

**Studia Politica Tamperensis**  
**No. 11**

**SERGEI V. PROZOROV**

**Political Pedagogy  
of Technical Assistance:**  
A Study in Historical Ontology  
of Russian Postcommunism

Academic dissertation to be presented, with the permission of  
the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Tampere,  
for public discussion in lecture room B661, Yliopistonkatu 38,  
on January 17<sup>th</sup>, 2004, at 12 o'clock.

Academic Dissertation in International Relations  
Department of Political Science and International Relations  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
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*Tampereen yliopisto*  
*POLITIIKAN TUTKIMUKSEN LAITOS*

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*Department of Political Science and International Relations*  
*University of Tampere, Finland*

## **Studia Politica Tamperensis**

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### *Electronic Dissertation*

*Acta Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 310*

*ISBN 951-44-5847-8*

*ISSN 1456-954X*

*<http://acta.uta.fi>*

*ISBN 951-44-5850-8*

*ISSN 0788-169X*

*Cover Petri Seppä*

*Background photo courtesy of <http://www.sovnarkom.ru>*

*Layout Marita Alanko, University of Tampere*

*Cityoffset Oy, Tampere 2004*

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## PREFACE

This is a study of how things happen in postcommunist Russia, of how the void left by the demise of the Soviet order is filled, in a myriad of diverse constitutive practices in different fields, and how postcommunist Russia takes shape in its positivity, its revolutionary moment of foundation supplanted by governmental practices unfolding on secure foundations of the new order. This study was motivated by two ambitions. Firstly, I ventured to address the political effects of EU technical assistance to socioeconomic reforms in contemporary Russia – the domain of mundane yet fascinating practices that have not yet been investigated in their constitutive force. Secondly, in this endeavour I attempted to develop an application of Michel Foucault's 'historical ontology' for the study of Russian postcommunism – the field, in which Foucauldian problematics of the productivity of power and the constitution of subjectivity appear highly relevant and fruitful, and yet are applied only rarely and unsystematically. These ambitions take concrete shape in the research tasks of the study, which in the threefold logic of historical ontology may be summed up as follows: the *archaeological reconstitution* of the discourse of technical assistance at the site of three EU Tacis projects in the Republic of Karelia undertaken in the period of 1997–2002, the *genealogical disentanglement* of its conditions of emergence as a *mode of governmentality* and its *strategic integration* into the field of socioeconomic reforms in Russia, and the attempt at an *ethical critique* of the EU-Russian interface of governmental practices. The result of these operations is a humble prolegomenon to what I consider to be a highly promising line of inquiry – a historical ontology of Russian postcommunism.

The structure of the study is defined by the three research tasks. In Chapter 1 I locate the problematic of technical assistance in the field of Russian postcommunist

politics of emergence and outline the philosophical, theoretical and methodological points of departure of the study and its relation to previous research. Chapter 2 features an archaeological analysis of the discourse of technical assistance, reconstituted in the study of three EU Tacis projects: “Support to the Implementation of Health Care and Social Protection Reform in the Republic of Karelia” (EDRUS9516), “Local Sustainable Heating Strategies for Border Communities in the Republic of Karelia” (ERUS9701) and “Karelia Parks Development” (ENVRUS9704). Chapter 3 is devoted to the genealogical interpretation of the conditions of emergence of the ‘diagram’ of governmentality, actualised in this discourse, in the historical constellation of governmental rationalities that I term ‘infra-liberalism’. In Chapter 4 I complete the genealogical task of historical ontology by analysing the interface between the local diagram of technical assistance and the strategic field of socioeconomic reforms delineated by the project of the Putin presidency. Chapter 5 addresses the ethical axis of historical ontology in a critique of the EU-Russian infra-liberal interface that affirms what I refer to as ‘concrete’ or ‘non-identitarian’ freedom and seeks to offer relief from the gravity of the governmental disposition of life. Finally, Chapter 6 sums up the conclusions of the study and suggests potential avenues of further research.

I would like to thank the University of Tampere and CIMO (The Centre for International Mobility) for financing the research for this dissertation and thus making this study possible. I am also grateful to the staff at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, particularly Seija Laalo-Ristilä, Riitta Lehtimäki, Raija Oksanen and Marketta Saikku, for their kind and patient assistance in administrative and technical matters that created a very comfortable environment for me to focus on my research.

This work is an outcome of over three years of study, which benefited tremendously from the assistance and support of a number of people, which I now have the pleasure to acknowledge while assuming all responsibility for the final result.

Firstly, I am very grateful to Professor Helena Rytövuori-Apunen for her inspiring, skilful and patient guidance throughout my Ph.D. studies and her persistent attempts to keep my overly enthusiastic theoretical endeavours within the bounds of the IR discipline and common sanity. It is now up to reader to judge how successful the latter were.

Secondly, I would like to thank the staff of the EU Tacis projects EDRUS9516, ERUS9701, ENVRUS9704, particularly Alexei Finogenov, Cormac Power, Anton Shabaev, Pavel Shevelin and Dmitry Titkov for their kind assistance in providing me with access

to official project reports and other relevant documentation. The critique of the practices they are involved in by no means questions their professionalism in administering them.

Thirdly, I am thankful to the following scholars who have read various parts of this study as seminar and conference papers at various stages of my research and provided valuable comments and criticism that have helped considerably in the preparation of the final version: Osmo Apunen, Andreas Behnke, Stefano Guzzini, Jef Huysmans, Pertti Joenniemi, Markku Kivinen, Eric Kulavig, Richard Sakwa, Michael C. Williams and all the participants of the postgraduate research seminar at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Tampere. I am particularly grateful to Jens Bartelson and Oleg Kharkhordin, the external examiners of this dissertation, for reading the manuscript in its entirety and providing helpful comments for the improvement of the final version of the text.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Valentina Maksimova at Petrozavodsk State University for her invaluable assistance, inspiration and encouragement throughout my study years.

# 1. INTRODUCTION: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF POSTCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENTALITY

## 1.1. Prologue: Ice Hammer and the Passion of the Real

Vladimir Sorokin's novel *Ice* opens with a series of bizarre incidents.<sup>1</sup> A number of residents of Moscow are abducted by the members of a certain Gnostic cult and subjected to a torturous procedure of repeated strikes in the area of the heart with an ice hammer. Few survive the ordeal and those who do not are dismissed by the cult as 'empties' or 'meat machines'. However, the three individuals who live through it speak to their torturers their 'true name' in the 'language of the heart', unmediated by verbal discourse, and join the select group of the 'awakened'. Part II of the novel renders the history of the cult and its Gnostic mythology of the 'originary light' that preceded the birth of the Earth and whose reign is to be restored by 'filtering' the human race in the search for the twenty three thousand privileged individuals who still carry in themselves the rays of this light and, probably for this reason, are all light-haired and blue-eyed. The ultimate goal is the final communion of the awakened that will lead to the destruction of life as we know it in the transcendent moment of the restoration of the originary light. The major events of the Russian history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are recast in terms of the struggle of the few possessors of the 'language of the heart' to liberate their fellows from their mundane and inauthentic existence through inflicting the strikes of the hammer, made out of the cosmic ice of the Tunguska meteorite, on the members of the unsuspecting humanity. Part III deconstructs this mythical narrative through redeploing the Ice Hammer as a newly marketed 'recreational complex' and

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<sup>1</sup> Sorokin 2002a.

the final communion as a 'virtual reality' computer simulation and providing us with a technical manual for its use and a set of 'customer responses' whose depiction of the authentic experience of 'speaking from the heart' produces a comic effect and displaces the elevated mystical pathos of the early chapters. Besides the more obvious readings of the novel as a parody of totalising and esoteric metaphysics and the violence inherent in it, this extended conceptualist<sup>2</sup> play on the metaphors of 'speaking from the heart', 'breaking the ice' and Nietzschean 'philosophising with a hammer' points to the primary leitmotif of our study: the *relation between constitution and origin, artifice and authenticity, discourse and violence*.

Sorokin's text is not merely a parody of the relentless search for the new unifying idea or 'spirituality', characteristic of the Russia of the 1990s. It is rather located in the interstice between the parodic play of 'postmodern literature' and a more tragic pathos of the 'modernist' literary avant-garde, with its frequently violent passion for unmediated expression, the non-verbal Logos and the transgressive passage to the Real.<sup>3</sup> Sorokin's radical opposition to language, which takes him towards a complete destruction of meaning and signification, has as its correlate the desire for the non-linguistic 'language of the heart'. In an interview on the publication of the novel, Sorokin remarks that his text is motivated by the nostalgia for immediacy and interiority, a "passion of the real"<sup>4</sup>: "People somehow lose themselves. They become

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<sup>2</sup> Conceptualism is a movement in the Russian art of the 1970s–1990s, whose basic principle is the affirmation of the primacy of the concept to authorial expression and the consequent deconstructive strategy of recontextualising or desemantising the concepts of Russian or Soviet art, primarily literary texts, with the effect of exposing the violence of the text and disabling it via the dissolution of all meaning in a purely a-significative speech. Vladimir Sorokin is a representative of the conceptualist movement, well-known for his dual strategy of deconstructing Soviet or Russian literature through following the faithful imitation of its style with sudden textual ruptures, either in content (e.g. the text's regression into obscene and violent descriptions, devoid of meaning) or in form (the text's regression into a mass of indecipherable marks). For a detailed discussion of Sorokin's conceptualism see Ryklin 1998, Kuritsyn 2000.

<sup>3</sup> See Bondarenko 2002.

<sup>4</sup> See Zizek 2001a for the discussion of this notion. 'Passion of the real' refers to the increasing disillusionment of modern culture with its thorough technologisation and the consequent quest of a passage to the real, which usually takes the form of a violent transgression in politics, sexuality or any other sphere of existence. "Precisely because the universe in which we live in is somehow the universe of dead conventions and artificiality, the only authentic real experience must be a somehow extremely violent, shattering experience." (Zizek 2001a, p. 1.) The intensifying technologisation of life entails, in this argument, the intensification of transgressive violence in the affirmation of 'real life'.

*figures of external technologies* in everything, from diet to love. One perceives a nostalgia for the originary, the unmediated. [...] ‘Ice’ is not a novel about totalitarianism, but a novel about the search for the lost spiritual paradise.”<sup>5</sup> A simple parody seems to be a hardly appropriate expression of this desire and, indeed, the humorous ‘customer responses’ all end, abruptly and without proper punctuation, on the point of the blinding flash of light, suggesting that the simulation might just not be a simulation after all.

On the other hand, Sorokin’s distaste for a totalising metaphysics leads him to renounce and ridicule all valorisations of the Origin and all attempts at the Return to a more ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ being. The non-verbal ‘language of the heart’ turns out to in fact consist of ‘hearty words’, albeit just twenty-three of them, which reveals a non-linguistic ‘pure language’ to be a simply more impoverished version of ordinary language, the hearty words in question being nothing but monosyllabic gibberish. Both the extreme violence of the Ice cult and the trivialisation of its Gnostic experience as a form of computer simulation displace the oppositions of exteriority and interiority, technology and immediacy, artifice and authenticity. The originary is thus the effect of the intermediary violence of the hammer and the authenticity of man is the technical artefact of *anthropogenesis*, best described by the Hebraic figure of the ‘golem’.<sup>6</sup> Sorokin’s text thus points both to the irresistible attraction of the anthropological experiment of creating a *new*, and at the same time an *originary* subject, and its self-defeating artefactual violence. Rather than ridicule totalitarian fictions that can be condemned and abandoned, *Ice* focuses on the ineradicability of the desire that cannot be fulfilled. It is no coincidence that the only redemption from this desire is granted in Part IV to a little boy, who, having stumbled on a segment of the ice in his room, uses it as a toy and, in a desire to ‘get the poor Ice warm’, covers it with blankets and lets it melt away. The figure of the child offers the most potent resistance to the temptation of the Ice Hammer since the child, oblivious in his innocence to the

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<sup>5</sup> Sorokin 2002b. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>6</sup> The publication of *Ice* practically coincided with the release of Andrei Levkin’s novel ‘Golem: Russian Version’, similarly preoccupied with the emergence of a ‘new man’, who in this novel is represented by a human being without a name and a history, fittingly working as a ‘political technologist’, devising the election campaign of the current Russian president, whose own alleged status as an effect of ‘political technologies’ renders him similarly eligible for the metaphor of the Golem.

dualism of the authentic and the technological, simply could not be bothered one way or the other.

This thematic of emergence and constitution contrasts with the 'postmodernist play' on the hyperreal and simulative character of postcommunist social reality, prevalent in the Russian literary landscape of the late 1990s and best exemplified by the work of Victor Pelevin.<sup>7</sup> The timeliness of the problematic of the constitution of 'new men' that *Ice* addresses has already been noted by Russian literary critics:<sup>8</sup> it has become customary to observe in the sociopolitical situation of the Putin presidency a turn towards not merely a *stabilisation*, coveted in the revolutionary turmoil of the 1990s, but a more active and positive turn towards *construction*, a construction of both new subjectivities and their social environment. In contrast to the age-old metaphysical ruminations on the Russian Idea that resurfaced in the early 1990s, this process is simultaneously more modest, piecemeal, technical *and* more consonant with the anthropogenetic phantasm, instituting concrete practices, identities and institutions that reconfigure the postcommunist landscape in its materiality and positivity. Sorokin's text both exemplifies and deconstructs this tendency, attuning us to the inevitably *discursive* and (therefore) *violent* character of this constitution, particularly insofar as it takes the shape of a return to the origin, a liberation of the authentic and the real: *speaking 'from the heart' always follows (and never precedes) the strike of the Ice hammer*. Though devoid of violent imagery and linguistic experimentation, this study poses similar questions. The problematics of discourse and violence, technology and identity, authenticity and artifice form the background, against which we investigate a set of local technical practices, whose apparent marginality to the dynamics of postcommunist transformation serves, in our account, as the condition of their successful constitutive functioning within contemporary Russian politics.

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<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Pelevin's novel *Generation P* (1999), whose protagonist, employed in the advertising business, gradually comes to the realisation that the entire socio-political reality, including the key political figures, is a computer-generated simulacrum, disposed of in accordance with the imperatives of advertising.

<sup>8</sup> See Bavilsky 2002, Bondarenko 2002.



## 1.2. Background to the Research Problem: EU-Russian Relations and the Problematic of Government

The theme of this study concerns the political effects of *EU technical assistance projects in postcommunist Russia*. More specifically, it seeks to locate the study of EU technical assistance within the problematic of the constitution of new forms of state-society relations in the Russian postcommunist transformation. It is therefore concerned with the question of ‘how do things happen’<sup>9</sup> in postcommunist Russia, how new forms *come into being*, i.e. how a purely negative condition of *post-communism*, of being past the very past present in the definition, gives way to a properly *postcommunist* present, no longer defined in terms of what it transcends, but approachable in its own positivity. A study of being, of course, bears the philosophical title of *ontology*. A study of coming into being, of emergence and foundation, renders ontological questions *historical*. Our approach to the study of Russian postcommunism, which we shall elucidate in detail in chapter 1.4., may thus be termed a *historical ontology*. The concrete domain of our application of historical ontology is delineated by three EU Tacis technical assistance projects undertaken in the Republic of Karelia in 1997–2002. Through our reconstitution of the discourse of technical assistance and the interpretation of its genealogical connections we shall seek to describe EU practices of technical assistance in terms of their political effects, i.e. their ‘assistance’, through governmental ‘techniques’, to the formation of new state and societal identities and patterns of state-society relations in postcommunist Russia. Of particular importance will be the formation of individual agency, due to its centrality both in the reforms promoted by EU Tacis and the present conjuncture in Russian postcommunism. We shall thus relocate the literary heuristics of the ‘passion of the real’ and the technological artifice of the constitution of a ‘new man’ into the political context of the Putin presidency and onto the technical site of local practices of EU-assisted administrative and managerial reforms.

The current Russian political context is marked by the trend of ‘reconstitution of the state’,<sup>10</sup> associated with the presidency of Vladimir Putin. This trend is manifested

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<sup>9</sup> Foucault 1980c, p. 150.

<sup>10</sup> See Sakwa 2000a, 2000b.

in the reassertion of the principle of ‘strong statehood’ and its enactment in the practices of restoring federal control over the regions via ‘establishing the *vertical* of power’ and reconstructing the political space ‘*horizontally*’ by consolidating the state’s capacity of agency versus ‘oligarchic’ financial-political groups, which throughout the 1990s have displaced state authority.<sup>11</sup> The reassertion of statehood is advocated as a necessary condition for the project of liberal socioeconomic reforms reactivated and radicalised in the Putin presidency.<sup>12</sup> The weakness of the governmental mechanisms of the state, their ‘privatisation’ and ‘regionalisation’, are cast by an increasing number of observers to be the primary cause of the problems and failures of the reforms in the 1990s.<sup>13</sup> It is no coincidence that the exhaustive list of socioeconomic reforms launched by the president has as a priority area the reform of governmental mechanisms themselves, whether through administrative and civil service reforms or the specification of the federal/regional division of competence. Throughout his presidential term, Vladimir Putin has retained the prioritisation of the goal of *strong, effective* and *efficient* statehood as a precondition of all socioeconomic reforms, and, crucially, as an instrument of specifically *liberal* reforms. “Our key task is to learn to *use the instruments of the state for ensuring freedom*. The freedom of the individual, the freedom of entrepreneurship, and the freedom of the development of the institutes [sic!] of a civic society. [...] Only a strong, effective – *if someone does not like the word “strong”, we will say that only an effective and democratic – state* can uphold civil, political and economic freedoms.”<sup>14</sup> In the 2002 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, the present state of government and the skills of public officials are cast as primary obstacles to further reforms: “The present functions of the state apparatus are not geared to solving strategic tasks. And the *knowledge by officials of the modern science of management* is still very rare.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> For the Russian discussion of the reassertion of statehood in the Putin presidency see Gaman-Golutvina 2000, Remizov 2000, Tretyakov 2000, Pavlovsky 2000a, 2000b.

<sup>12</sup> For the discussion of the scale of socioeconomic reforms embarked on by the presidency, see Bunin et al 2001a who develop a concept of Grand Reform to cover a multiplicity of radical transformations in the judiciary, taxation policy, land ownership, housing, education, military service, labour legislation, etc.

<sup>13</sup> See Mau and Starodubrovskaya 2001, Sakwa 2000a, 2000b, Gaman-Golutvina 2000, 2001, Gaidar 2001, Polyakov 2000, Tretyakov 2000, Ulykaev 1999, Ryabov 2001, Bunin et al 2001a, Fedorov 2001, Shevtsova 2001, 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Putin 2000, pp. 3–4. Emphasis added.

<sup>15</sup> Putin 2002, p. 3. Emphasis added. See also Putin 2001.

We may therefore claim that the problematic of government constitutes the centrepiece of the present reform project.

A project of assistance to liberal reforms in Russia is undertaken by the European Union in its programme of technical assistance to the postcommunist transformation in the CIS (EU Tacis). Russian postcommunist transformation has been marked by the density of international projects of assistance to the reform of the conventionally 'domestic' spheres: social welfare, environmental protection, education, energy management – the areas of governmental activity, the management of which has either disintegrated with the collapse of the Soviet order or has been deemed unsatisfactory in the present condition of the emergence of market economy. As an EU policy instrument, Tacis seeks to assist political and economic reforms by providing technical and managerial *expertise* and enabling international *exchanges* and *linkages* between Russian and European counterparts.<sup>16</sup> Assistance to socioeconomic reforms in the post-Soviet space within the framework of EU Tacis proceeds from the imperative of minimising and managing the 'new' or 'soft' *security threats*, a concept that spread beyond academic discourse into European policy initiatives.<sup>17</sup> The 1999 Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia lists the following 'common challenges to respond to': energy and nuclear safety, environment and health, organised crime, money laundering and illicit traffic in human beings and drugs.<sup>18</sup> Security threats from Russia are among the considerations for the active promotion of the Northern Dimension of the European Union, of which EU Tacis is one of policy instruments.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the socioeconomic transformation in Russia has throughout the last decade been perceived as a *source of threats, risks and challenges* for the European Union and thereby cast as a problem of government. The dual objective of the EU technical assistance programme is to support "Russia's efforts to consolidate its *democracy* and develop its economy, and to complete the transition to a *market economy*".<sup>20</sup> *State-society relations* have been reinforced as a focus of attention for EU Tacis in the 1999

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<sup>16</sup> See Common Strategy of European Union on Russia. (WWW-document.)

<sup>17</sup> See Pursiainen 2001. The problematic of 'soft security' (See Nye 1990.) has entered European policy discourse in relation to Russia with the publication of Country Strategy Paper in 2002. See Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup> Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. (WWW-document.)

<sup>19</sup> Tacis Indicative Programme. Russian Federation. 2000–2003, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: EU-Russian Federation. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

Regulation, which emphasises the role of the programme in supporting and strengthening the emergent *civil society*.<sup>21</sup> The reform of the programme in 1999 was justified by the need to “place a greater emphasis on the development of *good governance* and the *civil society* [arising out of the need for a] pluralistic society for a development of a healthy market economy.”<sup>22</sup> These imperatives were given concrete policy shape in the three selected areas of cooperation, designated by the Indicative Programme for 2000–2003: *support for institutional, legal and administrative reform, support to the private sector, and addressing the social consequences of reforms*.<sup>23</sup>

In the Tacis Country Strategy Paper for 2002–2006 these areas of cooperation were specified in terms of programme priorities that correspond to the reforms instantiated by the Putin presidency: *legal, administrative reform and regional policy; judicial reform; civil society, training and education; deregulation and corporate governance; social reform; municipal services*.<sup>24</sup> “An ambitious programme of socio-economic reforms was launched in 2000 with an impressive amount of legislation passed by Parliament or under preparation. In its response strategy 2002–2006, the EU should *lend its full support to the Government’s socioeconomic reform programme* and should concentrate on building the *legal, institutional and administrative framework* to allow economic development through *private initiative and market forces*.”<sup>25</sup> The focus on the transformation of governmental practices appears to be the basis for the increasing convergence between the EU and Russian conceptions of reforms, manifested in the EU’s adoption of the Russian government’s priorities in its own programme of assistance:

Over the past decade, Russia has already come a long way in reforming its legislative and regulatory framework. Since 2000, the process has gained *a new momentum with the Government’s socio-economic reform programme, which focuses particularly on establishing the legal and regulatory framework required to improve the business*

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<sup>21</sup> Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum. (WWW-document.) See also Council Regulation Concerning the Provision of Assistance to the Partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Annex II. (WWW-document.)

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>23</sup> Tacis Indicative Programme. Russian Federation. 2000–2003, p. 9.

<sup>24</sup> Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006, p. 2. See also National Indicative Programme 2004–2006.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1–2. Emphasis added. See also Tacis 2000 Action Programme, p. 2.

*environment and to reform the social safety system.* The new Government is also addressing *administrative and civil service reform* more resolutely than in the past. It is designing a reform strategy and developing a major programme to rebuild and reorganise *public administration*, as part of its *efforts to develop a functioning state.* *Technical assistance should be supportive to the implementation of this comprehensive reform of legislation and public administration.*<sup>26</sup>

Both the Putin presidency and the EU technical assistance programme therefore seek to *reshape social processes and state-society relations* via the reform of *governmental practices*. This initial convergence of problematics makes the question of government a fruitful site for the study of EU-Russian relations. Our research seeks to contribute to the study of the international dimension of the postcommunist transformation by addressing the *interface of Russian and European practices of government*, using as a concrete site of the interface the *discourse of technical assistance* in the EU Tacis projects, undertaken in the Republic of Karelia. In our research we focus on a set of three EU Tacis projects, which are aimed at the introduction of new *professional and managerial practices* in the sphere of public administration: “Support to the Implementation of Health Care and Social Protection Reform in the Republic of Karelia” (EDRUS9516), “Local Sustainable Heating Strategies for Border Communities in the Republic of Karelia” (ERUS9701) and “Karelia Parks Development” (ENVRUS9704). In this study, the discourse of technical assistance in the Tacis projects in Karelia offers a *local site* for the reconstruction of the EU-Russian interface of governmental practices. At the final stage of the research the results of the analysis of these local projects are also interpreted in their relation to the federal-level reform strategy that is articulated in presidential annual addresses to the Federal Assembly and the Government’s programmes of socioeconomic policy for the mid- and long-term perspective.<sup>27</sup> In this manner, we shall both analyse the EU-Russian interface at a most local level of its occurrence and address the question of the integration of the effects of this interface in the overall field of the socioeconomic reforms of the Putin presidency.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>27</sup> Putin 2000, 2001, 2002, Main Directions of Socioeconomic Policy of the Government of the Russian Federation for the Long-Term Perspective, Programme of Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation for the Midterm Perspective: 2003–2005.

### 1.3. Heuristic Points of Departure: Postcommunism as a Politics of Emergence

Our study of the EU-Russian interface proceeds from approaching Russian post-communist transformation as a *foundational moment*. Rather than reduce the postcommunist condition to stable conceptual frameworks such as ‘transition to democracy’ or the ‘Russian tradition’, this study seeks to highlight the present historical moment as a *politics of emergence*, which follows the collapse of Soviet communism. Postcommunism as the moment of *foundation* is logically marked by the absence of political, epistemic and ethical *foundations* of the social order. In this sense, the foundational moment of postcommunism in its flux, contingency and indeterminacy may be reformulated as a moment of *the political* as opposed to *politics*. This distinction, drawn by Claude Lefort, is a distinction between a preconstituted domain of ‘politics’, delimited *within* the social order against the non-political background of society or economy, and the ‘political’ conditions of possibility of the institution of the *overall* order that are placed in relation of *constitutive exteriority* with it.<sup>28</sup> The political thus refers to the *infrastructure* that precedes and conditions the internal structuration of the social order into the domains of ‘politics’, ‘society’, ‘economy’, etc.<sup>29</sup> While in the periods of ‘normal politics’ the political recedes to the background as the unthought foundation of the positivity of the social order, the revolutionary ‘moments of the political’ are marked by the experience of the absence of foundations and the resultant *radical openness*: “The being of the social vanishes, [or rather] presents itself in the shape of an endless series of questions.”<sup>30</sup> This distinction attunes us to the specificity of postcommunist politics, a specificity reducible to neither the institutional defects on the path of transition to democracy nor the determinants of culture and tradition. Instead, the sources of this specificity are immanent to the *exceptional* character of postcommunist political practice, whereby the foundations of the emergent social order are to be instituted in the condition of the ‘dissolution of markers of certainty’<sup>31</sup> that accompanies the demise of the old order.

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<sup>28</sup> See Lefort 1988, pp. 11–12.

<sup>29</sup> For a similar use of the concept of infrastructure see Torfing 1998, pp. 57–60.

<sup>30</sup> Lefort 1988, p. 227.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

The literally limitless possibilities of sociopolitical construction are aligned with the disappearance of all stable foundations that could ground a founding decision. In Carl Schmitt's famous dictum, a constitutive decision logically 'emanates from nothingness',<sup>32</sup> since it is by definition limited by neither that which it displaces nor by that which it founds. The specificity of the foundational moment may be grasped by the notion of *undecidability*, a radical abeyance of certainty traversed and effaced in the act of decision that institutes the certainty of new foundations.<sup>33</sup>

Decision and responsibility worthy of the name should not be controlled by previous knowledge, it should not be programmed. [...] When I make a decision, when I take responsibility, to some extent it must be *in the night*. [...] Between the accumulation of knowledge and the moment I make a choice, I take a responsibility, I make a decision, there is an *infinite abyss because of the heterogeneity of those moments*. [...] You have to go through the *ordeal of undecidability in order to decide*.<sup>34</sup>

For our purposes, the undecidability of the foundational moment reorients the discussion of postcommunism from a standpoint that questions governmental practices as to their conformity or correspondence to foundational principles of law, morality or political theory towards the study of the constitutive force of the practices themselves, insofar as their foundational character places them beyond the opposition of founded/unfounded: "Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can not by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves *violence without ground*. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust in the sense of 'illegal'. *They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment*. They exceed the opposition between founded and unfounded, or between any foundationalism or anti-foundationalism."<sup>35</sup> The *exceptional* character of the postcommunist moment renders its politics *ipso facto* decisionist in the Schmittian sense, operating in and out of the void left by the order it displaces and subsequently filled by the order it has yet to constitute.<sup>36</sup>

The understanding of postcommunism as a foundational moment, in which 'postcommunist realities' take shape, has ontological and epistemic consequences for

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<sup>32</sup> Schmitt 1985a, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> See Derrida 1992.

<sup>34</sup> Derrida 1999, p. 281. Emphasis added.

<sup>35</sup> Derrida 1992, p. 14. Emphasis added. See also Derrida 1999.

<sup>36</sup> See Schmitt 1985a, 1985b.

research. These consist in a critical stance towards ontological foundations, teleological directions and epistemological certitude that is inspired by the singular postcommunist experience of contingency: “Only symbolic universes that crumble reveal the contingent character of their construction.”<sup>37</sup> We may suggest that the crucial significance of postcommunism consists in this *event of revealing*, which exceeds in importance the actual gains or losses of this revolutionary experience: “While there are indeed results of the Revolution whose value can be questioned, it will never be possible to forget the disposition that has been revealed through it.”<sup>38</sup> In this sense, the experience of ‘specific’ postcommunism, the current political condition of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, redefines the overall “politico-philosophical terrain” and thus calls for an attitude of ‘universal postcommunism’<sup>39</sup>, a syndrome whose contours are shaped by the experience of contingency that the fall of communism inaugurated. It is the assumption of this work that only by adopting this kind of attitude may postcommunist studies be worthy of the *event* that gives them their object.

For the purposes of this study, the specificity of Russian postcommunism as a moment of the political consists in a radical destabilisation of the concepts of state and society, which serve as foundational premises of political discourse. Firstly, the fragility of the Russian Federation as a *new state* that never existed in its present borders and the contrasting continuity and stability of its internal regional division has resulted in the tendency, throughout the 1990s, for the regions to accumulate exceptional authority at the expense of the federal centre. The influence exercised by the regional authorities on federal policy has led to the reconstruction of the image of the Russian state as a secondary figure, derivative from mobile tactical configurations and alliances with and between the regional leaders, a situation described quite accurately in terms of ‘neofeudalism’, a heteronomous patchwork of multiple overlapping and interpenetrating authorities. This tendency, frequently discussed in terms of ‘regionalisation’<sup>40</sup>, may be referred to as a *vertical displacement of statehood*.

Secondly, the crumbling down of Soviet economy and the radical economic reforms of the early 1990s have led to a reconfiguration of the boundary between the

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<sup>37</sup> Kharkhordin 2000, p. 33, fn. 32.

<sup>38</sup> Foucault 1993, p. 16.

<sup>39</sup> Sakwa 1999a, p. 3. See Sakwa 1999a, chapter 1 for the distinction of specific and universal postcommunisms.

<sup>40</sup> See Kagansky 1995, Gaman-Golutvina 2000, Ulykaev 1999.



*private* and the *public* towards the erosion of the distinction between the two realms. The rejection of statism in the course of liberal reforms in the 1990s entailed the *reversal* of the elite hierarchy, whereby the economic elite assumed primacy over the political elite and redefined the latter's conditions of functioning: "The state was gradually transformed into a community of self-sufficient financial-political clans with claims to political decision-making."<sup>41</sup> The quintessentially public institution of the state has, according to many accounts of Russian politics, become *privatised* by quasi-oligarchic financial-political groups<sup>42</sup> – a tendency that we may refer to as a *horizontal displacement of statehood*. Thus, a statement like 'In Russia there is no state'<sup>43</sup> is not to be taken as a journalistic hyperbole but as an indicator of the defunct status of the concept of the state in the political discourse due to its vertical and horizontal displacements. Similarly, we may question the pathos but hardly the insight of the statement by Gleb Pavlovsky, a senior advisor to President Putin, that "where there should be society, there gapes a hole"<sup>44</sup> – by semantic logic, the disappearance of one member of the state-society distinction renders the other meaningless. The complex interfusion of bureaucracy and oligarchy<sup>45</sup>, the public and the private, the federal and the regional challenges the unproblematic invocation of the state-society distinction and necessitates the shift of focus from the postulation of the anterior presence of state and society towards the study of the governmental practices of their constitution that takes their manifest *absence* as a point of departure. Starting with *absences* will serve to attune us to the specific modalities of *presencing*, the ways in which new state and societal identities emerge in a relational pattern in piecemeal practices at plural sites.

From this perspective, the reformist governmental practices of (re)constitution of the state in the Putin presidency<sup>46</sup> can be heuristically grasped as *unfounded acts*

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<sup>41</sup> Gaman-Golutvina 2000, p. 8. Translation by author.

<sup>42</sup> See Fadin 1995, Kharkhordin 1997a, 2000, Gaman-Golutvina 2000. The term 'privatisation of the state' has been launched by the liberal economist Andrei Illarionov, appointed in April 2000 as economic advisor to President Putin.

<sup>43</sup> Izvestia, 24.11.1998 quoted in Sakwa 1999b, p. 24.

<sup>44</sup> This is the title of Pavlovsky 2001b.

<sup>45</sup> See Gaman-Golutvina 2000 for the historical analysis of the relation between the principles of bureaucracy and oligarchy in Russian statehood. The term 'oligarchy' as a designator of the form of government in the Russia of the 1990s has been launched by Boris Nemtsov, presently the leader of the Union of Right Forces (SPS). See Nemtsov 2000.

<sup>46</sup> Our reference to the Putin presidency should not be understood as a reduction of the complex political dynamic of 'reconstitution of the state' to the figure of the president. We use such phrases as

*of founding* a social order through heterogeneous practices in which particular types of state and societal identity are *produced*. Insofar as both state and society emerge in their positivity as effects of governmental practices, we shall in this study refer to types or patterns of state-society relations as *modalities of government*. These constitutive governmental practices are *political* insofar as they attempt to lay foundations in the conditions of their absence. At the same time, their very productivity renders them *depoliticising*, in that the political moment of undecidability, contingency and flux is effaced by its reinscription as a particular locus of ‘politics’ within the social order, that is by the emergence of the very distinction between state and society:

The fact that something like politics should have been circumscribed within social life at a given time has in itself a political meaning and a meaning that is not particular but general, [that] raises the question of the constitution of the social space, of the form of society. The political is [...] revealed not in what we call political activity, but in the *double movement* whereby *the mode of institution of society appears* and is *obscured*. [...] It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics [...] becomes defined as particular, while the principle, which generates the overall configuration is concealed.<sup>47</sup>

The depoliticising effects of a foundational governmental practice are thus contained in the effacement of the very contingency and indeterminacy that makes its constitutive effects possible: government, we may claim, “endeavours to *create a social reality, which it suggests already exists*”<sup>48</sup>.

