also depends on the party and we cannot expect to find a totally unanimous party line in other countries either; but rather there are competing positions within parties (see the previous chapter on political context and parliamentary parties). Some politicians stress that they are members of a certain party when arguing in public (this is true of party leaders especially, but also of Iabloko and Communist party members), but others do not mention this at all or try to belittle or avoid any partisanship. The peculiarity (or maybe just more visibly than in other countries) of the Russian party system is that many party members are not only not committed to the party, but do not express their party membership in public either (this especially concerns the parties of power). This might have to do with knowing these parties will not necessarily last for a long time and that the public, the electorate, has a low level of trust in parties.²⁰ As argued in Chapter 4, in Russia (as in many other new democracies) parties do not represent socio-economic cleavages and parties of power (or clientelist parties using Hale’s classification) are much stronger than programmatic or ideational parties. The state of the Russian party system is a reflection of the state of democracy in Russia in general – Russia as being between a democracy and authoritarianism.²¹ Having said all this, still the arguments of the members of the parliamentary factions and parties are taken here as representing the arguments of the party, and not merely as individual arguments of politicians.

Despite all the difficulties encountered and restrictions which have to be taken into account and have been listed above, the primary data that I have gathered represents the parties and their leading politicians equally and are adequate for my purposes in studying the argu-

20 On the trust in public institutions, see Shlapentokh 2006. The trust in parties is very low, around five per cent. However, many individual politicians of these parties might have a much higher trust.

21 See Carothers 2002 and 2006.

ments of three groups of parliamentary parties on Chechnia and NATO, and finally of their geopolitical visions. In order to ‘balance’ the individual politicians’ arguments, I also use party programmes and platforms for my data.

5.1.3 Party programmes as data

The party programmes represent collectively produced data in contrast to the personal data, which is here the newspaper articles written by different politicians.²² There could be other relevant materials produced by the party than just political programmes or platforms. For example, the Iabloko party regularly published *Information bulletins of the Commission of the Iabloko Association* on the problems of defence and international security in which the situation of Chechnia was discussed. Some parties have their own newspapers, publish other propaganda material, minutes from meetings and annual reports etc. However, I only use the election platforms or political programmes of the parties. Programmes were collected either from the websites of the parties, by using the PartInform database, from the INION library (Moscow) or they were received from the party.

The party programmes and platforms are used as additional data to either support or contrast the arguments found in the articles of the politicians. The party programmes should offer the official position of the party. As Olavi Borg has argued, the official programme is the symbol of the party – it publicly represents the party.²³ As a rule, a party programme should describe and reflect the party ideology, i.e. the values, interests and norms on which parties rely on and for which they try to get supporters and of which importance they try to justify.²⁴ However, I will not analyse ideology as such, but only the arguments that are related to the situation in Chechnia, to NATO relations, and to other more general statements that could be taken as geopolitical arguments. Here I do not discuss through which struggles, conflicts, discussions, and decision making processes these programmes have been produced, or who has been the real author behind these texts (many programmes are written by some ‘political technologists’²⁵ or consultants – political analysts, political scientists who do not necessarily have any other connection with the party). Again I take it for granted that these programmes and platforms

22 In addition there would be personal notes, letters, books etc. see e.g. Borg 1964, 14.

23 Borg 1964, 25.

24 Ibid., 6. The analysis of party programmes and manifestos using quantitative methods has e.g. been continued by the Manifesto Research Group since the early 1980s (See Mair 2001, 16).

25 *Politicheskii tekhnolog* is a term used in Russia for political consultants or ‘spin doctors’. However, Russian political technologists are different from those in the West. Ivan Krastev has argued they are the master-minds behind Russia’s managed democracy. They are those who frame political issues. They have direct or indirect connection to the Kremlin and they are “experts in manipulating dependent media [...] specialists in creative counting of the votes [...] apolitical technologist is not interested in the victory of his party but in the victory of the system”. So they try to get an election result that pleases the Kremlin (or what has been planned by the Kremlin). The most well known political technologists are Gleb Pavlinskii, Marat Gelman and Sergei Markov. They used to be typical Russian Westernizers, Russia’s liberals but now they have become political technologists. See Krastev 2006.

TABLE 3.
Party programmes of the parliamentary parties

Position	Political Party/Movement/ Electoral Association	Party Platform/Manifesto/Programme
<i>Party of Power</i>	<i>Nash Dom – Rossiia</i>	Predvybornaia platforma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia "Nash dom – Rossiia". 12 April 1995 Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia "Nash dom – Rossiia" 2 September 1995. Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia "Nash dom – Rossiia" "Vera – Sila – Svoboda" 24 April 1999 NDR: 10 shagov v XXI vek. Predvybornaia platforma dvizheniia "Nash Dom – Rossiia". 28 September 1999
	<i>Otechestvo</i>	Predvybornaia platforma OVR. Zakony vo imya Rossii. Predvybornaia platforma Izbiratel'nogo bloka "Otechestvo – Vsiia Rossiia". Sentiabr 1999. Programma Obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Otechestvo".
	<i>Edinstvo</i>	Tezisy platformy izbiratel'nogo bloka "Mezhregionalnoe dvizhenie "Edinstvo". 1999. Programma obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii – partii "Edinstvo" 29 October 2000
	<i>Edinaia Rossiia</i>	Programma Vserossiiskoi politicheskoi Partii "Edinstvo i Otechestvo" – Edinaia Rossiia. 2002. Manifest Vserossiiskoi politicheskoi partii "Edinstvo i Otechestvo" – Edinaia Rossiia. Put natsionalnogo uspekha. 2003.
<i>Democratic opposition</i>	<i>Iabloko</i>	Iabloko: Reformy dlia bolshinstva. Programma obednieniia Iabloko. Politicheskaiia programma. 1995. Bezopasnost, Doverie, Budushchee. Predvybornaia programma "IABLOKA" na vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumi 1999 goda. 1999. Demokraticeskii manifest. 2001. Put k svobode. Obrachshenie Uchreditel'nogo Sezda Rossiiskoi demokraticeskoi partii "Iabloko" 22 December 2001. Programma Rossiiskoi Demokraticeskoi Partii "Iabloko". 2002.
<i>Communist opposition</i>	<i>KPRF</i>	Predvybornaia platforma Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1995. Programma politicheskoi partii "Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii" 20 January 1995, amendments in 20 April 1997. Platforma patrioticheskogo dvizheniia 'Za Pobedu'. 1999. Za vlast trudovogo naroda! Predvybornaia platforma Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2003.

represent the official party position because they are public documents and have gone through the official process in the party structures (or at least this is the impression the party leadership wants to give). Of course, party programmes have been written at a more general level and they cannot comment on the day-to-day policies of the future, and may not necessarily comment on the current topics (at the time of writing the programme) in detail either. They might, however, be very precise in the description and analysis of the immediate past.

The platforms are more up-to-date but their function is somewhat different. As mentioned above, my purpose is not to study the programmes as a whole but to search the relevant sections in the programmes (whether there are any). Party programmes have been divided into two different categories: long-term ideological programmes and short-term action programmes. The action programmes (special programmes) comprise organizational programmes (for example, a party's youth organization), functional programmes (economic or cultural programmes), and campaign programmes (electoral platforms).²⁶ Of course, as already in the 1960s, the line between these two types has blurred and the tendency has led towards action programmes or special programmes, i.e. from ideological questions to 'practical political action'.²⁷

5.2 APPROACH TO STUDYING GEOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTATION

To start with, it must be mentioned that my position when studying Russian politicians' argumentation is a *view from outside*.²⁸ I have even wanted to keep a certain distance. Therefore, I have not used observance, participation or interviewing as my methodological tools. Consequently, this study is based on those *arguments that are expressed in public to a Russian audience and transmitted by Russian newspaper articles and party programmes to a foreigner*. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, I have also wanted to be culture-sensitive. In my study this means using original Russian data, Russian research literature, and giving a voice to Russian politicians. This is one reason why in the analysis chapters there are many quotations from Russian politicians; I have let them speak and allowed readers to see what has led me in my analysis of these politicians' argumentation.

In this section I will discuss some basic ideas which underpin my research – understanding texts as part of reality and constructing reality, and textual approaches in social sciences. I then move on to critical geopolitics, how geopolitics has been studied as a discursive practise (or as a narrative), and introduce the grammar of geopolitics – a methodological tool employed by Gearóid Ó Tuathail. Next, I introduce Stephen Toulmin's approach to studying logical practise

26 Borg 1964, 17–18.

27 See Ibid., 21.

28 However, it must be stressed that we cannot get outside our own experience, but we are a part of and construct the reality that we are studying. Thus, I cannot, for example, deny that my discussions with Russian scholars and my other experiences would not have had any effect on my understanding of Russian politics and society as a whole. However, the content of these discussions is not the object of the study itself.

and his model of argument. I will also explain how I employ Ó Tuathail's model and Toulmin's model in order to get more out of the politicians' arguments on Chechnia and NATO, the differences between the arguments of different parties, and the arguments of different politicians within the same party or parliamentary faction. My main focus is on how claims are justified: "Justification of a claim involves producing reasons for a claim after the fact of arriving mentally at that claim."²⁹ It is not merely a question of inferring a claim from evidence (data) but rather of justifying claims (concerning practical arguments). Finally I introduce the case-specific questions for my research. The more general research questions were introduced in Chapter 2 (Research agenda), in which the concept of a geopolitical vision was also explained. Gertjan Dijkink's concept is used for analysing the geopolitical thinking of political parties on a more general level (in contrast to case specific geopolitical storylines and the structure of the argument).

5.2.1 Studying texts as part of reality and as constructing reality

When politicians, or any persons for that matter, speak or write in public, we cannot ever be hundred percent sure of what they have in their minds (and revealing this would rather be a task for psychologists or philosophers than that of political scientists). We can, of course, speculate on their 'real' motivations and the intentions behind these speeches/writings by taking into account the time and the situation in which these speeches/writings took place, and of course, the politician him/herself. Or, we could ask these politicians to explain what they have really meant. However, interpretations/explanations obtained in retrospect are given in a different situation, to a different audience, and even the politician and his convictions/ideas/interests might have changed. Thus, what was meant in the original situation, in the original argument, is not the same any longer; it receives a new interpretation according to a new context.

In contrast, texts are the only concrete evidence which we have of politicians' public arguments at any given moment. They remain the same over time, from situation to situation and from person to person even though their interpretation changes. Thus, by studying these texts, we can focus on the argumentation and rhetoric of politicians in any given moment. Texts, the arguments expressed in them, and discourses (structures) characterising a group are all part of the very reality that we live in. Admittedly, different from the material reality, but in this study, as in hundreds of others after the 'linguistic or rhetoric turn' in the social sciences, I am more interested in the value and meaning that we give to the objects and phenomena. From this derives the way in which we describe these objects – how we use language. Here I may refer to Hall's understanding of Foucault's concept of discourse, which is "not about whether things exist but about where meaning comes from." As Hall argues, for Foucault things mean some-

29 Foss, Foss and Trapp, *www document*.

thing and are 'true' "only within a specific historical context"³⁰, "A statement always belongs to a series or a whole [...] it is always part of a network of statements [...]."³¹ Even though the 'Foucauldian way of understanding knowledge (truth)' as historically and culturally specific is employed here, I cannot agree with his understanding of discourse (alone) producing knowledge, and not the subject itself producing knowledge, or at least participating in the production of knowledge.³² I argue that no structure *alone* can be held responsible for producing knowledge; actors are very necessary components and these actors have a will of their own, even though this will is conditioned by the structure(s).

Thus, discourse is understood as a social practise and as *not being constructed without human action*.³³ We should take into account both the structure and agency. Accordingly, we are to acknowledge that the texts do not emerge or exist in a vacuum, without human interaction and without interaction between the texts themselves or other material reality. Moreover, when studying texts we should keep in mind that simultaneously we are engaging ourselves in an interaction between the arguments and discourse, action and structure and text and context. There cannot be one without the other, even though we may emphasize either of these aspects. My choice is made in favour of action, i.e. arguments that politicians use.

Here it must be mentioned that my primary data consist of texts, as introduced above, but that not all texts comprise arguments. That is, texts (written or spoken then transcribed into a written text) are the main source from which I look for arguments expressed by the politicians in question.³⁴ Following my research questions, I will not systematically search for or compare arguments of politicians /parties with any structure, like a hegemonic geopolitical discourse, yet at the same time I try not to leave them 'hanging in the air' either. Arguments expressed in the texts will find their structure, their context within other arguments of the same group (that is, within the arguments on Chechnia and NATO from all the parties under examination, or within the general geopolitical arguments of those parties, where they are found in the texts which discuss the two cases, that is, on their geopolitical vision), they will be compared with each other and within that group they can be analysed. It is a question of intertextuality. Even if I state above that I do not compare the arguments of the parties examined with a hegemonic discourse, my hypothesis is still that the parties of power represent the discourse of those in power³⁵ and Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii and Iabloko represent

30 Hall 2001, 74.

31 Foucault 1972. 99. Foucault's genealogy of knowledge and Derrida's concept of deconstruction form a basis on which the tradition of 'wise men' in geopolitics has been re-evaluated, an activity carried out in critical geopolitics. (see Chapter 2 on research agenda).

32 However, it cannot either be denied that "[...] men enter into communication and find themselves in the already constructed network of comprehension" (Foucault 1977, 331). That is, there is no *tabula rasa*, but we all are borne into a certain structure which in its turn restricts and creates possibilities for our understanding and other action.

33 See e.g. Jokinen, Juhila, Suoninen 1999, 71 & 75.

34 One text might not have an argument at all, but a mere statement with a claim (claims), without any data or warrant and backing. However, when several texts are taken together, we might find data and warrant and backing for this claim.

35 I assume that the dominant or even hegemonic discourse is today mainly produced and reflected by the president, the presidential administration, some political consultants, and others close to president Putin (and reproduced by the media

a discourse of different sides of the fragmented opposition. The tension between them is studied by analysing their arguments in the texts on Chechnia and NATO, representing Russia's potential internal and external threat in the mid- to late-1990s and the first four years of the 21st century.

Furthermore, in the rhetorical approach employed here I focus on the arguments – unlike in discourse analysis³⁶ in which, according to Potter and Wetherell, “the focus is on the discourse itself: how it is organized and what it is doing.”³⁷ [... Discourse analysts are] not trying to recover events, beliefs and cognitive processes from participants' discourse, or treat language as an indicator or signpost to some other state of affairs but looking at the analytically prior question of how discourse or accounts of these things are manufactured.”³⁸ Accordingly, I claim that the arguments of Russian politicians – say, on Chechnia – do reveal something on matters other than Chechnia itself. They *might* reveal some more permanent ideas, e.g. on what and where Russia is, in which direction it should be heading (whose model to follow or whether it has any mission).³⁹ A politician's argumentation might not be ‘consistent and coherent’, that is, we cannot always find the same arguments in a different time and situation (or if addressed to a different audience), but we might find the same general ideas behind them (e.g. appealing to democracy, order or stability, specifics in Russian geography and history) and for this purpose a structural analysis of arguments is required.

The very idea of language and discourses, both the use and interpretation of them, being part of the political struggle is a background for this study. Maybin, referring Bakhtin/Volosinov⁴⁰, argues that:

language use is always motivated and therefore framed within the struggle between different social groups [...] Social conflict is evident both in the way language is used to put a particular interpretation on experience, and at the level of the sign itself in the struggle over the meaning and evaluative accent of particular words or phrases [...] language should be seen as ‘refracting’ it [the world] through the lens of social struggle.⁴¹

loyal to Putin). As the party of power is a creation of this group, it is reflecting and also contributing to this discourse in its argumentation. During Eltsin the situation was more fragmented and there were more competing discourses.

36 There are various discourse analyses, that is, understanding of the concept ‘discourse’ varies from an analyst to an analyst, and in addition, there are various ways of analysing this discourse (which is defined in different ways).

37 Potter & Wetherell 2001, 205.

38 Ibid., 199.

39 I am referring here to Dijkink's concept of a geopolitical vision which comprises naturalness of borders, geopolitical code, mission, or model to follow and assumption on impersonal forces.

40 Two volumes published under the name of Volosinov are most likely written by Bakhtin. See Holquist 1981. Bakhtin was mostly writing about the novel and its heteroglossia, in comparison to e.g. poetry and about ‘development’ of language. However many of his statements on language can be generalised to other texts and times too.

41 Maybin 2001 citing Bakhtin, 65.

If taken to a macro-level, I could also adopt Bakhtin's understanding of a conflict between the opposing forces of centralization and diversification.⁴² Bakhtin argues that centripetal forces produce the authoritative, fixed, inflexible discourses of religious dogma, scientific truth, and the political and moral status quo which are spoken of by teachers, fathers and so on. "Authoritative discourse (religious, political, moral, the word of a father, adult, teacher) is a distanced zone organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically higher authority, acknowledged in the past. It is a prior discourse – religious dogma, scientific truth, fashionable book – demands our unconditional allegiance, either totally affirm it or reject it. Fused with its authority – with political power, an institution, a person – and it stands or falls together with that authority."⁴³ This authoritative discourse is associated with political centralization and a unified cultural 'canon'. This in a way can be said to be the agenda of the Putin period in Russia (centralization, unification, fixed rules for the 'game'⁴⁴), and also of some actors who are studied in the current study.

Within geopolitical literature Sami Moio has discussed the distinction between discourse and rhetoric, that is, between the discursive structure and action.⁴⁵ Moio stresses that geopolitics should be studied not just as representations which, according to many discourse analysts, have direct political consequences, or as structures (discourse), but as both. The relationship between the structure (discourse) and the human actor (rhetoric) is two-way: the human actor (the rhetoric) is both influenced by, and has influence on, the structure (the discourse).⁴⁶ This division between structure and action, discourse and rhetoric, can be derived from the division of the context and text, and the argument whether, and to which extent, the context (whatever the context is: 'material reality', other texts, the author) should/can be taken into account when analysing a text. It would then be possible to see the structure not only as limiting but also enabling the politician's opportunities for producing 'convincing' or 'acceptable' rhetoric or action.⁴⁷

Furthermore, Moio claims that critical geopolitics "has focused on global *governance* and earth writing attached to it [...]". However, Moio claims that "all the governmental systems are, however, neither inherently authoritarian by their nature, nor based on a strict use of unlimited violence that aims at silencing opposition or resistance. Physical violence is not the continuation of politics by other means, but rather something that destroys the political aspect".⁴⁸ Indeed, one cannot speak of politics unless there is an opposition or an opponent

42 Bakhtin was talking about the novel on the border of two tendencies in the languages of European peoples: one centralising (unifying) and one de-centralising and that in the Middle Ages the boundary lines between someone else's speech and one's own were flexible, ambiguous and confused – here he refers also to using the authoritative word of the Bible etc. (See Bakhtin 1982, 67 and 69).

43 Bakhtin 1982, 342–343.

44 For example, the campaign against Vladimir Sorokin for the purity of the Russian language used in the media etc.

45 Moio 2003, 98–103.

46 Moio (2003, 96–97) criticizes the determinism of post-structuralists associated with culturally defined and socially produced power structures.

47 Moio 2003, 104.

48 Moio 2004 referring Palonen 2003.

involved.⁴⁹ The “very condition of existence of *power* is that it is *not absolute*.”⁵⁰ “Politics presupposes the – peaceful or violent – *competition* between social forces and the essential instability of the relation between ruling order and ruling function.”⁵¹ What makes studying Russian parliamentary parties as geopolitical actors meaningful, is that these actors have competing arguments and they offer competing stories. They try to challenge the discourse of those in power, even though it has become more and more difficult.

Following Collingwood (1939), Moio argues that one must take into account to whom a certain argument was addressed and whom it was intended to support – to what question a political act was intended as an answer to. However, this demand for knowing to whose question somebody answers also raises problems, as we cannot always know who has said something first (what is the origin and author of the text) and, if many people have expressed the same idea, to whom the answer is addressed. Moreover, what we are saying (or those who we are studying) is nothing original – just belonging to us – or something of which we would be able to find the ‘origin’. We are speaking with the voices of others, the voices of authoritative others:⁵² “The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with his own intention [...]”⁵³ Thus, when studying texts of Russian politicians we must remember that these politicians do not necessarily (and most obviously) produce anything original and that they appeal to other authorities in their texts – these others may be political leaders, philosophers, or Russian or international law. One of the questions which will be examined is how Russian politicians justify their claims, e.g. to which authorities they refer. Moreover, the meaning (the meaning it receives, the content) is not fixed; texts get different meanings upon their reception depending on the audience: “[...] different points of view, conceptual horizons come to interact with each other. The specific world of the listener introduces totally new elements to his discourse [...]”⁵⁴ Therefore, as Maybin argues (referring to Bakhtin), “we can treat all discourse as essentially heteroglossic, dialogic, and the site of ideological struggle.”⁵⁵

Thus, Moio’s requirement to study the ‘content’ instead of (or in parallel with) representations is problematic.⁵⁶ We must ask ourselves how (or even whether at all) we can separate the content and meaning and its representation. All we actually have are representations, i.e. the text. Should we then try to determine the ‘pure’ content with the help of a context, of background information? The context could then be understood as other texts. But how far can we

49 Palonen 1988, 19.

50 Laclau 1994, 18.

51 Ibid.

52 Bakhtin/Volosinov cited in Maybin 2001, 68.

53 Bakhtin 1982, 282.

54 Ibid. The reception is not studied here.

55 Maybin 2001, 70.

56 Moio 2004: “the interest should not lie in the representations as such but *in the messages that they convey, their content, and, in particular, the presuppositions required as a background to the argumentation occurring in a given situation of political competition*”.

go in search of this context either? The world of texts is endless. We do have and should have some knowledge of the situation (the context, the background), but this too is interpreted in a different way by different actors of the same situation. Should we read the situation and the background, for example, from the point of view of *Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii* or of the party of power or *Iabloko*? We should also recognize the ways this background information may be used/misused. For example, when Barthes discusses literature and explanations of literature, he claims that the explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it. According to this post-modern view, we should not read the texts in this way.⁵⁷ However, when studying the argumentation of politicians we cannot ignore the position and the situation in which the arguments are given. A compromise between reading the text through comprehensive background information on one hand, and reading the text without almost any background information on the other, must be found. To conclude, contextualisation is surely necessary and my approach has been that first I have looked at the texts at such, and the arguments that they contain, and later I have tried to put them into a context which the politicians offer in the form of other texts. Moreover, I also offer a wider context of the Russian political situation and of geopolitical thinking in the literature review chapters. I acknowledge that this political context, discursive structures and traditions of geopolitics may restrict or encourage to certain ways of argumentation.

As described below, I use Ó Tuathail's grammar of geopolitics and Toulmin's model of argumentation⁵⁸ as methodological tools in my geopolitical research. The general interest is in politicians drawing the boundaries for Russia itself and others (NATO outside, Chechnia inside); politicians describing Russia's place in the world; discussing a potential internal threat and a potential external threat in the mid- to late-1990s and the first four years of the 21st century – their geopolitical visions. Let us now turn to an analytical tool which I use for understanding the practical geopolitical reasoning of each party for each case.

5.2.2 Critical geopolitics and Gearóid Ó Tuathail's grammar of geopolitics

In Chapter Two on research agenda I introduced the concept of critical geopolitics and explained that it differs from 'classical geopolitics' in many ways, e.g. by focusing on different levels of geopolitical action (formal, practical and popular geopolitics, or not regarding states as sole geopolitical actors) and by understanding geopolitics also as a discursive practise. In this section I introduce an approach which has been used in critical geopolitics by Gearóid Ó Tuathail⁵⁹ to study geopolitical narratives.

57 Barthes in Graddol and Boyd-Barrett (eds.) 1994, 167.

58 I presume that these tools also fit well to studying Russian politics and Russian texts. As argued in the Introduction Russia is not taken here as a unique case, even though cultural specifics of all countries are acknowledged.

59 Gearóid Ó Tuathail (born Gerard Toal) is an Irish born American professor of government and international affairs at Virginia Tech. He is the first to use the term 'critical geopolitics' and is author/editor of, e.g., G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby

Following *critical geopolitics*' literature, studying politicians' public argumentation on issues such as the conflict in Chechnia or Russia-NATO relations (especially NATO enlargement), falls under the title of studying *practical geopolitical reasoning*.⁶⁰ "Practical geopolitics concerns the daily *construction and spatialization of world affairs* and state interests *by foreign policy leaders and elites within geopolitical cultures*."⁶¹ How then has practical geopolitics as a discursive practise been studied? The study of narratives has expanded from literary studies to other fields, including the study of geopolitics.⁶² For studying practical geopolitical reasoning, Ó Tuathail uses the narrative apparatus of 'geopolitical storylines' and 'geopolitical scripts', which is a *discursive-argumentative perspective on practical geopolitical reasoning*.⁶³ According to Ó Tuathail, a 'storyline' is a "fundamental unit in the critical analysis of geopolitical discourse." [...It] can be defined as *the way in which geopolitical events, locations, protagonists, processes and interests are organized into a relatively coherent narrative of explanation and meaning*⁶⁴ or a "*regularized interpretative employment of a geopolitical drama*, [which is] refined and deepened through public argumentation and debate".⁶⁵ The building blocks of a geopolitical storyline can be discovered by using the 'grammar of geopolitics'.⁶⁶ This grammar of geopolitics (or storyline) is part of categorization and particularisation. One should analyse how the data answers the questions below, for example, concerning the conflict in Chechnia or NATO enlargement (see Table 4 below).

and P. Routledge, *A Geopolitics Reader*. Second edition. Routledge, 2006; J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal, eds., *A Companion to Political Geography*. Blackwell, 2004; and G. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (Volume 6 in the Borderlines series) and London: Routledge, 1996.

60 See e.g. Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, Ó Tuathail 2002.

61 Ó Loughlin et al. 2004a, 6.

62 However, Ó Tuathail does not discuss which texts can be taken as narrative texts. He assumes that politicians' accounts in the media on e.g. the conflict in Bosnia are stories.

63 This means engaging in 'meso-level discourse analysis' in contrast to the 'micro-level' associated with Linguistics or Psychology, or the 'macro-level', such as Foucault's genealogy of knowledge (Ó Tuathail 2002, 606). Ó Tuathail has used his apparatus in studying the US foreign policy concerning the Bosnian war and Russian geopolitics after 9/11.

64 Ó Loughlin, Ó Tuathail and Kolossov 2004b.

65 Ó Tuathail 2002, 619.

66 Ibid., 609. International geopolitics is a theatrical drama on a world state. Grammar of geopolitical reasoning is taken as a dramaturgical phenomenon. Ibid., 608–609. Here Ó Tuathail refers to Kenneth Burke's grammar of motives (1945) a dramaturgical analysis to create any act, scene etc..

TABLE 4.
Grammar of geopolitics according to Ó Tuathail

<i>Question</i>	Explanation of the question
<i>What?</i>	Situation descriptions (how (foreign policy) actors classify the drama under consideration and construct scenarios and analogies to render it meaningful) ⁶⁷
<i>Where?</i>	Location specification (e.g. is it a local, regional or global conflict and what is the relationship with these different 'levels') ⁶⁸
<i>Who?</i>	Actor typifications (e.g. who are the protagonists) ⁶⁹
<i>Why?</i>	Attributions and imputations of causality (blame strategies) ⁷⁰
<i>So What?</i>	What are the strategic calculations, that is, interests enunciation ⁷¹

What then is a 'geopolitical script' according to Ó Tuathail? A geopolitical script refers to the "*directions and manner in which foreign policy leaders perform geopolitics in public, to the political strategies of coping that leaders develop in order to navigate through certain foreign policy challenges and crises. It is a way of performing whereas a storyline is a set of arguments. [...It] may contain multiple storylines, voices and positions, depending on the situation.*"⁷² Accordingly, for Ó Tuathail a script is something that the political leadership constructs from among competing storylines, a compromise that should satisfy all competing parties. It is the 'pragmatics of foreign policy performance'. According to Ó Tuathail, the difference between the storyline and the script is that scripts are answers to *everyday* events and articulated before the media, but storylines are arguments around *persistent* public policy challenges.⁷³ Thus, in Ó Tuathail's narrative apparatus we can also track points of contact between the grammar of geopolitics (the storyline) and what has been described as three layers of narrative: *fabula*, *text* and *story*.⁷⁴ The *fabula* is the content, a series of events caused by actors. It comprises elements such as events, actors, time and place, which are then organised in a certain way in a story. A story carries a point of view; it is important in which order something is told, what kinds of traits the actors

67 Ibid., 612.

68 Ó Tuathail 2002, 621–622.

69 Ibid., 614.

70 Ibid., 614–615.

71 Ibid., 616.

72 Ibid., 619–620.

73 See O'Loughlin et al. 2004b, 285.

74 See Bal 1997.

have, what the characteristics of the location are, etc., i.e. the aspects of the story. A narrative text is told in a medium and might refer to the same story, but is told in a certain manner.

Coming back to Ó Tuathail's claim on performing, I would disagree that public argumentation is not a way of performing itself. Indeed, arguments are proofs of this action – they are performances themselves. Or to put it in another way: the end result (an argument) and the process (producing an argument, writing and speaking an argument) are inseparable – constituting action together. Thus, these are overlapping or parallel. Instead, Ó Tuathail's distinction between a 'storyline' and a 'script' might be taken as the difference between performances of different sorts. A script might be understood as a more general argumentation of the political leadership in front of an audience in a particular situation, or as a policy level and formulation and its implementation by the administration. A geopolitical script comprises the steps mentioned below in TABLE 5, in addition to the geopolitical storyline attributes (where, what, who, why, so what; TABLE). Actually, the first step of the script is here understood as the storyline.

TABLE 5.
Geopolitical script according to Ó Tuathail

<i>Steps of geopolitical script</i>	<i>Explanation of the steps</i>
Problem definition	"How (foreign policy) problems are defined and delimited – what is included in or excluded from the description and specification of a policy challenge – is crucial in understanding how geopolitics operates." ⁷⁵
Development of a geopolitical strategy and policy line by an administration	
Geopolitical accommodation	"How policy-making tries to accommodate the interests, concerns and political needs of the various parties to a conflict."
Problem closure	"The identification, development and promotion of a perceived solution to the defined problem. 'Problem closure' may not actually provide any kind of resolution of the problem, but may operate as a form of postponement in the hope that it goes away or retreats from media and public consciousness." ⁷⁶

75 Ó Tuathail 2002, 622.

76 Ibid.

Ó Tuathail has developed this analytical apparatus for the study of foreign policy *decision-makers* and adopted his model to study the Bush administration's script on the Bosnian crisis. I do not study the Eltsin or Putin administration and their answers to everyday policy challenges before the media. In addition, Russian politicians in the State Duma and Russian parliamentary parties do not have much *formal* power in (foreign) policy formulation and (foreign) policy decision-making, or in their implementation; that is, they do not develop a policy line or accommodate the interests of various parties. Therefore, the second and third steps of the script level are ignored in this study, and I focus on the storylines (problem definition and problem solution). It must be mentioned that the State Duma had more power during Eltsin's time and that it has been claimed that during Putin's time policy formulation and decision-making is in the hands of the president, the presidential administration and various informal actors. Of course, the laws are passed by the Duma but many of them are initiated by the president or the idea for a bill has come from the presidential administration and, as usual, the president signs the laws.

However, it is not the formal or informal *decision-making* power of parliamentary parties, which is under examination here. My focus is first on public arguments as a part of reality themselves (constituting geopolitical discourses, either supporting or challenging the hegemonic discourse). Second, I assume that these arguments have at least some *influence on decision-makers, those formulating policies, and on the public opinion, or that they or some of them reflect the 'general' atmosphere in society* (geopolitical culture).⁷⁷ Therefore, I take it for granted that the parliamentary parties have and use power when arguing in public.

Even though Ó Tuathail's storyline component is a relevant tool for understanding a (more general) geopolitical storyline of parties concerning Chechnia and NATO, it does not give me good enough tools to explore the differences and similarities of arguments between the individual politicians of the parties and within the parties. I use the storyline to look for answers given to the questions of where, what, who, why and so what (grammar of geopolitics) by politicians of the parties of power, the Communist Party and Iabloko – and I understand this step as the problem definition – and in addition, look for solutions offered by these parties (problem closure). It is not enough to answer to the question of what their claims are, but what matters most is how these claims are justified. For comparing arguments, we must analyse the argument itself – its structure. We may 'dissect' the argument by using Stephen Toulmin's model of argument. With this analytical tool we may find differences between arguments, which may look similar if just focusing on claims. We may examine how this is justified, grounded, how strong the argument is, and what the counterarguments are.

⁷⁷ As Kolossov argues through the media politicians participate in shaping the public opinion and the public opinion, in its turn, has a chance to affect the decisions taken. In the Soviet Union, public opinion did not shape the decisions taken in foreign policy, but in Russia the situation has changed to some extent (Kolossov 2003, 122).

5.2.3 New rhetoric and Stephen Toulmin's model of argument

As I argued in the previous section, it is not enough to grasp the more general geopolitical narrative answers to questions such as what and where is Chechnia, who are to be blamed for what has been going on there, and what solution should be adopted. It is not enough to merely answer *what* politicians have argued, but in addition *how* they have argued.⁷⁸ We should look more closely at the specific arguments – how their structure helps us to understand the similarities and differences between arguments of politicians of the same party and those from different parties. In order to achieve this I adopt Stephen Toulmin's model of argument.

Here, the interest in Stephen Toulmin's⁷⁹ work springs, in general, from his overall position in the sciences – his critic of what has been called 'Platonic essentialism' and, particularly from his work in the field of rhetoric, the model of argument which he introduced in *the Uses of Argument* (1958). Toulmin's model has been adapted, extended and criticized especially in the fields of philosophy and communication studies.⁸⁰ For example, Toulmin's model has been criticized for not taking into account the context and that it is unclear what is meant by one component of the argument – a warrant. However, my focus is on how "Toulmin's analysis and terminology provide an appropriate structural model by means of which rhetorical arguments may be laid out for analysis and criticism and they suggest a system for classifying artistic proofs which employs argument as a central and unifying construct", as Brockriede and Ehninger, who introduced Toulmin to the American audience, argued.⁸¹ Thus by using his model of argument we can reveal, for example, how two politicians arrive at the same conclusion (a claim in Stephen Toulmin's terminology, see below), but may use completely different grounds (e.g.

78 However, my point is not to evaluate the 'quality' of argumentation, whether the arguments expressed are better or worse formulated than others etc.

79 Stephen Edelston Toulmin was born in London in 1922. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics and natural sciences from King's College in 1942 and Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees from Cambridge. He moved to the United States in 1965 and is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Colleague of Toulmin, Professor of Philosophy Marx W. Wartofsky (*www document*) described Toulmin's intellectual career in the following way: "Toulmin the natural philosopher, Toulmin the ethical theorist, Toulmin the philosopher of clinical medical science, Toulmin the theorist of rhetoric, Toulmin the historian of concepts, Toulmin the virtuoso of cognitive psychology, Toulmin the historical sociologist of the interface between science and politics, Toulmin the student of Wittgenstein, Toulmin the historian of physical sciences, and of evolutionary biology, and of medicine, Toulmin The philosopher of practical reason and of rhetoric, Toulmin the culture historian. The range makes people nervous, particularly academics. Among us, a plurality of interests is as suspect intellectually as a plurality of worlds would be ontologically or a plurality of faiths theologically. [...But] for Toulmin, the different disciplines, and even the alternative methods within a discipline, are emblematic of pluriversity, to adapt William James's term. Different 'worlds' each call for methods of inquiry appropriate to the different subjects under consideration [...]. Each inquiry, each subject, each discipline has its distinctive parameters, its ways of being grasped. It is this tolerance of their differences, this concern for the varieties of reason, that marks Toulmin's approach to the sciences and makes him an arch critic of the Platonic essentialism which argues for a unified 'science' and a unitary scientific method."

80 For these discussions, see e.g. Freeman 2005 and Hitchcock 2005. Furthermore, on criticism raised against the Toulmin model, see e.g. an article by Christopher Schroeder (*www document*). David Hitchcock and Bart Verheij have edited a book *Arguing on the Toulmin Model – New Essay in Argument Analysis and Model*. Argumentation Library, Vol. 40. 2006.

81 Brockriede & Ehninger 2000, 239.

data, warrant, backing in Toulmin's terminology) when moving towards this conclusion and justifying it.

Stephen Toulmin specialized in logic and the philosophy of science. He, along with Chaim Perelman, can be classified as founders of the new rhetoric.⁸² Perelman begins with questions like "What does justification of values 'look like' in actual, verbal discourse?"⁸³ How do claims to reasonableness arise in prose that is not formally logical?⁸⁴ Perelman argues that "arguments, which are more or less strong, try to persuade or convince persons to whom they are addressed. Dialectic reasoning deals with justifiable opinion. [...] Theory of argumentation studies this dialectic reasoning. Dialectic reasoning consists of arguments, which seek the acceptance or rejection of a debatable thesis.[...] The theory of argumentation (the new rhetoric) covers the whole range of discourse that aims at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience addressed and whatever the subject matter".⁸⁵ Referring to Aristotle, Perelman argues that "recourse to argumentation becomes necessary in practical disciplines such as ethics and politics, where choices and controversies are inevitable, and also in situations where private deliberations or public discussions arise."⁸⁶ Indeed, since the 1980s it has become commonplace to study the rhetoric of political texts or of politicians' texts.⁸⁷

Perelman stressed the importance of the audience and was interested in the verbal structures by which the audience could be convinced or persuaded. "Argumentation is intended to act upon an audience, to modify an audience's convictions or dispositions through discourse, and it tries to gain a meeting of minds instead of imposing its will through constraint or conditioning".⁸⁸ The audience is "the gathering of those whom the speaker wants to influence by his or her arguments",⁸⁹ not necessarily the person who is addressed or all those who can hear the speaker. Here I assume that the audience is the Russian universal audience, i.e. all Russians who have the right to vote (the electorate), and includes other politicians in the political elite, especially the political leadership of the country. Public arguments are part of the political struggle and they are addressed at rivals and at the voters and those who have the highest political power. However, it must be mentioned that the readership of the newspapers varies greatly. For example, the readership of *Zavtra* is quite different from that of *Novaia Gazeta*, and differ-

82 When writing the *Uses of Argument*, Toulmin, a philosopher, never thought that he would be contributing to the study of rhetoric. This was revealed to him only later, when he moved to the United States and discovered that the study of rhetoric was doing fine and that scholars of that field were taken by Toulmin's model. (Foss, Foss and Trapp, www document.)

83 Introduction, Perelman 1982, viii.

84 Ibid., ix.

85 Ibid., 3, 4 and 5.

86 Ibid., 6.

87 Political texts may be produced by anyone, not only by politicians, and texts of politicians do not necessarily have to be political. Or at least, politicians most often want to hide the political aspect of their texts. Politicians prefer to represent themselves as neutral, objective and professional, and giving political-free *information* in contrast to opinions, ideas, interpretations.

88 Perelman 1982, 11.

89 Ibid., 14.

ent politicians get their texts published in different newspapers.⁹⁰ Going back to the discussion above on the impossibility of separating any ‘pure’ content from the form or its representation, I could also refer to Perelman:

Every argument implies a preliminary selection of facts and values, their specific description in a given language and an emphasis which varies with the importance given them. [...] But since a single and perfectly adequate way to describe reality does not exist, any other way cannot be seen only as a falsification or deformity; *the separation between the form and content cannot be realized in as simple a way as classical thought imagined it.* [...] *The opposition between data and construct is relative from the point of view of argumentation;* it enables us to separate the elements which come about through an interpretation from those about which there is an agreement that, until another comes along, is univocal and undisputed.⁹¹

That is, we cannot say where the form (representation) begins and content starts, or that there would be only one form for one content. Instead there are many forms in which the content might be expressed. And when the form changes, the content changes as well. Thus, it is very important to study the argument as a whole, and not to disregard the form when trying to filter the ‘pure content’ from the argumentation (or text).

Both Toulmin and Perelman view rhetoric as a way of knowing – they are modern epistemologists.⁹² As a way of knowing, rhetoric becomes a means for generating understanding.⁹³ As Robert Scott has argued: “[...] Truth is not prior and immutable but is contingent. Insofar we can say that there is truth in human affairs, it is in time; it can be the result of a process of interaction at a given moment. Thus rhetoric may be viewed [...] as a matter [...] of creating truth.”⁹⁴ Truth is created by the rhetorical process, which is situation- or context-bound.⁹⁵ Toulmin’s starting point is his criticism of formal logic, because it is not a way of knowing. According to Toulmin, the science of logic has turned away from practical questions towards the theoretical study on its own, free from all immediate practical concerns.⁹⁶ He asks “How far logic can hope to be a formal science, and yet retain the possibility of being applied in the critical assessment of actual arguments?”⁹⁷ The starting point, for Toulmin, is logical practise: “Logic is concerned with the soundness of the claims we make – with the solidity of the grounds we produce to support them – or, with the sort of case we present in defence of our claims.”⁹⁸ Toulmin equates

90 See the previous section on the primary data.

91 Ibid., 34, 39 and 41. Italics added.

92 Golden 2000, 235.

93 Ibid., 236.

94 Scott 1967 cited in Golden 2000, 236

95 Ibid., 236.

96 Toulmin 1958, 2.

97 Ibid., 3.

98 Ibid., 6.

logic with 'generalized jurisprudence'; "Arguments can be compared with law-suits, and the claims we make and argue for in extra-legal contexts with claims made in the courts, while the cases we present in making good each kind of claim can be compared with each other."⁹⁹

Toulmin begins from a question about the 'logical form', which has two aspects – a "question, what relevance the geometrical tidiness sought in traditional analyses of the syllogism could have for a man trying to tell sound arguments from unsound ones;" and the "further question whether, in any event, the traditional pattern for analysing micro-arguments – 'Minor Premiss, Major Premiss, so Conclusion – is complex enough to reflect all the distinctions forced upon us in the actual practise of argument-assessment." Toulmin argues that the "traditional pattern of analysis has two serious defects. It is always liable to lead us to pay too little attention to the differences between the different modes of criticism to which arguments are subject – to the differences between warrants and rebuttals. [... and secondly,] obscurity – the differences between different fields of argument, and the sorts of warrant and backing appropriate to these different fields."¹⁰⁰ Thus, Toulmin argues that justification for a claim differs in different fields, he is referring, e.g., to medicine and jurisprudence where we need to use different warrants and backings; they are field-dependent. However, as Johnson and Freeman have argued, the concept of a field and accordingly field-dependency is problematic,¹⁰¹ e.g. is politics a field? I would rather say that politics may concern many different fields, such as law, science, philosophy, astrology; that is, in political rhetoric various warrants and backings might be possible, depending on the context.

Toulmin searches for those stages of any justificatory argument "to see how far these stages can be found alike in the case of arguments taken from many different fields". This leads us to the rational form, the model of argument which follows a similar course regardless of the argument's field, that is, a claim-data-warrant-reservation-backing-qualifier model: "Whatever the nature of the particular assertion may be in each case we can challenge the assertion and demand to have our attention drawn to the grounds (backing, data, facts, evidence, considerations, features) on which the merits of the assertion are to depend."¹⁰² So even though the warrant and backing and rebuttal might be different in different fields, the structure (model) of the argument remains the same. "There are in a practical argument a good half-dozen functions to be performed by different sorts of proposition: once this is recognized, it becomes necessary to distinguish between claims, data, warrants, modal qualifiers, conditions of rebuttal, statements about the applicability or inapplicability of warrants."¹⁰³

99 Ibid., 7.

100 Toulmin 1958, 143.

101 Johnson cited in Freeman 2005.

102 Toulmin 1958, 11.

103 Ibid., 141–142.

As a way of knowing, an argument must advance knowledge. Conceptual change or knowledge generation is the result of practical reasoning.¹⁰⁴ When politicians reason in public, they (might) generate knowledge. It is this practical (geopolitical) reasoning of Russian politicians representing a parliamentary party that I am interested in and Toulmin's model is just the appropriate tool for studying it. As also argued above, arguments deal with probable or contingent propositions and their conclusions are tentative and modifiable. Argument is convincing when it is applicable to the situation at hand and when it produces a result that is 'better' than the status quo can offer, when it is relevant and when it is capable of justification.¹⁰⁵ However, we must also acknowledge that politicians are not necessarily arguing in public – they do not necessarily construct arguments as understood in a Toulminian way. They do not always present any reasons (data, warrant, backing) to support their claim, at least not explicitly (see below). Sometimes their statements consist of a mere claim. So in this case they do not practise logical reasoning and do not generate knowledge.

Let us now know look closer at the model of argument as introduced by Toulmin himself. First, what is an argument? According to Toulmin, an argument is

like an organism. It has both a gross, anatomical structure and a finer, as-it-were physiological one. A number of printed pages... one can distinguish the main phases marking the progress of the argument from the initial statement of an unsettled problem to the final presentation of a conclusion. The finer level comprises micro-arguments. The operation of arguments sentence by sentence, in order to see how their validity or invalidity is connected with the manner of laying them out, and what relevance this connection has to the traditional notion of 'logical form'.¹⁰⁶

My analysis will move from the 'gross structure' to the 'finer level' and back again, but the main focus will be on the gross structure, that is, on all the texts of a politician and on all the texts of all the politicians of a party.¹⁰⁷ As argued already above, the categories of an argument are too few in number in classical argumentation analysis and Toulmin argues that an argument comprises/may comprise the below introduced six components (TABLE 6).

104 Brockriede and Ehninger 2000, 248.

105 Ibid. 249.

106 Toulmin 1958, 94.

107 By 'all' I refer here to the parties examined, to the politicians examined, and to the texts in my data-set.

TABLE 6.
Explaining the model of argument

<i>Toulmin 1958/1979</i>	<i>Classical Rhetoric</i>	<i>Explanation by Toulmin (unless another author mentioned)</i>	<i>Adaptation of Toulmin's model to study Russian political parties' and politicians' arguments</i>
CLAIM	Conclusion	Assertions put forward publicly for general acceptance. Explicit.	CLAIM: What is the conclusion of the politician/the politicians of a party for each case?
DATA/ GROUNDS ¹⁰⁸	Major and minor premisses	What have you got to go on? Explicit: testimonies, statistical data etc.	DATA: On what grounds can the politician/the politicians of a party argue something? What evidence do they present?
WARRANT ¹⁰⁹	–	How do you get from the data to the claim? Why is this data relevant to the claim? (Freeman 2005). A generalized hypothetical statement; an inference rule (ibid.). A justified covering generalisation (but not universal), an inference-license (Hitchcock 2005) Implicit or explicit.	WARRANT: Explicit generalizations either used by the politician/the politicians of a party, or the implicit generalizations constructed by the author. What are politicians referring and appealing to in their argumentation?
RESERVATION, REBUTTAL	–	Conditions of exception indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside. Explicit.	REBUTTAL AND COUNTERARGUMENT: What is the reservation for the claim? Why would it not hold true? In which circumstances does it not hold true? Focusing more on the claim than on the warrant.
BACKING		Underlying theories, hypotheses on which warrants rely. Implicit or explicit (Freeman 2005).	BACKING: How is the warrant backed up by politicians? Statistics, examples or testimonies which provide justification for a warrant.
QUALIFIER	–	Explicit reference to the degree of force.	QUALIFIER: A construction by the author, not necessarily implicitly expressed. An assumption of the force based on other elements in the argumentation.

108 Hitchcock argues that the following grounds are justified: direct observation, written records of direct observation, memory, personal testimony, previous reasoning or argument, expert opinion, authoritative reference source.

109 Freeman (2005, 337) has an epistemic classification of warrants: a priori (necessary), empirical (discovering connections in the external world), institutional (based on learning sets of constitutive rules) and evaluative. This has to do with the evaluation of warrants, how relevant and reliable they are. Here I will not make normative statements on how reliable the warrants of Russian politicians' public arguments are.

Claims or conclusions are “assertions put forward publicly for general acceptance”.¹¹⁰ Data or grounds seek to establish the merits of the claim, they are the facts to which we appeal.¹¹¹ Data answer the question “What have you got to go on?” Data may equal, for example, someone’s testimony or statistical data, i.e. it is something on which the claim is based. As Brockriede and Ehninger argue: “Data and claim taken together constitute argument’s main proof line. [...] Claim implies ‘therefore,’ when the order [of claim and data] is reversed, the claim implies ‘because.’”¹¹² If we are to think about the example presented in the figure on the next page, we can see that in the first order, the sentence would go “Petersen is a Swede, therefore, Petersen is not a Roman Catholic”, and in the second case, “Petersen is not a Roman Catholic, because Petersen is a Swede”.

Warrants answer the question “How do you get there?” It is an assumption on why the data supports the claim or to put it differently: A warrant is a justification for inferring the claim from the grounds (data), it is appealing to *general* considerations. It is “the nature and justification of the step, which is committed by a particular set of data as the basis for some specified conclusion.” It should show that the “step to the original claim is an appropriate and legitimate one”. Warrants are “hypothetical statements, which act as bridges, and authorise the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us.”¹¹³ “The warrant, in a sense, is incidental and explanatory, its task being simply to register explicitly the legitimacy of the step involved and to refer it back to the larger class of steps whose legitimacy is being presupposed. [...] Data are appealed to explicitly, warrants implicitly.”¹¹⁴ Warrants are general, certifying the soundness of all arguments of the appropriate type.¹¹⁵ Warrants might be authoritative, substantive or motivational. They are general rules, laws or principles relevant to the case under examination, such as a relevant formula in science or a doctor’s experience in medicine.¹¹⁶ Warrants are an answer to how practical arguments are contextualised – how they are different from analytic arguments.¹¹⁷

Backing, rebuttal and qualifier may but need not necessarily be present in an argument.¹¹⁸ A *qualifier* is an “explicit reference to the degree of force which our data confer to our claim in virtue of warrant”. There are modal qualifiers and conditions of exception, that is, *rebuttals*. They are “distinct both from data and warrants, they comment implicitly on the bearing of W[arrant] on this step, qualifiers indicating the strength conferred by the warrant on this step, conditions of rebuttal indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside”¹¹⁹ *Backings* are “standing behind our warrants. [They are]

110 Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979.

111 Toulmin 1958, 97.

112 Brockriede and Ehninger 2000, 239.

113 Toulmin 1958, 98.

114 However, it has later been stated that warrants might be explicit too, see Toulmin et al. 1979.

115 Toulmin 1958, 100.

116 See Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979, 31, 47 and 50.


117 See Foss, Foss and Trapp, www document.

118 Brockriede and Ehninger 2000, 239.

119 Toulmin 1958, 101.

other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor currency”.¹²⁰ Backings are the underlying theories, hypotheses, on which warrants rely. They are “generalizations making explicit the body of experience relied on to establish the trustworthiness of the ways of arguing applied in any particular case”¹²¹. Thus, backings are supporting the way of arguing as expressed in the warrant.¹²² “The kind of backing we must point to if we are to establish its authority will change greatly as we move from one field of argument to another”.¹²³ “Statements of warrants are hypothetical, bridge-like statements, but the *backing for warrants can be expressed in the form of categorical statements of fact quite as well as can the data appealed to in direct support of our conclusions*”.¹²⁴ The backing of the warrants we invoke need not be made explicit – at any rate to begin with: the warrants may be conceded without challenge, and their backing left understood.¹²⁵ Backings might be statistics, examples or testimonies which provide justification for a warrant. Toulmin gives the following examples on how to recognize the data, warrant and backing.

FIGURE 1.
An Example of the Model of Argument
(Reproduced from Toulmin 1958)



So coming back to the meaning of warrant, David Hitchcock discusses the misconception on warrants: they are not premisses (data are premisses), nor are they implicit premisses. Instead,

¹²⁰ Ibid., 103.

¹²¹ Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979, 57.

¹²² Ibid., 58.

¹²³ Toulmin 1958, 104.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 105.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 106.

as argued above, they are inferences from data to the conclusion.¹²⁶ What we must recognize are the “different roles played in practical argument by one’s data and by the backing for one’s warrant” and that these different roles “make it rather unfortunate to label them alike ‘premisses’. A ‘singular premiss’ expresses a piece of information *from* which we are drawing a conclusion, a ‘universal premiss’ now expresses, not a piece of information at all, but a guarantee *in accordance with* which we can safely take the step from our datum to our conclusion. Such a guarantee will be neither factual nor categorical but rather hypothetical and permissive.”¹²⁷ That is, the speaker assumes that the audience agrees with her/his general rule.

If we still further think about warrants, we can say that there are warrant-using and warrant-establishing arguments. Warrant-using arguments are “those in which a single datum is relied on to establish a conclusion by appeal to some warrant whose acceptability is being taken for granted”, that is, a question of inference and deduction. Warrant-establishing arguments are “such arguments as one might find in a scientific paper, in which the acceptability of a novel warrant is made clear by applying it successively in a number of cases in which both ‘data’ and ‘conclusion’ have been independently verified. In this type of argument the warrant, not conclusion, is novel and so on trial”, i.e. it is a question of induction.¹²⁸

Moreover, Toulmin stresses the importance of recognizing the difference between analytic arguments (which make up a tiny minority of all arguments) and substantial ones. “An argument from D to C will be called analytic if and only if the backing for the warrant authorising it includes, explicitly or implicitly, the information conveyed in the conclusion itself. Where the backing for the warrant does not contain the information conveyed in the conclusion, the statement ‘D,B, and also C’ will never be a tautology, and the argument will be a substantial one.”¹²⁹ In addition, Toulmin is doubtful “whether any genuine, practical argument could *ever* be properly analytic.”¹³⁰ What Toulmin argues about practical argumentation in particular is also very true in the case of arguments of Russian politicians as well, as we will see in the following analysis chapters: “We make claims about the future, and back them by reference to our experience of how things have gone in the past; we make assertions about a man’s feelings, or about his legal status, and back them by references to his utterances and gestures, or to his place of birth and to the statutes about nationality; we adopt moral positions, and pass aesthetic judgements, and declare support for scientific theories or political causes, in each case producing as grounds for our conclusion statements of quite other logical types than the conclusion itself.”¹³¹

Brockriede and Ehniger adapted Toulmin’s model in 1960 and introduced a way in which this model could be used to find what artistic proof the arguments use (what kind of warrants)

126 Hitchcock, www document.

127 Toulmin 1958, 114.


128 Ibid., 120.

129 Ibid., 125.

130 Ibid., 127.

131 Ibid., 124.

FIGURE 2.
Analytical Diagram
(adopted from Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979)



and what kind of claims are made. Artistic proof might be substantive, authoritative¹³² or motivational¹³³; motivational arguments correspond to Aristotle's *pathos*, authoritarian to *ethos* and substantive to *logos*. Substantive arguments use, for example, generalization¹³⁴, parallel case¹³⁵, analogy¹³⁶ or classification^{137, 138}.

132 Data: factual reports or statements of opinion. The warrant affirms the reliability of the source from which they are derived. The claim reiterates the statement which appeared in the data, as now certified by the warrant. Studying the ethos of the speaker. (Brockriede and Ehninger 2000, 244–245.)

133 Data: one or more statements which may have established as claims in a previous argument or series of arguments. The warrant provides a motive for accepting the claim by associating it with some inner drive, value, desire, emotion or aspiration or with a combination of such forces. The claim as so warranted is that the person, object, event or condition referred to in the data should be accepted as valuable or rejected as worthless or that the policy there described should or should not be adopted or the action there should or should not be performed. (Ibid., 245.)

134 Data: information about a number of persons, objects, events, or conditions, taken as constituting a representative and adequate sample of a given class of phenomena. Warrant assumes that what is true of the items constituting the sample will also be true of additional members of the class not represented in the sample. Claim: makes explicit the assumption embodied in the warrant. (Ibid., 242.)

135 Data: one or more statements about a single object, event or condition. The warrant asserts that the instance reported in the data bears an essential similarity to a second instance in the same category. Claim: affirms about the new instance what has already been accepted concerning the first. (Ibid., 243.)

136 Data: relationship of a certain nature exists between two items. Warrant assumes that a similar relationship exists between a second pair of items. The claim makes explicit the relationship assumed in the warrant. (Ibid.)

137 Data: a generalized conclusion about known members of a class of persons, objects, events or conditions. The warrant assumes that what is true of the items reported in the data will also be true of a hitherto unexamined item which is known (or thought) to fall within the class there described. The claim transfers the general statement which has been made in the data to the particular item under consideration. (Ibid.)

138 See also Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979: reasoning from analogy, from generalization, from sign, from cause. As mentioned above it is not soundness or truth-value of politicians' arguments which is under examination here. However, according to Toulmin et al. eg. appealing to the people, appealing to compassion and appealing to force (a threat) are seen as 'fallacies' in argumentation. (See *ibid.*, 174–176.)

Narrative and rhetorical analyses have been previously combined in Political Science or IR, for example, by Riikka Kuusisto in her studies on the rhetoric of the United States, British and French leaders on the wars in the Gulf and Bosnia.¹³⁹ Compared to Kuusisto's analysis, this study uses narrative analysis just to give an introduction to the argumentation of Russian parliamentary parties. It serves as a more easily comprehensible overview of the arguments of each party. Kuusisto gives a more detailed description of 'foreign policy stories', their plots and images of the enemy. The narrative analysis answers the questions 'why' (and only to some extent 'how'). Kuusisto uses rhetorical analysis for examining, e.g., the audiences, premises and argumentation techniques (Perelman), motives for action (Burke) and the backings used (Toulmin), i.e. in answering the question 'how'. However, all these could, to some extent, be analysed by just adopting the Toulminian model. The premises as referred to by Perelman can be revealed by focusing on the warrant and backing, that is, whether the audience is assumed to share the same values and goals or whether the rhetoric needs to refer to some 'facts'. The argumentation techniques can be discovered by using Brockriede and Ehninger's adoption of the Toulmin model (whether comparison, analogy or generalization is used). Motives could be looked at by analysing data, warrant and backing. So the stress in this study is on the rhetorical analysis, what we can say on the basis of that on the arguments used, especially the justifications for the claims that the politicians made (data, warrant, backing) and the counterarguments provided.

5.2.4 Case-specific research questions

The measurement unit in my analysis is both a politician and a political party. First I introduce the analysis based on the storyline concept and name this storyline, which will be introduced in a table (for answers to the questions of the grammar of geopolitics, see above). All the texts of a party concerning each case will be used for this analysis. Then I will go to the level of a politician and I analyse all the texts of that politician on Chechnia and on NATO and present an analysis of arguments based on Toulmin's model of argument. I give examples from politicians' texts and here I also look for differences between different politicians of the same party. Then I return to the level of a party by combining these elements of the argument of all the politicians of a party and of the party programmes. I present a model of argument of a party for each case in a table following each analysis section.

When analysing the texts and the arguments expressed in them, I ask whether we can see any difference between the opposition and the power and whether the opposition offers any real alternative to that of the party of power – and especially how their arguments differ from each other (whether at all). According to the analysis schemes introduced above the 'case-specific' questions are as follows:

139 Kuusisto 1998 and 1999.

I Russo-Chechen relations

First, what are the storylines of the ‘parties of power’, Iabloko and KPRF? That is, using Ó Tuathail’s grammar of geopolitics, I ask where, what, who and why the conflict in Chechnia is taking place and what it means to Russia and the world? How do the parties represent Chechnia (and Russia) and Chechens (Russians) or in general the parties in the conflict? Is Russia in a ‘fight against international terrorism’?

Second, I move to the level of the individual politicians of each party and, using Toulmin’s terminology, I ask what is each politician’s (main) claim(s). Does their claim change when moving from the first to the second Chechen war? How do they move to that claim? I will look at what kind of artistic proof is applied, that is, how warrant travels in carrying the data to the claim. Is this done by means of an “assumption concerning the relationship existing among phenomena in the external world” (substantive arguments), by means of an “assumption concerning the quality of the source from which the data are derived” (authoritative arguments) or by means of an “assumption concerning the inner drives, values or aspirations which impel the behaviour of those persons to whom the argument is addressed” (motivational arguments).¹⁴⁰ Thus, I ask how they justify their claim, i.e. what is their data (evidence) and how they support the warrant (what is the backing); which counterarguments do they offer (if any). Then, at the end of the analysis, I move back to the party level and look at the model of argument for a party as a whole. Thus, I move from the macro-level to the micro-level and back to the macro-level of argumentation in my analysis. On the macro-level of argumentation (arguments in all texts of a party), I look for a common nominator, for a basic claim or an umbrella statement under which all the other statements fall. This claim is a paraphrase and it is not necessarily expressed explicitly with the exact words that I use. That is, I might combine two or three different statements in order to derive this claim (in the tables). However, the data and backing, which I introduce in the text, are extracted directly from the data.

II Russia-NATO relations

First, what is the storyline of the ‘parties of power’, Iabloko and KPRF? Using Ó Tuathail’s grammar of geopolitics, I ask where, what and is the NATO enlargement taking place, who are ‘behind’ it, and what meaning does it have for Russia? What about the conflict in Kosovo? What does it mean to Russia and how should it have been solved? Who were to be blamed? How do they represent NATO and/or the states comprising it (or the West in general)?

Second, I again move to the level of politicians of each party. Using Toulmin’s terminology, I ask what is their claim and how strong is their claim (that is, do they qualify their claim in any way)? And how do they move to that claim, that is, what kind of artistic proof is applied (see above)? How do they justify their claims? What reasons do they give for the claims? Why

¹⁴⁰ Brockriede and Ehninger 2000, 242.

should we believe in these claims – what evidence do they provide for the reasons? That is, from Russia's point of view, do these politicians find enlargement and the Kosovo operation justified and how do they justify or unjustify it? What should have been done and what should have Russia's role been in these? Finally, again, I go back to the level of a party and present the model of argument of each party as a whole.

To conclude, I also look at the geopolitical vision (see Chapter Two on Research Agenda), that is, I try to generalize from the case and look at a more general level on the geopolitical thinking of the parties.

In the Comparison and Geopolitical Vision sections I compare the parties on their storylines and on the model of argument levels, and finally on the geopolitical vision level.

6 Arguments on Russo-Chechen Relations I

In this Chapter I first describe the context in which the examined arguments were raised, that is, what, according to the previous research, happened in Chechnia during 1990-2006. This serves as a background for why it is important to study how Russo-Chechen relations are constructed in arguments on Chechnia. I then continue by looking at the events in 1994-1998, the first war in Chechnia and its aftermath until 1999. Finally I will go to my contribution, the analysis of the arguments of the political parties, first of Nash Dom – Rossiia, then of Iabloko and then of Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii. In the next chapter I will continue from this and look at the arguments from 1999 and the second war in Chechnia until the end of 2003.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most severe problems Russia has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been relations with Chechnia. The problem, as seen from the Russian side in the beginning of the 1990s, was separatism of the Chechens and consequently, the threat posed by this to the integrity of the Federation. As seen from the Chechen side, the problem was Russia's unwillingness to grant national self-determination to Chechnia. The extreme manifestation of the unsolved problems has been the Russo-Chechen wars, first in 1994-1996 and the second one beginning in 1999. The problems in Russo-Chechen relations and the efforts to solve them reflect other problems in post-Soviet Russia, especially to do with the administrative form and the territory of the Federation and all the political, economic, legal, social and moral issues connected to these. As Trenin has argued the "conflict has also become a hard test for Russia's territorial integrity within its post-Soviet borders. The authority of the current Russian state was never so weak as in the years of Chechnia's de facto independence [...]"¹ Russo-Chechen relations have been well discussed in the literature. We have been reminded of the history of this troubled relationship, e.g. Chechen resistance to imperial Russia, Chechnia's annexation to Soviet Russia and the deportation of Chechens (among other nationalities) to Central Asia

1 Trenin et al. 2004, 1.

in 1943–1944.² Scholars have addressed their attention to questions such as why Chechnia chose to declare independence unlike Tatarstan or other ethnically defined republics;³ why Russia chose a military solution instead of a political one or what the ‘roots’ of this military conflict were;⁴ and how Russia has approached problems in the whole of the North Caucasus.⁵ Moreover, studies have focused on how Chechens have been described in the Russian media and how the Russian attitudes towards the war changed from the first Chechen war to the second⁶, why the West responded as it did to the Chechen declaration of independence⁷ and whether the Council of Europe was able to change Russian policy on Chechnia⁸ or, in discussing arguments for and against the possibility of Russia’s collapse, what kind of role Chechnia might have in it⁹. Moreover, scholars have paid their attention to an extremely important and sensitive issue – human rights violations in Chechnia.¹⁰

Finally, Soili Nystén-Haarala has studied the legal arguments used for and against Chechnia’s right to secede from the Federation.¹¹ As she has noted, Chechnia appeals to international law when arguing for the right to national self-determination, whereas Russia appeals to the Constitution of the Russian Federation when arguing for safeguarding its integrity. In Eastern

2 See e.g. Gökay 1998, 25–64; Flemming 1998, 65–86, Sirén, 1998, 87–269, all the above mentioned chapters in Fowkes (ed.) 1998; Dunlop 1998.

3 Sharafutdinova 2000, 13–22; Mikhailov 2005, 43–66; see also Sakwa 2005 presenting different studies on disposition to secede.

4 See Isaenko & Petschauer 2000, 3–15, and Sirén 1998, 87–269. Isaenko and Petschauer argue that the breakdown of building a democratic state and society in Chechnia in 1991–1994 laid the basis for the federal military operation (ibid., 4).

5 Menon & Fuller 2000, 32–44. These authors wonder whether Moscow’s ‘chosen methods merely delay or actually accelerate fragmentation’ of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Menon and Fuller claim that Russia can never create a stable pro-Moscow government in Grozny and that there is a possibility that the North Caucasus would rather seek alignment with Turkey or even with Iran than with Moscow. (ibid., 40). Now we know that a pro-Moscow government has been established in Grozny, most recently by the presidency of Ramzan Kadyrov, but of course the time will show how stable it will be.

6 Russell 2002, 73–96.

7 Kagarlitskii 1999, 30–47, at p.38, argues that the World Community (the West) recognized Kuwait, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia as independent states in accordance with their own interests. Accordingly, they did not recognize Chechnia as independent, because the Russian elite was seen as a strategic partner of the West.

8 Fawn 2002, 3–20.

9 Hale & Taagepera 2002, 1101–1125. Hale and Taagepera (ibid., 1101–1102) cite President Putin, when he justifies the military operation in Chechnia by the danger of state collapse and the threat of the ‘Yugoslavisation of Russia’. Hale and Taagepera (ibid., 1104) recognize both ethnic and non-ethnic reasons for separatism. Only Tuva and Chechnia rank high on three out of four factors which increase the potential of the Federation subject to secede from the Federation. However, Hale and Taagepera (ibid., 1110 & 1112) conclude that the separatist potential of regions is weaker than that of the Union Republics in the USSR and that ‘Russia is unlikely to follow the Soviet ‘ethno-federal’ path of disintegration’.

10 See e.g. Poltkovskaia 2003, Cornell 1999, 85–100 and Heinze & Borer 2002, 86–94. Heinze and Borer actually claim that Russia is no different from other great powers in a similar situation. Double standards are usually used when criticising others’ conduct, but committing (having committed) the same kind of violations themselves. These authors argue that Chechnia is an exception in Russian human rights policy. Otherwise Russia is trying to protect human rights, for example, by supporting multilateral interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and East Timor. But instead, when the operation is not carried with the UN support, Russia has opposed it, as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and more recently Iraq.

11 Nystén-Haarala 2001, 1.

Europe in 1989 and 1990 the principle applied was to maintain the existing borders (*uti possidetis*), and as Chechnia was not a separate Union Republic, but part of the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic, its independence was not recognized. Still, Nystén-Haarala, like Kagarlitskii, wonders why Chechnia did not get international recognition, when the EU abandoned the principle of *uti possidetis* in 1991 and recognized the independence of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. According to her, there would have been many grounds for recognition, such as Russian aggression, Chechnia's annexation by force to the Soviet Union and the genocides during the Soviet era.¹² However, the Russian leadership keeps on arguing that in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation (unlike the Soviet Constitution concerning Union Republics), the Federation subjects do not have the right to secede. The referendum on the approval of the Russian Constitution was held on 12 December 1993 – 54.8% of the electorate voted, 58.4% of them for the Constitution. Chechnia did not participate in the referendum; hence, the then Chechen leadership claimed that it was not bound by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It had made a declaration on independence already on 1 November 1991 and in accordance with this, Chechnia was not part of Russia. However, Richard Sakwa argues that “international law does not recognize unilateral right to secession under whatever condition and through any procedure, however democratic.”¹³

From the legal point of view, the first Chechen war was based on two *ukases* of President Eltsin on restoring lawfulness in the republic. Even though there was a lot of discussion whether these *ukases* were lawful, the Constitutional Court decided that they were in fact in accordance with the Constitution by a vote of 8 against vs. 11 in favour. The second war was based on the assumption that Chechens had committed terrorist acts, and the offensive was begun in accordance with the Federal law on the fight against terrorism.¹⁴ President Putin was actually convinced that this ‘counter-terrorist operation’ had saved Russia and Russia's unity:

The situation in the Republic has become so difficult that this territory became a bridgehead for expansion of international terrorism to Russia. The initial cause here was also the absence of the state unity. And Chechnia in 1999 recalled the former mistakes. And only the counter-terrorist operation could remove the threat of Russia's collapse, professional soldiers helped to protect the dignity (*dostoinstvo*) and integrity of the state.¹⁵

However, as Trenin argues “while terrorism is certainly present in the republic, it is not the dominating element in Chechnia. Terrorism exists alongside separatism and ordinary banditry. Failing to distinguish terrorism from banditry leads to policy distortions and a loss of credibil-

12 For example, Sakwa disagrees with this view and argues that before the declaration of independence and the first war in Chechnia liberal Russian leaders were not planning any repression against Chechens, there were no violations of human rights. So Chechens did not have the remedial right to secession like Kosovo would have. (Sakwa 2005, 12.)

13 Sakwa 2005, 13–14.

14 Nystén-Haarala 2001, 4–10.

15 Putin 8 July 2000, www document.

ity [...]”¹⁶ So if the official argumentation of the Russian leadership was that the reason for the 1994–1996 war was retrieval of constitutional order against ethnic separatism, for 1999– war it was international terrorism, that is, the war was termed a counter-terrorist operation.¹⁷ At first, this war “isolated Russia politically and diplomatically from the West”, but “the events of September 11 enabled Russia to use Chechnia as a stage for achieving rapprochement with the United States and NATO.” Trenin even argues that “without Chechnia, Moscow probably would not have joined the antiterrorist coalition”¹⁸

The developments in Chechnia are so intertwined with other developments in the Russian Federation (and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space) that it is difficult to speak about them without any references to this context. As Trenin has argued, “the importance of Chechnia can be fully understood only in a wider context that there is a similar potential for conflict to develop in nearby oil- and gas-rich regions. Kazakhstan, Ferghana Valley, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan”¹⁹ Thus, Russo-Chechen relations and the situation in Chechnia itself are part of the post-Soviet reality, part of a ‘bigger picture’, with other parts influencing it and vice versa. “Whereas the war is largely peripheral to Russia and is largely perceived that way, the *conditions that have been created or greatly amplified by Chechnia have spread all across Russia*”²⁰ However, my purpose is not to study and disclose what has happened for ‘real’ in Chechnia, what were the ‘real’ reasons behind the counter-terrorist operation, or what is the ‘real’ state of Russo-Chechen relations. This has been done elsewhere (see above).²¹ For example, it has been claimed that the problem of Chechnia lies between two models of Russian statehood, that is, an imperial tsarist statehood tradition vs. a democratic federation²² or, to have different understanding of the problem, it is a question of these societies being in a different ‘historical time-zone’, i.e. a ‘post-modern Europe’, a ‘modern Russian state’ and the ‘largely traditional social environment of the North Caucasus’.²³ This is not a study of Chechnia – no Chechen voices are heard here. Instead, this is a study of Russia – of particular Russian political actors and their view of the world. As argued in the Introduction, Chechnia is seen here as an example of Russia’s geopolitics and, what is said about it as an example of Russian geopolitical argumentation.