The political represents the *moment of openness or undecidability*, when a new social order is on the point of establishment, when its limits are being contested. Politics, in contrast, is what takes place once the new order is institutionalised, it is the debate that occurs *within the limits* set by that order. In an important sense, the political could be described as a moment that *depoliticises*: the most intense political moment, the *moment of decision*, itself brings about the forgetting of the political that installs politics.<sup>49</sup>

However, the depoliticising gesture of the occultation of the political is not equivalent to its actual negation. The moment of the political as the instance of the

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‘Yeltsin era’ and ‘Putin presidency’ in a nominalist manner, as convenient names for complex strategic configurations and dispersed tactical dynamics, which need not necessarily converge upon the figure of the president.

<sup>47</sup> Lefort 1988, p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>48</sup> Lemke 2001, p. 203. Emphasis added.

<sup>49</sup> Edkins 1999, p. 126. Emphasis added.

foundation of the social order subsequently recedes to its *borderline* as both exterior to its existence and indispensable for its formation: a *constitutive outside*. In Schmitt's terms, the political is a 'concrete' *borderline concept* that pertains to "the outermost sphere"<sup>50</sup> of the social order and forms the irreducible *excess* of order that is nonetheless necessary for its emergence: "The concrete is that kind of instance or act which belongs to order, but can't be included in it."<sup>51</sup> This notion of the political as an irreducible excess at the foundation of every order aligns a Schmittian political realism with the poststructuralist research orientation that is the main source of theoretical inspiration for this study. For our purposes, the crucial contribution of Schmitt's notion of the political is its *critical* potential that consists in disturbing the closures and totalisations effected by the claims to the self-immanence of order and restoring to it the undecidable and thus decisionist character of its infrastructure. In other words, our approach to postcommunism as a moment of the political entails highlighting, in the study of the interface of Russian and European governmental practices, their infrastructural function in the politics of emergence, i.e. their *political effects* and *depoliticising dynamics*. The crucial questions in analysing the practices of reconstitution of government in the socioeconomic reforms of the Putin presidency and EU technical assistance to them therefore consist in the elucidation of their constitutive force and the historical configuration that makes these constitutive effects possible. Let us call these questions, respectively, the *what's* and the *how's* of the politics of emergence. In order to address these questions it is necessary to locate the analysis of the Russian postcommunist transformation on the level of 'the political', i.e. to inquire about the conditions of possibility of the concrete constitutive practices in which postcommunist modalities of government take their shape and thereby to *re-politicise* them. In this study we focus on one set of such practices that take place in the *EU-Russian interface at the local site of technical assistance projects*. Our research questions can thus be posed in the following manner: *In which ways do the practices of technical assistance reconstitute postcommunist modalities of government and what are the political principles that condition the possibility of this reconstitution?* The following section discusses the theoretical orientation espoused in the study of this EU-Russian interface.

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<sup>50</sup> Schmitt 1985a, p. 5.

<sup>51</sup> Ojakangas 2000, p. 67. See also Schmitt 1985a, p. 5, 20. See Ojakangas 2000, Muller 1999 for the explication of Schmitt's 'philosophy of concrete life'.

## 1.4. Theoretical Points of Departure: Michel Foucault's Historical Ontology

### 1.4.1. Historical Ontology of Postcommunism: Beyond Transitionalism and Traditionalism

The point of departure of this study in the notion of postcommunism as a moment of the political renders it *critical* towards the *nexus* of *practices* of international government of the postcommunist transformation and the mainstream *theoretical* discourses in International Relations (IR) regarding these practices. The notion of 'politics of emergence' attempts to critically reassess and move outside the continuum arguably present in the research on postcommunist Russia between the discourses of 'transition to democracy' and the mode of discourse we shall label 'traditionalism', which emphasises the relevance of (variously construed) historico-cultural determinants for the project of transformation. This dichotomy, whose extreme poles were constituted in the early 1990s by the influential works of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington<sup>52</sup>, serves to displace the focus on the *present* in the valorisation of either the *future* (liberal-teleological transitionalism) or the *past* (cultural-civilisational traditionalism). While the transitionalist discourse has arguably dominated both the international practices of managing postcommunism in the 1990s and the IR studies of postcommunism,<sup>53</sup> the traditionalist approach has served to cover those 'awkward cases' that did not fit or blatantly resisted the logic of liberal progress.<sup>54</sup>

The notion of the foundational moment permits to go beyond the discourses of 'transitionalism' and 'traditionalism', the former postulating a progressive teleology

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<sup>52</sup> See Fukuyama 1992, Huntington 1993. In the specific field of postcommunist studies this continuum has been actualised in the seminal debate in *Slavic Review* about 'grounding' transitology between the practitioners of comparative politics and area studies, i.e. the advocates of theoretical *models of transition* and the adherents of the thesis of the *cultural specificity* of the postcommunist 'area'. For the outline of the main positions in this debate see Schmitter and Karl 1994, Bunce 1995, Karl and Schmitter 1995.

<sup>53</sup> See Williams and Neumann 2000, Neumann 1998.

<sup>54</sup> For the discussion of this dual logic in the discourse of 'global civil society' see Hopgood 2000. One does not fail to observe the shift to the traditionalist discourse in the study of Russian postcommunism after the disillusionment with the reforms of the 1990s, especially in the aftermath of the partial default of August 1998 and the subsequent political crisis. For the discussion of this shift see Treisman 2000.

of liberal-democratic transition and the latter operating with an ontology of tradition that, particularly when construed as a cultural totality, disables the inquiry into the politics of emergence by definition. Both of these theoretical constructions serve to negate the contingency, ambiguity and radical openness involved in the foundational moment of postcommunism. The traditionalist discourse constructs a body of ‘tradition’, ‘mentality’, ‘culture’ and reifies these conceptual abstractions by assigning them an empirical function of attenuating change, discontinuity and disruption in the domain of practice.<sup>55</sup> The transitionalist discourse operates with a concept of change, whose direction is teleologically predetermined to the extent that the very *event of change* vanishes in a monotonous and paradoxically continuous *advance*, whereby the rich facticity of contingent foundational practices is cast in terms of a mere *deviation*.<sup>56</sup> In both cases, the radical epistemic, political and ethico-teleological *discontinuity* inaugurated by the foundational moment of postcommunism is negated and the open-endedness of the moment reduced to a facile opposition between an externally posited line of ‘progress’ and an externally authorised confinement within the variably defined domain of tradition. To speak of the discontinuous, the emergent and the open-ended is, of course, not to posit contemporary Russian politics as a field of pure indetermination and voluntarist decisionism. Lacking foundations *in depth*, the postcommunist political surface is nonetheless a *delimited* space, though the precise character of this delimitation owes far less to the dubious Imperial or Soviet ‘tradition’ than to the specific modality of its *demise*.<sup>57</sup> Having its point of descent in the revolutionary demise of the Soviet order, postcommunist government unfolds in the topography of its *ruins*.

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<sup>55</sup> The postcommunist moment is particularly resistant to the totalisations implicated in the unproblematic application of the notions of cultural identity or tradition. In Richard Sakwa’s remark, Russian postcommunist politics is “a fluid and changing situation where *almost anything has become a subculture*, and it is very difficult to identify *anything approximating a dominant strain*.” (Sakwa 1999b, p. 21. Emphasis added.) If we accept this diagnosis, it becomes difficult to conceive of any possible value of the deployment of totalised notions of culture and tradition.

<sup>56</sup> See Foucault 1991, pp. 55–58 for a critique of the notions of change and continuity in traditional history and an explication of the archaeological strategy of historical research, which substitutes for the analysis in terms of continuity and change the analysis of specific, multiple and perpetual transformations. For a more detailed discussion of Foucault’s archaeology, see chapter 1.5. of this study.

<sup>57</sup> The relative absence of attention to the process of the demise of Soviet communism, combined with a traditionalist prejudice in favour of continuity, leads to flawed descriptions and predictions regarding Russian politics. Most exemplary in this sense is the conclusion in Iver Neumann’s (1996) magisterial study of Russian political thought in relation to Europe that “some kind of social-democratic or socialist

This study seeks to restore historical openness to Russian postcommunism, alleviating the theoretical weight of both the past (disabling the cultural totalisations of the traditionalist discourse) and the future (avoiding recourse to any teleological postulations regarding the course of transformation or its immanent logic). It ought to be emphasised that the focus on the present as a moment of radical openness also attempts to avoid the pitfalls of the critiques of ‘transitionalism’ that valorise ‘local tradition’ as either a victim of hegemonic and repressive practices of international government or as a feasible alternative to them.<sup>58</sup> In contrast, this study will attempt to demonstrate that the notions of local culture and tradition, authenticity and empowerment, participation and autonomy that could so easily be utilised in the critique of international assistance to liberal reforms are in fact indispensable to the operation of the liberal rationality that is the object of criticism. As we shall see, the deployment of the themes of self-actualisation, authenticity and autonomy in the discourse of technical assistance parallels the use of the very same themes in what are frequently designated as ‘counter-discourses’ opposing global (neo)liberal governance. A genealogical approach to government that we shall rely on in this study attunes one to the fact of *identity*, on the level of governmental rationality, of the apparently *opposed* sets of problematics and solutions.

A critical distance from both traditionalism and transitionalism in the discussion of postcommunist transformation entails a similar stance to the disciplinary mainstream in IR theory, which is at present arguably constituted by the space delineated by (neo)liberal institutionalism and democratic peace theory that subscribe to the transitionalist paradigm and various trends within the constructivist orientation that emphasise the role of culture and identity in the processes of transformation.<sup>59</sup> Contrary to the critical self-image of constructivism<sup>60</sup>, our study shall seek to

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position will re-constitute itself. [...] It would indeed be remarkable if, for the first time since the 1840s, the debate about Europe should be without one or even two variants of a socialist position for more than a few years.” (Neumann 1996, p. 196.) Had either pre-Soviet or Soviet ‘traditions’ indeed maintained a latent existence in the depths of discourse, such a prediction, which of course has failed to materialise, would have been warranted. As we shall discuss in chapter 4.5.1., the immediate postcommunist topography precluded *from the outset* the formation of anything like a social-democratic position.

<sup>58</sup> See Ferguson 1997 for the illustration of this standpoint. Cf. Brigg 2001.

<sup>59</sup> See Rengger 2000, chapters 2, 3 for the discussion of liberal and constructivist approaches in IR theory.

<sup>60</sup> According to Stefano Guzzini (2000), throughout the 1990s constructivism has *become* the disciplinary mainstream, while avowedly maintaining its *critical* orientation towards the mainstream.

demonstrate the ways in which a broadly constructivist epistemology is a necessary condition for the (neo)liberal policies with regard to postcommunist transformation. In particular, the notion of *identity*, a central concept of constructivism, will in our account figure as an indispensable instrument-effect of neoliberal governmental practice. Therefore, in order to account for the EU-Russian interface of governmental practices on the level of the political it is necessary to maintain a critical distance not only from the practices of government themselves, but also from the theoretical discourses about them that, as the discussion below will make clear, exist in a relationship of constitutive interdependence with them. It ought to be emphasised that the notion of critique relied on in this study is neither empirical nor normative. The goal of critique is *not* to assess EU Tacis activities or suggest means for the programme's improvement or optimisation, but to trace, theoretically locating practices of technical assistance in the postcommunist politics of emergence, both the *technical operation of the political* and the *political effects of the technical*. As a critical strategy, *re-politicisation of technical assistance* should also be distinguished from a normative criticism of the sociopolitical conceptions that inform these practices. The latter form of criticism, while perfectly plausible, is not practiced in this study, whose author is sceptical about the militant opposition to (neo)liberalism, frequently resounded in development studies.<sup>61</sup> What is at stake is rather the question of relating practices of

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For the critique of the incoherent position of constructivism as a mainstream critique of the mainstream see Persram 1999. See also Kratochwil 2000 for the critical discussion of constructivism as a new disciplinary orthodoxy. This study's distance from constructivism has to do less with its ambivalent location in the disciplinary grid than with the two following reasons. Firstly, as Ian Hacking (2000) notes, 'social construction' derives its critical purchase from 'unravelling' the pretensions to naturalness or givenness of the respective object. In other words, it is only worthwhile to proclaim something as socially constructed *when it is commonly held not to be*. Evidently, our research area of the construction of new governmental modalities is free from such 'naturalist fallacies' and, furthermore, the governmental rationality that we reconstitute in this study is not merely implicitly, but *avowedly* constructivist, which renders constructivist concerns insufficient for this study. Secondly, we ought to note the ambivalence of the very concept of 'social construction' and the associated focus of constructivism on the ill-defined domain of culture. Our question in this study is not of 'social construction' but a 'construction of the social', insofar as 'the social' is taken to be the effect of governmental practices. Cf. the criticism of constructivism by Nicholas Rose, for whom relations constitutive of subjectivity "are constructed and historical, but they are not to be understood by locating them in some amorphous domain of culture. [...] Changing relations of subjectification cannot be established by derivation or interpretation of other cultural or social forms. To assume explicitly or implicitly that they can is to presume the *continuity* of human beings as subjects of history, essentially equipped with the capacity for endowing meaning." (Rose 1996b, pp. 24–25. Emphasis original.)

<sup>61</sup> See Ferguson 1997, Rankin 2001,

government to their *conditions of possibility*. “Critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.”<sup>62</sup>

In our study, this type of critical orientation is philosophically grounded in the approach of ‘historical ontology’<sup>63</sup> as elaborated by Michel Foucault in a retrospective reconstruction of his lifetime work. Foucault’s philosophy has been interpreted in various ways, that stress either the continuity, or, in Foucault’s own term, ‘discontinuity’ in his project. Best known is the separation of *archaeological* and *genealogical* ‘periods’ in Foucault’s writing, often equated with ‘structuralist’ and ‘poststructuralist’ phases in his work.<sup>64</sup> Archaeology practices the study of *discursive formations* as autonomous unities, with an emphasis on their internal rules of formation or conditions of existence, while later genealogical studies exemplify the linkage of discursive practices with the broader domain of sociopolitical practice that conditions their emergence, specifically via the concept of decentred and productive *power*. However, despite the significant difference in methodological emphasis between archaeology and genealogy,<sup>65</sup> Foucault’s work is marked by the continuous interest in the *historical constitution* of all that is thought of as originary, essential and foundational and, more specifically, a permanent questioning of the “modes by which, in our culture, human beings *are being made subjects*”<sup>66</sup>. The stakes of this concern for the historicity of the subject are that “[this critique] will separate out, from the *contingency that has made us what we are*, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think”.<sup>67</sup> In terms of the distinction presented above, Foucault’s philosophical strategy suspends both the teleological assumptions of transition and the ontological assumptions of tradition, and rather proceeds from

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<sup>62</sup> Foucault 1988f, p. 154.

<sup>63</sup> Foucault 1984f, p. 48. In post-Foucauldian scholarship the project of historical ontology has been advanced by Ian Hacking (2002a, 2002b).

<sup>64</sup> See Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982. Cf. Gordon 1980, p. 233, who does not perceive a contradiction between archaeology and genealogy and approaches both as ‘questions’ which together constitute Foucault’s project. Among the ‘continuist’ interpretations of Foucault, the most authoritative are Deleuze 1988 and Bernauer 1990. Foucault’s own retrospective representation of his work supports the thesis of the ‘continuity’ of his project. See e.g. Foucault 1984c, Foucault 1988a, pp. 48–49.

<sup>65</sup> See Foucault 1989, 1984a for the detailed discussion of respectively the archaeological and the genealogical approach.

<sup>66</sup> Foucault 1982, p. 208. Emphasis added

<sup>67</sup> Foucault 1984f, p. 46.



making “the intelligible appear against the *background of emptiness*”.<sup>68</sup> The latter notion is of course crucial to the understanding of postcommunist politics of emergence, which, as we argued above, ought to be approached without the postulates of stability, permanence and presence:

Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity, *its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present*, that it continues secretly to animate the present.<sup>69</sup>

There are no fixed essences, no underlying laws, no metaphysical finalities [...] genealogy *avoids the search for depth*. Instead it seeks the *surfaces* of events, small details, minor shifts and subtle contours.<sup>70</sup>

Foucault’s philosophical interest in the moments of rupture and discontinuity, his attunement to the aleatory and the contingent, and his avoidance of recourse to metaphors of depth, combined with his ‘happy positivist’<sup>71</sup> style, exceptionally attentive to empirical detail and the mundane facticity of local events, make his work particularly suitable for the study of the constitutive practices of postcommunist politics of emergence. Historical ontology is also referred to by Foucault as a critical ontology of the *present* and of *ourselves*,<sup>72</sup> marked by the concern for the irreducible

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<sup>68</sup> Foucault 1996b, p. 312. Emphasis added. See Simons 1995, pp. 69–70, Boone 1990, chapter 3, Caputo 1993, Morey 1992, Veyne 1993 for the importance of the figure of the void, abyss or absence in Foucault’s philosophy. This ‘scarce ontology’ is a distinguishing feature of Foucault’s poststructuralism that differentiates it strongly from its other practitioners, e.g. Gilles Deleuze, whose ontology is densely populated with vitalistic forces of creation. In contrast, Foucault’s philosophy proceeds from the combination of empirical plenitude and transcendental absence, whereby that which is beyond the specific and the historically constituted is, quite literally, the void (Hallward 2000, p. 102.), albeit the void, the proximity to which is a prime task for philosophical thought, since it serves to ‘de-specify’, i.e. render presently self-evident conceptions of subjectivity contingent and mutable and thus make it possible to transgress the limits that make us what we are. We shall involve the figure of the void in our critique of the governmental practices of technical assistance in chapter 5 of this study.

<sup>69</sup> Foucault 1984d, p. 81. Emphasis added.

<sup>70</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 106. Emphasis added.

<sup>71</sup> See Foucault 1981, pp. 70–72.

<sup>72</sup> Foucault 1993, p. 18. In Foucault’s reading, this ontology of the present is the second, relatively unarticulated and largely ignored field of philosophical inquiry inaugurated by Immanuel Kant. While Kant is generally credited with opening a field of critical investigation into the conditions of possibility of true knowledge (‘analytics of truth’), Foucault’s reading of Kant’s texts on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (1993, 1984f) unearths a modality of questioning, which prefigures his own projects: “What is our present? What is the contemporary field of possible experience?” (Foucault 1993, p. 18.)

specificity of the present, which as we have argued is necessary to do justice to the event of postcommunism. On a philosophical level, therefore, the problematic of historical ontology serves to provide us not with a theory but rather with an ethos of concern for the present and its constitutive force, which brings into being new objects and practices, including the forms of subjectivity that define and specify our very ‘identity’:

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, not even a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as *an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life*, in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the *historical analysis of the limits* that are imposed on us and an *experiment with the possibility of going beyond them*.<sup>73</sup>

A historical ontology of ourselves is marked by a radical historicisation of the human being, “placing within the process of development all that is considered immortal in man”.<sup>74</sup> In the historical critique that seeks to ‘eventalise’<sup>75</sup>, i.e. disturb and destabilise the self-evidences ingrained in the present conceptions of subjectivity, Foucault proceeds from the *decentring of the subject* and its problematisation as an *effect of power relations*, the main analytical question being the ‘reestablishment of various systems of subjection’.<sup>76</sup> This decentring problematises the ambiguity involved in the term ‘subject’ itself, the duality of that which is an autonomous self-identical agent and that which is amenable or liable to the authority of the other. Pointing to the interdependence of these meanings entails analysing the constitution of subjectivity as involving both *subjectification* in the sense of the constitution of identity and *subjection* to the relations of power.<sup>77</sup> Foucault elaborates three axes of inquiry into ‘subjecti(ficati)on’: a *truth* (knowledge) axis, a *power* axis and an *ethics* axis, to which there correspond the three commonly recognised ‘periods’ of Foucault’s work that we shall rather conceive of as ‘tasks’: archaeology, genealogy and ethics.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Foucault 1984f, p. 50. Emphasis added.

<sup>74</sup> Foucault 1984a, p. 87.

<sup>75</sup> Foucault 1991b, p. 76.

<sup>76</sup> Foucault 1984a, p. 83.

<sup>77</sup> See Foucault 1982, p. 212.

<sup>78</sup> See also Foucault 1984f, pp. 48–49.

Three domains [...] are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.<sup>79</sup>

The linkage of truth, power and ethics in the production of subjectivity and the possibility of its uncoupling is the primary concern of historical ontology.<sup>80</sup> Historical ontology seeks to elucidate the *conditions of possibility* of the practices that constitute individual and societal subjectivities, but locates these ‘a priori’ conditions not in a transcendental realm but in concrete historical fields of power relations, thereby ‘historicizing the transcendental’.<sup>81</sup> It thus combines *archaeological* and *genealogical* orientations, being “genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method”.<sup>82</sup> Our study seeks to explore the problematic of historical ontology in relation to the constitution of postcommunist modalities of government in Russia and combines the overall *genealogical design*, specified for our purposes in terms of *analytics of power*, with the point of departure in the *archaeological method*. We may thus speak of this research as a ‘Foucauldian study’ in three senses. Firstly, its ontological points of departure are ‘grounded’ in Foucault’s historical ontology and, more specifically, Foucault’s genealogical analytics of power, which approaches power as decentred and constitutive of its objects. Secondly, the theoretical points of departure of this study and its theory of interpretation draw from the problematic of *governmentality*, which concretises the notion of productive decentred power and focuses on local, immediate, ‘microphysical’ techniques of government antecedent both to institutions and political ideologies.<sup>83</sup> Thirdly, the methodological orientation of this study borrows from Foucault’s archaeological analysis of discourse, which in our research is methodically applied as the analysis of the order(ing) of the discourse of technical assistance. Below we shall outline the ways, in which these three dimensions take shape in this study.

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<sup>79</sup> Foucault 1984b, p. 351.

<sup>80</sup> See Foucault 1984f. The linkage of three axes can be best illustrated by Foucault’s history of sexuality. See Foucault 1990a, 1990b, 1990c. See Simons 1995 for the argument that the ethico-political direction of Foucault’s project consists in uncoupling the linkages between the three axes of subjectification.

<sup>81</sup> Veine 1993, p. 4.

<sup>82</sup> Foucault 1984f, p. 46. See also Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, pp. 124–125, Kharkhordin 1999, chapter 1.

<sup>83</sup> Foucault 1988g, p. 153.

## 1.4.2. Analytics of Power

Foucault's engagement with the question of power is motivated by his dissatisfaction with the 'juridico-discursive'<sup>84</sup> account of power, prevalent in political theory that is grounded in legal or institutional models.<sup>85</sup> Foucault's notion of power can be summarised as the rejection of five postulates that constitute what he terms the '*repressive hypothesis*' about power relations: the postulate of power being a 'tool' that is *possessed* by an identifiable agent, the *exteriority* of power to the domains of its application, the necessarily *hierarchical* manner of the exercise of power, the intelligibility of power relations in terms of *subjective intentionality*, the *exteriority of relations of resistance* to relations of power.<sup>86</sup> This restrictive representation of *repressive power* begs a question of the reason for its successes. It appears enigmatic that "this power, [...] poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics that it utilises, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself, [...] a power that only has the force of the negative on its side [...] basically *anti-energy*"<sup>87</sup> could achieve its alleged goals of domination and repression. Instead, Foucault undertakes a *reversal of the relationship of power and its object*: instead of a negative and repressive conception of power he presents an approach to power as a positive and productive network of multiple and heterogeneous force relations.

We need to [...] reverse the direction of our analysis: rather than assuming a generally acknowledged repression [...] we must begin with these positive mechanisms, insofar as they *produce* knowledge, *multiply* discourse, *induce* pleasure and *generate* power, we must investigate the conditions of their emergence and operation.<sup>88</sup>

The emphasis on the productivity of power is necessary but not sufficient for Foucault's analytics. The second problem with the juridico-discursive approach is its

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<sup>84</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 82. For the detailed discussion of the juridico-discursive conception of power see Foucault 1990a, 1982, 1988c.

<sup>85</sup> See Foucault 1982, p. 209. See also Foucault 1988c, p. 102. Commentary on Foucault's conception of power has already become an intellectual industry. See e.g. Walzer 1986, Taylor 1986, Smart 1985, Said 1986, Hindess 1996a, 1998, Patton 1998, Rajchman 1985, Bernauer 1990, Ewald 1992, Pizzorno 1992, Donnelly 1992.

<sup>86</sup> Foucault 1990a, pp. 90–99.

<sup>87</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 85. Emphasis added.

<sup>88</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 73. Emphasis added.

understanding of power as centred on, exercised and possessed by a sovereign subject. In Foucault's formulation, despite the demise of monarchical rule, political theory has remained "under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis we still haven't cut off the head of the king".<sup>89</sup> Foucault's famous 'regicide' in political philosophy proceeds from the *decentering of the sovereign subject*, in whom power is taken to be vested: "The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law or the overall unity of domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the *terminal forms that power takes*."<sup>90</sup>

Power's condition of possibility [...] must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the *moving substrate of force relations* which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always *local and unstable* [...] *Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere*. And "Power", insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert and self-reproducing, is simply the *overall effect that emerges from these mobilities*.<sup>91</sup>

Recasting sovereignty as a terminal effect of power relations entails an important consequence: extreme, violent and spectacular manifestations of power cease to appear indicative of its strength but rather serve to exemplify the failure of its more subtle modalities: "The interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being essential forms of power, are only its *limits*, power in its *frustrated* or *extreme forms*."<sup>92</sup> Instead, the decentred conception of politics necessitates an analysis of power relations in terms of the interplay of *strategies* and *tactics*, which entails approaching them in their *particularity*, *locality* and *timeliness*. The privileging of the "most local, most immediate power relations at work"<sup>93</sup> is necessary to understand the practices, in which more general and overarching political configurations are constituted. "Unless [...] relations of power are traced down to their actual material functioning, they escape our analysis and continue to operate with unquestioned autonomy, maintaining the illusion that power is only applied by those at the top to

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 89. See also Foucault 1984d, pp. 62–63.

<sup>90</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 90. Emphasis added.

<sup>91</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 93. Emphasis added.

<sup>92</sup> Foucault 1988e, p. 118. Emphasis added.

<sup>93</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 97.

those at the bottom.”<sup>94</sup> In this study the practices of technical assistance offer a site of power relations that, by virtue of their locality, form “the technical and real, immediately material counterpart”<sup>95</sup> of federal-level policies and nationwide political discourses, rather than being exterior, complementary or facilitating in relation to them.

Foucault’s emphasis on the constitution in power relations of that which is held to be natural, given or self-evident exemplifies the focus on *the political* as opposed to *politics*, the study of the infrastructural constitution of the overall social order, in which domains of ‘society’, ‘economy’ and ‘politics’ are subsequently delimited. Foucault’s investigations of power relations seek to go beyond the delimited domain of politics to analyse its constitution in local and technical practices of power relations that necessarily precede and exceed it. Of crucial importance for our study is Foucault’s displacement of the state/society dualism, whether analytical or normative. Analytically, a decentred conception of power focuses one’s attention on the multiplicity of power relations irreducible to the liberal opposition of the state and civil society as loci of, respectively, homogeneity and heterogeneity, unity and pluralism: “the state [...] does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think.”<sup>96</sup> Normatively, Foucault’s analytics of power is consequently marked by a persistent refusal to take the side of ‘society’ against the state, to “recognise in civil society a principle of good opposable to the evil of the state”.<sup>97</sup> Instead, the underlying concern of Foucault’s work with multiple and heterogeneous relations of subjection that have their locus *within* society demonstrates his distrust for the ‘social bond’ and the political struggles on behalf of ‘society’. Foucault “places little faith in the goodness of society”<sup>98</sup> and rejects as a dangerous utopia the criticism of the state in the name of a ‘society without power’.<sup>99</sup> The abandonment of the *postulate* of a state-society dualism permits us to investigate, against the background of emptiness, the

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<sup>94</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 186.

<sup>95</sup> Foucault 1977a, p. 303.

<sup>96</sup> Foucault 1991a, p. 103.

<sup>97</sup> Gordon 1996, p. 263.

<sup>98</sup> Gordon 1996, p. 264.

<sup>99</sup> See Foucault 1982, 1988c, 1988f, 1990a.

specific modalities of its formation as an *effect* of governmental technologies and enables a practice of criticism unconstrained by the normative confines installed by these very technologies.

The theoretical point of departure in Foucault's analytics of power can be summed up in the thesis of the *centrality of the technical* that reinscribes *the technical as the political*. In more conventional terms we can render this thesis as a claim for the *primacy of the executive* over the judiciary and the legislative branches of government, the latter corresponding respectively to the 'juridical' and the 'discursive' aspects of the conception of power, which Foucault sought to supplant in his studies of governmental technologies.<sup>100</sup> In our study, this thesis justifies the focus on the *constitutive*, and thereby political, character of the practices of technical assistance, engaged in by EU Tacis in the field of postcommunist politics of emergence. It also serves to bring the discussion of the formation of new patterns of state-society relations in Russia down from the level of 'juridico-discursive' reflection on either institutions or ideologies down to the level of concrete governmental practices, which precede the sedimentation of power relations into legal or ideological foundations of the social order. The problematic of the foundational moment of the political is thus relocated from the level of the spectacular sovereign decision<sup>101</sup> to the local sites of constitutive practices, whose force is owing to their relative anonymity and invisibility. Such a relocation is not only a matter of theoretical adjustment but is also called for by the specificity of foundational practices in the Putin presidency, whose revolutionary significance paradoxically contrasts with the impersonal, technical and meticulous manner of their implementation.<sup>102</sup> This reorientation of discussion proceeds from

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<sup>100</sup> See Schmitt 1985b for the discussion of liberal parliamentarism in terms of its valorisation of free and unconstrained proliferation of political discourse. For Foucault's arguments on the primacy of the executive in the context of punitive technologies see Foucault 1977a, particularly pp. 225–247. See also Dean 1999, pp. 33–34.

<sup>101</sup> This is the approach to the question of foundation taken by Carl Schmitt, in whose theory sovereignty consists in the constitutive decision that institutes the new order in its act of exception. See Schmitt 1976, 1985a. A Foucauldian reading of the concept of the political retains Schmitt's emphasis on the *constitutive character of power relations* and the primacy of the exceptional *founding rupture* but serves, as discussed above, to *decentre the notion of power* so that the figure of the sovereign is reinscribed as a sedimented effect of local practices of power relations. For the discussion of affinities between Schmitt and Foucault see Ojakangas 2001. We shall discuss the complex relation between sovereign and governmental power and attempt to re-introduce the question of sovereignty into the Foucauldian problematic of governmentality in chapters 3.6, 4.1, 4.2. of this study.

<sup>102</sup> See Bunin et al 2001a, Pavlovsky 2000a.

the specification of analytics of power in terms of the problematic of *governmentality*, discussed in the following chapter.

### 1.4.3. Dispositional Diagram of Governmentality

Our study of the political effects of EU Tacis practices on the reconstitution of modalities of government in Russia borrows its main analytical tools from Foucault's *analytics of government* that examines conditions of emergence and transformation of particular regimes of governmental practices.<sup>103</sup> For the purposes of this research, the definition of 'government' offered by Mitchell Dean illustrates the main aspects of governmental activity:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a *multiplicity of authorities and agencies*, employing a variety of *techniques* and *forms of knowledge*, that seeks to *shape conduct* by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs for *definite and shifting ends* and with a *diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes*.<sup>104</sup>

This definition permits to distinguish three aspects of government that are homologous to Foucault's axes of historical ontology. First of all, government involves mechanisms, procedures, instruments with the help of which *power relations* are exercised. These can be called techniques of government, or its *techné*.<sup>105</sup> The second aspect concerns the forms of *knowledge*, thought, expertise that both arise from practices of government and inform and support it. This aspect is called the

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<sup>103</sup> Dean 1999, p. 21. Foucauldian analytics of government is increasingly prominent in sociology where it is applied in diverse spheres of e.g. medicine (Osborne 1996), education (Hunter 1996), social movements (Cruikshank 1996). In International Relations, the problematic of governmentality in its relation to sovereignty has been addressed by Dillon 1995 and with regard to international development assistance by Ferguson 1997, Rankin 2001, Brigg 2001, 2002. For the introduction to the problematic and the examples of diverse studies in governmentality see the edited volumes of Burchell et al 1991, Barry et al 1996, Hänninen 1998.

<sup>104</sup> Dean 1999, p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>105</sup> In this study we rely on the distinction between technology and technique proposed by O'Malley 1996, p. 205, note 1. 'Technology' refers to the whole *ensemble* of governmental practices and comprises all aspects of government. 'Technique' refers to distinct means of application of technology in different domains. For example, psychoanalysis is a technique that applies confessional technology.



*episteme* of government. In accordance with what Foucault refers to as the *rule of immanence*, these two aspects are united in a relationship of constitutive interdependence, i.e. “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.”<sup>106</sup>

‘Truth’ is to be understood as a *system of ordered procedures* for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a *circular relation with systems of power*, which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power, which it induces and which extend it. A *‘regime’ of truth*.<sup>107</sup>

The rule of immanence thus stipulates that the study of a regime of governmental practices should proceed from the “study of programmes of conduct which have both *prescriptive* effects regarding what is to be done (*effects of jurisdiction*) and *codifying* effects regarding what is to be known (*effects of veridiction*)”.<sup>108</sup> The rule of immanence not only permits to elucidate the constitutive interdependence of international governmental practices and their theoretical correlates in IR, but also, by locating knowledge and power on the same ontological plane of practice,<sup>109</sup> displaces the grand ‘theory-practice dualism’ in favour of the analysis of specific nexuses of power/knowledge. “Theory does not express, translate or serve to apply practice, it *is* practice.”<sup>110</sup>

The third aspect of government is the constitution of individual and collective identity in governmental practices, the type of subjectivity they presuppose, promote, elicit and foster. This aspect is designated as the *ethos* of government in the Foucauldian meaning of ethics as a relationship to the self.<sup>111</sup> The ethos operative in

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<sup>106</sup> Foucault 1980c, p. 51. See also Foucault 1984d, 1988b, 1988c. The claim for the constitutive interdependence of power and knowledge should be differentiated from the argument for their identity, which is entirely alien to Foucault’s work. Neither identical nor antagonistic, power and knowledge are effects elicited by a practice, which reinforce and imply one another.