The large scale military operation has long been over, but – either regardless of or due to this operation – the acts of terror have continued, such as the theatre siege in Moscow in 2002, the assassination of President Kadyrov and the school siege in Beslan in 2004. Federal forces have succeeded in assassinating fighter Khattab in 2002, ex-president Aslan Maskhadov in March 2005 and, most recently, the most wanted man in Russia, leader of the fighters Shamil

16 Trenin 2004, 3.

17 See Isaenko and Petschauer 2000, 4 and Trenin 2004, 2.

18 Trenin 2004, 2.

19 Ibid., 4.

20 Ibid., 1.

21 See e.g. Fowkes 1998 and Dunlop 1998 concerning the first war, or e.g. Evangelista 2002 and Trenin, Malashenko with Lieven 2004 concerning the second war.

22 Trenin 2004, 2.

23 Ibid., 3.

Bashev on 10 July 2006. The federal centre has also been able to organize a referendum on the status of Chechnia²⁴ in March 2003 and later in the October 2003 presidential elections²⁵ and parliamentary elections.

6.2 THE WAR IN CHECHNIA 1994–1996 AND ITS AFTERMATH: RE-BUILDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OR FIGHTING FOR NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION?

Before the Belovezha Accords and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudaev had seized power in Chechnia in September 1991.²⁶ On 1 November Dudaev declared Chechnia independent.²⁷ In 1992 Russian troops were compelled to withdraw from Chechnia. During his rule Dudaev encountered a lot of opposition and for example, he dissolved the parliament which had set a motion to impeach him. The federal centre supported some politicians in the opposition and executed covert operations against the Dudaev regime in 1992–1994. Eltsin made the formal decision for war on 30 November 1994. The President argued that “taking into account that this is a republic of the Russian Federation, we cannot stay aside from this bloodshed”²⁸. He had given the task of preparing concrete steps to stabilize the situation in Chechnia to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Secretary of the Security Council Oleg Lobov. According to the President, in this operation it was a question of measures to re-build peace and democracy, constitutional lawfulness and order in the Chechen Republic.²⁹ The Dudaev government responded that “the address of the president of the RF gives the Chechen government the right to take adequate measures to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity (*tselostnost*) of the republic” and that the address is “violating international law”.³⁰ According to the Chechen leadership, Russia was breaking international law by declaring a “state of emergency in the territory of a sovereign polity” and by “interfering in the internal affairs of another state”. Moreover, the foreign policy leadership of Chechnia appealed to Islamic states for support. Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev had argued that the

24 The constitution of the Chechen Republic was accepted by the referendum in the Chechen Republic on 23 March 2003.

25 In the presidential elections the official rate of participation was 87.8 %, 80.84 % voted for Kadyrov. However, many instances have claimed that neither the campaign nor the elections themselves would have been free and democratic.

26 After that Dudaev was elected the president of Chechnia, but it has been argued that these elections were not democratic at all. See, e.g. Sirén, 1998, 88.

27 Almost all *Union* republics had given their declaration of independence before this.

28 Eltsin cited in 30 November 1994, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

29 The press service of President, *Rossiiskaia gazeta* 30 November 1994. Furthermore, President addressed the president of Republic Adygei, the president of North Ossetia (Aslaniia), president of Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, heads of administration of Stavropol krai, Krasnodarsk krai, Rostov oblast, the head of Karachaevo-Cherkess Republic and chair of the council of ministers of Karachaevo-Cherkess Republic and demanded guaranteeing the Constitution of the RF, human rights and citizen rights, stopping the bloody conflict in Chechnia and taking any measures to carry out constitutional order, protection of human rights and legal interests of citizens and first of all, right to life and security.

30 The declaration of the Chechen government 29 November 1994.

Russian armed forces had not participated in the events in Chechnia, but instead that it was fight for power within Chechnia. In contrast, Dudaev claimed that there was no Chechen opposition, and Russians were fighting against his government.³¹

As mentioned above, from the legal point of view, the first Chechen war was based on two *ukases* on restoring lawfulness in the republic. The first war in Chechnia was officially begun on 11 December 1994 and was ended by the Khasaviurt Accord³² just after the presidential elections in Russia in 1996. This accord has been called disgraceful or traitorous by some Russian politicians, because it partly enabled a *de facto* independence in Chechnia. Actually, it was already on 31 March 1996 when Eltsin announced that from 1 April 1996 there would be peace in Chechnia. However, in reality military actions did not stop. Two months later, on 28 May 1996, Eltsin visited Chechnia and announced the war is over. But right after 3 July, the victory of Eltsin in the elections, the battle actions were again activated and dozens of civilians died.³³ From July the withdrawal of forces began and on 6 August Grozny was in control of Chechen fighters. By 8 August many hundreds of Russian soldiers and officers had died.³⁴ On 31 December 1996 the last Russian units left Chechen territory and in January 1997 presidential elections were organized in Chechnia. Aslan Maskhadov was elected the president of Chechnia.³⁵ On 12 May 1997 a peace accord, the Treaty on Peace and International Relations, was signed at the Kremlin.

During the interwar period the situation continued to deteriorate in the republic; there were numerous kidnappings and the influence of radical Islamic movements was getting stronger.³⁶ President Maskhadov was pressured by the field commanders and had to make many concessions, including a transition to Shariah law.³⁷ There was fighting on the Chechen-Dagestani border in the spring and summer of 1999 and the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen and Dagestani fighters led by Shamil Basaev and Khattab in the beginning of August gave the final reason to the just appointed Prime Minister Putin and president Eltsin for starting a 'counter-terrorist operation' in accordance with the Federal law on the fight against terrorism (see Chapter 6.3).

Matthew Evangelista, an American scholar, gives three explanations for the first Chechen war. The first concerns strategic arguments, that is, Chechnia's location is important when considering transportation junctions such as the Rostov-Baku highway and railroad, and that the only links between northern Russia and Trans-Caucasus and the countries of eastern and

31 Dudaev cited in 30 November 1994, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

32 The Khasaviurt (a place in Dagestan) Accord was signed on 31 August 1996. Moscow (represented by General Aleksandr Lebed) and Chechnia agreed to end the war and to a withdrawal of Russian soldiers from the territory of Chechnia.

33 Eltsin had signed the ukase No 985 on the withdrawal of forces from Chechnia (excluding 205 motorised brigade 8,000 people and 101 brigade of the internal forces with 4,000 people) on 25 June.

34 Izmailov, 25 November 2002 *Novaia gazeta*.

35 Many, e.g. Gakaev (2005, 29), have doubted the freedom and fairness of these elections.

36 See, e.g. Evangelista 2002, 46.

37 See *ibid.*, 58.

southern Europe go through its territory. Moreover, it is an important centre for oil refining and transport. The second explanation has to do with the historical and structural legacy of the Soviet system. There were 100 ethnic groups within the Soviet Union and the Chechen case is an extreme example of the phenomenon. Evangelista talks about mass deportations and about suppression of ethnic identity, but at the same time “creation or fostering that identity through the development of local institutions and formalization and teaching of indigenous languages, encouragement of native culture.” Thus, the Soviet Union could have been defined as a “hothouse of nationalism”; “The Soviet authorities created the formal institutions of self rule, [...] which provided the basis for assertions of autonomy during the post-Soviet transition.” The third explanation stresses the importance of leadership politics and personalities, which should by no means be underestimated.³⁸ Dzhabrail Gakaev, a Chechen professor based in Moscow, stresses that the war was primarily about the “conflicting interests of criminal mafia groupings and the political elites of the federal centre and the Chechen republic supporting them”. These interests were usually focused on oil. So he more or less agrees with Evangelista’s first and third explanation.

Below I will first look at the geopolitical storyline of each party based on the grammar of geopolitics by Gearoid Ó Tuathail, representing a more general analysis on the party level. Then I will look at the arguments of politicians of the party and analyse them according to the model of argument by Stephen Toulmin, representing a more detailed analysis on the politician level. Thirdly, I will draw a figure of each party’s model of argument on Chechnia. This is a generalization based on a more detailed analysis of politicians’ arguments plus an analysis of the party documents. To conclude the Chapter, I will make some comparisons between the parties. In addition, I will take the analysis to a more general level by presenting the geopolitical vision of each party which can be constructed on the basis of the Chechnia argumentation. This is the structure which I also follow in the next analysis chapters (Chapters 7 and 8).

6.2.1 Party of Power Nash Dom – Rossiia: Democratic Russia is protecting its citizens

Nash Dom – Rossiia’s storyline on the conflict in/with Chechnia could be named *Democratic Russia is protecting its citizens against Chechnia, which violates laws and human rights* (see TABLE 7 below). For the party of power the conflict is taking place in one of the subjects of the Russian Federation, but has potential to expand to other near-by subjects. What is happening is that a criminal regime has taken over and Russia should come to rescue its citizens. That is, Russia must protect the democratic development and security of its citizens. Russia must oversee that the Constitution and federal laws are obeyed. Russia has the will and resources to end the conflict – to make things right. Russia represents democracy, the rule of law, and stabil-

38 Ibid., 1–3.

ity, as just Dudaev and those who support him have chosen chaos. Dudaev and his supporters appear as the guilty ones in this storyline. As to what significance this conflict has, NDR politicians refer to it as a threat to security – not only security in Chechnia, but in the whole region (North Caucasus) and in the whole Russian Federation. Moreover, there is symbolic significance to the region – losing Chechnia would bring a terrible loss for the image of Russia's unity.³⁹

TABLE 7.
Our Home is Russia politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the conflict
in Chechnia 1995–1998

What is Chechnia and this conflict about?	Chechnia is an anti-constitutional regime, violating human and citizen's rights. The conflict is a war; a legal conflict; a fight for power among Chechens; Russia is defending democracy and security.
Where is it taking place?	Chechnia is a subject of the Russian Federation, located in the North Caucasus region. A problem on a national level.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	Failure of nationalities policy; fight for power among Chechens; Dudaev is not able to maintain order and government; Russia must defend its integrity and protect its citizens.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	Dudaev and those Chechen people who have chosen him vs. Zavgayev and Russia and ordinary Russian and Chechen people; those who are for chaos vs. those who are for order, stability, wealth.
What are Russian/ worldwide interests in the conflict?	It is a question of Russia's integrity; a question of law, democracy; a question of stability in the North Caucasus region; Russia can guarantee peace and order. If Chechnia was independent, it would threaten the whole region's stability.

In order to analyse the argumentation of Nash Dom – Rossiia in more detail (using the Toulmin model as described in Chapter 5) I will now turn to the level of politicians and their arguments. The arguments will be discussed politician by politician and in a chronological order. Here we will also pay more attention to the differences between NDR politicians – either members of the Nash Dom – Rossiia party or of its parliamentary faction.

³⁹ If we look at General Lev Rokhlin's argumentation, then we would have an alternative storyline of NDR (more on this below in more structured analysis of the NDR politicians' argumentation).

The claim, which Vladimir Zorin, the first deputy of the Territorial Administration of the Federal Organs of the Executive Power in the Chechen Republic, presents concerning the problem solution, may be paraphrased in the following way: *the problems are better to be solved by political process, in negotiations*.⁴⁰ This also concerns the situation in Chechnia. Zorin gives a few reasons to back up his claim: first of all, in democratic countries (such as the Russian Federation) the constitutional solution is the only appropriate one in contrast to military solutions using force in authoritarian regimes. Zorin uses a motivational and authoritative argument, appealing to values of democracy, but at the same time to the authority of Zorin to implicitly classify the Russian Federation as a democracy.⁴¹ Secondly, there seems to be will from both sides for negotiations (the Chechen population “has forced Dudaev” to suggest negotiations). Thirdly, the military operation has not brought any desired results. Here a substantive argument is used: the military operation has not brought the desired results in the past, so it will not bring them in the future either – it is a question of an analogy or classification.⁴² However, there is one exception to this claim and it concerns the authority of the delegations then negotiating:

I would like to stress that the delegations in the negotiations do not have the authority to make any decisions on the status of Chechnia. I am even a little bit astonished that this theme dominates in the discussion of the participants. According to the article in the Constitution of the Russian Federation on its integrity, the Chechen Republic is a subject of the Russian Federation. That is how the Constitution of our state says, and no instances have any right to change anything in this question.⁴³

Zorin qualifies his claim by saying that the Budennovsk events⁴⁴ have nothing to do with the decision to start negotiations, and that the decision was made before them.⁴⁵ Thus he tries to convince that the Russian leadership was not pressured or scared by this act of terror. The status should only be discussed after free democratic elections have been organized and a legitimate government elected in Chechnia (thus Zorin is denying the legitimacy of the Dudaev administration).

The second claim, which defines the status of Chechnia and lays the grounds for the problem solution, states that Chechnia is and will be part of a multi-national and multi-confessional

40 Vladimir Zorin published a book entitled as *Chechnia : kremisty put k miru* in the winter 1996/1997 publisher the executive committee of Nash Dom – Rossiia. Stas Stremidlovskii, 18 January 1997, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*. NDR, Knizhnyi kiosk.

41 Zorin, 28 July 1995, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

42 Ibid. Zorin is also referring to this on 10 January 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

43 Zorin, 28 July 1995, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

44 In June 1995 Shamil Basaev and his troops took hospital staff and patients as their hostages in a hospital in a town called Budennovsk in Stavropol oblast. This was said to be a response to Russian army’s massacre at the village of Samashki. See *Evangelista* 2002, 40.

45 Zorin, 28 July 1995, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

Russia. This is what is emphasized in the Programme of the NDR (1995), too.⁴⁶ Zorin refers to the Constitution in this issue (as in the example above). This can be understood as a substantive argument (the Constitution represents a part of ‘the reality’ to which Zorin refers) or as an authoritative argument (the Constitution as an authority). In addition to the Constitution, Zorin refers to the will of the people: “The majority of the population in Chechnia does not think of itself outside Russia. We are historically called to live together.” This can either be explained as a motivational argument appealing to the value of people making their own decisions, or as an authoritative argument either referring to history, the common past as an authority to be respected, or referring to Zorin’s capability to judge what the Chechen population wants and what is good for it. Chechens are just one nationality in the multinational federation and they should not be given any special status.

We have understood that we have to learn to live together by respecting each other. What is Russia? It is 147 languages, five world civilizations: Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic, Judaism and Buddhism. All these civilizations exist together in our country. And we just have to be able to respect one another and not force on each other our own way of life.⁴⁷

Civilizations are here defined by religion, that is, Zorin uses a religion-based definition of civilization. Zorin is certainly not alone using this ‘civilization discourse’. It is shared by communists and democrats alike. However, communists define a civilization not only by religion, but also by geography, and democrats by shared values and shared history (and to some extent this is true of communists, too).

Six months later the claim introduced by Zorin (now a NDR candidate) is that Chechnia is already on the way to a political solution (that is, a real peace) with the help of the federal centre and Doku Zavgayev, a former leader of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Zavgayev was appointed head of the Chechen Republic by Moscow in October 1995. Here Zorin works with the sharp juxtaposition of the federal centre and Doku Zavgayev on one hand and Dudaev and his followers on the other. Zorin supports his claim by comparing the Dudaev regime with that of Zavgayev and Russia’s role. The *Dudaev regime represents anti-democracy, lack of government and order*. In contrast, the Zavgayev regime represents the intensified activity of local organs of power and the Ministry of Interior of the Chechen Republic, which means to control the disarmament of terrorists and other criminal organizations and the possibility to participate in the elections.⁴⁸ Again the argument can be understood either as substantive or authoritative depending on whether we take Zorin’s account as ‘facts’ as such, or whether we take them as facts due to the fact that Zorin, as an expert on Chechnia, represents them. Further evidence

46 *Programma vserossiiskogo obshchestvennogo politicheskogo dvizheniia “Nash Dom – Rossiia”* 1995.

47 Zorin, 28 July 1995. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, almost the same statement in Zorin, 10 January 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

48 Zorin, 1 December 1995, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

on Chechnia moving forward towards a political solution and peace is provided by the fact that the elections were successfully carried out and the Chechen people voted actively.⁴⁹ According to Zorin, 48 per cent of them voted for Nash Dom – Rossiia. A rebuttal to this claim is brought up by the interviewer, who claims that according to some Chechen politicians only 3–5 per cent of the population voted instead of the official figure of 60 per cent. Zorin, however, refutes this by referring to his own experience at the places of voting (an authoritative argument, Zorin himself – an eye witness). As an exception to the possibility of finding the political solution, Zorin names Dudaev and his extremist surroundings, and especially what happened in Kizliar⁵⁰. According to Zorin, it was evidence of the extremist part trying to increase their authority against the more moderate surroundings of Dudaev, including Maskhadov.⁵¹

Again a couple of months later Zorin, now a Duma deputy of NDR and Chair of the Duma Committee on Nationalities, stresses the fact that the federal centre has the will to change the state of affairs, to solve the problems, and to negotiate with all the political forces of the Chechen republic (including Dudaev's side).⁵² Zorin actually ties the problems in Chechnia to a larger picture of the nationalities policy in the Russian Federation. According to him, Russia has 178 nationalities and that the right of all of them to their culture, language, education, legal proceedings in their native tongue, and representation in the power structures should be guaranteed. However, Russia does not “yet have legal basis for this. [...]for the protection of the rights and national survival of these ethnic groups we need a particular legal mechanism.”⁵³ Thus, the “conflict in the republic is not so much military or political as it is a legal conflict.”⁵⁴ As an example, Zorin gives “a document, which determines the special status of Chechnia. I mean the agreement which was signed by Doku Zavgaev from the Chechen side.”⁵⁵ But, as Zorin states, “there is no law in the Russian Federation which would allow the subject of the Federation to change its status. Therefore this agreement in practise does not exist, it is just a declaration of the intent.”⁵⁶

Zorin does not argue that any problems would be solved by giving a defined territory to a particular nation; problems concerning nationalities can and will be solved on the federation level.

49 Zorin, 10 January 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

50 Salman Raduev captured a hospital in Kizliar, an old Russian fortress town on the Terek river in Dagestan, and took 2000–3000 hostages. Russian forces attacked the hospital but stopped when Raduev's troops started to execute hostages. Raduev and his men were allowed to leave Kizliar, but the Russian forces broke the agreement and attacked the Chechen convoy at the village of Pervomaiskoe. The Chechen rebels retreated to the village with 80 hostages, who were later released to Dagestani officials. Raduev and his troops managed to escape. (Evangelista 2002, 41.)

51 Zorin, 10 January 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

52 Zorin, 22 March 1996, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Zorin is referring to the Federation Treaty.

56 Zorin, 22 March 1996, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

It is time to *separate questions of nationalities policy from the territorial aspect*. We will end up with a dead-end situation if we will determine a national 'flat' to each 178 nationalities. The state and the population itself should have a kind of legal mechanism, which would protect national rights of the citizen regardless of the fact in which part of Russia he lives.⁵⁷

Thus, in Zorin's understanding the rights of a nation or people (referring to minorities in the Russian Federation) should not be tied to a particular territory, i.e. a representative of a people should have the right to his/her culture and language in any part of the Russian Federation. In parallel, this means that these rights do not include the right to a particular territory, that is, a nation and a territory are not a pair, but separate from each other. Similar arguments are presented by politicians from opposition (see Iabloko's State Duma deputy Vladimir Lukin's arguments below).⁵⁸

Zorin is relieved that the negotiations have been started with Iandarbiev, and sees this as a 'huge compromise' from the federal side.⁵⁹ Iandarbiev actually represents "those who have arms in their hands." When in the summer of 1996 there were acts of terror in Moscow, Zorin warns that "one should not fall into hysteria and blame the whole nation without any proof." According to Zorin, these acts are the making of 'bad individuals' and there is no such thing as a 'bad nation'.⁶⁰ Thus, Zorin does not want to 'demonize' the Chechen people or 'totalize', that is, he does not use one trait (terrorist) to describe the whole Chechen nation, even though he agrees that there are terrorists among them. During the second war, Aslanbek Aslakhanov (a deputy from Chechnia who was a member of the Otechetsvo faction in the Duma), discussed the same issues (see the next Chapter).

After the peace agreements Zorin continues with the same claim as before (and this is quite understandable for a representative of the party of power): the Russian leadership has the will to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chechnia, has the will to cooperation. To back up his claim Zorin refers to Ivan Rybkin replacing General Lebed:

[...] his choice [Ivan Rybkin] is evidence of that the presidential power aims at mutual understanding and cooperation with all the instances of the federal power and with society, because Ivan Petrovich is a person who can discuss with all of them.[...] On the other hand, it is evidence of the fact that the policy of the federal centre has not changed aspiring to the peaceful solution of the crisis in the Chechen republic.⁶¹

57 Ibid.

58 Zorin's argument might also be understood as a criticism towards the Soviet heritage of ethnically defined territories, that is, ethno-territorial form of federalism. During Putin's era Russia has renewed its federal structure, e.g. now the number of federal has decreased from 89 to 86, and also the ethno-territorial form might be questioned in the future.

59 Zorin, 30 May 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

60 Zorin, 17 July 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

61 Zorin, 25 October 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*

Secondly, Zorin mentions Viktor Chernomyrdin as a guarantee of trying to solve the situation by political methods. We can take these either as substantive or authoritative arguments (either we know Rybkin's and Chernomyrdin's past and take it as a guarantee for a peaceful solution, or we trust a skilful politician's – Zorin's – word). Organizing the elections in Chechnia is, of course, a crucial part of the political solution.⁶² But all political forces in Chechnia should participate in these elections and thus accept the results.

Today the initiative of one side, let's say that of the federal side or that of Iandarbiev, and which is not agreed by the other side, it is not a way to the solution of the conflict but to confrontation. I do not think that we have to repeat again the attempts to solve the questions in a one-sided way [...] I am a supporter of that the only mechanism which will allow to solve the collision of who is who in the Chechen Republic are the elections, but there have been elections a few times, which have not been recognized by a part of the Chechen society – elections of Dudaev, Zavgayev etc.⁶³

As a rebuttal to his claim on the Russian side willing to find a political solution, Zorin mentions the State Duma. The peace process might be jeopardized by it if it does not give amnesty to separatist leaders (Iandarbiev, Maskhadov).

In 1997 Zorin repeats his claim that only political solution is possible in Chechnia.⁶⁴ To back up this claim Zorin states that people in Chechnia are bored of war, of chaos. Moreover, they have given their vote (in the presidential election) to a person who is able to put up an eternal peace and safeguard the dignity of the Chechen people. Zorin is convinced that Aslan Maskhadov is also an active supporter of the political process of solving the problems. In addition, Zorin is sure that Chechnia and Russia will live together: "The question is of the form – what means 'together'. What the Chechen people expect from this form is that it would prevent what happened in 1944 and 1994."⁶⁵ Zorin's argument can be understood first as substantive, that is, Maskhadov as a guarantee of the political solution. Second it can be taken as motivational when he is appealing to the will of Chechens to have peace and order.

Sergei Beliaev, Chair of Nash Dom – Rossiia's Duma faction,⁶⁶ presents "the peaceful regulation of the Chechen crisis regardless of Dudaev fighters" as the official position of the NDR parliamentary faction, "because it corresponds to the interests of Russia and its citizens. War leads to more victims and provokes Chechens to acts of terror."⁶⁷ Again we can see that security interests of the Russian citizens are given priority in the argumentation (a motivational argument).

62 See also Zorin, 31 December 1996, *Trud*: organizing elections is the only possibility to form any legitimate power.

63 Zorin, 25 October 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

64 Zorin, 29 January 1997, *Trud*,

65 Ibid.

66 Beliaev was the chair of the parliamentary faction only until August 1997.

67 Beliaev, 3 February 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

As for Nash Dom – Rossiia representatives in the government,⁶⁸ first Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets defines the situation in Chechnia as an act of birth of an illegal and anti-constitutional regime, which is violating fundamental human rights. For Soskovets, the reason for what is happening is that this regime is a “gain of adventurers who have cheated the people to total poverty”, but it has also to do with the “indecision of the federal power”. As a solution, Soskovets suggests strengthening the peace process and going to negotiations. He also gives his support to the new Chechen leadership.⁶⁹ Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the leader of NDR, blames solely Dudaev for the Chechen conflict: “The roots of this tragedy are in 1991 when an adventurer came to power, breaking all norms of the law.”⁷⁰ In January 1996 Chernomyrdin addressed the State Duma and argued that the population had given its “support and recognition for the policy of the RF.” As data for this claim, Chernomyrdin uses the results of the elections of the head of the Chechen Republic and of deputies to the State Duma. Chernomyrdin continues that “Dudaev supporters tried to destabilise the situation, but they morally and politically lost.”⁷¹

Next, let us look at a more deviant case among Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians – that of General Lev Rokhlin. Concerning Rokhlin there might be varying views as to which extent we can define him as a representative of this party of power. Rokhlin was number three on Nash Dom – Rossiia’s list in the parliamentary elections of December 1995, but in an interview from 11 August 1995 he still says that “Politics does not attract me. I will take part in the elections as a voter [...]”⁷² Moreover, when already a candidate, Rokhlin reveals his suspicion towards the party system: “I do not believe in the party, there are too many of those [in NDR], who eagerly strive to power. Therefore, one must count on experts [...]”⁷³ Consequently, we must bear these statements in mind when studying his arguments as a member of the NDR faction (and how much emphasis we give them when thinking about the NDR argumentation as a whole). Before becoming a candidate, Rokhlin blamed the political leadership for the mistakes made, for example, in training Chechen fighters to confront Dudaev (these fighters then moved to Dudaev’s side) and for starting the military operation: “We [the army] did not want to go there.” Rokhlin’s claim is that negotiations must be started, because “you cannot cover the whole of Chechnia with barbed wire”. In an interview Rokhlin argues against the war in Chechnia and in the beginning wonders “Why the weapons were not taken from Chechnia in 1991, when there was a chance for this? Why they transport oil to Chechnia?”⁷⁴ He does not

68 That is, those who became Nash Dom – Rossiia’s State Duma deputies but were ministers at the time of these statements.

69 Soskovets, 19 August 1995, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

70 Chernomyrdin, 24 November 1995, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

71 Chernomyrdin, 18 January 1996, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

72 Rokhlin, 11 August 1995, *Trud*.

73 What I have noticed is that counting on specialists, on experts is a continuing argument especially for the representatives of the parties of power; that is, anything ‘political’ and politicians have a very negative image, but specialists, experts, expertise, special knowledge, professionals have a positive image in their argumentation.

74 Rokhlin, 25 November 1995, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

say that the military solution would not have been necessary, but criticizes the political leadership of the decisions made and for the way the war was conducted. His claim is that *the war was a chain of mistakes and the political leadership must take the responsibility for this*. The army is just a medium, it does not have any responsibility for what is happening:

A soldier must fulfil the command.[...] If the army every time will think whether the command it is fulfilling is right or not, it is not an army. But always in all issues the permission, the demand must come from politicians which take the decision. And if they take such a decision on the use of [federal] forces, then they do not have the right to say “We did not know this or that“. And they have to bear the responsibility.⁷⁵

Rokhlin’s argument is substantive: from the results of the war we can judge that it was not well-planned and the decision to go to war was made by the political leadership; therefore, this was a political mistake. He, as an army general, stresses that it was not the army but the political leadership that should be blamed.

Rokhlin discusses four different options on how to get out from this situation. After introducing all the options he argues that ‘somewhere in the middle’ is the best option: “We have to use both cane and carrot. On one hand, we have to deal with those, who fight, with firmness, [but] on the other hand, let the others live peacefully. We have to stop the war crimes. For them you should be shot. [...] In Chechnia nobody was convicted [...]” We can take the four options, which are claims themselves, and reasons for not choosing any of these options as data. These data support his more general claim on using ‘both cane and carrot’. Even though Rokhlin says that “the first best is to negotiate“, he no longer believes in this option: “They have tried this option for four months after Budennovsk [hostage taking]. During this period none of the Chechen divisions surrendered the weapons. And what to do with [Shamil] Basaev and others, who did not only fight but also committed ordinary crimes?” As the second option, he proposes to “withdraw the forces, create a strong border and after the first terrorist act on our land send back all Chechens to the historical motherland.” But Rokhlin recognizes the ‘huge minuses’ of this option: “Chechens would bring a sea of weapons from the Muslim countries. And very soon these weapons would be in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria. Mountain borders cannot be closed.” The third variant is “to prepare the troops and destroy the gangs.” As a fourth option, Rokhlin proposes “not to engage with them at all. The fighters are in the mountains, it is difficult to get them out of there. But the mountains could be isolated.” The first option is a substantive argument, Rokhlin refers to past experience, and the second option can either be taken as a substantive argument (continuing the fight would be something characteristic for Chechens or the nature of the situation would lead to its expansion) or as an authoritative argument (if General Rokhlin argues that this is what will happen, the audience will believe it). The third option is not supported by any data or backing for the warrant. The

75 Ibid.

fourth option could be understood again either as substantive (experience from the past) or as authoritative (an army general knows how the situation is). In the last three options Rokhlin refers to his geographic 'knowledge' when justifying his claim.

A year later Lev Rokhlin comments on the agreements between the federal centre and the Chechen republic and the ukase of the President on the withdrawal of the troops (101st and 205th brigades) during an extraordinary session of the Duma "On guaranteeing the territorial integrity and security of the Russian Federation" on the Friday before 4 December 1996.⁷⁶ The main claim, which Lev Rokhlin makes, is that Chechnia must be kept as a subject of the Russian Federation and the only way to do this is to keep/make it dependent on Russia (that is, the agreement should not be signed). Rokhlin starts by describing the then situation in which the Russian Federation cannot control Chechnia:

Whatever agreement or ukases are made, factually Chechnia has already freed itself from the control of the Russian Federation: it has its own army, and other institutes of that kind, controls its territory, does not fulfil any economic commitments to the federation, it passes and changes laws which are not congruent with the Constitution [of the Russian Federation].⁷⁷

Violation of the Russian Constitution by regional legislation was true of many other federation subjects, too, an issue which was to be corrected by President Putin's harmonization of legislation. Coming back to Rokhlin's claim, it is justified by defining the Chechen regime as criminal and stressing its dangerous impact on the rest of the North Caucasus. This becomes evident when Rokhlin draws a scary picture concerning what will happen after the Chechen leaders have gained the independence of Chechnia, which will be geographically isolated from the outside world:

[Chechen leaders will rely] firstly, on the diffusion of their influence on the whole territory of the North Caucasus; secondly, on the criminal and almost criminal ways of getting resources; thirdly, on the aid from outside. [And] in some particular conditions we cannot exclude the direct military expansion of Chechnia in the northern Caucasus region either [....]⁷⁸

Rokhlin's argument can be taken either as motivational (appealing to the value of the integrity of the Russian Federation, of Russia's great power status, and to the value of security and order) or as authoritative arguments (Rokhlin inviting us to believe all this due to his position and experience). What should be stressed is that Rokhlin clearly defines Chechnia as a threat

76 Rokhlin, 4 December 1996, *Krasnaia Zvezda*.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

to Russia's security. What then should be done in this situation? Rokhlin is worried that economic aid to the republic might lead to unexpected and adverse results from Russia's point of view:

By helping the republic to strengthen, Russia might be causing itself an unrecoverable damage, to get a contrary result. Aid to the Chechen people should be given gradually and with strong control over the resources from the federal side.⁷⁹

The reason for his worry is that Russia might lose Chechnia forever: the return of Chechnia to Russia can be expected only if it will be dependent on Russia.⁸⁰ This argument may be understood either as substantive (from the past we 'know' that if a nation/people have everything they need where they live, they are self-sustaining, then they will strive for independence) or as authoritative (Rokhlin's words are reliable).

Even though Rokhlin gives very precise recommendations for solving the problems in Chechnia,⁸¹ after it all, the integrity of Russia depends on the reform of the army: "No Chechen nor any other problems of the integrity of Russia will be solved if we today do not start the most determined strengthening of the army, its real reform."⁸² For Rokhlin, Russia's integrity and sovereignty are values as such and they do not need to be justified.

Lastly, Vladimir Ryzhkov, at this time Deputy leader of the executive committee of the movement Nash Dom – Rossiia and a Duma deputy, claims that Chechnia will come closer to Russia. One of the reasons for long-term optimism is that *the threat to the rights and liberties of Russian citizens do not originate from the central power but from regional political regimes*.⁸³ As evidence for this Ryzhkov states that in regions the political and economic power and the control over the media have concentrated in the same hands. In addition, the Federation Council is lobbying for these regional interests. "The extreme case is Chechnia, which proclaims to be the subject of international law." According to Ryzhkov, "people in Russia want to have peace, wealth, tranquillity. And this is possible only in the unified country. The aspiration to order is one of the bases of the self-consciousness of Russians, which allows trust on integrity, wholeness of the country."⁸⁴ So these basic values of peace and order and prosperity serve as the main warrant for justifying the step from data to his claim. Ryzhkov introduces here a sharp juxtaposition of federal vs. regional interests. The Federation (centre) represents peace and prosperity

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Such as, tying the withdrawal of 205th and 101st brigades with the creation of the essential system of security, giving economic aid only with strong federal control, strengthening the borders with Chechnia, strengthening the military presence and security in Dagestan and other republics of the Northern Caucasus and creating a free economic zone in Dagestan.

82 Rokhlin, 4 December 1996, *Krasnaia Zvezda*; the same in 18 January 1997, *Krasnaia zvezda*: All problems are due the state of the army – the reformers destroyed it.

83 Ryzhkov, 15 February 1997, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

84 Ibid.

for all citizens, whereas the regions represent selfish, biased interests (and disorder). Ryzhkov, like Zorin when referring to the federal centre and the Zavgayev vs. Dudaev regime, continues that only within Russia can Chechnia reach prosperity and “objectively the geopolitical position and the interests of the Chechen people causes it to turn towards rapprochement with Russia”.⁸⁵ When referring to the geopolitical position, Ryzhkov implies that he considers Chechnia’s territory and its political influence insignificant; Chechnia does not have any access to the sea (through Dagestan only), has no other natural resources but oil, has no developed industries and no influential ‘friends’. Therefore, it would suit the interests of Chechens to be friends with the federation centre. So, as mentioned above, Ryzhkov appeals here to Russians’ and Chechens’ values of peace, order, economic and security interests (a motivational argument), which should correspond a will to live in the federation.

In retrospect, Ryzhkov ‘confesses’ that he supported Eltsin’s decision to begin the military operation in Chechnia:

I will speak honestly: I supported the decision of the president to take troops to Chechnia in that time. I thought and think now that if the president was sure that the army was able to fulfil that task, it had to be taken there. It is my opinion and I will keep that.⁸⁶

Ryzhkov’s claim is clear: Eltsin had the right to use force in Chechnia. The reason for this right is safeguarding the integrity of the Russian Federation (a motivational argument). But as an exception or qualifier to this Ryzhkov mentions that Russia was not prepared for the operation from the military point of view and now it should not repeat the mistakes but try to set up border and economic control and try to negotiate. However, signing the Khasaviurt Accord and consequently, the withdrawal of troops, was a mistake because the conditions, for example, for keeping order in Grozny, were insufficient.⁸⁷ As for the situation of 1997, Ryzhkov argues that there is no other option to keep the ‘danger’ out of Russia but to isolate Chechnia:

[...] we do not have any other option but to set a cordon sanitaire on the perimeter of Chechnia, to set up a military border. [...] To block the danger coming from there from the all directions. Not militarily, we should not even try to do that. But what we should not do in any circumstances is to recognize its independence. Let them live there themselves for 200 years, 300 years....⁸⁸

85 Ryzhkov, 4 March 1997, *Zavtra*.

86 Ryzhkov, 8 October 1997, *Literaturnaia gazeta*. We should remember here that the period of 1997–1998 was a peak in regional power (see Chapter 4 on the political situation in the RF). Regional constitutions and laws violated the Constitution of the RF and other federal laws etc.

87 Ryzhkov, 4 March 1997, *Zavtra*.

88 Ryzhkov, 8 October 1997, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

Ryzhkov finds justification for not giving independence to Chechnia by referring to similar areas in other parts of the world:

In principle that kind of situation exists in many countries of the world. You know Punjab in India, the Kurd region in Iraq. In addition, there are many territories, which are not controlled by the central governments.⁸⁹

As part of his solution to the situation Ryzhkov suggests the evacuation of Russians from Chechnia: “We must bring them out from there. [...] They will be thrown out from there anyway.” But he does not demand returning Chechens living in Russia to Chechnia, because they are not the people who chose the regime unlike those living there: “People in Chechnia chose themselves this regime, fought for it. It seems like for them there are more important things than peace or stomach. [...] for them the important things are Ichkeriia, Sharia, the Koran...”⁹⁰ Accordingly, there are Chechens of two kinds: those have made a choice for (democratic) Russia and those who have made a choice for (Islamic) Chechnia. As other NDR politicians, Ryzhkov does not draw a border along ethnic lines but along the political choices made.

The programme of NDR stresses the policy of inter-national harmony (*soglasiiia*) and also a cultural autonomy as a solution to the conflict in Chechnia.⁹¹ Furthermore, the programme appeals to the unity (*edinstvo*) of the constitutional system and the territorial integrity (*tselestnost territorii*) of the RF. As a reason for the conflict, the programme lists the lack of an effective legal mechanism in Chechnia and that the Russian leadership was too late in its attempts at political regulation; in addition, the ‘calculations of the force structures’ also played their role. Below in TABLE 8 we can see a construction of the Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians’ argument based on the Toulmin model. First there is their argument on how the relations or the conflict is defined and then their argument on how it should be solved. The whole problem definition can be taken as data for the problem solution claim.

Comparison and geopolitical vision

As we saw above, Nash Dom – Rossiia (NDR) politicians’ claim concerning the problem definition and solution, if paraphrased, goes as follows: Chechnia poses a threat to Russian democracy and the security of its citizens, but the current political leadership is able to safeguard the democracy and integrity of the Russian federation (by keeping Chechnia a subject of the RF). It should be mentioned that especially Zorin and Ryzhkov stress the division between Russia as a democratic country with a democratic leadership, and Chechnia as part of this democratic multi-national country. Chechnia’s belonging to this entity is justified by the ‘history of living

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 *Programma vserossiiskogo obshchestvennogo politicheskogo dvizheniia “Nash Dom – Rossiia”* 1995.

TABLE 8.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians’ argument on Chechnia 1995–1998

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data Dudaev’s regime is criminal. Citizen and human rights have been violated. There is no (democratic) government. People feel insecure.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most likely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> Chechnia poses a threat to Russian democracy and the security of its citizens. The war is justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> Regimes such as Dudaev’s are opposite to democratic rule (a substantive and authoritative argument). Any democratic state must protect its citizens (a substantive and motivational argument) The state must safeguard its integrity (the best way to guarantee security of its citizens) (a motivational argument). If people feel insecure and demand order and security, a state must act accordingly (a substantive, motivational and authoritative argument). The will of citizens should be respected (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> A political solution would be better and the government has the will for negotiations.</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> Dudaev has carried out anti-democratic measures such as human rights violations. The constitution of the RF: Russia is a democratic country based on rule of law. Russian popular opinion demands stability and order. Russia as a democratic state respects the will of their citizens.</p>		

together’ and by legal bindings i.e. the Constitution. Concerning the geopolitical vision, Russia’s mission towards Chechnia is thus democracy and rule of law. Those who violate democratic principles or federal laws are enemies of Russia. Ryzhkov is more or less on the same ‘track’ with Zorin, arguing that it is the regional power which is the threat to democracy in Russia. President Putin was in no way the first person to ‘understand’ the problem of regional power in Russia, but the foundation for his federal reforms was laid much earlier and here we

TABLE 8...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data (see also the argument defining the problem) There is a criminal unstable regime in Chechnia. People want peace and order. According to the Constitution, Chechnia is a subject of the federation.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> Chechnia must be kept as a subject of the federation.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> If someone in high position says that it is a criminal regime, then it is so (an authoritative argument). In democratic societies the will of people is respected (a substantive, authoritative and motivational argument). The Constitution is the highest authority and should not be violated (an authoritative argument). Having peace and order is possible only within Russia, a democratic country (a motivational and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Russia should not use military means to keep Russia – a political solution must be searched for. It might be better to isolate Chechnia and evacuate Russians from there (Ryzhkov).</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> NDR politicians are experts in these questions (taken as authorities). According to the Constitution of the RF (an authority), Russia is a democratic and multinational country. Popular opinion is both a fact and authority.</p>		

can see one expression of it by a party of power politician.⁹² Ryzhkov's solution to the problems seems odd at first sight: he suggests Chechnia be isolated – 'bad' should be isolated until it becomes 'good', even if it takes 300 years or longer. For Zorin and Ryzhkov, democracy is the model that Russia should follow and in parallel the mission it should carry out in Chechnia too. However, there are differences between NDR politicians as we noticed above. Rokhlin is not so enthusiastic about democracy, for him the unity of Russia is more important. Therefore, he is worried about the expansion of Chechen rule to neighbouring areas, that this would

⁹² In 2007 Vladimir Ryzhkov was one of the few independent deputies in the State Duma and an open opponent to President Putin's rule.

somehow be ‘natural’ taking Chechnia’s geography into consideration.⁹³ What is perceived as ‘democratic leadership’ by Zorin and Ryzhkov, Rokhlin blames for its mistakes, for not taking responsibility for them.

6.2.2 IABLOKO: Undemocratic leaders are threatening democracy and unity

If we are first to look at the geopolitical storyline of Iabloko, we can see that in contrast to what Nash Dom – Rossiia claimed – that Russia is a democratic country and has a leadership devoted to democratic principles – Iabloko argues that the leadership is not democratic enough and the problems in Chechnia are partly to do with this. Iabloko’s storyline might be called *Russia’s undemocratic leadership is threatening Russia’s democracy and unity*. The conflict is taking place in the North Caucasus region, in Chechnia, which is or at least used to be a subject of the federation. Iabloko defines the situation as a war primarily caused by the interests of the Russian leadership. The leadership had failed in reforms and therefore it needed a war like to this to cover its failures. Consequently, the first one to be blamed is Eltsin. ‘Ordinary’ people are against the war regardless of their ethnicity. Iabloko sees the war itself as a threat to Russia and reveals the incompetence of the Russian leaders. It is proof of Eltsin’s failures.⁹⁴

TABLE 9.
Iabloko politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on the conflict in Chechnia 1994–1998

What is Chechnia and this conflict about?	The conflict is a war that could have been avoided, a war in the interests of the Russian leadership, but is a loss for the Russian state and people.
Where is it taking place?	North Caucasus, either a subject of the RF or an already seceded subject; a conflict on the local, regional, national and potentially international level.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	For the interests of the Russian leadership, to cover other failures; incapable, unprofessional leadership making decisions.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	Eltsin and the party of war (and traitors such as Chubais) vs. all the others – Russians and Chechens alike.
What are Russian/ worldwide interests in the conflict?	The war itself might lead to Russia’s destruction; it does not solve the problems but adds to them; but according to Lukin, letting Chechnia go would be even more dangerous, lead to a domino reaction and to chaos.

93 Expansion of the problem is a widely supported interpretation – and a justification for the steps taken – both among the party of power and the democratic and the communist opposition politicians.

94 However, if we look at the argumentation of Vladimir Lukin, we would have a slightly different if not an alternative storyline.

Let us now turn to a closer examination of the arguments as expressed in newspaper articles by Iabloko politicians or in the announcements of the Iabloko parliamentary faction.

Shortly after the beginning of the covered Russian offensive in Chechnia the Iabloko faction gave an announcement entitled *On the situation in the North Caucasus*,⁹⁵ in which Iabloko's opposition position is clearly presented. The first claim presented that instead of solving the problems, the "current policy of the President and Government in the North Caucasus is the best way to disintegrate the Russian state (*Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo*)" and bring it into a state of civil conflict and conflict between nations, "a Caucasian war." The faction blames Boris Eltsin for "tragic events", he is the one who should bear responsibility for what is happening. The second claim demands "negotiations with the representatives of Chechnia on the highest possible level" and results that would include, e.g. an immediate ceasefire and a gradual withdrawal of the forces.⁹⁶ Furthermore, amendments to the constitution are required, amendments "which will allow placing the power (*vlast*) under the control of society and to have [pre-term] presidential elections in 1995". Here, with the term *vlast*, Iabloko refers to the executive power and the impossibility of the State Duma to have control over the president and the government.

A few days later Aleksei Arbatov, member of the Duma committee on defence, continues from this and strongly criticizes the government and president.⁹⁷ Arbatov's main claim is that *only an alternative policy would be able to save the situation* (that is, stopping fire without conditions, negotiations at a higher level on all questions). If we look at the data supporting the claim (and backing to the warrant), we notice that firstly Arbatov is accusing the leadership of lying: the reason for the war was not what the president and the government claimed (to restore the constitutional order), but instead the war was started in order to cover the failures made by the president, government and civil servants – to cover corruption and to help the power ambitions of some politicians. For example, Arbatov begins the article by asking many questions: Why was nothing done with Chechnia for a period of three years and then suddenly it was decided to rely on a massive use of force? Why do they speak of the disarmament of gangs of criminals when they bomb civilians? Why do they invite to negotiations yet still set the conditions of unconditional surrender, which guarantee the war until a "victorious end"?⁹⁸ Why, if "our cause is right", has the government decreed an information blockade and Russian troops take the press as an enemy? He continues the questions and wonders why, if this is a struggle against aggressive nationalism, they are nationalists and fascists who support the president. Arbatov argues that one cannot answer these questions by following official versions of the events.

Arbatov's argument might be understood either as authoritative: he is enunciating his opinion ('the reason was not what it was said to be, the leadership was lying') and we should trust his opinion, because Aleksei Arbatov is reliable as an educated man, a member of the

95 Announcement of the Iabloko faction, 13 December 1994.

96 Ibid.

97 Arbatov, 28 December 1994, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

98 This is similar to the statement of Rokhlin who was a deputy from the party of power and who e.g. asked why the weapons were left in Chechnia etc.

Duma committee on defence, a former head of the centre of geopolitical forecasts, and the son of Georgii Arbatov – all of which serve as backings to the warrant. Or the argument might be understood as substantive: Arbatov lists ‘facts’ of the past and the present, like failures in the economic reforms, in solving social problems, in the development of democratic order, in foreign policy and in the relations of the centre with regions and the ‘near abroad’, and corruption. Furthermore, as a result of these failures, the popularity of the President was decreasing. Arbatov also believes that actually the general *goal of the Russian leadership is not democracy, but a sort of ‘enlightened authoritarianism’*. However, authoritarianism requires a ‘slogan’, a charismatic leader and an effective repressive apparatus.⁹⁹ As there are no such things, a crisis situation would compensate for this lacking: “If there was no Chechnia, it would have to be invented.” Arbatov is sure that in this kind of situation to show who was the master, and to demonstrate force and an ability to restore order was vital: “What could be better but a quick and victorious military action? The winners are not condemned. Especially if it is question of such popular goals as the lawfulness, order and territorial integrity of Russia.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, these failures in a way *caused* this policy, it was a ‘natural’ outcome of the above mentioned failures.

Moreover, starting this particular war might be understood as a representative of other wars like this, which were begun (by other ‘great powers’) for solving other domestic problems. Thus, Arbatov uses a classification – a substantive argument. This leads us to the second reason for why an alternative policy was necessary (the war must be stopped): this war cannot be won. Arbatov compares the war in Chechnia to the wars Russia had with Japan and Germany and to the Vietnam War and Afghanistan War. “Will Russia step into this disastrous, fatal way in Chechnia?”¹⁰¹ As we know that Vietnam and Afghanistan wars were not won by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, and if the Chechen war was a similar kind of war, then it could not be won by Russia either.

Arbatov produces a rebuttal (a counterargument) as well. He does not deny that the constitutional order should have been restored in Chechnia and perhaps even by using force; however, this should have been done according to the Constitution, according to the rules of the state governed by law.

Using armed forces inside the country is allowed only in exceptional cases according to the Law on the State of Emergency. [...] The President should have declared a state of emergency [...] and get ratification for that from the Federation Council.¹⁰²

The same demand for following the Constitution is made in the Political Platform of the Programme (1995); the conflicts should be solved by political means but if this is not possible then

99 We might wonder whether Russia now has received these preconditions, Putin as a charismatic leader and the slogan of law & order, stability and prosperity.

100 Arbatov, 28 December 1994, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

at least the force should be used in accordance with the Constitution.¹⁰³ The Constitution does not allow the ‘mass killing’ of Russian citizens. However, the Iabloko Platform also states that the Constitution is not strong enough, it is easy to violate.

Thus, Arbatov refutes the rebuttal: the constitutional order was not restored, the Constitution was not followed (no declaration of a state of emergency), there was no lawful basis for political consensus and public opinion was not respected. “The purpose is to show the right of force and not to strengthen the force of law.” The executive power did not have time to follow the constitutional path (wait for negotiations), because the war itself was the goal, a war in order to solve other problems.

In July 1996 shortly after the presidential elections Aleksei Arbatov’s criticism toward the leadership of the country continues; he argues that peace has not really materialized in Chechnia, the war is continuing.¹⁰⁴ He refers to an old Chinese saying (we can understand this as an authoritative argument; Chinese ‘wisdom’ as an authority): “It is easier to get on the back of the tiger than to dismount from it.” The war is easier to start than to finish. Again the main claim is for an alternative policy – stopping the war. This would mean, first of all, the president taking the situation under his individual control and leading negotiations with those who would be able to stop the war. The following serves as the data to support this claim:

In wars of this sort partisans will win in the end, if they do not face the definitive, determining defeat, government troops will lose, if they do not gain the ultimate victory. After a year and half of the war the ultimate victory in Chechnia is further away than it has ever been.¹⁰⁵

Accordingly, the warrant states that *the military solution to the problem in Chechnia is impossible, because now it is a question of a war, which belongs to the category of wars which cannot be won* (again a classification, which is a variant of the substantive argument). So the argument is the same as above in December 1994, right after the beginning of the war. Moreover, Arbatov argues that the Chechen people were bored of the war and they would be pleased with any solution that would bring peace; thus, Arbatov is appealing to the popular will. Respecting the will of the people is an integral part in Iabloko’s argumentation for democratic development.

In 1997 Arbatov warns about the consequences of an independent Chechnia (understood as part of the argumentation on the problem solution). He discusses the problem of borders between Chechnia and Russia, that is, whether it is better to “maintain ‘transparent borders’” as between Russia and Kazakhstan or set up real ‘state borders.’¹⁰⁶ In the case of ‘transparent borders’, Dagestan would be a “‘natural’ zone of Chechen expansion”. “Chechnia, which has such resources of pressure as the communication lines between Dagestan and the rest of Russia

103 Politicheskaia platforma in *Reformy dlia bolsinstva* 1995.

104 Arbatov, 18 July 1996, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

105 Ibid.

106 Arbatov, 15 March 1997, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

going through its territory,” would make territorial demands for the Khasaviurt raion of Dagestan. Moreover, there is a Chechen community in Dagestan (about 100 000) and Chechnia possesses experienced military units and substantial amounts of weapons and foreign currency. All this, according to Arbatov, “will lead to transferring Dagestan into a vassal Islamic state or a subject of the confederation with the Vainak Republic”. Having a real state border would not solve the problems either, because in that case “Chechens will make the border into a permanent line of front and cause everything to have conflicts between the local population and the federal power all over the North Caucasus, first of all in Ingushia and Dagestan [...]” As neither of the options is any good, Arbatov implicitly defines the situation as a deadend. He uses a substantive argument referring to facts about geography, communication lines and material resources. This might be interpreted as an authoritative argument as well (Arbatov as an expert, see above).

Vladimir Lukin approaches the purpose of the war from a somewhat different point of view than Arbatov in his article entitled *Groznye razdumia, Natsionalnoe samoopredelenie – vernyi put samounichtozheniiu*.¹⁰⁷ As the chair of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lukin is trying to justify the Russian policy by referring to the general, accepted principle of international relations: the right to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state, to defend the sovereignty. Lukin begins the article by asking “Who could defend the methods of solving the Chechen conflict, bloodshed [...]” but then he continues that “In the ruins of this beautiful southern city emerges the most serious factor, a problem of global significance, or rather a dilemma: national self-determination or state integrity.” So this human catastrophe is an example of a wider problem: national self-determination versus state integrity. Lukin continues by first presenting a rebuttal to his own claim, that is, he goes through the recorded history of the coexistence of these two principles, by giving various examples, from the United States gaining its independence and safeguarding its integrity to the Helsinki Charter and its promise to support the territorial status quo and finally to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and strivings of the Basque country, Catalonia, Normandy, Corsica, Wales and Scotland to gain independence.

However, Lukin refutes this counterargument and asks us to choose our side. His claim is that in the contemporary world *we cannot both defend national self-determination and safeguard the integrity of sovereign states*. State integrity is more important than the right to national self-determination; the right to self-determination should be restricted to nations which have it now. In this case we should read Lukin’s claim as the integrity of the Russian Federation is more important than the right of Chechens to national self-determination. What then is the data to back up his claim for not granting self-determination to any more nations? Lukin draws an apocalyptic vision in the case of more nations getting the right to self-determination: “We would step into the mine field, and the end of it would not be seen.” There are 180 states in the world, in which there are minorities of more than one million people, “giving the right

107 Lukin, 17 February 1995, *Segodnia*.

to national self-determination to all of these would lead to hell, to the self-destruction of the world.” Lukin gives Yugoslavia as an example of valuing self-determination higher than the integrity of the state (250,000 casualties, some million refugees): “What if this was to happen to Russia? Calculate proportionally: we are at the beginning of a drama, which leads to Armageddon.” Ethiopia/Eritrea serves as a warning example outside Europe:

For the first time openly and demonstratively the principle of the territorial integrity was broken down in favour of the principle of ‘proto-national’ self-determination, when the ‘self-determining nation’ does not possess any traditional prerequisites of the statehood (shared history, territory, emotional psychological cohesion).¹⁰⁸

Lukin gives us a possibility to see what has already happened due to giving self-determination to nations which were not entitled to it (the situation in Yugoslavia and Eritrea; the casualties and refugee problems). Lukin generalizes from these to any future nations, which might be given the right to national self-determination (a substantive argument), or to any future situations, in which the choice should be made between integrity and national self-determination. However, the casualties or the refugee problems do not seem to be the only reason why Lukin argues for safeguarding the territorial integrity. He appeals to the value of state integrity and sovereignty as such (a motivational argument). Thus, defending state integrity is a positive value, but the right to self-determination is negative. Giving self-determination to more nations would also mean the opposite to order and democracy:

It is a major threat not only to the ‘new world order’ but also to any order in the system of international relations [...] Nationalism was taken as an originally and unambiguously progressive turn in world history. Now there is growing understanding that it would mean self-destruction for the world in general, for Europe partially and for the unstable modernizing Eastern Europe in particular. It is a step backward in history. [It would] weaken the potential of democratic development in the new independent countries and predispose into danger the basis of democracy in democratic countries.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, Lukin concludes that preferring self-determination has led to the situation where the rights of individuals and of citizens and human rights have not been placed above the rights of groups, clans, and families, as they should have been. National self-determination equates to nationalism, with the rights of groups, clans and tribes over human rights, and the rights of citizens and individuals. State integrity equates to development towards democracy and respect of human rights. When arguing for the right of individuals, for democracy, Lukin tries to appeal to ‘our’ values (a motivational argument). Lukin’s claim for action is *integration* rather than

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

defending 'selfish local nationalistic ideals'. So actually the goal of the Russian operation in Chechnia (or the 'official' publicly presented goal, that is, restoring the constitutional order, and safeguarding the territorial integrity), is strongly supported by Lukin, even though he does not quite agree with the way in which it is done. However, he justifies his claim by the overall tendency towards integration in Europe and would like to adopt this in the Russian Federation as well. The Political Platform also stresses the need for the integration of subjects, moving from smaller units to larger units.¹¹⁰ This is what President Putin has started to execute by merging federation subjects and thus decreasing the number of subjects to 86 (1 January 2007). Iabloko has also always argued for a constitutional federation, and against the privileges and sovereignties given to subjects, i.e. against federalism based on agreements.

However, the question of state unity and integrity is not so black and white; instead there are 'grey areas'. For example, in the Political Platform of 1995 it is stated that unity of Russia can be guaranteed only by disintegrating state power, by dividing it between the Federation and its subjects.¹¹¹

A year later Lukin's claim is almost the same: Russia's integrity must be safeguarded, even by force if needed.¹¹² He admits that the war is a national humiliation: "I do not like it when I am beaten in the battle ground." This is what he feels as an individual, but in 'politics' he opposes the war because he, as a professional politician, knew that it would not bring anything good: "I had my doubts that it can end with destruction. Therefore, from the very beginning, I was against the war." The degree of force of the claim is in this way *qualified* – actually Lukin represents himself as a person who in general is against any use of force and is for finding a political solution: "I am against people dying anywhere [...] but nobody asks me." However, the value of patriotism overcomes the value of non-violent ways to solve problems, as according to Lukin, the best option among the bad options would have been that Russian troops would have fought better and suppressed the Chechens. Lukin more or less positions himself here as a 'realist' or 'pragmatist'. Russia had/has the right to use force, firstly because others have used/use force in similar situations as well, and secondly because otherwise it might face destruction.

But crisis situations are sometimes only to be resolved by force. Russia is no exception. And I do not have any right to demand that Russia would alone, at the cost of its dissolution or even self-destruction, abstain from the world's practise to solve unresolved conflicts.

Therefore, we can observe here two ways in which the warrant travels from the data to the claim, firstly by classifying this situation (Chechen separatism) as the sort of case in which

110 Politicheskaia platforma in *Reformy dlia bolsinstva* 1995.

111 Ibid.

112 Lukin, *Novoe Vremia* 45/96.

other countries have used force (classification or generalization → a substantive argument). But in addition, it is a *question of survival and of the value of integrity and sovereignty, of order against chaos* (a motivational argument). To this question of survival also belongs a forecast on the potential for an escalation of the problem: “Chechnia itself is not particularly necessary for anyone”, but there is a potential threat – the dissolution of Russia into 50 states, and these 50 states into more. Accordingly, Lukin seems to claim that giving Chechnia independence would lead to the dissolution of Russia and would mean a threat to democracy and to the security of the world. Lukin refers to his strong patriotism: even if Russia was wrong, he himself could not go to the other’s side. However, he says that he respects those who can, for example Sergei Kovalev.

A further warrant is that Lukin believes that the common good would demand the integrity of Russia: it would be mutually beneficial for both Russians and Chechens to live together. The warrant refers to the value of a ‘common good’, and thus it is a motivational argument; below a backing for the warrant:

Many Chechens have sincere patriotism and demands for Russia [...] some of them justified. I respect patriotism of the Chechens. But I hope that with time the passions will cool down and we will live together. *We will unite the freedom of Chechnia and unity of Russia.* Russia will abandon its rude uncivilized behaviour (*zblbstvo*) and self-confidence of force. [...And] Chechens will understand how much they have something related with Russia[...]¹¹³

As we saw above in the Nash Dom – Rossiia analysis, politicians of the party of power also appealed to the common past ‘living together’, and hoped that this would help to solve the problems or that this would be such an ‘authority’ that would be respected.

The claim that an alternative policy is required in order to solve the problem is most clearly presented in the statements of the Iabloko faction in the State Duma and by Grigorii Iavlinskii, the leader of Iabloko. The data, which Iavlinskii presents, is that Eltsin and his ministers are unable to solve this conflict and therefore, they would have to resign.¹¹⁴ Almost immediately after the beginning of the war, Iavlinskii offers a concrete plan for solving the conflict to Eltsin and Dudaev.¹¹⁵ This plan would require, e.g., the release of hostages on both sides and an agreement not to carry out an offensive, distribute weapons and to limit their action within the Chechen republic. After this, negotiations could be begun along with the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnia. Iavlinskii stresses that there is “nothing unsolvable in the Russian-Chechen conflict. What is required is the political will and wisdom of the parties [of the war]”.

113 Ibid. Italics added.

114 Iavlinskii, 5 January 1995, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

115 Announcement of Grigorii Iavlinskii, 11 January 1995. Iavlinskii already introduced his plan in *Moskovskie Novosti*, 5 January 1995.

Iabloko's opposition position in 1995 becomes evident in the Announcement of the Iabloko faction on the events in Budennovsk in June.¹¹⁶ Just like in January's announcement, Iabloko accuses the political leadership for the war in Chechnia, in general, and for not been able to prevent this act of terror. In particular: "The Caucasus war which was started by Eltsin and Dudaev has expanded outside Chechnia (*za predely Chechni*). Now the victims of foolish politicians become not only civilians of Chechnia but citizens of neighbouring regions of Russia. [...] What ever caused the bandit offensive in Budennovsk – either criminal negligence or conscious provocation of special services – the guilty ones must be held responsible."¹¹⁷ Iabloko would like to impeach the President but acknowledges that the State Duma does not have power to do that;¹¹⁸ in contrast, "it is in our power to express lack of confidence to the Government which has now become the ruling party and at the same time taking the whole responsibility for the events which take place in the country."

Even after the Budennovsk hostage taking in the summer of 1995, and that of Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe¹¹⁹ in January 1996, the Iabloko faction calls for negotiations: "Peaceful negotiations are the only real way to solve the crisis", and these should be carried out with the "representatives of the armed opposition, including D. Dudaev and without any pre-conditions".¹²⁰ Again Iabloko accuses the president and government of using the announcement on searching for ways to peaceful settlement as a cover for starting "new large-scale military actions in Chechnia". This is a "two-faced and criminal policy of the executive power". In addition to demanding an immediate ceasefire and re-starting negotiations, Iabloko argues that the "question of the status of Chechnia is a topic of negotiations between representatives of the power organs of the Russian Federation and participants of the conflict". Moreover, the "question of a permanent status of Chechnia will be decided only after having a referendum in the territory of Chechnia." Iabloko takes the tragedies in Budennovsk, Pervomaiskoe and Kizliar as evidence of the incompetence of the president and the government (again a substantive argument as in 1995). After the event in the village of Pervomaiskoe, the Iabloko faction started the collection of signatures for "starting the procedure of a lack of confidence in the government. The guilty one really is the President, but the Duma can only express a lack of confidence in the government...". Iabloko politicians argue that "it is the only way to make the leadership of the country publicly describe why Eltsin, Chernomyrdin, Grachev and Kulikov again are killing civilians and have sent Russian soldiers and officers to die."

116 Announcement of the Iabloko faction, 16 June 1995. On the Events in Budennovsk,

117 The opposition to President due to the war in Chechnia is explicitly stated e.g. in the Declaration taken by the II Meeting of Iabloko Association in 1995. The Political Platform also accuses the leadership of trying to keep the power to itself whatever it takes. This has led to collaboration with 'reactionary nationalistic' forces and finally to the Caucasian war.

118 In order to initiate the impeachment of the president, The State Duma has to have at least 1/3 support from the deputies. It has to have evidence that the president has committed a very serious crime and the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have to agree. The decision on the impeachment is adopted if it gets 2/3 of the votes both in the State Duma and the Federation Council.

119 See footnote 50.

120 Announcement of the Iabloko faction, 6 March 1996.

Even though Iavlinskii demands negotiations, he is not convinced that the Russian leadership carries them out whole-heartedly. He suspects that negotiations are carried out all “just with one goal in mind: to ‘calm down’ the masses (*obshchestvennost*) due to the presidential elections”.¹²¹ Evidence for his claim on the leadership not being serious in the negotiations can be found in that the Russian delegation “represents [...] unsuitable conditions, [such as] the federal side refuses to withdraw troops from small or medium-size towns (*naseleennye punkty*).” Furthermore, at the same time as the negotiations are under way, the “federal powers (*vlasti*) [...] also prepare under its own leadership (in the name of Zavgayev government) and with the presence of troops [...] more than dubious elections to the so-called parliament of the Chechen Republic, which during two years will not have the right to dismiss Doku Zavgayev”. Iavlinskii does not buy the official explanations for why the troops could not be withdrawn from towns (the official explanation: in case of withdrawal fighters will come to these towns and interrupt the settlement process, including elections), because “after a year and a half of war almost 80 per cent of the population have started to support (*sochustvovat*) separatists. These 80 per cent live practically in the whole territory of the Republic and so the majority of formally ‘taken’ towns and bases are actually controlled by separatists [...]”. So it is not even the federal army which needs this war but “the criminal ‘party of war’, only the authorities “from the war” (*chinovniki “ot voiny”*). It is not necessary for any rank and file citizen and should be stopped by honest, as open as possible, bilateral negotiations”. Here Iavlinskii uses a substantive and motivational argument, that is, he refers to the evidence he has and to values such as respecting the popular will.

After the presidential elections Iabloko accused the president personally of lying to people: “The power did not fulfil the hope of millions of Russians, who voted for B.I. Eltsin, believing his promise on stopping the war in Chechnia”.¹²² Iabloko demands that the president and prime minister would take the situation under their personal control. Negotiations should be carried out “by those whom the topic of negotiations really depends on – stopping the war and executing peace. It means not with Zavgayev’s leadership, village elders or field commanders”. Furthermore, “those who have carried out a war can never guarantee a peaceful settlement”. Iabloko politicians argue that a “peaceful settlement in Chechnia and at the same time preserving the territorial integrity (*tselostnost*) of Russia is a goal fully possible to acquire”. So one does not have to choose between a “military victory in Chechnia” and “withdrawal from there and secession of Chechnia”.

Two months later Grigorii Iavlinskii justifies the need for an alternative policy (and an alternative leadership), as he did previously, by first referring to the incompetent leadership: “The power continues to be dangerous to the country itself and to its citizens.”¹²³ After elections there were other options, everything could have been done in a different way, but Eltsin chose

121 Announcement of Grigorii Iavlinskii, 10 June 1996, On the negotiations in Chechnia.

122 Announcement of the Iabloko faction, 10 August 1996, On the Situation in the Chechen Republic.

123 Iavlinskii, 16 October 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

to strengthen the old system of power – an oligarchic, monopolistic and, to a great extent, criminal power. And this had especially to do with Chechnia. According to Iavlinskii, the President was ready to cling on to power at any price and created a system of three governments. Iavlinskii believes that *Chechnia is in a way a 'natural outcome' of the political situation in the country*. Here the warrant states that the political leadership was not able to solve the problem in the past, therefore (as the leadership was the same) it will not be able to solve it in the future either. So he uses an analogy or a parallel case, and accordingly a substantive argument.

The second justification for an alternative policy is that it is not possible to have a military solution to the problems with Chechnia: “The war cannot keep Chechnia with Russia. Chechnia can be lost by covering Russia with blood or by not covering it with blood.”¹²⁴ For Iavlinskii, what really threatens the integrity of Russia is the military operation of the federal army and the unwillingness *caused* by that to live in the federation, not the Khasaviurt agreement. Here Iavlinskii refers to the same thing as Arbatov, that is, *he does not believe that the integrity of the Russian Federation can be saved by this operation* (or that this is the real reason for starting the war). It was actually, “the insane and brainless position in relation to Chechnia in 1991–1994, some hired soldiers who were sent to Chechnia in the autumn of 1994, the ferocity of the bombings and ‘cleansing,’ and ‘filtering’ operations [*zachistki*], that put the integrity of Russia under the blow.”¹²⁵

Iavlinskii refers to the value of democracy in relation to maintaining integrity: “The main characteristic of the integrity, unity of the country is the wish of the citizens of the country to live in it. I am ready to fight for that kind of integrity.”¹²⁶ Thus, for Iavlinskii the integrity is of no higher value than the right of people to decide themselves what they want.

If as the result of 20 months of war and the whole history of the relations between Moscow and Chechnia, the majority of the citizens of the republic, let's say 80 per cent, do not consider themselves Russians (*rossiiskie*), citizens of the Russian Federation, and keep that view, what can you then do with it? Force them to be Russian citizens? Then it would not become a republic inside Russia [*v sostave Rossii*], but a concentration camp inside Russia. Of course, Russia can occupy this territory, but like that it can not make people think in a different way.[....]¹²⁷

Iavlinskii does not argue that the collapse of the Russian Federation, or the further secession of the whole North Caucasus, is self-evident: “The problem is, I repeat, not in Chechnia, but in Moscow. There is a possibility to save the integrity of our country. The question is only about the fact whether they [possibilities] will be politically utilized.”¹²⁸ In Iavlinskii's argumentation

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

it is evident that he believes that political decisions can influence the outcome of events; for him, who is in the political leadership really matters. Therefore, “with wise policy these territories [in the Northern Caucasus] stay in the legal space of Russia, because it corresponds to their basic interests”. All the Russian politicians under examination here argue that Chechens themselves will come to the conclusion that they are better off with Russia rather than outside it. This argument is either grounded on economic and security interests, on the common past, on common traditions, or on values of democracy.

Iavlinskii presents Iabloko as the only political force in the parliament which has been against the war in Chechnia: “In words all were against the war, but the war was politically useful for Communists and corresponded to their opinions. Ziuganov blocked all the decisions, which could have led to the peace.”¹²⁹ In addition, Iavlinskii claims that ‘democrats’ such as Chubais, Livshica, Satarov, and Baturin are traitors, they did not protest and leave the government when the war started. Their own interests (keeping the job, flat, etc.) were more important.¹³⁰

The last example of Iavlinskii’s argumentation reveals slight differences between him and Iabloko’s deputy chair Vladimir Lukin. Iavlinskii is asked to comment on Vladimir Lukin’s statement on the Chechen war in the previous issue of *Novoe Vremia*: “Even though the war was a disgrace, one should hope for the victory of one’s country...”¹³¹ Iavlinskii repeats his statement that the war itself was a disgrace:

Let’s look at it more seriously and deeply. The defeat of Russia was the war itself. That very day and hour when our troops moved to Grozny according to the command of Commander in Chief, they were defeated and they desecrated their country. From then on we can speak only about the price of that defeat [...] ¹³²

The interviewer mentions that Lukin is sure that Chechnia should not be let go; it would lead to the collapse of Russia. Again Iavlinskii repeats his claim: Chechnia is not part of Russia anymore. He seems to suggest that Russia has no moral right to Chechnia after what happened in the war.

The word “let go” (*otdavai*) is not suitable here at all. After what happened in Chechnia, Eltsin and Iandarbiev have equal rights. Moscow already now negotiates with Chechen leaders like with foreigners. Therefore, above all, we must say goodbye to Chechens, even though the separation will become a long one [...].¹³³

129 Ibid.

130 Iavlinskii, *Novoe Vremia* 47/96.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

TABLE 10.
Iabloko politicians' argument on Chechnia 1994–1998

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data There was no declaration of a state of emergency. Federal troops should not be used against own citizens. The war was begun to cover mistakes of the leadership. The war could have been prevented.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> It is an unconstitutional war in the interests of the Russian leadership and not justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> A democratic country should follow its Constitution and international law (an authoritative argument). Wars have been started in the past to cover mistakes of the leadership (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> This is also a war to safeguard Russia's integrity and has a justified goal (Lukin).</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> The constitution says that federal troops cannot be used inside the country without a declaration of a state of emergency. Russia as a rule of law state and a democratic country should follow the Constitution and international law and respect the will of the people. Evidence of the failures or results of the failures from the past and present; an analogy or a classification. Iabloko politicians are experts in these questions (taken as authorities).</p>		

Comparison and geopolitical vision

As we saw above, the main claim, if simplified and paraphrased, of Iabloko politicians is that an alternative Chechnia policy is required for Russia. This claim, this umbrella statement, runs through almost all the texts concerning Russo-Chechen relations during both wars in Chechnia. If the party of power politicians claim that Russia and the Russian leadership is democratic, and thus Russia can guarantee democratic development in Chechnia – unlike the Chechen leaders – the democratic opposition, Iabloko, sees the major problem in that Russia and the Russian leadership is not democratic (enough).

TABLE 10...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data This is a partisan war and cannot be won. Destruction of Russia might be ahead if the war is continued. The Russian leadership is incompetent.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most probably,</p>	<p>Claim: So A political solution must be found, (negotiations without pre-conditions must be carried out). Leadership must be changed.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since Popular support is required in order to win a partisan war (a substantive and authoritative argument). The will of the people should be respected (a motivational argument). Finding a political solution is a value as such for a democratic country (a motivational argument). If the problem is solved politically, there will not be acts of terror (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However Integrity of the RF must be safeguarded. Chechnia must not be let go, it would lead to a total destruction of the RF and to a domino effect (especially Lukin).</p>
<p>Backing: Because Analogies of similar wars or the classification of this war as belonging to the category of similar wars. The will of all Russian people does not support the war and those living in Chechnia do not support the federal army. Continuing acts of terror are proof of the unsuccessful strategy of the Russian leadership.</p>		

Concerning the geopolitical vision, Russia's model to follow and Russia's 'mission' *should* be democracy and the rule of law – but it seems not to be under this leadership. For example, Aleksei Arbatov suspected in 1996, a decade ago, that the real goal of the Russian leadership was authoritarianism. In 2006 we have arrived at a situation in which many Western and Russian scholars (at least those working at Western-funded research institutes such as the Carnegie Centre) define the Russian system as authoritarianism of some sort.¹³⁴ For Iabloko, enemies are those who are against democratic development – power creed politicians. So the border

¹³⁴ See e.g. Shevtsova 2005, 2006 and 2007.

is not drawn between Russians and Chechens but between the Russian leadership and others. Iabloko politicians want to stress that democracy and the integrity of the Russian Federation can be combined. And, especially for Iavlinskii, democracy appears with a value higher than integrity and the unity of the country. However, Vladimir Lukin, seems to appeal to the integrity of sovereign states as an absolute value and, accordingly, adversaries are separatists and those supporting them. Breaking the integrity of a sovereign state is not a model to follow, and integrity and unity is justified, in the Chechen case, by the value of democracy, which Russia can guarantee, and by the value of 'living together'. Instead of disintegration, Lukin argues for integration and sees European integration as a model.

6.2.3 Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (KPRF): Russia is breaking apart and in need of salvation by real patriots

For the KPRF politicians, Chechnia is a mirror to wider problems of the Russian Federation. It is not just a local conflict but describes the crisis of Russia in general – a Russia which is multi-national and represents a unique civilization. The KPRF storyline might be called *Russian democrats and Chechen nationalists are breaking Russia apart and Russia needs to be saved by real patriots* (see TABLE 11 below). This situation is a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the policies of 'democrats'. It is a result of allowing and supporting nationalism of other nations but not that of Russians. Eltsin especially is to be blamed and the border is drawn between him and his supporters and all the others – the real patriots, Russians and Chechens alike, who want Russia to flourish. The communists are afraid that the situation in Chechnia might just be the start of further disintegration of Russia, which in its turn would have a negative impact worldwide.

TABLE 11.
KPRF politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the conflict in Chechnia 1994–1998

What is Chechnia and this conflict about?	This is a war, a civil war – potentially expanding to other areas in the North Caucasus and to Russia proper.
Where is it taking place?	In the North Caucasus; multi-national and -confessional Russia; Eurasia; a unique civilization.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	Perestroika and Gorbachev, Russophobia and fighting nationalism which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union; Eltsin and the events of 1991 and 1993, incompetence of the leaders.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	Eltsin and the ruling group vs. real patriots and all Russians, those Chechens who want to live with Russia.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in the conflict?	This could be the start of the collapse of Russia; if there were no Russia then many problems could not be solved.

I will now turn to an analysis of the arguments of the KPRF politicians, which are introduced in chronological order.¹³⁵ Before the Russian offensive (December 1994) Viktor Iliukhin, Chair of the Duma Committee on Security, somewhat supported the undercover operations of Russian forces in Chechnia: “If we are saying that the regime of Dudaev is not constitutional and he violated laws of the Russian Federation, then without any doubt, we have to support contacts with the Chechen opposition – those who represent healthy forces in Chechnia.”¹³⁶ In contrast Gennadii Ziuganov, the leader of the Communist Party, wants to present his opposition position more clearly and criticizes the executive power for “the radical worsening of the situation in Chechnia”. He is afraid that “the implementation of a state of emergency in the whole country is hidden in the state of emergency in Chechnia.”¹³⁷ Also, Iliukhin in February 1995 demanded the resignation of the president if he was not able to solve the problem in Chechnia.¹³⁸ He is convinced that the battle actions could expand to Russia as well (the interviewer refers to some sources according to which field commanders had approached Dudaev and demanded this). Iliukhin claims that ‘a Chechen hand’ stands behind the terrorist acts that have taken place in Russia; however, “it is another matter, whether our law enforcement organs and special services are able to oppose this wave of terrorism.”¹³⁹ When defining the situation in Chechnia, Ziuganov and Iliukhin seem to position themselves as experts on the situation, thus the arguments are authoritative; or sometimes they are not arguments (in the Toulminian sense, see Chapter 5) at all, without any data, warrants or backing – presenting just a claim.¹⁴⁰

Like both the Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians (with some qualifiers) and Iabloko politicians, the communists argue that the situation could be solved by negotiating: “First of all, we suggest having *dialogue with dudaevians and not expressing any preconditions*. Secondly, to raise the status of negotiations to the level of acting prime minister, stop the flows of weapons to Chechnia, to use the spiritual potential of the East, and finally to improve the work of special services.”¹⁴¹ However, Ziuganov especially is not convinced that the current leadership would be able to solve the situation; instead a change of the leadership is required. So here, in rhetoric, Ziuganov represents the communists as a principled opposition to the power (the same position as the Iabloko politicians claim for themselves).¹⁴² Before the elections to the State Duma in 1995 Ziuganov laid his hope on the victory of national-patriotic forces: “The

135 The texts of the KPRF leader Ziuganov dominate in the KPRF materials, therefore, the arguments of the KPRF are not introduced a politician by a politician like above in the analysis of NDR and Iabloko argumentation but only chronologically.

136 Iliukhin, 3 August 1994, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

137 Ziuganov, 30 November 1994, *Kommersant-Daily*.

138 Iliukhin, 18 February 1995, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

139 Iliukhin, 1 June 1995, *Trud*. We must remember that even though the first war in Chechnia was not defined as a ‘counter-terrorist operation’, terrorism was present in the discussion. Of course, the acts of terror started during the first war, not before it as happened concerning the second war.

140 This might have to do with the materials available; if instead I would have chosen to study speeches e.g. in the party meetings, I might have had more argumentative material in this case too.

141 Ziuganov, 22 December 1995, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

142 See Chapter 4 on Gelman’s classification of the opposition position of Russian parties.

elections are our last chance for a peaceful and civilized solution of all problems. Otherwise the whole country will transform into one huge Chechnia.”¹⁴³ Chechnia here thus becomes a nominator to something most terrible that can happen, the worst misery of all miseries. Before the presidential elections the criticism towards Eltsin accelerated. According to Iliukhin, Eltsin should have resigned in 1993, as then the country would have been saved e.g. from shooting the parliament, from a destroyed economy, high crime rates, and a civil war in the North Caucasus.¹⁴⁴ This is what is stated in the Platform of 1995 too, that is, the main problem in Russia is the anti-people, exploitative nature of the power – one consequence of this is the conflict in Chechnia.¹⁴⁵ So the claim advocates changing the leadership and then the regime. As a justification for this (backing for the warrant) we can understand the dreadful position in which the country now is and all its mistakes in the past, i.e. breaking up the Soviet Union and shooting the opposition in 1993. Thus, it is a substantive argument referring to the then situation – to the results of the policies of the leaders.

In March 1996 Ziuganov comments on Eltsin’s plan for Chechnia¹⁴⁶ and argues that “all this has been said many times by the supporters of a peaceful settlement, but unfortunately not one of the decisions was made on time.”¹⁴⁷ So even though Ziuganov supports peace in Chechnia, he is afraid that it might be too late for that, that the situation in which something could be transformed for the better has already gone. If still in December 1995 Ziuganov demanded negotiations without any pre-conditions, in March 1996 he has hardened his argument by accepting set-up conditions for Dudaev and his supporters: “One must set conditions to *dudaevichi*: either you give up your weapons in 30 days and get amnesty or you position yourselves against all Caucasian peoples and the laws of the mountains.”¹⁴⁸ We should remember what happened in Kizliar and Permomaiskoe in January 1996 and the coming presidential elections as possible reasons for Ziuganov’s change of heart.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, Ziuganov warns about the outcome of the withdrawal of all troops – this should be done only in peaceful areas (thus, agreeing with Eltsin): “Where the violence continues one must not do this [withdrawal], otherwise enclaves like this will transform into a second Afghanistan, but now within the territory of Russia.”¹⁵⁰ Ziuganov employs the analogy of Afghanistan, i.e. the experience of a (parti-

143 Ziuganov, 12 September 1995, *Moskovskii komsomolets*

144 Iliukhin, 15 February 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

145 *Predvybornaia platforma KPRF* 1995.

146 Stopping the military operation from 1 April 1996, gradual withdrawal of troops from ‘peaceful’ regions along the administrative borders of Chechnia, preparation and organization of elections to the Republic’s parliament, passage by the State Duma of a statute on amnesty for the participants in the military actions, but not carried out any serious crimes, addressing financial and material resources to only those areas where a stabilisation of the situation has been reached, preparation and signing the Agreement on limiting authority between organs of power, creation of state commission, headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin, on the control on the regulation of the situation in Chechnia, negotiations with Dudaev through mediators.

147 Ziuganov, 2 April 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

148 Ziuganov, 7 March 1996, *Trud-7*. This hardening in the argumentation might have to do with Ziuganov’s candidacy for president.

149 Ziuganov came second in the presidential election.

150 Ziuganov, 7 March 1996, *Trud-7*.

san) war which could not be won. The problem could expand. Ziuganov, like Lukin of Iabloko, also believes in a domino effect.

Gennadii Seleznev, then Chair of the State Duma, has a softer position in his arguments towards the power.¹⁵¹ He argues for cooperation between different institutions of power: “The task of parliamentarians today is, together with the presidential and government structures to find mutual approaches for solving the problem”. He is also very optimistic, unlike Ziuganov, on the results of the work done in Chechnia: a “legitimate government already organizes the structures, the organs of governing the national economy, the social infrastructures [...] conditions for normal work will be created, the sooner peace and order will prevail [...]”.¹⁵² Moreover, he encourages “constructive dialogue between different political forces of this republic” and also with “influential Muslim actors from Bashkiria and Tatarstan”. Seleznev believes in grass-root-level influence, such as re-building, “giving Chechens building materials, to build their own homes and not to join the bands [of fighters].” So Seleznev does not share the view that there are no options or there is only one option available and argues that “different options are possible”.¹⁵³ However, he qualifies this by saying that Chechnia’s seceding from Russia or a military solution are not possible. Seleznev’s argument is both substantive and authoritative: we can already see evidence of the federal power’s policy working in Chechnia and this gives hope that peace and order will arrive in Chechnia.

Later in 1996, after signing the peace agreements, Seleznev defends the Russian leadership and says that “the presidential structures” have not violated the Constitution, as many Russian politicians claim. However, he qualifies this claim: “Possible violations may have to do with the status of Chechnia as a subject of the Federation. The change of this status can be carried out only on the basis of the constitution”. Furthermore, there might be a question of the violation of the RF Constitution when “Chechen separatists call their republic ‘Ichkeriia.’ [...] They ‘by mistake say’ (*progovorivaiut*) that Russian laws do not function in their territory. But their representatives come here [to Moscow] and then in the negotiations they ‘take back’ and say that Russian laws function in Chechnia...”¹⁵⁴ Thus, as argued before, Seleznev does not oppose the goal of the first Chechen war: “One of the reasons for sending our army there (even though I do not think that that was the right way to act two years ago) was to carry out ‘constitutional order’ there.” But the tactic by which this order was being implemented does not get his support: “[...] The form of carrying out ‘constitutional order’ in my opinion was not truly constitutional. ... We (the Duma) were from the first day against *the method of carrying out the “constitutional order”* which the close circle of the president chose”.¹⁵⁵ That is the tactic, the method, does not get Seleznev’s endorsement even though the goal of guaranteeing constitutional order and Russia’s integrity does. In this, Seleznev is very close to Vladimir Lukin’s

151 See previous studies on different positions of KPRF.

152 Seleznev, 6 February 1996, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

153 Seleznev, 20 February 1996, *Trud*.

154 Seleznev 28 November 1996, *Pravda*.

155 Ibid.

argumentation (Iabloko). Seleznev neither approves the presidential ukase on the withdrawal of the troops (like Rokhlin from NDR; according to Seleznev, even the Prime Minister did not know about this ukase and also possible neither the minister of defence nor the minister of the interior) nor the statements of Ivan Rybkin, Secretary of the Security Council and former Speaker of the State Duma: "Ivan Rybkin strangely keeps the Chechen position. He speaks a lot about the difficult situation of the Chechen republic, but does not remember the 400,000 refugees, who left the republic against their will."¹⁵⁶

In May 1996, Ziuganov again defines the situation in Chechnia as "a civil war in the country" and warns about the possibility that "this fire could expand to other regions."¹⁵⁷ As before, Ziuganov claims that "there is no military solution to the problem", yet also qualifies (expresses a rebuttal) his claim by saying that "we do not ask to stop the struggle against band formations which operate there at the moment, the terrorist character of which is clear to everybody today." What is really underneath all that is happening in Chechnia is a "*clash between mafia interests*" – the same as that which moves in organized crime.¹⁵⁸ So what Ziuganov argues is that one should get to the root of this criminal action, and that "their moving forces" must be revealed and stopped." However, Ziuganov again directs criticism against the Russian leadership: the "search for fundamental motives of the Chechen battles is not on the agenda of the current leadership of the country".¹⁵⁹ Ziuganov gives his election promise: "We will do it definitely. The war will be ended and the initiators will have punishment according to the law." One of the real reasons behind the problems in Chechnia is the regional policy of the Russian leadership and especially the provocation of nationalist sentiments before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union: "Nationalism and separatism are not only a consequence of the economic crisis, but a consequence of the loss of the common Fatherland by the people, the loss of its right to be proud of this Fatherland."¹⁶⁰ Thus, here Ziuganov again brings these problems into a 'bigger picture'. All the problems have something to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union and suppressing Russian nationalism while at the same time encouraging nationalism of other peoples living within the Soviet Union or Russian Federation territory. Those who lead the country are actually enemies of Russia and Russians. For example, Svetlana Savitskaia, a member of the Duma Committee on Defence and a former cosmonaut, argues that the "future situation in Chechnia [...] is tied with the economic and political interests of the ruling top level of the presidential-governmental power [...] and the *unity (tselostnost) of Russia is insignificant for many of them.*"¹⁶¹ The border again is drawn between those who understand what is good for Russia and Russians (the Communists and real patriots) and those who care for their own interests. The argumentation is authoritative (the communists *know*) and motivational (the people, who understand what is good for them and the country want to protect the unity).

156 Ibid.

157 Ziuganov, 23 May 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. All Ziuganov's quotes in this paragraph are from this article.

158 This is close to what Dzhabrail Gakaev (2005, 25), a Chechen professor of historical studies, has argued.

159 See also Savitskaia blaming Eltsin and his command 22 October 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

160 Ibid.

161 Savitskaia, 22 October 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

As for the claim for how the conflict should be solved, as mentioned above, the communists argue for finding a political solution, e.g. “We have categorically argued for a peaceful settlement of the Chechen crisis. [...] We have argued right from the beginning that nothing can be solved there militarily.”¹⁶² However, another main claim (or this might be understood as a rebuttal to the first claim) is that Russia’s integrity should be safeguarded (and here we must remember the claim that the situation in Chechnia poses a threat to Russia’s integrity)¹⁶³ and thus Chechnia must be kept as part of the Russian Federation. Keeping Chechnia as part of Russia is one of the main requirements of most of the politicians from all parties, even though Iavlinskii of Iabloko is almost ready to let Chechnia go if the people in Chechnia do not want to stay with Russia. In addition, other Iabloko politicians do not accept just any means in order to protect unity and integrity. In contrast, the communists do not give any precise limit to how far one may go: “The only strong demand is that Russia is united and indivisible, [because] it is the will of its people.”¹⁶⁴ Protecting the unity of Russia transcends all. As we have seen, one of the main reasons given to back up this claim is the popular will (motivational arguments). The people are represented as a homogeneous entity and the expresser of their will is each politician in question. However, this will varies from politician to politician, e.g. the popular will (and the people) to which Iavlinskii refers is very different from that of Ziuganov’s reference. Ziuganov even leaves us under the impression that those who do not understand that Chechnia belongs to Russia have somehow been misguided (or just does not understand politics): “Any reflecting human being (*dumaiushchii chelovek*) understands quite well that protecting Chechnia’s interests is possible only when it is part of Russia.”¹⁶⁵

After signing the peace agreement the situation has not turned for the better in Chechnia according to Ziuganov: “They kill more people there now than before, punish the dissidents (*inakomyshchii*). Militia and ordinary citizens are accused just for the fact that they expressed their wish to be part of Russia. I do not exclude that an internal civil war would begin there.”¹⁶⁶ Hence it is not only the Russian leadership but also the Chechen leadership which is blamed for the situation. Moreover, Ziuganov blames the Chechen leadership for trying to “internationalize the conflict.” And for sure, it is not only a problem for Russia, but for all neighbouring countries and countries in which there are minorities. Chechnia might stand as an example for them. He uses a generalization or classification, so it is a substantive argument: “I am astonished why it does not also alarm Georgia and Armenia; if one talks about Chechnia breaking away from Russia, that question will become a problem for them too. And to Ukraine, Spain and France and Iran...”¹⁶⁷

162 Ziuganov 14 September 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, also 25 October 1996, *Trud*.

163 E.g. Ziuganov (cited in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 3 October 1996) argues that “Russia will repeat the destiny of the USSR, the collapse of which also started not very visibly and therefore the Duma should extinguish threatening symptoms like the threat of Chechnia withdrawing itself or the autonomisation of the Far East [...]”

164 Ziuganov, 23 May 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

165 Ziuganov 14 September 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, also 25 October 1996, *Trud*.

166 Ibid.

167 Ziuganov 14 September 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

Viktor Iliukhin is also afraid of Russia breaking up and Chechnia serving as the catalyst: “The danger of the Chechen precedent for the territorial integrity (*tselostnost*) of Russia is that other separatists follow this means of the settlement of the Chechen crisis.”¹⁶⁸ Russia might be transformed from “a federal state into a union or union of states”. He criticizes the ukase of the president and the agreement signed by Chernomyrdin and Maskhadov on 23 November 1996, as according to Iliukhin the agreement strengthens separatism in the North Caucasus and other regions and “creates a dangerous precedent for the emerging of new demands for withdrawing federal troops from other North Caucasian republics and even from Bashkiria, Tatarstan, Kalmykia, and Yakutia and of replacing them by their national armed forces.” What follows automatically from the ukase and agreement is regional and national separatism. Iliukhin even presents some backing for his warrant: Maskhadov is planning to have border and customs posts at the borders and has announced that the “Khasaviurt raion of Dagestan is a sacred land of Vainakh”. Furthermore, “the foreign minister Chemaev of Ichkeriia has publicly announced that Chechnia gradually moves to its goal – to full independence.” Iliukhin is presenting his argument as a ‘law of nature’, a causal process that will inevitably happen. Hence, it is either an authoritative or substantive argument, based on whether we think that a certain ‘law’ exists or whether we just trust in Iliukhin’s statement. The KPRF programme from 1995 (1997) also stresses getting rid of separatism, nationalism and chauvinism; stopping Russophobia, Westernism and Americanism; and taking care of unity (*tselostnost*) of the Fatherland.¹⁶⁹

For Iliukhin private (economic) interests represent a threat to the state (strategic) interests. Iliukhin stresses the primacy of the state strategic interests over the economic interests of private companies:

The latest developments which are tied with Chechnia prove that strategic interests of Russia in the southern regions are more actively suffocated by the interests of oil and drug business, interests of separate companies. There is a dilemma in front of the country: to protect the oil pipeline or to keep the southern regions out of great civil war. I think that we will have to choose the latter option.¹⁷⁰

Iliukhin argues that not using the oil pipeline would “freeze out the ambitions of local nationalists [that is] the plan of uniting Chechnia and Ingushetia.”¹⁷¹

After the presidential elections (and then the parliamentary elections) in Chechnia both Iliukhin and Seleznev argue that they should be announced illegitimate: there was no real campaign, no authorized lists of candidates and “aid from foreign states and 30,000 organized and unorganized fighters cause chaos and lawfulness in the republic”¹⁷² and “the majority of

168 Iliukhin cited in 30 November 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

169 *Programma politicheskoi partii KPRF* 1995 (amended 1997).

170 Iliukhin, 4 December 1996, *Pravda*.

171 Ibid.

172 Iliukhin, 14 January 1997, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

refugees do not participate, which makes up almost half of the population of the republic”.¹⁷³ Furthermore, Seleznev criticizes the leader of the OSCE mission in Chechnia, Tim Guldiman, and doubts his objectivity: “Those 350,000 dollars that he brought to the elections in Chechnia, his public declarations of the fact that the preparation to them is done according to all international norms and requirements, cannot do nothing but cause protest.”¹⁷⁴ Iliukhin does not believe that the elections would bring about change: “To give [something] to drink and eat and to make [something] happen is much more difficult than shoot with machine-guns and therefore, it is not excluded that Chechen leaders will take up the weapons again.”¹⁷⁵ We can speculate whether this (and statements like this) is a self-fulfilling prophecy or actually a true statement of which we could see some proof starting in August 1999.

Geopolitical ideas used in the argumentation (if used at all) have to usually be ‘dug’ from the arguments of politicians of other parties, but Gennadii Ziuganov from the Communist party nurtures geopolitical ideas in his argumentation freely and most often on a very general level, drawing a picture of the world and Russia’s place in it.¹⁷⁶ He paints a black-and-white picture, with clear borders between friends and foes. As Urban has described, we can define the Communists’ discourse as a fairy-tale in which somebody (a villain, most commonly the ‘West’ and those cooperating with it) is trying to harm, ruin or even destroy Russia (a hero).¹⁷⁷ One of the ‘lessons of history’ for Russia, as Ziuganov presents, is that there have always been conquerors from the East and West who have tried to get to Russia “for getting our riches and suffocating our belief”. Now “non-friends of Russia try to drag Russia into three geopolitical mistakes”: first, to a conflict with Ukraine, second, to a conflict with the Islamic world and third, to a conflict with China.¹⁷⁸ When describing the new geopolitical model, Ziuganov sees the main enemy as the “financial cosmopolitan oligarchy”. The United States and its allies are represented and aided by this financial cosmopolitan oligarchy, which, in its turn, is the main force behind the Mondialist project of the new world order.¹⁷⁹ Ziuganov explains the current political situation in Russia as a struggle between ‘state-patriotic’ (*gosudarstvenno-patrioticheskii*) forces and the bourgeoisie which unites with the foreign capital and steals, i.e. *kompradorsko-vorovskoi* forces.¹⁸⁰ The goal of state-patriotic forces, to which the communists belong, is to “avoid war in the country, strengthen *gosudarstvennost*, spirituality, and put to the service of the Fatherland all good that has been our thousand years history. We argue for keep-

173 Seleznev, 16 January 1997, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

174 Ibid.

175 Iliukhin, 28 January 1997, *Argumenty i fakty*.

176 Ziuganov has also published books on geopolitics, such as *Rossiiia – Rodina moia. Ideologiia gosudarstvennaia patriotizma* in 1996.

177 Urban 1998, 979–982.

178 Ziuganov, 23 November 1995, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

179 Ziuganov, 16 December 1995, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

180 Ziuganov most likely refers to ‘liberals’ and ‘oligarchs’.

TABLE 12.
KPRF politicians' argument on Chechnia 1994–1998

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: Russian citizens are fighting against each other. The war is not in the interests of Russia or Russians. This is a war about the economic and political interests of the Russian leadership. Only the Russian leadership benefits from the war.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So This is a civil war, possibly expanding to other regions. It is not justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since In civil wars people are made to fight against each other, even though they would not want to (a substantive and authoritative argument). States should take care of the interests of the state and its people, not those of the leadership (a motivational and authoritative argument). If the war is continuing then someone is benefiting from it, and it is not the people (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However This is a question of terrorism too.</p>
<p>Backing: Because Analogies from the past People in Chechnia want to live in peace within Russia. KPRF politicians can be taken as authorities. The Russian leadership is incompetent and corrupt.</p>		

ing the territorial integrity of Russia and for gradually, voluntarily re-establishing the union state (*soiuznoe gosudarstvo*).¹⁸¹

Geopolitical vision

In the Chechnian argumentation it is the Russian leadership who is the main enemy, i.e. those who allowed the collapse of the Soviet Union. What defines contemporary Russia is 'false sovereignty', 'half-colonial dependence', 'omnipotence of civil servants' (*chinovniki*), and 'genocide of our people'; "The executive power has placed the country without warm seas, without

181 Ziuganov, 21 October 1995, *Trud*.

TABLE 12...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data: The military solution has not worked out and the leadership has not been able to solve the conflict. The war might expand to other areas of Russia and even beyond.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most likely,</p>	<p>Claim: So A political solution should be preferred. The leadership and regime must be changed (re-establishing a union state).</p>
<p>Warrant: Since The policy can be changed only by changing the leadership (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However Integrity is a value above others and it must be safeguarded. The government is finding ways to solve the problems (Seleznev).</p>
<p>Backing: Because Experience from the past – generalization or classification. This leadership is guilty of breaking the Soviet Union apart and therefore guilty of all the problems that were caused by this break-up.</p>		

allies, and almost without any markets.”¹⁸² Contemporary Russia is not the real Russia: it is an ‘enfeebled organism’ or a “geopolitical stump with destroyed, blood bleeding relations”.¹⁸³ As argued above, all problems really come down to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic reforms and the Atlanticist foreign policy at the very beginning of the 1990s and, of course, those who are ‘behind’ these, especially Gorbachev and Eltsin and those close to them.¹⁸⁴ What then caused the collapse of the Soviet Union and is now threatening Russia, is *fighting nationalism*. Chechnia is seen as one example of this. For Ziuganov, the ‘Russian question’ is one of the main problems; that is, Russians were not in an equal position with other peoples in the last years of the Soviet Union or first years of the Russian Federation:

182 Ziuganov, 22 June 1995, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

183 Ziuganov, 22 April 1997, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*; the expression of ‘blood bleeding stump’ used in various texts, in addition to this, e.g. Ziuganov, 24 November 1998, *Zavtra*.

184 See e.g. *Predvybornaia platforma KPRF* 1995.

The development of national self-awareness of any people – from Armenians and Ukrainians to Chukchi and Chechens – was taken as a positive and progressive phenomenon. Analogous processes in the self-awareness of Russians were taken as a strongly negative and reactive phenomenon – nationalism, shovininism, anti-Semitism etc. [...] Russophobia became one of the main instrument of perestroika. [...in the Soviet Union] Russians were in an unequal position in their own country.¹⁸⁵

If we think about the model Russia should follow (that is, what could still save Russia), it is the “re-creation of the union state” and safeguarding the “independence and wholeness (*nezavisimost i tselostnost*) of the Fatherland”, the “re-creation of friendship and cooperation of peoples on the basis of equality of nations and recognition of responsibility of each people for the unity of Russia”, and an “independent foreign policy, corresponding to Russia’s interests”.¹⁸⁶ What is especially stressed is building a strong state, something that was to be adopted by president Putin as one of the key concepts of his ‘agenda’: “Without a Strong State there Cannot Be a Strong Russia.”¹⁸⁷ “What moves us is the wish to save our Homeland (*Rodina*), country and state. That is why we – monarchists and communists, clericals and liberal-democrats – call ourselves gosudartsvenniki.” The requirement of building a strong state is justified by the geographical size of Russia: the “Great Russian people live today on huge territories, and have inhabited almost the whole continent of Eurasia between three oceans. [...] Russia was and will be great, a country of huge spaces. But in order to control these spaces a strong state is needed. And it should be built by a centralist philosophy [...]”.¹⁸⁸ Another concept which has found its way on to Putin’s agenda is that of the ‘dictatorship of law’; however, when Ziuganov used this in 1996, he was referring to restricting the ‘omnipotence of the president’ – the “[...] dictatorship of law, so that everything would be subordinated to the law and the president would show an example of following the law”.¹⁸⁹

Lastly, if we are to refer to the mission of Russia, for the communists Russia represents a unique or unrepeated civilization and “each great civilization has its form of national (people’s) way of living together and that of morality. The Eurasian location of our country, its expanses (plains), nature, climate, multinational and multi-confessional population – it is all ours.”¹⁹⁰ Russia’s *uniqueness* is based on its geography (e.g. vastness) and heterogeneous nature of the population. Even though Russia’s multicultural nature is stressed, still Russianess is something that rises above others: the “Russian people are the keeper of the Russian statehood and the

185 Ziuganov 12 February 1998, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

186 *Predvybornaia platforma KPRF* 1995, Also the Programme of 1997 (Programma-Minimum) argues for stopping the fraternal killings and execute ‘friendship and cooperation of peoples’.

187 *Predvybornaia platforma KPRF* 1995,

188 Ziuganov, 15 April 1997, *Zavtra*; talking about Russia as a country of huge spaces also e.g. Ziuganov, 24 November 1998, *Zavtra*.

189 Ziuganov, 22 February 1996, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

190 *Predvybornaia platforma kommunisticheskoi partii RF* 1995, see also e.g. Iliukhin, 8 September 1998, *Zavtra*. Also on the ‘Russian question’. See also Ziuganov, 4 November 1998, *Trud-7* on the uniqueness of ‘Russian civilization’.

free national development of peoples who have tied their historical destiny with Russia is a corner stone of the Russian statehood.”¹⁹¹ What have been and should be the essence of the Russian statehood is Orthodox Christianity: “Without the Orthodox faith there could never have been a centralized Russian state. In order to form a strong state, one must have an ideology. In the centre of the whole Russian ideology were two ideas. The first was respect towards the Fatherland and patriotism. The second idea was social justice, which operated on Christian communality and Christian socialism.”¹⁹² Respect for the Orthodox faith and other ‘traditional religions’ is demanded in the Programme of 1995 too.¹⁹³

6.3 COMPARISON AND GEOPOLITICAL VISION

Based on the analysis we can draw borders between the party of power, the democratic opposition and the communist opposition in their Chechnian argumentation 1994–1998. That is, there are differences between the parties and, to a certain extent, different ways of analysing the data reveal different differences and, to a certain degree, the findings of the different analyses are overlapping. Moreover, these differences vary from question to question and to some extent from politician to politician. If we first look at the *geopolitical storyline of the parties* (generalizations based on all the data of all politicians of a party during the whole period of time) on the conflict in Chechnia, we can see that the major differences appear in the causal explanations and blame strategies (answers to the questions *why* and *who*). For the party of power, the war is going on due to the Chechen leaders, their anti-constitutional activity, and to a some extent, NDR politicians admit that perhaps the nationalities policy has not been a success either (however, Rokhlin is a deviant case). For Iabloko and KPRF, that is, the representatives of the democratic and communist opposition respectively, this war is about the interests of the Russian leadership and proves the failure of the leadership. Actually, the communists would like to draw our attention to the perestroika period (and allowing ethnic nationalism) which then caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is the main reason for the problems Russia is facing today, including the problems in Chechnia. Concerning the meaning of the situation (answers to *so what*) in Chechnia all parties agree that it is a threat to Russia, and may possibly lead to its destruction.

When looking at the *content and structure (model) of the argument*, we can see that the party of power sees the war in Chechnia as more or less justified, whereas the opposition parties claim that it is not justified. However, both Nash Dom – Rossiia and Iabloko appeal to the Russian Constitution and democracy when giving their opposite claims on the justifiability of the war. Nash Dom – Rossiia and Iabloko refer to different Articles of the Constitution, e.g.

191 Ziuganov, 23 November 1995, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, see also Ziuganov, 15 April 1997, *Zavtra*

192 Ziuganov, 15 April 1996, *Zavtra*; on the national character or the ‘Russian idea’, see also Ziuganov 8 October 1998, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

193 *Programma partii “Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995*, amended 1997.

that the Constitution should be followed in the whole federation territory (NDR) or that the federal troops cannot be used within the country without a declaration of a state of emergency, or they give a different meaning or interpretation to the same Articles of the Constitution (Russia is a democratic country). Iabloko and KPRF agree that the war is not justified because it is in the interests of the Russian leadership. Concerning the problem solution, all argue for finding a political solution, but the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation still seems to overcome political means of solving the conflict, at least for NDR and KPRF (and to Lukin of Iabloko). How this political solution can be implemented varies from party to party: the party of power assures us that the leadership is willing and able to carry out a political settlement, just as both Iabloko and KPRF argue for changing the incompetent leadership. However, for KPRF the change of leadership would not be enough – what is actually required is a change of regime too. There were no major differences as to whether justifications of the claims were substantive, motivational or authoritative; all of them were in use by all parties. Perhaps we can still say that the party of power and Iabloko refer to the facts or authority such as the Constitution, or the value of democracy (however, giving different interpretation of democracy or what the people want), whereas KPRF appeals to our trust, or even to our belief in the KPRF politicians themselves and in the shared goals/values for the future.

Lastly, if we look at the argumentation on a more general level, and generalize from the Chechnia argumentation to a more general geopolitical argumentation and employ here the concept of *geopolitical vision*, we can see that on the basis of the above argumentation analysis that the parties do not share the same geopolitical code, model to follow, or a mission to pursue. First of all, if we look at the friends/foes question, we can see that for the party of power, the foes are those who oppose democratic Russia, and violate the Russian constitution. They do not employ any ethnically motivated definition of friends/foes. Friends are those who are willing to live in the multi-ethnic, multi-national, multi-confessional Russia. For Iabloko also those who oppose the democratic development are the main foes, but they are not the same as for Nash Dom – Rossiia because for Iabloko the Russian leadership does not represent democratic development but something quite the opposite. KPRF defines friends as state patriots, and non-friends are those who fraternise with the West, with the financial cosmopolite oligarchy, and with the (ethnic) nationalists including the Russian leadership. As a model to follow, both NDR and Iabloko see democracy – NDR stressing Russian democracy and the Russian constitution; Iabloko referring more to European democracy and a European path of integration. Contrastingly, KPRF sees as the right model to follow a strong union state, the independence of Russia, and the friendship of peoples. The model and the mission coincide: the mission for Russia (at least towards the Chechen republic) is taking care of democratic development for both the party of power and Iabloko. However, for Iabloko this mission should not be fulfilled if the Chechen people does not want to live with Russia. For KPRF politicians, the mission is to bring all peoples living in Eurasia together to cherish the unique civilization they have, with the Russian nation, however, as a leader in this process. The communists want to see Russia as multi-ethnic, multi-national and even multi-confessional, but still stress the significance of Orthodox Christianity and the miseries that the Russian people have suffered.

7 Arguments on Russo-Chechen Relations II

7.1 THE WAR IN CHECHNIA IN 1999- : A COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATION?

As mentioned previously in Chapter 6, during the interwar period the situation continued to deteriorate in Chechnia; there were numerous kidnappings and the influence of radical Islamic movements gained in strength.¹ President Maskhadov was pressured by the field commanders and had to make many concessions, including a transition to Shariah law.² There was fighting on the Chechen-Dagestani border in the spring and summer of 1999. Yet still in March 1999 then Prime Minister Primakov was convinced that “we are not going to restart military action in Chechnia.”³ However, the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen and Dagestani fighters led by Shamil Basaev and Khattab in the beginning of August gave the final reason for the just appointed Prime Minister Putin and President Eltsin for starting a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ in accordance with the Federal law on the fight against terrorism.⁴ The explosions of the residential buildings in Buinaksk (Dagestan) and in Moscow in September, for which Chechens were blamed, were taken as a further justification for the operation.⁵ Putin feared the Yugoslavization of Russia, i.e. Russia breaking apart.⁶ Soon the counter-terrorist operation turned into a war: a ground invasion into Chechen territory was carried out on 30 September, a day before Putin had still offered negotiations to the Chechen leadership.

As John O’Loughlin mentioned, over half of Russians gave positive evaluations of the Army performance in early 2000 before the March presidential elections, whereas at the end of the first war in Chechnia in 1996 two-thirds did not believe that the action in Chechnia was satisfactory.⁷ So, as Pain argued, Russian society radically changed from the first war to the second war.⁸ In addition to the favourable public opinion, liberal politicians like Gaidar, Nemtsov

1 See e.g. Evangelista 2002, 46.

2 See *ibid.*, 58; Sakwa 2005, 11; Gakaev 2005, 32.

3 Primakov, 12 March 1999. *Krasnaia zvezda*.

4 For a detailed description of the invasion to Dagestan, see Gakiev 2005, 34.

5 See e.g. O’Loughlin 2001, 38; Sakwa 2005, 16.

6 Sakwa 2005, 18.

7 O’Loughlin 2001, 37. In addition, even before the first Chechen war in August and December 1994 more than two thirds opposed sending troops to Chechnia, see e.g. opinion poll of August and 17 December 1994 by Fond Obshchestvennogo mneniia, www.fom.ru

8 Pain 2005, 68.

and Tsubais were against the first campaign but supported the second.⁹ Also, NATO's campaign in Kosovo and the government's successful propaganda campaign had their effect.¹⁰ Pain argues that the main reason for the change in public opinion was disillusionment with liberal reforms – people cried out for victory.¹¹ Actually, the counter-terrorist operation was the major factor in guaranteeing victory for Putin in the presidential elections: "Putin received a boost to his popularity from the Chechen war that was perceived positively for long enough to assure his election in the first-round voting in March 2000."¹² However, already "by July 2000, 79 per cent of Russians rated the military action as 'unsuccessful' or 'very unsuccessful'".¹³ Some Western countries, and especially human rights organizations, have criticized the federal action in Chechnia, but the criticism from the Western states has not been so hard as during the first war.¹⁴ One reason has been that the second Chechen war is considered Russia's internal matter.¹⁵ Moreover,

Russians reject Western criticism of the actions of the Russian armed forces in Chechnia, believing that this war was initiated by 'Chechen terrorists' and since it is an internal Russian affair, should be left to the Russian state to resolve [...] In the Russian view, national sovereignty trumps any international human rights standards and interventionism. For President Putin and almost all Russians, *the effort to keep Russia territorially intact is much more important than any deterioration in relations between Russia and other states.*¹⁶

It has been argued that the Dubrovka hostage drama resulted in hardening public opinion and restricting the freedom of the media.¹⁷ If we again look at public opinion we can see that still in May 1999 almost half (44 %) regarded Chechnia as an independent state and 41 per cent as part of Russia. In December 1999 and July 2000 more than two thirds (72%) thought that Chechnia is a part of Russia. When asked whether Chechnia *should* be a part of Russia, without any special status, a part of Russia with some special status, or an independent state, in May 1999 the majority replied that Chechnia should either be an independent state (41%) or have

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 69–70.

11 Ibid., 70.

12 O'Loughlin 2001, 37. Also see also Pain 2005, 70–71.

13 O'Loughlin 2001, 37.

14 See e.g. Cherkasov and Grushkin 2005, 132. The authors mention that during the first war the international community was very active and e.g. OSCE acted as a mediator in the conflict. During the second war the UN Human Rights Commission also criticised Russia 'for disproportionate and indiscriminate use of military force, particularly against civilians' in April 2000. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly also suspended Russia's voting rights. (Bowker 2005, 231–232.)

15 Ibid., 146.

16 O'Loughlin 2001, 43. Italics added.

17 However, others claim that Dubrovka and Beslan were just used as justifications for reforms that had been prepared for a longer time and would have been executed anyway.

some special status within Russia (21%), but when this question was asked in November 2002, May 2003 and December 2004, almost a half (45, 43 and 48 % respectively) thought that Chechnia should be part of Russia without any special status. Independence and special status received approximately 20 per cent support each time. What has been characteristic during the Putin period, has been the building of the vertical of power and as part of this, the taking over control of most of the mass media, especially television channels, by forces loyal to President Putin.¹⁸ Therefore, recently only partial information on the situation in Chechnia has reached the general public in Russia and this must be taken into account when reading the opinion polls in Russia.

As part of the 'normalization process' advocated by the federal centre, a new constitution was drafted for the Chechen republic. This constitution was accepted by a referendum in the Chechen Republic on 23 March 2003. According to the information of *Tsentribirkom*, 88.41% of the population in the Republic participated in the referendum. 95.97% voted for the approval of the Constitution, 95.37% for the approval of the bill "On the Elections of the President of the Chechen Republic" and 96.06% for the approval of the bill "On the Elections of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic".¹⁹ According to the Constitution, the territory of the Chechen Republic is an inextricable part of the territory of the Russian Federation. The only source of power in the republic is its multinational people. If the laws or the constitution of the Republic contradict those of the Federation, the laws of the Federation override those of the Republic. The Constitution prohibits any organizations whose goals and actions strive for the forceful change of the constitutional order and the violation of the unity (integrity) of the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation, or the creation of any military formations which are not decreed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The status of the Chechen republic cannot be changed without its consent and its borders can only be changed by mutual agreement of both parties.

The presidential elections were organised on 5 October 2003²⁰ and the Kremlin favourite Islam Kadyrov, who was later assassinated in 2004, was elected president of the Chechen Republic. Other candidates either withdrew from the campaign or did not have any large base of support.

7.2 PARTIES OF POWER

Below I will introduce the argumentation of each organization of the party of power separately, even though these three were merged into one organization during the period of study. First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Nash Dom – Rossiia was forced to merge into Unity in 2000 after

18 See Chapter 5.1: The majority of Russians do not have access to the internet.

19 www.kremlin.ru 23 March 2003, accessed 19 March 2004.

20 Ukase No 729 of President of the Russian Federation "On the Elections of the first president of the Chechen Republic". 4 July 2003.

the former's defeat in the parliamentary elections of December 1999. Secondly, Otechestvo first started cooperation with Edinstvo in 2001 and then merged with it, creating a new party – Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia).

7.2.1 Nash Dom – Rossiia: Russia is fighting against terrorism

The 'fading party of power' Nash Dom – Rossiia's storyline on Chechnia in 1999 differs somewhat from the storyline in 1995–1998. The storyline might be simply named as *Russia is fighting against terrorism to keep it from expanding*.²¹ Now the stress in the definition of the situation is on the anti-terrorist operation: the purpose of the operation is to eliminate terrorists in Chechnia and terrorism serves as the main justification for starting the operation. However, as during the first war, Nash Dom – Rossiia also justifies the operation by legal reasons; that is, Chechen authorities have not followed the agreements, but have violated the Russian constitution. Those who are fighting against each other are terrorists led by Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov (and some Western politicians supporting him) on one side, and the federal authorities together with all the ordinary people on the other side. The expansion of terrorism would follow unless Russia starts an anti-terrorist operation. So Russia is not only taking care of its own interests but the interests of humankind.

TABLE 13.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the conflict in Chechnia in 1999

What is this conflict about?	Operation to eliminate the terrorists; Russia re-building order.
Where is it taking place?	Subject of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus; in Russia's domestic space but Chechen fighters have international connections.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	The situation in Chechnia: a lack of order, terrorism, violation of agreements – a threat to Russia's integrity.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	Maskhadov, terrorists, some Western politicians vs. the federal power and ordinary people in Chechnia and everywhere in Russia.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in the conflict?	Terrorism could expand to other areas if Russia did not act.

21 Here we must remember that the texts of Nash Dom - Rossiia on the second war in Chechnia only cover the year 1999, because the party was dissolved after it did not succeed in passing the five per cent threshold in the State Duma election of December 1999.

Before the federal operation was started in Dagestan and then in Chechnia, Vladimir Zorin, Chair of the Duma committee on nationalities, defined the situation in Dagestan as an “organised and large-scale action in the Dagestani territory”.²² This action proves that those agreements that were signed with Chechnia in Khasaviurt have lost their meaning. Zorin’s claim is that “we have to change radically the whole Russian policy in the North Caucasus”. The way to do this would be to “get the local population to the struggle against the bandits”. As a rebuttal to this, Zorin reminds us that one should “not allow any uncontrolled self-armament of the population”. When the interviewer says that this conflict has an international character, there are citizens of foreign countries among fighters, Zorin replies by warning that “If we do not stop this conflict now, then the whole country might be dragged into it. The whole society must understand the danger of terrorism. For Russia, it is the problem Number 1. Struggle against terrorism requires the forces not only of the power but the whole society.” Thus, the main task now seems to be getting people onto the federal side and making them understand what is best for them. Russia, with the help of its citizens, can prevent the expansion of terrorism.

When the operation had already been started, in October 1999, Zorin presented himself as a man of peace – during the first Chechen war he indeed argued for finding a political solution to the Russo-Chechen problem. However, this time he sees no alternative but to use force: “I have always been an advocate of political means of resolving problems, but this time I support the determined actions of the Russian leadership as the only possible ones. Terrorism merits one fate – liquidation. In this respect there can be no other opinions.”²³ Zorin’s main claim is that the operation is justified: the “tough position of the power, taking the armed forces [into Chechnia] and the plans for the anti-terrorist operation are all morally and legally justified.” Zorin justifies his claim by several reasons. The first is that the *Chechen leaders have not upheld the conditions of the Khasaviurt agreement*: “Using force is also justified because the current Chechen authorities practically repudiated the Khasaviurt Accord. Grozny blamed and blames Moscow for not fulfilling obligations of the economic aid for rebuilding the republic. But it is a myth!”²⁴ In contrast, the federal centre has fulfilled the conditions by allocating economic aid (it just has not reached the pensioners due to the Chechen leaders) and by pulling its troops out from Chechnia. In addition, Russia accepted the results of the presidential elections held in Chechnia on 27 January 1997. The Chechens, instead, “have not confiscated any weapons, or liquidated any criminal gangs. And moreover, all the time the taking of hostages, killing of civilians, and terrorist acts have continued.”²⁵

The second data for the operation’s justification are what will be achieved with its help, that is, *getting rid of terrorism*: “We [the federal leadership] are obliged to destroy terrorists, to cleanse the territory of Chechnia from criminal filth (*skverna*),” and *the setting-up of order*:

22 Zorin, 13 August 1999, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

23 Zorin, 20 October 1999, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

“Power has strongly decided to set up order in our common home.”²⁶ Thus Zorin takes the then political regime as a criminal regime, incapable of restoring order in the Republic; therefore, the federal operation is vital. Moreover, Zorin argues that this solution (killing terrorists) would bring peace to the republic. Zorin is using a motivational argument. Further data supporting the claim, to which most politicians refer, is that this operation is supported by the people. As data (or backing for the warrant), Zorin refers to statistics according to which 700,000 Chechens “chose a long time ago where to live and which power organises them”²⁷ or that between August 1996 and December 1998 60,000 citizens left Chechnia or that since August 1996 180,000 Chechens (the Chechen intelligentsia and pro-Russian groups) have left the territory of the Republic of Chechnia. Here we can see that even though Zorin associates the Chechen operation with terrorism, Chechens with terrorists, he does not imply that all Chechens are terrorists or support terrorism. Instead, Zorin tries to convince the audience that *actually these terrorists do not get any support from ‘ordinary’ Chechens*, and this is the same as during the first war. When the interviewer mentions Shamil Basaev, Zorin says that he is a hero of a limited part of the population (or those in favour of a radical solution to political problems) and for others he is “no more than a terrorist”. Zorin uses both substantive (referring to the ‘evidence’ such as the statistics and non-fulfilment of the Khasaviurt Accord) and motivational arguments (justifying the operation by the goal for the future, that is, peace and order, and by the popular will).

As a solution Zorin offers ‘wise national policy’, which would mean more allocations for the socio-economic development of the republic. In addition, Zorin speaks of the importance of tolerance towards other peoples, ethnic groups or nationalities. The interviewer asks: “Today some thousands of Russian soldiers participating in the anti-terrorist operation have been drawn into the relations between nationalities. What do they have to know to keep the peace in the security zone?”

The army should remember that they are not participating in a military campaign but in the *liberation of a part of Russian territory and its population*. In addition, the habits and traditions of the mountain dwellers must be respected. We need to understand one thing: Russia will stand firmly on its feet, when the state respects each of its peoples regardless of which language they speak. *The Chechen people merit respect and empathy, I think we will convince people of that.*²⁸

Elsewhere Zorin’s claim seems to be that it is time to carry out dialogue with all the sane forces of the Chechen society.²⁹ The word ‘sane’ here refers to those forces with the state of mind to fight against international terrorism. In contrast, the current Chechen leadership (President

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 See Zorin, 28 October 1999, *Vek*.

Aslan Maskhadov and chair of the Chechen parliament Ruslan Alikhadezhiev) is responsible for the situation. However, as a qualifier for this we can understand by Zorin's statement that they have a possibility to restore their legitimacy by condemning international terrorism, by offering mutual action against terrorists. The leadership is responsible because they have not followed the Khasaviurt Accord and at the same time lost their legitimacy. Zorin gives the same evidence as above in an article from 20 October 1999: the Chechen government has not disarmed any military organizations (in 1996 the population was 750,000 and there were 50,000 weapons; in 1999 the population was 350,000 and there were 75,000 weapons), did not react to bandit groups rallying to Dagestan, and *de facto* supported the aggression.

Vladimir Ryzhkov's, Chair of the Nash Dom – Rossiia parliamentary faction, definition of the situation before the federal operation was that "what is now going on in Russia is total terror" and asks how the state should react.³⁰ Ryzhkov introduces two options that have been raised: for example, Berezovskii has suggested having negotiations with bandits and others have argued that a full-scale military operation in Chechnia must be started. But neither of these will do according to Ryzhkov. He justifies his claim for not choosing the first option by the bad experience from the Khasaviurt Accords, that is, Chechnia has not fulfilled the requirements. The latter option would not do because Russia should not repeat the mistake from 1994–1996, so he is constructing a substantive argument by referring to an analogy between the past and the current situation. A military operation would require at least one year's preparation. Ryzhkov is referring to his own expertise (an authoritative argument): "In my opinion, Russia will have to live with the problem of terrorism for many, maybe even tens of years, to come. We have to be psychologically ready as the threat will not go away right now and there is no simple solution to that." Ryzhkov suggests the following measures: first, elimination of those forces that execute terror and strengthening of special services in the way Israel has done for the whole history of its being;³¹ second, Chechnia was, is and will be a subject of the RF and any talk about its independence must be stopped; third, we should not exclude serious military operations in the territory of Chechnia, but they have to be carefully prepared; fourth, Russia should make the border of Chechnia totally closed for the delivery of weapons and military technology and for financing of fighters; fifth, Russia should pay special attention to the armed forces, so that they would not only be able to defend against terrorists but also make offensives against them; and "last and the most important, the whole world experience about the struggle against terrorism is based on the mutual actions of the power (*vlast*) and the population.[...] We should immediately develop the national propaganda of methods of struggle against terrorism." Thus, again the importance of getting people onto 'our side' is emphasized. Ryzhkov recognizes that in democracies the popular will should be taken into account; however, this will can be moulded in the direction of the political elite's will.

30 Ryzhkov, 16 September 1999, *Vedomosti*.

31 Israel's fight against terrorism is taken as an example of 'good practise' by other Russian politicians, too, e.g. Iabloko politicians.

After beginning the operation, Ryzhkov's claim is that Nash Dom – Rossiia supports the operation. The data given to support the claim is that *the operation is an operation to destroy terrorists, to restore the territorial integrity and unity (tselostnost i edinstvo) of the Russian Federation and to restore peace and tranquillity in the Caucasus region*.³² These goals serve as the main justification to support the operation, thus it is a question of a motivational argument. Ryzhkov appeals to listeners' shared values and goals for the future.³³ The rebuttal to the claim is actually brought up by the interviewer when he refers to the alleged humanitarian catastrophe. However, Ryzhkov refutes this by referring to 'facts', to statistics introduced by the then Prime Minister Putin, according to which the population of Chechnia had decreased from 1,2 million to 200–250,000 inhabitants (compare to Zorin's figures above). Thus, the escape of the mass population happened already before this operation. This can be taken either as an authoritative or substantive argument. Ryzhkov's solution is that everybody is given a chance to leave, to save oneself. As an exception to the support for the operation and to the claim of the rightfulness of the government's and president's position is that

I have never agreed with Russia perpetrating aggression, Russia perpetrating humanitarian terror or such against the civilian population. It is not right. Russia is actually now taking all possible steps in order to get the civilians (*mirnye grazhdan*) out of there.³⁴

If simplified, Ryzhkov's solution seems to be the evacuation of all civilians.³⁵ As a result of this only 'bandits' would stay in the region and the Russian forces would be free to destroy the whole area and worry about civilian casualties. As another exception we can understand Ryzhkov's statement that if Russia cannot find any authority, any legitimacy in Chechnia, the effect of the operation would be weakened. Russia should have a real political dialogue with forces which are legitimate among the Chechens. These forces should, however, be those "who would take responsibility for the further development of the situation, who would see the future of Chechnia as part of Russia".³⁶

The situation between Russia and Chechnia is not only between those two, but in addition, there is at least a 'third' party involved, ie. the 'West', represented by the EU, OSCE, the US, and the European Council. For example, when commenting on Maskhadov's announcement on the willingness to negotiate but only by the intermediation of Knut Vollebæk, the chair of the OSCE (1997–2000), Ryzhkov presents his opposition to this due to the fact that Chechnia is part of the Russian Federation and, in the negotiations between the federal centre and the Chechen authorities (*vlasti*), no foreign mediators are necessary. As an example

32 Ryzhkov, 23 November 1999, *Radio Svoboda*.

33 Ibid. and also 15 December 1999, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*; statements in support of the operation, see also Ryzhkov, 26 October 1999, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

34 Ryzhkov, 23 November 1999, *Radio Svoboda*.

35 In 1998 Ryzhkov also argued for isolation of Chechnia and letting people to emigrate from there, see Chapter 6.2.1

36 Vladimir Ryzhkov, 23 November 1999, *Radio Svoboda*.

of the tragic outcome of an analogous situation, Ryzhkov brings up what happened in Kosovo and the negotiations in Chateau Rambouillet, where Albanians, Serbs and international organizations were represented. Ryzhkov warns of repeating these dramatic developments. The interviewer introduces a rebuttal: the West does not accept the military action in Chechnia. Ryzhkov however refutes this:

The West is behaving really cruelly (*bepardonno*). I can say it frankly. People who bombed one of the most beautiful European capitals – Belgrade – just recently, half a year ago, now have a conscience to blame Russia. Russia, which took in hundreds of thousands of Chechen refugees, hundreds of thousands of Russian refugees from Chechnia. Russia, which now does everything for restoring there a peaceful, quiet life.³⁷

Furthermore, Ryzhkov compares the situation after the conflict around Kosovo and the situation in Chechnia: “Americans, who in the eyes of the whole world bombed Yugoslavian cities and villages, have now started to cry crocodile tears concerning the destiny of refugees in Chechnia. [...] Russia is dealing with the problem of refugees from Chechnia better than the Americans dealing with the destiny of Serb refugees from Kosovo.”³⁸ Thus, for Ryzhkov, the operation in Kosovo serves as a precedent and a justification for the federal action in Chechnia. The difference is that the Chechnian operation is justified because it is a question of Russia’s own territory and safeguarding its unity and integrity, whereas the Kosovo operation is not justified because foreign troops intervened in the internal matters of Yugoslavia. He uses a substantive and motivational argument.

Since the beginning of the federal operation in the North Caucasus in the autumn of 1999, Viktor Chernomyrdin, party leader and former Prime Minister, has maintained that Nash Dom – Rossiia “strongly supports the government and the armed forces in their aim to establish order in the North Caucasus, to end terrorism. We will argue for the position of a non-compromising struggle against bandits until their total destruction.”³⁹ Thus, “Russia should do [...] anything possible and even impossible to crush bandits-terrorists and to free civilians from them.”⁴⁰ Accordingly, his claim is that the operation is justified by *setting up order and finishing with terrorism* and banditry. The situation in Chechnia (or in the Caucasus in general) is a “threat to the stability and territorial integrity (*tselostnost*) of Russia.”⁴¹ “In no situation should the legal independence of Chechnia be recognized. In comparison to this mistake all the misses of the democrats would become just children’s mischief.”⁴² These goals for the future make this

37 Ryzhkov, 15 December 1999, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

38 Ryzhkov, 7 December 1999, *Vybory Rossii* site.

39 Chernomyrdin, 17 November 1999, *Vybory v Rossii* site.

40 Chernomyrdin, 27 September 1999, *Polit.ru Monitor* 28 September 1999.

41 Chernomyrdin, 17 November 1999, *Vybory v Rossii* site.

42 Chernomyrdin, 27 September 1999, *Polit.ru Monitor* 28 September 1999.

operation justified. Thus, Chernomyrdin's argument is motivational: order is a value which the audience shares and terrorism is a threat which needs to be demolished.

The interviewer suggests that "maybe, the West is only trying to recommend to us its ways to fight against terrorism". But Chernomyrdin is convinced that Russia can heal the illness alone, without any help (a substantive argument, referring to an analogous case in the past; or an authoritative argument, Chernomyrdin's evaluation of the situation should be trusted). Chernomyrdin represents *Chechnia as sick*

*The Chechen Republic is a part of Russia. Unfortunately, today it is very sick. But Russia has enough reason, force and resources to raise the sick [republic] to its feet. We are in a position to put our house in order and we do not need help from the United States nor from NATO. We do not need more of the Balkan tragedy.*⁴³

Like Ryzhkov, Chernomyrdin also reminds about the NATO actions in the former Yugoslavia: "When the USA and other countries of the West bombed Yugoslavia, violating all human norms, they did not only keep silent about it but behaved aggressively. Chechnia it is an internal affair of Russia and in this question it is mindless to pressure our country."⁴⁴ So here again, as in the argumentation of most Russian politicians, a demand to address Russia as an equal and to respect Russia's sovereignty is expressed. Russia is a country among other (great) powers, and Russia should have the same rights as they do.

Again the operation is also justified by *the wellbeing and interests of ordinary Chechens and Russia*: the "government has an obligation to safeguard its people".⁴⁵ Chernomyrdin accuses separatist forces of fighting for their own interests, of putting their interests before the interests of their own people: "The newborn 'defenders of Islam' are not interested in the lofty mission of this ancient religion. They are interested in concrete benefit, gain from the slave trade, drug trafficking and weapons."⁴⁶ Accordingly, the Russian government takes care of the interests of all the citizens, of the whole nation, whereas the Chechen leaders just care for their own. However, Chernomyrdin also understands them yet blames some Russian politicians: "I cannot understand Russian politicians who allow the encroachment of the territorial integrity of the state, the dissolution of Great Russia (*velikaia Rossiia*)."⁴⁷ Thus, a threat to the integrity is posed both by separatists and some Russian politicians. Chernomyrdin positions Chechnia under Russian control and Chechnia with the current Chechen regime, into direct opposition: order, democracy, law and human rights characterize the first option, whereas individual profit, the slave trade and drug trafficking characterise the second option.

The interviewer says that not so long ago Chernomyrdin's 'eternal opponent' Grigorii Iavlinskii (Iabloko) called for starting negotiations with the Chechens – in fact, for stopping

43 Chernomyrdin, 8 December 1999, *Argumenty i fakty*; the same in Chernomyrdin, 17 November 1999, *Vybory v Rossii site*. Italics added.

44 Chernomyrdin, 9 November 1999, *Vybory v Rossii site*.

45 Chernomyrdin, 7 November 1999, *Polit.ru*, see also *ibid*.

46 Chernomyrdin, 8 December 1999, *Argumenty i fakty*.

47 Chernomyrdin, 7 November 1999, *Polit.ru*.

the military action. Chernomyrdin's claim seems to be that *those who demand negotiations are anti-Russian pro-Western conformists and that negotiations should not be led with bandits*: "I categorically condemn those of Russia's internal forces, who conform to anti-Russian Western circles, dramatise the hysteria around the 'humanitarian catastrophe', and call for a halt to military operation and starting the negotiations."⁴⁸ The argument is motivational, Chernomyrdin appeals to the idea that stopping the military action and starting negotiations would be contrary to Russia's and Russians' interests. Chernomyrdin sees no point in negotiations and refers to *the nature of the Chechen leadership: they are bandits* and there action are no other Chechens with whom to negotiate. "Negotiations are not carried out with bandits. *Bandits are killed for those who want to live and work normally.*"⁴⁹

Chernomyrdin refuses even to talk about any humanitarian catastrophe: "There is no question of humanitarian catastrophe in Chechnia and there should not be any talk like that [...]" In addition, Chernomyrdin condemns any foreign participation in the conflict settlement: "We do not need any mediators here. It is our internal problem and we have enough of possibilities and all in order to solve it."⁵⁰ Actually, "the people of Chechnia have been made into slaves, they are left without schools, hospitals, education, salaries, pensions", so Russian generals, officers, and soldiers do not fight, but they carry out a "great peacekeeping (*mirotvorskii*) mission so that these people can be saved from bandits, and to help them create decent conditions of life."⁵¹

According to Chernomyrdin, not only is this operation necessary, but in addition, it is the only option: "There is only the military solution."⁵² Otherwise, terrorism would expand to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan: "Religious terrorism is a plague of the 21st century, and the only means in the fight against this is a total elimination of it."⁵³ Moreover, Chernomyrdin does not want to repeat the mistakes made after Kosovo, that is, according to him, to stop fighting against terrorism.⁵⁴

Roman Popkovich, chair of the Committee on Defence, defines Chechnia as a "criminal state, a centre of terrorism not only in North Caucasus but in the whole of the Middle East."⁵⁵ He interprets the acts of terror in Russia in the autumn of 1999 as a way to have influence on the election campaign: a "coalition of *gosudarstvenniki* [...]" would be a hard blow to the pretensions of Chechnia". So with the help of terrorist acts, "they planned postponement of elections [...], destabilisation of society, [...] banning of some parties and restrictions on citizen rights, [...] a blow to the Russian economy." So this would have meant destabilization and a change of government; Popkovich is using this conspiracy theory as justification for the operation (an

48 Chernomyrdin, 8 December 1999, *Argumenty i fakty*.

49 Ibid.

50 Chernomyrdin, 18 November 1999, *Vybory v Rossii site*.

51 Ibid.

52 Chernomyrdin, 14 October 1999, *Polit.ru*.

53 Ibid.

54 Chernomyrdin, 17 December 1999, *Vybory v Rossii site*.

55 Popkovich, 23 September 1999, *Vedomosti*. All quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

TABLE 14.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians’ argument on Chechnia in 1999

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: Chechnia has a criminal regime. Chechnia has violated the agreements. Terrorism springs from Chechnia. People in Chechnia and Russia proper are on our side.</p>	<p>Qualifier Certainly,</p>	<p>Claim: So This is a justified counter-terrorist operation to eliminate terrorists and to set up constitutional order.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since Criminal regimes are a threat to citizens (a substantive argument). All subjects must follow the Russian constitution (an authoritative argument). The state must protect its citizens (a motivational argument). The state must guarantee that the Constitution is followed and order maintained (a motivational and authoritative argument). Democratic states respect public opinion (a motivational and substantive argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: Because Analogies from the past, e.g. what happened in Kosovo etc. The Chechen republic is a subject of the Federation according to the Constitution. Russia has a constitutional order and is a democratic state. Popular will: people have moved away from Chechnia. NDR politicians are experts in these questions (taken as authorities).</p>		

authoritative and motivational argument). However, the acts of terror caused an opposite reaction: “Russians as a result of all what is happening do not think about the situation in economic terms but from the position of the unity, wholeness of (*tselostnost*) of Russian state.” As Ryzhkov had argued previously, Popkovich also talks about isolating Chechnia: “We have a total constitutional and moral right to create a chain of military and economic blockades and suffocate the fighters. Then there will be hope that a normal life in Chechnia can be built.”

In the party programme from April 1999 there are both implicit and explicit references to Russo-Chechen relations. For example, the programme argues for political solutions to prob-

TABLE 14...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data: (see also the problem definition above) There is no other alternative to finish with terrorism, to stop it expanding, to protect Russia's integrity.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most probably,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> Russia must continue the counter-terrorist operation.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> Terrorism must be finished with and order and unity protected (a motivational and authoritative argument). There is no other way to overcome terrorism (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Negotiations are also required (at least at the very beginning of the operation)</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> We share the goal of safeguarding Russia's unity and security. We know from the past what happens if terrorism is not responded to (analogies from the past).</p>		

lems: "There will never again be a civil war in Russia. Never again will the political questions be solved by the force of weapons [...]"⁵⁶ The claim of the programme (referring to the war in Chechnia 1994–1996) is thus somewhat different from that of its politicians in 1999 (concerning the second war). However, the programme advocates the federal centre's right to intervene if a federation subject violates the federal law. The programme also stresses the importance of the multinational state and the need for an effective national policy ('harmonisation of relations between nations') and this is seen as a way to protect the territorial wholeness and integrity of the Russian Federation. In the section entitled 'Caucasus – the region of vital interests of Russia', Nash Dom – Rossiia stresses the historical bond between Russia and the Caucasus: "During two centuries a unique Russo-Caucasian political, economic and cultural space was created;" but continues that the present situation in the Caucasus is a threat to the unity of Russia: "Today the Caucasus has transformed into a region of permanent political strife, economic instability and military conflicts, from where the main threat to the unity and integrity of the Russian state (*edinstvo i tselostnost rossiiskogo gosudarstva*) comes from."

⁵⁶ *Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvennogo politicheskogo dvizheniia "Nash Dom – Rossiia" 1999.*

Comparison and geopolitical vision

In Nash Dom – Rossiia’s argumentation there are no major differences within the party. All the politicians have the same claim and justify it in a similar manner, that is, by the goals of the operation (shared values). They also blame the West for double standards. Zorin, however, also talks about tolerance towards and understanding of other cultures and peoples. If looking at the geopolitical vision, Russia’s borders are taken as given – the unity and integrity of Russia are values in themselves. From this we can derive that the enemies according to NDR are those who do not respect Russia’s unity (e.g. some Chechens and some Russian politicians) and those who are a threat to security, e.g. terrorists. Friends are those who support the values mentioned above. In this context, the very narrowly defined mission is eliminating terrorism and stopping the expansion of terrorism and thus also implanting order in the world. The model to follow seems to be sovereignty, a world in which the sovereignty of a country is still respected. Israel is a country from which Russia could learn how to fight terrorism.

7.2.2 Otechestvo: Russia is defending unity but without popular support

The ‘rival party of power’ Otechestvo defines the situation in Chechnia as a partisan war and partly as a counter-terrorist operation. While still in the opposition (especially during the election campaign to the State Duma in 1999), Otechestvo blamed partly the Russian leadership and partly those committing acts of terror for the situation. The border is drawn between the authorities on both sides who gain from the war and the ordinary people who definitely lose from the war. Secession of Chechnia is taken as a serious threat and, therefore, Russia needs to react to the situation. Otechestvo’s storyline is called *Russia is defending the unity, but lacking popular support in Chechnia*.

TABLE 15.
Otechestvo politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on the conflict in Chechnia 1999–2003

What is this conflict about?	A partisan war but also a counter-terrorist operation; the situation is something between a peace and a war.
Where is it taking place?	In the Republic of Chechnia, a subject of the RF; but not under the control of the federal centre.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	Separatism and terrorism but also bad policies of the Russian leadership.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	The Russian and Chechen leadership; the military and terrorists vs. ordinary people.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in the conflict?	Secession and independence would lead to chaos worldwide.

The founder and leader of the Otechestvo party, Iurii Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow, argues for the isolation of Chechnia (just like some NDR politicians) and opposes the chosen course (the 'force option').⁵⁷ The administrative border should be given the attributes of a state border. Still, as a representative of an opposition party, he accuses the Russian leadership of being unable to do anything properly and argues again that the chosen course is not effective; a solution of some sort must be found:

*Time goes by, every day lives are lost, and society does not see any results.[...] Today we have to make a decision, to act – either to search for peace or to show that the chosen force option was the right one. But the situation which is not peace and not war is fatal.*⁵⁸

After the explosion at the Belorusskaia metro station in 2001 Luzhkov again brought up the need to look for peace instead of solely using force in trying to solve the conflict: "Chechnia is also now the sickest point of the country. I will remind you that from the very beginning I was not a supporter of the force option – *we might have had fewer losses, fewer refugees.*" We can interpret this as a motivational argument (respect for human life or worry over state's resources). As with Chernomyrdin above, Luzhkov also defines Chechnia as ill and something that should be cured.

As a solution, Luzhkov argues for the political process; however, he does not specify what he means by a 'political process'.⁵⁹ The critique continued in 2001 when Luzhkov talked about how to protect oneself against terrorism (or how cities can protect themselves and their inhabitants) after 11 September 2001. He acknowledges that no technology can protect us, instead we should look for the roots of terrorism: "[...]Revenge as a reason for terrorism bears a systematic character. [...]One must establish the reason: why among one or other nations, in one or other places [referring to Chechnia] at a particular moment have so many terrorists emerged?"⁶⁰

For Chechen terrorism, Luzhkov finds a reason in Russia's behaviour. However, he argues that Russia is not alone to be blamed; Americans have also behaved in this manner (in Vietnam and Yugoslavia). He thus uses an analogy of the past to partly justify Russia's operation (a substantive argument):

If we talk about Chechnia, I think that the initial reason was Russia acting like a great power, which did not want to negotiate with the other side in the first phases of the development of the conflict, but instead took tanks to Lenin Square in Grozny. They were shot at. And this the power could not bear... And so it did go on. Do you remem-

57 Luzhkov, 21 September 1999, *Trud*.

58 Luzhkov, 23 November 2000, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

59 Luzhkov, 8 February 2001, *Trud-7*.

60 Luzhkov, 25 October 2001, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

ber the project – pacifying Chechnia with one landing regiment in two hours. How many years have we been calming it down?⁶¹

Here Luzhkov still criticizes the Russian leadership, but the criticism is addressed specifically at the leadership during the first war.

Former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, who became leader of the Duma faction of Otechestvo after the 1999 parliamentary elections, claimed more than two months before the elections that something must be done in order to retain Chechnia as part of Russia: “I do not think that we can look indifferently at the fact that some subjects of the Federation are trying to break away from the entity of Russia. We cannot lose the North Caucasus. We cannot lose what was a Russian possession for many centuries thanks to the efforts of our forefathers.”⁶² He appeals to the indebtedness to ancestors, to *Russia’s historical right to this territory*. Accordingly, we can interpret Primakov’s argument either as substantive, referring to history as a ‘fact’, or as motivational, defining tradition as something to be preserved for the future, a value in itself. However, Primakov strongly opposes the measures of a full-scale war; instead, *Russia must make use of the population’s emerging support for Russia* in safeguarding integrity:

[...] There are promising factors. We have to take into account those cardinal changes which have occurred, when Dagestan supported the federal power [...] This means one thing: *sentiments have changed in the North Caucasus in favour of Russia and against separatism. Using this we have to function in the forthcoming actions.*⁶³

Moreover, Primakov argues that terrorism must be prevented, but not by a land operation, *because this will cause a lot of casualties*: a land operation “is a return to the situation which we already went through some years ago. *I am categorically against this.* [...] This cannot lead to any positive outcome. Instead, *there will be a lot of casualties*, both among the civilian population and among our soldiers.”⁶⁴ In addition, we know from the past (the first Chechen war) that a land operation would not bring any desired results. However, this does not mean that we should not “do everything to *prevent terror* by carrying out preventive actions. I include in these surgical strikes against bases and training centres.” Thus, the arguments used are both substantive (analogy to the events in the past) and motivational (a value that we protect [human life], something that we want to acquire in the future). The operation actually does not encourage Chechens to fight against terrorism, but instead against Russia: “There will be more and more people who regard the fight against extreme elements as their duty for survival and welfare [...]