<sup>107</sup> Foucault 1984d, p. 74.

<sup>108</sup> Foucault 1991b, p. 75. Emphasis added. The consequence of the articulation of power and knowledge is a *depoliticising effect*, that consists in transforming a political problem into a technical one by enfolding it in a particular regime of truth, “removing it from political discourse and recasting it into the neutral language of science”, thereby specialising and professionalising the field of possible solutions and replacing the ‘discourse of interpretations’ of the problem with a ‘discourse of implementation’ of the solution. See Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 196.

<sup>109</sup> See Deacon 2000.

<sup>110</sup> Foucault 1996c, p. 75. Emphasis added.

<sup>111</sup> Dean 1999, pp. 30–33.

a regime of governmentality also functions as its *telos*, a set of its strategic objectives that is grounded in a '*programmatically a priori*'<sup>112</sup>, a belief that the real is amenable to transformation by the practices of calculative rational management. Governmental rationality can thus be identified as '*teleotechnological*'<sup>113</sup> and summed up in terms of a classical definition of government as the '*right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a convenient end*'.<sup>114</sup> To analyse a governmental technology is thus to reconstitute its specific *dispositional arrangement* in terms of the three aspects of government.

Following Foucault's idea of an intelligible yet non-subjective logic of power<sup>115</sup>, an analytics of government seeks to reconstitute the *strategic logic* of governmental practices that is irreducible to the *programmatically logic* of subjective intention. Despite taking the programmatic discourse of governmentality as constitutive of the objects it governs, analytics of government seeks to avoid 'illusions of realisation and effectivity'<sup>116</sup> of programmes, which serve to equate Foucault's insistence on *omnipresence* of power with its *omnipotence*, a claim entirely contrary to Foucault's argument. However, though programmes are never fully realisable or effective, they nonetheless induce significant, though unintended and incalculable effects:

These programmes don't take effect in the institutions in an integral manner; they are simplified, or some are chosen and not others; and things never work as planned. But what I wanted to show is that *this difference is not one between the purity of the ideal and the disorderly impurity of the real*, but that in fact there are different strategies which are mutually opposed, composed and superposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects which can *perfectly well be understood in terms of their rationality, even though they do not conform to the initial programming*. [...] The fact that 'real life' is not the same thing as theoreticians' schemas does not entail that these schemas are therefore utopian, imaginary, etc. [...] *These programmes induce a whole series of*

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<sup>112</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 53.

<sup>113</sup> Dillon 1995, p. 332. See also Foucault 1990a, p. 139. In the Foucauldian approach the teleotechnological rationality of modern biopolitical government, aimed at securing the processes of the population, is contrasted with the logic of sovereignty, which sought to secure the hold of the prince over the territory. For the discussion of sovereign and biopolitical government see e.g. Foucault 1988d, 1990a, 1991a, Dean 1999, Stenson 1998.

<sup>114</sup> Guillaume de la Perriere quoted in Foucault 1991a, p. 93. Emphasis added.

<sup>115</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 94.

<sup>116</sup> Gordon 1980, p. 246. For the critique of 'essentialisation' of governmental programmes see also Rankin 2001, O'Malley et al 1997.

*effects in the real: they crystallise into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, they act as grids for the perception and the evaluation of things.*<sup>117</sup>

The programmes of governmental activity in their ethical, epistemic and technical aspects should not, therefore, be discounted since they serve to “[render] reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political programming”<sup>118</sup> and produce new objects, practices and identities as their veridictive and jurisdictional effects. In Mitchell Dean’s terms, strategic logic is the “intentional non-subjective logic or form of intelligibility of regimes of practices that can only be known through the realm of its effects.”<sup>119</sup> The objective of *reconstitution* of the strategic logic of governmentality in our study consists in elucidating, in the process of interpretation, the *conditions of possibility* of the objects of power and knowledge, formed as *veridictive and jurisdictional effects of the discourse of technical assistance*, whose methodical reconstruction is the analytical task of the study. In Foucault’s terms, the general thrust of the analysis can therefore be summed up as “eventalising singular ensembles of practices so as to make them graspable as different regimes of jurisdiction and veridiction”.<sup>120</sup>

For the purposes of this study this task can be analytically operationalised by schematising the space of technical assistance projects as a *dispositional diagram*, a relational scheme of the three constitutive elements of governmentality that is homologous to Foucault’s scheme of historical ontology that forms the philosophical background of this study.<sup>121</sup> In our analysis of the EU Tacis projects we shall seek to

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<sup>117</sup> Foucault 1991c, p. 81. Emphasis added.

<sup>118</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 42.

<sup>119</sup> Dean 1999, p. 210. It should be noted that the concept of ‘strategic logic’ of governmentality is not an ontological concept and does not therefore denote any deeper or more fundamental logic generative of governmental practice. It is rather a descriptive construct that designates a *property* of the discourse we investigate and *is of the same order* as this discourse. As a set of *historical* conditions of possibility, strategic logic is not ontologically anterior to that which it conditions. See Deleuze 1988, p. 114. It is also not a reductive concept that traces a plurality of practices back to a single principle. As we shall demonstrate below, the conditions of possibility of a governmental practice may well lie in an aporetic gap, a point of diffraction that opens dispersion rather than gather together a synthesis. While it is a presupposition of the ‘governmentality approach’ that a regime of government possesses a certain strategic logic by virtue of its teleotechnological rationality, the character of this logic is a property internal to the respective practices and is thus a strictly empirical question.

<sup>120</sup> Foucault 1991c, p. 79.

<sup>121</sup> The term ‘dispositional diagram’ refers to the heuristic *spatialisation* of the regime of governmental practices, a schematisation of its ‘dispositional arrangement of things’. For the detailed discussion of

reconstitute in the discourse of technical assistance the *structure* of the dispositional diagram that regulates the formation of objects along what we shall refer to as its *jurisdictive* (ethico-technical) and *veridictive* (ethico-epistemic) *axes*. In the interpretation of the results of the analysis we shall attempt a genealogical disentanglement of this structure, i.e. its ‘historicisation’. The task of the elucidation of the strategic logic of the practices of technical assistance may be thus grasped as a reconstitution of the *historical structure*<sup>122</sup> of their dispositional diagram, schematised in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Dispositional Diagram of Governmentality

‘spatialised reasoning’ that is characteristic of Foucault’s thought see the work of Thomas Flynn (1991, 1999) and Gilles Deleuze (1988, 1992). The interest in spatialisation is evident both methodologically in Foucault’s frequent recourse to the construction of ‘diagrams’, ‘axes’, ‘diagonals’, and substantively in his relentless concern with (literal or figurative) spaces of confinement, lines of exclusion, regions of power-knowledge, etc. For the best illustration of the methodical application of spatialised reasoning see Foucault’s *Birth of the Clinic* (1976), a ‘book about space, about language and about death’. (p. ix.) The diagram is presented as Foucault’s key concept by Gilles Deleuze (1988, p. 72.), who conceives of it as a scheme of relations between forces, a ‘function detached from any specific use’, but capable of being deployed in a variety of settings for different purposes. This notion of the diagram has an affinity with the relational scheme of the logic of practice developed in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990).

<sup>122</sup> This study applies the term ‘historical structure’, developed in *International Relations* in the work of Robert Cox (1996), in a Foucauldian sense as a set of historical ‘conditions of existence’ of governmental practices. To speak of a *historical* structure of a diagram is to differentiate the objective of Foucault’s studies from the structuralist enterprise, which is concerned with establishing formal abstract ahistorical rules that define the total space of all possible permutations. In contrast, Foucault’s historical ontology seeks to establish not formal conditions of possibility, but the ‘*historical a priori*’, local, particular and historically specific conditions of existence of actual practices. See Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 56, Deleuze 1992 and more generally Foucault 1989.

The following section elaborates the site of technical assistance in terms of the EU-Russian 'diagrammatic' interface of governmental practices.

#### 1.4.4. Technical Assistance as a Site of Governmentalisation

In terms of analytics of government, the practices of technical assistance to administrative and managerial reforms in postcommunist Russia can be heuristically grasped in terms of the notion of '*governmentalisation of government*'<sup>123</sup>. In our application, this term refers to the European problematisation of the performance of the existing governmental technologies in Russia and the ambition to *elicit transformative effects on the social by the transformation of the mechanisms of its government*. It is therefore through the study of concrete *local technical practices* of government that the question of the *emergent postcommunist social order* can be addressed, and it is through the study of international assistance to the reform of governmental technologies that the *international dimension of the postcommunist transformation* can be analysed.

Our analysis proceeds from approaching the site of technical assistance in terms of *the EU-Russian interface of governmental practices*. The notion of interface may be specified in its two aspects with recourse to Foucault's methodological prescriptions regarding the analytics of government. Firstly, on the *local level* of the analysed projects the notion of interface relates to the dynamics of *problematization* of present modalities of government and *intervention* into their operation within the *discourse of technical assistance*, which we reconstruct in the analysis of the Tacis projects. As we shall discuss in detail below, the Foucauldian notion of discourse relied on in this study designates a space of aleatory dispersion of statements rather than a coherent and determined system of their construction. Thus, we do not by any means seek to present the studied practices in terms of the interaction of antecedently given 'European' and 'Russian' governmental rationalities that give rise to internally coherent

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<sup>123</sup> The term 'governmentalisation of government' has been launched by Mitchell Dean and denotes the problematisation of governmental practices in the neoliberal regime of governmentality, whereby the activity of government itself becomes liable to its own mechanisms. In Dean's approach, this mode of 'reflexive' governmentality is contrasted with its predecessors: 'police' government of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and 'processual' government of classical and welfarist liberalisms. See Dean 1999, pp. 199-200. See also Burchell 1991, Rose 1996a, O'Malley 1996.

discourses of reform. The governmental diagram of technical assistance is rather actualised in the discourse that is formed in the course of the projects, all the gaps, incoherencies and contradictions of the interface being immanent to and constitutive of this discourse. In accordance with Foucault's *rule of continual variations*<sup>124</sup>, dispositional diagrams of governmentality are approached not as static forms, defined in terms of doctrine or tradition, but as 'matrices of transformation' subject to permanent modifications and shifts in the course of the interface. The local site of Tacis projects is thus conceived of as a *field of 'interplay of appearances and dispersion'*.<sup>125</sup> What we are interested in are the positivities formed in this interplay and their conditions of emergence.<sup>126</sup>

Secondly, the results of the analysis of these local practices should not be treated in an isolated manner as singular cases of assistance to reform. Though local and regional in scope, projects of technical assistance, understood in terms of 'governmentalisation of government', enter into and are integrated in a multiplicity of ways into the *overall governmental strategy* of the recipient. In the analysis of the effects of local practices of technical assistance we proceed from Foucault's *rule of double conditioning* of a general strategy by the specific tactics and of tactics by the strategic situation in which they operate: "No 'local centre' [...] could function if, through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an overall strategy. And, inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if it did not gain support from precise and tenuous relations, serving [...] as its prop and anchor point."<sup>127</sup> The study of double conditioning departs from the rule of *tactical polyvalence of discourses* that refers to the instability and impermanence of tactical functions of discourse, whereby a single discourse may serve various functions (e.g. support or resistance) in the overall strategy into which it is inserted.<sup>128</sup> The strategic conception

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<sup>124</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 99.

<sup>125</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 35.

<sup>126</sup> In this sense, the question of the EU-Russian *interface* should be distinguished from the study of the processes of advocacy of governmental practices by EU Tacis and their reception by the local counterparts. Such a study would focus on the communicative dynamics at work in the interaction of preconstituted agencies. However, as the analysis in chapter 2.1. of the formation of the object of local agency in the Tacis discourse should make clear, posing the latter question makes little sense in a Foucauldian approach, insofar as the figure of the local counterpart does not pre-exist the discourse of technical assistance but is formed inside it as its technical modality.

<sup>127</sup> Foucault 1990a, pp. 99–100.

<sup>128</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 100.

of power relations thus necessitates the focus on the ways, in which the dispositional diagram of governmentality actualised in the discourse of technical assistance enters into and provides content to the strategy of socioeconomic reforms undertaken in the Putin presidency, and, on the other hand, how these practices are conditioned by that strategy. In this study, the strategic field of federal-level reforms is concretely delineated by the policy programmes officialised by the Russian Government and the annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly.<sup>129</sup>

We may now sum up our problem formulation in terms of analytics of government as a series of three tasks: the reconstitution of the *structure of the dispositional diagram* actualised in the EU-Russian interface at the site of EU Tacis projects in the Republic of Karelia, the *retrieval of the conditions of possibility* of the veridictive and jurisdictional effects elicited in this diagram, and the elucidation of the *relation of double conditioning* between this local diagram and the overall strategy of the socioeconomic reforms of the Putin presidency.

## 1.5. The Empirical Domain of the Study and the Identification of Primary Sources

The concrete site of inquiry is delineated by the primary sources of the study, which may be grouped into three types. The first type includes official documents and reports of the three *EU Tacis projects* that form the scope of the study. The sets of documents include inception, interim and final reporting as well as policy documents of advisory and consultative character produced as project outputs. This type of sources is the most crucial for the reconstruction of the EU-Russian interface, since it is the problematisations and interventions proposed in this programmatic documentation that elicit concrete veridictive and jurisdictional effects, whose positivity and conditions of possibility we seek to analyse.

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<sup>129</sup> The notion of officialisation, developed in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990, pp. 108–111), is here used in the more conventional sense of endowing a practice with an official legal status and carries no connotations of the authoritative imposition of particular representations of reality by dominant social groups.

The second type of sources includes official documents and reports produced by the *Russian counterparts* in the projects. The latter are of two kinds: *professional groups* involved in the reform process (associations, organisations, and educational institutions) and *local or regional governments*. The set of sources includes documents and reports officialised by the Karelian government, and resolutions and statements authorised by professional associations or forums (conferences, round-table workshops, seminars) that are related to the reception of the advocated professional and managerial practices. This type of sources is secondary in significance and is of interest only insofar as these responses of the Russian counterparts are linked to the projects in question as their outcomes (e.g. the Strategy of the Development of Health Care in the Republic of Karelia) or exemplify authoritative responses to project activities (e.g. the Resolution of the International Conference “Reforms of Health Care and Social Protection in the Republic of Karelia: Results, Conclusions and Recommendations”).

The third type of sources includes strategic policy documents, officialised by the *Russian government*. The most important source of this type is the ‘Main Directions of Socioeconomic Policy of the Government of the Russian Federation for the Long-Term Perspective’, which provides federal policy guidelines regarding both the overall direction of socioeconomic reforms and specific policy areas, including those that the Tacis projects, which constitute the empirical scope of our study, provide assistance to.<sup>130</sup> These guidelines are concretised and specified in the government’s Programme of Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation for the Midterm Perspective.<sup>131</sup> In addition to these governmental programmes we shall also rely in our outline of the ‘strategic field’ of Russian socioeconomic reforms on Annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly, which, particularly in the Putin presidency, serve as a prime site of federal policy statements.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Main Directions of Socioeconomic Policy of the Government of the Russian Federation for the Long-Term Perspective. [Hereafter referred to as ‘Main Directions’.] This policy strategy was contracted in late 1999 by the then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and produced by the team of experts at the Strategic Designs Centre, headed by German Gref, currently the Minister of Economic Development and Trade. The text has been officialised by the Government of the Russian Federation in 2000 as its guideline document and bears the informal title of the ‘Gref Programme’.

<sup>131</sup> Programme of Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation for the Midterm Perspective: 2003–2005. [Hereafter referred to as ‘Programme 2003–2005’.]

<sup>132</sup> Putin 2000, 2001, 2002.



## 1.6. Methodological Orientation: Archaeological Analysis of Discourse

Our analysis of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface at the site of the Tacis projects in the Republic of Karelia approaches the practices of technical assistance as *discursive practices*, focusing on the veridictive and jurisdictional effects *produced* in the discourse. This study applies a Foucauldian notion of *discourse* as a set of “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak”<sup>133</sup>. The methodological orientation of the study draws on its tools from Foucault’s kind of *archaeological analysis of discourse*.<sup>134</sup> Foucault’s use of the term ‘archaeology’ is deprived of the connotations of the elucidation of deeper meanings or more fundamental structures that the term in its conventional usage might convey. Foucault specifically rejects two interrelated themes associated with the idea of archaeology: the theme of *arche* as the originary foundation and the theme of *excavation* as a search for deep underlying rules or meanings:

I attempt on the contrary to define the *relations on the very surface of discourse*; I attempt to make visible *what is invisible only because it is so much on the surface of*

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<sup>133</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 49.

<sup>134</sup> This is to differentiate the methodological orientation espoused in this study from a broad field of ‘discourse analysis’, which operates with a multiplicity of concepts of discourse, quite divergent from the one elaborated by Foucault in (1981, 1989, 1991b). See Frank 1992 for the reading of Foucault’s concept of discourse as situated between the linguistic system and its use in individual acts of speech. See Fox 1998 for the discussion of the difficulty of applying Foucault’s concept of discourse in sociology, which frequently results in the reduction of Foucault’s insights to more familiar approaches. See Sawyer 2002 for the argument that the current widespread usage of the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ in social sciences erroneously refers to Foucault’s work. Sawyer’s analysis demonstrates both that the current indiscriminate use of the term diverges sharply from Foucault’s highly idiosyncratic and technical use and that the conceptual lineage of the contemporary Anglo-American ‘discourse analysis’ is not at all related to Foucault’s archaeology but is rather assembled from structural linguistics, Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis – the intellectual trends that Foucault ironically was most critical of. In this conceptual confusion it ought to be emphasised that the methodical application of this study is developed on the basis of select aspects of Foucault’s archaeological approach and relies on Foucault’s notion of discourse as neither a textual corpus nor a set of grammatical or logical rules for the construction of sentences or propositions, but a ‘set of statements governed by the same rules of formation’ (Foucault 1989, p. 108.) From this follows an important methodological nuance: discourse is in a strict sense not the *object* but the *outcome* of analysis, a grouping constituted by the analysis of the rules that order its statements.

*things. [...] One must be able to make a historical analysis of the transformation of discourse without having recourse to the thought of men, to their mode of perception, their habits and the influences to which they have submitted.*<sup>135</sup>

Archaeological analysis explicitly rejects the ‘*assumption of depth*’, characteristic of certain varieties of both structuralism and hermeneutics<sup>136</sup> and rather seeks to map the surfaces of discursive events, receiving “every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption” and thereby restoring the aleatoric dimension to the existence of discourse.<sup>137</sup> It is therefore concerned with neither ‘formalisation’ (the investigation of linguistic laws of construction of discourse) nor ‘exegesis’ (interpretation of the meaning of discourse), the object of analysis being neither the linguistic ‘*code*’ nor the *meaning* of the statement in discourse, but discursive practices themselves as *events*.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Foucault 1996a, p. 58. Emphasis added. See also Foucault 1989, p. 131.

<sup>136</sup> See Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982. It ought to be noted that in speaking of Foucault’s ‘anti-hermeneutical’ attitude, we refer to exegetical ‘depth’ hermeneutics that presupposes, in John Caputo’s (2000) phrase, the possibility of accessing through interpretive practice the Secret, the deep, hidden and more fundamental meaning. It is this type of hermeneutics that Foucault rejects and derides in his frequent criticisms of commentary and its presupposition of the excess of the signified over the signifier (See e.g. Foucault 1981, 1989, pp. 118–126, 1976, pp. xv–xix.) In Foucault’s expression, “commentary must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said”. (Foucault 1981, p. 58.) Nonetheless, despite the rejection of the exegetical attitude and the affirmation of ‘no remainder to discourse’ (Foucault 1976, p. xvii.), Foucault’s work may be read as a certain ‘radical hermeneutics’ or a ‘hermeneutics of refusal’ (Caputo 1993, 2000) that denies the existence of the Secret, but is not thereby consigned to positivism, but rather “opens a depth of negativity” (Caputo 1993, p. 257.) and affirms what Caputo calls “responsiveness to the abyss” that is disclosed in the place of the Secret and the apophatic possibilities of being-otherwise that a proximity to this abyss makes possible. (Ibid., p. 258.) This form of radical hermeneutics appears compatible with the archaeological and genealogical standpoints. For Foucault’s rejection of the assumption of depth see also Megill 1985, pp. 222–226, Blanchot 1987, Flynn 1991, 1999, Veyne 1997, White 1994, Deleuze 1988.

<sup>137</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 25. For the notion of the event and the strategy of ‘eventalisation’ see Foucault 1984d, 1991c.

<sup>138</sup> Foucault 1991b, p. 39. See also Foucault 1989, chapter 1. To speak of discursive practices as events is to reject the approach to the *statement*, a unit of discourse, as a *structure*, and rather conceive of it as an *enunciative function that lends existence* to grammatical and logical structures (sentences and propositions), which, in Foucault’s understanding, only exist by virtue of being deployed, enunciated or *stated*. A statement as an event is therefore located at the most superficial level and yet is anterior to linguistic and logical units, whose unity is made possible by the enunciative function cutting through the domain of structures and thus individualising sentences and propositions. See *ibid.*, pp. 81–99 for Foucault’s discussion of the notion of the statement by contrasting it with the notions of sentence in grammar, proposition in logic and speech act in English linguistic philosophy.

What [discourse] is – what defines its intrinsic consistence, what makes it available for historical analysis is *not what was ‘meant’* (that obscure and heavy charge of intentions, imagined as carrying far more weight, in its shadowy way, than what is said); it is *not what has remained mute* (those imposing things which do not speak, but leave their traceable marks, their dark profile set off against the light surface of what is said): *discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period* (under the rules of grammar and logic) *and what is actually said*.<sup>139</sup>

The abandonment of the assumption of depth, the focus on the positivity of discursive events, the attunement to the aleatory all serve to endow Foucault's archaeological approach with a methodological disposition that he ironically referred to as ‘happy positivism’<sup>140</sup>. In our analysis, which deals with the formation in the discourse of technical assistance of objects of power and knowledge, this point of departure entails abandoning the attempt to render these effects meaningful by relating them to something beyond the field of discourse and rather investigating the conditions of their emergence *in* discursive practice. In this manner, we may move from the “questioning of the *document*” to the “intrinsic description of the *monument*”.<sup>141</sup> This means that our object of analysis is ultimately not a discourse *about* technical assistance (from which we may hope to find out what technical assistance is and how it affects modalities of government, and which we may interrogate as to its sincerity or authenticity), but a discourse *of* technical assistance, itself constitutive of a dispositional diagram of governmentality, which we ought to describe or rather reconstitute by way of description. The locus of such analysis is referred to by Foucault as a ‘threshold of positivity’,<sup>142</sup> and its object is defined as the finite and limited grouping of “things said, precisely as they were said”.<sup>143</sup> This “pure description of discursive events”<sup>144</sup> seeks to reconstitute their conditions of possibility

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<sup>139</sup> Foucault 1991b, p. 63. Emphasis added.

<sup>140</sup> Foucault 1981, p. 73. See also Foucault 1989, p. 125: “If, by substituting the analysis of rarity for the search for totalities, the description of relations of exteriority for the theme of the transcendental foundation, the analysis of accumulations for the quest of the origin, one is a positivist, then I am quite happy to be one.”

<sup>141</sup> Foucault 1989, pp. 6–7. Emphasis original.

<sup>142</sup> See Foucault 1989, pp. 31–39. For the typology of the thresholds of emergence of a discursive formation see Foucault 1989, pp. 175–179.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>144</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 27. This formulation illustrates most conspicuously Foucault's rejection of an interpretive strategy in relation to discourse. Archaeology is posited as ‘a historical analysis that avoids

that Foucault, by way of distinction from Kant's formal a priori, refers to as the 'historical a priori', a set of principles that governs the historical (trans)formation of statements and "is itself a transformable group".<sup>145</sup> The objective of archaeology is thus not to unravel "blocks of immobility, static forms that are imposed on discourse from outside and that define once and for all its characteristics and possibilities"<sup>146</sup> but rather to "take account of statements in their dispersion".<sup>147</sup>

The focus of this study is limited to one aspect of archaeological analysis that deals with the *formation of objects* of power and knowledge in the discourse of technical assistance.<sup>148</sup> Rather than individualise a discourse by its *reference* to an *anterior* set of objects, the archaeological strategy locates the unity of discourse in the *space* in which various objects are *produced* and *transformed*.<sup>149</sup> According to Foucault, the description of the formation of objects is to address the following characteristics of this space. Firstly, such analysis must outline the *surfaces of emergence* of objects,<sup>150</sup> institutional sites, in which an object appears and is transformed. For our purposes, the surface of emergence of the objects of discourse is provided by the site of technical assistance projects, a space of international cooperation in the sphere of restructuring the governmental sector in postcommunist

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all interpretation" (Ibid., p. 109.) and questions the things said neither as to what they 'really' say nor as to what they try to hide, but inquires about their conditions of existence.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 127. See also Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 53, Deleuze 1988, pp. 1–32, 47–69. According to Deleuze, Foucault's historical ontology proceeds from the premise that "the conditions are never more general than the conditioned element, and gain their value from their particular historical status". (p. 114.)

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>148</sup> Formation of objects is one of the four dimensions of Foucault's archaeological analysis of a discursive formation. It may be considered the *primary* or most elementary dimension, since subsequent formations (of enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies) take place in relation to the field of constituted objects. The relationship between these formations can be therefore summed up as a "vertical system of dependences". (Foucault 1989, p. 73.) This study has no ambition to provide a full-scale archaeological description of a discursive formation, but merely applies the tools offered by Foucault to study the most primary formation of the objects of discourse in order to individualise the unity of discourse of technical assistance at the site of inquiry. In the specific case of the discourse of technical assistance we do not make a distinction between objects of discourse and its subject-positions (enunciative modalities), since, as the analysis below will show, the latter function as the former in the Tacis discourse. Insofar as our object of analysis is not a discourse with claims to scientificity, the question of the formation of its concepts and theoretical strategies is not relevant to this study.

<sup>149</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 32.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

Russia. Secondly, the analysis of formation of objects addresses the *authorities of delimitation*,<sup>151</sup> which designate, delimit and define the object. In the case of the Tacis projects, these are constituted by professional and managerial authority vested in the project management, composed of European and Russian professionals. Lastly, the description of formation of objects is to address the *grids of specification*,<sup>152</sup> which are applied for division, distribution, classification and reconfiguration of the formed objects; in other words, the *ordering schemes*, according to which the emergent objects are specified in their positivity. While the two previous aspects of object formation may be considered given in our analysis, which proceeds from the existing *site of technical assistance, delimited by the projects' professional and managerial authority*, the latter aspect of object formation is to be established in the course of the study through the identification of the ordering schemes of discursive production. The following chapter discusses our application of this approach in the study of the EU-Russian interface at the site of technical assistance.

## 1.7. Methodical Application: Ordering Schemes and the Unity of the Discourse of Technical Assistance

Our methodical application of the archaeological approach may be specified as the attempt to individualise a discourse of technical assistance by describing the formation of objects as its jurisdictional and veridictive effects, i.e. establishing *what objects of power and knowledge* are produced and *what are the schemes of their production*. The site of technical assistance projects is approached as a surface of emergence of jurisdictional and veridictive effects, a surface that is both textual and discursive. While the question of the identification of the objects is to be probed on the level of the texts of particular projects taken in their *syntagmatic* aspect<sup>153</sup>, the question of the schemes of their production provides a possibility for the move to the *paradigmatic* dimension that is the level of the discourse of technical assistance. As a result of our

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> This syntagmatic aspect is of course already paradigmatic, insofar as our analysis deals with fragments from the entire set of documentation of every project.

analysis, we shall have identified and analysed the formation of, and the relations between, three objects of the discourse of technical assistance: *local agency*, *enterprise* and *government*. While not exhaustive of the discourse, the relational structure of the formation of these objects, which we shall have reconstituted, provides us with a sufficient outline of the dispositional diagram, whose conditions of possibility we seek to elucidate in the interpretive phase of the study.

In our analysis we proceed from reconstructing the policy implementation design in the project texts in terms of its *dispositional diagram*. At this stage this concept is operationalised as a mutually constitutive relationship of the goals and objectives of the reform programme, the indices of assessment that constitute the ‘problem’ and the interventions proposed in order to solve it. In terms of the Foucauldian approach these dimensions correspond to, respectively, the *ethos*, *episteme* and *techné* of the dispositional diagram of governmentality. The unity of the diagram is made possible by the linkages between the constitutive elements that form its *veridictive* and *jurisdictive axes*. In these terms our *analytical task* may be formulated as the individualisation, at the site of inquiry, of the unity of the discourse of technical assistance by the description of the schemes that delineate the space of formation of objects along the veridictive and jurisdictive axes of the dispositional diagram. This logic of analysis may be grasped in terms of the *move from the level of the text to the level of discourse* and can be elaborated at two stages.

The first stage of analysis seeks to isolate, on the level of the *texts* of individual projects, the formation of the objects of power and knowledge in the linkages between the constitutive aspects of the diagram. The organising tool at this stage is the notion of a ‘*central concept*’ as elaborated by Jens Bartelson:

A concept becomes central to the extent that other concepts are defined in terms of it, or depend on it for their coherent meaning within discourse. These *linkages* – whether *inferential* or *rhetorical* – saturate the concept in question with multiple meanings that derive from these linkages, which make it ambiguous; an ambiguity that is open to further logical and rhetorical exploitation.<sup>154</sup>

In our analysis, the central concepts identified in the project texts (public awareness and participation, economic efficiency, active governmental facilitation) are constitutive of the broad *ethico-teleological premises of the reform programme* and provide

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<sup>154</sup> Bartelson 1995, p. 13. Emphasis added.

initial clues to the primary objects formed at the site of the projects: ‘local agency’, ‘enterprise’ and ‘government’.<sup>155</sup> In the text of project reports these concepts serve to establish the *linkages* between the three nodes of the diagram. The linkage between the central concepts and the indices of the problem constitutes the *veridictive axis* of the diagram and the linkage between the central concepts and the proposed interventions forms its *jurisdictive axis*. In the analysis of the project texts, the formation of the axes is pointed out by means of the *verbal techniques*, by which the values and goals of reforms are linked with problematisations and proposed interventions in an *inferential* (e.g. causal) and *rhetorical* (e.g. exemplary) manner.<sup>156</sup> The notion of the diagram is at this stage of the analysis applied as an organising tool for the textual surface of the emergence of objects, bringing up its paradigmatic dimension in relation to the individual project and its syntagmatic dimension in relation to the overall textual corpus. This stage of textual analysis, presented in Figure 2 below, results in the identification of the objects produced along the jurisdictive and veridictive axes of individual project diagrams.




Figure 2: Formation of Objects of Discourse

<sup>155</sup> The choice of the three objects, whose formation we analyse in this study, is therefore not motivated by an a priori methodological principle but is itself a result of the study of the project texts, in which these objects figure as central concepts. Taking seriously the notion of discourse as a relatively polymorphous and dispersed space means recognising multiple possibilities of alternative object configurations.

<sup>156</sup> In our identification of the verbal techniques that link the three nodes of the diagram we draw, in a non-exhaustive manner, from the classification of rhetorical techniques elaborated by Chaim Perelman (1982, pp. 50–53). It must be noted that our Foucauldian points of departure are heterogeneous

The second stage of analysis consists in the move from the level of the texts of particular projects to the level of the discourse of technical assistance. In our analysis of individual projects we pose the question of the formation in the three project spheres (health and social protection, energy management, national park development) of the same veridictive and jurisdictional effects in the same verbal techniques and the same thematic structure. The isolation of verbal and thematic *regularities* that govern the production of objects *across* the various policy areas, addressed by Tacis projects, serves to delineate a *region of interpositivity*<sup>157</sup> that invites the question of the existence of a discursive unity. It is important to note that the focus on the regularities and isomorphisms across the three policy areas has no objective of reconstituting, on the basis of a cross-sector comparison, a general rationality of government that would characterise EU technical assistance programmes in Russia. The reconstruction of the discourse of technical assistance at the site of the Tacis projects is a matter of a *reorganisation* of the texts of the respective projects, not of generalisation or abstraction from them. The regularities and relations identified in the course of the analysis do not ‘spill over’ into other domains and the validity of the results of the analysis is limited to the region delineated by the three projects.<sup>158</sup>

The isolation of the region of interpositivity will allow us to shift in our analysis of the formation of the objects of agency, enterprise and government from the *syntagmatic* dimension of the *text* of particular projects to the *paradigmatic* dimension of the *discourse* of technical assistance, whose strategic logic it is our interpretive task to reconstitute. In Foucault’s approach, the unity of discourse is not given at the outset, but is rather to be established in the course of the analysis of given

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to a Perelmanian analysis of argumentative discourse, and we merely apply Perelman’s basic notions of causal ‘liaisons of succession’ (pp. 81–89.) and ‘argumentation by example, illustration and model’ (pp. 106–113.) in isolating inferential and exemplary regularities in the formation of the indices of the problems and the advocacy of reform interventions in the texts of the three projects.

<sup>157</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 159.

<sup>158</sup> See Foucault 1989, pp. 157–162. This region of interpositivity is in our study at the same time broader and narrower than specific project areas. It is broader insofar as we seek to individualise and interpret a discourse of *technical assistance*, not the particular problematisations and interventions offered in project reports with regard to specific problems. On the other hand, our task is substantially narrower than the reconstitution of the strategic logic of e.g. energy management or social policy. We are concerned strictly with the domain of discourse delimited by the projects in the Republic of Karelia and make no attempt to exhaustively address the question of the governmental rationality deployed in each of these policy areas.



discursive groupings, which serve as a starting point of the analysis, an “initial approximation that must allow relations to appear that may erase the limits of its initial outline”.<sup>159</sup> By the same token, the objective of our analysis is not to account for the conditions of possibility of separate project discourses (whose supposed unity may rest on their thematic) but to pose the question of the schemes of ordering the formation of objects produced in these particular sectors that may point to the relations constitutive of a different unity that we may refer to as the *discourse of technical assistance*.