61 Ibid.

62 Luzhkov, 5 October 1999, *Trud*.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

Executing wide land operations, which would develop into a full scale war, by contrast, would impede the creation and strengthening of the healthy elements in Chechnia itself.”⁶⁵

Evgenii Primakov writes on national self-determination and its future in November 2000.⁶⁶ He starts by conceding that “For two centuries the principle of self-determination has been dominant in international politics.” This helped to get rid of colonialism but, he asks: “Should we also follow the principle of self-determination in the future?” Primakov’s answer is a clear ‘no’. It is not suitable for today’s world. Instead of talking about national self-determination as something positive, as freedom from the ‘oppressor’, Primakov refers to separatism as something negative, the separatism of bandits against ‘the free will of their people’. Primakov’s claim is that *separatism should not be allowed because it would lead to chaos*. He justifies this by saying that there are too many ethnic groups wanting independence, and if we were to allow one such group to leave the ‘mother country’ then we would have to allow others to do so, too, which is far too dangerous. Primakov seems to believe in some sort of ‘domino theory’ (a generalization, an expert estimation and an appeal to the value of the popular will, thus Primakov uses a substantive, authoritative and motivational argument), just as Lukin of Iabloko in his article from 1995 does:

*Let’s imagine what kind of chaos will come, if we allow the ideas of separatism to spread freely over the whole world, where in more than 150 countries live about 2000 ethnic groups side by side. Indeed, today separatism is a problem which does not only touch the states and some societies but the whole world community.*⁶⁷

Primakov continues on from this in 2002 and refers to 11 September 2001 and to the “anti-Islamic wave in the United States and in the countries of Western Europe”.⁶⁸ He argues against allowing a “new division of the world [into an Islamic and non-Islamic world]” – that this would be a “serious blow to Russian federalism”, because it would create “favourable conditions for the growth of separatism, one of the most dangerous illnesses of the contemporary world”.⁶⁹ So, today the “formula of ‘self-determination until secession’ has gone out of date”.⁷⁰ As above, Primakov justifies his claim on the need to safeguard the territorial integrity of the existing states by the potential outcome, that is, chaos: the “national question exists and must be solved but the right to self-determination should never be in juxtaposition with the protection of territorial integrity of the state”.⁷¹ This is a motivational argument – what would happen in the

65 Primakov, 5 October 1999, *Trud*.

66 Primakov, 20 November 2000, *InoPressa.ru*.

67 Ibid.

68 Primakov, 5 November 2002, *Izvestiia*. Concerning Primakov’s arguments in 2002, we must remember that Primakov no longer was a State Duma deputy. He was nominated the chair of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in December 2001.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

future (if self-determination was allowed) would be against people's interests. Primakov thus presumes that the audience would also respect the value of unity of Russia and that of stability.

However, Primakov qualifies his claim for 'no to self-determination' by referring to the will of the people, that is, the totally unanimous will of the people:

It is clear that if all ethnic groups who live in a particular country agree to secession, then the world community should not prevent the creation of a new state. *But if one of the parties does not agree to the kind of division, separatism becomes illegal.* And now separatism is much more dangerous than in the post-colonial epoch taking into account the problem of international terrorism and religious extremism.⁷²

As previously, in November 2001 Primakov explains the situation by referring to Soviet/Russian policies: "I think that the rise of fundamentalism in the North Caucasus is to some extent an answer to unwise politics." But what we are dealing with now is international extremism: "The current situation in Chechnia is probably more serious, because here we are not dealing with fundamentalism but first of all with international extremism." Thus, Primakov would like to separate condemnable 'religious extremism' from acceptable, or at least understandable, 'religious fundamentalism'. Muslims were not free to practise their religion in the Soviet Union and therefore it is 'natural' that religious fundamentalism is tempting to them. In contrast,

The so-called religious extremists, who use terrorist methods, are a real threat to the whole world. Probably this danger is even stronger in Russia. In the North Caucasus people of different nationalities have co-existed for centuries. Some groups, especially Chechen Muslims, stick to the ideas of separatism. Others want to stay with Russia.⁷³

Here Primakov constructs a division between Chechens and other North Caucasian peoples. According to Primakov, Chechens are alone in their quest for independence and therefore, their claim is not justified. Primakov seems to wonder why they cannot live as they have lived for centuries, with others. He is sure that the only way for Russia is to encourage integration of different nationalities inside and outside Russia. As a solution to the problems Primakov "strongly support[s] *rapprochement and integration of different nationalities living in Russia*, which would enable the creation of a strong state."⁷⁴ Thus, he argues for finding a balance between the interests of the federal centre (or the state as a whole) and those of ethnic/national minorities: "Russia should solve its ethnic and national problems and also the problems of separatism, by developing cultural autonomy and national identity without harming the interests of the Russian Federation." The theme of unsuitability of the right to self-determination in

72 Primakov, 20 November 2000, *InoPressa.ru*.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

the current world Primakov returns again in 2002: “The right to self-determination should not go in juxtaposition with the protection of the principle of the territorial integrity (*tselostnost*) of the state.”⁷⁵ The solution to the problems of separatism (the root of which is the division of the world according to a ‘religious civilizational principle’) would be “autonomy within the framework of the surviving unity of the state.”⁷⁶ This would mean self-determination in the economy, politics and culture. Instead, “the division of the world according to a religious civilization principle will have the most negative effect on the stability of inter-state and intra-state relations.”⁷⁷

If we return to Primakov’s definition of the terms of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic extremism, we can see that for Primakov Islamic fundamentalism refers to the claims for religious education and religious traditions and it has to do with the dissolution of colonialism and thus has partly to do with raising national self-respect of the colonized people. It also has to do with the reaction of traditional culture to the ‘mass culture’ and in the case of Russia, a reaction to the Soviet period (see above). “Fundamentalism might finally secede from extremism and move to Islamic democracy”, however, this democracy would not be like democracy in the West. In contrast to fundamentalism, with extremism Primakov refers to a “distribution to other countries of the Islamic model of the state by force.”⁷⁸ Moreover, Primakov wants to stress that the “roots of terrorism are not in the Koran”. He rather speaks about the “interdependence of civilizations and religions”, referring by the Koran: “Our God and your God is the same God”. Thus, “the roots of extremist ideas are not in religion but in politics”. Andrei Kokoshin, Chair of the Duma Committee on CIS and Relations with Compatriots, would rather talk about the ‘struggle against radical organizations using methods of terror’ than against ‘terrorists’. He even believes that using the term ‘war on terror’ makes the real struggle against what should be struggled against more difficult:

We should fight against radical organizations, because terrorism – it is a means, it is like a method. [...] Terrorism it is also an instrument of politics, politics of certain radical organizations, which follow a corresponding political philosophy [...] today terrorism is a *weapon of powerful political organizations*.⁷⁹

As a solution to the problems of international terrorism Primakov suggests eliminating “conflict situations in the world, first of all in the Middle East. [...] The Spiral of violence, which has gone on here for dozens of years, is difficult to break down. It can only be done if negotiations are started, as a result of which might be the creation of a Palestinian state.”⁸⁰

75 Primakov, 5 November 2002, *Izvestiia*.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Primakov, 5 November 2002 *Izvestiia*.

79 Kokoshin, 10 September 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvyy*.

80 Primakov, 5 November 2002 *Izvestiia*.

Thus, Primakov's overall solution is that *we must condemn extremism and fight against it, but we must also negotiate, as Putin has suggested*: "Of course, we have to continue the anti-terrorist operation, but it should be accompanied by a negotiation process. If you noticed, President V. Putin went exactly this way. Unfortunately, his position was misconstrued."⁸¹ Here we can see that Primakov is already supporting Putin's policies in Chechnia. Later Primakov refers to 'Putin's line' – that this line does not exclude negotiations with Maskhadov. Primakov also refers to the misunderstanding that Putin would have demanded that the fighters should hand in their weapons within 72 hours, but instead Putin had actually said that the fighters should announce their willingness to negotiate on giving up their weapons within 72 hours. During the negotiations the Chechen fighters must promise to abstain from terrorist acts.

Even after the Dubrovka hostage taking, Primakov is convinced that "the Chechen problem cannot be solved only by military means."⁸² He qualifies his claim by saying that in addition to negotiations it is necessary to have the "military means to suppress the armed upheaval of extremist terrorism". Of course, Maskhadov is somehow linked to this act of terror so he cannot be a partner in the negotiations, instead they should be organised "with those who in public disclaim from terrorist methods for acquiring the goals and in public disclaim from all international terrorist centres, from which they have received both financial and material aid, weapons, training and medical care". Thus this is the condition for negotiations; in addition to Russia cannot "reject the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation". Primakov goes back to Tsarist Russia, when Poland, Finland and Georgia had different statuses, and then asks whether the 'Finlandization of Chechnia' would be possible. This could be understood as a qualifier (a rebuttal) for the claim on absolute unity and integrity of the Russian Federation; however, this is refuted. This model cannot be applied because Finland seceded from Russia: instead, "some special status as a part of the Russian Federation" should be worked out. Primakov's conclusion is that the military operation is necessary because the centre from which Chechen terrorism is led has not yet been eliminated. Accordingly, Russia should not change its strategy, that is, to safeguard integrity, but rather it should "re-think the tactics which are used for achieving this goal".⁸³

Konstantin Kosachev, Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs and a former diplomat, was interviewed in November 2000. The interviewer referred to a speech by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, delivered at the meeting of the leaders of the armed forces and in which he said that in the West there were people who continue to live according to the criteria of the Cold War, looking at Russia as a geopolitical adversary and consequently, taking the actions of the federal forces in Chechnia as recurrences of imperial politics.⁸⁴ According to Putin, the goal of such discourse is to isolate Russia from the rest of the world. The interviewer then adds one citation from Putin: "For us the formal status of the

81 Primakov, 10 September 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

82 Primakov, 6 November 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*; see also Primakov, 10 September 2002, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

83 Primakov, 10 September 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

84 Kosachev, 20 November 2000, *Radio Ekho Moskvy* (all quotes in this paragraph are from this interview).

Chechen Republic is not as important as it is important that this territory will never be used as the bridgehead for an offensive against Russia.” Kosachev comments on this and agrees with the President that the actions of Russian federal forces in Chechnia should not be regarded as recurrences of imperial politics: “The situation is without any doubt more complicated and the question is not that Great Russia is again trying to subdue the arrogant Chechen people.” *The most serious problem is crime and terrorism in Chechnia and that it may spread to other areas in Russia.* Therefore, the operation is justified: “No country in the world can bear a situation of this kind.” Kosachev justifies the claim by a classification or generalization and by the goal of the operation. Accordingly we define his arguments as substantive and motivational.

Kosachev does not deny Putin’s claim that the republic could be used as a bridgehead for an offensive against the Russian Federation. However, he would like to be more cautious about making any statements concerning intervention in the conflict by any external forces. His claim on the solution is that the *problems with Chechnia must be resolved with the Chechen leaders, not with any external forces.* There is no other solution:

[...] If we now leave questions of dialogue and the determination of the formal status of Chechnia for the sake of questions of classification what is happening in Chechnia as the bridgehead for the actions of some external forces, [in such a case] for us, to solve the Chechen conflict, Chechen problems, we have to be dealing with those who use Chechnia as a bridgehead, that is, let’s say the Taliban, Islamic fundamentalists [...]. I think that this [...] is a deadlock.⁸⁵

Kosachev also responds to criticism of the ‘West’ which, according to him, is only partly justified. His statement can be understood as a rebuttal and as refuting this rebuttal: “Evidently, along with the justified criticism concerning the infringement of human rights, the Chechen crisis is exploited by particular forces in the West in order to spread anti-Russian propaganda. Representatives of Europe are usually only interested in information which allows them to denigrate Russia.”⁸⁶ In accordance with its own interests, the ‘West’ wants Russia to fight against international terrorism yet at the same time it criticizes Russia regarding the Chechen conflict. Half year later Kosachev is now totally convinced of Putin’s claim that Chechnia is being used as a bridgehead for global expansion by international terrorists “The Chechen people have turned out to be a puppet in the long term plans of *the forces of international terrorism and religious extremism, which try to create in the south of Russia a bridgehead for their global expansion,* and of those forces in the West which use the Chechen conflict to exert pressure on Russia.”⁸⁷

Returning to the reasons for the war, in April 2001 Kosachev claims that at the beginning of the 1990s, and also later, a lot of tragic mistakes were made and this provoked a con-

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Kosachev, 3 April 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

frontation between Grozny and Moscow. During the first Chechen war the people supported Dudaev and, therefore, “[...] the situation ran out of the control of politicians. The lead was taken by extremists on one side and by military men on the other.”⁸⁸ However, later the leadership had a choice yet according to Kosachev, *the wrong choice was made when the option of sheer force was chosen*. Referring to the first war, Kosachev argues that the a forceful solution might fail again. Here he applies an analogy between the past and present, which represents a substantive argument:

The problem of extremism in the top power in Chechnia could be solved in two ways: either by physically eliminating the leaders or through taking the support of the people away from the extremists. The second way is more difficult. *The people must be convinced of the fact that to live with Russia inside Russia is better for Chechnia than being outside it*. The federal centre did not begin this. The choice was made for the first option, the option of sheer force, which failed in 1995–1996 and God grant that we do not fail now.⁸⁹

Along with almost all the other politicians, Kosachev also refers here to the importance of popular support – getting people on the federal side. Actually Kosachev already sees some signs of this failure: “At first, the actions of the new Kremlin leadership regarding Chechnia raised hope.” However, soon *the hope for a positive result soon faded*. “*The main task of the operation – the liquidation of the leaders of the fighters – has not been accomplished*.”⁹⁰ Here Kosachev joins the line shared by Luzhkov and Primakov for very limited, conditional support of the operation and, in general, of the government’s and the President’s line. Elsewhere Kosachev returns to the importance of getting people on the federal side:

[...]We will not solve this problem until we deprive the fighters of popular support which, as before, unfortunately in some localities has a massive character. And we can get the civilian population on our side only when we show real readiness and what is most important, the real ability of the federal centre to solve the burning problems of the people, who directly suffered from this long-term conflict.⁹¹

Two years earlier Kosachev more strongly argued that the operation is justified due to the presence of international terrorism in Chechnia. As a rebuttal we can understand Kosachev referring to civilian casualties, but he refutes this by saying that civilian casualties cannot be avoided and that *the West is actually doing the same as Russia*:

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid. Italics added.

90 Ibid.

91 Kosachev, 21 January 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvyy*.

Of course, it would be desirable that terrorists would be subdued without any damage to the civilian population (*grazhdanskoe naselenie*), which, unfortunately, is not possible given the magnitude of the Chechen problem. [...] Our Western partners act with double standards, in one way when they talk about Iraq or Kosovo and in another way when they talk about Russian matters.⁹²

The theme – blaming the West for double standards – continues after 11 September 2001 when Kosachev argues that actually the West does not criticize Russia for not finding a political solution and for the violation of human rights because it is genuinely worried about these. The real reason for the criticism is that anti-Russian sentiments are prevalent in the West.⁹³ Actually, the West is now doing what Russia has done all along, that is, fighting against terrorism; now it is accepted when done by the West, but was unaccepted when done by Russia. Later in 2003, Kosachev refers to the revenge directed against Afghanistan due to 11 September 2001, even though it is not known where Bin-Laden is. Kosachev stresses that no international involvement is necessary (or possible) in the conflict settlement in Chechnia:

The Chechen conflict is not a conflict between peoples, it is a conflict between people, who stand on the side of the law and people who try to solve problems, as they argue, of their own people, but are actually their own problems, by methods of force (*silovye metody*) and by methods of terror. In such situations peacekeeping operations are never carried out, the international community never takes any responsibility for itself for settling such a crisis.⁹⁴

Furthermore, in 2003 Kosachev is already convinced that Russia has the acceptance of the ‘international community’ for its operation in Chechnia and that Russia is moving in the right direction in the settlement of the crisis. We can understand the international recognition or acceptance as a further justification for the operation, thus it is an authoritative argument:

[...] The international community [...] quite unanimously acknowledges the right to that kind of anti-terrorist operation by the federal centre. [...] It is Russia’s internal matter. Moreover, Russia takes absolutely right concrete and pragmatic steps in order to get the Chechen crisis to a political settlement, not through negotiations with terrorists, but through free democratic elections. The Constitution has been accepted and it allows organizing these elections according to the generally accepted norms of international law.⁹⁵

92 Kosachev, 17 February 2000, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

93 Kosachev, 24 September 2001, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

94 Kosachev, 22 July 2003, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

95 Ibid.

Kosachev is not for fully supporting for the US actions in the war on terror even if this would mean less criticism concerning Chechnia, because “in this case we might be able to solve the problem of Chechnia, but after this we will become a passive witness of Americans solving all problems all over the world without Russia’s participation, and sometimes in contrast to the interests of Russia.”⁹⁶ What especially worries Kosachev is American hegemony and Russia not having any say in the world politics. He demands a serious and equal cooperation in the fight against terrorism. All questions should be discussed on an equal basis, referring to Russia-Georgia and US-Iraq. Here again the stress on Russia’s great power status emerges:

Russia and the United States are in the united anti-terrorist coalition and this conflict in Russo-Georgian relations is directly linked with the struggle against international terrorism. And taking unilateral steps in this, without consulting with our partners in the coalition, would be totally illegal. *As well we expect from the United States the same kind of consultations on whether they start to move towards some practical actions concerning Iraq or any other country.*⁹⁷

For Kosachev the reasons for terrorism include racial and religious intolerance, social inequity, the inexistence of perspectives of development of countries and peoples who do not belong to the ‘golden billion’ and also commercial interests of the leaders of extremist organizations.⁹⁸ Kosachev sees 11 September 2001 merely as a ‘culmination of far deeper processes’. The core of what happened, according to him, lies in the juxtaposition between the developed and developing world, between the rich North and poor South: “I am convinced that Al Qaeda with Osama Bin Laden and people like him would have never been born on the world level, if there were no feeding ground for terrorism. And this ground is the inexistence of light at the end of the tunnel for many societies, which are not guilty of that themselves.”⁹⁹

Aslanbek Aslakhanov was a deputy from Chechnia (elected from the 31st *okrug* on 20 August 2000) and a member of the Duma Committee on Nationalities until he was appointed as an aide to President Putin in August 2003.¹⁰⁰ His claim, as presented in a radio interview, is clear: “Even a child understands that one must stop this absurdity, which is called a ‘counter-terrorist operation.’”¹⁰¹ The data for his claim is that the *operation is inefficient* and that the

96 Kosachev, 24 September 2001, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

97 Kosachev, 14 September 2002, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

98 Kosachev, 19 October 2001, *Vek*.

99 Kosachev, 1 February 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

100 Aslakhanov was a member of the OVR faction (see <http://www.ovr.ru/hm/deputats.htm>, accessed 8 March 2002); however, it is not again clear-cut how ‘dedicated’ a member of the faction he was, that is, whether we can study him as a representative of Otechestvo or not. He joined the Otechestvo faction in October 2001. For example, on 15 September 2000 (*Vek*) he still stated that “my faction is the multinational Chechen people”. In addition, he was elected from the single member district, that is, from Chechnia and as a leader of *Obschcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia* “*Soiuz vozrozhdenie mira i soglasiia v Chechenskoii respublike*”. We can understand him as an example of the Chechen voice in the State Duma.

101 Aslakhanov, 25 August 2000, *Radio Ekho Moskvy* (all quotes in this paragraph are from this interview)

soldiers are committing war *crimes* as part of the operation. He does not deny that a forceful offensive would not be needed against ‘terrorists, bandits and slave traders’, but he does not agree that this particular operation would fulfil this function; instead, “now what is going on is what I call a ‘demoralization of the army’”. Aslakhanov defines *the military as no less corrupt than the bandits*: “You are no different from bandits, who have robbed people... You differ from them only because they have a beard and you do not. The forms, methods and actions are similar.” He refers to his own experience, he knows what is really going on in Chechnia, and to the testimony of some generals, who say that “[Russian] mercenaries – they are bandits, invariably drunk, invariably drugged, they have no respect for anyone, they kill their own and others, nothing is sacred to them”. Aslakhanov is thus using authoritative but also motivational arguments: the goal – elimination of terrorists – is not achieved by this operation.

Aslakhanov speaks on behalf of the Chechen people and claims that all they want is that “the dictatorship of law [...] would concern first of all Chechnia” and that the “Constitution of the Russian Federation, the law of the Russian Federation, would operate in Chechnia”.¹⁰² Aslakhanov seems to say that people themselves know what they want and their will should be respected. He is referring to democracy – it is a motivational argument. However, he does not have any faith in an independent Chechnia: “It is foolish to proclaim the creation of an independent state.” As data for his claim he presents the fact that Chechnia is dependent on Russia (for gas and electricity). Chechnia should be accorded a special economic status and, for example, its own law enforcement system with the presence of the Russian armed forces. Later in 2002 Aslakhanov again claims that “Chechnia should stay as a part of Russia”, but the question of status should be chosen by Chechens themselves, and that could be, for example, autonomy.¹⁰³

Aslakhanov brings up another theme – denigration of Chechens. He accuses the media of labelling Chechens as bandits: “Your colleagues made us bandits.” Furthermore, he refers to the situation in which “today the word ‘Chechen’ has become insulting: it means that you are not taken to the civil service and after university it is difficult to find a job; it means that at any time you can be taken to jail”. Aslakhanov demands that “I, as a Chechen, would need the status of citizen with the full rights of Russia. The concept of innocent until proven guilty should cover Chechens as well”.¹⁰⁴ Aslakhanov wants to vindicate ‘ordinary’ Chechens: “Our task was to show that we are like anyone else.”¹⁰⁵ Aslakhanov argues that Chechens are blamed for all crime and especially for any terrorist acts.¹⁰⁶ Like the Iabloko politicians, Aslakhanov also talks about the reasons why it is possible to recruit fighters from among Chechens – why violence is so difficult to stop. First of all, Aslakhanov reminds us that “there are a lot people who were made to take weapons to their hands”. He also refers to a double standard: “We talk

102 Aslakhanov, 24 August 2000, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

103 Aslakhanov, 17 October 2002, *Kommersant*, on the need for a referendum also 18 January 2002, *Radio Maiak*.

104 Aslakhanov, 28 March 2003, *Kommersant*.

105 Aslakhanov, 25 August 2000, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

106 Aslakhanov, 31 July 2001, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

with pride that in Nicaragua, Honduras and Cambodia rebels fight for that their villages that were destroyed, they are all heroes there but here they are all bandits.” Aslakhanov explains the context in which the fighters are recruited and thus explains their behaviour by the circumstances in which they grew up. This can be either a substantive argument (cause – effect) or authoritative argument:

They were 6, 8, 10 when Dudaev came to power. They are educated on cruelty, on inequality. They did not have any childhood, they have been betrayed, unhappy boys, they saw nothing in life. And we must speak with them like with people who, not by their own will but because of us the old ones, both Chechens and the representatives of the federal powers, have fallen into this, tragedy. They must be given a chance to give up their weapons with pride, with heads upright.¹⁰⁷

After the Dubrovka act of terror, Aslakhanov is sorry for a “crusade against Chechens in Russia”. But one should not “search for the root of the evil in them, the terrorist act was targeted against Chechens themselves”. One should not allow these conflicts between nationalities.¹⁰⁸

Aslakhanov knows how to solve the problems in Chechnia, that is, there should be compensation for the inhabitants of Chechnia for the homes they have lost, etc.; investments in the oil industry and in agriculture, education and health care; and the amnesty should be prolonged.¹⁰⁹ However, he also knows what impedes this solution: “If the Russian military does not want to have peace in the Republic, nothing will happen.” Putting Kadyrov and Gantamirov in the same administration will serve this purpose (prolonging the war). Now Russians have the possibility to say “Chechens will succeed in nothing, the troops need to stay there for a long time.” He comes back to this in 2002 when arguing that the war will not stop as long as there are generals who say that “the war in Chechnia was given to us by God, He gave us the possibility to equip an army with fighting power”. In addition, there are people whose interests the war serves: oil, the slave trade, etc.¹¹⁰ It is not only a question of will, as there is also no “concrete organ or concrete person who would bear responsibility for what is going on in the Chechen Republic”.¹¹¹ That is, the responsibility is decentralized in such a way that actually nobody bears the full responsibility.

In addition to the Russian leadership, it is particularly Iandarbiev who he blames for what is going on in Chechnia. Aslakhanov calls Iandarbiev “the main evil of the Chechen Republic. He is the main ideologist of what happened there”.¹¹² According to him, Iandarbiev is the one who “flutters around these Arab countries”. Thus, Aslakhanov does not sympathise with ter-

107 Aslakhanov, 18 January 2002, *Radio Maiak*.

108 Aslakhanov, 15 November 2002, *Trud*.

109 Aslakhanov, 15 September 2000, *Vek*.

110 Aslakhanov, 22 August 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

111 Aslakhanov, 18 January 2002, *Radio Maiak*.

112 Ibid.

rorists as according to him they are Godless, non-believers and they will not be forgiven.¹¹³ He also knows why terrorism does not stop – conditions where terrorism is not profitable anymore should be created. It has become a business in Chechnia (slave trade); therefore, terrorists should not be paid and concessions should not be made. Aslakhonov is also a supporter of the death penalty for terrorists.¹¹⁴

Aslakhonov is still convinced that all problems can be solved by negotiations – negotiations with those who fight, maybe Maskhadov, the Chechen parliament and, those field commanders who have not become bandits. Aslakhonov counts on Putin as well: “And when I talked with the President, I observed an understanding of the problem, a total knowledge of the situation and the will to carry out serious changes.”¹¹⁵ However, negotiations should be serious, “before there were unacceptable conditions for negotiations from both sides, for example the federal side asked Maskhadov to give up Khattab and Basaev, [...] or Maskhadov demanded the total withdrawal of troops from the Chechen republic”. In 2002 Aslakhonov suggests that there should be negotiations on the basis of what President Putin said: “For me it is insignificant what the status of the republic will be, but to violate the integrity of the Russian Federation I will not allow.”¹¹⁶ Just before the act of terror in Dubrovka, Aslakhonov still argued that negotiations should be carried out with Maskhadov and that people support him and the fighters more than the ‘federals’.¹¹⁷ However, this act of terror was also followed by growing demands for re-writing the legislation concerning terrorism. For example, Viacheslav Volodin argues that the “abolition of the death sentence was premature for Russia.”¹¹⁸

There are different accounts on how *international* the Chechen conflict is, for example, Aslakhonov states that it is an overestimation that there would be many foreign fighters in Chechnia: “It is a myth that there would be 300–400 foreigners in Chechnia around Khattab [...] Basaev has around 50–100 people.”¹¹⁹ However, nobody denies that fighters get funding from abroad, as Viacheslav Volodin states: “Now the war is not only in Chechnia and it is not only a Chechen war, but people are fighting who are financed from abroad, from the territory of Georgia or coming from a nearby state.”¹²⁰

After the referendum on the Chechen constitution, there was a strong belief in its power. It “solved the main question, that is, Chechnia as part of Russia (*v sostave Rossii*). The federal centre has the corresponding policy on the settlement of the situation.”¹²¹ Unlike many Iabloko politicians and Communists, Viacheslav Volodin of the Otechestvo faction argues that there

113 Aslakhonov, 31 July 2001, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

114 Ibid.

115 Aslakhonov, 15 September 2000, *Vek*.

116 Aslakhonov, 22 August 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

117 Aslakhonov, 17 October 2002, *Kommersant*. After Dubrovka Valerii Draganov (29 October 2002, *Moskovskii Komsomlets*) argues that Maskhadov discredited himself. He is a political corpse, politically dead.

118 Volodin, 26 October 2002, *Versty*.

119 Aslakhonov, 18 January 2002, *Radio Maiak*.

120 Volodin, 14 August 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

121 Such as strengthening borders with neighbouring states, struggle against active bands by the forces of the special service peace initiatives, like amnesty, which “allows return to normal life to people, who has not dirtied themselves by blood”.

TABLE 16.
Otechestvo politicians' argument on Chechnia 1999–2003

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: There is international extremism, terrorism in Chechnia. Russia must safeguard its integrity. Chechnia is a political problem. (could also be understood as a counterargument/rebuttal). The operation has caused civilian casualties (could also be understood as a counterargument/rebuttal).</p>	<p>Qualifier Only partly,</p>	<p>Claim: So This is a justified operation to fight separatism and terrorism.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since A state should protect its citizens against terror (a motivational and authoritative argument). A state has right to protect its integrity (an authoritative and motivational argument). Terrorism also has political roots (a substantive and authoritative argument). A democratic country should avoid civilian casualties and should try to solve problems by political means (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>Counterarguments: However Chechnia is a political problem. The operation has caused civilian casualties.</p>
<p>Backing: Because Russia has the right to 'behave' like other states, like other great powers. Chechnia is a subject of the RF. According to the constitution, Russia is a democratic country.</p>		

is no option for organizing the elections: "People in Chechnia wait for the elections and the bandits frighten them. [...] The sooner there will be elected organs of power in Chechnia, the sooner the acts of terror will end."¹²² We must also remember that from the beginning of 2002 the members of the Otechestvo party moved to the Edinaia Rossiia party as Otechestvo and Edinstvo merged; the Otechestvo faction in the State Duma still continued to function but decisions were not made individually within the faction but together with Edinstvo. In 2003 the support for the president and government was already unconditional among the original Otechestvo members: "Russia takes absolutely the right, concrete, pragmatic steps for taking

122 Volodin, 25 July 2003, *Trud*.

TABLE 16...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data: The problems (of e.g. terrorism) cannot be solved by military means alone. People are not on the federal side. There are too many civilian casualties and war crimes being committed.</p>	<p>Qualifier (Most) probably,</p>	<p>Claim: So The tactics of this operation must be changed: a political solution with negotiations must be looked for.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since The means and the ends do not correspond to each other (a substantive and authoritative argument). A political solution is always better (a motivational argument). Terrorism has political roots (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterarguments: However Russia's integrity must be safeguarded and Chechnia should in no way be let go. Pre-conditions for negotiations, e.g. abstaining from terrorist acts, must be set. Russia has the right to use force like other states. Putin already is trying to get a political solution (referendum, elections, re-building, amnesty).</p>
<p>Backing: Because Analogy, generalizations from the past. Otechestvo politicians are experts, they know how to solve the situation.</p>		

the Chechen crisis into a political settlement; not through negotiations with terrorists, but through free democratic elections. The Constitution has been accepted and it allows organizing these elections according to the generally accepted norms of international law.”¹²³

There are no explicit references to Russo-Chechen relations in the platform of the electoral bloc Otechestvo – Vsia Rossiia; however, the platform stresses the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation: “One of the most crucial tasks is to guarantee the territorial integrity (*territorialnaia tselostnost*) of the country on the basis of further development of federalism.”¹²⁴ The Programme of Otechestvo argues for a strong state, which “is able to guarantee [...] the basic rights and liberties of an individual [...]. Historical experience teaches us to respect and preserve the might of the state as a guarantee of the wholeness of the country, its internal and

123 Kosachev, 22 July 2003. *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

124 *Predvybornaia platforma OVR* 1999.

external security, its national dignity[...].”¹²⁵ Another important theme is Russia as a multi-national state, the introduction of cultural national autonomies and the unacceptability of separatism: “a categorical non-acceptance of any forms of separatism; for the protection and strengthening of the unity of regions – the basic condition of Russia’s revival [...]”. Thus, the Otechestvo politicians follow the claims introduced in the programme in their columns and interviews.

Comparison and geopolitical vision

As we saw above, there are no major differences in Otechestvo politicians’ argumentation, except for Aslambek Aslakhanov, who is more strongly against this operation than the other politicians examined here. Of course, we may doubt to what extent we can take Aslakhanov as a representative of Otechestvo, even though he was a member of Otechestvo faction in the State Duma (2001–2003). The first main claim of Otechestvo is that *separatism should not be allowed*: Chechnia is part of Russia, because Russia has the historical right to this territory (an authoritative argument) and because it is in accordance with the interests of Russian citizens (a motivational argument). Instead, cultural autonomy should be encouraged. The second main claim is that *terrorism is a threat to Russia and it should be prevented*. However, this particular operation is not the right thing to do because terrorism can neither be demolished nor separatist sentiments subdued by land operations (motivational and substantive arguments). The problems should be solved in a political process, by negotiating with the Chechen leaders, improving living conditions and stopping the human rights violations.

As for the geopolitical vision of Otechestvo, we can see that the model to follow for Russia is integrity and sovereignty. They are basic values which must be respected. Russia’s borders are justified by the past e.g. Russia’s right for Chechnia, which has been Russia’s possession in the past too. Russia’s enemies are those who do not respect state sovereignty, but in parallel, also those who do not at least search for a political solution of problems. As for Russia’s mission, Otechestvo stresses equality in world politics, that is, is against unipolarity, American hegemony and double standards. In addition, Russia’s mission is to prevent chaos, to which expansion of terrorism and separatism would lead.

7.2.3 Edinstvo: Chechnia is a hotbed of international terrorism

Following the official Russian line of argumentation (that of President Putin and the government), Edinstvo politicians define the federal action in Chechnia as an anti-terrorist operation taking place in the territory of the Russian Federation. Therefore, all that happens there is Russia’s internal affair. However, there is a contradiction here because, in parallel, Edinstvo

¹²⁵ *Programma Obsheherossiiskoi politicheskoi obschestvennoi organizatsii “Otechestvo”*, no year, accessed 2002.

politicians stress the significance of the connections of international terrorism with terrorism in Chechnia (see below). Edinstvo denies that this action of Chechen bandits would have anything to do with the national liberation struggle: Chechen fighters are mere mercenaries, fighting for money. Thus, the border is drawn between mercenaries or terrorists on one side and federal authorities and ‘ordinary people’ on the other side. The security of Russian citizens is used as the main reason and justification for the operation. Russian citizens have the right to be protected by their state; the army can guarantee their security and a return to constitutional order. Russia is executing this operation in order to protect its citizens and state unity but, in addition, if Russia did not act in this way, terrorism would expand to a wider area and consequently would cause instability in Europe. Accordingly, Edinstvo’s storyline is entitled *Chechnia is a hotbed of international terrorism which can be purified by eliminating terrorists*.

TABLE 17.
Edinstvo politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on the conflict in Chechnia 1999–2003

What is this conflict about?	This is an anti-terrorist operation; Bandits fight for money; Chechnia is a bridgehead for global expansion of international terrorism; But the federal forces enable stabilization of the situation and a return to normal life.
Where is it taking place?	Chechnia is a subject of the Russian Federation; There is international terrorism, but still it is a question of Russia’s internal matter.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	Chechnia is a constant zone of crime and a hotbed of international terrorism; Danger of the emergence of a Wahhabite state; Violations of the constitution place the security of the citizens and the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in danger.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	Bandits, (international) terrorists vs. ordinary citizens (Chechens, Russians etc.) and the Russian leadership.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in the conflict?	If Russia did not act in this way, Russia would lose Chechnia and Russia’s sovereignty and it would mean insecurity and de-stabilisation in Europe.

When Sergei Shoigu, leader of Edinstvo and Minister of Emergency Situations¹²⁶, is asked by a radio listener, whether the war in the Caucasus in September 1999 resembles that in Chechnia [in 1994–1996], Shoigu answers that it does not: They have “nothing in common [...] perhaps excluding the fact that the parties have remained the same. Firstly, in Dagestan the people

¹²⁶ Shoigu is the longest standing minister in the government, he has been in the government since 1991, see Shevchenko 2005.

(*narod*) rose up [against the fighters]. The people cannot put up with this anymore.”¹²⁷ Thus, the operation is justified in advance by the assumption that *the population in the North Caucasus supports it*.¹²⁸ This represents a motivational argument; the people’s will must be respected. Shoigu plays down the refugee problem and argues that Russia is handling it well: “[...] I can once again say concerning refugees that they have a roof over their heads, food, medical services and all children went to the school on 1 September without any problems.”¹²⁹ Elsewhere Shoigu again denies the humanitarian catastrophe in the North Caucasus.¹³⁰ He tries to convince us how well everything is organized in ‘the liberated territories’ (*osvobozhdennye raiony*), thus using an authoritative argument (as an expert on the situation).

Shoigu likes to make a clear distinction on one hand between himself, a professional in the sphere of practical questions in helping people in the emergencies, and on the other, professionals in solving problems like those in Chechnia. In addition, he tries to present himself as a man of practise, not involved in political (here seen as ideological) decision-making. So for each question there is an expert, and others should not try to interfere in questions in which they are not experts/professionals (an authoritative argument): “Let’s not take emotions as our starting point and keep ourselves experts in all spheres. Let’s still try to trust in professionals. I think that at this moment the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior are dealing with the Chechen problem professionally.”¹³¹ In addition, when the interviewer asks Shoigu how he sees the action of federal troops and what are the perspectives on whether Grozny should be taken. Shoigu replies that “when it comes to accounts of the actions of the federal troops, those accounts have been given many times and I do not consider myself competent to assess the actions of my colleagues. When it comes to the actions of our office, then I can tell you what kind of difficulties we have [...]”¹³²

Shoigu’s suggestions for solving the problem do not differ from those of the government in general. The negotiations should not be started unless the Chechen leadership fulfils the demands set by the federal centre:

We should have, and this was done, put our demands, our ultimatum [...] for what and in which circumstances the war will be stopped and the negotiations begun: extradition of terrorists or their elimination, extradition of [...]hostages, people, who were taken prisoners into enslavement. Do all this and I assure you that in a day and a half everything will be over, everything will be stopped.¹³³

127 Shoigu, 6 September 1999, *Radio Golos Rossii*.

128 Gakaev (2005, 25) confirms this by saying that the population of Dagestan supported the federal army and the fighters were perceived as an armed invasion from outside.

129 Ibid.

130 Shoigu, 12 November 1999, *Segodnia*.

131 Shoigu, 1 October 1999, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

132 Shoigu, 27 October 1999, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

133 Ibid.

At the beginning of the election campaign of Edinstvo in early October the interviewer asks whether Shoigu thinks that the problem can be solved by bombings and Shoigu answers: “Now we have to pay for the previous war. But I do not know any other way but force to stop the threat originating from Chechnia. And that it [the threat] is real, which we could see in the recent attacks.”¹³⁴ The reason to use force is that it is the only possible alternative to prevent or remove the threat (terrorism). The use of force is justified by the attacks: force must be met with force. So again a politician is ‘reasoning by a warning’ (a threat), which Toulmin *et al.* actually see as a fallacy in logical argumentation.¹³⁵ However, logic of political argumentation is not necessarily ‘logical’ from the point of view of logic (even of logical practise). Therefore, in political argumentation, this can be understood either/both as a motivational argument – we share the goal of removing this threat – and/or as an authoritative argument, that is, an established practise or Shoigu’s experience as an authority (Shoigu knows this is a threat and how it can be removed). Moreover, Shoigu claims that not all innocent people can be saved in this fight, the minority (even if they are innocent) has to suffer in order to save the majority.

Yes, the Chechen refugees who have now gone to Ingushetia are the same kind as, for example, refugees from Northern Ossetia and I feel equally sorry for them. Yes, these unfortunate women and children are not guilty of the fact that *Chechnia has transformed into a zone of constant crime. But tell me, what were the inhabitants of the houses, which were the objects of explosionss, guilty of?* And both of them are interested in the fact that finally order will be established in Chechnia. And I, like any normal man, pray to God that this war will end more quickly.¹³⁶

So the data and warrant to support the operation is what will be achieved as a result of the operation, that is, security and well-being of the civilians in the future. Accordingly Shoigu is using a motivational argument:

Tens of thousands of civilians in Chechnia need help from the state, protection from the despotism of terrorists and illegal armed formations. The first thing is to guarantee their security, then the total destruction of terrorist groups and only after that move to negotiations on the political regime and status of the Chechen Republic.¹³⁷

Furthermore, Shoigu justifies the operation as safeguarding Russia’s sovereignty and integrity. The goal of safeguarding integrity is far more important than the nature of the measures taken to reach that goal. Russia as a great power cannot allow anyone to violate its sovereignty:

134 Shoigu, 5 October 1999, *Itogi*.

135 See Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979.

136 Shoigu, 5 October 1999, *Itogi*. Italics added.

137 Shoigu, 29 October 1999, *Izvestiia*.

Russia intends to eliminate Chechen and international terrorists, who have taken up arms against the integrity and sovereignty of Russia. Never in the history of Russia have such attempts been left unpunished. And neither will they be now. *Chechnia is and will be part of a united Russia.*¹³⁸

Boris Gryzlov, the leader of the Edinstvo parliamentary faction until he was appointed Minister of the Interior in March 2001 (kept his position until December 2003) answers, whether his position differs from that of Putin in February 2000: “No, it does not differ. We have to start from our understanding of the usefulness of these or those measures and not from what is imposed upon us from outside.”¹³⁹ Thus the claim again is that the federal policy on Chechnia – government’s and (acting) President’s line – is right. Gryzlov justifies his claim, first of all, by saying that the *means are useful* and adequate: “It is a different thing that the measures by the state should be adequate to the extent of terrorism. And ours are adequate.”¹⁴⁰ The goal (eliminating terrorists) will be accomplished by this operation (“Terrorists must be eliminated or brought to justice, wherever they are, not only in Chechnia.”¹⁴¹). Consequently, the means are the right ones to reach the goal. This might be taken either as a motivational argument (a goal for the future – justice, peace and integrity – justifies the operation) or as an authoritative argument (we should trust on Gryzlov’s expertise in judging cases like this). Secondly, it is a question of a principle and security interests in general: “To Russia, the Caucasus is the most important geostrategic node and the Chechen Republic is a subject of the Russian Federation.”¹⁴² Thus Russia’s interests are at stake and Russia has the right to protect them (a motivational argument). An additional justification for the operation (or even the main justification) is that “When the anti-terrorist operation is over, the population of Chechnia will live according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”¹⁴³ That is, violations of the Constitution will be stopped and Chechens will have a chance to lead a normal life. Gryzlov provides us with some evidence of the normalization of the situation in Chechnia, such as some schools having been opened and social benefits being paid.¹⁴⁴

Furthermore, the claim is again supported by the ‘popular will’; Chechens themselves want to participate in the anti-terrorist operation, in setting up order:

138 Shoigu, 26 November 1999, *Krasnaia Zvezda*. Italics added. Also Gryzlov defends the notion of a strong state and a great power and justifies it by the history of Russia: [...] A strong state is able to protect democracy, it is able to protect liberal values. [...] Russia according to its historical experience, it is a great power, and we, we Russians, have that [...] understanding and the Edinstvo faction [...] will enable [...] the revival of the understanding that Russia is a great power. (Gryzlov, 17 February 2000, *Radio Golos Rossii*).

139 Gryzlov, 10 February 2000, *Vek*.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Gryzlov, 17 February 2000, *Radio Golos Rossii*.

Now in the internal troops and in the Ministry of Interior there are more than six thousand Chechens.[...] And we will have to encourage more actively local inhabitants to the Ministry of Interior.[...] They [Chechens in a military parade] carry the costume of the Russian Ministry of Interior with pride and participate in all operations. [...].¹⁴⁵

The support to the government and the President is again expressed by Vladimir Pekhtin, leader of the parliamentary faction after Gryzlov. When asked about his attitude towards Chechnia, he replies that “it completely coincides with the attitude of the President towards Chechnia and with the policy, which today is built up by the government.”¹⁴⁶ Again the operation is justified by *the need for the security of ordinary people* and by comparing the Russian situation to developments elsewhere in the world: “Due to the developments which took place in September in the United States, Afghanistan and now in Abkhazia, *nobody doubts* the necessity of additional attention to questions of security.”¹⁴⁷ Moreover, Edinstvo’s will to protect security and their expertise is emphasized: “After the terrorist acts of 11 September in the United States, the Edinstvo faction was the first to argue for an increase in the assignments for the fight against terrorism and protecting state security.” Pekhtin is lobbying for more allocations to the law enforcement organs: “[...] For those who take terrorism in Chechnia or on the borders with Afghanistan not only as a line in the news, for those who remember the explosions in the Russian cities, it is clear that one must pay for security.”¹⁴⁸

Aleksandr Gurov, Chair of the Duma Committee on Security, claims in 1999 that what the Russian Army and the Ministry of Interior are doing is “purging the south of Russia of international terrorist bands,”¹⁴⁹ and that this is an act of patriotism. When the interviewer asks whether Gurov supports the actions of the Russian government, he answers: “I do. First of all for the sake of the high level of the enlightened nature (*gramotnost*) of these actions.”¹⁵⁰ So as data and warrant for supporting the action, we can see the end of the operation itself (safeguarding Russia from international terrorists; a motivational argument) and the way it is. However, already in 2002 (when the operation has not proceeded as wished) Gurov is stressing that the “solution is not in the forceful methods, but only in the negotiations.”¹⁵¹ So his claim is qualified (see below for more qualifiers or rebuttals).

Two years later, in 2001, Gurov again justifies (data and warrant) the operation as terrorism – Chechnia being a hotbed of terrorism: We have “terrorism, including international, [...] it exists and functions in the North Caucasus. Its source today is Chechnia. [...]”¹⁵² The second justification is the danger of the emergence of a Wahhabite state in the North Caucasus:

145 Gryzlov, 17 May 2001 *Trud-7* and *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

146 Pekhtin, 4 April 2001, *Podrobnosti RTR*.

147 Pekhtin, 19 October 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

148 Ibid.

149 Gurov, 18 November 1999, *Vek*.

150 Ibid.

151 Gurov, 25 October 2002, *Kommersant*.

152 Gurov, 22 March 2001, *Radio Golos Rossii*.

Today in Chechnia the question is of action of international terrorism. It is a question of the so-called Wahhabite movement. It is question of that Wahhabism today is the most radical tendency of so-called “Islamic fundamentalism” (I do not like this word), it is not a question of religion, it is a question of extreme forms of this religious fanaticism[...].¹⁵³

As with the Otechestvo politicians, Gurov also denies that terrorism, extremism, radicalism and fanaticism would have much to do with religion, i.e. Islam. Gurov uses mostly motivational arguments; the operation is justified by the goals that it will achieve, that is, the elimination of terrorism and prevention of the creation of a Wahhabite state. We have to share the idea that these are goals that are worth pursuing. In addition, however, we have to believe in Gurov, in his expertise when he tells us that this operation is the best option to reach these goals. Therefore, these can also be understood as authoritative arguments.

As rebuttals (counterarguments) Gurov evinces two; firstly the violation of human rights. He more or less denies direct violations, but admits that the civilian population is suffering. However, this is refuted by saying that a war is a war: “Of course, the population suffers. But it is not because of violating these human rights, but because of certain expenses. And we do not deny this, that the civilian population is suffering, and we do our utmost that this would not be [...]”¹⁵⁴ Russia will also have to think about human rights of the civilian population, because otherwise Russia lose Chechnia and the the whole North Caucasus and this “would become a powerful source of destabilization in Europe and nearby countries.”¹⁵⁵ His second rebuttal concerns the fact that the Russian Federation has not been able to wipe out terrorism in Chechnia. Gurov refutes this by referring to external financing of terrorists: “Of course, we would seize them more quickly if they would not be ‘fed.’”¹⁵⁶ Liubov Sliska, Deputy Chair of the State Duma, has a similar argument about human rights and support for terrorists. When comparing the situation in the United States and in Russia and justifying the actions of the federal centre in Chechnia, Sliska argues that:

If we did not talk so much about human rights there would not be support for the Chechen terrorists on the world level...now all have said that the footprints lead to Pankisi Gorge. And then they say with a surprise: yes, it seems that we had a training base there. Like that we lie to each other [...] everyday.¹⁵⁷

Gurov presents one more qualifier for his support for the federal operation in Chechnia, that is, the problem cannot be solved solely by demolishing terrorists: “We will finish there this

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid. See also Gurov, 27 September 2001, *Trud*, where again the suffering of the civilian population is justified by the protection of the population as a whole.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Sliska, 16 January 2003, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

terrorism, but where do dozens of thousands trained fighters go? Where will they search for 'work'? Now one must, together with European states, think about this [...]"¹⁵⁸ Gurov's solution to the problem is international cooperation between law-enforcement forces, exchange of information, and international legislation, etc.

In addition to Frants Klintsevich (see below), Gurov is the politician who discusses terrorism most thoroughly among Edinstvo politicians. His definition of terrorism should be understood as a rebuttal from one side and as a justification from the other side for the counter-terrorist operation. According to Gurov, "terrorism is based on an idea."¹⁵⁹ From this follows that for us "they are criminals but from their point of view they are heroes". He also makes an analogy to the Great Patriotic War and asks "Didn't they die for an idea?" So even though there are varying ideas, "their psychological nucleus is the same". Gurov also warns about the danger of the conflict between Muslims and other Russians (also referring to Huntington without mentioning his name, just as an American professor): "There are 20 million Muslims and 35 million people who have Islam as their religion." The fact that terrorism is based on a particular ideology means that the use of force does not help solving the problem of terrorism.¹⁶⁰ Terrorism in a pure form is a crime but has a philosophical basis, that of German philosopher Karl Heinzen. However, contemporary terrorism is different, it is 'surrogate': "Religious concepts have been replaced by concepts which are useful for one or another social group, including criminal. Nothing is left from the idea in a pure form. Terrorism has become a business of its kind, where money decides all; they strive to gain a profit."¹⁶¹ Gurov explains that religious extremism can also "turn into terrorism for reaching concrete political tasks"¹⁶² and this is the way Wahhabism has been born. According to Gurov, people turn to e.g. Wahhabism in countries, which are most 'backward': "There are few literate people but instead millions of the poor and huge unemployment. And this is a reserve, a base for social solidifying (*zombirovanie*)." What often happens is that "Some politicians try to use the situation [the idea of the war between two civilizations – Orthodox-Christianity-Jewish and Muslim] for their own ends. Some under the disguise of the fight against terrorism try to eliminate extremism, others to liquidate the opposition."¹⁶³ Gurov is explicitly arguing here that the struggle against terrorism can be used for serving many different purposes, and this also discredits the arguments that Russia's operation in Chechnia would only be to do with eliminating terrorism.

Deputy Chair of the parliamentary faction and leader of the Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans, Frants Klintsevich, continues to connect terrorism originating from Chechnia with 'international terrorism'. He stresses that the theatre siege in Moscow in 2002 is taken as a

158 Gurov, 22 March 2001, *Radio Golos Rossii*.

159 Gurov, 13 March 2003, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

160 Gurov, 28 August 2003, *Militsiia*.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.

“continuation of what happened in the US on 11 September and not long ago in Indonesia”¹⁶⁴. The manifesto of Edinaia Rossiia in 2003 warns that *Russia is under attack from a ‘terrorist international’*; “Terrorists in Chechnia, Palestine and New York are twins. They are enemies of the whole of mankind and, therefore, enemies of Russia.”¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, Klintsevich reminds us that “the problem of Chechnia actually does not have an internal (*vnutrirossiiskii*), but a far wider scale”, and then refers to the international financing of Chechen terrorists and the roots of terrorism: “International terrorism is not an anonymous matter, but a result of the action of many special services: American, French, German and Soviet”¹⁶⁶. This definition of the Chechen conflict, its international character, serves as a justification for the federal action in Chechnia. We can understand these arguments as substantive (analogies or classifications), authoritative and motivational. Furthermore, Klintsevich connects terrorism with the ‘global criminal system’: “Chechen terrorism, which is the mimicry of a national liberation movement, has become a part of the global criminal system.”¹⁶⁷ Even though terrorism is a common evil (and the West did not understand this before 9/11), it is very difficult for the international community to struggle against it. Terrorism is also part of the world economy – it is an effective instrument in the fight for economic interests.¹⁶⁸ Concerning Chechnia, Klintsevich is convinced that the operation was unavoidable because “Bandits, regardless of their nationality[...] unfortunately, only understand the language of force and take negotiations as weakness.”¹⁶⁹ So the second justification (data and warrant) comes in the form of the characterization of ‘bandits’.

The platform of 1999 refers explicitly to the situation in the North Caucasus, to the refugee problem: “The flow of refugees will not be exhausted until we root out its basic reasons: separatism, terrorism and banditry. There should not be any place for terrorism on Russian soil, the threat, which foremost springs from Chechnia.”¹⁷⁰ As with all parties, Edinstvo argues for a mix of political and military means to solve the problem. The arguments of the Edinstvo politicians published in the media are, therefore, more in favour of the military operation than what was argued in the programme:

164 Klintsevich, 31 October 2002, *Trud-7*. Right after 9/11 Konstantin Kosachev also stressed that problems in Afghanistan, Chechnia, Northern Ireland and Basque country are all interconnected. Kosachev, 24 September 2001, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

165 *Manifest Vsesrossiiskoi politicheskoi partii “Edinstvo i Otechestvo – Edinaia Rossiia 2003*. Politicians had, of course, referred to the international aspect of the situation in Chechnia in the 1990s as well. For example, Iurii Luzhkov talked about the ‘Chechenization of Kosovo’ in 1999 and drew parallels on the situation between Kosovo and Chechnia by referring to religious intolerance, drug trafficking, terrorism etc (17 August 1999 *Moskovskie Novosti*). In 2000 Gurov argued that events in Kosovo, Macedonia and Chechnia share the same strategy, tactics and terminology. The fighters talk about national liberation and the West about human rights violations. However, according to Gurov, this terminology is not justified.

166 Klintsevich, 9 July 2003, *Krasnaia zvezda*.

167 Klintsevich, 31 October 2002, *Trud-7*; see also 26 October 2001; 14 September 2002, *Trud*.

168 Klintsevich, 14 September 2002, *Trud*; see also 11 October 2001, *Trud-7*.

169 Klintsevich, 31 October 2002, *Trud-7*.

170 *Tezisy platformy izbiratel'nogo bloka “Mezhregionalnoe dvizhenie “Edinstvo” 1999*

Solving this task must be done both by force and by political means, wherever it is possible. We are for eliminating fighters. But at the same time all possible conditions for the way out from the blocked zones must be created for civilians.[...] A demand to the powers (*vlasti*) of Chechnia must be called for: first handing over terrorists, freeing hostages, total destruction of gang formations and only after that negotiations on the political organization and future status of Chechnia within Russia (*v sostave Rossii*).[...] ¹⁷¹

The Edinstvo programme of October 2000 argues, for example, for finding ‘harmony in the relations between nationalities’: “The national policy of the state should have a means for supporting national cultural revival with the means for not allowing any attempts to solve the problems of one people at the expense of interests of other peoples in Russia”.

TABLE 18.
Edinstvo politicians’ argument on Chechnia 1999–2003

PROBLEM DEFINITION		
<p>Data: Chechnia is a hotbed of international terrorism. Chechnia has violated the Constitution. People support the operation.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So This is a justified counter-terrorist operation in order to protect the security of Russian citizens and the sovereignty and integrity of the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since Terrorism springs from Chechnia (a substantive and authoritative argument). The state must struggle against crime, to protect its citizens (a motivational argument). The state must guarantee that the Constitution is followed (an authoritative and motivational argument). People support the value of unity of the federation (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However There are human rights violations committed by the federal side, too, but the end justifies the means.</p>
<p>Backing: Because Evidence from the past and present: acts of terror in Russia, Wahhabism, Maskhadov’s criminal regime. Russia is a rule of law state. Edinstvo politicians as experts, as authorities: Shoigu is Minister of Emergency situations, Gryzlov Minister of the Interior, Gurov a general in the militia, etc.</p>		

Table 18...

171 *Programma obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii partii "Edinstvo" 2000. Italics added.*

TABLE 18...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data (see also above the argument defining the conflict) Chechnia is a threat to sovereignty and integrity of the RF. International funding enables terrorism in Russia.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So The operation must be continued. The international community should stop supporting the terrorists morally and financially.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since The unity and integrity of the Federation is a basic value and appreciated by Russian citizens (an authoritative and motivational argument). People want peace and security and they are best taken care of by the united Russian Federation (a motivational and authoritative argument). Violations of the constitution threaten the sovereignty of Russia. If all internal sources of weapons and other resources are blocked, then funding must come from abroad.</p>		<p>Counterargument: However A political settlement should also be used, that is, a referendum, presidential and parliamentary elections. Terrorism is a crime for economic interests so international cooperation against this crime should be carried out.</p>
<p>Backing: Because Popular opinion as a fact. The Russian Constitution and Edinstvo politicians as authorities.</p>		

Comparison and geopolitical vision

Again there are no major differences in argumentation between different Edinstvo politicians. However, what should be mentioned is that Gurov and Klintsevich more deeply discuss the reasons for terrorism, e.g. in Chechnia. Gurov also brings up the importance of solving the problem of human rights violations.

Concerning Edinstvo's geopolitical vision we can see that Edinstvo politicians justify the unity of Russia by the history and the will of people; the borders are sacred. Friends of Russia are those who do not question these borders, Russia's unity and the state policy to guarantee this unity. Enemies are thus those who do question this policy and value. So we can say that Russia's model to follow is constitutional order and the sovereignty principle. As to Russia's mission in the world, it is to guarantee order and security and to save the world from the expansion of terrorism.

7.3 IABLOKO: CHECHNIA IS A SAD EXAMPLE OF THE INCOMPETENCE AND POWER GREED OF RUSSIAN AND CHECHEN LEADERS

Iabloko firstly defined the federal operation as a counter-terrorist operation and well-justified due e.g., to the danger of creating a Wahhabite state. However, soon the operation turned into a war with a land operation and then transformed into a civil war inside Chechnia: the “armed rebel formations against the moderate part of the population, loyal to Moscow Chechen politicians and the federal centre”¹⁷². Iabloko politicians doubted whether terrorism is the only reason behind the operation. On the Russian side, there was the army which wanted to fight for real in Chechnia – they looked for a compensation for the 1994–1996 war and the Khasaviurt Accord – and there were some politicians who needed this war as an ‘electoral technology.’ Actually Iabloko blames the actions of both Chechen and Russian leaders for why this conflict has evolved. Thus, the reasons have to do with the criminal Maskhadov regime and the incompetence (and interests) of the Russian leadership. The situation in Chechnia is not a single case but mirrors the overall situation in the Federation, it is a part of a larger problem, e.g. a lack of democracy in Russia. However, Iabloko politicians doubt whether combining the ideas of sovereignty and democracy is possible for Russia. The storyline is called *Chechnia is a sad example of the incompetence and power greed of Russian and Chechen leaders – problems should be solved by negotiations.*

TABLE 19.
Iabloko politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on Chechnia 1999–2003

What is this conflict about?	At first a counter-terrorist operation, but it expanded into a full-scale war; a revenge for the lost war of 1994–1996; a partisan war with terrorist acts; a civil war inside Chechnia; nothing to do with national liberation.
Where is it taking place?	Chechnia is a subject of the Russian Federation. Russia should follow the principles of a democratic state in relation to it.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	Both the Chechen and Russian leadership are to be blamed; the federal centre had to react to the unconstitutional nature of the Maskhadov rule: the human rights violations, public executions, slave trade, and acts of terror (even though not know by whom they were executed) and to the incursion into Dagestan. The Russian leadership has no political will to solve the problems. Terrorism in Russia is directly connected with the situation in Chechnia.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	Criminal Chechen leaders (rebels, separatists, some of them terrorists) or ‘Chechen armed opposition’ and incompetent, power-seeking Russian leaders, that is, extremists on both sides vs. ordinary people. The international community might take part in finding the political settlement.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in the conflict?	In Chechen policy, it is a question of Russia itself, whether it wants to be a democratic country, a part of the civilized world.

172 Arbatov, 20 December 2002, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

After two months of the ‘operation’ in Chechnia have gone by, Grigorii Iavlinskii begins to argue for an alternative policy – one different from that of the government and President.¹⁷³ The first data to back up the claim for an alternative policy is that so far the operation has not produced any desired results and therefore the claim not to continue the operation in this form seems well-founded. Thus, he is using an analogy of the past with the future – a substantive argument.¹⁷⁴ Iavlinskii does not believe that the publicly declared goal – to protect the security of Russian citizens – is the real reason for the operation, because in that case a political process would be required. Instead, the goal of generals seems to be the ‘final victory’ in Chechnia, which, according to Iavlinskii, is an absolute fallacy and fatal to Russia. It does not lead to the strengthening of the state and army but to a ‘moral and geopolitical catastrophe’. The second data to support the claim is that the Russian government did not have any reasonable plan of action in Chechnia. We can understand this as an authoritative argument, in which Iavlinskii is the authority. Iavlinskii argues that the initiative has shifted from the politicians to the military, even though the “war and the fate of Russia are too serious issues to be decided by military logic. The military leadership cannot set political tasks and take political decisions.”¹⁷⁵

Iavlinskii presents his own plan for solving the problems, which comprise the following points:¹⁷⁶ a state of emergency must be declared in the territories adjacent to Chechnia, the bombardment must be stopped in the territory of Chechnia and the land offensive halted and the negotiations with Aslan Maskhadov – as the legally elected president of Chechnia – must be started. However, Iavlinskii qualifies his claim for starting negotiations; the negotiations should be started only if Maskhadov agrees to the following six conditions: to release the hostages, create a minimal basis for a civil constitutional state, extradite terrorists, eliminate all non-governmental military formations in the territory of Chechnia, liquidate all militarized repressive organs and deny any suspects of international terrorism access to Chechnia.¹⁷⁷ If Maskhadov does not agree to negotiate on these conditions, then 30 days time would be given to allow the refugees leave the country. After that the federal forces can accomplish these tasks. “Russia saved NATO from deadlock in Yugoslavia. Why not to do it for ourselves?”¹⁷⁸

After the parliamentary elections of 1999, which brought defeat to Iabloko, Iavlinskii argued that the war was used as an instrument in the elections.¹⁷⁹ His main claim remains the same as before the elections: an alternative policy is indispensable. Iavlinskii thoroughly reports his position (the position of Iabloko) and the changes that occurred in it. The first data for why

173 Iavlinskii, 11 November 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*; the claim stressing the need to find a political solution persisted throughout the period of study, that is, 1999–2003. See e.g. Iavlinskii, 5 December 2003, *Radio Ekho Moskvu*.

174 The same reason is again brought up by Sergei Mitrokhin, 4 August 2003, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. So the reasons supporting the claim have also remained almost the same from 1999 until 2003.

175 Iavlinskii, 11 November 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

176 See e.g. Announcement of the Iabloko State Duma faction leader Grigorii Iavlinskii, 9 November 1999.

177 These requirements are almost the same as Edinstvo presented. However, Iabloko stresses more negotiations, especially with President Maskhadov.

178 Iavlinskii, 11 November 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

179 Iavlinskii, 30 December 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*. The same argument is used by Ziuganov, the leader of KPRF.

the operation is not justified is that in November the nature and goal of the Chechnia operation changed: instead of an anti-terrorist operation *a full-scale war* was started which, according to Iavlinskii, is more reminiscent of a reprisal than of the fight against terrorism.¹⁸⁰ As a qualifier to the claim (a rebuttal or counterargument) we can understand Iavlinskii's approval of the first two phases of the operation:

The first phase of the war was the halting of the aggression of bandits, who in the name of religious views attacked Dagestan from the territory of Chechnia. They tried to change the constitutional order and establish other orders. They prepared an operation for getting to the Caspian Sea, creating a Wahhabite state. [...] For protecting Stavropol krai, Ingushetia and Dagestan, the creation of a security zone was absolutely necessary. *At that time our support of the government and the actions of the military was completely justified and absolute.*¹⁸¹

Hence, Iavlinskii here justifies the beginning of the operation by the goals it can reach, that is, his and 'our' goals are the same – guaranteeing the security of Russian citizens; he is using a motivational argument. Furthermore, continuing the rebuttal, the operation is justified, because “[during] three years in the eyes of the whole world the power which was formed there demonstrated an inability to establish order in the republic”. The Chechen leadership is incompetent. Here Iavlinskii gives evidence of the incompetence by referring to human rights violations and the slave trade (a substantive argument or an authoritative argument – referring to the ‘facts’). Thus, the operation is justified as long as it protects the security of Russia and Russian citizens, and as long as it has to do with stopping the aggression of bandits and creating a security cordon.

Iavlinskii's second data to support the claim (and warrant and backing for the warrant) for an alternative policy is again that the goal (destruction of terrorists, protection of security) could not be achieved by using military measures only: “The operation is continuing for the fourth month and *not one leader of the terrorists has been caught or eliminated.*”¹⁸² Iavlinskii refers to the federal centre's support for Beslan Gantemirov, the former mayor of Grozny, and presents a warning:

They began to set up prerequisites for civil war in Chechnia. [...] The point of the announcement was that the continuation of military and special operations was necessary but with the help of only these measures nothing can be solved.¹⁸³

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid. Italics added.

182 Again is the same argument as in November, that is, a substantive argument, that is, analogy between the past and the future.

183 Iavlinskii, 30 December 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

Again popular support is appealed to and seen as a major requirement in finding the solution to the conflict (and as a justification for starting negotiations): “Negotiations with different forces in Chechnia are needed, including Maskhadov, in order to win the population of the republic over to our side.”¹⁸⁴ This must be done because, “After the war order in Chechnia can be maintained only if the people who live there can somehow normally look to Russian power”. However, Iavlinskii is worried, because “this is incompatible with the endless mass bombings of towns and the countryside”. So even though the parties of power (excluding Otechestvo) and the Communists (see below) appeal to popular support, there is a difference in argumentation between them on one side and Iabloko (and Otechestvo at the beginning of the operation) on the other. The parties of power (and the Communists) insist that the federal centre/forces already have the popular support, whereas Iavlinskii here argues that the federal centre should, by its deeds, acquire the popular support.

Almost two years later in 2001 Iavlinskii again gives the same data to support a claim for an alternative policy: there are no results, because the leadership does not have any political will to solve the problems in Chechnia: “It is hard to believe that in two years it was not possible to neutralise the leaders of the terrorists – Basaev and Khattab. It seems as if there was no political decision.”¹⁸⁵ This is the same as the communists argue (see below). However, Iavlinskii also qualifies his claim by saying that this time the Russo-Chechen problem is much more difficult to solve than previously due to ‘aggressive fundamentalism’:

I do not think that this is any more the war which we saw in 1994–1996. For a long time it has not only been Chechens who are or think they are protecting their way of life. A lot has changed. Aggressive fundamentalism has emerged.¹⁸⁶

This does not, however, mean that a political solution should not be searched for, but rather it means that this time it will be even harder.¹⁸⁷ Finding a political solution does not mean that any political solution would be good enough, that is, there are some prerequisites that should be met. Thus an exception to the claim is raised up: the political solution (or a seemingly political solution but not really in essence) offered by the federal leadership in 2003 is not correct. The referendum on the constitution of the republic, and the later presidential and parliamentary elections, should have been better prepared and for that, a longer time would have been necessary. Iavlinskii asks, for example, “How many checkpoints need to be gone through to be able to go voting? How dangerous is it? [..] And by the way, have you yourself seen the draft of the Chechen Constitution? [...] I would like to read it [...] There are really few people who have seen this draft, if anybody has seen it at all.”¹⁸⁸ So Iavlinskii returns to his original claim:

184 Ibid.

185 Iavlinskii, 18 October 2001, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

186 Ibid.

187 See also e.g. the Announcement of All-Russian Democratic meeting, 3 December 2001.

188 Iavlinskii, 30 January 2003, *Radio Svoboda*. See also Arbatov, 4 February 2003, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

“One must return to the starting point, to the peace process. It is part of the political process but it must be prepared in a corresponding way [...] I think we should talk about organizing a peace conference in Moscow chaired by the president and with the participation of all opposing parties, excluding war criminals [...]”¹⁸⁹ Iavlinskii and Aleksei Arbatov¹⁹⁰ also criticize the questions that were posed in the referendum. What should have been asked was whether they wanted to be “a republic in Russia, to have a special autonomy within Russia [*v sostave Rossii*] or to be fully independent”.¹⁹¹ Arbatov continues that “Chechens went to the referendum hoping that it would help to stop the war. But the main questions [...] cannot be solved by these means [...] the referendum did not solve the conflict between the population and the federal troops”.¹⁹²

In February 2000 Aleksei Arbatov’s claim to change the policy is supported by the following data: “To go to one and the same war twice is more than a mistake”¹⁹³. That is, he employs an analogy of the first and the second war in Chechnia, which represents a substantive argument. According to Arbatov, ‘barbarous acts of terror’ are used to justify any kind of revenge even though terrorists are not known: “The power (*vlast*) takes the consensus [on finding those who committed these acts and on punishing them] as a sanction to the total freedom of action.” However, even though it is justified to unite in the face of a real danger, this uniting turns dangerous if there is no such danger. Arbatov points out that the military only has a mandate to block the territory of Chechnia, to conduct attacks against bases and special operations against terrorist groups. But some wanted to ‘fight for real’ in Chechnia; they look for restitution for the lost war of 1994–1996 and rehabilitation in the eyes of society. *The general goal – to keep Chechnia as a subject of the Russian Federation – is supported by Arbatov, but he does not believe that this operation and the current leaders are able to accomplish that* (a motivational and authoritative argument).

As mentioned above, the first data to support the claim is that the military operation was not able to solve the situation in the past, so it would not be able to solve it in the future either and that there are no positive results: after six months 6,000 men were lost and Grozny was destroyed, so Russia was back in the situation of 1995. Thus again it is a question of an analogy and a substantive argument. As an alternative policy Arbatov offers Iavlinskii’s plan of November. However, as the plan suggested, negotiations should only be conducted with those who recognize the integrity of Russia and are ready to surrender their weapons (so the claim is further qualified; a similar argument to that of Edinstvo). The second data to support the claim is that if there is no *cordon sanitaire*, special operations and negotiations, there will be a

189 Iavlinskii, *ibid.*

190 Arbatov was also a deputy leader of the State Duma commission on the enabling of a political settlement and the observance of human rights in the Chechen Republic.

191 Iavlinskii, 17 March 2003, *Politbiuro*.

192 Arbatov, 31 March 2003, *Politbiuro*. Arbatov also states that many did not read the constitution but they voted for peace.

193 Arbatov, 28 February 2000, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

never-ending partisan war ahead. Arbatov represents a warning to the audience; so this is either a motivational or an authoritative argument.

In March 2000 Arbatov presents the third data (and warrant) for his claim for changing the policy: there is *no popular support for the operation*. He is not convinced of what the military says about Chechens greeting them like liberators and at the same time saying that in no way can the forces be withdrawn: “If the majority of the Chechen people are on our side, why not recruit them to create law enforcing forces and leave?”¹⁹⁴ Moreover, Arbatov is worried about whether the solving of the Chechen problem and democracy can be combined: “For Russia it is vital to retain sovereignty over Chechnia, yet no less important to continue on the road to democratic development, but how to combine these two?”¹⁹⁵ Arbatov refers to the Soviet past: “The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, but if Russia is to live by democratic principles, then power should be based on elections, on the will of the people.”¹⁹⁶ Arbatov is afraid that Russia may have to compromise on democratic principles because if Chechnia secedes then the whole North Caucasus will secede. Therefore, Russia’s vital interest is to keep Chechnia. In Arbatov’s argumentation we can see that in principle democratic values transcend the values of state unity and sovereignty but in practise he seems to argue that it is not possible; that is, the value of unity still might transcend the value of democracy. Thus keeping Chechnia as a subject of the Russian Federation is reasoned by the common value of the integrity of the Federation (a motivational argument).

If in 1999 Arbatov predicted that the operation *might* turn into a partisan war, if the policy was not changed, then in 2002 he argues that it *is* a question of a partisan war. The local population does not support the federal power and many of them help the insurgents. Furthermore, as additional data for his definition of the situation, Arbatov mentions that the borders are transparent, the fighters have a practically unrestricted entry and exit from the zone for weapons, explosives, food, people, money and drugs. Furthermore, there is no legal mechanism for regulating the life of civilians or the actions and status of government troops.¹⁹⁷ There is no clear division of authority either. So Arbatov introduces the same evidence for supporting his claim on the need to change the course, to change the leadership as before in 2000 or 2001. The Dubrovka hostage taking is a further assurance for this claim.¹⁹⁸ The federal centre should combine the operation against terrorists and finding a political solution by negotiations: “Negotiations with different forces in Chechnia, including Maskhadov, are necessary in order to win the population of the republic to our side.”¹⁹⁹ After Dubrovka,

194 Arbatov, 21 March 2000, *Moskovskie Novosti*. This is contrary to what also e.g. Gryzlov from Edinstvo argues, that is, according to him, Chechens are recruited to the law enforcement forces and they themselves take care of the security in the Republic. It is a question of ‘chechenization’ of the problem or its ‘solution’.

195 Arbatov, 21 March 2000, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

196 Ibid.

197 Arbatov, 13 August 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

198 Arbatov, 29 October 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

199 Arbatov, 30 October 2002, *Moskovskii komsomolets*. Arbatov defines Maskhadov as a “total villain”, but still says that there is nobody to have negotiations with in addition to him.

Maskhadov is no more mentioned as a possible negotiator, but in parallel, Arbatov advises the federal leadership “not to listen to representatives of structures which are loyal to us (Kadyrov, Gantemirov), but those who openly and frankly talk about Chechen miseries.”²⁰⁰ If the policy is not changed, there might be an escalation of the conflict ahead. Unlike some Edinstvo politicians claim, terrorism in Russia and the war in Chechnia are directly connected to each other: “The only way to solve the problem of terrorism is to get a political settlement of the situation with Chechnia.”²⁰¹ The war itself might be a cause for the acts of terror and not necessarily vice versa. Accordingly, when referring to Dubrovka, Arbatov argues “International terrorism does not exist in a vacuum. If there was not the [...] war in Chechnia, this concrete act of terror would certainly not have happened.”²⁰² Iabloko politicians lay their hope on that part of the Chechen fighters who “fight because they see no other way out, any possibility to have peace and to move to a peaceful life. They revenge for the killed relatives, destroyed homes.”²⁰³ The federal centre should get them onto the federal side. Instead, the position of the federal centre has resulted in the culmination of the conflict and acts of terror. It has not led to peace in the North Caucasus.

In November 1999 Vladimir Lukin, now Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, is less worried about the operation in Chechnia than Iavlinskii or Arbatov, but he still argues for conducting political dialogue and an operation against terrorism in parallel.²⁰⁴ Lukin responds to the criticism of the West in his characteristic way: first he presents two ways in which Russian politicians have reacted to Western criticism and after condemning them both, introduces his own version. One justification (data and warrant) for changing the policy in Chechnia is that Russia must not damage its security interests, it must keep up good relations with the West. His argument is thus motivational. The Russian leadership should give honest, realistic information and invite the West to participate in the humanitarian actions²⁰⁵ and in finding a civilized solution to the problems with Chechnia. However, changing the policy and finding a political solution is qualified by Lukin:

We have to say that it is impossible to set a border between terrorists and military separatists. *The only real guarantee for the security and integrity of Russia is the non-existence*

200 Arbatov, 20 December 2002, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*. Arbatov mentions Aslanbek Aslakhonov. Politicians also participated in negotiations with terrorists, or tried to create negotiations with them. These politicians include Aleksandra Burateava, Grigorii Iavlinskii, Ella Pamfilova (Dubvitskii and Zelenkov, 26 October 2002, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*).

201 Arbatov, 29 October 2002, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

202 Arbatov, 30 October 2002, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

203 Arbatov, 20 December 2002, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*. According to Arbatov, in addition to the fighters who revenge for the killed relatives, etc., there are two groups of fighters. The first one fights for money “War has become their profession and way of life”. The second group fight for an idea, “they believe in the independence of Chechnia, they think that after what happened during the last 10 years, only full independence is possible”.

204 Lukin, 9 November 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

205 This is contrary to what Edinstvo politicians argue, they want to prevent any international involvement (or interference) in the conflict settlement.

*of any military formations on Russian territory which are disloyal to the federal centre. The political dialogue can only start after the recognition of this basic condition.*²⁰⁶

Thus, a political solution would actually only be possible with those actors who would be willing to recognize the value of the integrity of the Russian Federation (the same as the parties of power, and also Iavlinskii and Arbatov). This is one of the reasons why Lukin also supports the nomination of Kadyrov as the head of the temporary administration of Chechnia – it is the best of the worst options (again an authoritative and motivational argument): “I would like to believe that Kadyrov will succeed in protecting the state unity [*tselostnost*] of Russia, in which Chechnia would be free, but within the framework of the Russian Constitution.”²⁰⁷

In January 2000 Lukin justifies changing the policy by referring to the ineffectiveness of the operation and its transformation into a longstanding war (a substantive argument).²⁰⁸ He stresses support for the anti-terrorist operation (an exception to the claim for an alternative policy), but at the same time argues that the “punishment [for the attack on Dagestan] must be really commensurate and balanced, first of all, balanced from the point of view of what we are able to do”. The operation should concentrate on creating a cordon dividing the southern and northern areas, but the military leadership is not willing to stop at that. Even though Russia might have the right to take the operation even further, Lukin argues that from the strategic point of view, it is a mistake: “The war either should not be begun at all, or it must be won.” As the solution to the conflict, Lukin offers negotiations on all issues, except on the full independence of Chechnia. He returns to this theme later during the same year:

I am in favour [...] of saying to Chechnia, to the Chechen people, to the Chechen nation: There is a limit, a very simple limit. That is, *the borders of Russia are indivisible*. The borders of Russia will go there where they have gone. And that terrorism must be condemned. Everything else is a question of negotiations.²⁰⁹

In the aftermath of the hostage drama in Dubrovka in Moscow, Lukin would like to think about the consequences of terrorist acts and what kind of reply they receive from the authorities. Thus, if citizens’ rights, such as freedom of the press, are limited as a result of a terrorist act, then “it means that the operation ended with success for the terrorists. The biggest tragedy is that either terrorists put society in disorder and directly dominate it, or that society, by protecting itself from terrorism, becomes something totally different, becomes a state of the type of which George Orwell wrote about.”²¹⁰ Thus, according to Lukin, we should not restrict civic liberties because this is something that makes us different from those who commit acts of ter-

206 Lukin, 9 November 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*. Italics added.

207 Lukin, 14 June 2000, www document.

208 Lukin, 17 January 2000, *Radio Ekho Moskv*.

209 Lukin, 20 August 2000, *Radio Svoboda*. Italics added.

210 Lukin, 4 November 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

ror. Here Lukin also stresses the need for a real cooperation in the fight against terrorism (and the importance of the concept of sovereignty), without any double standards of the West:

The Georgian side has closed their eyes [...] if in the border there is a terrorist threat, then we must fight against it together. But if the other side refuses to fight, then – as the US have done many times – then one has to fight alone [...] Why the US respects the territorial sovereignty of Georgia, why not of Afghanistan, Iraq, Panama? [...] The biggest task which must unite us, the US and Europe is that in order to overcome terrorism, we must keep the values and those human approaches which form the basis of our world view.²¹¹

Lukin is here grouping Russia, the US and Europe as a value-based united front fighting against terrorism. Thus Lukin appeals to democratic values such as human rights and is not willing to sacrifice them in order to overcome terrorism; he is using a motivational argument.

In 2003 Lukin brings up an important notion, that is, today it is difficult to draw a line between ‘internal’ and ‘external’. Lukin refers to the ‘Chechen conflict’, in which it is “very difficult to say where internal and external factors begin”.²¹² These factors cannot be eliminated solely by military means but “by creating social prerequisites for creating stability there.”²¹³ However, what complicates the settlement of the conflict in Chechnia is the difference between Russia’s domestic policy line and foreign policy line during Putin’s era: “Any country which pretends to have a significant role in world affairs cannot allow one policy within its borders and different ones outside its borders.”²¹⁴ Lukin refers to the domestic situation as ‘semi-feudal’ and authoritarian feudalism, and to the outside as ‘post-industrial’. “Russia’s basic task is to gradually overcome backwardness and become a member of those who intensively form the new global area [...] By its historical cultural characteristics Russia is a European country, but geopolitically a Eurasian country.”²¹⁵ Elsewhere Lukin defines the current situation in Russia as a union of Byzantine domestic policy and European foreign policy: “If Chechnia is an internal problem of the state, which tries to live in accordance with European laws, then this problem automatically ceases to be internal – because how it is solved is no longer an internal matter.”²¹⁶ Lukin uses here an authoritative and motivational argument. In the end, Lukin becomes very close to Iavlinskii and Arbatov in his argumentation.

In 2003 Sergei Mitrokhin, Deputy Chair of Iabloko and Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Issues of Local Self-Government, is very worried because “*de facto* in Chechnia there

211 Lukin, 26 August 2002, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

212 Lukin, 9 September 2003, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

213 Ibid.

214 Lukin, 24 March 2003, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

215 Ibid.

216 Lukin, 24 November 2002, *Novoe Vremia*.

is a state of war, even though it has not been declared *de jure*.²¹⁷ Thus, as with Iavlinskii and Arbatov, he argues that there is no legal basis for what the federal forces are doing in Chechnia, therefore, either a state of war or a state of emergency should be declared. In addition, Mitrokhin discusses the means by which extremism could be prevented: “The main thing is not to fight against Wahhabites but to create conditions in which people will not go behind their backs” (so again a politician is referring to the importance of popular support). Here Mitrokhin also refers to economic conditions: “Any poverty, any struggling [*proziabanie*] is a way to extremism, and a way to jihad, a way to Wahhabites and so on, to anybody.” Another movement to which poverty pushed people is Communism, according to Mitrokhin. Generalizations are thus used here and we can understand Mitrokhin’s argument as substantive (and authoritative). As a solution, Mitrokhin offers the ‘Europeanization’ of Chechnia: “If from the very beginning a choice would have been made for distributing European cultural standards, if there would have been a determined policy on Europeanizing the Chechen population, then many people today would not be in Wahhabite sects nor in band-formations.”²¹⁸ So he believes that socialization into ‘European cultural standards’ would somehow be the magic tool, with the help of which all the problems could be solved in Chechnia. As to terrorism, Mitrokhin wants to stress that “any form of terrorism has political roots. So long as these roots have not been weeded, terrorism cannot be stopped”. This is also what other Iabloko politicians have argued in addition to some Otechestvo politicians. The Iabloko politicians also doubt whether terrorism in Russia and international terrorism are really connected: “It is really difficult to connect our domestic agonies with international terrorism, with Al-Qaeda etc. In contrast to other countries, nobody announces responsibility for the acts of terror [in Russia].”²¹⁹

The platform of 1999 repeats what Iabloko politicians argue in their columns and interviews: “*we are against permanent attempts to solve political problems with force and blood [...]. We are against the fact that the greatness of Russian state would be built on the blood and bones of people. For us, Great Russia is first of all the welfare and security of citizens [...]*”²²⁰ The same, now referring to terrorism, is brought up in the Democratic Manifesto of 2001:

Considering resisting terrorism by force necessary, we at the same time argue that the *roots of this evil can be removed only by political means*. A solely military solution to this problem does not exist. Political efforts targeted at the decrease of the mass support for terrorists should have priority in relation to military actions. We apply this principle to the Chechen situation in the same amount as to other centres of terrorism in the world.²²¹

217 Mitrokhin, 25 May 2003, *Radio Svoboda*.

218 Ibid.

219 Shchekochikhin, 19 May 2003, *Novaia gazeta*. Iurii Shchekochikhin was a Duma deputy in the Iabloko faction since 1995 elections and a journalist working for Novaia Gazeta. He died in suspicious conditions in July 2003.

220 *Bezopasnost, Doverie, Budushchee*. Predvybornaia programma “Iabloko” 1999.

221 *Democraticheskii manifest* 2001.

The Iabloko programme stresses the importance of respecting human rights: “[...] Today the accent on *the humanitarian response to terrorism is the sole path to an effective fight against it*, without any concessions in the sphere of basic values and human rights.”²²² Iabloko’s programme also offers more concrete advice on how to solve the problems in the Russo-Chechen relations, these are the same as those presented by, e.g., Iavlinskii in the media: “Iabloko argues that the settlement of the conflict in Chechnia is possible only by political means on the basis of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Russian laws. It is fundamental to carry out negotiations with all, excluding criminals and terrorists [...]” The concrete methods comprise

TABLE 20.
Iabloko politicians’ argument on the conflict in Chechnia 1999–2003

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: The operation/war has not brought/cannot bring the expected results. The operation/war cannot bring security and peace. The operation/war continues even though it is against the interests of the citizens. People are not on the federal side. Human rights are violated.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most probably,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> This is an unjustified war for the political interests of the leadership, not against terrorism.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> If there are no results, then one must change the policy (a substantive and authoritative argument). From the past we know that the war produces more acts of terror (a substantive and authoritative argument). A democratic country cannot allow human rights violations and the popular will should be respected (a motivational and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Maskhadov’s regime is criminal. There is terrorism, but one should look for the roots of terrorism. One should carry out a real counter-terrorist operation.</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> There are more and more acts of terror (e.g. Dubrovka). Somebody else has benefited from the war. Iabloko politicians are experts in these questions due to their experience.</p>		

Table 20...

²²² *Programma RDP Iabloko* 2002.

TABLE 20...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data (see also the argument defining the conflict) This military operation has not brought/cannot bring the desired results. The leadership has no alternative plan People are not on the federal side.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So A political solution must be sought for: the policy must be changed/the leadership must be changed.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since Terrorism cannot be eliminated by an operation like this (a substantive and authoritative argument). A democratic state should always seek for a political solution (a motivational argument). People cannot be brought to the federal side by violence (an authoritative and motivational argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However A cordon sanitaire must be set up. Terrorists must be eliminated. A state of emergency must be announced. The integrity of the RF must be protected.</p>
<p>Backing: Because Experience from the past (generalization) Iavlinskii has an alternative plan to solve the situation. Iabloko politicians are experts in this case.</p>		

the strengthening of borders, “using special divisions for destroying bandits and terrorists” and, declaring “a state of emergency in Chechnia and bordering its regions (raion)”. Moreover, Iavlinskii demands “punishment of those soldiers (or conscripts, *voennosluzashchie*), who have participated in war crimes” and this must be done “for gaining the support of the civilian population of Chechnia”.

Comparison and geopolitical vision

Henry E. Hale has argued that Iabloko politicians, or Iabloko as a party, did not have any common line on Chechnia during the 1999 election campaign and therefore the whole issue was dropped from the campaign.²²³ Furthermore, he argues that “given that no other party opposed the war, Iabloko missed a unique chance to galvanise its reputation as a human rights-oriented party”. Here too, we have noticed that there are differences in argumentation within the party; yet when looked at over a longer time period, there are arguments that unite Iabloko politicians. For example, Iabloko politicians do not believe that the main reason for starting

²²³ Hale 2004, 1012.

the operation in 1999 was terrorism. Furthermore, they stress the importance of democratic process and human rights, even when fighting against terrorism.

As for Iabloko's geopolitical vision, we can see that – especially for Lukin – the current borders and Russia's unity, is a basic value. For others, democracy comes first, and the unity of Russia second. For Iabloko those who are for democracy, for human rights are friends. Adversaries can be found in those who do not keep finding a political settlement and saving human lives as a value itself. Russia's model to follow should be democracy *and* sovereignty. Russia's mission in this context should be clear: stop the suffering of civilians, start the peace process, and work in accordance with the will of the people – that is, to implement and safeguard democracy.

7.4 KOMMUNISTICHESKAIA PARTIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII (KPRF): CHECHNIA IS THE MOST VIOLENT SYMPTOM OF RUSSIA'S ILLNESS

Communists see the world as a struggle between the forces supporting the 'socialist international' and those supporting the 'new world order', and 'imperialist globalization'. Choosing the socialistic path, choosing the ideology of Socialism and Soviet Power and the re-creation of the Union, can also solve the problems with Chechnia. Thus, *Chechnia is, in the eyes of the Communists, a mere consequence, a symptom of a disease or chaos, which has conquered the whole Russian Federation.* This disease has its roots in the perestroika of Gorbachev and was fortified by Gorbachev's and Eltsin's fight for power and, finally, by the destruction of the Soviet Union by the signing of the Belovekha Accord. Ever since, the same course has continued: Russia has been ruined economically, culturally, mentally, geopolitically and militarily, etc. The Russian Federation is a 'bleeding stump', poisoned by American mass-culture and is in danger of becoming a raw material, natural resources, reserve for the West. The guilty ones behind this sad condition of Russia are the reformers, the oligarchs and the external forces supporting them. In fact, Russian actors are mere emissaries and the moving force is the United States and the world oligarchy. Chechnia is vital for Russia, because if Russia lost Chechnia, it could no longer strive for the great power status, and this is a pre-condition for the final goal: the re-creation of the Union. All these factors can be found in the argumentation on Chechnia as well. Let us look below more closely in particular at the party leader Gennadii Ziuganov's argumentation.²²⁴

The Communists' main claim is that the *integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation must be safeguarded and, in order to do this, the leadership of the country and the regime must*

224 The comparison perspective within the KPRF below is very limited because the federal press has mostly published Ziuganov's texts on this case for this period. We should also remember that Ziuganov has been an unchallenged leader in the KPRF at least until 2004 when a competing party congress led by Gennadii Semigin was held. There have been different lines in KPRF, but Ziuganov's opponents have not had any serious candidate to replace him (see e.g. Makarkin 2001, 96).

TABLE 21.
KPRF politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the conflict in Chechnia in 1999–2003

What is this conflict about?	The second phase of the Caucasus war, a civil war. An instrument in the election campaigns. Not a national liberation struggle, but a rebellion using national liberation and religious camouflage.
Where is it taking place?	Chechnia is a subject of the Russian Federation; external forces should not interfere. International terrorism is, however, present in Chechnia.
Why this is happening? What causes this conflict?	The incompetent, anti-Russian Russian leadership has no idea of the Caucasus' policy; the regional leaders play the national card for their own interests. The guilty ones comprise Eltsin, Chernomyrdin, Stepashin, Lebed, Putin, Berezovskii, and the world oligarchy.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	A party of betrayers (the anti-Russian Chechen party: the Kremlin, oligarchs, politicians, influenced by external forces) on one side fraternizing with Muslim fundamentalists or wahhabites (drug dealers, slave traders, rapists and killers) on the other side. The people of Russia and Chechnia are not the guilty ones; they want to live together in peace.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in the conflict?	Russia's great power status is impossible without Chechnia. The integrity of the Russian Federation and the re-creation of the Union state should be guaranteed.

be changed. There is no question of the status of the Chechen Republic – it is and should be a subject of the Russian Federation. This is, for example, justified by the common history of Russians and Chechens and the will of the people. The argument can be interpreted both as a substantive, motivational and authoritative argument – as the ‘common history’ can be a ‘fact’ and an authority, and the will of the people again a ‘fact’ or a goal for the future which waits to be fulfilled. Viktor Iliukhin, then Chair of the Duma committee on Security, refers to the popular will and the common history:

*It is widely known that the majority of ordinary Chechens does not want Chechnia to break away from the Russian Federation. [...] We have hundreds of years tradition of living together [...] Our peoples have become relatives [...] celebrated the national and state holidays together [...] Unfortunately, many regional leaders try to play the national card for their own self-serving interests.*²²⁵

²²⁵ Iliukhin, 27 July 1999, *Zavtra*. Italics added. Chechen professor Gakaev (2005, 22) backs up Iliukhin's claim: “Russia is in Chechnia, Chechnia is in Russia and they are destined to live together.”

The ‘people’ here refers, as usual in political rhetoric, to ‘our people’, i.e. a community of people who agree with us. If they do not agree they are either ‘non-people’ or manipulated, lured and cheated by non-people. One of the very central issues in the communist ideology is the question of nationality – nationalities policies – and this is, according to the communist argumentation, very directly connected to the question of Chechnia (both at the level of how the problem was born in Chechnia and how it can be solved). For example, Gennadii Ziuganov argues that “without the renaissance of Russian (*russkaia*) culture, language, soul, history and traditions our country will not survive from the chaos (*smuta*). The Russian people (*narod*) have turned out to be the most subordinated and enslaved.”²²⁶ The misery of Russians today is that they have been divided socio-economically into ‘old’ and ‘new’; territorially into Great Russians, Little Russians and Belorussians – who are all actually “one people with one history, culture and traditions”. So the problems and the solutions to these problems in Chechnia can be interpreted as part of a larger web of national problems and their solutions. Ziuganov states: “Our proposals on Chechnia are part of the general programme of strengthening the national unity of the people of Russia [...] The Russian people [*narod*] are a pillar of Russia, not only due to their number of population but also by the territory they control.”²²⁷

For Ziuganov, acknowledging the integrity and unity of Russia is a pre-condition for the negotiations, or the starting point for them, and “the questions of national security of Russia and following its state unity and sovereign rights in the whole territory of the country have incontestable priority in comparison to regional problems [...]”²²⁸ The integrity of Russia is something which is also taken as a precondition by Nash Dom – Rossiia, Otechestvo and Edinstvo (and Lukin from Iabloko). Communists argue that negotiations must be initiated and, before the Dubrovka theatre siege, Maskhadov was also a legitimate negotiator from the Chechen side:

Military victory alone does not bring peace to Chechnia. Already our ancestors, who in the last century were fighting in that region, forecast that there is no purely military solution.[...] One should carry out negotiations with all those who acknowledge the territorial integrity (*tselostnost*) of the country [...].²²⁹

Russia’s unity and thus keeping Chechnia as part of Russia (and partly the right to intervene in the situation) is first justified by the popular will, as argued above. There is no doubt that ordinary Chechens do not want any independence: the war has nothing to do with national liberation or strive for national self-determination; this is just used as a camouflage.²³⁰ According to

²²⁶ Ziuganov, 29 August 2003, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

²²⁷ Ziuganov, 29 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ziuganov, 1 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*; see also Iliukhin, 31 October 2001, *Literaturnaia gazeta*. Iliukhin demands negotiations with Maskhadov, but not with Basaev or Khattab, because they are ‘executioners’.

²³⁰ See e.g. Ziuganov, 29 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

Seleznev, fighters who started the war in Dagestan in August 1999 also include mercenaries from other countries and they represent a threat not only to the peoples of Caucasus of Russia but also to other states.²³¹ Terrorism is used as an instrument to create chaos and manipulate people, e.g. to vote in a certain way. Thus, the solution to the problems in Chechnia, including terrorism in Russia, is to destroy “the party of traitors and thieves in the Kremlin, [...] to clean the power [...] from criminal interests of both Muscovite and Caucasian politicians.”²³² Chechnia can be understood as a

more terrible manifestation [than other manifestations] of the illness of the whole state and social organism [...] Chechnia is not the primary source of infection but its most violent symptom. [...] The terrorist Chechen regime is an undivided part of the Eltsin criminal oligarchic regime, which reigns Russia [...] One cannot eliminate the first without touching the other.²³³

What is actually going on is the fight for political and economic power, both on the Russian and Chechen side. This war is between the Russian leadership and the Chechen leadership; the masses want to live together in peace. The war is used for winning the elections, or for gaining profit. Thus, while the publicly declared goal of the ‘operation’ is actually legitimate (that is, safeguarding unity and integrity of Russia and eliminating terrorism), the Communists do not believe that this goal is the *real* goal or the *real* reason for starting the operation. Ziuganov argues that when comparing the two Chechen wars,

the most important similarity [...] is in the political context. [The war of 1994–1996 was made] an important element in the election campaign.[...] When this function of the Chechen war was used, the power lost any interest in it. They cold-bloodedly betrayed both Russian interests in the Caucasus and the army and the whole population in Chechnia giving it to bandits.²³⁴

Like the Iabloko politicians, Ziuganov also wonders why there are no results and suspects that this is because the Russian leadership has *no will* to solve the problems. This serves as a justification for changing the leadership:

231 Seleznev, 9 September 1999, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

232 Ziuganov, 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

233 Ziuganov, 29 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

234 *Ibid.*

Why is it not convenient for Mr. Putin to arrest them [Basaev, Khattab, Maskhadov]?[...] There is more and more evidence that Putin's rating was inflated with the help of the wave of explosions [...] Who each time warns terrorist leaders of danger?²³⁵

Ziuganov does not hide but instead emphasises KPRF's opposition position – *the Russian leadership is acting for their own interests, not for the interests of the state or the Russian people* (or the Chechen people) and it is responsible for the war: “The Chechen war was first of all unleashed in the Kremlin.”²³⁶ Ziuganov calls Eltsin and his surroundings the “party of betrayers [...] who fraternize with Muslim fundamentalists or Wahhabites”, who in their turn are actually “drug dealers, slave traders, rapists and killers”²³⁷. To this ‘party’ also belong well-known oligarchs, the oil men and note-worthy Russian politicians. The leaders in Chechnia and those in Russia are the same: “The terrorist Chechen regime is an undivided part of the Eltsin criminal oligarchic regime.”²³⁸ The roots of this conflict should be searched for in the anti-Russian policy of Gorbachev and Eltsin, which bolstered the national sentiments of other peoples. Furthermore, the Russian leadership armed the Chechen rebels: “Eltsin and his surroundings implanted separatism in Chechnia”²³⁹ and ruined the state and the army. Actually, the war of 1994–1996 was “organized by it for the redistribution of property.”²⁴⁰ As often in the Communist argumentation, it is a conspiracy in play. That is, the real reason for the Chechen war is a “liberal revenge, the return to the politics of the most evil-minded, anti-Russian forces [...]”. The ‘who’ that is blamed for all this is Berezovskii who has “not hidden the plans of the oligarchy: the dissolution of the Primakov government, the banning of the Communist Party by using a pretext of so called anti-Semitism and Russian fascism, the dissolution of the State Duma [...]”²⁴¹ So the “reason for this might become, let us say, terrorist acts or a large-scale conflict in the Caucasus [...]” These traitors ended the first war by the shameful Khasaviurt Agreement and then restarted the war when it suited their purposes:

235 Ziuganov, 16 March 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*; see also Ziuganov, 18 May 1999, *Parlamentskaia gazeta* or Ziuganov, 8 June 1999, *Zavtra*, when Ziuganov accuses the leadership of letting Chechnia to “go to Turkey's side”.

236 Ziuganov, 4 December 1999, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* and 7 December 1999, *Zavtra*.

237 Ziuganov, 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

238 Ziuganov, 29 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

239 Ibid.

240 Ziuganov, 29 August 2003, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

241 Ziuganov, 8 June 1999, *Zavtra*. Arguments before the start of the counter-terrorist operation or the offensive of fighters to Dagestan.

The second phase of the Caucasus war has begun.[...] Was the incursion to Dagestan unexpected to the people, politicians and the Kremlin? No. For the last year and a half one has talked about the fact that this war will come. All warned about the tragic situation on the Dagestani-Chechen border. And what did the power do knowing about this?²⁴²

So when defining the war as one between different economic and political interests, Ziuganov justifies his claim by seemingly referring to the current political situation; but in fact, all that we actually have as an audience is his word (against the word of, say, the President and the government), thus we interpret the arguments as authoritative.

The critique towards the Russian leadership continues during Putin's era as well. Ziuganov accuses Putin of 'giving up everything'; "Putin gave up the Americans all that can be given: starting from our state interests in the Baltic states up to the strategic bases in Lourdes in Cuba and Cam Ranh in Vietnam."²⁴³ He let the Americans into Central Asia [...].²⁴⁴ These strategic bases in Cuba and in Vietnam were taken as the last signs of Russia's great power status, and losing them meant losing the great power status (in parallel when the US had its bases on the former Soviet territory). Moreover, Putin is a 'virtual president', because personally Putin has not done anything during his rule. As an example, Ziuganov refers to Chechnia: Putin promised a victory there but instead what Russia got was that "each week they bring ten corpses and we cannot see the end to this."²⁴⁵ Ziuganov would also like to remind us that the "losses of the federal army in Chechnia are already corresponding to the losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan."²⁴⁶ As concerning the first war, so also the second war was just used as a tool in 'political games': Putin and his team used this war to get to the power and therefore, it is also useful to them to continue the war.

Moreover, Gennadii Zeleznev, Chair of the State Duma, is convinced that Russia will be able to solve the problems in Chechnia by itself, for example, when criticising the PACE resolution, "We do have enough energy to work out our political strategy on Chechnia independently. Let them not frighten us by the exclusion."²⁴⁷ In parallel, just like Edinstvo politicians, Seleznev implies that some Western countries are protecting terrorists and fighters even though the international community should unite its forces against international terrorism. Criticizing the West and in parallel the Russian leadership puts the Communists in a very difficult posi-

242 Ziuganov, 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

243 In October 2001 President Putin made a decision to close down two bases: Lourdes Electronic Radar Monitoring Centre, established in 1964, and Cam Ranh base. Cam Ranh was a Soviet naval base since 1979 and originally built by the US in the 1960s.

244 Ziuganov, 25 October 2003, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

245 Ibid.

246 Ziuganov, 1 February 2003, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

247 Seleznev, 8 April 2000, *Trud*. See also Ziuganov, 1 February 2003, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. Ziuganov advises Lord Judd to "less interfere in our business" and accuses 'them', e.g. those in the West, for a double standard when in the Middle East there are terrorists but in the Chechen Republic fighters for independence.

tion, because at the same time they have to convince the audience that Russia can deal with the problem by themselves, without any external interference. In addition, they have to argue that the current leadership is actually not capable of doing that. Of course, the solution to this dilemma is very simple: to change the leadership (see below for more).

The Communists also accuse the West of trying to intervene: “The leaders of the leading Western countries try to take the attention away from the failures of their policy concerning the conflict settlement in Kosovo. From this follows the attempts to intervene in our internal affairs.”²⁴⁸ However, even though Seleznev opposes any ‘Western interference’, he stresses the international character of the conflict. Thus, in the West it is a question of false information on what is going on in the Caucasus, because really it is a “struggle against international terrorism and the terrorism of Chechen separatists has become part of it.”²⁴⁹ Seleznev also makes an analogy between the situation in Chechnia and the situation in Kosovo, when nobody talked about Albanians chasing Serbs out of their homes, the same as how nobody is talking now about Russians being chased away from Chechnia. Seleznev’s argumentation is very close to Edinstvo’s, the party of power. He is criticizing less the leadership and stressing more the justification for the operation than e.g. Ziuganov. He supported the operation more openly right from the beginning.²⁵⁰

As mentioned above, for Ziuganov, the only solution to the situation is a change of the leadership – not only the leadership but of the whole regime, of the whole system: The solution to the problem is to destroy the party of traitors and thieves in the Kremlin, to cleanse the power, the Russian state (*gosudarstvennost*) from the criminal interests of both Muscovite and Caucasian politicians.²⁵¹ The new leadership, that of national patriotic forces, or real *gosudarstvenniki*, would use only “one instrument in the national policy, that is, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which decrees a united and undivided Russia [...] it allows to unite the interests of each people and an all-Russian (*obshcherossiiskii*) interest.”²⁵² This national policy should also acknowledge “the historical responsibility of each people to the state integrity (*tselostnost*) of Russia.”²⁵³ The current population in Chechnia is not allowed to solve the “problem of the status of Chechnia [...] without taking into account the opinion of all other citizens of Russia.”²⁵⁴ Furthermore, the new leadership would then allocate more funds to the army, so that they would be able to catch the terrorists. They would also plan and execute a socio-economic programme: the main problem in Chechnia is that people did not have any other source of income other than from the stealing of oil products or the of kidnapping people.²⁵⁵ Theoretically the solution would be easy:

248 Seleznev, 15 December 1999, *Krasnaia zvezda*.

249 Seleznev, 31 May 2001, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

250 See Seleznev, 15 December 1999, *Krasnaia zvezda*.

251 Ziuganov, 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

252 Ziuganov, 29 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

253 Ibid.

254 Ibid.

255 See Ziuganov, 7 August 2003, *Pravda KPRF*, also Ziuganov, 7 June 2001, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

For returning Chechnia to a normal life requires re-building of the economy, the social sphere and lawfulness.²⁵⁶ [...] [But] when raising the question of a return to a normal life, one must ask where is this 'norm' and where to find 'normal' conditions? Hardly in contemporary Russia?²⁵⁷

So according to Ziuganov, the problems and their solutions can be divided into three in Chechnia: that is, the economic, political and security sides of the problem. A solution to one of these alone is not enough: if the security side is taken care of by the anti-terrorist operation, then what is also required is a re-building of economy and, most importantly, "without the support of village elders, the leaders of teips²⁵⁸ and religious authorities, we cannot change the spirits of people."²⁵⁹ So again, it is recognized that without the support of people no change can be obtained.

As argued above, the solution to the problems in Chechnia is the change of the leadership (and of the regime). The Communists support their claim by referring to the communist past. The Communists would be able to 'normalize the situation' because they have "proved it historically"²⁶⁰. Thus Ziuganov uses a substantive argument, an analogous situation today as in the past in the Soviet Union. Ziuganov makes references to the 'bands' after the Civil War: the last band of Mitin was eliminated in 1956. Moreover, he argues that actually there was no organised crime in the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev and Eltsin allowed its formation.²⁶¹ Elections are not any solution at this point, because in the Chechen conditions "there cannot be any democratic or normal elections."²⁶²

The claim on having negotiations with the Chechen side is justified by the 'laws of history'; accordingly it is again a substantive argument, whereby a generalization is used: "I would like to point out that any wars, conflicts are ended by negotiations. We may like it or not, but negotiations must be carried out."²⁶³ However, the results of these negotiations must be different from those of the negotiations which ended the first war in Chechnia: "I do not want that the result of the negotiations would be like the traitorous Khasaviurt Accord, signed by Lebed [...] We should learn from this bitter experience and not repeat this inconsideration, which

256 Ziuganov, 29 February 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

257 Ibid.

258 "Teip is an extended kinship community consisting of family groups who can trace their origins to a single individual" (Sakwa 2005, 9).

259 Ziuganov, 7 June 2001, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*; see also Iliukhin, 28 March 2001, *Literaturnaia gazeta*. Iliukhin stresses that in preventing terrorism "politics and economy should bypass the law enforcement organs".

260 Ziuganov, 29 August 2003, *Moskovskii komsomolets*

261 Ibid.

262 Ziuganov, 1 February 2003, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

263 Iliukhin, 31 October 2001, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

turned out to be a great tragedy.”²⁶⁴ The stress on having negotiations (but not with Maskhadov anymore)²⁶⁵ continues even after Dubrovka: “Any attempts by authoritative representatives of the Russian and Chechen people to stop military actions, to stop the mutual destruction of Russians and Chechens, must be welcomed.”²⁶⁶

Actually *terrorism is also viewed from the position of seeing the world as a struggle between the forces that support the ‘socialist development’ and the ‘socialist international’, and those who support a ‘new world order’ or ‘imperialist globalization’* – it is question of a systemic crisis. Thus, it is not a question of an individual problem, but of the whole system. The whole system needs to be changed in order to solve this one problem. The problem of terrorism is a consequence of the aggressive part of the world, of the new world order, of the anti-cultural standard, the liquidation of the nation state, and of economic exploitation. It is the natural and expected outcome of all this. The Communists, in the middle of 1990s, already recognized the threat of the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalism, but NATO was still considered a greater threat to Russia.²⁶⁷ In Russia the roots of terrorism can be found in the collapse of the economy, in state security and in the destruction of the state. The Communists do not only claim that terrorism is caused by the leadership, but also that “terrorism [...] always plays into the hands of those who have power.”²⁶⁸ The answers to the questions of what is terrorism and why there is terrorism, and what is the solution to counter it, are even more interlinked in the Communists’ argumentation than in that of other parties. Stressing the question of a systemic crisis might have to do with the new situation after Putin came to power. President Putin has taken over many of the ideas previously argued for by the Communist Party or the national-patriotic forces in general (such as the strong state and patriotism rhetoric). The Communist Party might have been compelled to reconsider what then separated ‘us’ from Putin’s (and Edinaia Rossiia’s) line. The answer seems to have been stressing even more socialism, Soviet Power and the need to create a new union state. Accordingly, the Communists approach all questions from the point of view of this ideology. It has also been argued that at the beginning of 21st century the “left-conservative strand of discourse [including the Communist Party argumentation] exemplified the most fundamental challenge to the depoliticizing logic of the Putin presidency.”²⁶⁹

264 Ibid.

265 See e.g. Ziuganov, 12 November 2002, *Pravda KPRF*.

266 Glazev, 9 March 2003, *Zavtra*. Glazev was still a member of the KPRF faction in the spring of 2003. Together with Rogozin (and probably with the help of the Kremlin) he founded a new party Rodina in the autumn of 2003.

267 see e.g. Kuptsov, 15 October 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

268 Ziuganov, 17 July 2003, *Pravda KPRF*.

269 Prozorov 2004, 43.

TABLE 22.
KPRF politicians' argument on Chechnia 1999–2003

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: The collapse of the Soviet Union ruined the state, made it ill. The war continues even though there is no reason for it. People want to live together in peace.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So This is just one symptom of the illness, caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. This war is for the political and economic interests of Russo-phobic Russian leaders and not justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since If the people want no war and it is not useful for the state, then it must be the leaders who are benefiting from it. We know that people want to live in peace (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However Terrorism must be eliminated. Integrity of the RF must be safeguarded. (a prerequisite for further integration, creation of a union)</p>
<p>Backing: Because Popular opinion is on our side. KPRF politicians are experts in these questions (taken as authorities).</p>		

Geopolitical vision

As in 1994–1996 and later, also in 1999–2003, Ziuganov uses geopolitical arguments on a more general level (that is, not directly referring to the situation in Chechnia). “The Eurasian continent again calls to unity. The ideology of the Russian Renaissance fits into the philosophy of great Eurasianism.”²⁷⁰ Russia’s future should thus be built based on a philosophy of Eurasianism. This would also mean building a “new type of the state, which will be built thanks to the intellectual efforts of all peoples who inhabit the continent [...] the huge territory, culture and traditions of the peoples, lived together history, which has been full of victories and achievements, feeling of a common destiny and task, which will be decided on by the Eurasian humankind on this part of the planet between three oceans, all this begins to work already now.” Concerning the geopolitical vision, this is the model to follow, that is, a Eurasian union or at least a union of Slavic ‘brothers’. After the change of the leadership in Russia one should

²⁷⁰ Ziuganov, 8 June 1999, *Zavtra*.

TABLE 22...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data (see also the argument defining the problem) This is a systemic crisis.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So The leadership and then the regime must be changed. A new regime must be based on Eurasianism, Socialism, Soviet experience and a re-creation of the Union.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since Only by changing the system can the problems be solved (a substantive, authoritative and motivational argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: Because The good experience of the Soviet past and thus of the Soviet future as well. Ideology of Socialism and Eurasianism. KPRF politicians, especially Ziuganov, as experts in these questions (taken as an authority).</p>		

concentrate on building a strong state: “We cannot create a strong, united union state (*edinoe soiuznoe gosudarstvo*) without a strong and united Russian Federation.”²⁷¹

Russia’s borders (and expansion) are justified by history and the common good (the popular will). Friends are those who fight against the criminal oligarchic regime and, on a world level, against the new world order and globalization. Accordingly, as before, enemies are the forces behind the new world order and globalizaton. One of Russia’s missions is to gather other forces opposing globalisation à la America and the ‘new world order.’²⁷² Anti-globalisation has especially been stressed since the turn of the century: “Now on the agenda is the creation of a wide union of anti-globalists, a kind of anti-globalization International.”²⁷³ Russia’s mission also includes bringing about equality and friendship between nations.

271 Ziuganov, 22 April 1997, Sovetskaia Rossiia

272 Prozorov argues that for left conservatives (like the communists, and especially the Homeland party) “globalisation is a form of political struggle, a friend/enemy distinction, constituted by the ‘globalisers’ and the ‘globalised’” (Prozorov 2004, p.41).

273 Ziuganov, 18 December 2001, *Zavtra*.

7.5 COMPARISON AND GEOPOLITICAL VISION

All parties have a fairly united line concerning Chechnia; there are no significant differences on the claims and justifications between politicians of any one party. However, as mentioned above, there are some differences, e.g. between Iavlinskii/Arbatov and Lukin in Iabloko, but this situation also changes when coming to the end of the period of study.

If we first look at the *geopolitical storylines* of the parties, we can see that between the parties there are major differences in the definitions of the conflict as well as in blame strategies. For parties of power Nash Dom – Rossiia and Edinstvo, it is without doubt a question of an anti-terrorist operation. As for Otechestvo, Iabloko and KPRF, it is a war, a civil war or a partisan war. The parties of power blame the Chechen leadership and Chechen terrorists or Wahhabism and disorder and terror for the situation in Chechnia. Instead, the democratic (Iabloko) and communist (KPRF) opposition especially see that the Russian leadership is as guilty as the Chechens. If, for parties of power, the general meaning of what is going on or why and how Russia should react, is to stop expansion of terrorism, stop chaos expanding to other areas, and to safeguard the sovereignty of Russia, then Iabloko sees democracy as something which is at stake here. The reaction to the situation in Chechnia depends on how Russia can be defined, i.e. which path it has chosen for itself and what place in the world it holds. For KPRF, it is a question of wider issues too, in addition to Russia's integrity. Russia's interest is in expansion and this cannot be started by losing Chechnia.

Turning to the *structural analysis of politicians' argumentation*, again we can witness differences between the parties. In their claims we can see that parties of power are for the operation and the democratic and communist opposition against the operation. If we look at Nash Dom – Rossiia and Edinstvo, the justifications used for the claims are terrorism, crime, citizens' security, unity of Russia and popular support. Otechestvo at the beginning of the operation and Iabloko for the whole period deny that there is any popular support for the operation in Chechnia. In addition, Iabloko politicians refer to the fact that the operation has not brought the desired results and has led to human rights violations. KPRF also sees that it is the Russian leadership that benefits from the operation and it is not in people's interests. Criticizing how the power handles the situation in Chechnia might just be a way to get hold of power for KPRF.

Thus, we have found out, as in the analysis of the arguments concerning the first war in Chechnia, that all politicians use analogies to the past, contemporary evidence (such as statistics), shared values, shared goals for the future, and authoritative statements as justifications for their claims. There are no major changes in the argumentation in 1999–2003. Of course, after 9/11 the politicians of the parties more often comment on the nature of international terrorism, its connections with Chechnia and Russia's position in the global war on terror, but their arguments on Chechnia remain otherwise very similar if compared to the pre-9/11 situation. What changes is Otechestvo's argumentation – they become more in the favour of the opera-

tion. Lukin (Iabloko) and Gurov (Edinstvo) instead become more doubtful about what can be achieved (and lost) with the operation.

Lastly, let us look at the *geopolitical visions* of the parties. As we have seen, the Russian parliamentary parties do have different positions on whether Russia is/should be part of the West (what kind of West is a different matter) or a totally unique civilization and this is linked also to their arguments on Russo-Chechen relations. Thus, there is a difference both in their view on the identity of Russia and consequently, in their view on the borders of Russia, i.e. whether Russia should keep the current borders or whether it should strive to expand.

Parties of power define terrorists on one hand, and those supporting American hegemony and unipolarity, on the other hand, as Russia's enemies. Also, KPRF argues that Russia should fight against the United States, or the order and the regime it represents. Russia is a unique civilization, able to cope without the West, or those forces in the West which might be classified as allies of the US. Russia should act more in a 'great power' manner concerning Chechnia as well. And as a great power, Russia cannot lose any of its territories; instead it should acquire even more, so the borders of Russia should be changed but not in the direction of diminishing, but rather expanding. Once the leadership in Russia has changed and the terrorists eliminated, a true friendship between nations could be created and leading to the creation of a new Union as well, which would lean on the ideas of socialism and Soviet power. Communists understand Russians as great safeguards of the culture of the smaller peoples within the Russian Federation (or formerly in the Soviet Union), guaranteeing their security, saving them from the Western 'leaven', the mass culture, a non-cultural form of being. This we can understand as their mission, or one part of their Eurasian mission and model.

Iabloko, for its part, does not argue for changing the regime, the system in the Russian Federation. The current borders are acceptable, even though the collapse of the Soviet Union was a tragedy. Instead Iabloko politicians would like to make this system work more effectively and more democratically and changing the leadership could do this. Russia should follow democratic principles both in its domestic (including Chechnian) policy and in its foreign policy – so democracy is the model they follow. Russia should become a great power, but a European style great power, where citizens have good social services, high income and the state is characterised by the rule of law and democracy. Geopolitically Russia is Eurasian, it has interests in the West, East and South. The model to follow for parties of power is to keep Russia a sovereign power. For parties of power Russia's mission is to stop terrorism expanding, stop chaos and to set up constitutional order. Otechestvo in particular also stresses equality as its mission.

8 Arguments on Russia-Nato Relations

Russia-NATO relations, the arguments of Russian politicians concerning NATO, form only one part of Russia - 'Western' (however it is constructed) relations, of positions towards the 'West', and how these are described and used in public argumentation. There are many other topics that can be discussed when referring to the West or the 'parts' constituting it during this period of study (other security and political questions such as the EU and its enlargement, the Council of Europe and especially its statements on Chechnia, the discussion about Russia joining the WTO, the US decision to withdraw from the agreement on missile defence systems and START II). Why, for example, instead of the arguments on the EU, have I chosen arguments on NATO? One of the reasons is that the European Union enlargement to the east has not been "*per se* an issue for Russia. Russia itself [was] anxious to join the EU 'bandwagon', if one in fact exist[ed]".¹ If we compare the debates around NATO, the relations between Russia and the European Union "have received comparatively little attention from Russian leaders and policy-makers. EU-Russia relations [...] have comparatively little to offer in a geopolitical analysis as they have only really developed dynamism and substance in the technical-economic area".² The reason for this has been territory, that is, NATO enlargement has been "mainly about the US and its allies taking over and marking out territory for themselves in geopolitically important areas." Instead, EU enlargement has meant an extension of the single market, which has been interpreted as a positive development.³

However, if looking from a geopolitical point of view – Russia drawing borders both mentally and geographically – discussion around NATO seems particularly interesting for reasons discussed below. Firstly, NATO discussions deal with the two main entities of the West, with European NATO countries and most often with the United States – the main (ideological, military, political) adversary of the Soviet Union in its time. The West, or especially Europe,

1 Lynch 2002, 171. The tense changed.

2 Smith & Timmins 2001, 81. Here it must be stressed that after 2001 many studies on EU-Russia relations have been carried out from the geopolitical perspective.

3 Ibid., 82. Also Trenin argues that NATO was treated as an adversary while the European Union was treated as a strategic partner during the first years of Putin's era (Trenin 2002, 189). However, even though "relations with the states of the EU are not the issue for Russia", it must be mentioned that "Russian analysts see a major challenge posed by the manner in which EU integration and expansion eastwards has been taking place" (Lynch 2002, 173). So as Smith and Timmins argued in 2001 "further deepening of its integration process together with widening to take in new members for both CEE and the near abroad region", development of the EU as an exclusive bloc and development of a viable military component in the EU would change the relations (2001, 83). This is something we witnessed concerning the Kaliningrad question, for example.

has been the main reference point against which Russia has constructed its identity.⁴ Secondly, the discussion on NATO's Kosovo operation in particular gave birth to the analogies to the situation of Chechnia and the possibility of NATO using the same policy towards Russia as it did towards Yugoslavia. The question of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the role of NATO in violating this principle of international law were at the top of the agenda. Thirdly, NATO enlargement was really seen as both mentally and physically threatening Russia's borders, the former enemy coming to the Russia's borders and having its troops in the territory of the former Soviet allies or even within Soviet republics.

Thus I have chosen to look at the arguments on NATO enlargement and on NATO's Kosovo operation – two developments which cover not only most of the NATO discussion, but also the discussion on external threats to a significant extent especially in the mid- and late 1990s. As Tuomas Forsberg mentions, NATO discussions within Russia have been focused on three issues: NATO enlargement, NATO's new strategic doctrine of 1999, and the Kosovo war.⁵ All of them are of course intertwined, e.g. Kosovo being a first 'evidence' of the new doctrine. Since the first wave of enlargement, Putin's coming to power together with the second war in Chechnia and 9/11, NATO has probably no longer dominated the discussion on external threats or on Russo-Western relations. It must be acknowledged that international terrorism has to some extent replaced it as the 'main threat' yet NATO discussions still remain extremely relevant in Russia.

Below I will not describe NATO as an organization as such – its internal development, the changes in the external environment – and neither will I give any specific account of the history of Russia-NATO relations. One may turn to Martin A. Smith's recent book (2006) *Russia and NATO since 1991* and Tuomas Forsberg's article (2005) 'Russia's Relationship with NATO: A Qualitative Change or Old Wine in New Bottles?' for analysis of these relations. Smith defines the 1991–1993 period as a honeymoon in relations between Russia and the West, and thus also NATO. Eltsin even declared that Russia's membership in NATO would be a long-term political aim.⁶ In the summer of 1993 the enlargement issue emerged for the first time when President Eltsin visited Poland. There, Eltsin stated together with the Polish President that Poland's potential NATO membership did not harm the interests of Russia.⁷ However, the domestic political situation in September and October 1993 resulted in the "hardening of the President's line on NATO enlargement". Smith has argued that this was a "direct result of the debt he owed to the Russian military for saving his political career".⁸ In a letter to the US, UK, France and German leaders, Eltsin wrote that "security must be indivisible and must rest on pan-European structures". He also expressed his worry over the danger of Russia being isolated.⁹ Smith

4 See e.g. Neumann 1996.

5 Forsberg 2005, 337.

6 Smith 2006, 51.

7 Ibid. 53.

8 Ibid., 55.

9 Ibid.

calls the second phase beginning from 1994 as 'deterioration and revival'. If in 1993 the Russian leadership was still under the impression that the Partnership for Peace programme was an alternative to NATO enlargement,¹⁰ in 1994 this was all gone. However, a Contact Group was established and in 1995 there were the 16+1 negotiations.¹¹ The third phase is defined as an 'institutionalised special relationship' with a question mark. The negotiations on what was to become the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation were begun in January 1997 between Xavier Solana and Evgenii Primakov and their deputies.¹² The Act was signed by NATO members and President Eltsin in Paris in May 1997.¹³ However, the air operation against the Serbs over Kosovo in March 1999 "dealt a blow to the PJC from which it never fully recovered".¹⁴ However, as presented below in the chapter concerning the Kosovo conflict, even though Russia walked out from the Permanent Joint Council in March 1999, it was back in working meetings of the PJC as early as July 1999 and "the acting President demonstrated an early interest in revamping links with NATO by inviting its Secretary General to Moscow for talks in February 2000".¹⁵

8.1 NATO ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST - A POTENTIAL THREAT?

Even though Russia presented NATO as a 'remnant of the Cold War' and was not seeking its membership in the 1990s,¹⁶ Russia searched for an active cooperation with this organization: Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)¹⁷ in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. Moreover, in May 1997 the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security was signed in Paris and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council met for the first time in July 1997. In January 1998 a permanent Russian mission was opened in NATO and the NATO information centre started its work in Moscow.¹⁸ The Rome Declaration 'NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality' was signed on 28 May 2002. It established the NATO-Russia Council which replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (1997).¹⁹ It has been argued that "agreements with NATO provided Russia with the opportunity to concentrate its forces on the most vital and vulnerable frontiers/strategic directions".²⁰ The Founding Act has also been described as a "painful compromise".²¹

10 Talbott in Smith 2006, 57.

11 Smith 2006, 66.

12 Ibid., 70.

13 Ibid., 71.

14 Ibid., 75.

15 Smith & Timmins 2001, 79.

16 Excluding Eltsin's and Kozyrev's statement in early 1990s.

17 This was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.

18 Isakova 2005, 35.

19 Ibid., 42.

20 Ibid., 30.

21 Ibid., 33.

Moreover, Lynch has asked whether “the NATO-Russia accord was an agreement on the substance of Russia’s participation in NATO councils or was it mainly a symbolic concession to Russian pride that concealed Russian capitulation to superior NATO power?”²²

Actually, during 1991–1994 Russian politicians still believed that all European countries were willing to create a common security space after the end of the Cold War, as Irina Isakova mentions.²³ During this period the Russian leadership did not consider NATO enlargement as a threat to Russia’s security, because they supposed NATO was transforming into a political organization.²⁴ For example, foreign minister Kozyrev had argued that NATO was an “effective mechanism for overcoming the division of Europe.”²⁵ In August 1993 President Eltsin did not oppose Poland integrating into West European security structures.²⁶ Later Viktor Chernomyrdin also expressed the official line of Russia concerning Poland’s NATO membership – it will be Poland’s internal affair.²⁷ This has been described as “a product of Russia’s geopolitics of vulnerability but made within the process of ‘overall European integration.’ Russia was not excluded from the revamping of the European security architecture – a process that might involve but not be limited to NATO enlargement.”²⁸ However, problems emerged during the Partnership for Peace negotiations during 1994, when the first date of the enlargement was incorporated in the documents.²⁹ NATO made the full membership opportunity open in early 1994.³⁰ Russia also advocated the CSCE for *primus inter pares* amongst European security institutions, yet NATO was for the Partnership for Peace programme.³¹ “By the time of the CSCE summit in Budapest in December 1994, NATO enlargement was becoming an overriding issue in European security affairs for the Russian government.”³²

On 8 July 1997 NATO officially invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks with the Alliance,³³ a year after the presidential elections in Russia. As Isakova states, the first wave of expansion “kept intact the ‘buffer zone’ between the regularly stationed forces of Russia and NATO.”³⁴ In contrast, the NATO enlargement to the Baltic States, and

22 Lynch 2002, 173–174.

23 Isakova, 2005, 29.

24 Ibid., 29.

25 Kozyrev 1993 cited in Forsberg 2005, 334.

26 Isakova 2005, 29.

27 Zubko, 10 March 1995, *Izvestiia*.

28 Smith and Timmins 2001, 74.

29 Isakova 2005, 29.

30 In January 1994 an announcement was made: NATO would “welcome the enlargement to democratic states to the East” (NATO Handbook, www document) and in September 1994 NATO “adopted the Study on NATO Enlargement which described factors to be taken into account in the enlargement process” (ibid.).

31 Smith 2006, 12.

32 Ibid., 13. Also Forsberg (2005, 338) mentions that in 1994 NATO expansion became the “most irritating security problem for Russia”.

33 We must also remember the statements of the Russian ambassador to Finland, Iurii Deriabin, who in 1995 said that Russia’s attitude towards Finland’s (and Sweden’s) potential NATO membership would be negative. So the opposition within Russian political elite towards enlargement did not concern only the East European countries, former members of the Warsaw treaty, and the former Soviet republics, but also non-allied (during the Cold War) countries such as Finland and Sweden. (Zubko, 10 March 1995, *Izvestiia*.)

34 Isakova, 2005, 30.

possibly to Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria, would be more threatening from Russia's point of view.³⁵ In the case of the Baltic states, the NATO forces "would be stationed on the frontiers of mainland Russia."³⁶ If NATO was to expand southwards, then Ukraine would become a bridge state between GUAM states³⁷ and Uzbekistan and NATO, the role of which Russia would like to keep or get for itself.³⁸ However, when the second wave of enlargement was being prepared, President Putin announced that NATO enlargement was not necessarily a negative outcome. Just after becoming president of Russia in March 2000, Putin even raised once more the possibility of Russia ultimately joining NATO in a British television interview.³⁹ In October 2001 at the NATO headquarters, Putin had said that "Russia would no longer oppose NATO enlargement if the alliance could prove that it was becoming more a political and less a military organization;"⁴⁰ and in November 2002 in Brussels Putin referred to the expanding, transforming Russia's cooperation with NATO, to it becoming "more comprehensive and full"⁴¹ This was, however, conditioned by the internal transformation of NATO and by the beneficial nature of this cooperation in regard to Russia's national interests.⁴² Isakova states that "Russia could never publicly accept NATO enlargement" and that the first wave enlargement was seen as "an opening of a Pandora's box of an unstoppable and uncontrolled enlargement process."⁴³ However, Isakova continues that due to Russia's economic, political and military interests⁴⁴ (that is, what were perceived as those interests) Russia has acted 'politically correctly'.⁴⁵

Furthermore, public opinion has still been if not negative then at least suspicious concerning NATO enlargement. When in 2004 (after the second wave of NATO enlargement) Russians were asked about how Russia should react to the enlargement, half of the respondents wanted Russia to strengthen the armed forces and only 23 per cent wanted more cooperation with NATO against mutual adversaries.⁴⁶ In January 2003 still almost half of the respondents (46 per cent) saw NATO enlargement as a threat to Russia's security and the membership/potential membership of the Baltic states and Ukraine were viewed negatively (48 per cent)

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

38 See Isakova 2005, 30.

39 Smith&Timmins 2001, 80. Also Gorbachev and Eltsin had speculated with Russia's potential membership, see e.g Forsberg 2005, 346. From 'NATO's side,' US Secretary of State James Baker III had in 1993 said that NATO could expand to Russia. See Forsberg 2005, 334.

40 Isakova 2005, 40.

41 Ibid., 48.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 37.

44 Isakova mentions the following fields of cooperation vital to Russia's interests: practical assistance in the implementation of the arms control agreements, prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, regional air traffic safety; the exchange of information on strategy, defence policy, military doctrines, budgets and infrastructure developments; cooperation in the field of emergency relief operation, in maintaining joint production and development service lines, the preservation of the basis of the military-industrial complex; cooperation in planning and participating in peace keeping operations outside the area of responsibility of NATO (Isakova 2005, 37–38).

45 Isakova 2005, 37.

46 Levada tsentr opinion polls, www document.

but also indifferently (25 per cent). Russia's membership was seen as a threat to Russia's security by 43 per cent of the respondents.⁴⁷

Below I will look at the arguments of politicians and try to find answers for not only whether these politicians are for or against NATO enlargement, Russia's membership in that organization (that is, what is their claim), but especially what justification is given for their opposition or agreement to the enlargement process (e.g. what data, warrant and backing they provide; whether they use a substantive, motivational or authoritative argument) and how they argue on Russia's (re)action concerning the enlargement and in general Russia-NATO relations.

8.1.1 Parties of Power

8.1.1.1 *Nash Dom – Rossiia: Enlargement equates to the betrayal and isolation of Russia*

Nash Dom – Rossiia's storyline could be called *enlargement equates to a betrayal of the united Europe idea and the isolation of Russia*. NATO enlargement is described as threatening Russia's borders and entering the post-Soviet space and Russia's sphere of influence. The expansion of this military organization is seen as a betrayal of the promises, of the idea of a united Europe following the collapse of the Berlin wall and the Soviet Union. This is all happening because NATO, or the NATO countries and especially the United States, are selfishly taking care of their own interests. The disagreement over the enlargement goes on between NATO, which is often seen as a disguise for the United States, and the post-communist countries, the former Soviet allies, on one side and Russia on the other. Russia should not allow enlargement or should at least try to influence its conditions. Russia should in no case be left outside, but instead be among those making decisions on the security architecture in Europe.

TABLE 23.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians' grammar of geopolitics on NATO enlargement 1995–1999

What is NATO enlargement about?	A (the) military organization coming to Russia's borders, threatening Russia; betrayal of the idea of one united Europe.
Where is it taking place?	In Europe, in post-Soviet space, near to Russia's borders, moving to Russia's borders, within Russia's sphere of influence.
Why it is taking place?	NATO's (the US) interests contradict Russia's interests.
Who are the parties on the different sides?	US-led NATO and former Soviet allies against Russia.
What are Russia's interests at stake?/ Why is this wrong?	Enlargement is against Russia's interests; Russia has no say in security questions in Europe, Russia is left outside

⁴⁷ Ibid.

When the discussion on NATO enlargement to the East was at its peak (1994–1998), the leader of Nash Dom – Rossiia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was Prime Minister. Therefore, in his statements Chernomyrdin expresses the official position of Russia, of the Russian government: “Our position is widely known. *We are against the enlargement to the East*, especially in military parameters.”⁴⁸ There is a qualifier, or an exception here softening the claim: “If NATO was a charity organization, Russia would not oppose, but NATO is a military organization.”⁴⁹ Chernomyrdin states that there was no need for any enlargement as actually bilateral agreements would be enough. Of course, Chernomyrdin’s great concern is that Russia is not taken into account when discussing and making decisions on security issues. Russia is left aside. Chernomyrdin acts in a conciliatory manner: “[...] There is no hurry – let us get to know each other [...] Let us cooperate, let us work together!”⁵⁰ Chernomyrdin believes that the enlargement “creates dividing lines in Europe, which have just begun to heal up. We will have to move in a totally different direction – to a united democratic Europe, which is built on the principle of the non-divisibility of security.”⁵¹ Thus, *enlargement is not necessary*, because Russia has an alternative to offer: wider cooperation, which would unite Europe and in which Russia would also have an important role to play. This could be classified as a motivational argument, in which the claim is justified by our common desire to have a united Europe, without any divisions. The programme of NDR also states that NATO enlargement does not solve any real security problems in Europe and actually makes it more difficult to create an all-European security organization on the basis of the OSCE.⁵²

The claim of Sergei Boskholov, Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security (formerly a member of PRES⁵³), goes even further than Chernomyrdin: *NATO enlargement is a serious threat to Russia’s security* (and to NATO and applicant countries) *and should be opposed*. The first data and warrant to support this claim is that enlargement would cause tension in international relations and reproduce the situation of the 1980s, of a new juxtaposition. Thus, he is using a motivational argument, in which we look at the future expectations – at something we do not wish to have. This warning serves as a justification for the claim. Boskholov is sure that NATO and the applicant countries have not thought through all the possible consequences. Another set of data and warrant state that the funds needed for the enlargement can find a more rational use. Boskholov is using here an argument which might be interpreted either as authoritative or as substantive, that is, Boskholov as an authority himself or the statement as a fact known by all and not requiring any proof.

What is Russia’s role in this? Possible scenarios of the future are either in safeguarding the status quo, which means also ‘no’ to enlargement and the creation of a collective structure

48 Chernomyrdin, 3 October 1996, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*. Italics added.

49 Chernomyrdin, 21 January 1997, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.

50 Chernomyrdin, 9 July 1996. *MN-Biznes*.

51 Ibid. Boskholov has the same reason; the enlargement would mean new dividing lines, the recreation of Cold War. (Boskholov 29 May 1996, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.)

52 *Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia “Nash Dom – Rossiia 1995*.

53 PRES *Partiia Rossiiskogo Edinstva i soglasiia* (Party of Russian Unity and Accord), which had deputies in the first session of the State Duma 1993–1995.

of security, or, totally unacceptable to Russia, in NATO alone protecting Europe's security. The OSCE and Russia would only be given an assisting role in this last scenario. However, as the enlargement cannot be totally impeded, Boskholov qualifies his claim on opposing the enlargement: Russia's main strategic task is not to let NATO come to Russia's Western borders. Therefore, Russia should also make sure that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would join NATO according to the conditions accepted by Russia.⁵⁴ Boskholov thus seems to believe that Russia has a say in these matters.

Also, General Lev Rokhlin⁵⁵, Chair of the Duma Committee on Defence (until May 1998), names NATO as one of three external threats to Russia along with China and Turkey. He does not believe that NATO has been planning an offensive on Russia, but instead he believes that NATO is using "all means so that Russia would collapse without any military intervention"⁵⁶. The main concern for Rokhlin is the state of the army in Russia. In the future, Russia might not be able to oppose anyone in any situation due to the disastrous state of army funding.

Thus, NATO is a threat due to this situation in Russia. Actually the most serious threat comes from inside the Federation: the consequences of the defeat of the army in Chechnia. There are many regions in Russia ('donor regions'), which would like to secede from the federation. Now the Chechen experience shows that the Army cannot suppress separatism. Therefore, the collapse of Russia might be ahead. Tatarstan, Bashkiriya, Yakutia and Tiumen might unite their forces and decide that they will not be dealing with Moscow anymore (as they were not getting anything from the centre). Rokhlin anticipates that Kaliningrad might then fall into the sphere of influence of Germany, Primorye to China or Japan, Karelia to Finland, and the Caucasus to Turkey, etc. In this situation the internal threat would connect with the external one – Rokhlin claims that this would have been a good excuse to send multinational (including peaceful NATO) troops to Russian territory, for example in order to guarantee the safety of nuclear power stations.⁵⁷ Rokhlin's argument might be defined either as substantive (referring to the current situation of the country), as motivational (Russia should keep its sovereignty and oppose any foreign intervention), or even as authoritative (Rokhlin as an expert).

Rokhlin strongly criticizes Russia's foreign policy leadership for not taking care of Russia's interests.⁵⁸ This has to do with NATO enlargement as well. According to him, in contrast the United States has been taking care of its own interests. The meaning of the NATO enlargement to the east is that Russia would never again enter that space. Russia should have taken care of its interests, at least in the former Soviet space, but nothing so that: "Russia which has deep roots in the CIS countries has been wise enough to get almost all these countries to distance

54 Boskholov, 29 May 1996, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

55 Rokhlin left the NDR faction in September 1997. Whether he ever was a 'true' member of the party of power due to all his criticism towards the president and the government, is of course questionable. However, this also tells a lot about parties of power, political parties, the party system and the political system and situation at that time in general. Rokhlin was killed in July 1998 and before that he established DPA, an organization in support of the Army.

56 This is what the communists argue too and a claim that reappears in the new century and especially after the Orange Revolution.

57 Rokhlin, 14 January 1997, *Argumenty i fakty*.

58 Rokhlin, 15 November 1996, *Krasnaia zvezda*.

themselves from it.”⁵⁹ Rokhlin contrasts democratic principles with interests and advises the Russian leadership to forget about any ideals or values and to concentrate on Russia’s strategic interests:

In our press Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are criticized for lack of democratic principles. For a “very democratic” Russia, Uzbekistan is not enough democratic. But for such a country “with a weakly developed democracy” such as the USA, Uzbekistan was good enough for a partner. As a result, Karimov, who still in 1993 suggested to preserve the united armed forces of the CIS and not to create an army of their own, has now turned to the USA [...] The same will happen in Tajikistan, Moldova, Ukraine [and Belarus] [...] But we are talking about the “regime” and rights and “freedoms”.⁶⁰

So here Rokhlin questions Russia’s democracy and compares the democratic United States’ policies with those of democratic Russia.

Sergei Beliaev, Chair of the parliamentary faction of Nash Dom – Rossiia (until 31 August 1997), approaches NATO enlargement from the point of view of relations between Russia and applicant countries. He wants to find the reasons why these countries turned their back to Russia and re-orientated to the West, even though Russia and these countries share the same goals: building democracy and a market-based economy. These reasons should be understood as qualifiers for the claim on opposing NATO. Beliaev is convinced that the reasons for joining NATO were not ideological but of a more practical nature. NATO is seen as a catalyst for political integration with the European Community and applicant countries hope to get more investment from the West – making enlargement understandable. Russia is not a desirable partner because it is not in the position of donor anymore.⁶¹ Here we can see the argument in which the Central and East European countries would have had just two options: to choose either Russia or NATO (the US) – and they have made the choice purely on practical calculations. Beliaev also expresses a certain disappointment with the former allies, or more likely with the level of development (transition if you like) of Russia: Russia was not attractive enough. Thus, enlargement was partly Russia’s own fault.

Even if NATO enlargement might be one of the major mistakes of the West in the post-war period, Beliaev does not believe that the enlargement should be viewed as Russia’s defeat. But what should Russia do in relation to the enlargement? Beliaev’s main claim here is that Russia should look to the future and concentrate on building good relations with the potential new member countries. As the first data and backing for Beliaev’s claim we can understand ‘accepting the reality’, thus it is question of a substantive argument: Russia must acknowledge that the

59 Rokhlin was referring, e.g. to a then recent meeting in Dushanbe: the defence ministers from Ukraine, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not arrive. Rokhlin’s advice has seemingly later been taken by President Putin.

60 Ibid.

61 Beliaev, 17 April 1997, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. We may compare this to the situation of the past couple of years when Russia has been economically very strong due to the high prices on oil. Despite this, Russia has not been any more desirable partner to Central and East European countries than in the 1990s.

applicant countries are sovereign countries and subjects of international law, thus having every right to join the bloc. As the second data we can understand the uncertain future of the Alliance: “Actually, all purely military European unions have sooner or later fallen down” and “now the only consolidating force in NATO is the US.”⁶² Finally, as the third data, Beliaev represents that building good relations is congruent with Russia’s interests, because Russia might have had a chance to return to its traditional markets of arms sale.⁶³ We can understand the latter two as motivational (and authoritative) arguments. The programme of NDR also stresses cooperation with the CIS, the UN and OSCE e.g. in peace-keeping in the post-Soviet space.⁶⁴

TABLE 24.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians’ argument on NATO enlargement 1995–1999

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: Russia is isolated. Only NATO and US interests are taken into account. This is a threat to security. There is an alternative structure for European security.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most probably,</p>	<p>Claim: So Enlargement is not justified and Russia must oppose it.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since Russia cannot advocate or allow any developments that would lead to its exclusion (a substantive and motivational argument). Russia must take care of its security interests (a motivational argument). This contradicts the idea of one, united Europe (a motivational argument). If there is one military bloc, usually another one emerges to oppose it (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However If NATO was not a military organization, then it would be acceptable.</p>
<p>Backing: Because NATO is a military organization and Russia has not been invited to join NATO. The idea behind the German unification, the collapse of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw pact was one Europe – a common European home. Shared ideals in the past, that is, what was perceived as a shared ideal.</p>		

Table 24...

62 This is something to which Iabloko politicians also later refer: NATO will split eventually.

63 Beliaev, 17 April 1997, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

64 *Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia “Nash Dom – Rossiia 1995*

TABLE 24...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

Data: This enlargement cannot be impeded. Russia's interests must be taken care of.	Qualifier Probably,	Claim: So A wider cooperation should be promoted and Russia should build good relations with new NATO countries.
Warrant: Since One cannot prevent sovereign countries joining the blocs they want to (a substantive argument). The idea of one united Europe has been abandoned (a substantive and motivational argument). If you cannot prevent something, you should try to participate in it to have some influence on it (a substantive argument).		Counterargument: However A further enlargement should be prevented (Russia should come forward with conditions for Baltic States joining NATO).
Backing: Because Applicant countries are sovereign and independent countries according to international law. One undivided Europe was the shared idea. Russia has no political or military power to oppose NATO enlargement.		

Comparison and geopolitical vision

Nash Dom – Rossiia's mission seems to be of an undivided united Europe and Russia with an active part in it. A model to follow, other than for Rokhlin, is democracy and a market-based economy. Enemies to Russia are those that want to isolate Russia. In the 1995 and 1999 party programmes there is nothing written explicitly on NATO but there is something on the geopolitical vision, which corresponds to our reading of this vision based on the two cases – Chechnia and NATO. In the programme of 1995 Russia is defined as a great European state and, due to geostrategic, political, historical and economic factors, Russia was and will be a great power. NDR is against the global domination of any one state or organization, is against 'hegemonism', and is for the active participation of Russia in world affairs. In the 1999 programme Russia is defined as a European power but also as a great power in Asia. NDR stresses the domestic situation; actually, Russia's 'destiny in world politics' depends on its internal state. NDR would like to have a world order which respects the sovereignty, independency and territorial integrity of

states, democratic choice, international responsibilities, human rights and economic cooperation⁶⁵, and this can be taken as Russia's mission and the model for it to follow.