In terms of the archaeological approach, one can pass from the level of individual texts to the individualisation of a discourse if one can describe the schemata that, operating isomorphously across the texts, specify the positivity of the objects produced along the veridictive and juridictive axes of the dispositional diagram. This move to the level of discourse proceeds from the assumption that, since “discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say [...] and what is actually said”<sup>160</sup>, the identification of the *ordering schemes* that establish this difference serves to isolate a discourse in its temporal unity.<sup>161</sup> For the purposes of this study we can specify these ordering schemes in terms of three broad types of regulation of discursive production identified by Foucault. These are *exclusion*, *rarefaction* and *restriction*.<sup>162</sup>

Exclusion refers to the procedures of the *exterior delimitation* of the discursive space, such as direct *prohibition* of certain types of enunciation, *division of reason and unreason* that grants particular value to ‘reasonable’ discourse and relegates the discourses of ‘madness’ to marginal domains and the *true/false distinction* that, taking various shapes historically, serves to regulate production and reproduction of particular types of ‘true’ discourse.<sup>163</sup>

Rarefaction of discourse refers to ‘internal’ schemes of regulation that take shape in various procedures of gradation, distribution, and classification of the *content* of

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<sup>159</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 30.

<sup>160</sup> Foucault 1991b, p. 63.

<sup>161</sup> It ought to be emphasised that the ordering schemes in our application are *descriptive constructs* rather than fundamental ‘deep’ structures, i.e. they function as immanent principles of configuration of statements rather than transcendental principles of their production.

<sup>162</sup> See Foucault 1981, pp. 52–64.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 52–56.

discourse. Foucault distinguishes three modes of rarefaction. The first mode is *commentary*, which proceeds from the installation of the hierarchical distinction between originary (primary) and transitory (secondary) discourses, by virtue of which there is a possibility of the incessant proliferation of secondary discourse, which is nonetheless limited to the reactualisation of the contents of primary discourse.<sup>164</sup> The second type of rarefaction is *authorship*, which is a principle of grouping discourses in terms of coherence and unity of meaning provided by authorial intentionality. Thirdly, discourse may be rarefied via *disciplines*, which organise its content by prescribing rules and definitions that make possible the construction of an infinite number of true statements.<sup>165</sup>

Schemes of *restriction* serve to *limit access* to discourse by determining the conditions of its application, i.e. they rarely not the discourse itself but the *enunciative modalities*<sup>166</sup> from which it may emanate. Among the variants of this scheme Foucault notes the following: *ritual*, that concerns the specification of the qualifications of the speaking subject and the circumstances that are to surround the enunciation for it to have an assigned efficacy; '*societies of discourse*', whose function consists in enabling the circulation of discourse in closed spaces; *doctrines* that bind individuals in various subject-positions to certain types of enunciations; *pedagogical practices* of transfer and appropriation of discourse.<sup>167</sup> Schemes of restriction entail what may be called a 'double subjection' of the subject to discourse and of discourse to the subject. The former ensures the *distribution of speaking subjects into various types of discourse*. The latter enables the *appropriation of discourse by certain categories of subjects*, whose very existence is due to this act of differentiation.<sup>168</sup>

Exclusion, rarefaction and restriction may be conceived as three successive folds of the discursive space of dispersion, relating to, respectively, its *exterior limits*, *interior grounds* and *inner distribution*. Our study attempts to systematically utilise this threefold logic of discursive ordering across the project areas, yet does not seek to apply in a taxonomic manner the more detailed typologisation. The types of ordering schemes identified by Foucault are rather treated in a non-exhaustive

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>166</sup> See Foucault 1989, pp. 50–56.

<sup>167</sup> Foucault 1981, pp. 61–64.

<sup>168</sup> Foucault 1981, pp. 63–64.

manner as clues to be specified with reference to the concrete examples from the site of inquiry.<sup>169</sup> The identification of the ordering schemes of the formation of the objects of agency, enterprise and government serves to fulfil the *analytical* task of the study: the individualisation in its temporal unity of the discourse of technical assistance, which induces particular jurisdictional and veridictive effects in the real. This task of *regrouping*, exemplifying the *archaeological* dimension of historical ontology, provides us with the *positivity* of the diagram that is the object of the *interpretive* stage of research, a *genealogical retrieval* of the political conditions of emergence of this diagram in a particular historical constellation of governmental rationalities.<sup>170</sup> The logic of inquiry thereby integrates the two foci of historical ontology, the *rarity* of discursive forms and their constitutive *force*, “the power to constitute domains of objects”,<sup>171</sup> and thus poses the question of the constitution of new modalities of government in postcommunist Russia in terms of *scarcity* and *affirmation*, and “ultimately, scarcity of affirmation”<sup>172</sup>. In short, this methodical application of archaeological analysis permits to reconstruct a discourse of technical assistance, constitutive of a dispositional diagram of governmentality, whose strategic logic is to be reconstituted in the interpretive phase of research.

## 1.8. From the Government of Identity Towards an Ethos of Concrete Freedom: Interpretation of Research Results

The interpretation of the research results has a threefold task. Firstly, in our interpretation of the results of the analysis of the discourse of technical assistance we seek to reconstitute the *strategic logic* of the dispositional diagram emergent at the site of the EU-Russian interface. At this stage of interpretation we rely on the studies of modern governmentality produced by Foucault and contemporary scholarship in

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<sup>169</sup> At this stage in our analysis, having already established the region of interpositivity, we no longer seek to illustrate the operation of ordering schemes in each of the three projects separately, but shall rather select from the primary sources the examples that offer the most lucid demonstration of the ordering of the overall discourse.

<sup>170</sup> See Foucault 1981, pp. 70–73.

<sup>171</sup> Foucault 1981, p. 73.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis original.

this orientation that address the question of the reconfigurations of state-society relations in various modalities of government.<sup>173</sup> Since both the general framework of the Tacis programme and, as the analysis below will demonstrate, the reforms in particular policy areas depart in their governmental rationality from liberal and neoliberal conceptions of government, studies of various strands of liberal governmentality will form the main scope of our theory of interpretation. However, we must stress the specificity of applying ‘liberal governmentality’ as an *interpretive tool*. In our interpretation we proceed from ‘liberalism’ as a name for a historical constellation of governmental rationalities, irreducible to, though intertwined with, various trends within liberal political philosophy.<sup>174</sup> The problematic of governmentality operates in a narrow domain between political philosophy and empirical sociology of government, focusing on neither ‘thought’ nor ‘practice’ but on the nexus of the two that forms a governmental rationality, a domain of “thought as it seeks to *make itself technical*”<sup>175</sup>. In this clearing, liberalism emerges less as a name for philosophical and normative debates on state and society than as a conjunction of ethico-political thought and technical practice that enables the ordering of human being as a positive mode of existence amenable to acts of government.<sup>176</sup> In our interpretation of the strategic logic of governmentality at work in technical assistance we shall also seek to map the dispositional diagram in its specificity as a function of postcommunist politics of emergence. In this manner we shall not merely ‘contextualise’ the specific reform solutions proposed by EU Tacis in a broad trend of (neo)liberal governmentality, but, with a Foucauldian attention to the interplay of strategy and tactics, also attempt to demonstrate the ways in which the postcommunist historical conjuncture in turn problematises and reconfigures liberal governmental technologies. The notion of *infra-liberalism* that we shall offer as a description of this reconfiguration is arguably more fitted to describe the intricate relation between a governmental modality and the foundational moment of its institution than the critical claims about ‘imposition’, voiced in the studies of (neo)liberal governmentality in postcolonial settings.<sup>177</sup> This stage of interpretation will result in the identification and genealogical disentanglement

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<sup>173</sup> See e.g. Dean 1996a, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, Burchell 1996, Gordon 1991, Cruikshank 1996, 1999, Rose 1990, 1996a, 1996b, 1998.

<sup>174</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 48–53.

<sup>175</sup> Rose 1996b, p. 23. Emphasis original.

<sup>176</sup> Rose 1998, pp. 81–83. See also Rose and Miller 1995.

<sup>177</sup> See Ferguson 1997, Rankin 2001.

of the liberal governmental *technologies of agency, performance and rule* that condition the formation of the objects of, respectively, local agency, enterprise and government.

The second stage of interpretation concerns the elucidation of the relationship of *double conditioning* between the tactical effects induced at the site of technical assistance and the strategic field of socioeconomic reforms in the Putin presidency. At this stage we focus on the ways, in which the dispositional diagram emergent at the local site of the EU-Russian interface is integrated into the overall strategic diagram delineated by the federal reform programmes. In other words, we focus both on the way the local diagram is conditioned by the Russian socioeconomic reform strategy and its governmental rationality that excludes or prescribes certain problematisations and solutions, and the way it in turn conditions, in terms of either support or resistance, that strategic field by providing it with concrete technical matrices that function as (counter)models of the solutions envisioned on the federal level. More broadly, we pose the question of the way the strategic logic of the diagram of technical assistance converges with or diverges from the strategy of 'reconstitution of the state' associated with Putin presidency. At this stage we look for elements of the theory of interpretation in the recent studies of Russian politics, which proceed from the radical destabilisation of the state-society distinction in the postcommunist condition and address its institution in contemporary political practices.<sup>178</sup> In our interpretation of the interface of the diagram of EU technical assistance and the Russian diagram of socioeconomic reforms we shall point out and account for the main convergences and divergences between the two in terms of the three governmental technologies of agency, performance and rule. This focus on the technological aspect of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface will allow us to specify a more intricate relation between the politics of the Putin presidency and European technical assistance than is suggested in the wholesale normative criticism of the 'illiberality' of the project of the Putin presidency.

Finally, the third phase of interpretation attempts to elucidate the possibilities offered by a Foucauldian approach for the *critique* of and *resistance* to governmental practices. It ought to be reiterated that the approach of this study purportedly eschews

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<sup>178</sup> See e.g. Fadin 1995, Kapustin 1995, Kharkhordin 1997a, 1997b, 1999, Sakwa 2000a, Gaman-Golutvina 2000, Mau and Starodubrovskaya 2001, Markov 2000, Tretyakov 2000, Polyakov 2000, Bunin et al 2001a, 2001b, Fedorov 2001, Zudin 2002, Shevtsova 2002.

normative criticism and the discussion of 'alternatives' that usually accompanies it. This avoidance is necessitated both by the requirement of consistency with the archaeological and genealogical styles of inquiry, which leave the researcher no privileged ground from which to pronounce normative judgment, and by the conviction of this author that alternatives are not theoretically induced, but rather emerge locally, at the sites of governmentalisation, in the practices of the subjects involved in relations of government. Taking seriously Foucault's oft-cited claim of the '*indignity of speaking for others*'<sup>179</sup> means, in this study, the absence of any 'suggestions for improvement', proposals for better, more efficient or inclusive government or any other "use of academic discourse as a vehicle of practical injunction"<sup>180</sup>. Throughout the study, we focus on *eventalising* the practices of technical assistance, i.e. their *regrouping* as a discursive unity and the *retrieval* of their political conditions of possibility, with no view whatsoever to advocating their adjustment or discontinuation in favour of an alternative diagram of government. The scepticism regarding 'alternatives' is partially motivated by the very results of our research, which will demonstrate the indispensability to (neo)liberal governmentality of the 'participatory' discourse of local authenticity, autonomy and empowerment, which is presently deployed 'in opposition' to neoliberalism. The critical contribution of this study is thus not envisioned in terms of articulating a positive 'counter-discourse' but rather consists in demonstrating, via the genealogical disentanglement of the conditions of emergence of the diagram of technical assistance, the lines of fragility that exist within it and thus destabilising its ordering function: "So many things could be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex but temporary, historical circumstances than of inevitable anthropological constants."<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Foucault 1996b, p. 76. Emphasis added. See also Foucault 1984d for the distinction of 'universal' and 'specific' intellectuals. The position that Foucault rejects is most clearly exemplified by Michael Walzer, who claims that "we [concretised as 'you and I'] need men and women who *tell us when state power is corrupted or systematically misused*, who cry out that *something is rotten*, and who *reiterate the regulative principles* with which *we might set things right*." (Walzer 1986, p. 67. Emphasis added.) For a detailed discussion of the debate of 'normative foundationalism' and poststructuralism in IR theory see Campbell 1998b.

<sup>180</sup> Gordon 1991, p. 6. See also Rose 1996a, 1996b, Dean 1999, Burchell 1996, Gordon 1980, Simons 1995 (chapter 5) for the importance of normative neutrality for a Foucauldian standpoint.

<sup>181</sup> Foucault 1988f, p. 156.

Nonetheless, this study also has a critical ambition that goes somewhat beyond this 'happy positivist'<sup>182</sup> brand of Foucauldian critique that has been dominant in the studies of governmentality.<sup>183</sup> This ambition arises from the realisation of the (at first glance paradoxical) *loss of freedom* involved in the infra-liberal diagrammatic constitution. The very notion of the positivity of agency as a *surface effect* of governmental practices, as opposed to a deep-seated *identity*, provides us with a point of departure for a more 'affirmative' type of criticism, advanced in the name of what Foucault refers to as 'concrete freedom'<sup>184</sup>, which dispenses with the need for the specification of identity and the illusion of authenticity. In the final part of the study we attempt to involve in the critique of governmentality the 'third axis' of historical ontology, drawing on Foucault's writings on ethics, aesthetics of existence and transgression<sup>185</sup> in order to suggest a possibility of a mode of thought and practice that does not merely supplant one dispositional diagram with another, but is rather *non-dispositional*, i.e. critical of governmentality *qua* governmentality and affirmative of the *freedom from* diagrammatic subjectification. This means that our critique ultimately seeks not to provide a different perspective on the field of governmentality, but rather to *perspectivally* reshape this field itself by opening it up to the outside that resists diagrammatic enfolding.

This type of criticism focuses not on governmental technologies and the positivities they form, but on that *force* which governmentality takes as its object, the energy that power exercises its energy on and encounters resistance from. In terms of Foucault's account of the historical emergence of modern governmentality as a *bio-politics*,<sup>186</sup> this force is contained in the notion of 'life' as preceding and exceeding 'identity', the latter always being an instrument-effect of governmentality. Rather than deploy an alternative theory of agency in resistance to the governmentalisation of identity, we shall argue that a critique that seeks to be heterogeneous to the dispositional mode of

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<sup>182</sup> Foucault 1981, p. 73.

<sup>183</sup> See Rose 1996a, 1996b, 1998, Burchell 1996, Gordon 1980, Dean 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2002a, 2002b for the discussion of the critical function of the problematic of governmentality.

<sup>184</sup> Foucault 1988b, p. 36.

<sup>185</sup> See e.g. Foucault 1977b, 1977c, 1987, 1990b, 1990c. For the discussion of the 'ethical axis' of historical ontology see e.g. Deleuze 1988, Connolly 1998, Allen 1998, Bernauer 1990, 1992, 1994, Rajchman 1992, 1994a, Simons 1995 (chapters 6, 7, 8), Bennett 1996, Ziarek 1998.

<sup>186</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 139, Foucault 1991a, 1988d. See also Dreyfus and Rabinow 1992, Rajchman 1985, Simons 1995, Donnelly 1992, Koivusalo 2000.

thought needs to dispense with the very notion of identity, whose academic fashion finds a direct correlate in its increasing deployment in practices of government: “Freedom for Foucault is a kind of irrepressibility, a *refusal to contract into an identity*, a continual *twisting loose* from the historical forms of life by which it is always already shaped.”<sup>187</sup> In a gesture reminiscent of negative theology,<sup>188</sup> Foucault rejects all discourses that say what the individual is or should be in the name of preserving a (non)space “of what the individual is not, of what we can not say about the individual, to preserve a space of a certain negativity that refuses all positivity, *all identification that is always in the end a historical trap*”.<sup>189</sup> Insofar as life precedes and exceeds identity, which is always an effect of diagrammatic constitution, we may say that the transgressive pathos of Foucault’s work is contained in the ‘nonpositive affirmation’ of life *in excess* of the diagram, the affirmation that seeks *relief* from the governmental disposition of existence.<sup>190</sup> In the final chapter of this study we shall attempt a detailed reconstitution of a Foucauldian conception of ‘concrete’ or ‘non-identitarian’ freedom and discuss its relevance for the resistance to the constitution of ‘autonomous identity’ in the diagram of technical assistance and, more generally, for the present moment of consolidation, stabilisation and depoliticisation in postcommunist Russia. In this manner we shall have completed the threefold task of historical ontology with regard to the tripartite dispositional diagram of governmentality: its *archaeological reconstitution*, *geneological disentanglement* and *ethical displacement*.

## 1.9. EU-Russian Relations, Postcommunism and Poststructuralism: Relation and Contribution of the Study to Previous Research

The contribution of this study to the discipline of International Relations may be summarised in terms of its relation to previous research in three areas: postcommunist

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<sup>187</sup> Caputo 1993, p. 255. Emphasis added.

<sup>188</sup> See Bernauer 1990, chapter 6. Foucault discusses the parallels of his thought with negative theology in Foucault 1987, particularly pp. 16–19.

<sup>189</sup> Caputo 1993, p. 251. Emphasis added.

<sup>190</sup> Foucault 1977b, p. 36.



transformation in Russia, EU-Russian relations and the application of Foucault's poststructuralism in IR research.

In relation to the *studies of Russian postcommunism*, our study seeks to make the following contributions. Firstly, the notion of 'politics of emergence' that constitutes the heuristic point of departure of this research attempts to critically reassess and move beyond the dichotomy of 'transition to democracy' and 'cultural traditionalism'. Our point of departure in the historical ontology of the present deprives our discourse of stable grounding in the past or the future and rather generates an attunement to the aleatory, contingent and indeterminate – the features of postcommunist politics of emergence that have largely been obscured in theoretical discussions. In its appreciation of the specific historical conjuncture of postcommunism, the approach of this study partly resonates with the work of Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya in historical sociology that conceives of the Russian transformation as an analogue of the 'Great Revolutions' of modernity, and points out the spontaneous and contingent unfolding of sociopolitical processes in the conditions of weak or inoperative statehood as the defining feature of the revolutionary moment.<sup>191</sup>

Secondly, the step beyond the transitionalist/traditionalist dichotomy entails a shift from a normative standpoint, which privileges whatever is defined as democracy, market economy and civil society, to a focus on the formation, in local technical practices, of particular modalities of government, which we seek to describe in their irreducible positivity rather than enfold them in meta-discourses of democratisation. Our Foucauldian points of departure orient us away from grand narratives and normative debates towards a 'microphysics of power', whose foci of interest are the productive techniques of governmentality. In the discussion of 'democratisation' and 'promotion of democracy' in Russia the *technological aspect* of these processes has been obscured due to the excessive normative bias in favour of 'democracy' and 'civil society' that disables the capacity for a critical analysis of such notions as 'freedom', 'human rights', 'pluralism' as *modalities of governmental practice*, formed and deployed within particular 'regimes of truth'. Readdressing this problematic in terms of the analytics of government, normatively neutral yet analytically critical towards the practices it studies, may provide a more fitting description of the constitutive practices of the Russian postcommunist transformation than the reiteration of the normative

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<sup>191</sup> See Mau and Starodubrovskaya 2001.

principles of the dominant discourse that governs it or their similarly normative denunciation.<sup>192</sup>

Thirdly, while the international context of Russian postcommunist transformation has been addressed quite frequently<sup>193</sup>, our study seeks to bring up the aspect of the international dimension of Russian postcommunism, which is largely omitted from inquiry. The focus of this research is not on ideological or normative convergences and divergences between Russia and the EU or the global dynamics of economic interdependence,<sup>194</sup> but on the concrete political effects of the technical work, *actually undertaken* at local sites in Russia in the framework of the EU technical assistance programme. This reorientation permits us to speak not (merely) of addressing the *international context* of transformation in Russia but of analysing *international practices* of postcommunist transformation.

In relation to the *studies of EU-Russian relations*, this study aspires to two contributions. Firstly, we argue for the necessity to supplement the fashionable problematic of culture and identity with a focus on concrete professional-managerial practices. What is at stake in our study is therefore not the historico-cultural meditation on the possibility of Russian integration into Europe, its compatibility or even commensurability with 'European civilisation' but the concrete effects of the actually existing EU-Russian interface. We suggest that this shift is an important corrective to the trend in contemporary IR to collapse the discussion of political divergences into problems of cultural difference.<sup>195</sup> Such a shift may in turn produce empirical studies, which in the long run could make historico-cultural ruminations on identity less and less relevant.

Secondly, the critical ambition of this study is to bring up the political effects of the EU practices of technical assistance whose legitimacy and success is in many ways

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<sup>192</sup> The latter tendency is best illustrated by Reddaway and Glinski 2001 and Cohen 2001. See Treisman 2000 for the critical discussion of this accusatory pathos in Russian studies. The alternative tendency to focus in appreciative detail on reform tactics utilised in the course of the transformation is exemplified by Schleifer and Treisman 2001.

<sup>193</sup> See Sakwa 1999a, White 2000, Bowker and Ross 2000, Cohen 2001.

<sup>194</sup> Political value convergence and economic interdependence are presented as two prime international processes of identity reconstruction in Wendt 1996.

<sup>195</sup> See e.g. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996 for various studies within the 'cultural turn' in IR. See Neumann and Williams 2001 for the discussion of 'the cultural turn' taken in the theory and practice of NATO enlargement, whose post-Cold War resurgence owes much to the 'constructivist' fetishisation of culture and identity as opposed to interests.

owing to the depoliticised self-presentation of the programme. This critical strategy of re-politicisation attempts to explore, in the empirical research of EU-Russian relations, the problematic of the political and depoliticisation, recently introduced into the IR discussion.<sup>196</sup> In this exploration, we eschew both empirical and normative evaluation and rather seek to trace the conditions of possibility of the political effects, brought about in the practices governed by a teleotechnological rationality, and their integration into the Russian strategic field of socioeconomic reforms. While critiques of depoliticisation generally tend to uncover difference, disjunction and contestation, obscured by technological discourses, our re-politicisation of technical assistance draws attention to a basic *identity* of the governmental rationalities, deployed in the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface, and thus may safeguard against facile attributions of either a hegemonic or an emancipatory function to EU assistance programmes in Russia. Against the background of the proclamations of the EU-Russian 'strategic partnership'<sup>197</sup>, we pose the question of the existence, on the level of governmental rationality, of relations of *partnership* between Russia and the EU in reshaping the postcommunist *strategic* field along (neo)liberal lines. While the studies of the EU-Russian partnership have tended to focus on the 'peripheral' activities of regional and cross-border cooperation between the EU and the regions of Northwest Russia, deemed to constitute a 'postmodern challenge' to the boundary-producing practices of statehood,<sup>198</sup> our study ultimately poses the question of strategic partnership in a domain both central to contemporary Russian politics and decidedly 'modern' – the (neo)liberal reconstitution of state-society relations.

Finally, in relation to the *application of Foucault's philosophy in the IR discourse*, this study attempts the following two contributions. Firstly, we seek to advance beyond both the purely illustrative use of Foucault in the intradisciplinary

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<sup>196</sup> See Edkins 1999, Edkins et al 1999, Doucet 1999.

<sup>197</sup> Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. (WWW-document.) Russia's Midterm Strategy towards the EU. (WWW-document.)

<sup>198</sup> See e.g. Eskelinen et al 1999. The regional-level cooperation of the EU and the Republic of Karelia has been addressed by e.g. Cronberg 2000, Aleksandrov 2001b. Due to its active policy of foreign relations in the 1990s, the Republic of Karelia has figured in these analyses as an exemplar of emergent post-statist or 'postmodern' practices of international cooperation. In contrast, our contribution approaches the Republic of Karelia as a site of the formation of postcommunist modalities of government, i.e. the *emergence* of the very positivity of the state rather than its 'decentring'.

theoretical debate and the rather un-Foucauldian industry of ‘Foucault-commentary’.<sup>199</sup> As an attempt at an inquiry in historical ontology, this study is somewhat more ambitious since it is grounded in Foucault’s work at three distinct levels: ontological points of departure in historical ontology as a critique of the present, theoretical strategies of analytics of power and government and methodological tools offered by Foucault’s archaeological analysis of discourse. At all three levels, however, we do not attempt to totalise Foucault’s evasive and self-effacing writings<sup>200</sup> into a coherent theory or to remain exegetically faithful to the author so derisive about exegesis. Instead, at all these levels we look for both a general attitude and specific tools<sup>201</sup> that we consider helpful in understanding the operation of technical assistance in Russian postcommunist politics: the nominalist scepticism of historical ontology, the prioritisation of constitutive technologies in analytics of government and the ‘happy positivism’ of the archaeological method.

Secondly, although we remain indebted to the insights of the poststructuralist orientations in IR theory, the ambitions of this study lie elsewhere. Our application of a Foucauldian approach is intended first and foremost not as a contribution to ‘dissident IR’, engaged in the deconstruction of the discipline and the destabilisation of its variously construed orthodoxies,<sup>202</sup> but as a critical engagement with the more mainstream discussion of the international dimension of postcommunism and the problematic of ‘democracy promotion’ through technical assistance. This domain of

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<sup>199</sup> By ‘illustrative use’ we mean the practice of scattered references to Foucault’s concepts to support the authors’ claims, which may often be so general as to not require the invocation of Foucault or may conflict with Foucauldian points of departure. See e.g. Ferguson 1997, Rankin 2001, whose use of Foucauldian notions of power and government is difficult to reconcile with their accentuation of themes of ‘oppression’ and ‘emancipation’ in development policies. The frequent but relatively unsystematic application of Foucault in IR has to do with the difficulties of translating his philosophical insights into analytical frameworks. See e.g. Fox 1998 for the discussion of similar difficulties in the application of Foucault’s work in sociology, where his theses tend to be reduced to banalities (the reduction of the concept of ‘discourse’ to any textual material) or subsumed under broader critical trends (Foucault’s conception of power reduced to the very ‘repressive hypothesis’ he sought to supplant). This study has a limited yet ambitious objective to develop a working application of Foucault’s historical ontology *for a particular site of inquiry*. See Der Derian 1987, Bartelson 1995, Smith 1995 for the examples of Foucauldian genealogies of, respectively, diplomacy, sovereignty and IR theory.

<sup>200</sup> See Foucault 1989, p. 17, Chambers 2001.

<sup>201</sup> For Foucault’s and Deleuze’s notion of ‘theory-as-toolkit’ see their conversation in Foucault 1996c.

<sup>202</sup> See e.g. Walker 1990, 1993, Ashley and Walker 1990, Ashley 1990, Edkins et al 1999, Der Derian and Shapiro 1988.

disciplinary discourse arguably lacks critical reflection on the hegemony of global democratisation, which eclipses the power relations and governmental technologies involved in these processes through a gratuitous invocation of epistemico-moral certitude regarding their constitutive principles.<sup>203</sup> The problematic of governmentality disturbs this certitude by analysing the specific modes of operation of (neo)liberal technologies at local sites and addressing their political effects. The relocation of the Foucauldian problematic of governmentality to the domain of postcommunist studies also serves to broaden its horizon of application beyond North-American and West European (neo)liberalism, which, as in Foucault's own works, is at present still the main geographical focus of this field of research.<sup>204</sup> The application of Foucault's work to postcommunist Russia<sup>205</sup> appears both justified and necessitated by the discontinuities and ruptures of its 'politics of emergence', the interstices, in which Foucault's philosophical thought finds its locus.<sup>206</sup>

As we conclude this Introduction and begin our empirical analysis of the discourse of technical assistance, let us express the hope that the relevance of the results of this study will be empirical as well as theoretical, that it serves to foster curiosity with regard to the practices of technical assistance, whose mundane character has rendered them safe from scrutiny, and thereby make 'facile gestures'<sup>207</sup> about them more difficult.

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<sup>203</sup> This certitude is most clearly manifested in the research on democratic peace and security communities. See e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995, Owen 1994. For a critique of epistemico-moral certitude in IR see Campbell 1993, 1998b, Connolly 1991, Hopgood 2000.

<sup>204</sup> See Barry et al 1996, Burchell et al 1991.

<sup>205</sup> See Oleg Kharkhordin's (1999) study of the technologies of the self in the Soviet Union for an example of the application of a Foucauldian approach in Russian studies. The volume 'Michel Foucault and Russia', edited by Kharkhordin (2002), comprises a variety of recent studies by Western and Russian scholars that apply Foucault's work to Imperial, Soviet and postcommunist Russian history, politics and culture.

<sup>206</sup> See Foucault 1989, 1984a.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Foucault 1988f, p. 155.

## 2. SCARCITY OF AFFIRMATION: AGENCY, ENTERPRISE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE DISCOURSE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

### 2.1. Constitution of the Object of Local Agency in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

#### 2.1.1. Public Awareness and Participation as a Central Concept: Preliminary Mapping of a Region of Interpositivity

We shall begin our analysis of the formation of objects in the discourse of technical assistance in the EU Tacis projects in the Republic of Karelia with the object of *local agency*. The reporting of the three projects accentuates the themes of *awareness* and *participation* of both professional counterparts and the general public in the reforms as both the goal and the means of the reform process.

##### 2.1.1.1. *The Object of Local Agency in Health Care and Social Protection Reform*

The synopsis of the health care and social protection project (EDRUS9516) states its objectives as “enhancing the well-being of the people of the Republic of Karelia through support to the health care and social welfare reforms, which are expected to lead to the implementation of *efficient, effective, flexible and high-quality consumer-oriented* services”.<sup>1</sup> The specific content of the project consists in designing and

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<sup>1</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516 , p. 1. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

testing the strategy of reform that aims at the development of primary preventive medico-social care as an alternative to expensive institutional health care services, not integrated with the system of social protection.

The theme of enabling local agency is present in the project both on the level of its general principles and its specific activities in the process of reform. In its formulation of the principles of project operation the Inception Report makes recourse to the principle of *partnership*, according to which “all joint activities are undertaken on the basis of mutual respect and partnership. This will help ensure the viability of the results of the project after its formal completion.”<sup>2</sup> In the concluding report, the principle of partnership is presented as “[having] worked extremely well and is the *basis of whatever success the project may have had*. The project management structure has been tight but *inclusive*. [...] All decision-making within the project, including the allocation of financial resources, has been on a partnership basis.”<sup>3</sup> The project’s assessment of its outcomes in terms of the criterion of sustainability proceeds from the positive effects of the high level of participation of the Karelian counterpart: “The process has been *steered* throughout by the Karelian partner, whose commitment and willingness to take responsibility for the project have never wavered and whose *vision of the goals of reform has become even sharper* over the last 29 months. In short, the Karelian partner *owns the process*. From this point of view, the *prospects for sustainability are excellent*.”<sup>4</sup> Active participation of local agents is thus presented as an important *precondition* of project success.

In its task of ‘increasing public awareness’, the project proceeds on the assumption that “there is very *low awareness of the population* about the *situation* in health care and social protection and *objectives of current reforms*”.<sup>5</sup> The causes of this situation are deemed to consist in the “poor presentation skills of the key decision-makers. [...] The population has a generally *negative perception* of reform and are *sceptical* of its benefits *despite the Karelian authorities’ best efforts to explain otherwise*. Key administrators and decision-makers *lacked practice and skills in explaining their policies and communicating with the public and mass media*.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 12. Translation by author.

<sup>3</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 34. Emphasis added.

<sup>4</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>5</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22. Emphasis added.

The text establishes the *index of ineffectiveness* of the public relations, presently practiced by the authorities. The inferential linkage is formed by positing a *causal relationship* between awareness of and attitude to the reforms and the public relations practices of health care and social protection officials. Low awareness and negative perception of the reforms are cast as indicators of the problem *on the level of administration* and thus to be addressed *by administrative reforms* in the direction of a more participatory management of the sector. The objective advanced in the ‘public awareness’ task of the project is as follows:

To ensure that the population in general and the target groups of particular services have *a basic understanding* of the purposes and consequences of social and health care reform, and are *given opportunities to participate in the reform process*.<sup>7</sup>

The necessity of this public relations campaign is justified by pointing to the benefits of public awareness, participation and feedback for the effective implementation of reforms:

*For successful implementation of reforms in any sphere understanding of their contents by the population is necessary. Reforms are intended for the population. That is why it is very important to provide information to Karelian population about activities, realised by the Government and Tacis project in the field of reforming health care and social protection and to clarify objectives of reforms, to get a feedback*.<sup>8</sup>

The working group on public awareness has as its main task the provision of information support to the reforms undertaken by the project itself. These activities are summarised in the following fragment:

The most accessible and practice-oriented of the project’s written material has been disseminated as hard copy in a *training manual prepared for each district*. In addition, a series of 10 short guides to specific areas of reform activity – the work of a general practitioner, the role of medico-social service centres, and others – have been *prepared by local consultants for dissemination to a wide audience*. The series is entitled “Working in a New Way” (“*My rabotaem po novomu*”). [...] A 20-minute *professional standard video film* has been prepared on the objectives of social and health care reform

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>8</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.



in the republic, *illustrating practical achievements to date*. [...] Information on Karelian reform and the work of the Tacis project has been *disseminated through the Internet*. The Karelian Project Director, the EU Team Leader and 3 local consultants *made presentations at the international Terve-Sos conference* in Helsinki in May.<sup>9</sup>

The project is thereby rhetorically cast as the *exemplary model* of health and social sector communication, most importantly through its activities in the dissemination phase. The report on the dissemination phase posits increased communication with the broader professional public as the cause of the success of the project both in the implementation of its activities and, more generally, in stimulating greater enthusiasm about the reform process:

The growing momentum of the dissemination programme has resulted in a *widening*, even an *acceleration* of the reform process in the republic. It has also expanded the membership of the *core group of influential health and social professionals* who are *committed to driving the process forward* in the future. The project of dissemination to the districts previously not involved in the project *has found an enthusiastic audience*, interested to *see at first hand* what has been achieved in the pilot districts.<sup>10</sup>

Dissemination of information to the local public is presented as *accelerating* the reform process, expanding and consolidating the group of professionals, capable of sustaining the reforms after project expiry, thus increasing their ultimate *effectiveness*. The project relies on the exemplary model of Finnish health care, which is taken to demonstrate that public awareness of the goals of reforms results in more effective implementation. “Experience from Finland and elsewhere indicated that health services designed in cooperation with user groups would provide better care and more efficient use of resources.”<sup>11</sup> This exemplary model is tested in the pilot districts where re-trained local professionals in the new medico-social establishments are encouraged to actively communicate with the public, both directly and through mass media.

The task of the project has been to assist the Karelian partner to *develop skills in communication with the public* and with the mass media, and to elaborate a long-term

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<sup>9</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, pp. 17–18. Emphasis added.

<sup>10</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 19. Emphasis added.