8.1.1.2 *Otechestvo: Speculations about Russia's membership are a trap*⁶⁶

Again we can see that discussion on Russia's NATO membership is not taken seriously but is seen as a trap, and that enlargement is actually taking place due to the NATO ambition to dominate the world. Consequently, the enlargement should not be carried out. Russia cannot be left aside without any decision-making power in security issues.

TABLE 25.
Kosachev's (Otechestvo) grammar of geopolitics on NATO enlargement 2001–2002⁶⁷

What is NATO enlargement about?	Discussion on enlargement including Russia is a trap.
Where is it taking place?	Around Russia, Russia's borders.
Why it is taking place?	NATO striving to dominate the world.
Who are the parties on the different sides?	NATO countries vs. Russia.
What are Russia's interests at stake?/ Why is this wrong?	Russia is left outside; it has no decision-making power; Russia's interests are not taken into account.

During the existence of Otechestvo (from December 1998 until February 2002; the parliamentary faction however functioned until the parliamentary elections of December 2003; see Chapter 4) the question of NATO enlargement was not at the very centre of discussions anymore – partly because in March 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland already joined the Alliance after the invitation issued at the 1997 Madrid Summit Meeting. But now, as the enlargement continued (in April 2004 there were seven new member states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria), a new peak in the discussion on this theme emerged. In addition, there were discussions on Russia's possible participation in the Alliance. For example, NATO General Secretary Robertson and President Putin both raised this question, although for what purpose is another matter. Konstantin Kosachev, Deputy

65 *Programma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniia "Nash Dom – Rossiia" 1999.*

66 Here we cannot talk about Otechestvo storyline, but just about Konstantin Kosachev's storyline.

67 This analysis is based on a limited data.

Chair of the Otechestvo parliamentary faction and Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on International Relations, touches on this issue from the point of view of Russia's membership in this organization and of NATO's function as an organization of collective security in his articles published in 2001. The claim, which Kosachev makes, is that *Russia cannot become a member of NATO*. It is not realistic to assume anything like that due to the 5th article of the Washington agreement:

The fifth article of the Washington agreement presupposes that if there is an offensive against any one NATO member state, it is considered as an attack on the whole Alliance and the member countries should go to protect the victims of the aggression. If we look at the map, it will come evident that it is unrealistic to wait for that kind of responsibility concerning Russia.⁶⁸

As backing for the warrant on NATO not protecting Russia, Kosachev presents a map, a geographical fact: Russia has too large an area – Russia's borders are as long as one and half times the Equator. In addition, he argues that the borders are not very well guarded and they are vulnerable to conflicts in the South Western and Pacific regions. Kosachev is making a substantive argument by referring to "a relationship among the phenomena in the external world", that is, Russia's geography versus NATO's Washington agreement. Actually, Kosachev claims that Western politicians have not seriously come up with the idea of Russian membership. It is just used as a trap, a carrot for Russia in order to get Russia to change its position on further NATO enlargement.⁶⁹ This argument is similar to what had been said earlier in Russia about the Partnership for Peace Programme.⁷⁰

The second claim is that *Russia should either try to transform NATO from the inside*, that is, by influencing its member countries, *or create a new structure of collective security*.⁷¹ The data for this claim is that NATO is a strong but not universal organization in comparison to universal, but ineffective organizations like the UN and OSCE.⁷² Moreover, Kosachev is disappointed that the modernization of NATO's concept has not yet been carried out and, therefore, he sees Russia's role in this as crucial. The data and warrant for not accepting NATO is that Russia does not have any power in it or any influence on its decisions, which might concern Russia's interests. As an example, which also serves as backing for the warrant, Kosachev mentions that it is not normal that Russia has no say in European security issues, as Luxemburg does as a member of NATO. Thus, it is humiliating to Russia, a former super-power and a potential great power, to be left aside, to be left outside of the institutions in which decisions concerning Europe's security, and thus also concerning Russia's interests are taken. Again Kosachev uses substan-

68 Kosachev, 23 October 2001, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

69 Kosachev, 28 October 2001, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

70 See e.g. Lukin (Iabloko) in 1995.

71 Kosachev, 28 October 2001, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

72 Kosachev, 5 December 2001, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

tive arguments, referring to the state of affairs, but also a motivational argument, referring to a shared goal or a value, in which Russia would be taken as an equal or even a great power.

In the programme of Otechestvo NATO enlargement is discussed explicitly: “There is no reason why Russia could support NATO enlargement to the East.”⁷³ The potential consequences of the enlargement serve as data for this claim: Russia wants no new Cold War, no new confrontation, no new dividing lines, and no isolation of Russia. Instead, Russia wants to create a new system of European *and* transatlantic security – a system in which all countries would be given the right to participate in decision making. Further data is provided by the nature of the organization, especially its new doctrine, the aggressiveness of which was manifested in the conflict with Yugoslavia. Russia also had to change its own military doctrine due to these events.

TABLE 26.
Kosachev’s (Otechstvo) argument on NATO enlargement 2001–2002

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: Russia is left outside. NATO has not been modernized (a betrayal). The Washington agreement’s supposition is that NATO protects all its members against any external threat.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> NATO’s enlargement is humiliating to Russia and damaging its interests. Moreover, Russia cannot become a NATO member.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> Enlargement of any military organization of which Russia is not a member is a threat to Russia’s interests (a motivational argument). Russia has no say in security questions (a motivational argument). NATO cannot be expected to fulfil the obligations of the Washington agreement towards a member like Russia (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> NATO is still a military organization. Russia’s geography and the Washington agreement – the agreement could not be fulfilled. Kosachev is an expert in these matters.</p>		

Table 26...

73 *Predvybornaia platforma OVR 1999* does not mention NATO at all.

TABLE 26...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

Data Russia's interests must be taken into account in Europe's security architecture.	Qualifier Most likely,	Claim: So A new security organization must be created or NATO must be modernized (= stop being a military organization).
Warrant: Since Great powers must have a say in security issues concerning Europe's future (a substantive and motivational argument).		No counterarguments
Backing: Because Even Luxembourg, as a NATO member, can impact on security arrangements. Russia is not a member of NATO, but it is a great power.		

Geopolitical vision

Kosachev's arguments on NATO enlargement do not provide us with much material for constructing Otechestvo's geopolitical vision. What we can surely say, however, is that Russia's mission should be executing equality in world politics on the basis of multipolarity. If we look at the party programme, then we can see that for Otechestvo Russia safeguarding its statehood (*gosudarstvennost*) and national security, and Russia being a nuclear power cannot be separated – there cannot be the former without the latter. Russia is in real danger of losing its sovereignty. The enemies to be combated are threats to sovereignty, that is, unipolarity and its main proponent, the United States. We can take “other centres of power”, that is, Western Europe, China, Japan and the Muslim world (and the CIS) as Russia's partners. With them, Russia should seek cooperation.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ *Programma obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Otechestvo" 2002.*

8.1.1.3 *Edinstvo*⁷⁵

When a parliamentary group from the United States was visiting the State Duma, a radio interview with the Democrat congressman from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich, and Duma First Deputy Speaker Liubov Sliska was broadcast. Kucinich and Sliska were asked to comment on the NATO General Secretary George Robertson's statement on not excluding Russia's membership from the Alliance. Sliska is convinced that the suggestion has emerged because Russia is worried about NATO enlargement to the East, so her argument is similar to that of Kosachev of Otechestvo (see above). However, she suggests that actually it is not clear what NATO's goals are. In addition, Sliska stresses that humanitarian intervention without UN Security Council agreement is not acceptable. Sliska is pleased that Mr. Robertson spoke about Russia and NATO as equal partners, and her claim is that *the relationship between them should be built on mutual confidence and not on the threat of NATO moving to the East*.⁷⁶ So here we can again see the importance of treating Russia as an equal partner, with publicly declared respect for Russia as an equal partner.

Later in 2002, according to Sliska, Russia was very much involved in NATO already due to the mutual interests in struggling against international terrorism: "In actuality we are in NATO, not belonging to that organization formally [...] Terrorism is a threat to our country and today we carry out the fight against it together with NATO. How long will this union exist? I think it needs to proceed from the fact that the new form of relations with NATO pleases Russia, is useful to us, and further on, time will show."⁷⁷ Sliska speaks in accordance with Russia's official line and confirms what most NATO states claim. However, for Sliska, it is really about taking care of Russia's own interests, and Russia's interests determine the duration and forms of NATO cooperation. 'International terrorism' is the key term here; it is the one thing that unites Russia and NATO.

Boris Gryzlov, the then Minister of the Interior, also comments on Robertson's announcement and argues that "If NATO was a political organization which took care of the protection of peace and political stability, then Russia could and should be a full member of NATO."⁷⁸ However, we should notice here the conditional 'if' – NATO is not a political organization and therefore, Russia cannot become a full member. However, Edinstvo member Vladislav Reznik, Deputy Chair of the Duma faction, describes Schröder's and Rice's statement on Russia potentially joining NATO as a "diplomatic victory for President Putin."⁷⁹

75 I found only few newspaper articles concerning NATO from Edinstvo politicians in the period of study, so on the basis of these data it is difficult to judge what their argument is. Therefore, the analysis remains partial, for example, no firm storyline could be constructed.

76 Sliska, 20 February 2001, *Radio Ekho Moskvy*.

77 Sliska, 21 June 2002, *Trud*.

78 Gryzlov, 20 February 2001, *RIA Novosti & Interfax*.

79 Reznik, 10 August 2001, *Nezavisimaja gazeta*.

There is nothing explicit said on NATO in the programmes or platforms of Edinstvo or Edinaia Rossiia (or the All-Russian Party Edinstvo and Otechestvo); however, there are more general statements on foreign policy, e.g. in the 2003 Manifesto⁸⁰. Edinstvo is for safeguarding Russia's interests, for realism, openness and efficiency. Russia should be an equal partner in the world community and, like NDR and Otechestvo in its own programme, Edinstvo wants Russia to strengthen relations with the CIS. The fight against international terrorism is also stressed. The main problem of national security is to re-establish self-confidence, and belief in Russia.⁸¹

TABLE 27.
Edinstvo politicians' argument on NATO enlargement 2001–2002

PROBLEM SOLUTION		
Data 1) NATO cooperation is useful to Russia. A united front is needed in the fight against terrorism. 2) NATO is a military organization.	Qualifier Most probably,	Claim: So 1) Russia should cooperate with NATO. 2) Russia cannot become a full member.
Warrant: Since No country can do without cooperation in fight against terrorism (an authoritative argument).		Counterargument: However 2) If NATO was a political organization, Russia could join it.
Backing: Because Russia's own interests in the fight against international terrorism should be taken care of. Russia and NATO are already intensively cooperating. NATO has not transformed itself.		

8.1.2 Iabloko: NATO is isolating Russia and threatening all-European security interests

The story told by Iabloko is almost the same as that of the parties of power; however, Iabloko politicians stress more the significance of Europe – that NATO is a threat to Europe and not only to Russia. NATO enlargement is taking place in Europe, which could finally be borderless,

80 Manifest Vsesrossiiskoi politicheskoi partii "Edinstvo i Otechestvo" – Edinaia Rossiia. Put Natsionalnogo uspekha.

81 Programma Vsesrossiiskoi politicheskoi partii "Edinstvo i Otechestvo" – Edinaia Rossiia 2002.

without any divisions. *NATO is now creating new divisions* and thus betraying all the shared ideas and values, such as the idea of an undivided Europe. Moreover, NATO enlargement does not serve its purpose: this organization cannot take care of European security. Thus, the enlargement is not in the interests of Europe, but rather all this is happening for the sake of US interests or the interests of the then NATO countries. The parties in the enlargement ‘conflict’ are this military organization on one side and Russia and the others who are excluded from the organization on the other. The main problem, in addition to NATO enlargement being a threat to Europe, is that Russia’s interests are not paid any attention and Russia has no say in decision-making concerning security in Europe. However, Iabloko politicians also belittle NATO’s significance. Its enlargement is really not meaningful anymore, and actually it is no longer worth much opposition from Russia’s part.

TABLE 28.
Iabloko politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on NATO enlargement 1994–2003

What is NATO enlargement about?	Enlargement of an exclusive military organization; betrayal of the common principles, ideas and values of one undivided Europe; re-division of Europe; a useless enlargement of a useless organization, not capable of taking care of security.
Where is it taking place?	In Europe, which is finally free of all divisions; Russia perceived as a part of Europe.
Why it is taking place?	NATO countries, the US are taking care of their own interests.
Who are the parties on the different sides?	A military organization vs. Russia and others who are left aside.
What are Russia’s interests at stake?/ Why is this wrong?	Russian interests are not taken into account; Russia is left aside from decision-making; dangerous for Europe; later no longer meaningful.

The main claim of Vladimir Lukin, then Deputy Chair of the Iabloko Association and former Chair of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs,⁸² concerning NATO enlargement can be paraphrased in the following way: *enlargement of this one-sided organization is not acceptable*. In the structural analysis of his argument, the first data and warrant state that enlargement betrays mutual ideas and values and contradicts the agreements made between

82 In the third Duma Deputy Chair of the State Duma, since February 2004 the Russian Ombudsman for Human Rights.

Russia and the West and Russia's concessions, which were based on mutual idea of one, undivided Europe. In the first warrant to back up his claim, Lukin refers to the "position shared by the majority of Russians", that is, enlargement is a betrayal. The backings presented for the truthfulness of this warrant are Russia's concessions (voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw pact; voluntary abandonment of the security zone in Central and Eastern Europe; voluntary nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament): "The West did not react by a real decrease and re-orientation of its military power, but instead by its consolidation and primitive seizure of former allies of Russia."⁸³ Here Lukin wants us to read that he was merely expressing the position of the majority of Russians, and not necessarily committing himself as a reasonable politician to this position. Still he uses, as many other politicians, popular opinion to justify his main claim. Moreover, later he criticizes the fact that the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact were not followed by agreements on creating a new European structure of security. He also refers to some verbal agreements made to Gorbachev on the non-enlargement of NATO when the unification of Germany was discussed.⁸⁴ We can understand Lukin's argument as substantive, based on popular opinion and verbal agreements, or as authoritative, in which popular opinion is taken as an authority.

Later in 2000 Lukin explains the connection between NATO's enlargement, the Kosovo conflict and Russian domestic policies and the reason for why the enlargement was opposed to so much. This serves as backing for the popular opinion warrant: "Russia took [the enlargement] as a potential threat to its security when it was weakened by structural difficulties of the transition period. The crisis deepened during the Kosovo conflict when NATO, headed by the US, for the first time since 1945 used military force in Europe against a sovereign state."⁸⁵ Russia was in a state of weakness and felt isolated. Lukin is also worried because due to NATO's new strategic concept of April 1999, Russia revised its military doctrine and dropped its abstention from the first-use of nuclear weapons in the case of a threat to its vital interests and to its territorial wholeness (*tselostnost*).⁸⁶

Lukin uses a dichotomy of a 'New division in Europe vs. the End of Cold War' or 'NATO's one-sided (partial) security vs. All-European security', in which Russia represents the latter position, and NATO and NATO enlargement signify the first position. *Enlargement thus means a new dividing line in Europe and the isolation of Russia*; this statement forms the second data. Lukin presents a motivational argument: Our ideal (value) was a united and secure Europe and NATO could only protect a part of Europe; therefore, its enlargement should have not taken place (or actually the organization itself was not necessary). This is connected to betrayal arguments: NATO enlargement has betrayed these mutual ideas. Thus, what is really needed is an all-European security system and NATO is not an acceptable basis for European security alone, because "if NATO became a basis for European security, it would mean that

83 Lukin, 12 May 1995, *Izvestia*.

84 Lukin, 14 July 1995, *Segodnia*.

85 Lukin, 9 November 2000, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

86 Ibid.

Russia would become an external element concerning the European system of taking decisions on the cardinal questions, which are deeply interesting for itself. [...] Russia would be put aside from taking the most important decisions [...]”⁸⁷ Therefore, in the case of not dissolving NATO and allowing it to enlarge eastward, the primary problem is that Russia would be left aside and it would not have the right to take decisions on European security issues. However, Lukin does not believe that the OSCE would be able to function as a basis for the security structure either:

The OSCE is an ineffective organization and can hardly become anything else. It is a mandate without force, when NATO is a force without a mandate. [...] I do not think that our idea to widen the OSCE to the level of effective regional organization can be successful.⁸⁸

However, the Political Platform still stresses the creation of a multilateral system of the “second generation”, and this might be created on the basis of the OSCE. This would halt NATO’s eastward enlargement and the new division of Europe into military blocs.⁸⁹ The third data for the claim on the enlargement’s unacceptability has to do with its impact on Russia’s domestic policy and its further impact on Europe’s future. Lukin constructs an image of Russia as a wild and unpredictable creature:

I would like to warn Western colleagues: a simultaneous loss of faith by the West in Russian democracy and an intended or unintended antagonizing of the Russian population may become very expensive [to the West]. [...] Would the West be better off with a Russia wounded but with nuclear power potential, again forced to leave for the steppes? With a Russia which would be morally suppressed but still heavily armed and convinced that it has little to lose? [...]”⁹⁰

Lukin uses a motivational argument: the warrant assumes a future goal which is shared by the audience, that is, a secure and peaceful Europe and a democratic Russia. And enlargement is a threat to both of these. Lukin continues his warnings and threats, now referring to the level of agreements and security blocs. He is worried about a dead-end situation, whereby Russia would be left without any other options but to seek security on its own.

If NATO’s enlargement to the East becomes true, Russia might come to the conclusion that the former bilateral and multilateral agreements become meaningless. [...] We want all-European security. But if they do not want to offer us a place there, we have to

87 Lukin, 14 July 1995, *Segodnia*.

88 Ibid.

89 Politicheskaia platforma in *Reformy dlia bolsinstva* 1995, 61.

90 Lukin, 12 May 1995, *Izvestiia*.

take care of our own security [...] and make arrangements with those neighbours that are not invited into NATO.⁹¹

Using warnings and threats in argumentation seems to be a very common feature in politicians' speeches: politicians draw a picture which might come true if somebody did not act in a way s/he advises. As a rebuttal to his claim, Lukin represents NATO's hypothetical argument: enlargement has its shortcomings, but does Russia have any alternative to offer? Lukin somewhat admits this counterargument: so far there has not been enough of political will to prepare an alternative, but for this the West and Russia are both to blame. We can agree with Lukin's argument that Russia has actually been just a reactive power on many issues.

In the mid-1990s Lukin still believes in Russia's ability to influence NATO's enlargement and in general decisions taken by NATO. In addition, it would actually be congruent with the West's interests to listen to Russia and let it participate in decision-making. To qualify his claim Lukin offers some compromises to settle the enlargement crisis.⁹²

[..] In the position of the West I would totally exclude from the political lexicon this thesis, which I find provocative: Russia does not have the right to a veto on the questions of NATO enlargement. In a legal sense this is right, but in the political sense it is absurd, because without Russia these questions cannot be solved.⁹³

Lukin continues to disapprove of NATO or NATO enlargement as a basis for European security in 2000. Instead, Lukin is convinced that the organization of European security based on bilateral relations and on different international organizations (the UN, OSCE, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, CIS) can bring stability and serve as an example for other regions if certain conditions would be fulfilled. So this alternative serves as data for the claim. First of all, the EU "must more clearly formulate the main parameters of what it means by the perspectives of European identity in the sphere of foreign policy and security." It should "get rid of the understanding that the US is an internal factor and Russia an external factor in Europe." Secondly, the "US must overcome its understanding of an eternal unipolarity of the world, headed by Washington". Thirdly, "Russia can become a real, equal participant in the triangle of European

91 Ibid.

92 First of all, NATO should announce a moratorium on the publication of the exact dates and concrete countries, which will be invited to NATO. This would save the face of both parties of the dispute. Secondly, the associated member states should become full members gradually and thirdly, a new round of Russo-American negotiations (e.g. on disarmament) should be started. Fourthly, the functions of the Council of Europe should be developed (prevention of ethnic conflicts, social aspects of organised crime, drug trafficking) and fifthly, consultations should be arranged concerning the fact, which forms and methods of Russia's military cooperation with its neighbours (especially with the members of the CIS) might cause anxiety for some European states. Lastly, the OSCE should be placed as the forum for discussion of the most important problems of the continent, a sort of UN for Europe and its surroundings, even though "we can hardly in the near future count on a radical increase in its efficiency in solving real problems of security". (Lukin 14 May 1996, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*).

93 Lukin, 14 July 1995, *Segodnia*.

security only if it demonstrates in deed that the European priority for it is not only a concept but a real political orientation.” This includes that “democracy should not become managed but managing and the basic European values not a slogan but practise”.⁹⁴ Thus, Russia’s domestic policy and foreign policy are very tightly linked to each other and the key here is Russia’s European orientation. From this point of view – Russia belonging to Europe, Russia making a choice for Europe – and together with the mutual interests of struggling against terrorism, we should also see Lukin’s acceptance for Putin’s line after the events of 11 September 2001. However, this line is nothing new as such. Lukin explained that:

It was an intellectual choice [...] We have matured to take the course on the direction of the 21st century already in the beginning of 1990s but for two main reasons we could not reach that. The first was about forces of inertia, which were very strong back then. The being, as we used to say, was left behind from the consciousness. And the second reason was the personal incapability of the then leaders to solve this problem.⁹⁵

Lukin is happy that Americans have chosen the way of “taking us into account” (*schitanie s nami*). Still there are many problems especially, concerning NATO and the missile defence system:

When Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld tell us that the agreement on missile defence systems has become out-of-date, we do not have any Cold War any more, then I say what about NATO, has it not become out-of-date? It is also an inheritance from the Cold War. NATO was created against the Warsaw Pact,⁹⁶ and the Soviet Union. Now there is neither the first, nor the second, so why then a unilateral enlargement without taking us into the alliance?⁹⁷

After the first phase of the enlargement, there are more discussions on Russia’s potential membership. Commenting on Putin’s statement on the BBC, Lukin argues that *the line of Russia becoming a member of NATO fully corresponds to Russian national interests*. NATO is now also defined as “an agreement on mutual defence, which has a tendency of widening; it is an agreement on a nuclear umbrella.”⁹⁸ So Russia’s interests serve as the first data for the claim on Russia becoming a NATO member. Moreover, it would be very important to Russia if it became a member of NATO (*voshla v NATO*) that it would get a veto in that organization. Lukin supports Putin’s announcement in a BBC interview about Russia’s possibilities for join-

94 Lukin, 9 November 2000, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

95 Lukin, 18 November 2001, *Novoe Vremia* 46/2001.

96 In fact, the Warsaw Pact was created against NATO.

97 Lukin, 18 November 2001, *Novoe Vremia* 46/2001.

98 Lukin, Interfax, Press release of Iabloko, 9 March 2000.

ing NATO: “The idea is of course correct, but a very long-term one.”⁹⁹ Lukin is expressing a ‘conditional yes in the future’ to Russia’s membership and thus qualifying his claim. These conditions comprise that “both we and NATO would have to change a lot.”¹⁰⁰ Russia would have to form an army that corresponds with the NATO criteria and domestic policy changes would be required, too. NATO would also have to transform into a security organization. We can understand Lukin’s statement that creating a wider system of collective security is better than creating an anti-coalition, a coalition against NATO, as a warrant. So, the motivation behind Russia’s potential membership is still the idea of undivided Europe, an organization of security, and the security for all Europeans (including Russians); it is a motivational argument. In September 2001 Lukin is convinced that if Russia is proposed to join NATO, Russia should do it because it corresponds with its interests (the main enemy now being terrorism). However he, like Kosachev of Otechestvo, doubts whether Russia would ever be invited to enter the bloc due to the consensus principle applied with it.¹⁰¹ The 1995 Political Platform had argued that “Russia will never become a member of NATO or member of the European Union”.¹⁰²

If in the 1990s Lukin opposes the enlargement or, at least understands very well those who do oppose it, and in 2000 and 2001 speculates on Russia’s potential membership, in 2002 Lukin is highly sceptical about the future of NATO and argues that *opposing NATO and its eastward enlargement is a waste of time*: “For more than ten years we have been talking about whether the alliance is still a threat to our country and what losses NATO’s eastward enlargement bring to our national interests. During that time NATO enlarges. Russian adversaries of this process [referring especially to the communists] acknowledge that Russia has no ‘levers’ to prevent this enlargement.”¹⁰³ Thus, the claim is that *opposing NATO enlargement is totally useless*, firstly because Russia has no means to stop it (and Russian politicians do know that, so therefore the question is more of populism – it might be a way of getting votes in the elections) and secondly because NATO is not worth this opposition. Accordingly, these serve as the data. As backings for the warrant, Lukin talks about NATO losing the grounds for its existence, that is, the enemy and the mission, and thus it “could not remain in the unchanged form”. Lukin argues that disagreements between the members have led to a situation in which making practical decisions for enabling the “Alliance’s adaptation towards new threats and geopolitical realities have been overtaken by the process of finding new borders for the union.” According to Lukin, NATO’s conception of “humanitarian intervention” has proved to have been a failure; by realizing it in practise, “NATO has rather given birth to doubts in regards to its own ability for action in the decisions of military tasks in the autonomous regime, that is, without

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Lukin, 27 September 2001, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

102 Politicheskaia platforma in *Reformy dlia bolsinstva* 1995, 60.

103 Lukin, 11 December 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. We must also remember that there were new institutional arrangements between NATO and Russia. NATO-Russia council was established in May 2002 and it has been argued that it gives a more equal position to Russia than the previous arrangements. E.g. Forsberg (2005, 341) mentions that now NATO countries would not agree on a common position before the NRC meetings.

the aid of 'local forces.' And finally, "11 September 2001 showed that NATO is not able to fulfil its main function – to safeguard security of its members[...]"¹⁰⁴

Aleksei Arbatov, member and, since 1996, Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Defence and Deputy Chair of the Iabloko Association, discusses NATO enlargement at least as intensively as Lukin. Arbatov's main claim is the same as Lukin's: NATO enlargement is not acceptable because *NATO was not an adequate basis for the new system of European security* (as a warrant: a new system of European security was necessary). NATO is not adequate because it is an old structure, an organization of the Cold War era and not capable of transforming itself. As a further warrant we can understand that its existence and especially its enlargement are contradictory with Russia's interests and with the idea of a 'new thinking' in international relations. Furthermore, the enlargement might create a new division of European space: "European space should not be divided in a way so that in some regions the questions of security are decided by the UN and NATO and in others the CIS is suggested to take the protection of the OSCE."¹⁰⁵ So the data, warrant and backing are the same as for Lukin: the mutual ideas – values of one, undivided Europe – have been betrayed. Arbatov is thus using a motivational argument. This leads us to the second data: NATO is using double standards; its 'behaviour' could not be morally accepted. As backing, we can look at what Arbatov argues on the unequal position between Russia and the NATO countries in protecting their interests:

The plans for the colossal re-arming of the new NATO members are treated just as a routine: there must be compatibility of forces of the Union. [Instead] cooperation between Russia and Belarus in the sphere of missile defence and leaving a Russian division of incomplete composition in Armenia cause discontent and opposition. [...]"¹⁰⁶

Arbatov continues on the double standards used in questions of national self-determination and human rights. Here we can see 'principles' against 'interests': according to Arbatov talking about principles or values seems to be just lip-service, whereas in reality the interests are what matter. As backing, Arbatov offers the following cases, where he uses substantive arguments by referring to 'cases of real life':

If the West thus in principle acts for the self-determination of some national minorities, why in other analogous cases it takes a completely contradictory position: Karabakh, Abkhazia, Pridnestr, Kurds in Turkey [...] Evidently, apart from public declarations, the question is not of high principles, but of pragmatic political preferences and interests in each concrete case.¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, NATO must be perceived as a threat because it is an organization, of which Russia is not a member. Now this 'alien' organization is moving near to Russia's borders. So the

104 Lukin, 11 December 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

105 Arbatov, 20 July 1995, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

106 Arbatov, 23 July 1998, www document.

107 Ibid.

opposition is not only about breaking the idea of an undivided Europe or NATO's double standards. As a warrant for Arbatov's claim we can understand the desire and the right to protect Russia's sovereignty as there is now something close to Russia on which Russia has no influence. This can be seen as a threat to Russia, to its sovereignty. Arbatov is thus using a motivational argument. Russia's exclusion might have dangerous consequences (the same warning as used by Lukin in 1995, see above):

The 'vacuum of security' was filled by the old structure. The course was taken for the enlargement of NATO to the East to the borders of the former Union, and then maybe through them. Whatever is said about the defensive nature of NATO, Russia will take this enlargement as targeted against it. *If it [Russia] will not be invited to join this bloc on equal terms, it will take measures for enlargement of its own defensive perimeter to the West and the South.*¹⁰⁸

As a rebuttal Arbatov mentions that if the enlargement continues, then it must be made *de facto* political. He appreciates the results of the Russo-American Summit held in Helsinki in 1997: if there was NATO enlargement, it would not mean an increase in conventional weapons in Europe. Therefore, for the enlargement there can be a political response. Furthermore, to back up his warrant that NATO cannot be a basis for an all-European security, Arbatov is describing the wide consensus in foreign policy among Russian politicians in 1997.¹⁰⁹ He contrasts Russia's diplomatic way of solving problems and NATO's way of solving problems by force (referring to the Bosnian war):

NATO's massive air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs from the summer of 1995 showed that force and not patient negotiations remains the main instrument of diplomacy and the position of Moscow was taken into account only in as much as it did not contradict the US line. In the eyes of the majority of Russians the myth of the defensive nature of NATO was shattered.¹¹⁰

Arbatov returns to the Western or NATO way of solving problems in 1998, again referring to Bosnia and making an analogy to the situation around Kosovo: The US started to carry out this model in Kosovo, threatening Serbia by strikes and in fact taking the side of Kosovo separatists and Albania, which is supporting them.¹¹¹ Arbatov also reminds us that NATO did not "agree its policy with Russia in the spirit of the Act of 1997". So he also refers to an analogy made by 'Russian sceptics' that "the model of Kosovo will soon extend to the North Caucasus" (see below for more on the argumentation on the Kosovo conflict). The principle of humanitarian intervention is thus seen as a real threat to Russia, a threat of interfering in internal matters of a sovereign state, and potentially those of Russia. Thus, the warrant states that as this model

108 Arbatov, 20 July 1995, *Obshchaia Gazeta*. Italics added.

109 He did not explicitly say to which extent he supported this consensus.

110 Arbatov, 14 March 1997, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

111 Arbatov 23 July 1998, www document.

of action has been used before, it can be used again in a seemingly similar situation within the Russian territory. So Arbatov uses a substantive argument. Furthermore, NATO action is seen as a violation of agreements: Russia was not taken into account at all. So Arbatov refers here also to the principle of equality in safeguarding interests, to the principle of the equality of (nation)states: “Moscow has the same rights to determine and safeguard its interests which in some cases contradict with the interests of the USA and the West.”¹¹² This can be understood as a motivational argument.

When the context changes, the argumentation of politicians changes, too. Argumentation, at least to some extent, is flexible and dependent on the context. Arbatov uses the same argument in 2002 as Lukin in 2001: it is useless to oppose NATO enlargement even to the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, Arbatov qualifies his claim and uses a rebuttal: Russia should get at least some concessions for the enlargement, “I think that our line of simple opposition to the process of NATO enlargement is not based on any strong political, economic or military positions, and thus, similar to our opposition to the US withdrawal from the Agreement on nuclear defence – it is a weak line. And understanding that the alliance will enlarge we have to try to get maximal concessions in other fields.”¹¹³ These concessions might comprise, for example, “uniting the Baltic States on the Agreement on the decreasing of conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe [...] [or] returning to the idea of a nuclear free zone in Central and Eastern Europe, including Kaliningrad”¹¹⁴ or to “make the ‘twelve’ a serious organ, which takes serious decisions and which if we have the veto right, would save us from those NATO operations which go into their new strategy and which we are more afraid of than the old ones – during the times of the Cold War.”¹¹⁵

However, Arbatov expresses his opposition position, too, and accuses the Russian political leadership of a lack of will for negotiating these concessions. His claim is that the leadership is not competent and, as data for this claim, he uses Russian-NATO or Russian-West relations which he links to Russia’s domestic situation and policy. When the interviewer asks about “Washington’s position on the war in Chechnia, human rights, and the independence of the mass media and law courts”, Arbatov answers demanding reciprocity in relations: “If the West would give us more, then it would have more rights to demand more as well. But so long as it has given too little it therefore cannot demand anything. Not even what we should do in our own interests.”¹¹⁶ Here Arbatov is referring to stopping the military operation in Chechnia: “The continuing terrorist acts show to all that there is no stabilization in Chechnia.”¹¹⁷ Hence, Russian leaders should be blamed for the lack of reciprocity, for the lack of equality in the relations. When talking about concessions for the help in Afghanistan (“our president took the

112 Ibid.

113 Arbatov, 23 May 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

114 Arbatov, 18 November 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

115 Arbatov, 23 May 2002, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

correct position by taking the path of cooperation with the US and the West in general”¹¹⁸, Arbatov argues that “In the sphere of security it is possible to demand credits: [...] To work out mutual guarantees of security in the struggle against terrorism. Could it have been possible to demand more? Yes if we had a different policy concerning NATO enlargement and in the sphere of strategic nuclear weapons.”¹¹⁹ So the reason for inequality and non-reciprocity in Russo-Western relations is really dependent on Russia’s domestic policy:

The whole domestic policy of the preceding period made Russia very defenceless, unprotected in attempts to have equal cooperation with the West. *Looking from the side of how elections are carried out, what kind of decisions our judges make, how the freedom of speech is carried out, how the operation in Chechnia is carried out and how democratic citizen’s rights are carried out, Western politicians are so far not sure about Russia really being their strategic partner.*¹²⁰

The incompatibility of Russian foreign and domestic policies is a new and recurrent theme in Iabloko’s argumentation during Putin’s era (see also Lukin’s arguments on Chechnia). Arbatov believes that “so far as between our post- 11 September foreign policy and domestic policy there is emerging a wider gap, even a gorge, and there will not be any equal and long-term relations”¹²¹

Grigorii Iavlinskii is not as enthusiastic about discussing NATO enlargement as Lukin and Arbatov,¹²² but we can refer to e.g. his article from 1997.¹²³ Iavlinskii does not oppose the enlargement like Lukin and Arbatov but still sees no point to it either. Iavlinskii’s main claim is that the enlargement, and NATO in general, is not necessary because, first of all, Russia does not pose any military threat. As warrant and backing Iavlinskii gives the fact that NATO was created for opposing military threats (the Soviet Union) and as there is no such thing anymore, NATO becomes useless. Instead, Russia poses other kind of threats, such as being unable to control military arsenals – including nuclear power stations – and that salaries are not being paid to the military and therefore, it can become a base of international crime and terrorism. In addition, according to Iavlinskii, Russia does not take care of its environment. The second data to support the claim are that NATO is not able to fight against the real threats. In this new post-Cold War situation, NATO does not have any function anymore; Iavlinskii is stating this fact in 1997 to which Arbatov and Lukin refer to a couple of years later. Iavlinskii is using both substantive and authoritative arguments. Iavlinskii’s argument goes on: Due to all this,

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid. Italics added.

121 Ibid.

122 Lukin and Arbatov are/were Iabloko’s foreign and security policy experts. Iavlinskii concentrated more on the economic side of foreign policy and on domestic policy, including economic policy, rule of law, and democratic development – including human rights, and the situation in Chechnia, etc.

123 Iavlinskii, 13 February 1997, *Obshchaia Gazeta*.

the interests of Russia and the West are congruent, therefore a new strategic union for protecting these interests is needed. Russian leaders should say to its Western partners:

Look now gentlemen, *our interests in the sphere of security are totally congruent*, what threatens us and you most of all is nuclear safety, terrorism and the ecological situation, and therefore, a strategic union for mutual protection against these is necessary.¹²⁴

In the Political Platform, too, Iabloko stresses that Russia, the US and Western Europe share the same interest of opposition to aggressive Islamic fundamentalism, regional great power aspirations (*velikoderzhavie*), expansion of weapons of mass destruction and drugs, and to international terrorism.¹²⁵

Iavlinskii explains the incongruence in the statements of Russian leaders by saying that they understand that even though NATO is not really a threat – meaning that it would not enter Russia – NATO enlargement still is a ‘total fiasco for Russia’s foreign policy’. So Iavlinskii does not agree with Beliaev of Nash Dom – Rossiia who argues that NATO enlargement is not a defeat for Russia. For Iavlinskii, it is not important for what reason the enlargement is taking place, but that in practise it means that the West does not see Russia as Russians themselves do. The enlargement signifies the collapse of the illusion of warm relations between Russia and the West, about moving into the right direction. “It is insulting, because the encouraging gestures of the West are the only justification for the Eltsin ‘course of reforms.’” Thus, the ‘West’, represented by NATO and its enlargement, can be perceived as a threat to democratic development in Russia. Here Iavlinskii refers to the collapse of the economy and the Chechen war and the other outcomes of the Eltsin course. Therefore, Iavlinskii agrees with Chernomyrdin’s and Chubais’ statement about NATO’s plans being a threat to the security of Russian (executive) power [but not to Russia itself].¹²⁶

Later in 2000 Iavlinskii is asked whether he still believes that in 20 years time Russia should become a NATO member. However, Iavlinskii, as Lukin too, is very doubtful about NATO’s future: “I strongly suspect that NATO will exist in that time. My task is to enable Russia to become a European country in 20–25 years, which is integrated into the system of all-European and international security.”¹²⁷ Russia’s Europeaness is the key idea in all policies advocated by Iabloko politicians.

124 Ibid. Italics added.

125 *Politicheskaia platforma in Reformy dlia bolshinstva* 1995, 60.

126 Iavlinskii, 13 February 1997, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

127 Iavlinskii, 18 February 2000, *El Pais*. Thus the original text is not addressed to the Russian audience.

TABLE 29.
Iabloko politicians' argument on NATO enlargement 1994–2003

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: 1) Enlargement signifies a betrayal of promises and ideas. It results in a new division of Europe and the isolation of Russia. Enlargement reveals double standards of the West. Enlargement is opposite to Russia's interests. It has a negative impact on Russia's domestic political situation 2) NATO will not last long anyway.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most probably,</p>	<p>Claim: So 1) Enlargement is not justified and should not be accepted (1994–1999). 2) No point in opposing enlargement anymore (2000–2003, Iavlinskii already before this). However, Russia cannot become a member.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since The policy is contrary to the promises given (a substantive and authoritative argument) One Europe is a shared value and goal for the future and this is also in Russia's interests (a motivational and authoritative argument). Russia argues for equal cooperation and security for all (a motivational argument). No place in the world for organizations like NATO (a authoritative and substantive argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However 1) & 2) If it was a political organization, then there would not be any problem in its expansion and Russia could join. 2) If Russia was invited and got the same rights (veto), then Russia could become a member.</p>
<p>Backing: Because One undivided Europe was promised to Russia. There were promises made around the unification of Germany. NATO cannot provide security for all, not even to its members (terrorism). Disagreements between members, cannot guarantee security, i.e. fulfil its main function. Iabloko politicians as experts in the field of NATO and other security issues.</p>		

Comparision and geopolitical vision

All three Iabloko politicians, Arbatov, Lukin and Iavlinskii, emphasize that NATO is an organization belonging to the Cold War era and is not adequate in the contemporary world (consequently, the enlargement process is not necessary). Arbatov and Lukin make accusations

TABLE 29...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data Russia's interests should be taken into account. Russia should be an equal partner.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most likely,</p>	<p>Claim: So 1) Russia should participate in creating an all-European security organization and demand concessions 2) Russia should engage in intensive cooperation (especially in opposing international terrorism) and demand concessions.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since An all-European security organization would correspond to Russia's security interests (an authoritative and substantive argument). Equality should be respected in international relations (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: However OSCE is not the right organization and Russia has no alternative to offer.</p>
<p>Backing Because NATO is a one-sided organization. NATO takes care only of US interests.</p>		

towards NATO countries (and the West, in general), but the purpose is probably to make the West acknowledge (or to make the Russians acknowledge) the priority of cooperation between Russia and the West, instead of the one-sided enlargement of the organization.

Concerning the geopolitical vision which can be constructed from the NATO argumentation, we can note that Iabloko politicians do not refer to Russia's borders *per se*, but of course they talk about Russia's sovereignty (within the current borders) and about the undesirable outcome of the enlargement: new dividing lines in Europe. Russia is taken as part of this newly divided Europe. Moreover, Iabloko politicians are worried about all-European security, and of enlargement as a threat to this and Russia's democratic development. So the mission for Russia would be to persist with European values and encourage democratic development; the model is, as before, European democracy. If not enemies, then at least threats to Russia are incompetent Russian leaders and those who oppose all-European security and support the principle of humanitarian intervention.

8.1.3 Kommunisticheskaia Partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii (KPRF): NATO enlargement is a manifestation of the American dictatorship

KPRF sees NATO enlargement as a plot, as a conspiracy against Russia – the end goal of which is to wipe out Russia, to eliminate it. Enlargement is happening in the sphere of Russia’s vital interests, NATO is without any shame coming to Russia’s borders, just like Hitler was in 1941. *NATO is a disguise for the coming of an American dictatorship.* The enlargement is all about the US interests and Russian leaders are in on the same plot. Those who are against each other in this conflict are the US and NATO and Russian leaders who have been lured to their forces on one side, and the Russian people on the other side. If the enlargement is allowed to continue, it would mean American hegemony, a unipolar world and the end of Russia.

TABLE 30.
KPRF politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on NATO enlargement 1994–2003

What is NATO enlargement about?	The enemy is coming to our borders; a repetition of the 1941 fascist invasion; the coming of an American dictatorship; Russia more and more becoming under American influence; new division of Europe.
Where is it taking place?	In the sphere of Russia’s vital interests; in the post-Soviet space; in Europe and Eurasia; along Russia’s borders.
Why it is taking place?	NATO/US interests dominate; Russian leaders are in the same plot; they try to wipe out Russia.
Who are the parties on the different sides?	US led NATO/the West & Westernized, or manipulated Russian leaders against real Russia, the Russian people.
What are Russia’s interests at stake?/Why is this wrong?	Russia’s interests are not taken into account; as a result we can see American hegemony, unipolarity and this might lead to end of Russia.

Throughout the mid-1990s until 2003 the Communist Party politicians have a very consistent line concerning NATO in general and NATO’s eastward enlargement in particular. Their main claim can be paraphrased as *NATO enlargement and NATO as such should be opposed, because it is a serious threat to Russia, to Russia’s security and sovereignty.* As Ziuganov argues in 1997: “We are categorically against the moving of NATO to the East.”¹²⁸ He justifies his opposition by using authoritative arguments and refers to the data that NATO’s expansion to the east was

128 Ziuganov, 16 January 1997, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

an impediment to “any expansion of our unions and strengthening of our possibilities”.¹²⁹ Thus, NATO’s process was contradictory to Russia’s interests: “Any agreement of the political leadership of the country with the plans of NATO enlargement to the east [... will be taken] as a betrayal of national interests”.¹³⁰ Other external threats and dangers are also recognized; Valentin Kuptsov refers to the developments in Afghanistan, the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalists, but still sees the West as the main enemy: “The main danger to Russia comes as before from the West. [...] [NATO] is a strategic, long-term danger, and targeted just towards Russia.”¹³¹ However, in the communist argumentation it is not all about strategic interests (see below for more on these), but also about opposing the (political, military, ideological) re-division of Europe, like other Russian politicians, too, and this can be understood as further data:

NATO was established as a defensive block, and it has now fulfilled its mission. And today to again move the military borders, to take the weapons, is senseless. In addition, the enlargement of the bloc creates new dividing lines. It creates common distrust and pushes the creation of unions in the East and South, hinders normal business contacts and mutual trust.¹³²

Seleznev also brings up this consequence: The “NATO bloc will make Europe split, and we support a non-bloc policy”.¹³³ According to Ziuganov, Russia and NATO should together “give guarantees for the security of Eastern Europe [...] Eastern Europe becomes a zone of peace, a good neighbourhood, and a bridge which would create qualitatively different prerequisites for the development of Russia, Europe and the United States.”¹³⁴ Thus, NATO enlargement is a “relic of the Cold War”.¹³⁵ As there is no Cold War, and no Soviet Union anymore, NATO’s time has passed – it should be dissolved.

In the debate on (NATO as) an external enemy, the element of an internal enemy is very strongly present. That is to say, there is an enemy inside Russia and it is at the highest level: the political leadership, i.e. President Eltsin and the government, the oligarchs etc. manipulated by the West, and harming Russia from within. So, in addition to accusing the former and current leadership of giving up all the “international positions” as, e.g., Iabloko politicians did, Ziuganov argues that Russia’s political independence has severely decreased and that the goal of “NATO expansion [is to] strengthen the positions of their supporters in Moscow with their tanks in Eastern Europe.”¹³⁶ Thus, it might be claimed that for Ziuganov and KPRF politicians “the incapability of the Russian leadership to respond adequately to the plans of NATO

129 Ibid.

130 Ziuganov, 15 February 1997, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

131 Kuptsov, 15 October 1996, *Moskovskii komsomolets*.

132 Ziuganov 8 October 1998, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

133 Seleznev 13 March 1999, *Trud*.

134 Ziuganov, 27 February 1997, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

135 Ibid.

136 Ziuganov, 22 April 1997, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

enlargement to the East” is an expected outcome. NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe is necessary for the Russian leadership, because if the Russian “people” would win, try to overthrow the then leadership, then Russia would be “circled with a ‘cordon sanitaire’”.¹³⁷ NATO is a guarantee for their staying in power. NATO’s main goal is “not to let [Russia] re-create its traditional influence on the course of world affairs.”¹³⁸ Therefore, the Communist Party politicians “support relations with the People’s Republic of China, India, the Arab world and all other countries on the basis of mutual interests.”¹³⁹ As a rebuttal to their claim on NATO as a threat, these politicians “recognize the importance of development of the partnership with the US and the West in general. But these relations must be equal, without double standards and conspiracies.”¹⁴⁰ Thus, opposing NATO enlargement, or defining the ‘West’ as an enemy, does not mean totally refusing cooperation with the West. What is required is equality in relations, i.e. the same requirement all the Russian politicians have put forward.

Referring to the national security concept as an authority, Ziuganov presents severe criticism against Putin after his references to Russia’s potential membership of NATO in 2000. Ziuganov is doubtful whether the acting president Putin was “not aware of the official military doctrine of the country, the concept of the national security, in which all questions of relations with NATO have been written out.”¹⁴¹ So the claim is that *Russia’s NATO membership, or even playing with this idea, would be a serious betrayal of Russia’s national interests*: “To argue for Russia’s possibility of entering NATO, in which everything is subordinated to American hegemony, and in which, as we can see, even the largest European countries are not able to carry out independent foreign policy, is political diletantism.”¹⁴² Putin is following the foot steps of Gorbachev and Eltsin when they withdrew Russia’s troops from Eastern Europe without getting any strong guarantees that these countries would not enter NATO: “In order to strengthen the security of Russia Mr Putin should not strive to NATO but make all effort to create a union of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.”¹⁴³ Thus, a union of these Slav countries would be Ziuganov’s alternative for taking care of Russia’s security in the future and Eltsin and Putin are classified as traitors of Russian interests. Ziuganov calls Putin’s statement:

As expensive to Russia as the scandalous statement of Eltsin when he visited Warsaw and said that he did not see anything bad in Poland’s membership in NATO. [...]After this short-sighted statement of Putin the current Russian government has to keep silent and witness when Ukraine and the Baltic republics are taken to this aggressive alliance. And this is directly damages the national security of Russia.¹⁴⁴

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 Ziuganov, 10 March 2000. *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Ziuganov, 14 March 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

Thus, again Ziuganov uses national security and Russia's independence as the main justification for why NATO and its enlargement are opposed. He uses motivational, but also authoritative, arguments.

NATO, or the West as a whole, is always represented as 'offensive' and Russia as 'defensive' in Ziuganov's argumentation. Ziuganov again tries to offer an alternative for NATO when he speaks for cooperation of Europe with Russia instead of NATO: "The united Europe might have an impressive future if it united its potential with Russia."¹⁴⁵ However, this is also a threat: "If Europe will take arms, create military blocs along our borders then Russia would have no other way out but to create a geopolitical counterbalance. It can take the form of uniting forces and strengthening ties with India, China and the Arab world."¹⁴⁶ Thus, Russia does not want to create any anti-bloc, but would be forced to if the West continues its military enlargement in Europe.

In an open letter to President Putin, Ziuganov again expresses his criticism against Putin's foreign policy and speaks in the name of 'the public', as so many politicians before him. Here we can also see the double opposition of KPRF, that is, opposition to the West (or at least to NATO and the US) and to Russia's (westernized) leadership. The claim is that Russia's leadership has betrayed the Russian people. Public opinion is again referred to when defining the current policy: "Some steps were taken by the public as a return to the shameful 'Kozyrev policy', which means giving up the interests of Russia: for example, NATO enlargement. [...] ¹⁴⁷ [...] many people are sure that the Russian state already gave its agreement to the expansion of NATO." What is most dreadful is that the expansion might go on and this has the blessing from the Russian leader: "Your recent statements in Vienna and Helsinki were taken as an agreement to the joining of NATO, not only of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, but also neutral Austria, Finland and Sweden."¹⁴⁸ Ziuganov uses a motivational argument, a shared goal for the future and also an authoritative argument: he knows what is good for the people. Ziuganov continues to accuse Putin of the

refusal to support friendly Russian forces in the Balkans, the silent approval of the suppression of Milosevic, the plan to withdraw Russian troops from Georgia and Transdniestria, ignoring the interests of Russians (*russkie*) who are victims of discrimination in the Post-Soviet space, [...] decision to close the bases in Vietnam and Cuba and an agreement to create bases of the United States in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Soon Russia will not have any geopolitical home front left.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Ziuganov, 24 October 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ziuganov, 25 June 2002, *Zavtra*.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

These serve as further data to support the claim. NATO enlargement thus becomes a symbol for all the lost honour, dignity and greatness of Russia. NATO enlargement is proof of the Russian leadership's incapability and is more like plotting with the West and its willingness to destroy Russia. Ziuganov seems to believe that Western leaders have made Putin change his mind on a Russia-Belarus union:

President Putin in public talked about the serious disagreements with the Republic of Belarus, which prevent the creation of united state Russia and Belarus. [...] All this happens after the meetings of Putin with Western leaders, after the signing of the declaration of cooperation with NATO.¹⁵⁰

Ziuganov also accuses the Edinstvo faction:

I am surprised that the faction of the pro-Kremlin majority in the Duma welcomes NATO to the borders of Russia, to the post-Soviet space. [...] To welcome the kind of decision that threatens our national security can be done only by one hundred per cent traitors [...] Or people who have totally forgotten their own roots (*polnye mankurty*), who do not know the history of their own country, have forgotten that only during the last thousand years of Russia's existence our, forefathers spent 700 years in battles, safeguarding their land.¹⁵¹

Ziuganov often refers to a total ignorance of history by other politicians. For him, history offers a lesson to be learnt and from history we can deduce the line for our contemporary actions; this is thus the usual warrant used in his arguments.

Like in the argumentation of other opposition politicians, those of Iabloko, the lack of reciprocity in Russo-Western relations is one topic which also emerges in KPRF argumentation: "The West, after having received the maximum of concessions, did not take any analogous steps. The strategic condition of our country becomes worse. Actually, Russia is already a deliverer of cheap natural resources to rich countries."¹⁵² Ziuganov assures that "We do not call for a confrontation with the West. We want to live with them in peace and friendship. But we should be equal, respected partners. Russia has its destiny, history, character and national interests, which are not necessarily the same as those of the West."¹⁵³ Ziuganov wants to remind us of the eternal truths or 'laws of nature' – Russia can never become a member of NATO due to its history, traditions and geography (a warrant or backing to the warrant). Russia is different, Eurasian: "The official reinforcements for the possibility of Russia joining NATO do

150 Ibid.

151 Ziuganov, 17 December 2002, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

152 Ziuganov, 13 November 2001, *Zavtra*.

153 Ibid.

not increase the number of our friends in the South or in the East. Russia was, is and will be a Eurasian country.”¹⁵⁴

So the claim is that Russia should find its own way and oppose the Western hegemony. One set of data and warrant comprises what has been described above: Russia being different from the West due to its history etc. Furthermore, the second data states that the Western capitalist model is stagnating or even fading. It would not be of any use for Russia to have intensive cooperation e.g. with the US:

Even the Pope is forced to talk about the dead-end of the current model of capitalism. New centres of power are turning up – China, India, the Muslim world. New social forces turn up the anti-globalization movements in the West. The economy of the United States and their allies goes into the crisis. In these circumstances to think about an alliance with the United States as a universal recipe for solving problems of our country is hardly justified. Russia needs its own strategy of development.¹⁵⁵

Strangely here, Ziuganov uses the authority of the Pope as backing for his warrant on the Western model lacking any perspective.

In 2002 the rhetoric becomes even harsher. Now Ziuganov uses an analogy of the NATO enlargement and the German expansion of 1941 (a substantive argument): “The announcement of Mr Putin in Brussels that NATO enlargement does not pose a threat to Russia is one more step on the path of national betrayal [...] It is clear that NATO expansion goes in the same scheme as the fascist expansion of the spring and summer of 1941.”¹⁵⁶ This is dangerous not only to Russia but, according to Ziuganov, also to “Asian states and the Arab world.”¹⁵⁷

Again Ziuganov brings up the question of a lack of reciprocity in relations with the West and gives examples of the UK not extraditing “the Chechen bandit”, referring to Ahkmed Zakaev, and of taking “the Baltic republics into the North Atlantic Alliance even though they know that it is the zone of our vital interests.” Furthermore, Putin is blamed for not demanding concessions such as the “non-enlargement of NATO to post-Soviet space and forgiving at least half of the Russian foreign debt for the help given to Americans in the war against the Taliban.” Part of the accusations goes towards Vladimir Lukin (Iabloko), who argued “If NATO enlarges then it becomes such a large military bloc that it will break up.” But Ziuganov described this statement as “rubbish of untalented persons.” Again NATO enlargement is equated with “Hitler’s plan *Drang nach Osten*”.¹⁵⁸

The most obvious justification of the claim on opposing NATO is still that NATO troops were “concentrated on our borders. NATO troops exist already in the territory of the former

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Ziuganov, 14 November 2002, *Pravda*.

157 Ibid.

158 Ziuganov, 17 December 2002, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

Soviet Union, directly on the borders of Russia.” The rebuttal that the reason for this would be “to catch terrorists and drug dealers” is refuted by Ziuganov: “We understand that this is nonsense! And the government of Putin-Kasianov keeps on cherishing the myth of mutual partnership and anti-terrorist coalition!” In contrast, the question is about “the huge global project of the American dictatorship”. Again the analogy of Hitler’s Germany is used: “Yugoslavia and Iraq have been beaten and now it is the turn of others. At our doors is beating not the third but the fourth Reich. A repetition of June 1941 becomes possible.”¹⁵⁹ What, of course, worries the most is that NATO troops are based on the territory of the former Soviet Union, in the territory which is classified as a sphere of Russia’s vital interests. Now Russia is giving up all that it has fought for during Soviet times – the symbol of which being the Great Patriotic War: “Today the bases of NATO have emerged in Central Asia where Hitler did not even dream of getting to [...] Tomorrow they will come to the Baltic states and after tomorrow maybe to Ukraine. The threat, as in 1941, grows.”¹⁶⁰ As a solution, Ziuganov again offers Soviet power: “This misery cannot be prevented without a re-creation of Soviet power – the power of all people, without the re-creation of social equality. On these bases Russia can and should recreate its internal unity, which had a significant meaning in the collapse of Hitler.”¹⁶¹ According to Ziuganov, the Soviet model has worked in the past so it would be a key to solve the problems of today and in the future too; thus, it is a question of a substantive argument. In its Programme of 1999, KPRF urges the ‘social class based movement’ and ‘national liberation movement’ to merge and establish one opposition movement.¹⁶² In 2003 Platform it is about combining the goals and ideas of communists with ‘people’s patriotism’ (*narodnyi patriotism*).¹⁶³ Russia cannot be re-born without a return to the path of socialism.¹⁶⁴

159 Ziuganov, 19 June 2003, *Pravda KPRF*.

160 According to the communist interpretation, in 2004 this forecast was fulfilled with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

161 Ziuganov, 29 July 2003, *Pravda KPRF*.

162 *Platforma patrioticheskogo dvizheniia “Za Pobedu”* 1999.

163 *Za vlast trudovogo naroda! Predvybornaia platforma KPRF* 2003.

164 *Platforma patrioticheskogo dvizheniia “Za Pobedu”* 1999.

TABLE 31.
KPRF politicians' argument on NATO enlargement 1994–2003

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: NATO (enlargement) is a real danger to Russia's security and sovereignty. Enlargement would mean a re-division of the world.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> Enlargement must be opposed/prevented. Russia's membership (or even talking about it) would be a betrayal of national interests.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> This means a repetition of history (a substantive and authoritative argument). This might mean the end of Russia, the only force able to resist American dictatorship (an authoritative argument). Russia advocates multi-polarity and Russia should be taken as an equal actor; enlargement means isolation of Russia (a motivational argument). Russia is a guarantee of equality and peace in the world (a motivational and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Cooperation with (part of) the West is acceptable.</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> This equates to the fascist invasion of 1941 (an analogy). NATO troops are already on Russian borders, in the territory of the former Soviet Union, i.e. in Russia's sphere of interests. There is no longer a Cold War. The geography and history of Russia.</p>		

Table 31...

Geopolitical vision

Usually in the communist discourse, Russo-Western relations are referred to on a more abstract level rather talking about Russia's relations with a particular country or organization. Ziuganov especially likes to talk about the differences between the 'West' or 'Western civilization' and Russia or 'Eurasian civilization'. The West equates also to the 'liberal-democratic world view', with Russian 'democrats' preaching for "all-human values, human rights, sovereignty of each individual", which all "turned to malice, suppression and genocide – an unparalleled state

TABLE 31...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

Data Russia cannot accept American hegemony and Western-dominated organizations like NATO.	Qualifier Without any doubt,	Claim: <i>So</i> Russia must follow its own way (the Soviet and/or Eurasian model).
Warrant: <i>Since</i> Western models are not suitable for Russia (a motivational, substantive and authoritative argument). Western-originated organizations and models do not suit non-Western parts of the world (a motivational, substantive and authoritative argument).		No counterarguments
Backing: <i>Because</i> Russia is different. Russia has followed the 'Western' model and now we can see to what it has led. Western organizations coming to Russian borders are a threat to Russia.		

catastrophe." So, as mentioned above, the West is inside Russia as well: "Extremists, racists and pathological nationalists are those representatives of liberal democratic circles, which are full of hatred towards Russia and Russians [...]"¹⁶⁵ Russia, or true Russia together with the Communist Party, represents other values such as "friendship and brotherhood" and the "state as the highest value." Thus, "Russian civilization [...] is an alternative to an aggressive oligarchy,"¹⁶⁶ which is represented by the West.

As in the geopolitical vision represented in Chechnia argumentation, KPRF lists many enemies to Russia: an aggressive world oligarchy, globalization and of course NATO which represents American hegemony. Friends are those who oppose all these. For the communists, borders wider than Russia's are currently are 'natural' for Russia, and the mission and the model are the same as what we have seen above: Soviet power, socialism with Eurasianism and the re-creation of a Union State, of which Russia is the leader.

165 Ziuganov, 19 January 1999, *Zavtra*.

166 Ibid.

8.2 SEVERE TENSION IN NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT AROUND KOSOVO

It is useful to look at one particular moment in Russia-NATO relations more closely, that is, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and Russian politicians' arguments on the conflict and the principle of 'humanitarian intervention'. The situation in Yugoslavia (already during the Bosnian war) complicated relations between Russia and NATO (and the 'West', in general), but difficulties in the relations did not culminate until 24 March 1999 when NATO started its air strikes on Serbia – or Yugoslavia as most Russian politicians stressed.¹⁶⁷ As Lynch argued "NATO's war against Serbia in the spring of 1999 provoked the loudest, most intemperate and sustained Russian protests against the West since the disintegration of the Soviet Union."¹⁶⁸ For example, the State Duma condemned the NATO bombings and postponed the ratification of the START II treaty. Moreover, ministerial meetings of the PJC were interrupted.¹⁶⁹

In fact, NATO's Balkan war was a traumatic event for the Russian government in ways that previous Western actions in Bosnia were not – if only because of the timing of the war, just weeks after the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into North Atlantic Alliance.[...] NATO's war in Serbia had a much broader significance than the future of Kosovo: this was to be case study No 1 of the world after NATO expansion, in which NATO states, led by the United States, determined without reference to the UN Security Council or even to the letter of NATO's Charter as to when, where and how force might be employed to affect political behaviour, perhaps extending to the border regions of Russia itself.¹⁷⁰

Moreover, it was a question in which "NATO's war emphasized the weakness of Russian power and the extent to which Russia's influence depends upon fissures in its external political environment."¹⁷¹ So Russia sought to "balance its great power pretensions while preserving its lines to the West"; "Russian officials distinguished their attitude towards NATO's war and NATO itself from their interest with respect to the states constituting NATO." When Russia was "faced with the choice of Milosevic or NATO, [it] accepted the role of postman for the

167 The question was about the conflict in Kosovo. In 1989 Kosovo's autonomous status was abolished, but in 1991 the Republic of Kosovo was created in a secret referendum. From the mid-90s there had been attacks from the Serbian police, and bombings and attacks against them by the Kosovo Liberation Army. In March 1998 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 condemning the excessive use of force by Serbian police against civilians in Kosovo and an embargo of arms and material against Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.). In September 1998 Resolution 1199 demanded stopping the hostilities.

168 Lynch 2002, 174. See also Forsberg 2005.

169 Isakova 2005, 36.

170 Lynch 2002, 174.

171 Ibid.

North Atlantic alliance, with the Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin in effect helping to deliver NATO's terms to Milosevic in early June 1999.¹⁷²

The Russian leadership's and political elite's opposition to the NATO action was backed up by (or reflected) the public opinion. Only one per cent of the Russian respondents argued for supporting NATO's pressure of Yugoslavia. Instead 59 per cent demanded Russia pursue an end to the conflict by peaceful means and act as an intermediary; 26 per cent argued for providing humanitarian aid (only nine per cent for military support) and 28 per cent for avoiding getting involved in the conflict.¹⁷³ The air campaign continued until 10 June 1999 and was officially ended by Solana on 20 June. During this period and, of course, before it, there were numerous attempts to solve the crisis, for example, from the US, EU, UN and Russia's side (Chernomyrdin as the intermediary).¹⁷⁴ The disagreement concerned Kosovo's status and the composition of the international presence. Russia argued for Yugoslavia's integrity (Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia) and opposed NATO-led peacekeeping forces. As we know now, neither of these Russian goals were reached. Russian participation in KFOR (NATO-led Kosovo Force which was mandated by the UN) was approved by the Federal Council in June 1999.¹⁷⁵ 3,250 Russian peacekeepers participated in the 42,500 strong KFOR force.¹⁷⁶ It might also be mentioned that the Kosovo crisis did not interrupt Russia's participation in SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Russia had 1,200 troops there.¹⁷⁷ Russia and NATO formally resumed relations in May 2000.¹⁷⁸

Anti-Western and especially anti-American attitudes strengthened during the NATO action against Yugoslavia,¹⁷⁹ yet it has been argued that in general "Russians do not sustain a dislike for Americans". So the "opinion about the US was strongly correlated with US military actions".¹⁸⁰ The US was seen as the biggest threat by 66 per cent of the respondents in Russia and five per cent in Ukraine. "By April 1999, 39 per cent of Ukrainians (and 70 per cent of Russians) saw NATO as a military threat."¹⁸¹ Public opinion in the NATO countries was not unanimously for the bombings either. However, the majority (55–60%) of Americans "supported the aerial war throughout its 11-week course, [...] about two-thirds of the U.S. public thought that the US had a "moral obligation" to launch attacks on the Yugoslav forces and in

172 Ibid., 175.

173 O'Loughlin 2001, 42.

174 In October 1998 Ambassador Holbrooke had negotiations in Belgrade with Milosevic. In February 1999 there were peace talks in Chateau Rambouillet, France, and then in Paris in March. However, Milosevic did not sign the peace treaty. In March 21 Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade gave the 'final warning' to Milosevic.

175 On 12 June there was an episode when the Russian troops entered Pristina three and half hours before the NATO troops entered Kosovo.

176 Isakova 2005, 36.

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid., 37.

179 The figure of those disliking Americans doubled from a normal figure of about 20–25 per cent to more than 50 per cent in March and April 1999.

180 O'Loughlin 2001, 38.

181 O'Loughlin & Kolossov 2002, 586–587.

general, humanitarian concerns and beliefs spawned more support for US involvement than Clinton administration arguments about US national interests.”¹⁸² In Italy, the Czech Republic and Spain the majority of people were against the bombing campaign and in Greece the public opposition (92%) was “as strong and unanimous as in Russia and the Ukraine”.¹⁸³ It has been argued that a ‘psychological iron curtain’ was “developing in Europe between NATO members (both original and new) and the states to the east, especially Russia and increasingly Ukraine. The Yugoslavian war clarified this geopolitical divide.”¹⁸⁴

Russia’s opposition to a unilateral situation in Europe, the need to gather a counter-alliance to NATO – especially during the conflict in Kosovo – and the need to support the Serbs, has been justified by Pan-Slavism.¹⁸⁵ According to Pan-Slavism of the 19th century, the Slavic culture was higher than that of the West, as the “Slavs were younger and more vigorous than decadent West-Europeans”. However, “Pan-Slavism was never a hegemonic paradigm in Russia and even today, its basic tenets are widely challenged by the nation-based interest.”¹⁸⁶ “A comparison of contemporary Balkan conflicts (the Kosovo war of 1999) with those of the late 19th century reveals many similarities but some key differences. Actually, only “14–16% of Russians sympathized with Serbs at the time of the Kosovo conflict.”¹⁸⁷ “However, both Ukrainians and Russians fear that the next NATO intervention could be in their domestic conflicts and contribute to further conflict and possible disintegration of their countries.”¹⁸⁸ It has been claimed that before the NATO bombing, Kosovo was a “secondary issue for Russians”. “Their major foreign policy concerns extend only to the countries of the ‘Near Abroad’ on Russia’s borders and to separatist movements in the Caucasus.”¹⁸⁹

Let us see below how the party politicians define what is NATO’s operation, what the conflict on Kosovo is about and what should be Russia’s position concerning it.

8.2.1 Parties of Power

8.2.1.1 *Nash Dom – Rossiia: Intervention into a sovereign country violates international law and is part of America’s hegemony aspirations*

Nash Dom – Rossiia’s core story on the Kosovo conflict is the interpretation of *the operation as an intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign country*. The NATO operation is a violation of international law, an attempt to divide Yugoslavia or even establish American hegem-

182 Ibid., 581.

183 Ibid., 582–583.

184 Ibid., 587.

185 See *ibid.*, 577.

186 Ibid., 577–578.

187 Ibid., 578.

188 Ibid., 595.

189 Ibid., 596.

ony in Europe. It is a war against the Yugoslav people. This is all happening due to America's hegemony ambitions and due to the weakness of the Russian state. The 'Albanians' should be blamed too, as they aspire to creating a Greater Albania. Against each other in this conflict are those who are for the principle of humanitarian intervention, invented by NATO and the US and Albanian terrorists on one side, and the Serbs and Russia and those for respecting international law on the other side. This conflict is important not only in itself, but as a symbol of the need to safeguard the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as guaranteed by international law. Concerning Russia, this also shows how Russia is again excluded from decision-making in world politics.

TABLE 32.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the Kosovo conflict in 1999

What is this conflict about?	An attempt to violate Yugoslavia's integrity and unity; to divide Yugoslavia; an attempt to set up American hegemony; NATO violating international law; bombing a sovereign state; a war against the people.
Where is this happening?	In a sovereign country – Yugoslavia, in the Balkans, in an ally country, in a non-NATO state.
Why is this happening? What caused this conflict?	America's hegemony ambitions; Russia is weak; division of Yugoslavia, Russia's turn might be next. An attempt to create a Greater Albania.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	NATO & the new strategy of humanitarian intervention, Albanian terrorists, the US vs. the Serbs, Russia, international law.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in this conflict?	Principles of sovereignty, integrity violated; Russia excluded, Russia loses its ally.

The leader of the Nash Dom – Rossiia parliamentary faction (since December 1998) and Deputy Chair of the State Duma (from September 1997 until December 1998) Vladimir Ryzhkov interprets the *then current problems in world politics as a consequence of Russia's weakness* and as being connected with the (in)competence of the Russian president. He openly criticizes President Eltsin but also has an overoptimistic estimation of the capability of the Russian president (or any president) to influence world politics: "If we had a healthy and active president, then we would not have that kind of problems with the IMF, there would not be that kind of use of force in Iraq and the threat of using it in Yugoslavia, that kind of expansion of NATO and of the USA."¹⁹⁰ So the party of power is not 'the president's party' in the sense that it would

190 Ryzhkov, 30 January 1999, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

save the president from being criticized of the party politicians. Instead, from time to time we can find evidence of the party of power politicians trying to create their own space, trying to become independent players. This is more understandable of Nash Dom – Rossiia during Eltsin’s era because Eltsin’s rating was very low among the public.

Ryzhkov, however, supports Russia’s official policy on the Kosovo situation because *diplomacy and negotiations are the right way to solve conflict situations*. Thus, he uses a motivational argument, in which the warrant refers to a shared ideal of finding a political solution. Further data states that the main thing is not to get involved in the conflict, because that would mean the end of democracy and of the market economy in Russia. In addition, the Russian state would not survive but would break apart.¹⁹¹ A completely contrary position to Ryzhkov’s (and to Chernomyrdin’s) on Russia’s policy is held by Roman Popkovich, Chair of the Committee on Defence (from May 1998). He argues for a change in the Russian policy: Russia should have given military aid to Yugoslavia. If NATO did not stop the air campaign, Russia should deliver weapons to Yugoslavia and also change its attitude towards the EU, the Council of Europe and some other countries. As data for his claim Popkovich states that Yugoslavia is actually the only real ally of Russia, because it has not yet fallen under US influence. Further data and warrants are provided in the form of a warning: the threat is that after Yugoslavia, NATO would try to influence Russia through the territories of the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹⁹² He uses an analogy here and his argumentation is both substantive and authoritative. Russia’s military involvement would not lead to a third world war, as many politicians in Russia claim, therefore he refutes this rebuttal.

However, Popkovich also recognizes that the operation was not successful because it is “impossible to force Yugoslavia to its knees [...] It is impossible to eliminate the people.”¹⁹³ What NATO is doing has “nothing to do with liberating Kosovo from some fighters or with creating possibilities for life there”; instead, it is a question of dividing Yugoslavia: “Kosovo by ground operation, Voevodina by destroying the bridges, Montenegro by other means.”¹⁹⁴ So the operation did not fulfil the purpose of NATO, instead *the bombings have united the Serbs, so that those who were against Milosevic before and had nothing against the US, now fight for their fatherland*: “the war is going on not against Milosevic but against the people of Yugoslavia.”¹⁹⁵ What is really going on is the destruction of Yugoslavia: “They want to destroy the economic potential of Yugoslavia [...] if they do not win by military means then they will make Yugoslavia ask for economic aid and in that way they will occupy the state.”¹⁹⁶ According to Popkovich, European countries are not independent, and did not have any say about what was going on: “Europe – it is an additional state of America. If somebody thinks that European politicians

191 Ryzhkov, 10 April 1999, *Izvestiia*.

192 Popkovich, 10 April 1999, *Izvestiia*.

193 Popkovich, 8 April 1999, *Radio Golos Rossii*.

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

are independent, it is nothing like that.”¹⁹⁷ The operation can be seen as further proof of Europe falling under American hegemony. NATO could be classified as a terrorist organization: “anyone who starts aggression against a country without the sanction of the UN is an aggressor, a terrorist.”¹⁹⁸ The goal was to establish American hegemony, American dictatorship: “the war in Yugoslavia is not only the elimination of a state but an attempt to create Europe under one flag.”¹⁹⁹ Popkovich’s motivational argumentation is similar to that of Ziuganov of KPRF (see below).

Vladimir Zorin, Chair of the Duma Committee on Nationalities, is more in line with Ryzhkov and Chernomyrdin concerning Russia’s role by saying that “Russia does not have to hasten to rattle their sabres, to flex its muscles.” Zorin goes back to the premises of the conflict and this serves as data for the claim that the operation was not justified: “ethnic cleansings did not start in Yugoslavia just yesterday. About 400,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have been driven out of Kosovo over the course of several decades.” Zorin does not take side with the Serbs, but tries to reproduce a more objective picture of the background of the conflict. So even though the Serb leaders have not ‘behaved correctly’, “the language of bombing of the current NATO ‘peacekeepers’” cannot be taken “as a civilized approach.” Again Zorin argues for negotiations and diplomacy as an alternative to a military operation. Russia should learn from what is going on in Yugoslavia: “What happened in Yugoslavia [...] should be a serious lesson for us, we must not repeat this tragic process.” Zorin is referring to the Russian legislation in which there is “no statement of responsibility for actions and statements, which enable the dissolution of the territorial unity of the state, which provoke the diversity between nations.”²⁰⁰ We can understand Zorin’s arguments as both substantive, that is, e.g. referring to the ‘facts’ in the past and as motivational, appealing to a shared ideal: the unity of the state.

Viktor Chernomyrdin was dismissed from the post of Prime Minister in March 1998, and on 14 April 1999, he was named Special Envoy of the President of Russia on the Regulation of the Situation in the Balkans. Chernomyrdin’s claim is that the Kosovo operation was both ineffective and excessive.²⁰¹ It was excessive, because “due to the mistakes of one man, should the lives of thousands of people who are not guilty of anything, be taken, the whole country be destroyed, and at the same time can we think that the war can be won by bombing Kosovo?”²⁰² It was ineffective, because bombings do not solve anything. Here Chernomyrdin refers to the ‘history of the bombings’ in Berlin and Vietnam, that is, he uses this analogy as backing. In addition, the operation could be characterized as illegal, because NATO tried to solve Yugoslavia’s internal problems by bombing a sovereign country.²⁰³ Accordingly, these bombings were

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid.

200 Zorin, 13 April 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

201 Chernomyrdin, 3 June 1999, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*. It is not known whether Chernomyrdin wrote his article before 1 June, when Yugoslavia accepted Group of Eight principles for peace.

202 Ibid.

203 Chernomyrdin, 3 June 1999, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

against international law, such as the Helsinki Final Act.²⁰⁴ Here we can see that Chernomyrdin refers both to the history of international relations by using the generalization ‘bombings do not lead to the desired results’ and an analogy of Berlin and Vietnam on one hand and Belgrade on the other, and to the moral wrong ‘innocent ones punished for the deeds of one wrongdoer’ and to the legal injustice ‘bombing a state which is sovereign according to international law’. His arguments can thus be understood as both substantive, authoritative and motivational.

Chernomyrdin’s further data for the claim that the operation was not only unjustified but also dangerous is the worsened relationship between Russia and the USA. As backing he offers the results of the opinion polls made among Russians:

If before the bombings the attitude of 57% of the population towards the US was positive and 28% was negative, then after the bombings started only 14% had a positive attitude and 72% had a negative attitude. The majority of Russians (63%) think that the party guilty of causing the conflict is NATO and only 6% think it is Yugoslavia.²⁰⁵

Here again, a Russian politician represents the people as an authority which should be respected. Moreover, Chernomyrdin represents himself as a real democrat, a politician on the side of the people: “For me, as the leader of one of the major political parties and as a man who was the head of government for a long time, the attitude of Russians concerning what is happening in Yugoslavia is far from insignificant.”²⁰⁶

But it is not only the opinion of the masses that worries Chernomyrdin. He also considers the broader influence of the bombings on the status of the USA and Russian domestic and foreign policy.

[...] now America has lost the moral right to be called the leader of the free democratic world, bombing the ideals of freedom and democracy in Yugoslavia, and unfortunately, adding arguments to the camp of communists and radical patriots, who are always reiterating the aggressiveness of NATO and demanding an increase in the funds allocated for defence and for carrying out the policy of self-isolation.²⁰⁷

Chernomyrdin is thus worried because the action taken by NATO proves right the arguments of the ‘national-patriotic forces’ which talk about the threat coming from the West (see the Communists’ argumentation below). The Kosovo conflict gives them a possibility to strengthen their public support. However, in the parliamentary election of December 1999 the new players Edinstvo and Otechestvo together gained more votes than KPRF.

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

207 Ibid.

What then should be done to solve the Kosovo conflict? First of all, it must be acknowledged that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia and that an agreement must be found with Yugoslavia concerning the presence of any international troops.²⁰⁸ Actually Chernomyrdin advises the president to not participate in the negotiation process until the bombings have been stopped.²⁰⁹ Chernomyrdin argues that Russia had not taken the role of mediator between Belgrade and NATO in order to carry out NATO's strategy, like Lynch above argues: actually Russia's and NATO's goals differ from each other, because NATO advocates Milosevic's capitulation and the establishment of a NATO 'protectorate' over Kosovo, whereas Russia argues for sending UN forces to Kosovo and safeguarding Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial unity.²¹⁰ There is disagreement on the nature of Albanian fighters as well: Chernomyrdin's claim is that Albanian fighters are terrorists, because they receive their resources from drug trafficking. Therefore, when the West supports contacts with them, it supports crime and might enable the creation of a Greater Albania, and consequently causing further suffering (and in the end possibly nuclear war).²¹¹

By supporting close contacts with the fighters and by arming them, the West, first of all, directly or indirectly enables the emerging of a centre of drug trafficking in the region, and secondly, stimulates fighters to expand their influence to the neighbouring countries. The slogan of a Greater Albania might soon start to be realized. Then there would be more bloodshed, new wars, a new division of borders. The world has come closer to nuclear war than ever in the past ten years.²¹²

Chernomyrdin claims that Russia saved the world from a catastrophe²¹³: the ground operation had not yet been started and Russia alone persuaded Milosevic to concessions, that is, to the even points which were then accepted in the G8 and the UN Security Council.²¹⁴ Milosevic had tried to convince Russia to join the Union and to deliver weapons to him, but as Chernomyrdin states, Russia agreeing to do that would have led to a catastrophe. "And he [Milosevic] said: let them destroy us all, but we will not surrender. We were able to avert a catastrophe of that nature."²¹⁵ Once again, the unacceptability of the NATO operation and the rightfulness of Russia's position are justified by the potential future, the shared idea of having no more wars, bloodshed or division of borders. It is, therefore, a question of a motivational argument.

208 Chernomyrdin, 11 May 1999, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

209 Chernomyrdin, 3 June 1999, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*.

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.

213 Chernomyrdin did not mention any other mediators or countries.

214 Chernomyrdin 26 August 1999, *Obschchaia Gazeta*.

215 Ibid

TABLE 33.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians’ argument on the Kosovo conflict in 1999

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: NATO is bombing civilian targets. There has been ethnic cleansing on both sides. The political solution was close. This is a threat to Russia. Public opinion is against the NATO aggression.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> NATO is interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. The military operation is not justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> According to international law one should not bomb a sovereign country and especially not civilians (an authoritative and substantive argument). If politicians in high positions say that the political solution is close, we must believe it (an authoritative argument) This policy might expand to other countries, including Russia (a substantive and authoritative argument). Democratic countries should respect public opinion (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Milosevic is guilty (of organizing ethnic cleansing), but that does not justify a military operation. There is ethnic persecution on both sides.</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> Yugoslavia is a sovereign country according to international law. Experience from the past (analogies, generalizations). Testimonies of Russian politicians Public opinion polls are taken as a fact.</p>		

Table 33...

Geopolitical vision

Concerning the geopolitical vision, we see that Nash Dom – Rossiia argues that Russia is for territorial integrity and international law, that is, against the disintegration of any state, be it Yugoslavia or Russia. Accordingly, Russia’s enemies are those who violate these principles, such as NATO and Albanian terrorists. Russia’s mission should be an undivided Europe and Russia as an equal player in world affairs. International law and the sovereignty principle are models that should be followed.

TABLE 33...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data 1) Military involvement in the conflict would be a threat to democracy in Russia. There is a danger of a Greater Albania being created. 2) Yugoslavia is a sovereign country and the only ally of Russia (NATO countries are enemies).</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: So 1) Russia should not get involved. The problems should be solved by negotiations with Milosevic and Kosovo must remain part of Yugoslavia. 2) (Popkovich:) Russia should help the Serbs even militarily.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since We must trust these politicians' words (an authoritative and motivational argument) One cannot allow interventions against sovereign countries otherwise this policy will expand (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: Because 1) Russia should be a democratic country. 2) International law: Yugoslavia is a sovereign country.</p>		

8.2.1.2 *Otechestvo: the goal of the NATO operation is to break Yugoslavia apart*

For Otechestvo politicians, what is happening is the destruction of a sovereign country – Yugoslavia. There is no need for humanitarian intervention and the real reason for this operation is to punish Yugoslavia for not obeying the rules set by the United States. The opposing sides are NATO and the US together with Albanian terrorists on the one side and the Serbs and Russia on the other. The sovereignty principle should be untouchable and the example of Yugoslavia shows that it is no longer respected and Russia might turn out to be the next victim of this. Otechestvo's storyline is called *the goal of the NATO operation is to divide Yugoslavia*.

TABLE 34.
Otechestvo politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the Kosovo conflict 1999–2001

What is this conflict about?	The destruction of Yugoslavia; the protection of Kosovo Albanians is used as a disguise; the <i>Chechenization</i> of Kosovo; no 'humanitarian intervention' or any such thing is actually required.
Where is this happening?	In the Balkans, in Yugoslavia, in a sovereign country.
Why is this happening? What caused this conflict?	To punish Yugoslavia for not submitting to American dictates; the West has double standards.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	NATO/the US and Albanian terrorists vs. the Serbs and peace-loving Russia
What are Russian/worldwide interests in this conflict?	The sovereignty of a state should not be violated; this principle must be adhered to, otherwise Russia might be the next victim; The US is acting as a superpower.

Even though Otechestvo was not yet a parliamentary party in the spring of 1999, it had been established in December 1998 (and some politicians have also given their comments in retrospect), therefore we can look at the argumentation of Otechestvo politicians on the Kosovo. Iurii Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow and founder and leader of Otechestvo, has reacted to what happened in Kosovo both at the actual time of the events taking place as well as looking at the situation in retrospect. In contrast, Evgenii Primakov, who was Prime Minister during the operation, has only commented on the situation in retrospect in my primary data.

Just as for Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians, for Luzhkov, the operation cannot be justified because 'humanitarian intervention' was a disguise for breaking Yugoslavia apart, for dissolving a sovereign country. He supports his claim by referring to popular opinion: the operation was seen as an act of aggression by most Russians.²¹⁶ Luzhkov presents a rebuttal too: Milosevic was personally responsible for ethnic cleansing. However, Luzhkov refutes this rebuttal: this is not good enough reason to violate country's sovereignty. Nor is it the right way to resolve these problems.²¹⁷ Luzhkov does not buy into the American rhetoric concerning the need to intervene in Yugoslavia's affairs. Actually, the operation serves as a "punishment [to Yugoslavia and probably to Russia supporting Serbs] disguised as protecting Kosovo Albanians".²¹⁸ The West has tried to present "the ten year long destruction of Yugoslavia as constructive and helping the regulation of the conflict".²¹⁹ Furthermore, Luzhkov accuses the West of having

216 Luzhkov, 20 April 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

217 Luzhkov, 17 August 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

218 Luzhkov in retrospect 23 March 2001, *Izvestiia*.

219 Luzhkov, 13 July 2001, *Izvestiia*

double standards. As backing for the warrant he uses a comparison or a negative analogy: the West advocated national self-determination in relation for Croatia, Slovenia and Albanians, but changed its position when the Serbs wanted to unite Serbian lands. The West changed its position concerning Kosovo Albanians, who wanted to create an Albanian state 'in the centre of historical Serb lands'. The claim is that the West is therefore partly responsible for the tragedy in Yugoslavia.²²⁰

The problems in Kosovo could not be resolved by an air campaign or a ground operation. The operation did not serve its function: the Serb government was not isolated from the people by the air strikes, but instead the bombings caused the people to support the government.²²¹ This is exactly what Chernomyrdin of Nash Dom – Rossiia argues as well. We can understand Luzhkov's arguments as substantive, when referring to the consequences of the operation or the 'facts', as authoritative when referring to public opinion and international law, and also as motivational when appealing to the value of human life and the principle of sovereignty.

Luzhkov's solution to the conflict consists of maintaining the status quo, because Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia. Luzhkov supports this by saying that keeping Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia corresponds to the spirit of certain UN documents, thus he is appealing to the UN as an authority. Furthermore, Luzhkov advocates the return of refugees under the protection of multinational UN troops from countries which do not cause political tension [raise political allergy] in Yugoslavia, such as France or Russia.²²² Luzhkov continues his claim by arguing that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) should be destroyed because it is a terrorist organization. Here Luzhkov refers to the testimony of an authority, that is, the statement made by the Spanish Army Headquarters.²²³ However, when classifying the KLA as a terrorist organization, Luzhkov does not accuse Muslims in general. Instead, he argues that extremism in Kosovo and in Chechnia is not connected to any religion. The data for this claim are that it has nothing to do with Islamic fundamentalism, and this is warranted by the fact that Kosovo Albanians and Chechens are not 'real' Muslims. As backing, Luzhkov points out that if they were 'real' Muslims, they would not engage in drug trafficking or illegal emigration: "to be a Muslim fundamentalist, you have to be a real Muslim to start with".²²⁴ Secondly, a reason for the need to destroy the KLA is that it is planning to create a Greater Albania. As backing, Luzhkov refers to the statement of the Albanian Academy of Sciences, according to which "Macedonia was historically a part of the Albanian State". Concerning the KLA, Luzhkov is making an authoritative argument, referring to "the reliability of the source from which these [factual reports or statements of opinion] are derived"²²⁵, that is, the Spanish Army and the Albanian Academy of Sciences. It is also a motivational argument as it opposes the alleged goal, and a substantive argument, as it claims that drug trafficking proves the non-Islamic character of the KLA.

220 Ibid.

221 This is what Konstantin Kosachev claimed as well (30 September 2000, *Versty*).

222 Luzhkov, 20 April 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

223 Luzhkov, 17 August 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

224 Luzhkov, 23 March 2001, *Izvestiia*.

225 Brockriede and Ehninger 2000, 244.

Moreover, Luzhkov uses an analogy of Kosovo and Chechnia (and Macedonia and Dagestan respectively). He is convinced that Kosovo is Europe's Chechnia: religious intolerance is prevalent, kidnappings and drug trafficking abound, the KLA and Mafiosi cannot be controlled.²²⁶ Luzhkov is using a substantive argument and below is the data and backing he presents. His argument may also be interpreted as authoritative, because we have to trust his word.

The first characteristics of the *Chechenization* of Kosovo are already present. As in Chechnia, a huge number of people are kidnapped on ethnic grounds. Religious intolerance is prevalent. As a result of the KLA actions in 1998, even Albanian Catholics have been forced to leave the region. Now Serb monasteries are defiled and it is no secret that the Mafiosi from among Kosovo Albanians control the distribution of drugs to the British Isles, Germany, Austria, France and Scandinavian countries.²²⁷

Luzhkov continues the analogy by explaining the situation. The central power cannot control the situation, nor can the field commanders:

Kosovo field commanders provoke the central power and act according to the interests of their clans and bands. The leadership of the KLA announces that they are not responsible for the attacks against Serbs and gypsies and for the destruction of Orthodox churches, rather the 'wild' units are. These explanations are painfully reminiscent of those used in Chechnia. Russia in its time 'overlooked' the strengthening of extreme formations in Chechnia and now struggles with huge problems in safeguarding its integrity.²²⁸

If the West wanted to avoid the problems which Russia had faced (in Chechnia), it should have learnt from Russia's experience and brought an end to Albanian extremism.²²⁹ The main issue in the solution would be that each country should be able to leave the situation with dignity and without losing face.

Another main claim is that *Russia should not interfere in the conflict*. As data, warrant and backing for this, Luzhkov gives an example of a hypothetical situation in the future: If NATO had started a ground operation, Russia would have had to abandon the embargo and give military and technical aid to Yugoslavia. This might then have led to a third world war. Thus, the claim is justified by the potential consequences of the operation, which is both a substantive argument (cause-effect in the future) or a motivational argument (a shared desire for peace).

Evgenii Primakov²³⁰, Chair of the Otechestvo parliamentary faction, defines the operation, in particular the bombings, as a 'huge historical mistake'.²³¹ His main claim is like that of

226 Luzhkov, 17 August 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti* and 23 March 2001, *Izvestiia*.

227 Luzhkov, 17 August 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

228 Ibid.

229 Luzhkov, 23 March 2001, *Izvestiia*.

230 Primakov was never a member of the party.

231 Primakov said this to Gore when the bombings were started. Primakov was the Russian Prime Minister at that time and he made the decision in an aeroplane on his way to the United States. However, he did not land in the US due to the

Luzhkov: the operation was neither necessary nor effective. He supports his claim by saying that the situation was far from critical and it should have been solved by political means.²³² As others before him, Primakov does not deny that Milosevic was guilty, so he presents a rebuttal: “He allowed a lot of mistakes before the war. And the main one was that he did not return the autonomy of Kosovo in time”.²³³ As evidence for the unnecessary nature of the operation, Primakov tells us about his own experience and uses his own testimony (Primakov himself was one of the participants in the process): Russia’s role in solving the problems was the following: Chirac asked for help from Russia after which Russia was to go and negotiate with Milosevic and bring a ‘small positive signal’ from him so that the bombings could be stopped. Milosevic agreed to

[...] negotiations between two communities on the status of Kosovo and to guarantee the return of refugees and allow representatives of international organizations into Kosovo. As a condition for the withdrawal of troops from Kosovo, he set the level of the withdrawal of NATO troops from the Macedonian-Yugoslavian border rightly explaining his position by the fact that in the case of a unilateral announcement of the withdrawal of the troops, Serbs would flee the region.²³⁴

Therefore, as there was the opportunity for a peaceful solution, NATO should not have started a military operation against the Serbs. This serves as further data for why the operation was not necessary. Primakov would have been satisfied with Milosevic’s concessions, but to his disappointment the bombings continued. Just like Luzhkov, Primakov argues that Kosovo is an inextricable part of Yugoslavia.²³⁵ Another reason for us to believe Primakov’s claim is the consequences of the operation: the operation was not justified, because it resulted in the escalation of the conflict: Albanians extremists had carried out military actions in Macedonia, which might have given birth to a new Balkan crisis.²³⁶ Primakov discusses the lessons learnt from the Kosovo crisis: the first one being that there are more and more opponents to ‘humanitarian intervention’ and secondly, that

Russia was right when it warned: you should not blame one side in the conflict when supporting the other. The United States, for example, first stated that the ‘Liberation Army of Kosovo’ was a terrorist organization, but then raised it almost to the level of patriots, fighters for freedom and independence. The USA turned a blind eye when fighters, arms and money flowed through Albania and from Albania. And what happened? Separatist feelings strengthened, just as Russia had predicted.²³⁷

beginning of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia.

232 Primakov, 26 March 2001, *Vremia Novostei*.

233 Ibid.

234 Ibid.

235 Primakov, 24 May 2001, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

236 Ibid.

237 Primakov, 26 March 2001, *Vremia Novostei*.

Primakov's argument can be understood both as a substantial argument (we can see the negative consequences, and there were other alternatives available than the use of force), but also as a motivational argument (a political solution as a value or desire, which we share).

TABLE 35.
Otechestvo politicians' argument on the conflict in Kosovo 1999–2001

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: The operation represents an intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. There was the possibility of a political solution (resulting from the negotiations with Milosevic). The West supported terrorists. The operation does not serve its function.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> The operation is used as a disguise for breaking Yugoslavia apart. The military operation is not justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> According to international law, one should not intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign country without a resolution of the UN Security Council (a substantive or authoritative argument). Democratic countries should strive toward a political solution if at all possible (a motivational argument). One should treat both parties equally, and have no double standards (a motivational argument). If there is no support from the people, then the operation has not been successful (a substantive and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Milosevic is guilty, of e.g. abolishing Kosovo's autonomy.</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> Yugoslavia is a sovereign state according to the UN documents. Negotiations were going on (testimony from a participant). Albanian fighters are extremists/terrorists, and have committed crimes. Kosovo resembles Chechnia (an analogy and an example). The possibility of extremism escalating; danger of creating a Greater Albania (testimonies from authorities). There is no popular support for the operation in Serbia (or in Russia): the Serbs support Milosevic. Otechestvo politicians can be accepted as authorities.</p>		

Table 35...

TABLE 35...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data Continuing the military operation might result in an escalation of the conflict, Russia's interference and a third world war. Yugoslavia is a sovereign country.</p>	<p>Qualifier Most likely,</p>	<p>Claim: So A political solution must be sought after and Russia should not interfere militarily. Kosovo must remain part of Yugoslavia.</p>
<p>Warrant: Since From the past we know that the war might escalate (a substantive argument) We must trust the words of a respected politician (an authoritarian argument). We must respect international law (an authoritarian argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: Because Analogies from the past. Otechestvo politicians can be accepted as authorities. The UN documents are an authority.</p>		

Comparison and geopolitical vision

Both Luzhkov and Primakov condemn the operation because of why it was started (there was no good reason to start it) and because of the consequences it had. They both accuse NATO of being unwilling to seek a political solution and incapable of fighting against real threats, such as Albanian extremism and terrorism. Last, but not least, Luzhkov and Primakov also see the NATO operation as an intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, and are worried that this would become commonly accepted and Russia would be subjected to the same fate.

As for the geopolitical vision, for Otechestvo, the world is divided into those who respect the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and those who do not. Accordingly, the proponents of these principles are on our side and those who accept humanitarian intervention are on the other side. If there is an enemy in this case, it is the US and Albanian terrorists (the KLA). Russia's mission is to warn the West about the outcome of the conflict (it has prior experience from Chechnia) and to make sure that a political solution is found.

8.2.1.3 *Edinstvo: NATO operation equates to one-sided aggression*

The Kosovo crisis took place before the *Edinstvo* movement was started (in October 1999), but we can still look at some of the statements of the Emergency Situations Minister, Sergei Shoigu (humanitarian aid from Russia to Yugoslavia was channelled through his ministry), both at the time of the crisis, as well as after it was over, and at statements of the then Minister of the Interior, Boris Gryzlov. However, these statements are few in number and not very extensive, which is why one cannot perform any proper narrative or rhetorical analysis based on them. However, we can still recognize some features that they have in common with *Otechestvo* and *Nash Dom – Rossiia* politicians.

Sergei Shoigu criticizes the (Western) attack on one side of the conflict as well as the one-sided media coverage of the situation. The media concentrates on the Kosovars: “Why have they forgotten that 700,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina so far have not been provided with accommodation? Why has no television channel shown the masses of refugees fleeing from Serbian Kraina and Croatia and Bosnia?” Shoigu is worried about the effect of NATO bombings on civilians: “NATO says: yes, we bombed targets in the energy sector; no, you do not have any lights or water in the hospitals, but we will not help you as long as Milosevic is in power. And tell me, what can normal civilians do?” Here we see the same argument used against NATO, which will then later be used to support Russia’s actions in Chechnia. That is, the military operation in Chechnia could help civilians against an unfair criminal regime, but a military operation against the Serbs could not help civilians in Kosovo.²³⁸ So again, the claim is that the Kosovo operation is not fair, that it is unjustified. Shoigu defines the situation as a “great shame” on one hand. But this is not all: what is happening in the Balkans is part of a ‘bigger picture’, that is, a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc before that. He comes very close to the Communist argumentation, which blames the misery of the people on perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and on the people who caused these developments. Shoigu blames Gorbachev:

On the other hand I will take care of my health because I want to see the day when Gorbachev’s fault is officially recognized. Everything that is now happening is a result of incompetent policy-making and incompetent work. And he has the gall to say that he is ready to become the main peacemaker in Yugoslavia! A man who has openly betrayed all his party comrades, has become “the best German of the year”, and a Nobel laureate! And why? Because of Karabakh? Because of Fergana? Because he withdrew the troops from Germany? [...] Because nobody took care of our property in the former people’s democracies, but now they come to us full of pretensions?²³⁹

238 Vladimir Lukin (Iabloko) later also argued that there would not have been a counter-terrorist operation in Chechnia if it were not for the Kosovo operation. It set the precedent.

239 Shoigu, 16 July 1999, *Parlamentskaia gazeta*.

What this boils down to is that “the problem is that the world has become unipolar”.²⁴⁰ The Kosovo conflict is one example of this, and presents a contrast to Russia’s attempt to create (or maintain) a multipolar world in which Russia forms one of the poles, and in which it is on an equal footing with the other players.

Shoigu supports the “creation of an international commission under the OSCE to facilitate the objective inspection of those areas of Yugoslavia which suffered most during the NATO bombings.” He blames NATO for ruining the economy in Yugoslavia and for using enriched uranium: “I am amazed that many, including the military political leadership of NATO, when speaking about the so-called “uranium syndrome”, for some reason “forget” the ordinary inhabitants of Yugoslavia.”²⁴¹

After the conflict, Boris Gрызлов claimed, like all Russian politicians discussed here, that NATO carried out an act of aggression against a sovereign state (Yugoslavia) under a fictitious excuse. However, he does not justify his claim in any way. Gрызлов also referred to double standards of NATO when the ‘Balkan syndrome’ was revealed. NATO became worried about the consequences of the use of enriched uranium in the bombings only when the suspicion arose that some NATO soldiers might also be affected by this syndrome. According to Gрызлов, this shows that NATO did not care at all about the effects on the civilian population.²⁴²

8.2.2 Iabloko: The Kosovo operation is a threat to democratic development in Russia

In Iabloko’s story the emphasis is also on NATO bombing a sovereign state, which represents a violation of international law. In many respects, Yugoslavia was reminiscent of the situation in Russia, and therefore, Russia could not tolerate such violations or double standards. NATO interfered in Yugoslav affairs because Yugoslavia was not a NATO member. The West had no coherent policy concerning nations that were seeking national self-determination. Ethnic cleansing elsewhere did not bother the West, neither did trampling on minority rights as long as it was executed by a NATO country. In the conflict itself, the two parties were NATO (led by the USA) and the Serbs, however, the conflict affected a much broader community. For example, it severely damaged the Russia-United States relations and resulted in the situation in which the US was once again seen as the main enemy. Most significantly, *NATO was now ruining the chances of democratic development in Russia*. The Russians’ perception of democracy was based on operations like this one. Furthermore, the danger was that if Russia intervened militarily in this conflict, a third world war might be the result. The storyline might have

240 Ibid.

241 Shoigu, 12 January 2001, *Interfax*. Shoigu was referring to the event when in July–August 1999 experts from Russia, Switzerland and Greece inspected more than 40 objects in Serbia and Kosovo and 50 hectares of area of g. Vrane, where they used actively uranium. According to these experts, the radiation was 30 times over the limit.

242 Gрызлов, 10 November 2001, www document.

been described as *NATO's Kosovo operation is destroying democratic development in Russia* (see TABLE 36 below).

TABLE 36.
Iabloko politicians' grammar of geopolitics on the Kosovo conflict 1998–2001

What is this conflict about?	Bombing a sovereign state; violation of international law; a crisis in Russo-American relations.
Where is this happening?	In Yugoslavia, a post-communist federative country like Russia; in a sovereign state; in Europe.
Why is this happening? What causes this conflict?	Yugoslavia is not a NATO country and not seeking to become one; the West's double standards: ethnic cleansing is disturbing only if executed by a non-ally country.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	US-led NATO vs. the Serbs.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in this conflict?	Russia cannot tolerate violation of the principle of sovereignty being violated (double standards); this war, if Russia gets involved, has the potential of turning into World War III.

Before the beginning of the NATO military operation against Milosevic's Yugoslavia, Aleksei Arbatov, Chair of the Duma Committee for Defence, discusses the double standards of the West. He reveals them by comparing the policy on Kosovo/Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Turkey. These double standards serve as data for the claim that *the US and NATO only take care of their interests*. Arbatov refers to the situation in Cyprus, which was analogous with that of Kosovo, but the West still adopted a different policy. Arbatov is surprised that no attention was paid to "another area of conflict in the same region [as Kosovo] – Cyprus. [...] Under the protection of Ankara, a self-declared state, Turkish Republic of the North Cyprus, was created, even though it was not recognized by any other states." Thus, Arbatov asks why the United States, the leadership of NATO, the UN Security Council and the G8 did not "pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, fulfilling the UN resolutions concerning the returning of property to the Greeks and the peaceful reunification of the country, for example as a federation". Just as NATO supported "armed Albanian separatists in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, then we should also have expected some sort of action from the Alliance for the protection of an independent European member-state of the UN, which faced a direct internal threat. Even more so as the issue concerned a democracy that was a candidate for joining the EU." However, as Arbatov reveals, this had nothing to do with any principles or values but of security and economic interests. The West supported Turkey in this question because "according to Washington's geo-

political strategy, this country is seen as the main outpost of American influence in the trans-regional Black Sea-Caspian Sea region [...and] as a counterbalance to Russia, Iran and the Arab world and as a convenient corridor for oil from the Caspian [region] to Europe.”²⁴³

Arbatov is not convinced that *the policy on Kosovo could have had something to do with the 'humanitarian aspect' either*, and this is his claim. Otherwise the US and NATO could not have supported Turkey (instead of Greece) and this evidence serves as data to support the claim. As backing for the warrant Arbatov argues that “Turkey is a state controlled by the military and is violating human rights. [...] one has shamefully turned a blind eye to this issue [Kurds being repressed], as well as to the Serb victims of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia, to the Greeks of Northern Cyprus and to millions of Russians turned away from former Soviet Republics.”²⁴⁴ What bothers Arbatov most is the unequal situation in which Russia had been put: if NATO was expanding toward the east, why should Russia not have strengthened its “political influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was based on the sincere and voluntary aim for democratic countries in the region to cooperate with Russia.”²⁴⁵

The main claim in Arbatov’s April 1999 argumentation, that is, after the NATO operation had already been started, is that *the military operation is an act of unjustified aggression* e.g. due to the violation of international law.²⁴⁶ In addition, it might have destructive consequences for Europe as a whole. Let us first look at the grounds for the operation (serving as the first set of data, backing and warrant): Arbatov does not think that the operation could have been justified as the Western leaders were arguing. The humanitarian-political reasons were not strong enough reason to justify the bombings. He does not deny that Milosevic had done in Kosovo was not wrong, and this serves as a rebuttal, just as in the case of almost all the Russian politicians studied here. It is true that the Serb forces had done wrong, and in addition, Belgrade’s stance in Chateau Rambouillet negotiations was inflexible. However, Arbatov refutes this rebuttal by saying that by not returning autonomy to Kosovo Milosevic was making a political error, but that this fact and the dislike of his character still did not justify NATO’s actions: it was not a good enough reason for using force.²⁴⁷ Further data are provided by arguing that the military conflict was actually initiated by ‘Albanian separatists’: “Who shed the first blood, using violence for political goals? The answer is: Albanian radical separatists. In the end, the responsibility for all that happened lies on their shoulders.”²⁴⁸ The real reason behind the operation is that in the new situation NATO had to look for a meaning for its existence:

In search for new reasons for its existence, NATO transformed itself into an expansionist union with military forces and operative plans with offensive strategies [...] [It is]

243 Arbatov, 4 November 1998, www document

244 Ibid.

245 Ibid.

246 See e.g. Arbatov, 16 April 1999, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

247 Arbatov, 16 April 1999, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

248 Arbatov, 23–29 April 1999, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*.

is impossible for NATO to exist without enemy countries, without being faced with a threat or without the use of military force.²⁴⁹

Thus, Arbatov concludes that NATO is the 'main problem facing European security' and the 'main obstacle in the way of cooperation and partnership between Russia and the West.'²⁵⁰ The Kosovo conflict has revealed the real character of NATO and thus, Arbatov presents the claim that *Russia should "reconsider its relations with NATO* and the role of the Alliance in Europe in order to never let this organization act as gendarme again, using force as it wishes on the basis of double standards, bypassing the UN Security Council and violating all the fundamental norms of existing international law."²⁵¹ Arbatov here follows Russia's official line which is to strengthen the role of governmental organizations: "It is necessary to move this military bloc forever from its central place in European security and return to it those which should be there: the UN, the OSCE and the EU". The main criterion for supporting these organizations is that they "work in the sphere of politics and human rights, so Russia could participate in these spheres and have a role equal to its status."²⁵²

Arbatov's argument can be understood mainly as substantive (cause-effect, the operation brings about further threats such as a collision in Russo-American relations or the violation of international law), but part of it can be defined as motivational too (the value of stability, the value of equality between different states, the desire to punish the guilty).

We can then turn to the consequences of the operation; Arbatov sees them from Russia's point of view. As a result of the operation, NATO is again seen as the main potential adversary in Russia. Moreover, this has led to the reform of Russia's military doctrine²⁵³. Arbatov again refers to the popular opinion and argues that it is widely believed that Russia might become the next victim of Western aggression. He mainly uses authoritative arguments here, presenting both popular opinion as an authority as well as himself as an authority. It is not only the fact that within a short period of time Russia might get involved in the conflict that worries Arbatov. More worrying is the fact that a long-term consequence might be the disappointment of Russian democrats with the West and Western leaders.²⁵⁴ These concerns serve as data for the claim on the unjustifiable nature of the operation. Of course, the question is not only about Russian domestic policy, but on the impact at the international level. This operation creates disharmony in Russo-American relations (and in the relations between Russia and the West in general; Chernomyrdin of Nash Dom – Rossiia refers to this consequence too): Arbatov considers the operation as the most dangerous juxtaposition between Moscow and Washington

249 Arbatov, 16 April 1999, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Arbatov, 23–29 April 1999, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*.

253 A new military doctrine.

254 Arbatov, 22 April 1999, *Segodnia*. Also Forsberg 2005, 336, refers to Kozyrev's statement on the domestic political repercussions of the enlargement.

since the Berlin and Caribbean crises in the 1960s.²⁵⁵ It is very threatening, even if compared to the Cold War, because now “there was no mutual understanding between Russia and the West on the spheres of influence” (CIS, Balkans) and there was an “unbalance of forces and possibilities between Russia and NATO”.²⁵⁶ Here we can understand these comparisons as backing for the warrant which is a generalization based on the relations in the past. The argument is both substantive when referring to past events and authoritative when we have to trust in Arbatov’s expertise.

What should Russia’s role be in this and what should be done? Arbatov’s claim is that *the only right way was to execute active policy in order to end the conflict and have peace*. Arbatov introduces three policy options with some hypothetical consequences. These serve as data and backing for convincing us about the rightfulness of the claim’s message: the need to continue active policy. The first option is, according to Arbatov, advocated by the masses, leftist and nationalist parties, the parliament and military circles. The claim in this option is to give military aid to the Serbs and destroy NATO. Arbatov does not see any problems in this from a moral and legal point of view: the claim is justified by Yugoslavia being a victim of aggression from outside and accordingly being entitled to external aid for self-defence.²⁵⁷ Even though the operation brought forward the discussion on the need to build a union with Yugoslavia, Arbatov argues that in a conflict situation like this, no union should be established. Elsewhere he argues that Russia should not give any military aid to Yugoslavia, because being in a union with Yugoslavia or solely giving military aid would lead to Russia’s involvement in the war and consequently to a third world war.²⁵⁸ The second policy option’s claim advocates non-involvement: “not to intervene directly and let NATO suffer from its catastrophic mistake”. According to this option, the collapse of the North Atlantic Union should then be used to strengthen Russia’s influence and role in the Balkans and in the whole of Europe. Arbatov, however, sees some problems here, such as the “cost of ‘educating’ NATO might be too high in regard to the number of victims, the amount of destruction and humanitarian catastrophe in Yugoslavia”. The third and best option is the policy of the government (which, according to Arbatov, had been carried out without any major success so far): “active policy with the goal of rapidly ending the conflict and reaching a peaceful solution”. However, for this policy to be successful, three main conditions must be fulfilled, and these qualify the claim:

Belgrade should agree to moving peacekeeping forces to Kosovo under the aegis of the UN and to the return of the observers of the OSCE. Secondly, NATO should humble itself to decrease its role in the regulation and stop supporting the fighters of the Libera-

255 Arbatov, 16 April 1999, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

256 Ibid.

257 Ibid.

258 Arbatov 23–29 April 1999, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*.

tion Army and inciting Albania against Yugoslavia. Thirdly, Russia should change its mediator policy.²⁵⁹

Elsewhere Arbatov introduces what would have been a 'patriotic position' in this situation, and here too he argued for both stopping the suffering of civilians and demanding that NATO admit to its mistake:

It is necessary to keep more destruction from taking place in Yugoslavia and its people from being victimized, to make NATO to stop the bombings [...] We must make the North Atlantic Alliance admit to its mistake and change the conditions that were prepared in Rambouillet²⁶⁰ (they do not work after the bombings), and according to the conditions, which are acceptable to moderate Albanians and the Serb leaders, and the guaranteeing of which should be up to both the West and Russia, to set up law and order, peace and stability. Then those who have suffered from the humanitarian catastrophe should be helped.²⁶¹

Furthermore, an active policy is necessary because "nobody else but us can pressure Milosevic into accepting these concessions, and at the same time help NATO somehow make right the catastrophic mistake and save face [...]"²⁶² Arbatov provides us with both substantive arguments, referring to cause-effect in the future, forecasts on 'what could happen, if....' and motivational arguments referring to the strengthening of Russia's status or importance in world politics or to the value of human life, when he justifies his claim concerning Russia's active participation in finding a solution to the conflict.

Grigorii Iavlinskii's main claim can be paraphrased almost like that of Arbatov: the military operation, that is, bombing a sovereign country, is a violation of international norms and thus not justified. Moreover, he provides almost the same data, warrant and backing to support his claim as Arbatov. First, the NATO operation, that is, bombing an 'independent sovereign state', represents a violation of international norms,²⁶³ the UN Charter and the principles of international relations.²⁶⁴ In addition, there was an alternative to the air campaign: the Serbian side was willing to negotiate. Iavlinskii is especially disappointed in the negotiations in Rambouillet (in particular in regard to the adding of one more condition to the draft concerning the presence of NATO troops in Kosovo, see below). Moreover, the goal – protecting Albanian

259 Arbatov, 16 April 1999, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*

260 Referring to the talks in Chateau Rambouillet, France in February 1999. The Albanian delegation and Serb delegation did not sign the political accord. The talks resumed on 15 March in Paris. Then the Albanian delegation signed the agreement, but the Serb side refused to sign it.

261 Arbatov, 23–29 April 1999, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*.

262 Ibid.

263 Iavlinskii, 8 July 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

264 Iavlinskii, 31 March 1999, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

civilians – cannot be reached by a military operation, instead it produces contrary results. Here Iavlinskii is using a substantive argument:

They tell us that the countries of NATO just wanted to protect Kosovo Albanians. But the results of the punitive bombings are the opposite. [...] In Kosovo, civilians are killed just because they are Serbs or Albanians, Orthodox Christians or Muslims. As a result of the NATO air bombings all this has increased.²⁶⁵

Iavlinskii claims that *as a result of the bombings, a terrorist region might be in the forming, a Euro-Chechnia* as he later calls it, a region with a huge amount of people who were unemployed and had no income, but were armed:²⁶⁶ “One of the hardest consequences of the bombings might be the creation of a terrorist region in the centre of Europe, which could be compared the Republic of Ichkeriia.”²⁶⁷ Thus, Iavlinskii uses almost the same analogy between Kosovo and Chechnia, as Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow (Otechestvo), uses about the Chechenization of Kosovo (see below on the Vietnamization of Kosovo by Vladimir Lukin). We can define Iavlinskii’s argument both as substantive and motivational when referring to a potential undesired future, and authoritative when referring to his own expertise.

Like almost all politicians discussed here, Iavlinskii, too, offers a counterargument (a rebuttal) to his claim, but he looks at this from a slightly different point of view: yes, Milosevic was *guilty of advocating and promoting Serb nationalism. This should have been a lesson for the Russian Federation to learn.* According to Iavlinskii, the Serb example proves that a multinational country like Yugoslavia or Russia should never advocate the nationalism of any one nation or ethnic group as a state strategy as this can only lead to the collapse of the state. Iavlinskii then also refutes the rebuttal to his claim; that is, the rebuttal is not enough to nullify his claim on the operation not being justified. Here he refers to NATO adopting the concept of ‘the end justifies the means’; NATO troops have bombed civilian targets etc. Iavlinskii reminds us that “You cannot kill innocent people in order to protect the rights of other innocent people.”²⁶⁸ Furthermore, Iavlinskii criticizes the West’s double standards in relation to ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide. Ethnic cleansing is condemned only when it is carried out by politically non-loyal countries (this is the same accusation as made by Arbatov when he referred to the situation in Cyprus and the position of the Kurds in Turkey). As his data and backing, Iavlinskii reminds us of the Croatian genocide of the Serbs in 1995; the situation in which the US supported Pol Pot in Cambodia, condemned the Vietnamese who brought an end to the genocide there and defined their action as an act of aggression against a sovereign country; and of the situation of the Kurds in Turkey: the US and West-European countries did not want to get involved

265 Ibid.

266 Iavlinskii, 8 July 1999, *Obshechaia gazeta*. On 8 July 1999 Iavlinskii gave a speech in Salzburg (published in *Obshechaia gazeta*), so he was originally speaking to an international audience.

267 Iavlinskii, 31 March 1999, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

268 Iavlinskii, 8 July 1999, *Obshechaia gazeta*.

because Turkey was a NATO member.²⁶⁹ Accordingly, if the operation is not legally justified, it is not morally sound either. The argumentation is both substantive and motivational.

What should be done and what is Russia's role in this? Russia must participate in finding the solution. This should be started by stopping the bombardment and sending UN peacekeeping forces (also Russian peacekeepers) to Kosovo. However, it is of utmost importance that no military aid be given to Yugoslavia, because Russia should not get involved in the conflict.²⁷⁰ This serves as a rebuttal to the claim for active policy. Active policy means diplomacy, not military action. The main body responsible for the events is the United States, according to Iavlinskii, because it behaves like the Soviet Union, trying to solve all its problems by force.²⁷¹ Iavlinskii states that after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the disappearance of the juxtaposition between the two world systems led to the emergence of local ethnic conflicts. However, NATO is totally incapable of solving any conflicts of this type.²⁷² Russia is also responsible for the events because it is unable to offer any plan for solving the problems. Iavlinskii is disappointed because a solution was at hand, been close, but then in Rambouillet one more condition was added to the agreement, that is, the presence of NATO troops in Kosovo. The Serbs did not agree to this. However, this should not have led to the bombings, rather the negotiations should have been continued at a different level. In the end Russia 'saved Europe from catastrophe' by Chernomyrdin's mediating work. It prevented the beginning of the ground war.²⁷³

Vladimir Lukin's main claim regarding the solution to the problem is that Russia should actively participate in finding the solution, but on its own terms. Reasons for these are that firstly, the United States tried to use Russia to serve American interests: Russia is merely offered the role of messenger between the West and Belgrade, Russia is to be a Trojan horse: "We do not want to participate in an adventure, in which Russia has the role of the Trojan horse – organizer of the occupation of Kosovo and the dissolution of Yugoslavia."²⁷⁴ Therefore, it is most important that Russia should not accept this role, but instead offer its own plan for solving the problems, which should consist of the following points:

Stopping the bombings and pulling Serb troops out of Kosovo [...] and the West agreeing to a certain contingent of Serb troops staying in Kosovo in their pre-crisis location (exactly how many is a question to be negotiated). One of the main Russian suggestions is that peacekeeping forces should not include troops whose countries participated in the bombings. The role of NATO should be limited to patrolling the borders and

269 Iavlinskii, 24 June 1999, *Severnyi Kurer*.

270 Iavlinskii, 31 March 1999, *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

271 Ibid.

272 Iavlinskii, 24 June 1999, *Severnyi Kurer*.

273 Iavlinskii, 8 July 1999, *Obshchaia gazeta*.

274 Lukin, 25 May 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

destroying the forces of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the territory of Macedonia and Albania.²⁷⁵

As Luzhkov of Otechestvo, Lukin stresses the necessity for the ‘complete destruction’ of the KLA. Moreover, the USA was just trying to save face when pretending to have been willing to accept Russia’s help:

NATO is already faced with the Vietnam dilemma – it has either to accept defeat and withdraw its troops or it has to send more troops there but at the same time risk losing domestic support. Therefore, Americans hope to win with the help of Russian pseudo-mediatory work.²⁷⁶

Lukin wants to draw an analogy between the situation of American/NATO forces in Kosovo and American forces in Vietnam (no possibility of winning the war – partisan war). Moreover, just as Luzhkov (Otechestvo) and Iavlinskii (Iabloko) compare the Kosovo situation with that of Chechnia (referring to separatism and terrorism), Lukin also connects the operation in Kosovo with Russia’s operation in Chechnia. The Kosovo operation enabled the second war in Chechnia: “the transformation of tension in the Caucasus sub-region into the second Chechen war was partly an echo of Kosovo.” He explains this as a precaution to try and prevent “the possibility of turning into a SRYU, a country under separatist forces which are supported from outside the country by military means”. According to Lukin, this explains to a significant extent the public support for the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in Chechnia, and for when the West criticized Russia for using force against separatists and civilians, which was understood not so much as a “concern for human rights, but as an attempt to a further geopolitical removal of Russia, and as a cynical interest in the oil resources of the Caspian [region]”.²⁷⁷

As a rebuttal to his claim and accusations against the US and NATO, Lukin is sorry to admit that Russia is not able to offer any serious plan or alternative to the Rambouillet agreement. Therefore, Russian diplomacy and the Russian leadership have failed.²⁷⁸ As we have seen, Lukin discusses, Russia’s role in the operation more than the operation as such.²⁷⁹

275 Ibid.

276 Ibid.

277 Lukin, 9 November 2000, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

278 Lukin, 8 June 1999, *Moskovskie Novosti*.

279 In retrospect (2001), Lukin came to the same claim as Arbatov and Iavlinskii: Military intervention was illegal, because it could only be justified if it was necessary for self-defence, or if a country that needed it in self-defence was a member of a military union that would help it.

TABLE 37.
Iabloko politicians' argument on the Kosovo conflict 1998–2001

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: NATO is bombing civilian targets. NATO is interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country. The West has double standards: KLA 'terrorists' are as guilty as the Serbs, the KLA started the bloodshed. The operation is a threat to the democratic development of Russia (public opinion). The operation brought about the second war in Chechnia.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> The military operation has nothing to do with humanitarian intervention. The military operation is not justified.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> One should avoid civilian casualties in wars (a motivational and substantive argument). If one uses a standard in one case, and another in a similar case, it is a matter of double standards (a substantive argument). One should treat both parties of war equally (a motivational and authoritative argument). Bombing a sovereign country is a violation of international law (an authoritative argument). The operation gives non-democratic forces in Russia the excuse to oppose democratic development (a substantive, motivational and authoritative argument).</p>		<p>Counterargument: <i>However</i> Milosevic has committed a political mistake (Serb nationalism, taking away autonomy from Kosovo); the Serb forces are wrongdoers; Milosevic had an inflexible line in the Rambouillet negotiations; but these do not serve as justification for bombing a sovereign state.</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> Evidence from civilian casualties. Cases in the past when genocide and ethnic cleansing were ignored when committed by allies. Arbatov and Lukin as experts of the history of international relations and security policy. International law is an authority. Public opinion: the operation has a negative impact on the image of the West and democracy in Russia.</p>		

Table 37...

TABLE 37...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data A third world war might be ahead if Russia interferes militarily. If no political solution is reached, Kosovo might transform into a EuroChechnia.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> Russia should contribute to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict, but on its own terms, and it should not interfere militarily.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> We must trust these politicians' word and that they know what 'history' has taught us (an authoritative and substantive argument). We do not wish to have any third world war (a motivational argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> Analogies or generalizations from the past. Example of Chechnia. Iabloko politicians are experts in these questions (taken as authorities).</p>		

Comparison and geopolitical vision

Arbatov, Lukin and Iavlinskii all condemn the NATO operation against Yugoslavia and argue for Russia's active policy in finding a solution to the conflict. They all question the principle of humanitarian intervention, or were doubtful whether this could have been the reason for the NATO operation. They accuse the West of double standards. Arbatov is particularly concerned about the consequences that the operation had on Russo-American relations. Consequently, neither Arbatov nor Iavlinskii see any justification for this operation due to its consequences (civilian casualties in Yugoslavia and Russia taken to the edge of intervening in the conflict).

Here in the geopolitical vision, the world is divided into NATO versus the others. NATO tries to lay down the rules of the game, that is, what is acceptable and to whom. Russia's model and mission is to follow and safeguard the sovereignty principle and oppose humanitarian intervention. The mission is also to solve the problem by political means and by following international law. Moreover, Russia's mission includes opposition to nationalism and advocating an equal status for Russia, and to have an active Russia capable of looking out for its own interests.

8.2.3 Kommunisticheskaia Partia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (KPRF): Russia should stop NATO aggression by creating a counter-bloc

Again, the Communist argumentation²⁸⁰ represents a very black-and-white story on the conflict in Kosovo. Russia and the Serbs are on the side of the good, and the Albanian separatists together with the aggressive military bloc NATO led the USA, which aspires to dictatorship, on the side of the bad. The consequences (or what the consequences should have been, the lesson learnt) of this adventure are that Russia built a union, or a bloc to resist the situation of unipolarity – to gather forces to oppose ‘the techno-throne fascism’ (*tekhnotronnyi fashizm*) of the US. Accordingly, KPRF’s storyline is entitled *Russia should stop NATO aggression by creating a counter-bloc*.

TABLE 38.
KPRF politicians’ grammar of geopolitics on the Kosovo conflict 1999–2000

What is this conflict about?	NATO aggression; intruding upon the land of sovereign Yugoslavia; creation of global US dictatorship; wiping out Yugoslavia.
Where is this happening?	In Serbia; in an independent European state; in sovereign Yugoslavia; in the land of cultural, civilised, ancient European people.
Why is this happening? What causes this conflict?	US/world oligarchy interests: global dictatorship, global liberal fascist dictatorship; The US has the Russian leadership on a leash; Russia is a satellite state of the US.
Who are the parties in the conflict?	US & NATO & world oligarchy vs. the rest of the world: the Muslim world, India, China, Latin America, Russian Eurasia; Aggressive US led NATO, Albanian separatists vs. the Serbs.
What are Russian/worldwide interests in this conflict?	If Kosovo is allowed to secede, then others will follow: the Basque, Corsica; NATO is the main adversary; a multipolar world is in Russia’s interests.

²⁸⁰ First, it must be mentioned that KPRF argumentation is represented here solely by Ziuganov’s argumentation (no primary data were found in the searches of other politicians on the Kosovo conflict). However, Ziuganov was the unchallenged leader of KPRF and therefore, can be taken as the best representative of KPRF argumentation. Secondly, Ziuganov’s argumentation differs from e.g. the Iabloko politicians discussed here in that most of the time he presents claim after claim, sometimes supported by data but other elements of the argument are usually missing, therefore, it is difficult to make a Toulmian structural analysis of his argumentation.

Ziuganov uses very colourful language in defining NATO's actions: "the rockets and bombs of NATO [...] intrude upon the land of the sovereign country of Yugoslavia, spill the blood of the Serbs, and strengthen the era of aggressive World order."²⁸¹ The main claim is similar to that of other parties: *the operation is not justified*. Before the start of the NATO bombings, Gennadi Seleznev opposes any NATO involvement: "Kosovo is a part of Serbia. NATO army should not be permitted to go into the country. If it does, there will be a big war in the Balkans."²⁸² So the first data supporting the claim are that Yugoslavia is a sovereign country and Kosovo part of it. Furthermore, after the military operation Ziuganov argues that the NATO-led peace-keeping operation is targeted against the Serbs as a nation, and what is worse is that Russia is participating in this: "Today Russia is present in Kosovo with its peacekeeping divisions under the NATO anti-Serbian operation."²⁸³ "The UN forces play a negative role in Kosovo, they represent only transatlantic interests". Thus, further data are provided by the fact that the interests of those living in Kosovo are not taken into account: "The victory of so-called democracy, financed by American and German money, did not bring and will not bring stability to the country. *Without Russia none of the problems in the Balkans can be solved.*"²⁸⁴ Again, we can see the emphasis on Russia's irreplaceable role in world politics.

The general meaning of the NATO operation for the Communist leader Ziuganov is that it signified the move (or an attempt to move) from the post-World War II world order to a 'new world order'. This only strengthens the already established move from an old order, which was more appreciated by the Communists, to a new order, which should be opposed: "The Balkan War ruined the whole global world order, which was created after the Second World War."²⁸⁵ But it is not just that, it is about "the myth of the 'democratic West' being erased for good."²⁸⁶ *So the communists had been right: the West had nothing to do with real democracy, it was just a myth cherished by Russian 'democrats', Russian reformers.* Now the aggression of NATO "put Russia face to face with the threat of a global liberal fascist dictatorship of the 'new world order' headed by the US and NATO."²⁸⁷ According to Ziuganov, peace on earth is in danger, and we can take this as further data: "the decision made by the United States and NATO to bomb Yugoslavia nullified all the post-war achievements in the sphere of guaranteeing peace on the planet."²⁸⁸ During the bipolar world order, in which the Soviet Union existed, NATO was able to hide

its beastly, aggressive essence. Now nothing holds it back. The dictatorship of NATO over the civil institutions of Europe, its denial to obey the laws and norms of the post

281 Ziuganov, 30 March 1999, *Zavtra*.

282 Seleznev, 4 February 1999, *Krasnaia Zvezda*.

283 Ziuganov 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

284 Ziuganov, 24 October 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. Italics added.

285 Zyuganov, 6 April 1999, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*.

286 Ibid.

287 Ibid.

288 Ziuganov, 26 March 1999, *Trud-7*.

–Word War II period, its blind, stupid aggressive force, which now in the eyes of humankind will wipe Yugoslavia – a cultural, civilized, ancient European people – away, has received the name “techno-throne fascism”.²⁸⁹

Ziuganov is mainly using authoritative and motivational argumentation. As in general in communist rhetoric, Ziuganov often refers to the concepts of ‘world oligarchy’²⁹⁰ and ‘world government’ and their excluding nature, the gap between them and people. Concerning Yugoslavia, NATO is defined as “an instrument of world government, which has been formed outside the borders of the UN, not taking into account the interests of the world as a whole and the peoples of the world, but advocating the interests of the privileged ‘golden billion.’”²⁹¹ As a result, NATO is Russia’s main adversary.²⁹² Thus, nothing has really changed since the Cold War. All the ideas of the ‘common European home’, common values and mutual interests is just a delusion. The enemy is where it has always been – in the West, that is, NATO and the US. But now in a far more dangerous form and without any equal opposition.

What the USA is doing is creating a “global dictatorship using the methods of neo-fascism. The aggression of NATO against an independent European state returns us to the times of Hitler.”²⁹³ As when defining NATO enlargement, Ziuganov draws analogies between the contemporary situation and that of the Second World War. The threat is as serious to Russia as it was back then: “*The threat of Russia losing its state sovereignty and national independence is as real as ever!*”²⁹⁴ Thus, Russia’s need to oppose NATO and the US are usually justified by Russia’s sovereignty and independence. The goal of the US/NATO is to “divide the world, become masters of the world and humankind with the help of the contemporary military, political and information technologies.”²⁹⁵ But this is not all bad: NATO fascism would make people to realize that they have a common enemy: “American hawks, armadas of NATO planes which carry out their bloody strikes on Yugoslavia”. The new division of humankind into two unequal parts means that “on one side there is NATO, its generals and strategies, economists and bankers [...] On the other side there is the rest of humankind, whether it is the Muslim world, India, China, Latin America or our Russian (*Rossiiskaia*) Eurasia.”²⁹⁶ Russian foreign policy should be determined in accordance with this new reality: “we, the national patriotic forces of Russia, will do our part towards the creation of a global anti-NATO union and opposition. There will not be any end of history.”²⁹⁷

289 Ziuganov, 8 June 1999, *Zavtra*.

290 Elsewhere (e.g. Shenfield 2000, 53) it has been argued that Ziuganov refers to ‘Jews’ or ‘Sionists’ with this expression.

291 Ziuganov, 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

292 Ibid.

293 Ziuganov, 30 March 1999, *Zavtra*. Ziuganov uses the analogy of Hitler and the Second World War as early as 1999, and the intensity of this comparison increases in the 21st century.

294 Ziuganov, 6 April 1999, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. Italics added.

295 Ziuganov, 8 June 1999, *Zavtra*.

296 Ibid.

297 Ibid. Referring here to Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on all countries becoming liberal democracies.

However, NATO and the US are not the only ones to be blamed for what was going on in Yugoslavia and in the world in general; this has to do with the Russian leadership, too. Again Ziuganov brings up the idea of the enemy within Russia, of the enemies of 'true' Russia:

The tragedy in Yugoslavia is an inevitable result of the activity of the pro-American group within the ruling elite of Russia. With the ruling elite's resources and in line with American interests, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact were eliminated, resulting in the economic and military potential of Russia being destroyed to a level which is no longer dangerous to the US. [...] *Gorbachev and Eltsin were working in the interests of the world oligarchy.*²⁹⁸

Ziuganov also raises serious criticism against Chernomyrdin, Russia's mediator in the Kosovo crisis. According to him, his work and the results of his work as a mediator are a "tragedy to the Serbs, a tragedy to Russia". As a result of Chernomyrdin's mission, all the power went to "Albanian separatists; Serbs are being beaten – once again a Slavic people has been forced to its knees." As Luzhkov, Arbatov and Iavlinskii, Ziuganov uses the analogy of Kosovo and Chechnia: "the depredation to Kosovo by Yugoslavia is a full analogy of depredation to Chechnia by Russia."²⁹⁹ However, Ziuganov uses this analogy in the sense that somebody will come and take Chechnia away from Russia. Therefore, the Kosovo crisis is not a misfortune for the Communists just for the Serbs (or other peoples living in Kosovo or in the territory of the former Yugoslavia), but this problem must be looked at on a larger scale, on a global scale of world order and world peace.

If the West carries out the further destruction of the Yugoslavian state, disconnecting Kosovo, then it will give birth to a chain reaction in contemporary Europe. Then there is an additional reason to surrender to the demands for independence of Catalonia and Basque land in Spain, Northern Ireland breaking away from Great Britain, Corsica from France, and the collapse of the Belgian federation. *The emergence of an independent state in Kosovo would give birth to territorial claims among its neighbours in the Balkans. And this means new wars.*³⁰⁰

Of course, this potential domino effect influences Russia as well, especially the situation in the North Caucasus. It serves as data supporting the claim. Other politicians also talk about the double standards of the West, that is, how some entities wanting independence are treated, and how their claims are answered.

298 Ziuganov, 30 March 1999, *Zavtra*. Italics added.

299 Ziuganov, 14 September 1999, *Zavtra*.

300 Ziuganov, 24 October 2000, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. Italics added.

What should Russia do in this situation? What is the solution offered by the communist leader Ziuganov? According to him, Russia must answer to the ‘aggression of the West.’³⁰¹ This means taking the following concrete steps: “Russia should withdraw from all the agreements with NATO, [...] withdraw the Russian battalion in Bosnia from under NATO command, [...] withdraw from sanctions against Iraq, Libya and Iran, [...] deliver weapons to Serbs [...]”³⁰² Ziuganov is the only politician among those studied here, except for Popkovich of NDR, who speaks on behalf of Russia’s military intervention in the conflict. Furthermore, there would not have been any “question of ratification of START II – the last guarantee of the sovereignty of Russia, [...] nuclear weapons should be placed in the territory of Belarus [...] and volunteers

Table 39.
KPRF politicians’ argument on the Kosovo conflict 1999–2000

PROBLEM DEFINITION

<p>Data: The operation is a threat to world peace in general and to the principle of state sovereignty, including Russia’s sovereignty, in particular. The final goal of the operation is US hegemony, dictatorship and a new world order. NATO forces are spilling the blood of Serbs. Yugoslavia is a sovereign country and Kosovo is part of it.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> The military operation is NATO/US aggression supported by the Russian leadership. The military operation is not justified</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> We must trust Ziuganov’s word (an authoritative and motivational argument). Nobody should bomb a sovereign state (an authoritative argument).</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> Evidence from the bombing of civilians. There is no sanction from the UN Security Council. UN documents are an authority. Russian leadership’s support: Chernomyrdin’s actions as a negotiator. Experience from history: hegemony aspirations of Nazi Germany correspond to those of the USA.</p>		

Table 39...

301 Ziuganov, 26 March 1999, *Trud*-7.

302 Ziuganov, 30 March 1999, *Zavtra*.

Table 39...

PROBLEM SOLUTION

<p>Data Russia must make sure that this intervention policy does not expand to other countries. Russia must safeguard Russia's sovereignty. Russia must answer to aggression against an ally. The current leadership is not able to safeguard Russia's sovereignty.</p>	<p>Qualifier Definitely,</p>	<p>Claim: <i>So</i> Russia should help the Serbs (weapons, volunteers). Russia should withdraw from all agreements with the West. Russia must create an anti-NATO union. The leadership must be changed in Russia.</p>
<p>Warrant: <i>Since</i> Russia must safeguard its sovereignty. Russia as a great power must protect the rights of its allies. There is a fear of the expanding of NATO's intervention. There is a fear of losing Russia's sovereignty. All motivational and authoritative arguments.</p>		<p>No counterarguments</p>
<p>Backing: <i>Because</i> We must trust Ziuganov and his words and believe in the values which he talks about.</p>		

should be sent to the brotherly Serbia.³⁰³ However, this is not enough, and again Ziuganov offers an alternative to NATO: “a strategic Union of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Yugoslavia and all Slav peoples would break the monolithic front of NATO which moves from the Baltic and Black Sea and the Mediterranean to Belgrade, Minsk and Moscow”.³⁰⁴ Thus, a creation of a Pan-Slavic counter-bloc is required. Ziuganov does not discuss the potential consequences of this policy and it seems that he does not even believe himself that the policy advocated by him could ever be executed either. The only reasons given for the policy of (even military) opposition to NATO and the US are safeguarding Russia's sovereignty and re-gaining an equal status in the world.

Geopolitical vision

As usual, in KPRF's geopolitical vision, the enemies are the West, or the US and NATO, those attacking the sovereignty principle, and their aides can be found in Russia too. KPRF strongly

303 Ibid.

304 Ibid.

argues for combating these enemies by setting up a counter-bloc. The mission and the model are the same as before, that is, Russia should oppose American hegemony and the new world order, even though they are not clearly manifest in this context.

8.3 COMPARISON AND GEOPOLITICAL VISION

Firstly, looking at the *geopolitical storylines* on NATO enlargement, we find that the only differences between the parties is in the definition of enlargement and in who the parties are in this process, and here the only 'deviant case' is KPRF. They use the Hitler analogies when defining enlargement and place the blame on Westernized Russian leadership for making enlargement possible. Concerning Kosovo, KPRF emphasizes the role of the world oligarchy in this conflict.

Then moving to the *structural analysis*, the claim that all the parties make about NATO enlargement is that it is not justified. Whether it can be considered a threat to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity is another matter, but most politicians under examination here incline to this conclusion. Some, however, (most evidently Iabloko politicians) cannot take the claim seriously that NATO could still threaten Russia, and they see this organization as useless and unable to answer to contemporary challenges (also Beliaev of Nash Dom – Rossiia). If we then compare the data, warrant and backing, that is, justifications for the claim that the parties represent, they do differ from each other. In particular, KPRF differs from the others, even though there are striking similarities as well, especially between Nash Dom – Rossiia, Otechestvo and Iabloko.³⁰⁵ Nash Dom – Rossiia, Otechestvo and Iabloko alike refer to the isolation of Russia, the idea of a united Europe while condemning NATO enlargement. In contrast, KPRF talks about Russia's security interests and defines enlargement as an 'existential problem', that is, as a threat to Russia's existence as a sovereign power and an example of Western hegemony.

All the parties also condemn NATO's Kosovo war. They refer to the violation of international law (sovereignty principle) and are afraid that the principle of humanitarian intervention might expand even to Russian territory. Without exception, politicians maintain that both the Serbs and the Albanians are guilty, and if they have to choose, it is the Albanians who are guiltier – because they are the ones who started the bloodshed. Otechestvo politicians claim that the war was started to punish Yugoslavia for not "obeying the US". All parties argue for a political solution, however. Russia should in no case interfere militarily in this conflict (except for Popkovich/Nash Dom – Rossiia and Ziuganov/KPRF who argue for giving military aid). Russian politicians also draw analogies between the situation in Kosovo and in Chechnia. The Chechenization of Kosovo is the term used by Luzhkov from Otechestvo, among others. Iab-

³⁰⁵ Edinstvo has been excluded from comparison because there are too few data. Nash Dom – Rossiia data extends only to the end of 1999.

loko's Iavlinskii warns that Kosovo might turn into a *EuroChechnia* if the right steps are not taken by the West. Consequently, in the argumentation on NATO's operation on Kosovo, it is difficult to find any differences between the parliamentary parties. However, there are some, and these should not be underestimated. Even if Nash Dom – Rossiia's Chernomyrdin and KPRF's Ziuganov mention the domestic political consequences of the operation, the representative of the democratic opposition, Iabloko, is the only one who discusses this issue in more detail. They are the only ones who, in my sample, argue that the Kosovo operation in the spring of 1999 enabled the starting of the military operation in Chechnia in the autumn of 1999. It made Russia's operation morally sound. Moreover, Iavlinskii is the only one to warn about the dangers of Serb nationalism, or about the nationalism of one nation in a multi-national federation. This should serve as a warning example to the Russian Federation, too. Russian nationalism should not be allowed. This can be seen as a total opposition to KPRF, which instead advocates Russian nationalism and the re-birth of the Russian nation.

As we can see, party of power (Nash Dom – Rossiia and Otechestvo) and Iabloko politicians mainly use substantive arguments, referring to the state of affairs “on the ground”, or motivational arguments, justifying their claims by the supposed desires or goals of the audience/readership in the future. Iabloko politicians discuss NATO enlargement in more depth and try to give a more expert image of the party than e.g. Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians. That is, Iabloko politicians usually try to offer alternatives and explain why they have come to a certain claim. KPRF's Ziuganov uses more authoritative and motivational arguments, even though he also makes analogies to the past and accordingly uses substantive arguments. Thus, there are no striking differences in which analytic proof is employed by the different parties. The content of the proof, however, varies.

Concerning the *geopolitical vision*, Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians see Europe as a single entity and Russia as a part of it. Rokhlin explicitly names the threats to Russia; they are China, Turkey, and NATO, but the most serious threat is the domestic situation and in particular the uncontrollable situation in Chechnia. Other politicians more or less fear a return to the Cold war, or ‘going back’ in any situation. What Rokhlin does not share but other party of power politicians advocate is democracy as a model for Russia. The democratic model, however, is not referred to in the argumentation on Kosovo. Kosachev of the Otechestvo politicians also stresses that those who are against Russia's equal position are Russia's enemies. In Kosovo argumentation, the enemies get a new name: they are Albanian terrorists. In the argumentation on NATO enlargement, Edinstvo politicians are more for fighting together with the West against terrorism, and in that sense see the West as a friend.

For Iabloko politicians, Russia is part of Europe and Russia's main enemy is Russia itself, more specifically, the main enemy is Russia's domestic policy both during Eltsin's and during Putin's era. There is no doubt that for Iabloko the model to follow is European democracy and the mission is to change Russia's domestic policy in that direction. Still, Russia must become an equal partner for the West, but this cannot happen unless Russia itself changes. In the Kosovo argumentation, however, Iabloko politicians do not talk so much about European democracy, but here we can see a division made into NATO versus the others.

For KPRF, Russia's borders are justified by history and this speaks for the expansion of Russia, at least by forming a union of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Russia's enemies are again the West, or especially the US, NATO, the world oligarchy, and the new world order. Russia's friends consist of new centres of power and potentially Europe. The mission has to do with opposing American hegemony, new world order, globalization, but also with giving Russia (and other suppressed nations) an equal position and safeguarding the sovereignty of Russia. The model to follow is that of Soviet power, socialism and Eurasianism. It must be mentioned that in the argumentation on Kosovo, the model and mission are not expressed as explicitly as in the argumentation on NATO enlargement.

9 Geopolitical Visions and Argumentation

9.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

In the spring of 2007, many – probably those who are not so familiar with Russian politics and Russian political rhetoric – were surprised by the critical statements of President Putin concerning the NATO missile defence system, or more particularly, concerning the bases to be built in the territory of Poland and the Czech Republic. These statements were interpreted in the West as anti-American and as a return back to Soviet rhetoric. However, as we have seen in this study, opposition to ‘a unipolar world’, ‘a new world order’, ‘American hegemony’ and fighting for *Russia’s sovereignty and equal position in world affairs* have been, if not in the very centre of Russian political rhetoric, then at least among the important political debates during the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, they are not a novelty or a turn in Russian political rhetoric. We can find traces of this discourse emphasizing Russia’s equal position and multipolarity in all the parliamentary parties under examination here, whether party of power, communist or democratic opposition.

Russo-Western relations also became more tense due to the harsh reactions of Russian leaders, Duma deputies and youth organizations supported by the Kremlin to the decisions made by Estonian leaders to re-locate the Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn. For Russians this monument represents the Soviet Union’s victory over fascism – its victory in the Great Patriotic War. Accordingly, the arguments for sovereignty and against intervention in internal affairs of a sovereign country do not seem to apply to all the new independent states in the former territory of the Soviet Union, such as Estonia, Ukraine or Georgia. Blaming the West for its double standards, e.g. in national self-determination or the use of force, seems to be as fair an accusation against the Russian Federation as it was against the West, now against Russia concerning the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty arguments are only used in certain cases concerning the Russian Federation and Yugoslavia/Serbia, e.g. opposing Martti Ahtisaari’s Kosovo plan. This, of course, also has to do with the fear of the consequences of granting independence to Kosovo and of the demands to grant independence to Abkhazia and Transdnistria as well.¹ What we can conclude is that it is extremely important to know the different actors in Russian society and to be familiar with their argumentation, because they may have an impact

1 Riabov 2007, author’s interview.

on the future argumentation and policies of the Russian leadership, or reflect the positions of the public and the political elite.

Indeed, the purpose of this study was to make Russian politics, especially the argumentation of Russian political parties and Russian geopolitical thinking, more understandable for non-Russian speaking audiences. Moreover, the purpose was to show that we can study Russian politics and political argumentation in the same way as that of any other country. In the methodology there are some universal features, even though cultural specifics (which can be understood as a context) must not be ignored either. Accordingly, even though each country or political community (or group of countries, of political communities) has its own particularities and is unique in some sense, these features do not usually impede the use of methodology, for example of rhetorical analysis, as it has been developed in the West.