<sup>11</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

strategy for *informing and involving the population in the ongoing process of reform*. [...] The working group has consciously targeted district managers of social and health care services for training in communication with the media, mainly through *practical exposure*. Thus it is district managers who have usually been asked to handle television broadcasts and interviews with the press. In the case of Hapalaampi ambulatory in Sortavala district, the staff were encouraged to *open their services up to scrutiny by the press and the public on an 'open day'*.<sup>12</sup>

*Transparency* to public scrutiny and active communication with the public are thus presented as a central feature of the exemplary model of management that the project constructs in the pilot districts. If scepticism and negative attitudes to the reforms are posited as the effect of the lack of information, then the increase in transparency and more active communication with the public are expected to lead to more favourable public attitudes towards the reform process.

The issue related to public awareness concerns the *participation* of local counterparts in project activities. The project seeks to involve local professionals and managers in its operation through a *training programme* that takes two forms: *exemplification* of what the project refers to as '*best western practice*'<sup>13</sup> through *study tours*, and *illustration* of the workability of these practices through the demonstration of *pilot project* results. In relation to the former task, the project has organised a number of study tours to the Netherlands, Finland and Great Britain.

Whenever possible, the effort was made to *combine participants* who would have some continuing reason for working together. This was felt to add greatly to the long-term impact of the study visit. The whole of Olonets social and health care management team went on a study stage to Lieksa in Finland and *were able to work together afterwards to apply some of the lessons they had learned*. Study stages and tours do not always enjoy a good reputation. However, the project's experience is that a well-planned visit can have quite a *dramatic effect on long-held attitudes*. The study stage to Kotka in October 1998 was *very influential in accelerating the move towards collaborative working in the social and health sectors*. A study tour to Britain in May 1998 *converted* a previously highly sceptical senior professor to the importance of general practice. This has changed the university's policy towards the training of general practitioners.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 30. Emphasis added.

<sup>13</sup> Progress Report 2 EDRUS9516, p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>14</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 36. Emphasis added.

Study tours are presented as an effective means of exemplifying the benefits of the proposed interventions and gaining local adherence to them. The fragment above emphasises the process of *conversion*, which takes place when key decision-makers “become acquainted with current European thinking in social and health care reform”.<sup>15</sup> Similarly to its assessment of public scepticism about the reform, the project proceeds on the assumption that the problem of scepticism and opposition to the proposed reforms on behalf on the professional counterparts is due to the lack of exposure, acquaintance with or knowledge of the respective practices and can thus be solved by demonstrating its operation in foreign settings. “It is no exaggeration to say that the *mindsets of many participants have been transformed* by the exposure to the EU thinking and practice.”<sup>16</sup>

A complementary task is undertaken in the pilot districts, where the objective is to produce *models*, which would *illustrate* the feasibility of the advocated solutions in the local conditions. The strong emphasis of the project on piloting reform solutions in the localities proceeds from two interrelated project principles, *realism* and *integration of policy and practice*. According to these principles, the proposed solutions are to be “firmly grounded in practical experience”, acquired in pilot projects at the local level that take due account of the existing conditions.<sup>17</sup> The project notes its own responsibility to provide realistic policy advice “to achieve the goals of reform within, at best, the existing financial constraints”.<sup>18</sup> The exemplification of ‘best western practice’ via conducted tours and pilot projects is claimed to succeed, firstly, in *converting* the local counterparts to the advocated solutions, and, secondly, in *enabling* them to autonomously *reproduce* the learned examples in local settings. Both study tours and pilot projects are, as proposed interventions, rhetorically linked to the goal of public participation through the claim for their beneficial impact on firstly, enhancing the local counterparts’ *support* for reform, and, secondly and consequently, increasing the potential for the *sustainability* of the advocated practices.

We may thus identify *public awareness and participation* as a *central concept* of the reform programme. It is a goal, in terms of which the index of the problem is established, rendering current public relations practices *ineffective* via the causal

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>16</sup> Progress Report 2 EDRUS9516, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>17</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 13. Translation by author.

<sup>18</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 13. Translation by author.

linkage of low awareness and the scepticism of the population about the reforms with the poor presentation skills of the decision-makers, which, despite their best efforts, disable them from involving the population in the process. Public awareness and local participation are also concepts in terms of which the project states and justifies its proposed interventions, both on the level of the overall objectives (creation of ‘basic understanding’ and provision of participation opportunities) and in terms of concrete solutions, such as publication activities, organisation of seminars and conferences and the involvement of local professionals through study tours and pilot projects that are proposed as effective means of *increasing enthusiasm and ensuring the sustainability of reform results*. We may summarise the constitution of the object of local agency in the health care and social protection reform in the following figure.




Figure 3: Constitution of the Object of Local Agency (EDRUS9516)

2.1.1.2. The Object of Local Agency in Energy Management Reform

The heating systems project (ERUS9701) proceeds from the objective to “meet the Energy 50<sup>19</sup> targets, to *promote investments* and to *foster operational improvements*

<sup>19</sup> ‘Energy 50’ refers to the wider project, currently operating in Murmansk Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Republic of Komi, St. Petersburg, Omsk, Volgograd and

in the district heating system in the border regions of the Republic of Karelia”.<sup>20</sup> The specific content of the project consists in developing a policy of substitution of locally sourced fuels (peat and wastewood) for ‘imported’ coal and oil and thereby increasing local employment, guiding the process of application for foreign investment to finance the renovation of district heating systems in the pilot districts of Kalevala and Lahdenpohja, promoting the establishment of SMEs (small- and medium enterprises) in fuel supply and heating operations, and providing assistance to the management of the energy sector in reforming the overall managerial system.

In its synopsis, the project claims to adopt a “*bottom-up approach*, in which solutions are identified in the relevant municipalities”.<sup>21</sup> A separate component of the project, “Information and Training Programme”, aims at subsequent *dissemination* of the identified local solutions to a republic-wide audience:

The main aim of this subtask is to *ensure a forum* where management/organisational, technical/operational issues and investment/financing issues of the district heating operators in the seven Karelian border towns/regions can be discussed. Furthermore, experience of individual district heat operators will be disseminated in order to assist other district heating operators in order that *positive experience can be replicated and negative experience avoided*.<sup>22</sup>

Public awareness of the reforms in the energy sector emerges in this fragment as a *central goal* of the project. Specific policy interventions are justified with recourse to a *negative index* of the present practices of enhancing public awareness. The project states that both the professional and the general public are at present insufficiently aware of the range of possibilities of reform and the potential means of their implementation.

The most significant problem facing the general population of the project region is *remoteness from any information centre* and the *reliance on Radio and TV for information* relating to many of the *practical issues*, including energy efficiency, conservation and insulation. The same is true to a large extent in the energy industry itself,

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Moscow. The project seeks to “reduce the consumption of fuel by 50%, reduce energy production emissions to the environment by 50% and increase residential comfort by 50%”. For more information on the project see <http://www.planora.fi/english/forums.html>.

<sup>20</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 21. Emphasis added.

with a *lack of information about the available options* to fuel management and energy production and transmission efficiency. *Methods of project appraisal* are also missing and also therefore *any understanding of the practical steps required to attract financing* for energy efficiency projects in the region.<sup>23</sup>

The indices of ineffectiveness of current public relations practices established in this fragment relate to the problematisation of the unawareness of the general public of *practical issues* of energy utilisation. The information about the issues of energy sector reform provided to the local residents by radio and television is deemed by the project to be insufficient. This index is based on a *causal link* between low awareness and ineffective practices of public relations. Secondly, the text problematises the low awareness of local professional counterparts who are deemed unaware of, firstly, the *available options of management*, which makes impossible the introduction of new and more efficient practices, and, secondly, oblivious to *methods of project appraisal*, which puts the local professionals in a disadvantaged situation with regard to the application for external financing of reform projects. Related to low awareness is the problem of public *participation* in energy management. The lack of publicity is one of the indices of the problems in the existing management system, whose inadequacy is addressed in the following fragment:

The *management culture*, which has led to the current state of old and outdated system of heating supply, has resorted to using utilities to a point where they have to be completely renewed. The implementation of *market-oriented* and *competitive* service and heat supply companies has not yet been finished or has been delayed. *Due to centralised management* in the last eighty years it is *generally difficult to implement new and more effective management practices*.<sup>24</sup>

The fragment indicates a problem in the current 'management culture' by linking in a causal manner the heritage of centralised management and the difficulty of introducing more effective market-oriented practices.

The enhancement of local participation is presented by the project as a key principle of its activity.

Cooperation with Russian experts in the form of *active participation* in the project at its different phases is one of the Consultant's major commitments. [...] Both the long term and short term experts will *work closely with the Local Working Groups* in the seven

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 21. Emphasis added.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 24. Emphasis added.

regions where local experts will be associated with the work. At the end of each short-term expert assignment and before the short-term expert departure from the region a *joint statement of findings and recommendations* will be drafted.<sup>25</sup>

The overall goal of increasing public awareness and participation takes concrete shape in the strategy of *information campaigns*, aiming at both professional and general audiences and implemented through the programme of *training* seminars and workshops:

Past experience of the Consortium has shown the importance of information seminars and workshops as a tool for ensuring a *direct, efficient transfer of information to the appropriate parties*. The seminars and workshops organised within this project will present to the respective authorities responsible a *clear picture of major issues* to be considered in the development of the district heating networks and the use of natural resources. Emphasis will not only be given to the *use of natural resources and the improvement of the district heating system*, but will also focus on issues relating to the *necessary administrative and management changes* required for updating existing systems, implementing new systems and promoting the environmental benefits of such changes.<sup>26</sup>

This fragment links the proposed program of seminars with the goal of public awareness and participation via, firstly, a claim for the *efficiency of direct* transfer of information and, secondly, via the commitment to provide the local counterparts with a *clear picture* of the issues of reform. The emphasis on *clarity* is laid in the following statement of the proposed content of training:

Direct assistance to the district heat operators by helping them to *determine* options and to *define* fuel substitution programmes and investments [...], long term assistance through *training the operators to be able to further develop* priorities and investment plans and loan applications in the future *by themselves*.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, the training programme seeks to enable the local counterparts to *determine* and *define* reform possibilities, and thereby to arrive at a 'clear picture' of the issues at stake and, secondly, to grant them *capacity* for performing similar actions *autonomously* in the future. In this sense, training is central to the project's overall task of eliciting managerial changes in the energy sector.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 25. Emphasis added.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 20. Emphasis added.

The project overall contains a *developmental* and *training* aspect to it. [...] Although this constitutes a form of '*training*' in the broad sense of *imparting knowledge, attitude changing and organisational development*, nevertheless there is also the requirement for specific training measures. [...] These will be focused locally on the *relevant needs of the seven towns* and will employ a variety of methods such as *on-the-job activities, seminars* and *workshops*. The overall objective of the local training/retraining programme will be *to equip the relevant personnel to be in a position to effectively implement the project objectives in their own district*. The areas outlined for specific training measures are as follows: fuel assessment techniques, operational issues for boiler house operators, SME creation and activities for fuel providers, management issues for DH operators entering into loan agreements.<sup>28</sup>

The project thus distinguishes between two senses of training, the general training-by-participation, where the project's exemplary models demonstrate the benefits of advocated solutions, and the specific organised training programme where concrete skills are imparted on the basis of a 'local needs assessment'. The example of the latter type of training is provided by 'energy efficiency demonstration projects' undertaken in study tours and piloted locally. "The main priority has to be to convince local administrations and DH [district heating] operators that substantial organisational changes are necessary. One way the contractor proposes to achieve this is to *demonstrate the efficiency of modern small energy supply utilities*. The contractor will therefore invite Karelian experts from each of the seven regions and from the Regional Energy Commission to Finland for know-how transfer from small independent energy suppliers."<sup>29</sup> In addition to study tours, efficiency demonstration projects are undertaken in all seven districts involved in the project to illustrate the local workability of the proposed solutions and train local professionals to undertake similar demonstrations in the future: "The local management of the site will be *actively involved in all aspects of the energy demonstration project*. [...] During the execution of the project the technical staff will build up a knowledge and experience to *demonstrate similar kinds of energy savings projects at other locations*. [...] Energy efficiency demonstration projects [...] can also be used as *training material* and for *awareness campaigns* and *information dissemination*."<sup>30</sup> Efficiency demonstration projects thus serve a double function of, firstly, convincing

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 32. Emphasis added.

<sup>29</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 29. Emphasis added.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 40. Emphasis added.



local experts to adopt the project solutions, and, secondly, of training them to perform similar operations to convince others. Training is thus *causally linked with acceptance* by the local counterpart of project strategies and is presented as a precondition for enhancing the local counterpart's reform activity.

With regard to the general public the dissemination of project results through mass media is aimed at the widest possible audience: "Through the use of media, [the project will] engender greater awareness of the economic and environmental benefit of improved energy efficiency for energy using enterprises and for individuals *from children to adults*."<sup>31</sup> Public awareness is posited as *causally linked* with broad *acceptance* of the proposed changes: "Better public awareness of energy saving techniques *will result* in cost savings and faster modernisation."<sup>32</sup> This strategy takes concrete shape through the establishment by the project of a 'forum' for professional and social discussion of reform options and fostering cross-border cooperation.

*The exchange of new ideas, visions and challenges for change for the future development of the Region will be facilitated. An opportunity will be provided for simulating [sic!] theoretical and practical discussion and debate between research, politics and business in order to build up more interdisciplinary point of view and understanding. [...] It is intended to gather together politicians, civil servants, business people and researchers with different points of view in order to discuss the current state of co-operation and to obtain information, knowledge and future visions for co-operation and the development of the CBC region. A network should also be established between Karelian organisations, representatives from the Finnish District Heating Association, the Association of Finnish Peat Industry and the International Peat Society.*<sup>33</sup>

The project thereby takes on the role of facilitating active discussion of reform options and the establishment of links between the management of the sector and various social organisations, both local and international. According to the project's own assessment, such actions have resulted in better understanding and acceptance of the reforms undertaken by the project.

The Energy and Environmental Forum was held in Petrozavodsk from 2<sup>nd</sup>–4<sup>th</sup> June and attracted over 300 participants from Russia and EU. The Forum had a *huge effect on the*

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 41. Emphasis added.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 31. Emphasis added.

*local attitude towards the project and has led to a better understanding of the project objectives. It served as the best possible opportunity to promote the project in the media and on the highest diplomatic level.*<sup>34</sup>

The linkage of the central concept of public awareness and participation with the proposed interventions proceeds, in a homologous way to the health care project, by rhetorically casting project activity as an *exemplary model* for proper public relations in the energy sector: “Through broad dissemination of its outputs, the project will act as a *model for the region* and therefore *will result in further actions* taken by the Russian counterparts.”<sup>35</sup> Enhancing local awareness of the issues of energy sector reform and facilitating local participation in designing and implementing it are thus crucial tasks of the project and are addressed through a broad information campaign targeting professional and general audiences and the involvement of professional counterparts in training activities that serve to elicit their support for the proposed solutions and enable them to sustain the reform process autonomously. The summary of the constitution of the object of local agency in the energy management project is presented in the figure below.




Figure 4: Constitution of the Object of Local Agency (ERUS9701)

<sup>34</sup> Progress Report 2 ERUS9701, p. 6.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30. Emphasis added.

### 2.1.1.3. *The Object of Local Agency in National Park Development*

The parks development project (ENVRUS9704) has the objective of “improving the livelihood of local people by developing nature-related tourism and safeguard[ing] biodiversity conservation by establishing a well-managed network of protected areas in Western Karelia”.<sup>36</sup> Specifically, it seeks to assist the presently existing Paanajärvi National Park to change its management strategy to further develop tourism and provide advice in the process of establishment of four new national parks: Tuulos, Koitajoki, Ladoga Skerries and Kalevala.<sup>37</sup> The approach chosen by the project (that we discuss in detail in chapter 2.2.1.3.) is based on the combination of nature conservation and the development of ecotourism in national parks to achieve relative independence of the parks from the increasingly scarce state budget funding.

In the assessment of the ‘main problems and deficiencies’ of the current situation with ecotourism in Karelia the project notes that “Russian tradition, legislation, and institutions for managing protected areas differ significantly from the Western ones. [...] *The role of a managing organisation is that of a police, participatory approaches are new.*”<sup>38</sup> This management structure is also the reason for the *lack of public awareness* about the purpose of nature conservation or the excessively high expectations for national parks: “Although nature conservation has been developed in Karelia with a sense of purpose, the main objectives of it are still not known among *authorities* or the *average man in the street.*”<sup>39</sup> The socio-economic assessment of the feasibility of the establishment of new national parks, prepared by a joint team of EU and Russian experts, has as one of its main conclusions the need to address the issue of public awareness and participation:

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<sup>36</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10. Of the five parks, Paanajärvi National Park was the only one to exist at the start of the project, having been founded in 1992. The other four protected areas were designated by the government as ‘proposed parks’ and consultations were underway with the federal government about their official establishment. In the course of the project, the legal status of the areas was specified in the decision of the Head of the Republic to organise ‘Municipal Entities’ in every proposed park to serve as official counterparts to the Tacis project. At the time of writing, the Kalevala National Park has been formally established by the decree of the Karelian Government from August 6, 2002. Three other parks are presently maintained in their temporary status and governed by Municipal Entities established in the course of the projects.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

*Special attention has to be paid to public awareness; although nature conservation has been mentioned as a motive for the establishment of the parks, the aim, form and function of the national park are not clear. The local population is poorly informed about national parks and about possible changes of socio-economic development of their district and their involvement. [...] Up to now the local participation in the tourism business has been low and local resources are poorly, if at all, used in the tourism business.*<sup>40</sup>

The *socio-psychological situation* in the districts looks quite favourable for both forming nature protected areas and expanding the tourism business. But *some people don't have a definite attitude* toward the idea of a national park, and *this is based upon the poor awareness* of the population about the purposes and functions of the parks, and about the role of the local population.<sup>41</sup>

The text establishes the index of ineffectiveness of the current management of protected areas in terms of the central concept of public awareness and participation by linking it causally with the 'policing' character of management. The lack of awareness is presented as a cause of the lack of a 'definite attitude' of the local population to the idea of park establishment.

The intervention proposed by the project is the introduction of 'participatory management planning', presented as a *method*, "even internationally relatively new".<sup>42</sup> Recent international experience of participatory planning is offered as a positive *example*, justifying the application of the model in Karelia: "*All societies are developing to the direction* where the officials and authorities are *offering more methods and means for participation and decision-making*."<sup>43</sup>

The participatory planning system is developed in order to *provide an opportunity* for local people, administrations of a different kind [sic!], NGOs and other stakeholders to *genuinely participate in planning, decision-making and implementation. Problems and conflicts due to the missing and wrong information can be avoided*. Meetings and press conferences are arranged in order to *invite participation and share information*. Articles for magazines and program ideas for radio and television will be produced.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Socio-Economic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 51. Emphasis added.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>42</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>43</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 59.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The inception report advocates participatory management planning as an intervention into the managerial process in the protected areas with recourse to the possibility of *avoiding social conflicts* that this method offers. The project has the participatory method as its own guideline in management planning activities, thereby casting itself as an *exemplary model* of management that functions as a training device for the local counterpart: “Where all the authorities and interest groups are *involved in the planning process*, this gives a chance to *clarify the situation* as regards the borders of the parks and the privileges of local people in future parks. [...] The project aims at a plan which is *made together* and where the main questions are *widely accepted and respected*.”<sup>45</sup>

The participatory method has been elaborated in detail at the management planning seminar organised by the project.<sup>46</sup> Participatory management in nature protection is claimed to be needed since “nature conservation *can be carried out more successfully if there is strong interest and participation*”.<sup>47</sup> In a manner similar to the heating systems project, the success of project implementation is defined in terms of making management plans more “easily acceptable” by “avoiding conflicts”.<sup>48</sup> The effectiveness of the method is demonstrated by the *illustration* of the experience of the EU Consultant, Metsähallitus (Forest and Park Service of Finland) in its application:

The reputation of Metsähallitus has not been very good in the 1980s. There were *lots of conflicts* with nature protection questions [sic!] in commercial forests. The structure of Metsähallitus changed in the beginning of the 1990s and after that we made a decision to renew our Forestry Planning system. After that *public participation has played a very essential role* in every planning system that we use. [...] We have *a lot of positive examples* of using participatory planning in Finland. Nowadays Metsähallitus has a *more positive and open public image* in Finland. The public knows more about our activities and there are not so many *problems* caused [sic!] misunderstandings. [...] Our cooperation with interest groups is nowadays continuous also after the planning process, so participatory planning is a *good way of starting cooperation and collaboration with society*.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>46</sup> Report of the Seminar annexed to Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, pp. 46–76.

<sup>47</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 59. Emphasis added.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pp. 59–60. Emphasis added.

In this illustration the adoption of the participatory method is offered as a way to improve the *image* of the managerial authority and to *avoid conflicts* with social groups by *involving* them in the discussion process. The inferential linkage between the central concept and participatory planning as a proposed intervention is based on the assumption that low awareness and non-participation of the local public *causes* conflicts and opposition. The following fragment, concerning Paanajärvi National Park, illustrates the operation of this causal linkage:

The National Park was established in 1992. Before the establishment of the park opinions were *polarised* both for and against. The establishment of the park was recommended by Karelian and Finnish scientists and environmental organisations, and the idea of the establishment of the park got support from the local level. All the same *there was a strong opposition against the park*. [...] *There was a problem with correct information about the aims and functions of the park and about the role and rights of local people*. Nowadays *opinions have evened out*, and people are mostly satisfied with the situation. The importance of the park *is admitted by many of those people who earlier were against it*, although some people still think that the establishment of the park was not a good thing *from the point of view of the local lespromhoz* [timber industry company].<sup>50</sup>

In this fragment the opposition to park establishment is explained by the absence of *correct information* on it, a problem solved by proper public relations practices or the demonstration of the parks' actual operation. The measures at increasing public awareness are considered conducive to opinions' *evening out*, i.e. the neutralisation of polarised, unbalanced views, with the notable exception of particular business interests. Similarly to the two projects discussed above, there is a direct causal connection between awareness or participation and acceptance or support for policies.

At the site of the envisaged national parks, the project makes a commitment to apply the method in the following manner: "We *will involve all the relevant stakeholders and interest groups* in preparatory meetings and workshops. [...] It is *essential that the work groups will include representatives from all involved groups*, i.e. local and regional authorities, nature conservation administrations, NGOs, forestry, tourism."<sup>51</sup> The planning process proceeds in two stages. The first

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<sup>50</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 48. Emphasis added.

<sup>51</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 61. Emphasis added.

planning seminars involve local and republic-level professionals, representatives of local and regional authorities and the Karelian Research Centre.<sup>52</sup> Secondly, the results of these seminars are presented in broader public meetings in the protected areas, and the comments received there are taken into consideration in the preparation of the final versions of the plans.

[Public meetings and assemblies] will be held in every region in the beginning of the process. There will be *open invitation to all possible stakeholders and also the media will be invited to these meetings. In the end of the process, when we have the results, we might have a new meeting where we will tell the contents of the plan to the public and there will be a possibility to make some checking after the meeting.*<sup>53</sup>

Participatory planning is thus exercised at two levels: professional and public. On the professional level, the project seeks to involve local experts in the production of management plans both to ensure the role of local knowledge in the planning process and as a mechanism of training the counterparts in planning skills.

The main part of the work in this project will be done by local Russian experts. The total number of work months in this project [...] is 313 person months, of which foreign experts have only 17%. *This way local features in working methods and results will be guaranteed as well as a learning process in both directions. It will increase ownership and sustainability.*<sup>54</sup>

On the level of the general audience, the project presents the results of management planning seminars for public discussion in the respective districts. This commitment proceeds on the assumption that the possibilities for the development of tourism in national parks are conditioned not only by legal and economic factors but also by “*socio-psychological preconditions* which allow to adapt the idea of a national park among different social groups of the population”.<sup>55</sup> Specifically, the concern of the project is to avoid or minimise the limitation of local ‘traditional rights’, most notably those of fishing and berry- and mushroom-picking and thereby make it easier to promote park establishment.

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<sup>52</sup> See Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 48.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61. Emphasis added.

<sup>54</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 19. Emphasis added.

<sup>55</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 11. Emphasis added.

People living next to the Park, in the nearest villages, will have a *permanent right of entry*.<sup>56</sup>

The NP *will limit the rights of local people, but only in minor things*. Hunting is already forbidden in the Tolvajärvi Partial Nature Reserve and will be prohibited also in the Koitajoki area. In that area, at the moment, practically nobody other than frontier guard staff and their guests are hunting. Fishing, picking of berries and mushrooms will not be limited. After the establishment of the NP, there will be not be anymore free access to the Strictly Protected zone, the area of which is 7 219 ha, it means 9,4 % of the NP. *These restrictions are not going to have any practical importance for local people*.<sup>57</sup>

Secondly, the project considers it necessary to actively utilise the local knowledge of nature and culture in the management of the park and be otherwise sensitive to local viewpoints on managing the protected area.

From the beginning the park administration should apply participatory methods and be *extremely sensitive to hearing the local points of view and apply them whenever they are not in contradiction with the park objectives*. The Park should *actively learn from the local knowledge of nature management and history, collect it and use for Park management and environmental education*. The Park should not unnecessarily restrict the traditional rights of the villagers.<sup>58</sup>

On both levels, participation is aimed at enhancing the *autonomy* of the agents involved, whether professionals and managers or the local population targeted as potential tourist entrepreneurs: “This [approach] will ensure that the management plans will be prepared with an *understanding of the local conditions and local ways of life*. This will *make their implementation easier*. It will also give the local inhabitants *training and practice in planning their development and responsibility for their own environment*. It will also strengthen *local ownership of the project*.”<sup>59</sup> This fragment exhibits the two rhetorical linkages between the proposed interventions and the central concept: the *positive impact of participatory management on*

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<sup>56</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 48. Emphasis added.

<sup>57</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 33. Emphasis added. For similar statements concerning the other parks see Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 48, Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, p. 36, Proposal for the Establishment of the Tuulos National Park, p. 20.

<sup>58</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 44. Emphasis added.

<sup>59</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 61.



*reform content* (understanding of the local situation and way of life) and *implementation* (easier acceptance of proposals and their sustainability), and the beneficial character of public involvement for the population's *planning capacity* and *sense of responsibility*. As a result of its application in the four protected areas the Completion Report declares participatory planning to have been a successfully working method:

The park plans were prepared by using the so-called participatory planning method. *Meetings open for local people as well as for authorities were arranged in the beginning of the work (in Dec. 1999–Mar. 2000) in villages close to the proposed parks.* Ten public meetings were held and altogether 350 people attended. *Meetings were considered very useful. [...] Lots of comments and proposals were received both from public meetings and seminars, and they had an influence on the content of the park plans. [...] When the plan drafts were ready, some more public meetings were arranged in November–December 2000.*<sup>60</sup>

The Project used Participatory Planning Approach in informing local people and authorities about the new park plans. *This way also important response was received from local level.* Some of the Russian experts were *earlier sceptic* [sic!] to the idea to implement this method, developed in the US and actively used by Metsähallitus in Finland, in Russia. *Our experience showed that the method works well in Russia, and for the Project, it was an important tool in communication.*<sup>61</sup>

The experience of the application of participatory planning in the protected areas serves to illustrate the *local feasibility* of the model, which was initially received with scepticism by the local counterpart.

To sum up: the local agents' awareness of the reforms in the sphere of nature protection and their active participation in the reform process are central concepts in the project texts, in terms of which the current situation is rendered problematic and the proposed interventions are justified. The constitution of local agency in the parks project is schematised in the following figure:

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<sup>60</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>61</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 32–33. Emphasis added.




Figure 5: Constitution of the Object of Local Agency (ENVRUS9704)

### 2.1.2. Authenticity and Artifice: The Ordering of the Object of Local Agency in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

The three figures demonstrate the *regularities* in the constitution of the object of local agency in the project texts that point to the existence of a *region of interpositivity* in which this object is formed. We can observe isomorphisms in the *verbal techniques* of this constitution on the level of the text, namely the *inferential* linkages that posit a causal relationship between current professional and managerial practices and the negative index of the central concepts of awareness and participation, and the *rhetorical* use of exemplary and illustrative models to justify the proposed interventions in terms of these concepts. More importantly, we can identify regularities in the *thematic structure* of problematisation of local agency in terms of awareness and participation. This structure can be summarised in the following way:

The problem of **public awareness and participation** is:

- a) *causally related* with the *effectiveness* of government policies in that:
  - a1) information campaigns and participatory management can reduce *opposition and conflicts*, that are due to *misinformation* or *unawareness* and improve the *image* of administrative agencies;

- a2) involvement of a broad array of local groups can generate more *qualitative* policies;
- a3) public participation in reforms develops *local responsibility* and *planning capacity*;
- b) to be addressed in project interventions through
  - b1) *involvement of professional counterparts* in project activities through on-site *training programmes, study tours* and *local piloting* of proposed reforms;
  - b2) *involvement of the local public* in the reform process through *information and awareness campaigns* and *joint management planning*.

Having isolated a *region of interpositivity* in which local agency is constituted in a unitary thematic structure through isomorphous verbal techniques, we may proceed to the level of discourse by posing the question of the schemes that order its emergence and establish grids of its specification.

#### 2.1.2.1. *Exclusion from Discourse: 'The Real Value of Different Kinds of Opinions'*

We shall begin our analysis of the schemes that order the constitution of the object of local agency in the discourse of technical assistance with the question of how the exterior limits of the discursive space are instituted in the practices of exclusion. Since all three projects propose and deploy a variety of participatory approaches to involve professional and general audiences in the reform process, we shall first discuss the ways, in which incitement to active participation is combined in the approach of the projects with the exclusion of certain statements from discourse.

The first specification concerns the relationship between *public participation* and *decision-making* that we shall discuss relying primarily on the examples drawn from the parks development project. In its presentation of the participatory method the project emphasises that *decision-making remains with the park authorities* despite the inclusion of other groups in the process of *discussion* and *deliberation*.

Participatory planning is *only a method for collecting information and opinions* [from] interest groups and individuals. For example in Finland, when we are making management plans to our national parks, *we make ourselves all the decisions*. But decision-making will be easier for us, because we know what are the expectations of

surrounding society. [...] It's important to remember and notice that the *responsibility will remain to the park authorities* [...] when using participatory planning.<sup>62</sup>

Participation thus concerns manifestly not the process of *collective decision-making*, but the fostering of *public discussion*. Neither are the opinions stated in these discussions posited as *necessary* guidelines to decisions. The relationship of the decision-making authority to public discussion is explicated in the following fragments:

During the process there will come up some easy questions and also some difficult problems. Sometimes there will be very *negative opinions* and *aggressive wishes*. We *have to listen to the public and write the opinions on the board* and to the memorandum. When making decisions we have to estimate what is the *real value of different kinds of opinions*. Always there is a lot of *suggestions that we can implement* but also a lot of *wishes, which are not possible to fulfil*.<sup>63</sup>

The Park should contribute and establish a system for more active participation of the local people. To start with, public meetings should be established at least once a year utilising *external facilitators*. [...] The park should aim at adopting people's initiatives *when they are not in conflict with the conservation objectives* and informing them adequately of the justifications of the decisions.<sup>64</sup>

The fragments demonstrate that, while discussion is *necessary* ('we *have to* listen to the public'), it is not necessarily *useful*, so that, having accumulated the opinions, the managerial authority has to establish the *real value* of each particular proposal. This discrimination is based on the dissociation of *suggestions* that may be *implemented* and *wishes* whose *fulfilment* is impossible either in principle or due to their contradiction to the objectives of the park. Thus, while no direct *prohibition* is at work in participatory planning (and furthermore, participation is incited and 'externally facilitated'), the managerial authority is required to make a distinction between sound and implementable suggestions and requests for wish fulfilment, which are 'negative' and even 'aggressive'. Let us suggest that the form of *exclusion* practiced in this scheme centres on the *authoritative dissociation between the reasonable and the unreasonable*.

This dissociation is practiced across the other projects in a similar manner. The energy management project has, as one of its primary objectives, the development of

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<sup>62</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 60. Emphasis added.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 61. Emphasis added.

<sup>64</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 19. Emphasis added.

an energy policy for the seven border districts that form the scope of its activities: “A *sound* energy policy will be established for the project site to assist the move to *market economics*”.<sup>65</sup> In this fragment, the possibilities of enunciating an ‘energy policy’ that do not conform to the logic of ‘market economics’ are excluded as *unsound*. The linkage between market orientation and the ‘soundness’ of policy proposals serves to systematically exclude, without direct proscription, other alternatives by pointing to their non-conformity to economic rationality.<sup>66</sup>

The health care and social protection project utilises a similar scheme in the discussion of the existing system of health care and social protection management at the outset of the project. Among the identified indices of the problem is the following:

*Realistic alternatives to institutional social and health care* [are] *not tested in practice*. The inception report noted [...] that a ‘strategic line’ had been adopted – the promotion of primary health care – but no field tests had been carried out. There was as yet no *concrete evidence* as to the effectiveness of general practice or the cost and care advantages of combining social and health care services.<sup>67</sup>

The programme of the new government of the Republic of Karelia *reflects clearly the values and principles of social and health care reform promoted in the course of the Tacis project*. The strategy document under preparation in the Ministry of Health endorses the move towards primary health care and general practice and an integrated approach to the provision of social and health care services. *Policies, which were once controversial, are now accepted as the sensible way forward*.<sup>68</sup>

The project enables its own discourse by the dissociation of its practices of pilot projects in the selected localities, which successfully demonstrate via ‘concrete evidence’ the feasibility and ‘sensibility’ of primary non-institutional care, from the untested ‘strategic line’, which was subject to criticism and controversy in the absence of such evidence. The above-noted principle of *realism* that the project proceeds from in its local pilot programme serves to dissociate its discourse from the proposals which, though identical in content, are weakened by the absence of ‘hard evidence’ to support them and thus can not be accepted as ‘sensible’.

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<sup>65</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>66</sup> In chapter 2.2.2.1. we shall discuss in detail the ways in which entrepreneurial rationality, proper to the domain of market economy, functions as an exclusionary criterion in its own right.

<sup>67</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis original.

<sup>68</sup> Progress Report 3 EDRUS9516, p. 1. Emphasis added.

Despite inciting public participation the projects therefore reserve the authority to pass a verdict on the realistic, sound or sensible character of wishes and expectations, expressed by the public, and *exclude* the options that are not about to materialise. Let us now focus on the specific criterion of the reasonable that is employed in the projects by using the example of the parks project's requirements for management plans to be produced in its activities.