In the Introduction and Research Agenda Chapters I set as my goal to study what kind of arguments parliamentary parties of three different groups – party of power, democratic opposition and communist opposition – used when discussing the relationship between Russia and Chechnia, ‘an internal enemy’, and NATO, ‘an external enemy’. My assumption was based on previous research and my own reading, and was firstly, that Russia’s relations between Chechnia and NATO were somehow seen as problematic to Russia and that they were perceived as threats, and secondly, that these three groups somehow differed from each other and that they represented three different positions. Accordingly, I wanted to discover whether there indeed were any differences in their argumentation – in the content and the structure of the argumentation – both between the groups as well as within them. I was also determined to find a geopolitical storyline for each party in each case. Furthermore, I wanted to find out whether there was continuity or change in the argumentation. Based on these arguments, I then asked whether there was something continuous in the argumentation of the parties, and whether there were some ideas behind their arguments that persisted, regardless of time and context. Here I employed, in particular, the concept of a geopolitical vision. In addition, I was curious to see what else I could find out about the political parties in Russia and about the concept of party of power and of opposition, and in this way, contribute to the ‘core’ questions of Political Science.

Consequently, there were different ways of analysing and different levels of analysis in work here. First of all there was context-bound or micro-level case-by-case and party-by-party analysis by using narrative analysis (geopolitical storylines). Then there was context-bound case-by-case and party-by-party and politician-by-politician analysis by using argumentation analysis and then macro-level analysis of geopolitical visions. Below I will first repeat the main points in the analysis of the two cases, that is, Russo-Chechen relations and Russia – NATO relations. Then, I will look at some of the remarks about political argumentation in general, then at remarks about Russian political parties and finally at remarks about the geopolitical thinking of these parties.

9.2 CASE-SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS AND GEOPOLITICAL STORYLINES

9.2.1 Russo-Chechen relations

Concerning the first war in Chechnia, for *Nash Dom Rossiia* it is extremely important to stress that Russia has its own line and it cannot be pressured by Chechens or any external forces. To support their claims, NDR politicians refer to the Russian constitution. It is central power which safeguards democracy and in contrast, regional power threatens democracy. Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians want to see the Chechen conflict as a part of the nationalities question, but they do not argue that *nation* (or an ethnic group) and *territory* are somehow linked: all nations do not have the right to their own territory. What NDR tie together is *unity* (integrity) and *democracy*: there cannot be democracy without unity of the Russian Federation. NDR also tried to belittle the significance of Chechnia. Ryzhkov generalizes the situation in Chechnia, saying that it was just one of those areas in the world that cannot be controlled by central government and that it is not a unique case. Concerning the second war in Chechnia, for Nash Dom – Rossiia it is now all about terrorism, and that society as a whole should fight against it. Chechnia is Russia's internal affair and no foreign mediator is needed in solving the conflict. Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians refer to the violation of agreements by the Chechen leadership and to the will of the people for justification of the 'operation'.

During the second war in Chechnia, *Otechestvo* politicians argue that Chechnia must be kept as part of the Russian Federation. They refer to the *historical right to the territory*. However, unlike NDR, *Otechestvo* admits that there is *no popular support* for the operation in Chechnia, but stresses that the support must be gained. Like Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians or Lukin of Iabloko, *Otechestvo* politicians oppose national self-determination for new nations, as it would lead to *chaos*. Moreover, today's situation is very different from that of the colonized peoples in the 1960s. In the Caucasus Chechens are actually alone with their demands for self-determination and thus, their demands were not justified.

Otechestvo politicians talk about the denigration of Russia, and about anti-Russian feelings which were the main motive for criticizing Russia's Chechnia policy. In 2003, after *Otechestvo* had already been dissolved and *Otechestvo* parliamentarians had become members of *Edinaia Rossiia*, *Otechestvo* politicians stressed that Russia is like any other great power in a similar situation and that its actions are fully accepted by the world community. However, they still mention that what is up against each other are Russia's interests and American hegemony aspirations.

Edinstvo politicians stress that all questions require their own expertise, their own experts and professionalism. What they actually do at the same time is deny the chance of politics. There are no political matters (or there should not be any political matters), only matters of a technical nature, requiring expert knowledge (here we can also see a link to some Soviet discourses). Accordingly, there is no need for discussion and there can be no deviant positions because the questions are not questions of opinion or of values, but of expertise: an expert

knows how things are, and there is nothing to be discussed after the testimony or decision of an expert in the field. However, despite the stress on professionalism and ideology-free pragmatism, the idea of sovereignty and integrity as a basic value seems to be at least as important as any political or economic interests in the Chechen case.

In the beginning of the operation Edinstvo politicians were convinced that the goal (*constitutional order and security for citizens, which requires the elimination of terrorists*) could be reached by this operation. The main justification for the operation is the attaining of these goals and the ultimate goal above them: the *unity and sovereignty of Russia*. International terrorism is the cause of the operation, and is a threat to unity and sovereignty. Unlike many others, Edinstvo politicians are convinced that they have the popular support in Chechnia and Russia proper for the operation. They see no other solution but the operation. However, dissident arguments emerge, too, when the operation continues and the goals are not reached, for example, those of General Gurov when he refers to the suffering of the civilian population and the actual roots of terrorism.

For Edinstvo, Russia is a *great power*, which is able to cope with its problems alone. The problems in Chechnia could actually already have been solved if the fighters had not been supported from the outside. Russia has participated in the international struggle against terrorism sincerely, but has not received any real support in its own struggle in Chechnia. Chechen fighters are totally 'others', and in relation to them, no principles of the civilized world can apply. They only understand the language of force.

Iabloko politicians see the first war in Chechnia as a result of the *mistakes made by the Russian leadership*, which has also violated the Russian constitution. *Iabloko* politicians also discuss the connection between integrity and democracy. Lukin agrees with the NDR position and values integrity more than democracy; otherwise chaos might be at hand. Consequently, we can see that the parties are not unanimous in all the contexts. Individual politicians might have their own positions, as Lukin did. Others argued that *democracy enables unity* and not vice versa. Democracy is a pre-condition for unity, contrary to what the parties of power (NDR and Otechestvo) argue.

Concerning the second war in Chechnia, *Iabloko* politicians agree with others that the state should be strengthened and terrorism eliminated. However, they do not argue that *these goals could be reached by this operation*. In addition, they are sure that the operation has *no popular support*; it is necessary to gather the support, but not by force. This is the main difference between *Iabloko* and the parties of power: unlike the parties of power, *Iabloko* politicians do not believe that this is the right tool for struggling against terrorism, and they do not really believe that the people are on the federals' side. More than NDR or Edinstvo, *Iabloko* also stresses *interdependency or connectedness of problems*, for example, they say that terrorism in Russia does not stop until the conflict in Chechnia is solved. They also discuss the connection between unity and democracy and are now more pessimistic about whether they can be combined in Russia. It is another matter whether this kind of discussion would be appreciated by Russian audiences or whether the electorate would require 'action' to be convinced of their

claims – deeds instead of words as the saying goes. Like others, Iabloko politicians accuse the West of having double standards and Lukin in particular speaks out for integrity as a basic value (as he did during the first war).

Concerning the first (and second) war in Chechnia, KPRF sets the war into a larger picture and argues that the collapse of the Soviet system and those who have helped bring it down, that is the democrats, are the direct cause of the problems in Chechnia. Therefore, what should be changed is not only the policy but also the leadership and the regime. One of the key problems is the *nationalism of minorities*, such as Chechens. Instead, the goal should be the *nationalism of Russians*, to raise the Russian nation from its underprivileged position. Here we can see one of the major differences between the communist and the democratic opposition. Iavlinskii of Iabloko just warns against nationalism of the kind that Ziuganov of KPRF is advocating – nationalism of one nation in multi-national countries like Yugoslavia (Serb nationalism) or the Russian Federation.

We can also notice that there are changes in KPRF's argumentation. In 1995, KPRF politicians demand negotiations without preconditions, but in 1996 with preconditions. The context changes within this time as well; the first acts of terror conducted by Chechens take place and Ziuganov also runs for presidency in 1996.

Concerning the second war in Chechnia, KPRF speaks out for the *integrity* of the Federation because it is a *precondition for creating a wider union*. They justify this with *history and the popular will*. KPRF politicians define the situation as a fight for power: it is all about leadership interests, about a liberal revenge. Seleznev, however, talks more about international terrorism as the reason for executing the operation. Of course, we must remember that Seleznev created his own party *Rossia*² in 2000 and in 2002 was dismissed from KPRF.

Concerning the model of argumentation, it is worth mentioning that politicians, such as Rokhlin from NDR and Arbatov and Lukin from Iabloko often introduce different options which have been argued for by state leaders or political opponents and then offer their own solution based on these options which is somewhere between the options of the others. That is, their argumentation follows the model: a thesis (politician A's solution), another thesis (or an antithesis; politician B's solution) and then finally a synthesis (their own solution). Their argumentation thus builds on previous argumentation.

9.2.2 Russia-NATO relations

Nash Dom – *Rossia* politicians see that NATO enlargement signifies the isolation of Russia and the betrayal of certain promises, in particular, the promise of a United Europe. There might be a 'trauma' caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union among many Russians, and now this 'trauma' is appearing in the *emphasis for unity and for more integration*.

2 Seleznev's party has been classified as spoiler party (see e.g. March 2006).

Concerning a special case in Russia-NATO relations and a proposed analogy to the situation in Chechnia, that is, the conflict in Kosovo, NDR politicians seek reasons for the conflict and find them in the weakness of Russia – it cannot oppose American hegemony. NATO actions signify a violation of international law because Yugoslavia is a sovereign country. So the NATO operation cannot be classified as humanitarian intervention, rather the real goal is to divide Yugoslavia. The Serbs are certainly not the only guilty ones. This portrays NDR's interpretation of world politics in general. Russia should safeguard the multipolar world and equality, but Russia's weakness results in situations like this. NDR politicians also worry about the impact of the conflict on Russia – US relations and its impact on the domestic political situation (the threat of 'national-patriotic forces' coming into power is growing). This worry is shared by the democratic opposition.

All the parties despise the military nature of the enlargement. However, in the 1990s, NDR politicians admitted that Russia was a threat to itself, in particular the state of the army, its defeat in Chechnia and the fact that Russia was not attractive enough as a partner. Concerning Kosovo, all but KPRF politicians (explicitly) condemn the actions of Milosevic, but at the same time want to say that the Serbs are not the only wrong-doers. With the exceptions of Popkovich from Nash Dom – Rossiia and Ziuganov of KPRF, all the Russian politicians under examination here oppose Russia getting involved in the military conflict.

Otechestvo politicians continue advocating the modernization of NATO (or expressing disappointment over the fact that it has not been modernized) into a political organization. According to them, Russia can never become a NATO member. Enlargement is *isolating* Russia. It is also proof of the fact that Russia has no significant influence in the world. This is contrary to Russian aspirations, according to which Russia should be seen as *an equal actor and partner*. Concerning Kosovo, for *Otechestvo* (as for NDR) the Kosovo operation is not a humanitarian intervention, rather is about dividing Yugoslavia; it is to punish Yugoslavia. The West again has double standards. *Otechestvo* politicians also draw up an analogy of Kosovo and Chechnia and talk about the Chechenization of Kosovo. The analogy includes a reference to the nature of Chechens and Albanians (Kosovars), according to which they are not real Muslims but mere criminals.

In the public argumentation of *Edinstvo* politicians in 1999–2003 we cannot find many references to NATO, but what we can find is that *Edinstvo* argues for Russia's equal position and status, and notices that Russia and NATO share mutual interests, which have to do with eliminating international terrorism. *Edinstvo* politicians also emphasize the fact that NATO should be transformed into a political organization. In the Kosovo argumentation, the NATO operation is interpreted as an act of aggression against a sovereign state and a fear of unipolarity is expressed.

For *Iabloko*, NATO enlargement stands for one-sided security, the betrayal and isolation of Russia and the creation of a new dividing line in Europe. However, later on, in *Iabloko* argumentation, there is speculation about Russia's membership in NATO. This would only be possible if Russia was given the veto right in this organization and if both Russia and NATO

were determined to change. NATO membership would actually coincide with Russia's national interests. As early as in 1997, Iavlinskii argues that the interests of Russia and NATO countries are congruent. However, democracy in Russia would be required otherwise Russia would not be taken seriously by the West. Iabloko politicians advocate 'European orientation' in all of their argumentation. However, this does not mean that they do not also accuse the West of having double standards and condemn the humanitarian intervention principle, which, according to their interpretation, might extend from Bosnia and Kosovo to the Caucasus.

Iabloko politicians are realists in the sense that they say that enlargement cannot be stopped, however, some concessions should be required for this. Iabloko politicians often bring up the theme of the skills and expertise of diplomats and of political leaders. They refer to 'know-how', or 'the wit of diplomacy' and from time to time seem to be ashamed of Russian diplomats or politicians who are not skilful or competent or civilized. So it is partly the diplomats' and political leaders' own fault that there is no reciprocity in the relations with the West and that Russia has no equal status. If Russia is not treated equally, it is not the question – as some other politicians claim – of anti-Russian sentiments or some kind of conspiracy against Russia.

Iabloko politicians do not argue that NATO or NATO enlargement would be a security threat to Russia. This is in contrast to promises that have been made and to the idea of an all-European security and thus causes disappointment in democrats and jeopardizes the democratic development of Russia. So NATO and NATO enlargement (or the 'behaviour' of the West in general) is seen as a threat to the democratic development of Russia; the domestic policy consequences are the most worrisome.

As for other Russian politicians, for Iabloko politicians the Kosovo operation means a violation of international law and a punishment for those who are not NATO members. Again they are worried in particular about the impact on Russia – US relations and more so about the impact on the democratic development in Russia. They also refer to the double standards of the West. They argue for continuing the active policy but still criticize Russian diplomats and political leaders insisting that the mediator policy be changed. However, the mediator policy is to be carried out on Russia's own terms and not those of NATO or the US. Still, Russia is seen as the only possible instance for solving the conflict.

As mentioned above, Iabloko politicians are the only ones who represent Serbia or Serb nationalism as a warning example for Russia. Russia or any other multinational country should not adopt nationalism based on one nation as a state strategy. They also use the analogy of Kosovo and Chechnia and actually explain the second war in Chechnia partly as an 'echo of Kosovo', maintaining that there would probably not have been a second war in Chechnia if it had not been for NATO's Kosovo operation.

KPRF politicians argue most clearly and strongly that NATO enlargement is *a serious threat to Russia's security and sovereignty*. Here again we see a major difference in argumentation between the communist and the democratic opposition. For *KPRF*, the enlargement also means new dividing lines, as other politicians have argued too. Instead, Russia could act as a guarantee for the security of everyone. NATO and its supporters in Moscow hinder Russia's

traditional influence and equality. NATO represents *American hegemony*. As an alternative to NATO cooperation, KPRF offers a union between Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, or more cooperation between a united Europe and Russia, or between Russia, India, China and the Arab countries. In KPRF argumentation, double opposition appears, that is, against the Russian leadership and against the West. KPRF politicians also use the analogy of Hitler's Germany (third *Reich*) and today's US and NATO (fourth *Reich*), which are approaching Russia's borders.

Concerning the Kosovo operation, KPRF politicians again argue against unipolarity and highlight the value of the sovereignty of Yugoslavia (and that of Russia). It is Yugoslavia that the Russian politicians are talking about, and not Serbia. For the Russian politicians, Serbia is Yugoslavia, and its unity and integrity are sacred like those of the Russian Federation. The Kosovo operation reveals the aggressive world order and is all about transatlantic interests. It signifies an attempted move to the new world order and that the myth of the democratic West is ruined. Russia is represented as a main player in the Balkans and in the world in general.

Unlike other parties, KPRF uses the enemy within discourse: Gorbachev and Eltsin play in accordance with the world oligarchy, which represents a 'liberal fascist dictatorship'. But Ziuganov, the KPRF leader, is sure that there will not be an end of history. What have been read in Russia are Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and Fukuyama's End of History theses.³ The latter analysis is denied and the former is taken as a threat which is to be prevented, but the possibility of this clash is taken seriously.

TABLE 40 presents a summary of the geopolitical storylines on the first and second war in Chechnia and on NATO enlargement and NATO's Kosovo operation. There are no major changes in Iabloko's or KPRF argumentation between the first and second Chechen war storylines, except for the fact that in Iabloko's argumentation there is more pessimism and no longer any reference to Chechnia's independence. Nash Dom – Rossiia's storyline has changed the most. The storylines of all the parties on NATO enlargement and on the special case in Russia-NATO relations, that is, on the Kosovo operation are very similar to each other. The years in brackets refer to the years from which there are primary data on these cases.

What certainly unites the two cases – Chechnia and NATO argumentation – is that both of them are to some extent defined as consequences of Russia's weakness by most Russian politicians, weakness that manifests itself both in Russia's territory as well as in the international arena. The wars in Chechnia and NATO's enlargement and the Kosovo operation could be interpreted as echoes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crisis of Russia's statehood. From this interpretation stems the emphasis on strengthening the state and safeguarding the integrity of the Federation.

3 See Tsygankov 2003b.

TABLE 40.
Geopolitical storylines on Chechnia and NATO

		STORYLINES ON			
Party		Chechnia I (1994–1998)	Chechnia II (1999–2003)	NATO enlargement (1994–2003)	NATO & Kosovo (1998–2003)
Party of Power	<i>Nash Dom – Rossiia</i>	Democratic Russia is protecting its citizens against Chechnia, which violates laws and human rights.	Russia is fighting against terrorism to keep it from expanding.	Enlargement equals to the betrayal and the isolation of Russia.	Intervention into a sovereign country is violating international law and part of American hegemony aspirations.
	<i>Otechestvo</i>	N/A	Russia is defending unity but lacks popular support in Chechnia.	Speculation about Russia's membership is a trap.	The goal of the NATO operation is to break Yugoslavia apart.
	<i>Edinstvo</i>	N/A	Chechnia is a hotbed of terrorism which can be purified by eliminating the terrorists.	N/A	The NATO operation equals to one-sided aggression.
Democratic Opposition	<i>Iabloko</i>	Russia's undemocratic leaders are threatening Russia's democracy and unity.	Chechnia is a sad example of the incompetence and greed for power of Russian and Chechen leaders – problems should be solved by negotiations.	NATO is isolating Russia and threatening all-European security interests.	NATO's Kosovo operation is destroying democratic development in Russia.
Communist Opposition	<i>Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii</i>	Russian democrats and Chechen nationalists are breaking Russia apart and Russia needs to be saved by real patriots.	Chechnia is the most violent symptom of Russia's illness which can be cured by a change of regime.	NATO enlargement is a manifestation of American dictatorship.	Russia should stop NATO aggression by creating a counter-bloc.

9.3 REMARKS ON POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION

Political argumentation is all about the potential future. It is about allegedly shared ideals (e.g. democracy, peace, progress, modernization, socialism, great power status, respect and honour, sovereignty, territorial and political unity) in the present time as well as in the future, and about shared goals to be fulfilled in the future. It is also about the shared – glorious or bitter – past upon which we construct our present and future. Moreover, it concerns (the shared understanding of) threats in the future, and promises about how to prevent those threats from becoming a reality. Political argumentation is about finding a consensus, generating knowledge together, challenging and beating your rivals, struggling for power, generating disagreement and presenting your knowledge as the only possible truth.

If we accept the claim that argumentation is field-dependent, that is, different justifications (data, warrant, backing) are used and required, e.g., in the field of law than in the field of medicine, but at the same time accept the claim that there is still one model which can describe the structure of the argument in all these fields, then when studying arguments of Russian politicians we can find evidence that this universal model is applicable to Russian argumentation, too. Moreover, we find that in political argumentation there are various ways (all those used in the field of law or in the sciences) to justify the claim. Politics in this way transcends all these fields; the audience is not only people in a given field, but all people in all fields.

We may also ask whether Russian politicians are capable of arguing in public and whether there is any point in trying to analyse their rhetoric. Do Russian politicians merely present claims, or are they able (and willing) to justify their claims? Do they try to convince and persuade us, instead of just telling us how things are and what we should do? My assumption, based on my earlier reading of Russian politicians' texts, was that parties of power use less argumentation and opposition parties more. And, now as a result of my analyses, this proves to be right. Sometimes it was difficult to find any 'proper' arguments especially from Edinstvo politicians (and some Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians before them). It is, of course, difficult to say whether this has to do with *their inability to argue in public* (they do not know how to) or *their unwillingness to argue in public*. Accordingly, we may ask whether they see Russia's relations with one of its subjects and with the Trans-Atlantic military organization as irrelevant, where there are other issues they would rather argue about, or whether they see their position as such that they do not have to argue, that is, to produce the grounds for their claims, to discuss their claims in the light of counterarguments, and to appeal to some more general idea. Undoubtedly, this also depends on the context, the period that I am studying and the position of the party of power. They do not need to convince the electorate to join their side, it already has, and if it has not, the administrative resources will force it to. This also tells us a lot about the Russian party system and political system in general. However, it must be mentioned that KPRF politicians also argue without any 'hard evidence' and trust that the audience will have confidence in their expertise, regard them as an authority, or share the same ideals and goals as KPRF politicians.

Even though Toulmin's model has been very useful in the study of Russian political rhetoric, it must be mentioned that perhaps in the future we could do with a less detailed model of analysis. As argued in Chapter 5, there are problems with the model that have been recognized by other scholars, such as with the warrants – hypothetical statements – and with the data and the backings. These problems also became evident in the analyses. Initially, I wondered what the difference between data and backings is and whether they are not the same. First, there is data produced (supporting the claim), then a generalized hypothetical statement justifying the step from the data to the claim (warrant) and finally there is backing supporting the warrant, so are they not the same? However, as we saw in the analyses, they are not the same even though they might be similar to each other.

9.4 PARTIES OF POWER VERSUS OPPOSITION PARTIES

What can we say about Russian parties, about parties of power and opposition parties based on the argumentation analysis? As we saw in the analyses, and what should be emphasized is that *if we are to compare parties of power with opposition parties, we find significant differences in the argumentation concerning the internal threat, but not as many differences in the argumentation concerning the external threat.* Hence, the definitions of the internal threat or of Russo-Chechen relations in general vary between the parties of power, the democratic and the communist opposition. However, when it comes to the external threat, the definitions and solutions are much more similar. What unites the opposition parties in both cases is, of course, their criticism against the ruling power, the Russian leadership. Otherwise, the *justifications for the claims and the solutions to the perceived problems in the democratic and in the communist opposition are at the opposite end of the spectrum.* Thus, there is no single opposition in Russia; rather there are various oppositions. Moreover, a party might present opposition in one case and in one context, but not in another. In other words, the opposition position is not something permanent, but varies from one case to another. However, we also noticed that parties are not completely homogenous, but that there are varying arguments expressed within the parties.

For example in KPRF, there were different lines between Seleznev and Ziuganov, and this has been noticed in the general ideology, for example, by Luke March.⁴ In the early 2000s, Seleznev runs more along the line of Putin, and this preceded the dismissal of Seleznev from the party and the establishing of his own party (with the help of the Kremlin). As to today's situation, Korguniuk states that there is no opposition to Ziuganov in KPRF and that those who opposed him have left.⁵ In Iabloko, too, there were differences between Iavlinskii and Lukin. However, other leading figures were more on Iavlinskii's line, such as Mitrokhin and Arbatov. Those who did not disagree have also left: Lukin is no longer a member of Iabloko,

⁴ March 2002.

⁵ Korguniuk 19 April 2007, author's interview.

but a Duma ombudsman for human rights and Igrunov, one of the founders, has left the party. Parties of power more or less follow the president's or government's argumentation, but there is a difference between the Eltsin and Putin eras. Nash Dom – Rossiia was not pleased with the president's (and in the end, the government's) policy and tried to build an independent line. However, it was not a party of Eltsin in the same way that Edinstvo or Edinaia Rossiia are parties of Putin, that is, Eltsin did not want to identify with NDR. In the end, Nash Dom – Rossiia did not have any government positions either.

What also needs to be taken into account when analysing the argumentation of different parties and using as part of the primary data interviews published in Russian newspapers is that the questions posed to different politicians and to representatives of different parties vary. To the representatives of the executive power, such as Viktor Chernomyrdin from Nash Dom – Rossiia, Sergei Shoigu or Boris Gryzlov from Edinstvo or later Edinaia Rossiia (at a certain period of time they were federal ministers, but also representatives of parties of power) questions asked concerned more the current state of affairs and what the government was doing about it. To the 'opposition' questions concerned more how things should be and what they think about e.g. the government's action or inaction. So, there is a certain scene set for their answers beforehand.

What about the future of the parties studied here? Parties of power changed from one election to another in 1995, 1999 and 2003. However, we will also see Edinaia Rossiia in the elections of 2007 and in addition, a rival party of power, *Spravedlivaia Rossiia* (Just Russia). The ratings for Edinaia Rossiia have been high and the results of the parliamentary elections of 14 different subjects of the Federation in March 2007 were not poor either. President Putin's announcement to head the list of Edinaia Rossiia in the elections will boost the rating of this party of power.⁶ So I suppose that what Golosov and Likhenstein argued holds true: as long as the party of power is able to maintain a majority in the parliament, the costs of creating a new structure are higher than keeping the old, so it will be used in the future as well for the purpose of supporting the president in the parliament. It is, however, difficult to predict the situation as we do not know for sure who the candidates for the presidency in 2008 will be, or whether the constitution will be amended so that the prime minister would have more power than the president.⁷

Iabloko did not reach the five per cent threshold in the parliamentary elections of 2003 and thus is no more a visible actor in politics at the federal level. Andrei Riabov from Mos-

6 Some commentators forecast two thirds, some even 90 per cent of the vote for Edinaia Rossiia (see Rossiiskaia gazeta, Nezavisimaia gazeta, Moskovskie novosti, Pravda, 2 October 2007). Putin's announcement is also said to be a hard blow to Mironov, leader of Spravedlivaia Rossiia, and means that SR can no longer call itself as Putin's party.

7 In the spring of 2007 there were two 'official' candidates; Sergei Ivanov and Dmitrii Medvedev, both of them deputy prime ministers. There has, however, been speculation about other candidates, such as Naryshkin, deputy prime minister; Serdiukov; defence minister; Iakunin, the head of Russian Railways; and again, about changing the constitution so that Putin could continue for a third term. However, it has also been argued that it does not matter who the candidates are, but what groups stand behind them and what kind of political system they prefer (Riabov 2007, author's interview). In September 2007, the situation again changed, the new Prime Minister Zubkov was seen as another serious candidate.

cow Carnegie Centre and Iurii Korguniuk from the Centre of Political Technology (*Tsentr Politicheskikh Tekhnologii*) see no chances for Iabloko in the future.⁸ New figures and a new organization would have been required to represent that part of Russian society who still upheld the values that were advocated by Iabloko.⁹ It has also been argued that KPRF is an actor of the past and is not able to adapt to the new circumstances of the Putin era.¹⁰ There are contrary estimations too, Korguniuk argues that KPRF will do pretty well in the next elections and will become the number two party after Edinaia Rossiia.¹¹

In 2002 Iurii Korguniuk forecast that all the existing parties were transitional parties or parties of the transition period in Russia, and that there would be different parties in the short-term future.¹² It is true that some of the parties studied here have either disappeared from the political arena at the turn of the century or will probably do so within the next two decades (or at least from the centre of political arena). However, the politicians have continued and will continue to be public figures for the rest of the decade and some of them for the next, and the marginalized position of these parties and their politicians in federal level politics does not mean that their argumentation, if not directly supported by some groups of Russian society and leadership, then may at least either reflect or, to some extent, have an effect on them. And most importantly, the arguments that they have raised will re-appear somewhat altered for years to come if the context does not radically change, as have many of the ideas that have survived on which they base their arguments. How they will be used and by whom cannot be predicted.

If we are to study the arguments of Russian political parties with State Duma representation from 2007 onwards, it is certain that we would take at least Edinaia Rossiia and KPRF as objects of the analysis. Of course, at the time of writing, we do not yet know the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections or the fate of *Spravedliivaia Rossiia* or LDPR. If we were to study active political actors in Russia (other than *vlast*), the parties might no longer be the right objects, but we might turn to another group, for example, the youth movements.

9.5 GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS AND IMAGINATION

As we saw in the analysis chapters 6–8, the geopolitical vision remains almost the same from time to time, from context to context. There are some permanent, continuous ideas that we can find in the context-bound argumentation of the parties. However, there are some differences

8 Author's interviews in Moscow April 2007.

9 There are also differences within Iabloko, that is, the St. Petersburg organization has been active in *Drugaia Rossiia* or *Marshi nesoglasnykh* but the party leadership in Moscow has not officially participated in this new opposition movement.

10 March 2006.

11 Korguniuk 2007, author's interview.

12 Author's interview with Korguniuk in May 2002. In 2007 Korguniuk states that Russia has a pseudo-party system. None of Sartori's party system models corresponds to Russia's system.

that should be noted too. I have made a summary of the geopolitical visions¹³ of parliamentary parties in the context of an internal and external threat and this summary can be found below in TABLE 41. In the context of the first war in Chechnia and in the context of the second war in Chechnia, *the definition of Russia's mission and model it is to follow changes most visibly for Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians*. That is, during the first war, for NDR, Russia's mission and model to follow clearly included democracy, but in the beginning of the second war, elimination of terrorism, setting up order and respecting the sovereignty principle seemed to override democracy. This has to do with the changed circumstances in Chechnia itself but also with the changed position of the party. It must also be taken into account that Nash Dom – Rossiia existed only at the beginning of the war and that the analysis thus only concerns the very beginning of the war (only the year 1999; the offensive was started in September 1999; the party did not make the 5% threshold in the party lists to the State Duma and was later dissolved). Secondly, we should note that KPRF added to its 'enemy list' (or they now appear in this context) a new world order, globalization etc., as opposed to during the first war when the main enemy was the Russian leadership who allowed the collapse of the Soviet Union. *During the first war in Chechnia the most similar to each other in one sense were Nash Dom – Rossiia and Iabloko*, if we look at Russia's model and mission as represented by them. However, an extremely important difference between these parties was that the former, as a *party of power*, argued that *Russia represents democracy and follows democratic principles, whereas Iabloko, as an opposition party, argued that Russia did not, even though it should*. As mentioned above, what is common to both opposition parties, Iabloko and KPRF, is that they blamed the then Russian leadership for most of the miseries in the world, or at least in Russia.

Then, if we compare the geopolitical vision based on the argumentation on the conflicts in Chechnia (an internal threat) and on the argumentation on NATO enlargement (an external threat) and the conflict in Kosovo, then we notice that, regardless of their position in the party system, whether a party of power or an opposition party, *they all define enemies as those who violate the sovereignty principle and advocate 'humanitarian intervention' and want to re-divide Europe. Accusing the West (or NATO or the US) of double standards in all contexts is also something that unites all the parties examined here*. Russian politicians ask why a factor such as the fight against terrorism or safeguarding territorial integrity, which is permitted for NATO or for the United States is not permitted for Russia. Thus, *all politicians argue for equality in world politics*. The similarity of the geopolitical vision becomes extremely visible in the argumentation on the conflict in Kosovo. Here again, the model and mission of KPRF differs from all other political parties. No other party among the examined ones argues for changing the system or explicitly appealing to Eurasianism and the Soviet past, or for creating anti-NATO or anti-globalization forces.

Moreover, concerning previous research it is important to note that the schools of thought or traditions (geopolitical culture) introduced by Graham Smith, Dmitri Trenin, Andrei Tsyg-

13 The building blocks of the geopolitical vision are based on Dijkink's (1996) definition of a geopolitical vision.

TABLE 41.
Geopolitical visions of parliamentary parties in the context of an internal and an external threat
(the year in brackets refers to the year when the party was established)

'Threat' (the context)	<i>Parties of Power</i>				<i>Democratic Opposition</i>	<i>Communist Opposition</i>
	Nash Dom – Rossiia (est. 1995)	Otechestvo (est. 1998)	Edinstvo (est. 1999)	Iabloko (est. 1993)		
Geopolitical vision components based on Dijkink 1996						
Chechnia – an internal threat	<i>Naturalness of Russia's Borders</i>	Current borders (history of living together and Russian Constitution).	Current borders (history and debt to ancestors).	Current borders (history and popular will).	Current borders (international law and Russian Constitution).	This is not the real Russia, but a stump. The Eurasian Union or the Union of Slavic nations (history and geography, popular will).
	<i>Russia's Enemies</i>	Enemies are those who violate democratic principles, e.g. Chechen leaders (1 st war). Those who threaten integrity and security e.g. some Chechen and Russian politicians, terrorists.	Enemies are those who do not respect unity and those who do not look for a political solution.	Enemies are those who do not respect state unity, e.g. terrorists.	Enemies are those who violate democratic principles, e.g. Russian and Chechen leaders.	Russian leadership, those who allowed the collapse of the union; nationalists of minorities (1 st war) & new world order, globalization, world oligarchy (2 nd war).
	<i>Russia's Mission</i>	Democracy and rule of law (1 st war), and Russia represent these; elimination of terrorism and stop its expansion (2 nd war).	Russia's equal position, political solution, prevent chaos (separatism and terrorism).	Constitutional order, stability, security (=elimination of terrorism).	Democracy and rule of law (1 st war), but Russia does not represent these.	Integrity/unity and friendship between nations, Eurasianism, equality.
	<i>Model for Russia to Follow</i>	Democracy (not for Rokhlin) and unity. Sovereignty (2 nd war).	Integrity and sovereignty; cultural autonomy.	Sovereignty, great power, strong state.	(European) democracy, rule of law and sovereignty.	A union state, great power, strong state, Soviet power.

TABLE 41...

	<i>Parties of Power</i>				<i>Democratic Opposition</i>	<i>Communist Opposition</i>
	Nash Dom – Rossia (est. 1995)	Otechestvo (est. 1998)	Edistvo (est. 1999)	Iabloko (est. 1993)		
"Threat" (the context)	Geopolitical vision components based on Dijkink 1996					
NATO – an external threat	<i>Naturalness of Russia's Borders</i>	See above.	See above.	N/A	See above.	See above.
	<i>Russia's Enemies</i>	Enemies are those who violate international law and do not respect sovereignty.	Enemies are those who are for a unipolar world, global domination, humanitarian intervention; those who do not respect the sovereignty principle and who oppose Russia's equal position.	Enemy is terrorism.	Enemies are those who are for division in Europe and who are for the humanitarian intervention principle and oppose all-European security; incompetent Russian leaders.	Aggressive world oligarchy, globalization and NATO which represents American hegemony, Russia's westernized leadership.
	<i>Russia's Mission</i>	United Europe (active Russia as part of it).	Equality, multipolarity, political solution, Russia as peacemaker.	N/A	European democracy, European values; concerning Kosovo: sovereignty principle and political solution, opposition to nationalism; equal status for Russia.	Socialism with Eurasianism and re-creation of a Union State, opposing American hegemony, new world order, globalization, but also giving Russia (and other suppressed nations) an equal position and safeguarding the sovereignty of Russia.
	<i>Model for Russia to Follow</i>	Democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity; international law.	Sovereignty, equality.	N/A	European democracy, European values, international law.	Soviet power, Socialism with Eurasianism and re-creation of a Union State

ankov or John O'Loughlin, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov cannot be 100 per cent reserved for a body such as a parliamentary party, because parties and even politicians within a party may represent different traditions in different contexts, which has not been left completely unnoticed in previous studies. Therefore, it was important to see how the arguments were actually used by Russian politicians of different parliamentary parties in a certain context and during a longer period of time and whether we can talk about Eurasianists or Westernizers which are the most widely used definitions for the two poles in geopolitical thinking (these might correspond to anti-Western and European traditions in a classification based on Trenin).¹⁴ Nowadays a third tradition – somewhere in the middle – is added to this binary classification, such as Smith's (and later O'Loughlin's et al.) democratic statism and Trenin's Great Russia tradition. I have placed the parties examined here into the previous classifications of geopolitical schools of thought and we can see that the parties may represent more than one school (even in the same classification) at the same time. For example, Iabloko politicians may be taken as representatives of Eurasian democratic statist, non-Eurasian democratic statist, Eurasian stabilizers, Westernizers and European tradition. However, based on my analysis, we can see that the previous classifications otherwise more or less hold true when challenged by the systematic analysis of parliamentary parties' argumentation on an internal threat and an external threat.

On the current situation and the traditions of Westernism and Eurasianism, I would argue that today we can witness that these two schools of thought have merged with each other to a certain extent, into forces loyal to Putin, or temporarily into the anti-orange movement in 2005.¹⁵ What Putin and forces loyal to him want to do is exactly what both of these schools or traditions have advocated, that is, to catch up with the West and to remain unique, to keep the special Russian characteristic, to achieve both modernization and protect Russia's unique civilization. So there is one group that strives for both of these goals and these forces would be compete with each other on different sides.

Moreover, Sergei Prozorov writes about the change which has taken place between the 1990s and the first three or four years of the 21st century. A new hegemonic discourse, that of conservatism, has emerged in Russia. Prozorov argues that "conservatism has functioned as a modality of political identification that ventures to transcend the dualisms, characteristic of the Russian politics of the late 1980s and the 1990s, most notably, 'democrats' vs. 'communists' and 'liberals' vs. 'patriots'. The claim to hegemony is thus strongly tied in with overcoming

14 E.g. Pursiainen and Patomäki (2005) argue that Westernism and Slavophilism continue to have a great impact on Russian political thought and on the division of political actors. Pursiainen and Patomäki argue that the question has been and continues to be whether Russia should follow the path of universal modernization (Westernism) or rely on a culture-centred particularism (Slavophilism). Accordingly, they argue that contemporary Russian political thought is rooted in this fundamental juxtaposition and the dividing line still runs between Zapadniki of all kinds and Slavophiles, which today might be called Eurasianists or national-patriots.

15 After the revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and most significantly in Ukraine in 2005.

TABLE 42.
Geopolitical schools/traditions and parliamentary parties. Old classification – new places.

	Smith 1999		Tsygankov 2003a				Trenin 2002				O'Loughlin et al. 2006			
	Party*	Eurasianism	Eurasianism	Expansionists	Civilizationists	Stabilizers	Geoeconomists	Westernism	Anti-Western	Great Russia	European	Westernizers	Democratic Statists	Neo-Eurasianists and Neo-Communists
		<i>New Right</i>												
		<i>Eurasian Communists</i>												
		<i>Dem. Statism</i>												
Party of Power	NDR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	OTE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	EDI	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)
Democratic Opposition	IAB	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Communist Opposition	KPRF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

* NDR= Nash Dom – Rossia, OTE= Orechestvo, EDI= Edinstvo, IAB= Iabloko, KPRF= Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii

the political polarisation [...].”¹⁶ According to Prozorov, discourses of conservatism cannot be approached with “such dualisms as liberal/statist, Westernizer/Slavophile, modern/post-modern”, because these discourses “override these very oppositions and whose political success is precisely owing to this transcendence.”¹⁷ In my analysis, transcending these binary oppositions became evident when analysing Edinstvo’s/Edinaia Rossiia’s argumentation. That is, concerning the two cases, we discovered that Edinstvo combined elements from ‘Great Power, strong state, no intervention in internal affairs/sovereignty’ discourses with those of ‘cooperation with the US/the West, integration into international organizations’ discourses. It should be mentioned here that if Iabloko is classified as a representative of Russia’s Westernizer or pro-Western tradition (and this is partly true), Westernism in Iabloko’s case certainly does not mean truckling to the West. So even if democratic values are the guiding line for Iabloko, it does not mean that democratic states in the West would not be criticized by Iabloko if they deserved it in Iabloko politicians’ view, e.g. concerning NATO’s Kosovo operation. Thus, we cannot say that Iabloko would ever have been a ‘pure’ example of Russia’s Westernizing tradition. Even if the West, or in particular Europe, had been models to follow, they would certainly not have been models which should be followed *blindly*. As for KPRF, the data used in this study give no evidence of transcending any opposition: KPRF is nationalist and anti-Western and emphasizes Russia’s uniqueness and its Eurasian nature. It is true that KPRF is not a leftist party as understood in the West (this is no novel discovery), but nationalism has always played a very important part in its rhetoric.

If we then return to Agnew’s concept of the modern geopolitical imagination introduced in Chapter 3, we can say that of the four fundamentals characterising modern geopolitical imagination we can find traces of at least the first one in Russian thinking: the global vision, the division of the world, a natural gaze, a view from nowhere, and also of the third one: the state-centric understanding of spatiality of power, the so called territorial trap. In addition, there are some traces of the second one: translation of time into space, that different geographical areas would be on a different state of historical development, and of the fourth one: that the pursuit of one state’s interests is relative in relation to the pursuit of some other state’s interests. Let me make myself clear on this issue. The first point needs no further clarification, because all politicians structure the world according to certain (geographical) features such as the poor South, rich North, West and anti-West. With the second one I mean that all Russian politicians under examination here maintain *total state sovereignty as an ideal*, however, there is variation on how seriously they see the possibility of any state assuming such sovereignty. They all admit that in today’s world, state sovereignty has weakened, but how to strengthen it and whether it is even possible to strengthen it, varies. With the third point I refer to the fact that some politicians

16 Accordingly, conservatism has become “a marker of the emergent ideological hegemony in the Putin presidency”. However, there is no single ‘conservative discourse’ in Russia, but it is “fragmented into two antagonistic perspectives [...] liberal and left conservatisms [...] and] this line of fragmentation is a key constitutive dualism in the contemporary Russian political space” (Prozorov 2004, 4).

17 Ibid.

consider Russia as being either as backward or forward, on a way to something in the past or in the future and that some others are either on a higher or lower level of this development. We can refer here to Ziuganov of KPRF: Russia has experience and qualifications that no other country has. According to the communists, Russia is unique and capable of leading the forces against American hegemony and globalization. Iabloko politicians then use Europe as a point of comparison, as something worth aspiring to (but not without criticism). If we return to the Eurasianism of the 1920s and 1930s, we can see that they opposed this thinking of universal measures of development, or of a universal concept of culture. They opposed setting Europe up as an ideal measure to which all others would be compared. However, at the same time they set Russia up as an ideal for other Eurasian peoples, Russia was the first among equals. The last point, the relative nature of interests or that it is a zero sum game (that if a state fulfils its interests, it will be subtracted from some other state's interests) is not frequently present in Russian politicians' argumentation, because usually they emphasize the need for cooperation and the sharing of mutual interests. However, there are also concerns about American hegemony among all politicians, about the US or NATO fulfilling their interests at the expense of Russia. If all the others join NATO, it is subtracted from Russia's security. This line of thinking is mostly present in KPRF and parties of power.

To conclude, this study has shown that there is no single Russia or single Russian position on e.g. Chechnia or NATO, but rather there are various positions which vary in accordance with the source, context and time. Europeans should not treat Russia as one homogeneous entity, but likewise Russians should not group the 'West' under one single position. It is important to recognize the differences between different politicians and groups, differences in public opinion from one country to another and within these countries. I would argue that this study has provided Russian Studies and Political Science with new information on Russian parliamentary parties and their rhetoric, in particular concerning Chechnia and NATO and more generally concerning geopolitical thinking of different parties. It has re-affirmed some of the previous studies on Russian politics, but has also challenged some over-generalizing categorizations of Russian political parties and geopolitical traditions. It has answered the questions set in the Introduction, Research Agenda and Data and Method Chapters, on the similarities and differences between the representatives of the parties of power, the democratic and communist opposition, and on their geopolitical visions. However, together with the answers, it has brought up new questions which still remain unanswered. How will circumstances for the opposition to operate change and what will be the most significant opposition groups in the future? We might also ask whether the current tendency – power as a monopoly to speak as referred to above – can be defined as any power any longer, and whether the executive power will eventually lose its support when trying to gather it and impose its power against all other actors in society. And whether it will lose those willing to cooperate and eventually the ability to get anything through (except by coercion). Moreover, we might ask whether the current opposition or some new opposition forces would have the opportunity to strengthen themselves and to gather support, and whether this attempt to “monopolize the right to speak”

would enable the opposition to act as a united front. These important questions remain open for further examination. Moreover, we may ask what meaning, if any, political parties will have in the political system in the future. What does geopolitics mean to Russians? How it is taught and studied e.g at universities? Moreover, many questions of great importance on the surface of Russian Studies and Political Science require our attention in the future as well. We may also ask how an area study specialist could contribute to the fields of Political Science and International Relations, Political Geography and vice versa. Many questions are of a multidisciplinary nature and require cooperation between scholars of different disciplines in order to be answered. This study has already hinted at the fact that transcending disciplinary boundaries is possible and might even be essential for finding answers to broader questions.

Epilogue

If we look at the elections to the State Duma on 2 December 2007 from the point of view of the parties that were examined in this study, we can argue that the campaign and the results of the elections brought no surprises. The campaign was dominated by Edinaia Rossiia and the number one on the party list – President Putin. The real discussion and opposition action were marginalized and so-called administrative resources were used with no sense of decency. Edinaia Rossiia did not participate in the election debates on television – the party again denied the chance for politics and for public discussion. Edinaia Rossiia and the president himself considered the election result (64.1 % of the vote) a sign of confidence in President Putin, and to some extent, in the government and the party itself. Putin can now be called a “national leader”.¹ The task of the Edinaia Rossiia party is now to develop the national economy (to put Russia among the top five national economies) and solve social problems in Russia such as poverty.² Liudmila Alekseeva, chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group, was certain that Edinaia Rossiia’s victory in the elections was a prerequisite for amending the constitution in the future.³

As many commentators predicted, the democratic or liberal opposition did not pass the seven per cent threshold. Iabloko managed to get 1.6% of the vote and SPS only one per cent. However, the Iabloko leader, Grigorii Iavlinskii, felt that Iabloko’s task had been accomplished: Iabloko politicians had been able to warn society about the dangers of a one-party system and about the dangers of a totalitarian leader.⁴ In addition, they had been able to present Russian voters with a real alternative – one without nationalism, Communism-Stalinism or corruption. However, it is still unclear whether these election results were a final blow to Iabloko, or whether it can survive without a parliamentary faction for the second four-year Duma session in a row. It is also still unclear whether the democratic opposition will be able to agree on a single candidate to run for presidency, or whether some parties/movements will decide to boycott the presidential elections in March 2008.

1 Ilin, Aleksei, Zakatnova, Anna, Vladimir Kuzmin, Pavel Dulman and Per Sidibe, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 3 December 2007, *Za nashu pobedu! Rossiiane prishli na vybory i podderzhali Vladimira Putina*, available at <http://www.rg.ru/2007/12/3/vibori-putin.html> and www.rg.ru/2007/12/03/putin-doverie-anons.html; accessed on 3 December 2007.

2 Ibid.

3 Alekseeva, Liudmila, *Moskovskie Novosti*, Liudmila Alekseeva: Upravliaemyi parlament nuzhen dlia izmeneniia Konstittutsii. (Moskovskie Novosti referring to an interview on *Radio Svoboda*), available at <http://www.mn.ru/print/news/news/62310.html>, accessed on 3 December 2007.

4 Iavlinskii, Grigorii. *Radio Svoboda*, 3 December 2007, available at http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2007/2007_12/071203_svob_yavl.html

The Communists (KPRF) came second with 11.6% of the vote which actually means that the number of KPRF's seats increases. However, Ziuganov and Melnikov of KPRF immediately announced that the elections were a 'total falsification' (*totalnaia falsifikatsiia*) and there had been just too many violations in the elections.⁵ KPRF politicians decided to arrange a protest against these elections and argued that they would even give up their seats if a re-election was arranged.⁶ KPRF claimed to be the only opposition party left in the next Duma, and the only party representing democracy.

Thus, the party of power, Edinaia Rossiia, the communist opposition, KPRF, and the democratic opposition, Iabloko, continue to occupy the positions held in 2003, when my studies ended - Edinaia Rossiia claiming to be above politics and adopting the role of a technocrat 'putting things right' and of a safeguard of national values. As for the opposition, it claims to be for the people and for safeguarding democracy, and accuses the power of violating the rules of democracy. However, drawing any definite conclusions on what the argumentation and geopolitical visions of these parties today comprise would require a more comprehensive study than time allows for this epilogue. Accordingly, it provides a topic for further studies in contemporary Russian politics.

Tampere, Finland, 3 December 2007

5 *Moskovskie Novosti*, 3 December 2007, KPRF reshila protestovat protiv "griaznykh, protivopravnykh parlamentskikh vyborov", (Moskovskie Novosti referring to Interfaks), available at www.mn.ru/issue/media/31474.html, accessed on 3 December 2007.

6 *Ibid.* (Moskovskie Novosti referring to Novyi Region and an interview on Ekho Moskvyy).

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APPENDIX 1.

POLITICIANS OF THE PARTIES AND THE COMMANDS OF THE SEARCHES USED IN COLLECTING THE DATA IN THE INTEGRUM DATABASE

The politicians selected for searches from each party are presented in alphabetical order in the tables (leaders of the parties have been written in bold print). There were phases in collecting the data (and thus different commands), but the final lists are presented below.¹ In the search commands there are some of the names of the politicians which had been used in previous stages of the searches, but which later were excluded.

TABLE 1.
Nash Dom – Rossiia politicians selected for searches (1995–1999)

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Andreev, Aleksei</i> 17 February 1958	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs
<i>Beliaev, Sergei</i> 6 April 1954	Chair of the parliamentary faction January 1996 – August 1997, then member of Russian regions faction, member of the Duma Committee on Property, Privatization and Economics
<i>Boskholov, Sergei</i> 6 July 1950	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security (formerly a member of PRES, deputy in the first Duma as well, deputy chair of PRÉS faction)
<i>Chernomyrdin, Viktor</i> 9 April 1938	Leader of Nash Dom – Rossiia, Prime Minister 1995-1998, not a member of the parliamentary faction²
<i>Kuvshinov, Aleksandr</i> 13 October 1951	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics
<i>Paradiz, Aleksandr</i> 1 January 1949	Member of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, left the NDR faction in October 1999.

1 I have used the information on politicians available on the State Duma website <http://www.duma.gov.ru> *Sostav i struktura GD* and the website of the party in question.

2 In the Russian Federation ministers (or any other persons who have a position in the executive power, like governors) cannot be deputies in the State Duma.

TABLE 1...

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Petrenko, Sergei</i> 6 June 1969	Member of the Duma Committee on Security until 20 March 1996, Member of the Duma Committee on Issues of Nationalities, Chair of the Council of Veterans of the Afghanistan war in Stavropol, left the NDR faction in December 1998.
<i>Pobedinskaia, Liudmila</i> 15 March 1949	Member of the Duma Committee on Security (formerly Deputy of the Federation Council from Murmansk)
<i>Popkovich, Roman</i> 26 January 1937	Member of the Duma Committee on Defence, Chair of the Committee since May 1998
<i>Rokhlin, Lev</i> 6 June 1947 – 3 July 1998	Chair of the Duma Committee on Defence until May 1998, left the NDR faction in August 1997, (former army commander, Chief of the Volgograd garrison, participated in Afghanistan and Chechen wars)
<i>Ryzhkov, Vladimir</i> 3 September 1966	Chair of the parliamentary faction December 1998 – December 1999, in 1997 Deputy Head of the Executive Committee of the movement, First Deputy Speaker of the State Duma August 1997 – December 1998 (formerly a member of the Demokraticeskii vybor Rossii and a Duma deputy in Vybor Rossii faction 1994-1995, but left this and became a member of the Rossiia faction.)
<i>Shokhin, Aleksandr</i> 25 December 1951	Chair of the parliamentary faction, member of the Duma Committee on International Affairs August 1997 – December 1998, but then was nominated Deputy Prime Minister. (1994-1995 elected from the list of PRES, but then left this faction)
<i>Zorin, Vladimir</i> 9 April 1948	Chair of the Duma Committee on Nationalities (the First Deputy Chair of the Territorial Administration of the Federal Organs of the Executive Power in the Chechen republic until his Duma period, leader of the expert group of the delegation of the Russian Federation government in the negotiations in Grozny in 1995, later Minister on Nationalities Issues)

Nash Dom – Rossiia search command:

(/ДТ(01.08.1994-31.12.1999!Д))/(ТТ("Виктор Черномырдин» или «Сергей Беляев» или «Владимир Рыжков» или «Лев Рохлин» или «Олег Сосковец» или «Константин Титов» или «Александр Шохин» или «Никита Михалков» или «Николай Травкин» или «Алексей Андреев» или «Сергей Босхолов» или «Михаил Бугера» или «Олег Гонжаров» или «Владимир Зорин» или «Александр Кувшинов» или «Александр Парадиз» или «Сергей Петренко» или «Людмила Побединская» или «Роман Попкович») или /АВ(«Виктор Черномырдин» или «Сергей Беляев» или «Владимир Рыжков» или «Лев Рохлин» или «Олег Сосковец» или «Константин Титов» или «Александр Шохин» или «Никита Михалков» или «Николай Травкин» или «Алексей

Андреев» или «Сергей Босхолов» или «Михаил Бугера» или «Олег Гонжаров» или «Владимир Зорин» или «Александр Кувшинов» или «Александр Парадиз» или «Сергей Петренко» или «Людмила Побединская» или «Роман Попкович»))((НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или «чеченская война» или «Европейский союз» или Ичкерия или Косово или Кавказ или Сербия или Босния или терроризм или террорист* или Афганистан или «11 сентября 2001 г.» или «Североатлантический союз» или Европа или Запад или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))

TABLE 2.
Otechestvo politicians selected for searches (1998–2003)

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Aslakhanov, Aslanbek</i> 14 March 1942	Member of the Duma committee on Nationalities' Affairs (later Deputy Chair of the Duma committee on State Building), deputy from Chechnia, elected on 20 August 2000 (formerly a deputy of the Russian Federation (1989-), major general), joined the Otechestvo faction in October 2001; became an advisor to the president in October 2003.
<i>Draganov, Valerii</i> 22 April 1951	Member of the Duma Committee on Budget and Taxes, Chair of the Duma Sub-Committee on Customs Affairs (later a member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction, Chair of the Committee on Economic Policy, Entrepreneurship and Tourism)
<i>Grishin, Viktor</i> 17 February 1951	Chair of the Duma Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy (2003- a member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction and Chair of the Duma Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy)
<i>Kokoshin, Andrei</i> 26 October 1945	Deputy Chair of the Committee on Industry, Construction and High Technologies, Chair of the Committee on CIS and Relations with Compatriots, (former secretary of the Security Council 1998, former First Deputy Minister of Defence 1992-1997 (later a member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction and Chair of the committee on the issues of CIS and relations with compatriots)
<i>Korzhakov, Aleksandr</i> 31 January 1950	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Defence, member of the faction, but was not a candidate in their list (Worked in KGB (1970-89), veteran of the Afghanistan war, former member of the CPSU, former 'bodyguard' of Eltsin, headed the Security Service of the President) (in 1996-1999 Duma session an independent deputy) (member of the committee on defence 2003 - , member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction, Deputy Chair of the Committee on Defence)
<i>Kosachev, Konstantin</i> 17 September 1962	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Deputy Chair of the faction (former diplomat, worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example as a interpreter and aid to Prime Ministers Kirienko, Primakov and Stepashin), State councillor (later a member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction, Chair of the Committee on International Affairs)

TABLE 2...

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Kovalev, Nikolai</i> 6 August 1949	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security, member of the Commission on Geopolitics, (former leader of FSB) (later a member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction, Chair of the committee on veteran affairs)
<i>Luzhkov, Iurii</i> 21 September 1936	Leader of the Otechestvo party, Mayor of Moscow, not a member of the parliamentary faction.
<i>Primakov, Evgenii</i> 29 October 1929	Chair of the parliamentary faction (1999-2001), member of the Duma Committee on CIS and Relations with Compatriots (former Prime Minister 1998 – 12 May 1999, former Foreign Minister (until 1998), not a member of the party.
<i>Volodin, Viacheslav</i> 4 February 1964	Chair of the parliamentary faction, member of the Duma Committee on State Building (later the First Deputy Chair of the Edinaia Rossiia faction and Deputy Chair of the State Duma)

Otechestvo search command:

(/ДТ(01.12.1998-31.12.2003!д))(/ТТ("Андрей Кокошин" или "Константин Косачев" или "Валерий Драганов" или "Вячеслав Володин" или "Юрий Лужков" или "Евгений Примаков" или "Асланбек Аслаханов" или "Виктор Гришин" или "Николай Ковалев" или "Александр Коржаков" или "Александр Сизов" или "Светлана Смирнова") или /АВ ("Андрей Кокошин" или "Константин Косачев" или "Валерий Драганов" или "Вячеслав Володин" или "Юрий Лужков" или "Евгений Примаков" или "Асланбек Аслаханов" или "Виктор Гришин" или "Николай Ковалев" или "Александр Коржаков" или "Александр Сизов" или "Светлана Смирнова"))(НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или "чеченская война" или чечен* или «Европейский союз» или Ичкерия или Косово или Кавказ или Сербия или Босния или терроризм или террорист* или Афганистан или «11 сентября 2001 г.» или «Североатлантический союз» или Европа или Запад или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))

TABLE 3.
Edinstvo politicians selected for searches (1999–2003)

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Bicheldei, Kaadyr-ool</i> 2 January 1950	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee for Nationalities' Issues
<i>Burataeva, Aleksandra</i> 30 March 1965	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee of International Affairs, member of the Duma Commission on enabling the political settlement and observance of human rights in the Chechen Republic, formerly an anchor of "Novosti" and "Vremia" on ORT (since 1994) (2003– member of the Committee on Culture)
<i>Gryzlov, Boris</i> 15 December 1950	Chair of the parliamentary faction 2000 – April 2001, Minister of Interior since April 2001 (2003 – leader of the Edinaia Rossiia party and parliamentary faction and Chair of the State Duma)
<i>Gurov, Aleksandr</i> 17 November 1945	Chair of the Duma committee on Security, formerly worked in the militia, Ministry of Interior (2003- member of the Edinaia Rossiia faction, member of the Duma committee on Security)
<i>Klintsevich, Frants</i> 15 June 1957	Deputy Chair of the parliamentary faction, (leader of the former Narodnaia respublikanskaia partiia), Deputy Chair of the Duma Commission on Enabling the Political Settlement and Observance of Human Rights in the Chechen Republic, member of the Duma Committee on Labour and Social Policy, leader of the Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans (2003– Deputy leader of the Edinaia Rossiia faction, member of the Duma committee on Defence)
<i>Lushin, Vladimir</i>	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Defence (only until January 2002) (formerly served in the navy)
<i>Pekhtin, Vladimir</i> 9 December 1950	Chair of the parliamentary faction April 2001–2003 (formerly a member of the Federation Council from Magadansk oblast parliament) (2003– deputy leader of the Edinaia Rossiia parliamentary faction and deputy chair of the State Duma)
Shoigu, Sergei 21 May 1955	Leader of the party, Minister of Emergency situations, not member of the parliamentary faction
<i>Sliska, Liubov</i> 15 October 1953	First Deputy Chair of the Duma (2003– First Deputy Chair of the Duma, member of the Committee on International Affairs)
<i>Tsybakin, Iurii</i> 12 March 1963	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security

Edinstvo search command:

(/ДТ(01.01.2002-31.12.2003!д))(/ТТ "Александра Буратаева" или "Каадыр-оол Бичелдей" или "Владимир Лушин" или "Юрий Цыбакин " или "Александр Гуров" или "Франц Клинецвич" или "Владимир Пехтин" или "Сергей Шойгу" или "Борис Грызлов" или "Любовь Слиска") или /АВ "Александра Буратаева" или "Каадыр-оол Бичелдей" или "Владимир Лушин" или "Юрий Цыбакин " или "Александр Гуров" или "Франц Клинецвич" или "Владимир Пехтин" или "Сергей Шойгу" или "Борис Грызлов" или "Любовь Слиска")) (НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или "чеченская война" или чечен* или «Европейский союз» или Ичкерия или Косово или Кавказ или Сербия или Босния или терроризм или террорист* или Афганистан или «11 сентября 2001 г.» или «Североатлантический союз» или Европа или Запад или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))

TABLE 4.
Iabloko politicians selected for searches (1994–2003)

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Arbatov, Aleksei</i> 17 January 1951	Deputy Chair of the Party, Member of the Duma Committee of Defence 1996–1999, Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee of Defence 2000–2003
<i>Averchev, Vladimir</i> 1 November 1948	Member of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, 1993–1995, 1996–1999
<i>Iavlinskii, Grigorii</i> 10 April 1952	Leader of the Iabloko Association (and the Russian Democratic Party Iabloko) and of the parliamentary faction 1994–2003
<i>Igrunov, Viacheslav</i> 28 October 1948	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on CIS (the second and third Duma), left the party 14 October 2001, still a member of the faction until 2003
<i>Karapetian, Saak</i> 28 March 1960	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security 1996–1999
<i>Lukin, Vladimir</i> 13 July 1937	First Deputy Chair of the Party, Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs 1993–1995, 1996–1999, Vice Speaker of the Duma 2000–2003
<i>Melnikov, Aleksei</i> 8 April 1964	Deputy Chair of the Party, Member of the Duma Committee on Economic Policy 1993–1995, Member of the Duma Committee on Natural Resources 1996–1999, Member of the Duma Committee on Budget and Taxation 2000–2003
<i>Mitrokhin, Sergei</i> 20 May 1963	Deputy Chair of the Party, Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on the Issues of Local Self-Government 1996–1999, 2000–2003
<i>Shchekochikhin, Iurii</i> 9 June 1950 – 3 July 2003	Member 1996–1999 of and Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security 2000–2003

Iabloko search command (only part of the material is collected with the help of Integrum)

(/ДТ(01.01.2002-31.12.2003!Д))/(ТТ("Григорий Явлинский" или "Владимир Лукин" или "Алексей Арбатов" или "Алексей Мельников" или "Вячеслав Игрунов" или "Владимир Аверчев" или "Сергей Митрохин" или "Саак Карапетян" или "Юрий Щекочихин") или /АВ ("Григорий Явлинский" или "Владимир Лукин" или "Алексей Арбатов" или "Алексей Мельников" или "Вячеслав Игрунов" или "Владимир Аверчев" или "Сергей Митрохин" или "Саак Карапетян" или "Юрий Щекочихин")) (НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или "чеченская война" или "Европейский союз" или Ичкерия или Косово или Кавказ или Сербия или Босния или терроризм или террорист* или Афганистан или "11 сентября 2001 г." или "Североатлантический союз" или Европа или Запад или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))

TABLE 5.
KPRF politicians selected for searches (1994-2003)

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Benediktov, Nikolai</i> 3 January 1949	Member of the Duma committee on International affairs 2000–2003, not a Duma deputy in any other sessions of the Duma
<i>Bratishchev, Igor</i> 12 July 1938	Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy 1993–1995, member of the Duma Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy 1996–1999, not a Duma deputy 2000–2003
<i>Budazhabov, Sergei</i> 1 January 1952	Member of the Duma Committee on Nationalities 1996–1999, Deputy Chair of the Duma committee on Nationalities and also member of the Duma Commission for Finding Political Solution and Fulfilling Human Rights in the Chechen Republic 2000–2003
<i>Glazev, Sergei</i> 1 January 1961	Member of the Duma Committee on Credit Organizations and Financial Markets 2000–2003, main author of KPRF's economic programme in 1999 (1994–1995 deputy from Democratic party of Russia, Chair of the Duma committee on economic policy, 1996–1999 not a Duma Deputy, in 2003 co-founder of Rodina party with Dmitri Rozogin)
<i>Goriacheva, Svetlana</i> 3 June 1947	Deputy chair of the Duma (1996–1999), Chair of the Committee on Women, Family and Youth Affairs 2000-2003, was dismissed from the party and faction in July 2002
<i>Iliukhin, Viktor</i> 1 March 1949	Chair of the Duma Committee on Security, 1993–1995, 1996–1999, member of the Committee on Security 2000–2003
<i>Ivanchenko, Leodid</i> 6 June 1942	Chair of the Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy 1996–1999, member of that committee 2000–2003
<i>Kazakovtsev, Vladimir</i> 7 January 1950	Member of the Duma Committee on Health 1996–1999, member of the Duma committee on Nationalities 2000–2003
<i>Krasnitskii, Evgenii</i> 31 January 1951	Member of the Duma Committee on Information Policy and Media 1993–1995, not a Duma deputy after that
<i>Kulikov, Aleksandr</i> 3 December 1950	Member of the Duma Committee on Security, 1996–1999, 2000–2003, not a Duma deputy in 1993–1995
<i>Kuptsov, Valentin</i> 4 December 1937	Member of the Duma Committee on International Affairs 2000–2003 and on Tourism and Sports 1996–1999, not a Duma deputy in 1993–1995
<i>Lukianov, Anatolii</i> 7 May 1930	Member of the Committee on Legislation 1993–1995, Chair of the Committee on Legislation 1996–1999, member of the Committee on State Building 2000–2003
<i>Makashov, Albert</i> 12 June 1938	Member of the Duma Committee on Defence 1996–1999, not a Duma deputy in 1993–1995 or 2000–2003

TABLE 5...

POLITICIAN	POSITION IN THE PARTY/FACTION/STATE DUMA
<i>Masliukov, Iurii</i> 30 September 1937	Chair of the Committee on Economic Policy 1996–1999 and on Industry and Building 2000–2003
<i>Melnikov, Ivan</i> 7 August 1950	Chair of the Committee on Education and Science 1996–1999, member of that committee 2000–2003
<i>Mikhailov, Aleksandr</i> 15 September 1951	Member of the Duma Committee on Defence 1993–1995, 1996–1999 (governor of the Kursk Oblast 20 November 2000-?) the first secretary of the oblast committee of the KPRF
<i>Savitskaia, Svetlana</i> 8 August 1948	Member of the Duma Committee on Defence 1996–1999, 2000–2003, not a Duma deputy in 1993–1995 (a former cosmonaut)
<i>Seleznev, Gennadii</i> 6 November 1947	Deputy Chair of the State Duma 1993–1995, Chair of the State Duma 1996–2003, in 2001 established the movement Rossiia, in July 2002 was dismissed from KPRF and the parliamentary faction.
<i>Sevastianov, Vitalii</i> 8 July 1935	Member of the Duma Committee on International Affairs 1993–
<i>Titov, German</i> 11 September 1935	Member of the Duma Committee on Defence 1996–1999, member of the Duma Committee on Industry, Building, Transport and Energy 1993–1995, not Duma deputy in 2000–2003
<i>Varennikov, Valentin</i> 15 December 1923	Chair of the Committee on Veteran Affairs 1996–1999, not a Duma deputy in any other sessions of the Duma
<i>Volkov, Vladimir Nikolaevich</i> 23 August 1948	Member and then Deputy Chair of the Duma committee on Defence 1993–1995, 1996–1999, 2000–2003
<i>Ziuganov, Gennadii</i> 26 June 1944	Leader of the KPRF and the parliamentary faction 1993–until present
<i>Zorkaltsev, Viktor</i> 24 April 1936	Chair of the Duma Committee on Public Associations and Religious Organizations 1993–1995, 1996–1999, 2000–2003

KPRF search command:

(/ДТ(01.01.1994-01.01.2004!Δ))(/ТТ(«Геннадий Селезнев» или «Геннадий Зюганов» или «Валентин Купцов» или «Виктор Зоркальцев» или «Виктор Илюхин» или «Игорь Братищев» или «Евгений Красницкий» или «Иван Мельников» или «Сергей

Глазьев” или “Александр Куликов” или “Владимир Волков” или “Светлана Савицкая” или “Александр Михайлов” или “Анатолий Лукьянов” или “Леонид Иванченко” или “Юрий Маслюков” или “Альберт Макашов” или “Герман Титов” или “Владимир Казаковцев” или “Сергей Будажабов” или “Валентин Варенников” или “Светлана Горячева” или “Николай Бенедиктов”) или /АВ(“Геннадий Селезнев” или “Геннадий Зюганов” или “Валентин Купцов” или “Виктор Зоркальцев” или “Виктор Илюхин” или “Игорь Братищев” или “Евгений Красницкий” или “Иван Мельников” или “Сергей Глазьев” или “Александр Куликов” или “Владимир Волков” или “Светлана Савицкая” или “Александр Михайлов” или “Анатолий Лукьянов” или “Леонид Иванченко” или “Юрий Маслюков””Альберт Макашов” или “Герман Титов” или “Владимир Казаковцев” или “Сергей Будажабов” или “Валентин Варенников” или “Светлана Горячева” или “Николай Бенедиктов”)) (НАТО или (Чечня или Чечения) или “чеченская война” или “Европейский союз” или Ичкерия или Косово или Кавказ или Сербия или Босния или терроризм или террорист* или Афганистан или “11 сентября 2001 г.” или “Североатлантический союз” или Европа или Запад или (ЕС или Европейское:сообщество))

APPENDIX 2.

NEWSPAPERS USED IN COLLECTING THE ARTICLES

<i>Nash Dom – Rossiia</i>	Pravda
<u>Newspapers</u>	Rossiiskaia gazeta
Krasnaia zvezda	Rossiia (only 2002–2003)
Literaturnaia gazeta	Segodnia
Moskovskie Novosti	Trud
Moskovskii komsomolets	<u>Journals (only 2002–2003)</u>
Nezavisimaia gazeta	Novoe Vremia
Obshchaia gazeta	Itogi
Pravda	Ogonek
Rossiiskaia gazeta	Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn
Segodnia	Pro et Contra
Trud	Profil
<u>Journals</u>	<u>Radio</u>
Novoe Vremia	Ekho Moskvu
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn	
Pro et Contra	<i>Edinstvo</i>
Profil	<u>Newspapers</u>
	Argumenty i Fakty
<i>Otechestvo</i>	Vedomosti
<u>Newspapers</u>	Vek
Argumenty i Fakty	Versia
Vedomosti	Versty (only 2002–2003)
Vek	Zavtra (only 2002–2003)
Izvestiia	Izvestiia
Komsomolskaia Pravda	Kommersant Daily (only 2002–2003)
Kommersant Daily (only 2002–2003)	Komsomolskaia Pravda
Literaturnaia gazeta	Krasnaia zvezda
Moskovskie Novosti	Literaturnaia gazeta
Moskovskii komsomolets	Militsiia
Nezavisimaia gazeta	Moskovskaia Pravda
Obshchaia gazeta	Moskovskii komsomolets
Parlamentskaia gazeta	Nezavisimaia gazeta

Obshchaia gazeta
Pravda
Rossiiskaia gazeta
Rossiia (only 2002–2003)
Segodnia
Trud
Moskovskie Novosti
Parlamentskaia gazeta
Journals
Itogi
Novoe Vremia
Profil
Pro et Contra (only 2002–2003)
Radio
Ekho Moskv

Iabloko (most of the materials
collected from the party website)
Newspapers
Argumenty i Fakty
Zavtra
Kommersant v Daily (only 2002–2003)
Komsomolskaia Pravda
Kraznaia Zvezda
Moskovskie Novosti
Moskovskii komsomolets
Nezavisimaia gazeta
Novaia gazeta
Obshchaia gazeta
Parlamentskaia gazeta

Rossiiskaia gazeta
Trud
Journals
Delovye liudi (only 2002–2003)
Itogi (only 2002–2003)
Novoe Vremia
Ogonek (only 2002–2003)
Profil (only 2002–2003)
Radio
Ekho Moskv

KPRF
Newspapers
Argumenty i Fakty
Zavtra
Komsomolskaia Pravda
Krasnaia zvezda
Literaturnaia gazeta
Moskovskaia Pravda
Moskovskie Novosti
Rossiiskaia gazeta
Moskovskii komsomolets
Nezavisimaia gazeta
Novaia gazeta
Obshchaia gazeta
Parlamentskaia gazeta
Pravda KPRF
Pravda
Sovetskaia Rossiia
Trud