Fundamentally the management strategy needs to be realistic. It has to view current levels of activity and development in the context of what is and what isn't possible. It would be easy to produce a '*model*' strategy, *which reflects all the latest academic goals and objectives* for PAs [protected areas]. However, if it doesn't *truly reflect the needs and requirements and restrictions* that face the current NP [national park] directors, all we will have in the result is a *nice bookend*.<sup>69</sup>

The specification of the notion of the 'reasonable' that this fragment provides permits us to isolate a related scheme of exclusion. The fragment dissociates the proposed management strategy from a 'model' that would reflect 'academic' goals and objectives without due notice of the locally existing requirements and restrictions that need to be '*truly* reflected'. The dissociation in this fragment is functionally similar to what Foucault refers to as the 'will to truth',<sup>70</sup> a distinction of true and false discourse on the basis of a particular criterion, thereby excluding 'false' discursive possibilities from serious consideration. In our case of the object of local agency this scheme takes concrete shape in the 'truth criterion' of *authenticity of local knowledge*. To recall the discussion above, the participatory method in the parks development project is justified by recourse to ensuring that "the management plans are prepared with an understanding of *local conditions* and the *local ways of life*"<sup>71</sup>. The heating systems project adopts a *bottom-up approach* in order to identify relevant solutions in *particular municipalities* to ensure that the final reform proposals are attuned to local specificity. The health and social protection project posits its contribution as providing, through *pilot projects in the localities*, the *concrete evidence* for the superiority of the modes of management so far adopted as a mere strategic line. The

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<sup>69</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 73. Emphasis added.

<sup>70</sup> Foucault 1981, pp. 55–56.

<sup>71</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 61. Emphasis added.

project principles of partnership, realism and integration of policy and practice all proceed from the valorisation of specifically *local* knowledge as a condition of validity of the project's own discourse.

Thus, simultaneously with advocating the inclusion of the local public in the deliberation process for the purposes of enabling autonomous agency and thereby ensuring project sustainability, the projects also incite local participation since it is expected to endow the proposed interventions into managerial and professional practices with the status of truth conceived in terms of *authenticity*, concrete knowledge of the actual local situation, drawing from *on-the-ground* experience. The scheme of authenticity therefore operates both as a principle of *exclusion from discourse* that permits to discriminate between authentic and inauthentic enunciations and as a principle of *incitement to discourse* that confers an a priori validity onto 'local knowledge'.

Let us illustrate the way the scheme of authenticity is deployed for the purpose of ensuring the legitimacy of the projects' own output. The energy management project utilises the scheme of authenticity in its above-discussed adoption of a bottom-up approach and the commitment to involve local experts at all stages of project activities: "Local engineers and economists *should fully participate* in this project's activities so that they can *contribute their specific knowledge and experience on local general and technical conditions*."<sup>72</sup> The participation of local counterparts serves to endow the project interventions with validity based on the 'truth criterion' of authenticity. The theme of local knowledge is also present in the health care and social protection project, in which the advocated prioritisation of *preventive* and *non-institutional care* is not merely justified with recourse to the indices of economic efficiency, but also posited as *having origins in the local tradition*:

The enthusiasm for specialised care and treatment of in-patients was only 100 years old: in the 1880s relatively ill-equipped Karelian doctors – and [the Karelian project director and the EU team leader] can quote their names – performed eye and bladder operations, lanced abscesses and performed amputations. Moreover, they paid attention to *preventative* [sic!] *medicine*, understanding the reasons for the spread of typhoid, encouraged peasants to isolate children with smallpox and taught people hygiene and sanitation.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 26. Emphasis added.

<sup>73</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

This appeal to the pre-Soviet Karelian tradition serves to present the proposed non-institutional approaches to health and social care in terms of *re*-discovery of authentic local practice, a *re*-acquisition of the knowledge that was there before the Soviet period and may now be *re*-covered with EU assistance. Finally, authenticity is a particularly dominant theme in the parks development project, whose subject matter, ecotourism that combines the attractions of local *nature* and *culture*, is conditioned by the valorisation of authentic experience as a primary characteristic of the type of services to be developed and marketed. According to the Tourism Strategy, prepared by the project, ecotourism, as “new tourism,” provides “real life experiences”.<sup>74</sup> The involvement of local publics in both planning and implementation is thus necessary to maintain the identity of the object of ecotourism: “The *full involvement of local communities* in the tourism sector not only benefits them and the environment in general but also *improves the quality of the tourism experience*.”<sup>75</sup>

All the projects thus proceed from the need for ‘local knowledge’ to validate their proposed interventions. Local pilot experiments, undertaken by the three projects, serve not merely to illustrate to the counterpart the benefits of the proposed solutions, but to *transform* these very solutions from ‘academic’ ‘bookends’ into ‘living, dynamic frameworks’.<sup>76</sup> The health care and social protection project is exemplary in seeking to ‘authenticate’ its proposals by their testing in pilot districts with active local participation.

The policy of project management in giving the initiative to the pilot districts has been *wholly vindicated*. It has *enormously increased motivation* and has ensured that reform proposals are *practical* and *realisable*.<sup>77</sup>

The reform vision is immensely strengthened through being *based on practical, tested experience on the ground*. Policy-makers *can point to 6 working models of general practice*, in both urban and rural areas, and to a *variety of proven non-institutional approaches* to medico-social care and multi-professional working. The gatekeeper function has been amply demonstrated to be effective in reducing referrals to secondary care. *The ‘strategic line’ has been supported by hard evidence*.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 7.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>76</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>77</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23. Emphasis added.



Local participation in the reforms and the testing of project models in pilot localities are thus suggested as both instruments of enhancing motivation and support, and as valuable for the advocated models themselves, which would not be ‘practical’ and ‘realisable’ without pilot testing. This aspect is also stressed in the heating strategies project, which takes a similar approach to the elaboration of its reform initiatives, in which the ‘worthiness’ of the strategy has to be validated locally.

The course of the project was the assessment of the current district heating system in selected towns in the border region, to assess the potential of local fuel resources and to *create a model from the implementation of the pilot projects*, by which the REC [Regional Energy Commission] can continue the work of the renovation of the energy system and the substitution of fuels.<sup>79</sup>

The strategy which will be proposed by the consultant [will be] *the most practical, workable solution in the short and medium term*. The proposals will be *effected by the outcome of the pilot projects*, which will *demonstrate the worthiness of the proposed strategy*.<sup>80</sup>

The valorisation of ‘local experience’ is also evident in the scepticism of the heating strategies project about the application of ‘Western models’ in Russia and the need for a *careful synthesis* of Western models and local experience. “The *management model of a western small independent energy supply utility* could be a good example for Karelia, although recent years have shown that *western experience could not always be adopted in Russia*. Therefore a *careful synthesis of proved Western management* taking into account the *characteristics of Russian/Karelian development* has to be *discovered*.”<sup>81</sup> In this mode of ordering, ‘local experience’ functions as an exclusive figure that renders the (Western) model practical, a privileged ingredient that literally *animates* the proposed interventions: “Strategy documents have provided managers with practical tools, not masterplans, but *living, dynamic* frameworks for decision-making.”<sup>82</sup> This living and dynamic character is owing to the local experimentation that preceded the production of the reform strategies. Nonetheless, we ought not to overstate the degree to which local knowledge

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<sup>79</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>80</sup> Progress Report 5 ERUS9701, p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>81</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>82</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

and participation transform the original reform strategy.<sup>83</sup> As the health care and social protection project states, “the principal criteria for choosing the [pilot] districts [...] were the *commitment* and *motivation* of the district leadership and operational staff.”<sup>84</sup> Similarly, “the wish of the local authorities to reform health care and social welfare *in compliance* with the strategies approved within the framework of the Project has *afforded a basis* for selection of Sortavala as a pilot territory.”<sup>85</sup> Commitment, motivation and compliance are thus *a priori* conditions of participation. To be chosen as a site of pilot experimentation, the relevant management in the territory must first commit itself to the substantive reform strategy advocated by the project in the inception phase. The above-cited statements of enhanced local motivation and commitment to project policies thus appear less surprising, since a degree of commitment and motivation was to be there for the site to become a pilot area in the first place. In the ordering of the discourse the valorisation of local *authenticity* is thus combined with the authoritative exclusion of local enunciations not conforming to the reform strategies chosen by the project.

The two lines of exclusion that may be designated as the principles of *reasonability* and *authenticity* serve to delimit, in the most elementary way, the object of local agency by the combination of the *incitement to discourse* of the local population and the *reservation* on behalf of the managerial authority of the *right of decision*, including the decision to discriminate between sound and implementable solutions and unrealistic wishes, authentic local knowledge and ‘academic’ or ‘theoretical’ visions. From this perspective, it is possible to appreciate the above-discussed causal link between *public involvement* and *public acceptance*: the discursive space of public participation is delimited in advance in a way that makes it possible to exclude as unreasonable or inauthentic the enunciations that are not statements of acceptance of the solutions that technical assistance proposes.

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<sup>83</sup> We shall discuss the relation between reform strategies and their local testing in greater detail in chapter 2.3.2.2.

<sup>84</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 31. Emphasis added.

<sup>85</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 11. Emphasis added.

### 2.1.2.2. Rarefaction of the Content of Discourse: 'We Create the Base'

Moving from the exterior of the discursive space to the level of internal *rarefaction* of discourse, we may isolate a modality of ordering its content via the installation of primary elements that serve as grids of specification of the enunciative function of local agency. In a most explicit way, the participatory planning method as presented by the parks development project serves as a *grid* that establishes in its positivity the concrete *way of proceeding* about public deliberation. The other projects also deploy rarefying schemes that for our purposes are variations of the 'participatory planning method'. The health and social protection project practices the organisation and specification of the participatory approach by means of a *questionnaire* targeted at local health care and social protection professionals that inquires about existing problems and potential reform strategies.<sup>86</sup> The energy sector reform project utilises a more substantive scheme of ordering discourse in setting down precise specifications for the jointly produced financial plans, which are to be "*prepared in accordance with the [European Commission's] 'Guide to Energy Efficiency Bankable Proposals'*".<sup>87</sup> With the help of this guideline text "the responsible decision-makers including politicians will be *enabled and motivated to actively participate in and promote* the implementation of renewable energy technologies."<sup>88</sup> Let us now discuss the operation of such ordering grids in detail.

In its programme of Management Planning Seminars the parks development project adopts a *single framework of discussion* of the reform of management in the emergent national parks. The seminars held in the four locations proposed as future parks (Tuulos, Koitajoki, Kalevala, Ladoga Skerries) as well as the already existing Paanajärvi park have all proceeded in the framework of 'SWOT Analysis', introduced by the project.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 9.

<sup>87</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 10. Emphasis added.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26. Emphasis added.

<sup>89</sup> SWOT analysis refers to the tabulation of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. See Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, pp. 35–36 for the explanation and illustration of this framework.

A SWOT – analyses [sic!] is needed to understand the present situation. It is easier with the help of the SWOT-analyses to find out *weak places* and to plan the future. Our further activities will depend on SWOT. [...] Please remember to be *open, honest and truthful*.<sup>90</sup> As a method it [SWOT analysis] is a very simple method and very suitable for group work. *Based on the information collected and views given, it yields an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the National Park.* [...] SWOT analysis is seldom complete if prepared as an internal work. The park officers usually *need external facilitation in preparing it. Alone they can be too close to their problems to be able to see wider perspectives and to outline all sides of the situation.* [...] That is the reason why the formulation of this analysis started in two seminars together with the personnel of the Paanajärvi National Park and consultants of the Tacis Karelia Parks Development project. [...] The basic information was received from the Park officers, the *consultants assisted in prioritising and allocating the facts in the right framework*.<sup>91</sup>

The fragment above illustrates the way discourse is both incited and rarefied via the installation of a grid that delimits the *enunciative spaces of designation and classification*. As an analytical framework, SWOT analysis is a grid of discourse in the literal sense, since the results of the analysis are presented in the form of a tabulated taxonomy. At the same time, unlike the exclusionary schemes, this modality of rarefaction does not *proscribe* particular enunciations or *prescribe* others: the fragment features a call for ‘open, honest and truthful’ responses of the seminar participants. Yet, in all openness, honesty and truthfulness, these responses are conditioned prior to the fact of their enunciation by the grid established by SWOT analysis to organise discourse, i.e. both to enable its exercise and to structure possible statements. Furthermore, the specific structuration of statements (i.e. their allocation into one of the quadrants of the taxonomy) is undertaken with the help of ‘external facilitation’ of Tacis consultants, preoccupied with processing the ‘brute’ information provided by the park employees, to the extent that it remains up to the facilitators whether a given fact should be designated as a strength or a weakness, an opportunity or a threat. While the installation of the SWOT framework grounds and organises the content of the discourse of the local counterparts, external facilitation serves to enable the local counterparts to correctly utilise its rarefied possibilities.

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<sup>90</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 37. Emphasis added.

<sup>91</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 13. Emphasis added.

In all three projects, the installation of a certain type of 'primary text' (concretely exemplified by the SWOT table, the questionnaire format, the guideline manual for investment proposals) serves to rarefy discourse in a way that effects a combination of empowerment and constraint: local participants are simultaneously '*enabled to participate*' in the discourse by following the posited guidelines and '*motivated to promote*' particular solutions since they are defined as available choices in terms of the ordering grid. These modalities of application of the participatory planning method have an affinity with the mode of rarefaction that Foucault calls *commentary*. The installation of a primary text as an organising grid both enables proliferation of discourse and delimits its possibilities by the *substantive* or *procedural* principles laid down in the primary texts.<sup>92</sup> The example of substantive rarefaction is offered by the heating systems project's deployment of a 'guide to energy efficiency bankable proposals', which installs the basic economic principles, according to which energy sector reform must proceed.

The project will provide the local authority, power station managers and government officials with the *most up-to-date practical know-how on attracting investment* in the energy sector in Karelia. [...] Having worked closely with the European team on the two pilot projects in Lassanen and Kalevala, the local experts *will have gained a strong techno-economic understanding of the choices available*.<sup>93</sup>

This type of primary text provides a substantive 'techno-economic' ground to the discursive practice of the local counterpart, which thereby becomes limited to the commentary on the attraction of external financing for renovation projects.

Another example of substantive rarefaction is offered by the parks development project's specification of the concept of ecotourism through a series of distinctions and precise terminological codifications, illustrated in the following two tables.

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<sup>92</sup> The distinction is utilised with full awareness of its dubiousness. Certainly, procedures are inscribed in substantive forms of life and are never 'purely' procedural but always entangled in substantive modes of understanding: for example the framework of SWOT analysis has inscribed in it a commitment to a type of prudential reasoning that characterises the economic agent's deliberation on risk. It also serves to reinscribe deviations from the privileged indices in terms of 'weaknesses' and the alternative modes of intervention as 'threats', thereby enabling a univocal (re)coding of otherwise ambiguous and uncertain situations.

<sup>93</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 26. Emphasis added.

Table 1: Shifts in Contemporary Tourism (ENVRUS9704)<sup>94</sup>

Old Tourism	New Tourism
Mass	Individual
Packaged	Flexible
Unreal Life Experiences	Real Life Experiences
Irresponsible	Responsible

The establishment of the identity of the concept of ecotourism by its delimitation from ‘old tourism’ and its endowment with positive features of flexibility, ‘real life’ experience and responsibility serves to limit the content of possible local enunciations regarding future tourism development to the reinvoation of a highly specific type of tourism, thereby disabling some discursive possibilities and business opportunities (e.g. development of packaged tours) and orienting local activity towards the provision of the visitors with ‘real life experiences’. The concept of ecotourism is specified further in the managerial aspect in the following primary text, the ‘Ten Principles of Sustainability’, developed by the World Wide Fund for Nature Conservation (WWF) and installed by the project as the basis of the Tourism Strategy that it prepares with local participation.

This codification of the principles of ecotourism sets down strict and detailed criteria for planning, research, marketing, communication and public relations aspects of management in national parks that the local counterparts would have to replicate in order to endow their practices with the privileged status of ‘sustainable

<sup>94</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 7.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added. See also *ibid.* for other primary texts that specify the concept of ecotourism, e.g. Ten Commandments of Ecotourism (p. 9.), Development Model of Tourism and Communication in National Parks (p. 15.) and the Code of Conduct in National Parks (pp. 119–120.). We shall address the content of these primary texts in the following chapters with regard to their function in the constitution of the objects of enterprise and government.

Table 2: Principles of Sustainable Tourism (ENVRUS9704)<sup>95</sup>

Use resources sustainably	Conservation and sustainable use of resources – natural, environmental and cultural – is crucial and makes long-term business sense.
Reducing over-consumption and waste	Reduction of over-consumption and waste avoids the costs of restoring long-term environmental damage and contributes to the quality of tourism.
Maintaining diversity	Maintaining and promoting natural, social and cultural diversity is essential for long-term sustainable tourism and creates a resilient base for the industry.
Integrating tourism into planning	Tourism, which is integrated into a national and local strategic planning framework and which undertakes environmental impact assessments, increases the long-term viability of tourism.
Supporting local economies	Tourism that supports a wide range of local economic activities and which takes environmental costs and values into account, protects local economies and avoids environmental damages.
<i>Involving local communities</i>	<i>The full involvement of local communities in the tourism sector not only benefits them and the environment in general but also improves the quality of the tourism experience.</i>
<i>Consulting stake-holders and the public</i>	<i>Consultation between the tourism industry and local communities, organisations and institutions is essential if they are to work alongside each other and resolve potential conflicts of interest.</i>
Training staff	<i>Staff training, which integrates sustainable tourism into work practices, along with recruitment of local personnel at all levels, improves the quality of the tourism.</i>
Responsible marketing of tourism	Marketing that provides tourists with full and responsible information increases respect for natural, social and cultural environments of destination areas and enhances customer satisfaction.
Undertaking research	On-going research and monitoring by the industry using effective data collection and analysis is essential to help solve problems and to bring benefits to destinations, the industry and consumers.

tourism'. Through the installation of these primary texts that specify the identity of ecotourism, the discourse of local agents (park managers, tour operators, the local public) on tourism development, whose solicitation is in fact one of the ten principles of sustainability, is endowed with a ground that enables a plethora of enunciations but only insofar as they remain tied to and permanently reactualise these constitutive definitions.

The procedural modality of rarefaction may be illustrated by the health and social protection project's use of the formatted questionnaire, targeted at local health and social sector professionals, that concerns existing problems and potential reform strategies:

Among those questioned were the following: the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Welfare, Committee on Issues of Families, Youth and Children, Committee on Social Policy of the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia, Obligatory Medical Insurance Fund. They were proposed to grant their vision on:

- situation in health care and social welfare in the Republic of Karelia, in particular for the last 6–12 months;
- opportunities of specific ministries and organisations to resolve the *existing problems*; their *view upon the challenges and opportunities* to resolve them;
- possible *strategies for reforming*;
- priorities of the Tacis Project.

This turned out to be important for the reason that *earlier in the Republic there was no concept to reform and develop health care and social welfare*.<sup>96</sup>

The incitement of local professionals to express their views on the situation is structured in terms of the notion of reform, whose necessity is posited a priori. The questionnaire structure that is based on an already established index of problematisation of the current situation in the sector serves as a basic grid, in terms of which concrete reform proposals are discussed and the formerly absent 'concept' of reform emerges. While not prescribing any substantive responses (aside from the basic recognition of the need for reform as such), the questionnaire format serves as a grid of organising the discourse to which local professionals are incited. Specific reform strategies eventually adopted by the project receive their justification by casting their content as an *expert specification* of the concerns and proposals of local professionals,

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<sup>96</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 9. Emphasis added.



expressed in the responses to the questionnaire, and are thus, by a relation of *derivation*, endowed with the privileged 'authentic' status of local knowledge.<sup>97</sup>

This 'external facilitation' function of rarefaction is expressed particularly explicitly in the following statement: "*We do not give advice. We create the base. [sic!]*"<sup>98</sup> The 'creation of the base' that installs the distinction between primary and secondary texts exemplifies the functioning of the principle of commentary that in our case may be specified as the *grounding of discourse*, its endowment with privileged content whose reactualisation in the 'new' enunciations is the condition of their validity. In Foucault's words, "commentary [...] allows us to say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is this text itself which is said, and in a sense completed."<sup>99</sup>

The particular type of 'grounding content' laid down in the discourse of technical assistance permits us to specify the principle of rarefaction at work in the scheme of grounding. Insofar as the primary texts utilised in this scheme take the shape of *rules* (methods of analysis, terminological specifications, decision-making techniques), we may note the convergence of the commentary principle with what Foucault refers to as the *disciplinary scheme* that governs the production of statements endowed with

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<sup>97</sup> The respondents to the questionnaire have offered the following reform priorities: "development of a strategy for reforming health care, including medical insurance; a concept of social welfare reforming, taking into account the problems of families, youth and children; strategies for developing collaboration between social and health care services; improvement of management at all levels; establishment of information systems, compliant with the reforming concept; strengthening the role of legislation, including the process of developing, adoption and financial support of laws." (Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 9.) The Report proceeds with its statement of strategies of intervention in the following manner: "*Having analysed the results of the poll, [...] the "Policy, legislation and management" Working Group has outlined the following strategies for realisation within the framework of the Project: development of the primary health care through introduction of general practice [...], development of the system of community-based services [...], organisation of the joint work of health care and social welfare to establish models of different degrees of integration.*" (Ibid. Emphasis added.) The proposed solutions are thus presented as *resulting* from the analysis of the responses of local counterparts, with the consequence being the transfer of the *authentic status of the local professionals' discourse* onto the project strategies that are deemed *derivative* from these responses (the actual procedure of derivation remaining unexplicated). This fragment thus exemplifies the articulation of the exclusionary scheme of authenticity onto the rarefaction of the content of discourse, whereby the rarefying grid, provided by the questionnaire, serves to organise and structure around the concept of reform the discourse of local professionals, which is subsequently utilised to confer the status of authenticity on the substantive interventions advocated by the project.

<sup>98</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 39. Emphasis added.

<sup>99</sup> Foucault 1981, p. 58.

the status of truth by the imposition of precise rules for their construction.<sup>100</sup> The primary texts therefore rarely the content of discourse by establishing a *twofold relation of identity* between themselves and the statements they enable. In the combination of commentary and disciplinarity the presence of the principle of rarefaction in any enunciated statement is doubly ensured: it is present both in the form of *reinvocation of the primary text* that grants the enunciation *content* and in the form of *reactualisation of the disciplinary rules* that endows it with *truth*.

### 2.1.2.3. Restriction of Access to Discourse: ‘Genuinely Knowledgeable Guides’

Finally, in our description of the formation of the object of local agency we shall address the question of the rarefaction of the *enunciative modalities* of the discourse of technical assistance, i.e. describe the operating schemes of *restriction*. As demonstrated above, the task of enhancing public awareness and participation is, across the three projects, addressed in the practices of *training*, which recast the relationship of partnership into an *asymmetrical relationship* of governing *access* to discourse. A more detailed investigation of this theme will allow us to discern the specific patterns of rarefaction of the enunciative modality of local agency.

Let us proceed with illustrating the restrictive operation of training by the example from the heating systems project. The project combines training and public relations activities into one component: “Information and Training Programme”, whose instruments are study tours and pilot projects. *Study tours* are designed to introduce to the Russian counterparts *exemplary models* of energy management that are applicable in the local conditions: “The course will present *best practice examples from Western Europe pertinent to the local situation*.”<sup>101</sup> The *pilot projects* undertaken in the districts of Lahdenpohja and Kalevala are also deemed to have an educational aspect since the participation of local counterparts in all the stages of the renovation of heating networks is claimed to ensure their subsequent *capacity to autonomously utilise* the effects of reform:

*The pilot projects also form an important training and educational element as local and regional authorities and personnel from heat utilities will be following every step*

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<sup>100</sup> Foucault 1981, pp. 59–61.

<sup>101</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 20. Emphasis added.

*taken in the projects during their implementation and will also participate in most of the negotiations related to the development of the projects. As an additional training benefit, the different development phases will be presented at workshops, training courses and seminars.*<sup>102</sup>

This fragment points to the combination of incitement to participation and partnership with the emphasis on (re)education and (re)training within the framework of the project. This combination allows us to discern a pattern of restricting discourse that may be broadly referred to as the *pedagogical scheme*. Pedagogy links incitement to discourse with a detailed *prescription of its practice* and, unlike the exclusionary schemes, does not prohibit particular enunciations but rather *guides the speaking subject through the possibilities of discourse* with the objective of endowing him with the capacity for *autonomous reproduction* of these possibilities in the future. The local public is incited to discourse *on condition of its being taught* its correct utilisation, guided through its possibilities or, as in the fragment above, various phases of its practice.

The principle of pedagogy may be specified further with the help of examples from the other projects. The parks development project's training programme has as its target groups the following professional agencies: park staff in the already existing Paanajärvi national park and the four proposed parks, tourist entrepreneurs targeted as potential operators in the parks, mass media reporters, scientists and local administration officials.<sup>103</sup> The content of training relates to principles and practices of ecotourism management, which is presented as a highly specific form of enterprise that requires additional skills from national park officials and tour operators. The Tourism Strategy produced in the project commences with a detailed *specification of terminology* to delimit 'ecotourism' as a primary goal of reform from similar concepts:

Ecotourism is *responsible travelling* contributing to the protection of natural areas and the well-being of the local population. Ecotourism is often claimed to be the most rapidly expanding sector of the tourism industry, however, it has been *lumped together* with nature, wildlife and adventure tourism which ecotourism should be distinguished from. [...] Ecotourism places *stricter demands* on companies and products than required by

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>103</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 37–41.

“normal” environmentally adapted nature tourism. To *safeguard* against ecotourism becoming a *watered-down term* that can be *abused* in marketing, the introduction of *clear criteria* for ecotourism products is needed.<sup>104</sup>

This definition of criteria takes the form of such primary texts as “Ten Commandments of Ecotourism”<sup>105</sup> and is functionally related both to the rarefaction of discourse (by being posited as a primary text, controlling the ‘watering-down’ of the concept) and the rarefaction of enunciative modalities, since the adoption of the prescribed definitions is a *condition of access to discourse*. The terminological specifications of the Tourism Strategy provide a point of entry into the discourse via a *pedagogical initiation into the enunciative field* that endows the speaking subject with the mastery of the conceptual system of ecotourism. This scheme of restriction specifies the *pedagogical principle of guided transmission of discourse* in terms of what Foucault refers to as *doctrine*. The doctrinal scheme is similar but not reducible to the principle of discipline, since besides rarefying the *content* of discourse, it also rarefies its *enunciative modalities* through a *double subjection* of the subject to a discourse and of the discourse to the speaking subject. Firstly, a doctrine binds the subjects to specific types of prescribed enunciations. Secondly, it attaches specific enunciations to particular privileged subject positions, thereby enabling them as authoritative discourse practitioners.<sup>106</sup> This modality of restriction is illustrated clearly in the health care and social protection project, where the doctrinal scheme is utilised in the (trans)formation of *academic curricula* for the new professions of ‘general practitioner’ and ‘social worker’.

Measurable progress has been made in building a *sustainable infrastructure of education and training for the knowledge and skills required by a reformed social and health care system*. The training of nurse and social work teachers is being comprehensively revised; *the first ever accredited training course for basic social workers has been devised and introduced*; assistance has been given to Petrozavodsk State University to *transform the training of general practitioners* from being a peripheral activity to being a *central concern of its planning for the future*.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>106</sup> See Foucault 1981, pp. 63–64.

<sup>107</sup> Progress Report 2 EDUS9516, p. 4. Emphasis added.

Specifically, the curricula are restructured with a view to “a much stronger emphasis on primary health care, general practice, an integrated approach with social care services”.<sup>108</sup> The reshaping of curricula serves to form a new enunciative modality (‘general practitioner’) by simultaneously subjecting the speaker in this position to a particular type of discourse (‘primary care’) and subject this discourse to the newly established professional agency. Besides designing curricula for future training, the project also engages in the actual re-education of local counterparts by EU consultants by means of *on-site training* and *study tours*, utilised in all the components of the project: training in regional-level management of the sector<sup>109</sup>, economic analysis, medical insurance and pricing<sup>110</sup>, operation of information systems<sup>111</sup>, training of medical and social care staff and trainers<sup>112</sup> and training of the sector management in public relations.<sup>113</sup> Since local counterparts receive training in every aspect of reform, *training becomes co-extensive with their participation* in project activities. As a result of training, local agents are endowed with the privileged enunciative modalities of ‘general practitioner’, ‘medico-social nurse’ or ‘local consultant’. Yet, this subjection of discourse to local agents is conditioned by their subjection to its rarefied content, i.e. their autonomous reproduction of the respective doctrines. It is this reproduction that ensures the projects’ success in terms of sustainability and ‘local ownership’ of reform results. “The majority of these individuals are in their early or mid-careers. They have *grown in the project* and are perhaps the *republic’s best guarantee of the sustainability of the reform process*.”<sup>114</sup>

We may conclude that in the pedagogical scheme of restriction *training becomes necessarily participatory*, presupposing an active independent practice of the possibilities of discourse, while *participation becomes necessarily educational*, in that it is conditioned by an antecedent endowment of the agent with the mastery of the doctrine. In this sense we may specify the notion of the pedagogical scheme in terms of *participatory indoctrination*.<sup>115</sup> This scheme may be isolated whenever enunciative

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<sup>108</sup> Progress Report 3 EDRUS9516, p. 3.

<sup>109</sup> Progress Report 1 EDRUS9516, p. 11.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13. See also Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, pp. 22–23.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>113</sup> Progress Report 2 EDRUS9516, p. 13.

<sup>114</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 35. Emphasis added.

<sup>115</sup> In this study, the term ‘indoctrination’ is devoid of the connotations of ideological misrepresentation

possibilities of a given subject position are restricted by anterior acquisition of doctrinal mastery and posterior reinvoation of doctrinal principles in one's discourse.

Let us now describe the way, in which this restriction of enunciative modalities through participatory indoctrination serves to mould the concrete figure of the local agent. We may suggest that the *paradigm* of 'local agency' in the discourse of technical assistance is offered by the enunciative modality of *local expert*, a counterpart of Tacis in the projects of technical assistance.<sup>116</sup> The example below draws from the reporting of the parks development project, concerning the figure of the 'local guide' but is *replicated* in the other projects' constitution of a 'local operator' (ERUS9701) and a 'local specialist' (EDRUS9516).<sup>117</sup> With the help of this example we shall further elucidate the relation of 'double subjection' and demonstrate the *integrated operation* of the three types of ordering schemes, not in the reductive sense of attributing a singular logic to their operation but in the sense of describing their reciprocal functioning in a system of dispersion.

The Code of Conduct in National Parks, developed by the project, proclaims that "highly qualified guides are needed in every park" since "guides meet visitors and guests of the park. Their work has an *essential role in building up the image of the park*."<sup>118</sup> The Fifth Commandment of Ecotourism states that "travel companies must ensure that they have *genuinely knowledgeable guides* whether their own or engaged locally. *The aim shall be to use local guides as much as possible*."<sup>119</sup> However, the relation between 'locality' and 'genuine knowledgeable' is not causal, i.e. the image-enhancing function of tour-guiding is not assigned to the local population on the basis of its *anterior expertise*. The subjection of discourse to the enunciative modality of 'local guide' is in fact accompanied by the subjection of this subject-position to

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and is used in its primary sense as a process of "instructing, especially in fundamentals or rudiments". (Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com>.)

<sup>116</sup> See Kuhn 1970a, 1970b. See Masterman 1970 for the discussion of the multiple meanings of the term 'paradigm' in Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and the reconstruction of three basic senses of the term: metaphysical paradigms (sets of organising principles or 'ways of seeing'), sociological paradigms (achievements recognised within a scientific community) and artefact paradigms (concrete exemplars of problem-solution). Kuhn's 'Reflections on my Critics' (1970a, pp. 271–274) unites the first two senses under the label of 'disciplinary matrix' and reserves the term 'paradigm' for the very specific, 'artefact' sense that we rely on in this study.

<sup>117</sup> See respectively Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 26; Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 20.

<sup>118</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 119. Emphasis added.

<sup>119</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 9. Emphasis added.

specific types of enunciations: prior to acquiring access to discourse, local guides are to be 'trained by scientists'<sup>120</sup> and thereby guided through the codes and commandments of the doctrine of ecotourism that serves as a *primary text* that rarefies their discourse. We may suggest that the restriction of the guiding function to the local population is conditioned by the exclusionary scheme of *authenticity*. The doctrine of ecotourism invokes the notion of authentic "real-life experience" as a primary characteristic of the type of services to be developed and marketed.<sup>121</sup> As a condition of possibility of the doctrine of ecotourism, the principle of authenticity governs the practice of discourse in a wide variety of domains: "*Local style* in constructions gives a *catchy memory* in visitors' minds", "Find out *old stories*, interview *old people*, use *local guides*."<sup>122</sup> In this doctrinal scheme the specification of objects of discourse, including the positions of its subjects, occurs in the field, already delimited by the exclusionary scheme of authenticity.

We may therefore suggest that the enunciative modality of 'local guide' is constituted in the articulation of the restrictive scheme of participatory indoctrination with the schemes of grounding and authenticity. The assignment of discourse to local guides exemplifies the link between the schemes of authenticity and indoctrination, in that the attribution of doctrinal enunciations to the particular modality serves to reinforce the boundaries of the discursive space constituted in the exclusion of the inauthentic from the domain of discourse. It also exemplifies the link between the schemes of indoctrination and commentary, insofar as the figure of 'local guide' is both *presupposed* by the primary texts (Ten Commandments of Ecotourism and the Code of Conduct in National Parks) and *is relied on* for their permanent reactualisation in his own discourse by virtue of the received training.

This articulation of the ordering schemes brings us to a paradox, whereby the figure of the local guide appears to be simultaneously both an origin of authentic truth and an object of instruction in its fundamentals. The local guide, whose autonomous discourse should elicit a sense of 'real life experience', is at the same time a manifest artefact of the training practices, which guide him through the external doctrine, whose entire existence is in turn conditioned by the valorisation of local knowledge.

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<sup>120</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 119.

<sup>121</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 7.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

The 'genuinely knowledgeable' local guide is thus *assumed to know best precisely that which he is to be taught*.

Incompatibilities of this kind are easy to discern in the other two projects. The heating systems project simultaneously insists on both (re)training local operators and utilising their active participation on the grounds of the local knowledge that they possess:

*The know-how transfer on investment potential and local energy sources between Karelian and Western European researchers is an essential aspect of this project and is necessary to ensure a broad local acceptance of the obtained results. Local engineers and economists should fully participate in this project's activities so that they can contribute their specific knowledge and experience on local general and technical conditions.*<sup>123</sup>

On the one hand, the restrictive scheme of participatory indoctrination makes training an essential condition of access to discourse and the rarefying scheme of commentary makes prior installation of the basic know-how a necessary condition of acceptance and sustainability of the proposed interventions. Yet, the exclusionary scheme of authenticity requires that the knowledge to be imparted to the local counterpart be *already* imbued with 'specific knowledge and experience', whose authenticity is verified by its local origin. The paradox at work in the articulation of these schemes is evident: *it is essential to transfer to the local counterpart the know-how authenticated by his anterior expertise*.

The health care and social protection project offers an example of the effects of this articulation in its statement of the outcomes of the project:

*Approximately 2000 specialists have undergone training in the course of the project. Key specialists in republic ministries and district administrations have been equipped with the necessary skills for economic analysis, human resource planning, the management of an integrated social and health care information system. [...] The message of reform has been taken persuasively to managers and specialists in every district of the republic. This has been done in the best possible way – by local consultants who themselves have direct and practical experience of bringing about change. [...] The policy of the project management in giving the initiative to the pilot districts has been wholly vindicated. It has enormously increased motivation and has ensured that reform proposals are practical and realisable. [...] In short, the Karelian*

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<sup>123</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 26. Emphasis added.



partner *owns the process*. From this point of view, the prospects for sustainability are excellent.<sup>124</sup>

The professionals *trained* in the course of the project are in this fragment recast as *autonomous agents*, whose *reiteration* of project solutions in the dissemination phase is, on the grounds of their *direct* and *practical experience*, endowed with *authenticity* and granted the status of practical and realisable, hence *reasonable*, discourse. The practices of participatory indoctrination, whereby the local counterpart was pedagogically guided through the possibilities of discourse, are presented as having successfully *effected* the formation of *autonomous* local agency, whose discourse is *authentic* and *reasonable*. At the same time, the very *content* of the acquired doctrinal mastery is, in the scheme of authenticity, to be conditioned by the participation of local experts with specific knowledge and experience. The enunciative modality of local agency is therefore endowed with the status of authenticity by virtue of its *autonomous reiteration* of the doctrinal principles, which themselves derive their truth claims from their *posterior reactualisation* in the discourse of local agents. In all these examples, the local agent as an object of discourse is marked by a distinctly aporetic status: she is always simultaneously both the origin and the effect of the grounding doctrine, the empirical object formed by the practices of technical assistance and the condition of possibility of the expertise relied on and proposed in these practices.

Yet, one need not either infer from this aporia the ‘insincerity’ of the discourse of technical assistance (revealing its ‘pseudo-authentic’ character, thereby reinforcing the chimera of ‘real-life experience’ as a conceptual possibility) or its ‘incoherence’ to be resolved by recourse to an underlying meta-discourse (e.g. arguing conspiratorially that behind the valorisation of local experience there lurks a cynical drive to indoctrinate local agents into a Western ‘hegemonic discourse’). Both these strategies would proceed from the desire to (re)establish the discourse as a coherent and meaningful unity – a desire thoroughly at odds with our Foucauldian approach to discourse as a system of dispersion. Instead, we may at this stage suggest that in our description of the incompatibilities in the order of the discourse of technical assistance we have identified a *point of diffraction*<sup>125</sup>, the source of discursive

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<sup>124</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>125</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 65.

dispersion that does not *dent* but rather *defines* technical assistance as a discourse and points pathways for its genealogical interpretation. In other words, the aporetic authentic/artefactual status of local agency is not a “defect of incoherence”<sup>126</sup> of the formation of this object of discourse, but its constitutive principle.

Our archaeological description of the ordering schemes of local agency has resulted in the identification of a discursive space of technical assistance, where the positivity of local agency is formed in a specific distribution of exclusions, rarefactions and restrictions. We may now schematise the order of discourse, in which the object of local agency is constituted, in the following manner:




Figure 6: Constitution of Local Agency in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

Let us sum up the results of the analysis at this stage. The *unity of subjectification and objectification* that characterises the formation of local agency as a jurisdictional and veridictive effect of the discourse of technical assistance serves to emphasise the aspect of ordering discourse that Foucault refers to as *scarcity of affirmation*. Local agency, an object whose ethos of awareness and participation connotes greater openness and inclusion, owes its existence to the practices that systematically exclude, rarefy and restrict the enunciative possibilities of the subjects thus constituted. The emphasis on *affirmation* helps us avoid a facile accusatory gesture against EU Tacis for limiting, repressing or dominating 'local knowledge'. Our analysis demonstrates that authenticity is not an island of prediscursive virginity but rather a function of the ordering of discourse, which establishes the fact of virginity only by virtue of systematic defloration. The emphasis on *scarcity* helps us refrain from an equally facile gesture of uncritically lauding the achievements of EU Tacis in enabling autonomous local agency in postcommunist Russia. The autonomy of local agency is not an effect of liberation but a technical modality of the discourse of technical assistance, whose function consists in *validating by autonomous reproduction* the authenticity of the discourse that made it possible. What is formed in the discourse of technical assistance is a *local agency, whose pedagogically guided participation in an externally grounded discourse serves as the condition of the latter's validity*. In relation to local agency, the discourse of technical assistance is something one accepts by participating in and participates in on the condition of one's acceptance of it. The object of local agency may therefore be expected to occupy a central *node* in the enunciative field of technical assistance, since it is the aspect of *reproduction* that conditions the criterion of *project sustainability* and the aspect of local *validation* that conditions the criterion of the beneficiary's *ownership of project results*, both of these criteria being 'the basis of whatever success the projects may have'<sup>127</sup>. We shall address this function of local agency below, when we discuss the relation that obtains between the three objects of agency, enterprise and government. In the following chapter we shall continue our analysis of the formation of objects of the discourse of technical assistance and focus in detail on the content of the reforms advocated by EU Tacis in our discussion of the formation of the object of enterprise.

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<sup>127</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 34.

## 2.2. Constitution of the Object of Enterprise in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

### 2.2.1. Economic Efficiency as a Central Concept: Preliminary Mapping of a Region of Interpositivity

The reporting of the three Tacis projects accentuates the theme of enhancing economic efficiency as the crucial component of the reforms in the respective sectors. The projects identify the problems in the respective institutions in terms of the absence of economic approaches to management and propose their restructuration through various efficiency-enhancing measures.

#### 2.2.1.1. *The Object of Enterprise in Health Care and Social Protection Reform*

The indices of the problem, identified by the health care and social protection project, concern the balance between treatment-oriented institutionalised health care and non-institutional, home-based social care, which serves a preventive function. The report notes the “imbalance in the development of institutional and non-institutional forms of care and generally between social and health care. There is an absence of any *gate-keeping functions* that could *ration access to costly institutional care*.”<sup>128</sup> The absence of a rationing function invokes the notion of *waste*, negatively assessing the present system in terms of its lack of capacity for *efficient utilisation of scarce resources*. This linkage constitutes the *index of inefficiency*, as the underdevelopment of non-institutional care prevents the deployment of more cost-effective practices and perpetuates the overreliance on costly hospital services.

The index of inefficiency is presented in detail in the reporting on the financing component of the project, whose assessment of the present situation in the sector focuses on the way scarce financial resources are utilised. The project claims that “there is a need of more *rational* utilisation of resources, a transition *from more costly services to less costly ones*”.<sup>129</sup> The report causally links the unbalanced

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<sup>128</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 21. Emphasis added.

<sup>129</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 4. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

distribution of resources between non-institutional and institutional care with the absence of governmental instruments of *economic analysis*:

There is an absence of a clear *strategy* for deployment of resources between primary and institutional care. *No mechanism exists for analysing the actual and comparative cost of services or for evaluating cost-effectiveness.* The fragmentation of ministerial responsibilities is reflected in the *lack of a joint approach to the allocation of diminishing resources.*<sup>130</sup>

The human resource component of the project deploys the theme of economic efficiency and flexibility in its emphasis on personnel planning as an instrument of rational utilisation of resources: “However good the structures, they would not be *effective* without *productivity* and support of the personnel. Besides, as *personnel costs* form a significant share of the total costs in social policy, *quality personnel planning* is directly related to *efficient* utilisation of resources.”<sup>131</sup> The establishment of the indices of the problem may be illustrated by two issues raised in the project’s discussion of this component.

The first index concerns the ratio of doctors and nurses in the present health care system, which is deemed “excessively high”,<sup>132</sup> resulting in the performance by the doctors of the tasks that could be performed by less qualified personnel. To demonstrate the excess, the report makes recourse to the technique of *illustration via a pilot study*, which reveals that “at least a third of all the visits to the ophthalmologist had to do with either measuring eye pressure or getting prescriptions for glasses”.<sup>133</sup> This illustration serves to causally link the present personnel management with the waste of scarce resources and thereby constitute the *index of inefficiency* of personnel planning: “The *costs incurred* by the state in the training of the staff are not *properly compensated.*”<sup>134</sup>

The second index concerns the *content* of the training of doctors: “Doctor training is heavily imbalanced toward *treatment* not *prevention*, while *it is prevention that is the main aspect of reform.*”<sup>135</sup> The emphasis on treatment entails frequent

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<sup>130</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 21. Emphasis added.

<sup>131</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 5. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>135</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 5. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

recourse to the *referral* of the patient by the therapist to the specialised doctor further up the professional hierarchy: “There is a *lack of incentive* for doctors to treat and not refer the patient.”<sup>136</sup> The tilt toward treatment in doctor training perpetuates the reliance on more costly professional services and thus *causes* inefficient resource utilisation.

The information systems component of the project focuses on how the republic’s health care and social protection institutions utilise information technology. In its assessment of the present situation it establishes a causal linkage between the capacity to operate information systems and the lack of targeting health and social assistance:

Ministries rarely use new technology of analysis to *forecast needs and plan services*. On the local level, there is *no systematised collection of data at all*. [...] The majority of the employees are not capable of operating computer-based information programmes. *This makes targeting assistance to the neediest even more complicated*.<sup>137</sup>

The index of inefficiency is founded on the causal claim that targeting, which exemplifies a more efficient technique of administration of social services, is disabled by the present system of information management. This inferential linkage is strengthened by recourse to the rhetorical illustration of the current information management at the Ministry of Education:

There was no standard for format of software and *exchange between departments was fragmentary* and only occurred after a specific enquiry. There were also areas where there was no use at all of information technology. Ministry of Education had a *mass of valuable data collected from 6000 clients, but this information was not computerised*.<sup>138</sup>

The absence of a common standard and the inaccessibility of non-computerised information constitute the index of *inflexibility*, precluding information exchange, necessary for more efficient service targeting.

The second index concerns the usage of the existing information systems on the level of the republican ministries. The project notes that “information systems of

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<sup>136</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>137</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 12. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>138</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document). Emphasis added.

health care and social protection are *functioning in parallel, actually without contacts, regardless of common clients*".<sup>139</sup> The systems thus duplicate each other, which causes *waste* of scarce resources. The absence of inter-ministerial cooperation and integration in the sphere of information management thus points to the inadequacy of the current administrative practices in terms of the *index of efficiency*.

To sum up, the indices of inefficiency and inflexibility are constituted in the project texts in relation to the following problems: the reliance on non-integrated institutional health care with no rationing of access to it, non-utilisation of economic analysis by the authorities in the sectors, a tilt in professional training toward treatment rather than prevention, unsystematic and non-integrated application of information management. The intervention proposed by the project consists in a *policy of 'substitution'* of local medico-social primary care for institutional health care, presented in terms of three reform strategies.

1. Development of *primary care* through introduction of *general practice* and improving *preventive medicine*.
2. Development of the system of *community-based services*, in particular, services for the most vulnerable population groups.
3. Organisation of the *joint work of health care and social welfare* to establish *models* of different degrees of integration in providing medical assistance, and also in management of those sectors.<sup>140</sup>

These interventions are linked rhetorically with the central concepts of economic efficiency and flexibility through *exemplary* models constructed in the pilot projects in the Karelian districts. The possibility of drastically reducing recourse to institutional care is demonstrated by the economic analysis undertaken in the pilot district of Sortavala by a Dutch GP team. The results of the analysis showed that 67.3% of the patients "should not be in the hospital, 20% should be there, while the rest were borderline cases".<sup>141</sup> The alternative proposed by the project is the creation of *local outpatient care services* that would allow to achieve a decrease in expensive hospitalisation. The savings provided by this restructuration are presented in the *exemplary cost analysis* of care for 'social cases' in various types of institutions per

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<sup>139</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>140</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>141</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.)

day. The result is as follows: 80 roubles at the Central District Hospital, 56 roubles at the District Hospital, 7.5 roubles in medico-social home care, 4.8 roubles in social home care.<sup>142</sup>

*It was thus established just how much more could be achieved in terms of patient care with scarce resources, if patients were cared for at home, especially when there is no clinical requirement for hospital treatment. Though, this was only true if the client had proper housing and sufficient resources to pay for fuel and food.*<sup>143</sup>

On the basis of this analysis the project concludes that “it would be necessary to reduce the capacity of the institutions from which the patients were being removed. *The resources thus freed should be moved to the outpatient institutions, and new outpatient institutions built up. In the meantime there should be a general shift of resources from health care to social service institutions.*”<sup>144</sup> The advocated policy of reallocation of resources towards local medico-social care is linked to the central concept of economic efficiency via the exemplification, by economic analysis, of the cost-effectiveness of non-institutional solutions, piloted in the three districts of the republic: Kondopoga, Olonets and Sortavala. “The impact of model establishments has been tested and shown to be significant. Referral rates to hospital care in general practice ambulatories have declined by 30–50%. The cost of medico-social care has been demonstrated to be 10% of hospital care.”<sup>145</sup> This exemplification of cost-effectiveness leads to the proposal for the republic-wide replication of the policy of substitution.

The principal policy recommendation of EU consultants was the *concept of substitution*. Substitution means developing primary care services through a *transfer of existing resources from institutional care* rather than through investment of additional resources, *which is not in any case realistic at the present time*. In two districts EU consultants advised that between 60 and 70% of in-patients could have been treated just as effectively at primary level if this had been substituted for hospital care. Further evidence of the possibility of substitution was presented in an analysis of specific medical conditions – asthma and pneumonia care, diabetes – which calculated the comparative cost of treating

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>144</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 1.



the conditions at primary and secondary levels. *Most convincing however was the evidence from the new general practice ambulatories where referral rates to hospital fell by between 30 and 50% in a monitored period in the winter of 1998/9.*<sup>146</sup>

Substitution is thus advocated both with recourse to the exemplary model of primary care and the local illustration of the savings that it enables, and with recourse to the causal inference from the present index of financial scarcity of the impossibility of *additional* investment into the primary sector. Importantly for our discussion below, the experience of the local pilot ambulatories is presented as more convincing than the analytical exercise of the EU consultants. On the basis of pilot experiments, the project is able to assert that “the *economic case for a transition* [to primary medico-social care] has been *demonstrated* and *accepted*. [...] Karelian specialists have been *introduced to techniques of measuring inputs to service costs*. Service managers are *already applying these techniques* in their day-to-day decisions.”<sup>147</sup> The introduction of the techniques of economic analysis that have been deployed as a tool for exemplification is posed as necessary for the acceptance of the policy of substitution and the training programme in economic analysis is thus presented as a key outcome of the project in its own right.<sup>148</sup>

The *comparative cost analysis* for hospital and medico-social care in the home *formed the basis of a training programme* for economists from every district of the republic, carried out in the extension period. *In each district there is now at least one economist equipped with the basic skills of economic analysis of social and health care costs.*<sup>149</sup> Sortavala district administration *applied the new techniques of economic analysis in preparing and justifying to the Ministry of Finance its annual budget* for social and health care and in its decision to convert a small village hospital in the district into a nursing home *on grounds of cost-effectiveness.*<sup>150</sup>

The republic-wide recommendations, issued at the end of the project on the basis of the experience in the pilot districts, do not only concern the application of newly-established models, but also “the *methods of research*, proposed by the EU and local

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 26. Emphasis added.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 27. Emphasis added.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis added.

experts within the project for analysis and assessment of using financial, staffing and other resources”<sup>151</sup>.

On the basis of the economic analyses undertaken in the pilot districts, the financing working group of the project came up with the following recommendations:

1. It is necessary to propose a mechanism of providing medical and social services, *using budget resources rationally* and not limiting clients’ rights.
2. Cost of treatment of certain patients in inpatient care is *several times higher* than in same quality outpatient treatment. Conclusion: development of primary care and prevention is a *right choice*.
3. Many patients are treated in inpatient care longer than necessary, and it causes *additional costs*. Conclusion: *new standards* of free medical inpatient services are needed.
4. Existing systems of salaries and principles of budget resource spending do not *motivate staff* to actively participate in reforms; salaries do not depend on the volume and quality of work, but are regulated by the tariff scale, *rational spending of resources is not encouraged*. It is necessary to resolve the issue of using the *contract system*, of making general practices *independent subjects of obligatory medical insurance* in order to attract medical insurance resources, and of *developing services for payments*.<sup>152</sup>

The fragment declares primary care as ‘*the right choice*’ on the basis of the above-discussed exemplary models that demonstrate its cost-effectiveness, which is posited as the decisive goal in the first recommendation. The third recommendation argues in a similar way for new standards regulating length of hospital stay. Recourse to cost analysis serves to link de-institutionalisation of health care with the central concepts of efficiency and flexibility, whereby additional costs can be demonstrably avoided by establishing more flexible service standards. The concept of flexibility is also utilised in the discussion of establishing incentive systems, encouraging the staff to participate in efficiency-enhancing reforms. Instead of a current single-source salary financing the project proposes a flexible multi-source system, involving the endowment of general practices with commercial status, introducing ‘services for payments’ and a contract system for general practitioners. Incentives for ‘active participation in reforms’ are presented in the form of a shift towards a contractual, commercial and entrepreneurial operation of health care and social protection institutions.

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<sup>151</sup> Recommendations of the International Conference “Reforms of Health Care and Social Protection in the Republic of Karelia” EDRUS9516, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>152</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 20. Emphasis added.

To sum up: the key verbal technique at work in the formation of the indices of the problem in the health care project is the inferential linkage between present institutionalised and non-integrated practices and the *waste* of scarce economic resources. The proposed interventions are based on the rhetorical linkage of the advocated practices of de-institutionalisation and integration with the central concept of efficiency through exemplary and illustrative models that demonstrate the possibility of the elimination of this waste in the local conditions. These models serve to vindicate what the report refers to as a “hard policy” of substitution, presented as “the *only practical way forward*” in the current conditions of financial scarcity.<sup>153</sup> Since the project both establishes the problems of present health and social services and proposes their solutions in terms of the enhancement of economic efficiency, we may claim that the object formed in the project texts, concerning the reshaping of health and social service provision, is the *enterprise* in the sense of ‘a unit of economic organisation of activity’.<sup>154</sup> We may summarily present the constitution of the object of enterprise in health care and social protection reform in the following manner.




Figure 7: Constitution of the Object of Enterprise (EDRUS9516)

<sup>153</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>154</sup> Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com>.

### 2.2.1.2. *The Object of Enterprise in Energy Management Reform*

The heating systems project seeks to assist the reforms in the energy sector that are expected to “result in *energy savings and more efficient practice*, and [...] pave the way for a *total overhaul* of the energy system in the Republic of Karelia.”<sup>155</sup> Economic efficiency is thus manifestly the central concept of the project, in terms of which both the overall goal and more specific objectives are defined:

The specific objectives of the project are to help make local district heating operations *commercially viable* in the partner towns by: using *locally available and relatively cheap fuels to replace imported oil and coal*, improving *boiler efficiency* and thus reducing heat losses as well as the pollution from exhaust gases, *improving operating efficiency of distribution systems*, *creating* fuel supply and transport *SMEs*, enabling local authorities to make their own evaluations of the *economic feasibility* of investment projects for financing.<sup>156</sup>

The project evaluation of the present situation in the border regions of the republic that are involved in the project begins with the description of current economic difficulties: “The local administration is often in deep financial difficulty and struggles to provide basic services, such as securing the supply of heat and domestic water to citizens. Road networks, water, heat supply service and waste disposal in no way meet Western levels.”<sup>157</sup> The index of *inefficiency* is constituted by the districts’ resort to expensive ‘imports’ of coal and oil in these conditions of economic scarcity, in spite of the availability of potentially cheaper local fuels such as peat and wastewood. “The Karelian economy is generally not in good shape. Therefore, the utilisation of local fuels *would undoubtedly have a positive effect* not only on the economy of Karelia as a whole, but also in a more specific context to the outlying border communities considered in this project.”<sup>158</sup> This primary index is the target of the project’s general direction: “The core of the overall project concerns the *substitution* of coal and oil, which are ‘imported’ into the republic for use as a fuel

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<sup>155</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17. Emphasis added.

in district heating boiler houses, by peat and wood which are *available locally in abundant qualities*.”<sup>159</sup>

However, the policy of substitution is deemed impossible in the current situation in the energy sector management. The project problematises the lack of managerial skills in designing and implementing reforms in market conditions, particularly in attracting private investment, both domestically and internationally.

At the start of the project, the management of the Municipalities and the DH [District Heating] companies of the border regions *were not faced with modern investment issues*. They *only possessed knowledge about the former centralised planning and investment process*. [...] In particular they also had no *know-how of making economic, financial, commercial and environmental approaches to foreign investors*. It was necessary to enable them to understand *international loan requirements, modern financing mechanisms, the process of attracting investments* and preparing and undertaking successful energy renovation projects in their regions.<sup>160</sup>

The present mode of management is deemed incapable of operating in the new economic situation: the only managerial knowledge possessed by local professionals concerns the no longer existing system of central planning and state investment, and the new possibilities of investment, involving the domestic private sector and international financial institutions, are thereby foregone. Furthermore, the project's assessment of the present 'management culture' is that its 'philosophy' does not actually involve dealing with the issues of financing and investment:

In Russia, managers' perception of their main task was (and still largely is) *production-based* which has in turn led to the *output and asset-oriented management philosophy*. While this basis fostered the development of a technically skilled management, which can deal with an admirable amount of uncertainty, other key aspects of utility management are not accounted for so well. This means, Russian managers are often *driven by the desire to supply*, whereas their Western counterparts are *more focused on making money*.<sup>161</sup>

Thus, while the technical qualifications of energy managers are not questioned, the overall 'management philosophy' is rendered problematic in terms of the concept

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<sup>159</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 16. Emphasis added.

<sup>160</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 43. Emphasis added.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44. Emphasis added.

of efficiency, i.e. it is in-efficient by virtue of its lack of concern with efficiency: “The technical knowledge of the Russian engineers is normally very high. They are familiar with modern technologies, [...] on the other hand they often do not have an *economic-financial* and *cost-minimising approach*.”<sup>162</sup>

The lack of the economic approach and concern with efficiency constitutes the negative index of present management. It is the reform of the managerial aspect in the direction of greater economic efficiency that is prioritised in the solutions advocated by the project. The main goal of the project is “to define a *workable management strategy* with an *emphasis on commercialisation*”.<sup>163</sup> More concretely, the project’s “specific objective” is presented as making “local district heating operators *commercially viable*”.<sup>164</sup> The new management strategy was prepared on the basis of the project’s studies in the pilot districts of the republic: Louhi, Kalevala, Muezerski, Suojärvi, Sortavala, Pitkyaranta, Lahdenpohja.<sup>165</sup> The Report sums up the advocated strategy of reform as follows:

1. Develop *technical and financial renovation plans to get a loan*.
2. Establish a *reliable local fuel supply chain*.
3. Replace the large number of *small inefficient boiler houses with a small number of modern biofuel boilers*.
4. Renovate the district heating network and install heat substations.
5. Establish a *reliable and transparent computerised accounting system*.
6. Develop CBC [Cross-Border Cooperation] twinning activities to provide *training and support future development*.
7. Invoice the customer based on actual consumption.
8. *Invest* fuel savings back into the system to *repay loans* and continue development.<sup>166</sup>

These solutions take concrete policy shape in the project’s 5 ‘tasks’: renovation of district heating systems, local fuel resources, support to municipalities and DH operators, information and training programme, environmental impact assessment.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>163</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>164</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>165</sup> These border districts of the Republic form the overall scope of the project. Properly ‘pilot’ projects, involving actual reconstruction work, equipment provision and loan application, have been undertaken at two sites: Kalevala and Lahdenpohja.

<sup>166</sup> Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, pp. 19–20. Emphasis added.

<sup>167</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, pp. 3–4.

Let us briefly describe the way the project's interventions in these areas are advocated. The first and second tasks are addressed in the pilot project, which involves the renovation of the district heating system in the districts of Kalevala and Lahdenpohja with the target of the "increase in energy efficiency and a reduction in fuel consumption of approximately 50%".<sup>168</sup> As the renovation of boiler plants and networks requires additional financing, the pilot projects also involve the procedure of loan application and negotiation with the international financial institution NEFCO (Nordic Environment Finance Corporation).<sup>169</sup> Since the local professionals' lack of experience in attracting foreign investment was deployed as an index of the problem, the project-led process of application and negotiation functions as an exemplary model that is both a *training device* and a *rhetorical tool* of advocating the proposed managerial strategy of 'commercialisation'.

This project will provide the local authority, power station managers and government officials with the most *up-to-date practical know-how on attracting investment in the energy sector in Karelia*. [...] The know-how transfer on investment potential and local energy sources between Karelian and Western European researchers is an *essential aspect of this project and is necessary to ensure a broad local acceptance of the obtained results*. [...] This action will produce a set of *guideline documents for use in attracting investment in the energy sector in the Republic of Karelia, with a wider application for the entire Northwest of Russia*. Having worked closely with the European team on the two pilot projects in Lassanen and Kalevala, the local experts will have gained a *strong techno-economic understanding of the choices available*.<sup>170</sup>

Training in investment attraction is presented as both "enabl[ing] participating public officials and energy managers to design logically consistent groups of energy efficiency projects"<sup>171</sup> and, by involving local counterparts in project activities, resulting in 'broad local acceptance' of the results of reform.

The other aspect of renovation concerns the substitution of local fuels for imported ones. As demonstrated above, the project conceives of the policy of

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<sup>168</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 27.

<sup>169</sup> According to the project design, the Tacis funding for the renovation projects amounts to 700000 ECU, while the NEFCO loan covers 2000000 ECU, with the Karelian government contributing 50% of the total cost of the project. See Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 14, Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, p. 3.

<sup>170</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 39. Emphasis added.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 33.

substitution as its ‘core’ since it both renders efficient the actual heating operations and brings additional economic benefits to the community. The latter issue is of particular importance, since substitution also carries clear socioeconomic costs to the community, i.e. the increased workforce redundancy. In its advocacy of this solution, the project claims to identify through economic analysis the possibilities of alternative employment creation:

In any decision to substitute local energy sources for imported coal and oil, the *socioeconomic impacts will be an important factor for local and regional administrators*. A *trade-off* may be expected between declining employment in *fewer and more efficient boiler houses and employment generated in local fuel production and transportation*. [...] This will be an important aspect in helping to *persuade administrators of the benefits of using local energy*, particularly in regions, which have suffered recent economic decline.<sup>172</sup>

Other benefits stipulated by the project include “the income created to local fuel suppliers [...] and the tax revenue to the Karelian government that would otherwise be lost by continuing with imported oil”.<sup>173</sup> Finally, in its advocacy of the policy of substitution the project refers to the market conjuncture at the time of project operation, marked by a steady increase in fuel prices. In these conditions, the project reiterates that “the worsening economic climate will dictate that *the only tangible option* will be to introduce a *strict policy* of local fuel substitution as soon as possible”.<sup>174</sup> The intensification of financial scarcity, which has led to the problematisation of current management in the first place, removes all alternatives save the most cost-effective option.

The third task of the project relates to supporting the reform of the managerial structure of the sector. Since, as remarked above, the project’s management strategy is from the outset defined as having an ‘emphasis on commercialisation’, the primary activities in this task concern the assistance to SME creation in the energy sector. “The overall intention of this project is that locally-sourced fuels [...] will be substituted for imported fuels for use in modified or upgraded boiler systems to supply district heating. It is envisaged that these activities will be operated on an *enterprise*

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>173</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 9.

<sup>174</sup> Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, p. 5. Emphasis added.



*basis.*<sup>175</sup> The project proposes the establishment of ESCOs (Energy Service Companies) that could undertake renovation activities in an efficient and even profitable manner.

ESCOs are *special purpose energy efficiency companies* that provide energy services to clients in the public and private sectors. The creation of ESCOs can be considered as one of the most *real* [sic!] *ways of achieving profitability* by first taking responsibility for the renovation of the energy system away from a large group of organisations with conflicting interests and establish a new company to take responsibility for the renovation of the energy system.

The ESCO, at its own initial expense, installs and operates new equipment in the client's premises to realise a guaranteed level of energy savings through improved efficiency measures. *The ESCO is reimbursed its cost, together with a profit, from the realised energy savings.* Once the ESCO has recovered its costs, the ownership of the equipment is transferred to the client who receives the full benefit from the energy saving thereafter. Because the ESCO guarantees the level of energy savings that will be realised (in other words, it absorbs the technical risk) the client knows that it is guaranteed to reduce its energy bill from the moment the investment is implemented.<sup>176</sup>

The establishment of ESCOs would thus entail the introduction of the dimension of profitability into the very process of energy sector reform. The question of SME creation is also a prominent feature of the training programme undertaken by the project, particularly insofar as the policy of substitution requires the establishment of peat and wastewood supply, which the project envisions to be operated on an enterprise basis, requiring “support of the municipalities for entrepreneurs to establish new SMEs for wood fuel supply and to set up competition”.<sup>177</sup> Finally, although the renovated district heating utilities remain in municipal property, the project expresses the hope for their eventual privatisation: “In the long run it is hoped that the DH utility will be developed into a *private enterprise*, thereby giving a better

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<sup>175</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 35. Emphasis added.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added. While the Inception Report mentions ESCO establishment as an activity within the project, subsequent reporting clarifies the more limited function the project fulfils with regard to this proposal: “The ESCO concept is primarily being expanded around this project, and [...] our enthusiasm got a little carried away on this point – the intention is to identify the needs in each region in relation to establishing an ESCO, to *do all the background work* regarding regulations, legal issues, scope of the project [...] and to *lay the foundation* on which an ESCO can be established, rather than actually establish an ESCO during this project.” (Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 7. Emphasis added.)

<sup>177</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 47.

opportunity for *transparency* to see what are the real costs.”<sup>178</sup> The private enterprise, whether an ESCO, a fuel supply company or a district heating utility is presented by the project as a model of efficiency, either to be introduced as a long-term goal or to serve as an example to guide the activities of state-owned enterprises.

The fourth task of the project is the information and training programme that addresses what the project considers to be ‘local training needs’. We have already discussed the project’s emphasis on training in chapter 2.1.1.2. What interests us at this point is the specific skills that the project deems necessarily to inculcate.

The standards of knowledge, skills and competence required of the people who will be expected to *satisfactorily carry out the various functions, tasks and activities* will be determined. Next, the *current standing* of these personnel relative to the standard relative to their own job will be assessed. Finally, a programme of training measures aimed at equipping the various managers, supervisors and operatives to bridge any *competence gap* that may have been identified will be designed.<sup>179</sup>

The result of the training needs assessment shows, according to the project, the existence of the competence gap in relation to the economic aspect of provision of services and the preparation of loan agreements. Thus, for example, the training course on the ‘development of wood resources’ focuses primarily on “the defining attributes of an enterprise entity”, “sales and marketing, production/transport, finance” and has the goal “to impart a thorough understanding and appreciation of SME start-up and operation together with enabling the creation of SMEs from a knowledge and skills point of view”.<sup>180</sup>

Finally, the fifth task of “Environmental Impact Assessment” relates to the analysis of the impact of the advocated policy of substitution on local environment and possible mitigating measures. Environmental feasibility is defined as one of the conditions for acquiring the NEFCO loan:

The issue here is [that] not only does the project not cause environmental damage but it must also be defined what is the *positive environmental effect* of the project not only from the point of view of efficient activities in the boiler house but also in the fuel supply.

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 56. Emphasis added.

<sup>179</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 32. Emphasis added.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

The use of renewable fuels is a positive step in this regard. Sustainability and reliability of supply should be achieved with the use of local fuels, peat and woodwaste, for example the forest resources must not be obtained through methods that are not sustainable. *Only when these questions are answered will NEFCO lend money for the projects.*<sup>181</sup>

Environmental sustainability of the reforms is thus presented as a condition of receiving foreign investment for the renovation, and thereby conducive to the goal of increased efficiency. Besides the environmental impact assessment, in its environmental component the project also advocates the development of emissions trading policy in the republic in the framework of 'Joint Implementation', according to which EU countries "may meet their obligations for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by receiving credits for investing in emissions reductions in the Republic of Karelia".<sup>182</sup> The project emphasises that this approach is based on *economic incentives* and *mutual benefits* rather than top-down regulation and argues that it therefore may be conducive to the development of cross-border cooperation between Karelia and Finland.

The main question with partnership support for the regions of Karelia has always been: *what will be the benefit for the Finnish utility* to support their neighbours in Karelia.<sup>183</sup> Contact on the issue has already been initiated between the Governments of Karelia and Finland. Both are aware that the implementation of JI [Joint Implementation] projects has *mutual benefits*, both by providing *much needed investment* in the renovation of the DH system in Karelia and by providing *cost-effective emission reduction credits* to Finland.<sup>184</sup>

Insofar as the project establishes the indices of the problem in energy management and proposes its solutions in terms of enhancing economic efficiency in heating operations and fuel supply, improving business and financial skills of the operators, and ultimately positing the private enterprise as the model the district heating utility should emulate, we may speak of the formation in the project texts of the object of enterprise. The constitution of the object of enterprise in the heating systems project may be schematically presented in the following manner.

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<sup>181</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 13. Emphasis added.

<sup>182</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 46.

<sup>183</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 63. Emphasis added.

<sup>184</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 58. Emphasis added. See *ibid.*, pp. 58–61 for the description of the Joint Implementation model, which goes beyond the scope of the present project.




Figure 8: Constitution of the Object of Enterprise (ERUS9701)

### 2.2.1.3. The Object of Enterprise in National Park Development

The parks development project has a dual objective “to improve the *livelihood* of local people by developing *nature-related tourism* and to *safeguard bio-diversity conservation* by establishing a well-managed network of protected areas in Western Karelia.”<sup>185</sup> In the Progress Report the team leader of the project elaborates and specifies this two-fold objective in terms of a cause and effect relationship.

The question that comes up rather often sounds like: what is the Project involved in – *environmental protection* or *development of tourism*? The most *effective* way to implement the Project is to define *increase in living conditions of the local population* as the *ultimate goal*, which can be achieved through *development of tourism and establishment of parks, improvement of management systems*.<sup>186</sup>

<sup>185</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>186</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 26. Emphasis added.

The project's goal is thus to achieve economic benefits for the population of the border districts of the Republic of Karelia through the reform of management in the sector of nature protection and the formation of a "basis for sustainable tourism".<sup>187</sup> The 'wider objective' of the project is also presented in economic terms: "*developing new revenue streams from sustainable ecotourism.*"<sup>188</sup> The economic efficiency of the management of protected areas<sup>189</sup> may therefore be considered a central concept of the project.

The need to address the question of economic efficiency arises out of the decline of state support for protected areas in the aftermath of the transition to market economy.

With the transition to the market economy, and the ensuing economic impacts, *state support for protected areas has fallen dramatically*, and although the funding situation has stabilised, it is improbable that the situation will improve in either the near or distant future. [...] *There is a need for protected areas to adapt to this new situation and for the management of protected areas to better reflect these changes in circumstance.*<sup>190</sup>

Scarcity of economic resources is in this fragment taken to necessitate changes in the management of the protected areas in order to find additional sources of income. In its assessment of the situation the project states that "in order to create new living and working possibilities, e.g. to develop tourism, a lot has to be done. The most serious problems are the remoteness and access difficulties to the areas [sic!] and the lack of even a basic tourism infrastructure."<sup>191</sup> Besides these difficulties, the problem is also posed at the level of management:

Experience and skills in business development, tourism services, foreign languages, use of computers, guiding, nature knowledge, are all *extremely limited*. *There are very few enterprises dealing with tourism*. Due to the *lack of enterprise culture and remarkable*

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<sup>187</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 4.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p. 25. Emphasis added.

<sup>189</sup> 'Protected areas' (PA's) is the legal term that covers a variety of forms of organising nature protection: strict and partial nature reserves, national and nature parks, forest parks, health resorts, etc. See Inception Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 29–31 for the discussion of the legal basis of nature protection in the Russian Federation.

<sup>190</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 73. Emphasis added.

<sup>191</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 8.

*bureaucracy*, setting up new enterprises in this remote and sparsely populated part of the republic will take place slowly. *Now it is the time to identify all of the persons, who are ready to develop themselves with these skills* [sic!].<sup>192</sup>

In this fragment a causal linkage is established between the underdevelopment of tourism and the lack of ‘enterprise culture’ and the prevalence of bureaucracy. These two features serve to constitute the index of inefficiency of current nature protection practices in the territories proposed for national parks. They also serve to indicate the two ‘target groups’ of the project. While the problem of bureaucracy entails targeting project activities on the republican government and district administrations, the question of ‘enterprise culture’ entails a wider target: “Indirectly *all the people* living inside or near the areas are important target groups. In the first place *new employees and entrepreneurs* in park related activities *should be raised among these people*.”<sup>193</sup>

Secondly, the index of inefficiency is constituted in relation to the present economic structure in the districts to which the protected areas belong. The socioeconomic assessment notes that most of the protected areas have a “*mono-industrial economy*”, based on either forestry or mining.<sup>194</sup> These are ‘budget-forming’ industries and their market situation has important consequences both for local revenue and social services. “The socio-economic situation in the district *entirely depends* upon income and stability of enterprises working in this sphere.”<sup>195</sup> This non-diversified economic structure, “exposed to even minor changes in export markets”,<sup>196</sup> is deemed to be causally linked with the high rate of unemployment in the areas, since “*the increase of unemployment results from the fluctuating economic situation* of the district’s enterprises which provide the largest number of working places.”<sup>197</sup> Mono-industrial economic structure in this causal linkage constitutes the *index of inflexibility*, whereby the reliance on a single industry limits economic options for the population and induces high unemployment risks depending on the fluctuations in the export markets.

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<sup>192</sup> Ibid., p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., p. 13. Emphasis added.

<sup>194</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 42. Emphasis added.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., p. 29. Emphasis added.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., p. 32. Emphasis added.

The third index of the problem concerns the absence of the legal status of the territories proposed as future national parks. “The proposed four parks have *no legal status and only limited organisation*. This causes practical problems for implementation and sustainability of the project. *A proposed park with neither name, borders nor staff is difficult to make an internationally acknowledged object for nature related tourism.*”<sup>198</sup> This problem is exacerbated by the *absence of management and business planning* for the protected areas: “Russian tradition, legislation and institutions for managing protected areas differ significantly from the Western ones. [...] The role of integrated natural resources *management plans or business planning* has to be recognised in this system.”<sup>199</sup> Business planning, presented as a crucial component of the management process, is claimed to be necessary since it “help[s] those responsible for the development and administration of the park in decision making *so that more income can be generated* [and] *getting finance for investments* needed from banks, or convincing eventual partners or other investors. [...] A BP [Business Plan] helps to find out those “products” or services *that have a business value and bring in income.*”<sup>200</sup> The absence of management and business planning is thereby causally linked with the underdevelopment of nature-related tourism and constitutes the index of inefficiency.

Finally, the index of inefficiency is constituted in relation to the current management of tourism in the territories proposed for national parks. The absence of the legal status of the territories, currently protected only under the temporary governmental decree, results in what the project refers to as “wild tourism”<sup>201</sup>.

The number of visitors is still low. *Because of the character of the tourism, no statistics of visitors, their origin or influence on the local economy is available.* [...] With a lack of *supervision and organised* tourism, the impact of this wild tourism on nature is hard. [...] *Supervision and ecological education is urgently needed in order to teach visitors how to behave in nature.*<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>200</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 62. Emphasis added.

<sup>201</sup> This term, a direct translation from the Russian ‘dikiy turizm’, is less a comment on the behaviour of particular tourists than a designator of a practice of recreation, arranged by individuals themselves without recourse to travel agencies.

<sup>202</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 54. Emphasis added.

The unregulated and unsupervised character of tourism is presented as both detrimental to nature protection and inefficient in the economic sense since non-organised visits to the territories deprive the districts of possible revenue. The widespread occurrence of 'wild tourism' serves as an indicator of the inefficiency of management in the sector, since the relevant authorities derive no gain, whether environmental or economic, from the territories, "already in recreational use".<sup>203</sup> "The benefit of tourism is often going somewhere else other than to the local level."<sup>204</sup>

*The local activity towards tourism and related to it spheres [sic!] is very low in many regions in Karelia. There are some local tourist offices providing nature tourism services in Petrozavodsk, Ladoga region and Kostamuksha. Many or even most of the foreign or Russian nature tourists outside Karelia come independently by themselves or through a tourist office somewhere other than in Karelia.*<sup>205</sup>

The absence of local tourist entrepreneurship in the protected areas indicates the inefficiency of management that disables the possibility of the ordering of 'wild tourism' that would combine economic and environmental imperatives.

The project interventions to solve the problems, constituted in these five indices, are summed up in the following set of planned outputs:

A basis for sustainable tourism connected to the protected areas is developed, and new employment created.

*Information disseminated* and the visitor services of the protected areas improved.

*Legal establishment* of four new protected areas.

*Basic capacity for the management* of the parks is created.<sup>206</sup>

These goals take concrete shape in two strategies of intervention: establishment of new parks as legal entities and a training and dissemination programme in the protected areas.

The establishment of the parks became a project task due to the failure of the government to complete the process of establishment of the new parks prior to the start of the project: the project assumption was the parks would already be established

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<sup>203</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 28.

<sup>204</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 51.

<sup>205</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>206</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 4. Emphasis added.



when the project is initiated.<sup>207</sup> The very establishment of the parks thus becomes a proposed intervention, advocated by the project with recourse to the following themes.

Firstly, the establishment of parks is presented as an *economically viable alternative* to the use of the areas for wood extraction:

The Government of the Republic of Karelia emphasises wood extraction as an *already existing source of revenues*. Forest industry and income from forestry are extremely important for the economy of the republic and for the employment of people in remote areas. [...] *These aspects have made the decision making more complicated and are perhaps the main reasons, why the establishment of the proposed parks has not advanced as expected.*<sup>208</sup>

Presenting national park establishment as an alternative to this policy, the project demonstrates the economic value of its proposal through a *socioeconomic assessment* of the situation in the designated areas. Firstly, the approach of the project sets as its declared priorities not merely environmental but primarily socioeconomic benefits: “improvement of living conditions of the population, [...] establishment of new jobs, [...] increasing the republican revenue.”<sup>209</sup> Secondly, the expert evaluation of the socioeconomic situation in the districts results in the claim that “the benefits from [current wood extraction] policy to local people and economy are very limited”.<sup>210</sup> In contrast, the *cost* of maintaining this policy is presented as extremely high: “If the territory of Karelia is taken in full use as production forests of category 3, it will *forever lose* its North-Europe-wide *outstanding ecological, recreational and culturological importance.*”<sup>211</sup> The ‘industrial’ alternative to national parks establishment is rejected through a *cost-benefit analysis*, according to which the more immediately profitable option of the use of the territories emerges as comparatively inferior in the long run. In contrast, the approach of the project promises a variety of economic benefits:

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<sup>207</sup> Progress Report 3 ENVRUS9704, p. 12.

<sup>208</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 10. Emphasis added.

<sup>209</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 25.

<sup>210</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 27. An identical formulation is used in Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 32.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

[The park] will provide *more employment both directly and indirectly*. It is estimated that the need of new jobs in the park administration is 43 permanent persons within the five first years. Most of them will be dwellers of the nearest villages, of Kostamuksha town and settlements in Kalevala. It is quite predictable that *unemployment rate in the rural areas will decrease by 50%* through employing (about 40–50 people) to fulfil environmental protection and maintenance actions in the Park, and in tourism services. Establishment of the Kalevala National Park will *cause more room for entrepreneurs*. Consequently, this will increase the *number of self-employed people promoting creation of jobs for themselves and their assistants*. This will *enhance interest from investors and positively impact the income level of the population in all sectors*.<sup>212</sup>

The establishment of the parks is presented as both leading to direct creation of new employment in park administration and maintenance, and, through the creation of opportunities for ecotourism, providing a stimulus for the development of tourist enterprises and the attraction of investment. Nature conservation is thus advocated as having a positive economic impact.

A National Park is organized mainly to protect natural and cultural heritage, but – however strange it might sound – this should lead to settling and development of uninhabited areas in Karelia.<sup>213</sup>

When estimating the benefits of nature conservation one should take into account that nature conservation can influence the structure of the economy also in a *positive way*. The establishment of a National Park *creates new work opportunities through the maintenance of the structure and function of the National Park and through tourism and economic activities related to it*. For the development of tourism much additional work and activities are needed, especially in the *fields of service and construction*. This way it *diversifies the economic structure and working possibilities*. Through tourism *women and young people* are easily employed – they particularly suffer from the unemployment today in the villages. [...] Nature related tourism *does not need investments in the extent that tourism in general needs*.<sup>214</sup>

The development of tourism in the new national parks is thus advocated with recourse to its positive impact on the *diversification of the economy*, which is particularly *beneficial for women and youth*, who according to the socioeconomic assessment suffer most from unemployment. Finally the establishment of national

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>213</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 9.

<sup>214</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 61. Emphasis added.

parks is advocated as an *economical* option, since unlike 'leisure tourism', ecotourism depends far less on investment in the infrastructure. The exemplary model of the benefits of ecotourism is partially provided by the Paanajärvi National Park, whose 10-year operation serves to vindicate the claim for the positive economic impact of the conservation option:

Many local people have been *employed directly by the park*. At the moment the park has 38 workers. The park also has an *indirect employment impact through the construction works, trade and service, transport, science and education*. On the other hand, the park provides *advantages for the village for example by the communication and transport service and by the development of tourism*.<sup>215</sup>

Despite these improvements, "so far the economic impact of tourism has been insignificant for the local budget, because there has not as yet been any realisation to develop tourism and tourism infrastructure besides the park."<sup>216</sup> Paanajärvi National Park is thus both an exemplary model for the proposed parks and the object of project interventions, advocated with recourse to positive international experience:

Tourist business development will help overcome the economical crisis in the region. As *worldwide practice has shown*, the tourism industry is one of the *largest, profitable and rapidly developing industries*. In Russia the international tourist sector is skyrocketing. [...] The creation of the park will lead to improvements in the economy which are *urgently needed in the region with progressing unemployment and an economic slump*.<sup>217</sup>

These fragments demonstrate the way in which the establishment of the parks is advocated as a cost-effective alternative to the utilisation of the protected areas in forestry. The project claims that it has succeeded in this advocacy: "During the project the attitudes towards conservation have become more positive and the project is expected to have contributed to the final establishment of parks."<sup>218</sup> A concrete indicator of this attitude change is the decision of the Head of Government to establish

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., p. 48. Emphasis added.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, p. 39. Emphasis added.

<sup>218</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 13.

four ‘municipal entities’ in the protected areas as juridical persons that serve as project counterparts prior to the official creation of the parks:

The establishment of *Municipal Entities* in each of the pilot territories (but not in the Paanajärvi NP) was a *constructive proposal* of the Head of the Karelian Government. This way the project could *support the establishment of a structure, even if temporary, which can grow to an origin of a national park*. The MEs also *commit the local administrations to the future park development*. Directors of the MEs were *first employed and trained by the project, which gave a start for the capacity building in each territory*.<sup>219</sup>

The restructuring of management in the proposed parks proceeds through the assistance provided by the project in the preparation of management and business plans for the protected areas. This assistance is considered to be necessary since “in the Russian legislation the concept of ‘management plan’ is not known”.<sup>220</sup> According to the project, the final plans, authored by local experts trained in the course of the project, “can be considered *among the best in Russia* [and] meet very well *the criteria internationally set for the management plans of national parks in Europe*”.<sup>221</sup> With its professional authority the project casts the management plans as *exemplary models* of the approach that combines tourism and nature protection. Let us briefly discuss the main features of this model.

Firstly, the project introduces tourism as a central component of national park operation: “Tourism is *only one* of the activities undertaken on the territory of parks, but takes an *exclusive position for parks’ development*.”<sup>222</sup> Tourism is essential to the parks’ operation and development since it is what renders nature protection activities *economically efficient*, which is the primary goal of the project. Similarly to the policy of substitution in the health care and social protection project, the park development strategy proceeds on the assumption of the impossibility of additional budget financing for the parks and instead proposes an alternative mode of park operation, less reliant on state resources:

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p. 16. Instead of a management plan, the proposal for the establishment of a national park must, according to the Russian legislation, consist of three separate documents: Feasibility Study, Establishment Plan, Operation Plan for the first five years.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>222</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 28. Emphasis added.

The Park is a public entity. The logical consequence from this is that in order to be able to fulfil its mission, the Park should also enjoy public financing from the state budget to cover all its investing and recurrent costs. However, under the present economic conditions in Russia and the Karelian Republic, state spending is very limited. In most cases it is barely sufficient to cover the salaries of the minimum staff to keep the basic services running. [...] *New sources of finance must be found to be able to develop the Park and make it more accessible and attractive.* In fact, since its establishment in 1992, the [Paanajärvi] Park continuously collects some own income in terms of entrance fees and fishing licenses. [...] The present Strategic Development plan wants to *strengthen this approach. It endeavours to develop tourism into the major activity of the park and the principal source of finance for future investments for improvement of the various services and creation of new ones.* The idea is that a *financially healthy park will also be better equipped to take care of its main mission: nature conservation.*<sup>223</sup>

However, in this dual policy strategy, the management of national parks must combine a number of apparently contradictory goals, which requires specific professional skills:

Any nature-protected area is a very *complicated structure*, which is intended to fulfil several contradictory functions: ecological, economic and social. A park is involved in *deep scientific research*, but at the same time *tries to sell its services to promote the tourist business.* To combine these two goals is very difficult, *special skills are needed.*<sup>224</sup>

These special skills primarily concern the ‘selling of services’ in the park, which is a novel function of nature protection in Russia. This aspect is addressed in the *training programme* implemented in the framework of the project, in which the following skills are addressed: language and computer skills, “*client oriented service* in nature and culture related tourism”, “*business thinking* in nature tourism”, “management, leadership and economy”.<sup>225</sup> The training programme, in which a total of 850 persons participated, involves both on-site seminars and workshops and study tours to Finland and Portugal. The recipients of training are not merely the employees of nature protection institutions or the newly-established Municipal Entities but also private tour operators from the respective districts.<sup>226</sup> The content of training in the

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<sup>223</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 33. Emphasis added.

<sup>224</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 41. Emphasis added.

<sup>225</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 50–51. Emphasis added.

<sup>226</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 37–42.

municipal entities accentuates the role of business planning in national park management. The project emphasises that a “national park is *not a typical business enterprise* [and] has many public functions such as conservation of nature, scientific research, training”.<sup>227</sup> However, business planning is an crucial component of the project strategy of enhancing the economic efficiency of protected areas by making them “financially semi-independent”.<sup>228</sup>

The main reason for this business plan is *to secure more income for the Park*. In the emergent market economy there is *always a possibility for more competition, even between the national parks*. Ecotourism has a growing potential. *To turn that potential into concrete cash flows requires that the business operates well*. That is a reason for writing this plan, which could be a tool for increasing the effectiveness of the Paanajärvi Park.<sup>229</sup>

The Business Plan is intended to find a *way of living less dependent on state budgets*. The Park’s experience during recent years affirms that this is a feasible alternative. [...] If the park manages to get surplus income, it can be ploughed back for the development of the Park itself. *The only meaningful source of such funds is seen in income from the sale of tourist services*. Thus, attention and forces should be concentrated on this business. [...] *This should become the goal towards which all efforts should be directed*: work for the territorial development in and outside Park (including promotional and scientific actions), staffing policy, inter-regional and international ties.<sup>230</sup>

Although the parks are presented as being in need of “many-sided financing from federal budget, republic budget, [and] the participation of international funding organisations”,<sup>231</sup> the role of the parks’ own income is most significant, since the criterion for successful park operation stipulated in the management plans is that after ten years of operation *the income generated by the four proposed parks exceeds*

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<sup>227</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 62. Emphasis added.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.


<sup>229</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 54. Emphasis added. The Paanajärvi park is the only one for which a full-scale business plan was produced (Ibid., pp. 54–72.), since the other parks were not established by project expiry. Elements of a business plan are incorporated in the proposals for their establishment prepared by the project.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., p. 63. Emphasis added.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

*their budget funding.*<sup>232</sup> Within this strategy, tourism is granted exclusive importance as the only ‘meaningful’ source of income and thus the primary goal towards which ‘all efforts should be directed’.

Insofar as the project problematises the non-entrepreneurial and economically inefficient character of the management of nature conservation in the republic and proposes its solutions in terms of enhancing the efficiency of nature protection activities, deriving economic benefits from national park establishment in the form of new employment and additional budget revenue, and ultimately arriving at relative financial self-sufficiency of national parks, we may speak of the formation in the project texts of the object of enterprise, whereby the national park emerges as a unit of economic activity. We may schematically present the constitution of the object of enterprise in the parks development project in the following manner.



*Figure 9: Constitution of the Object of Enterprise (ENVRUS9704)*

<sup>232</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, p. 63, Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 53, Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 51, Proposal for the Establishment of the Tuulos National Park, p. 37.

## 2.2.2. The Supplementary Logic of the 'Untypical Enterprise': The Ordering of the Object of Enterprise in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

The three project diagrams demonstrate the regularities in the constitution of the object of enterprise in the project texts that suggest the existence of a common region of interpositivity in which this object is formed. We may observe isomorphisms in the verbal techniques of this formation (use of causal inferences and exemplary models) as well as in the overall thematic structure of problematising the operation of administrative agencies and public services (medical and social institutions, national parks, energy operators) in terms of the model of a private enterprise. This thematic structure, operative across the three projects, may be presented in the following manner.

The problem of **entrepreneurial management** is:

- a) causally related to present *wasteful practices* under conditions of *financial scarcity* in that:
  - a1) the lack of '*enterprise culture*' precludes the development of *cost-effective solutions*;
  - a2) the lack of *economic-analytical* and *business skills* disables practical implementation of otherwise proclaimed solutions;
- b) to be addressed in project interventions by:
  - b1) preparation of *exemplary management strategies* and *business plans* that demonstrate the benefits of proposed *economic models* (general practice, ESCO, national park);
  - b2) *illustration* of the *feasibility of proposed solutions* through involving local counterparts in *pilot projects* on the district level;
  - b3) on-site *training* and *study tours*, aimed at enhancing the local capacity of autonomous utilisation of *techniques of economic analysis*.

Having isolated the region of interpositivity in which the enterprise is constituted in a unitary thematic structure through isomorphous verbal techniques, we now proceed to the level of discourse by posing the question of the ordering schemes that specify the formation of this object.



### 2.2.2.1. *Exclusion from Discourse: 'From More Costly Services to Less Costly Ones'*

Let us begin by describing the schemes that delimit the exterior of the region of interpositivity we have isolated in our textual analysis. In the case of the object of enterprise the field of discourse is delimited in advance by the logic of *economic rationality*, whose various forms of operation we shall describe in this chapter.

The health and social care project proceeds on the basis of its evaluation of the socioeconomic situation in Karelia to state that the “reform of social and health systems towards *targeting assistance for the neediest, preventive emphasis* and restructuring of services with an objective of a *rational utilisation of decreasing resources have never been so important*”.<sup>233</sup> The link of the proposed solution with the situation of the decreased state financing of the sector serves to recast the question of reform in terms of the response to the scarcity of financial resources. As the *rational utilisation* of resources acquires decisive importance, conformity to this utilitarian rationality becomes the criterion of exclusion of alternative statements from discourse. In other words, the reform of the sector becomes *identical* to “a transition from *more costly* services to *less costly* ones”.<sup>234</sup> This form of exclusion invokes what we have presented in chapter 2.1.2.1. as the scheme of reasonability and gives concrete shape to the criterion of the reasonable by its equation with economic rationality.

This specification carries exclusionary consequences for two types of statements: the proposals deemed not to *conform* to economic rationality (e.g. the maintenance of the present institutionalised health care system tilted toward treatment) and, more subtly, statements *not framed* in terms of economic rationality. In the first case the statements are excluded as unreasonable (economically irrational), while in the second case they are excluded as not conforming, in their construction, to the criterion of rationality provided by economic analysis. Let us recall the problematisation by the project of the ‘absence of a *clear strategy for deployment of resources*’ and a ‘*mechanism for analysing the cost of services or evaluating cost-effectiveness*’. The project’s concern is less the local unwillingness to implement a policy of

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<sup>233</sup> Inception Report EDUS9516, p. 3. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>234</sup> Inception Report EDUS9516, p. 4. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

substitution, but rather the absence of an *economic justification* for the shift to primary care. Thus, the project's statement of its achievements emphasises precisely the economic aspect of its proposals: "The *economic case* for a transition has been *demonstrated and accepted*."<sup>235</sup> A similar emphasis is laid by the Ministry of Health Care in its Conception of the Development of Health Care, which, when referring to the outcomes of the Tacis project, mentions general practices, medico-social centres, nursing hospitals as "new economic models"<sup>236</sup>. Irrespectively of their substance, solutions not framed in terms of economic rationality (e.g. unsupported by cost analysis) are excluded from serious consideration, while the projects' own initiatives derive their force precisely from their possession of *analytical techniques* pertinent to establishing the rationality of a practice: "The project offers an opportunity to *evaluate the efficiency of application of various policies through approbation on the local level* in the process of pilot experiments."<sup>237</sup> The rationality of an enunciation on health care and social protection reform therefore hinges on its capacity to demonstrate a cost advantage. This delimitation permits the above-discussed univocal conclusion about primary care as the '*right choice*' on the basis of its being 'several times' cheaper than institutional care. The scheme of economic rationality thus carries the burden of discriminating between the rational and the irrational and in this manner delimits the field of discourse by the conformity of statements to the 'hard policy of substitution', whose efficiency and practicality is conclusively demonstrated at the pilot level.

Similarly, the parks project goal of relative financial self-sufficiency, understood as the excess of the parks' own income over federal financing, serves as a model of economically rational management of the protected areas in the conditions of financial scarcity. The reform of the nature protection sector thereby becomes equivalent to the establishment of opportunities of autonomous income generation and thus exclusive of options that are unable to demonstrate their economic cost-effectiveness. In this approach the development of ecotourism is indeed of "exclusive"<sup>238</sup> importance for the parks' activity even though it is simultaneously

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<sup>235</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>236</sup> Conception of the Development of Health Care in the Republic of Karelia, p. 26. Translation by author.

<sup>237</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 10. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>238</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 28.

presented as only one of the functions of the park and, furthermore, the one subordinated to nature protection: “The *main task of the national park is the conservation of the natural and cultural heritage of the territory*. All other activities shall be *subordinate to that*.”<sup>239</sup> We shall address below the complex relationship between the goals of conservation and tourism in our discussion of the rarefaction of content and the restriction of access to discourse. However, on the level of the exterior delimitation of the discursive field, no contradiction obtains between these goals. On the contrary, the dual conservation-and-tourism strategy succeeds in excluding at once two *diametrically opposed* visions of the districts’ development: returning the currently protected areas into industrial use and practicing conservation without introducing entrepreneurial methods of management and permitting tour operations. These are exemplified by the two fragments below.

The main area of the Project’s activities should be *targeted at environmental protection*. *Development of tourism is only a compensation for forest withdrawal from industrial use*. All efforts must be bent on *maintenance of existing parks and forest reserves*.<sup>240</sup> *Karelia has enough nature protection areas. Production is to be supported and developed*. Naturally, establishing the park will *withdraw a significant part of forest resources from economic use*, and, as a result, it will lead to a decrease in working places, in particular in the Lendery timber industry enterprise. *The base [sic!] of the economy in Muezerski (Muujärvi) is timber cutting! And the park will give not more than 20–30 new jobs*.<sup>241</sup>

In response to the first statement, the project demonstrates that rather than serving as a mere compensation, an activity secondary to nature protection, ecotourism is essential for the maintenance of nature protection activities in the conditions of scarce funding. The position that advocates the retention of the existing system of nature protection and minimises the role of tourism is delimited in the indices of the

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<sup>239</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 34. Emphasis added. The identical formulation is used in Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 30, Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, p. 40, Proposal for the Establishment of the Tuulos National Park, p. 20.

<sup>240</sup> V. P. Solomonov, Deputy Head of the State Environmental Committee of the Republic of Karelia, cited in Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 29. Emphasis added.

<sup>241</sup> Muezerski Timber Industry Enterprise Chief Engineer V. V. Mikhailov and Head of the Production Department A. A. Es’ko cited in Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 34. Emphasis added.

problem as illustrative of a 'lack of enterprise culture'. This position that we may term 'ecological' is excluded from the field of discourse by highlighting the above-discussed complex multifunctional nature of a national park as a rational means of adaptation to the situation of resource scarcity, a 'way of living less dependent on state budgets'.

The second position that we may term 'industrial' is of course rejected by the project on the grounds of the risk that Karelia will "forever lose"<sup>242</sup> its ecologically unique natural environment. However, it is also excluded through its recasting in terms of particular business interests, which may not conform to the economically rational option for the district in general. As discussed above, the very fact that timber cutting is a 'basis' of local economy is already an indicator of a lack of economic diversification and thus an index of inefficiency.

*One may assume that the attitude of some timber industry enterprises towards the establishment of the national park on some territories of the reserved area may be negative because of competition for forest areas.*<sup>243</sup>

The dual strategy of conservation and tourism advocated by the project thus occupies the privileged middle ground between ignoble business interests and unreasonable ecological positions.

Finally, the most direct practice of exclusion may be isolated in the heating strategies project, which involves the process of applying for and negotiating a foreign loan for the renovation of district heating utilities. The project explicitly states that "the focus must be on feasibility, not just technical, but also economic"<sup>244</sup>. Economic feasibility refers to the capacity to repay the loan on project completion: "[The renovation pilot project in Kalevala and Lahdenpohja] *should generate profit* and it should be structured in such a way that it can *repay the investment through the savings realised*."<sup>245</sup> This requirement explains the imperative of making "local district heating operators *commercially viable*"<sup>246</sup>. The economic benefits of the

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<sup>242</sup> See e.g. Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 4, 27, 28.

<sup>243</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 44. Emphasis added.

<sup>244</sup> Progress Report 4 ERUS9701, p. 11.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>246</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 4. Emphasis added.

project, the actual ‘savings realised’ are thus posited as decisive factors in the reform process.

The problems regarding commercial viability are also addressed in the discussion of ‘institutional feasibility’ of the project, a requirement of sustainable operation of the renovated utility after project expiry. The project’s solution in this regard is the long-term plan to restructure DH utilities as *private enterprises* and the users as *market consumers*:

In the long term it is hoped that the DH utility is developed into a private enterprise – this gives a *better opportunity for transparency to see what are the real costs*. There is a difficulty in moving towards full energy recovery through tariffication. The consumer pays between 50–80% of the real costs. *In the long term it will benefit the community if the user pays a total bill. The best way to give incentives for energy conservation is if the user is responsible for the total energy consumed.*<sup>247</sup>

*Invoicing made on measured consumption will increase the consumers’ willingness to save considerably which will enable total energy saving.*<sup>248</sup>

Once the lack of foreign investment is established as the index of inefficiency, and the process of application for the NEFCO loan posited as an intervention with both direct economic benefits and additional exemplary functions, the financial feasibility of the reform, i.e. its economic rationality, forms the basic line of exclusion, unmediated even by the participatory pathos, which, as we discussed in the previous chapter, is strongly accentuated in all three projects. The initial problematisation of inefficiency under financial scarcity results in the prioritisation of seeking foreign investment for efficiency-enhancing projects, which in turn enfolds the entire space of reforms within economic rationality, whereby only those solutions that relate to the energy utility as a commercially viable enterprise are included in the discursive space. Thus, the requirement of financial feasibility conditions the proposed solutions in other aspects of the reform, be it the suggestion to privatise the utilities, the injunction to avoid subsidising energy users or the requirement of transparent accounting. As a result of this *a priori exclusion*, the project’s research into reform options and its own

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<sup>247</sup> Progress Report 4 ERUS9701, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>248</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 5. Emphasis added.

final assessment of its initiatives is phrased strongly in terms of commercial viability and its training programme is so skewed towards the inculcation of business skills:

The output of the project will be to provide a detailed model, which clearly outlines options for *bankable projects*, which will produce modern energy systems with an operational life of over 20 years.<sup>249</sup>

The [training in management skills] will start with an initial training course on “project selection, project application and project control” for the participants from the seven municipalities. This will familiarise the participants with the concept of *project financing*: technical and legislative issues, investment project identification, energy project financing and *loan agreements, loan application procedure and presentation, communication skills* and the *management of change in the economy*. The subsequent courses will provide *special training on business topics, relevant to the preparation of loan applications* and their *management implications*. Each of the participants will gain an *in-depth knowledge of loan agreement and business development* worthy to be expanded and transferred to the other municipalities.<sup>250</sup>

We have now described the way economic rationality operates as an exclusionary criterion of the reasonability of enunciations in the discourse of technical assistance. In conclusion it is important to note that the postulation of economic rationality as the exterior limit of discourse is not necessarily equivalent to its ethical valorisation. Throughout the region of interpositivity formed by the three projects, efficiency-enhancing reforms are posited not as necessarily *preferable*, but as ‘hard’, ‘strict’ policies that are nonetheless ‘the only tangible’, ‘meaningful’ and ‘realistic’ ‘ways forward’. In this sense, economic rationality serves, by semantic logic, to exclude alternatives as illusory, meaningless and unrealistic, while endowing its advocates with a quasi-heroic posture of fearlessly facing adverse circumstances. It is therefore spared the burden of self-justification as ‘rational’ since it functions to set the terms of, and embody, rationality itself. The heating systems project’s claim to “develop and begin the implementation of the *framework for the rationalisation* of energy management”<sup>251</sup> is thus conditioned by the prior setting up of the delimited region of a particular rationality, within which efforts at ‘rationalisation’ may then meaningfully unfold. Irrespectively of whether its application relates to actually-existing or potential

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 33. Emphasis added.

<sup>251</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 28. Emphasis added.

private enterprises (ESCOs or heat supply companies) or the institutions, whose privatisation is not stipulated in the project's own discourse (general practices and national parks), the function of economic rationality is the same: it installs in the discourse both the *terms* on which its enunciations are possible and the positive value the proposals ought to have *in these terms*. In this sense, the basic exclusionary scheme of economic rationality delimits the space of reform in the respective institutions as a space of entrepreneurial activity whose interior is to be furnished by a range of practices that foster specific forms of application of economic rationality, guide the local counterparts through its enunciative possibilities and govern its circulation in the wider domain. It is to these practices that we now turn.

#### 2.2.2.2. *Rarefaction of the Content of Discourse: 'Not a Typical Business Enterprise'*

Moving inside the discursive space delimited by the logic of economic rationality that guards and measures the reasonability of enunciations, we shall now describe the ways in which the content of discourse is rarefied. In all three projects, rarefaction occurs via the installation of a primary text that conforms to the logic of economic rationality. Nonetheless, the entrepreneurial grounding of the discourse is a more complex procedure than a simple installation of a dominant principle that determines its positive content. If on the exterior of discourse economic rationality fulfils an exclusionary function, within the discursive space it is itself subject to a series of rarefying practices.

Let us begin with discussing the way in which economic analysis and its derivations such as financial and business planning serve as primary texts that ground discursive possibilities. We have described above the ways, in which economic efficiency is granted the status of decisive importance in the reform process and the proposed interventions of the projects are advocated through the demonstration of their efficiency through exemplary models. In this demonstration, the technique of *economic analysis*, which makes possible the rhetorical linkage, is also advocated as an intervention in its own right, included in the training programmes and recommended for dissemination among the non-participating districts. Insofar as it is deployed in the training programmes, economic analysis exemplifies the operation of the *disciplinary scheme*, functioning as a *method for discursive production of true statements*. Adherence to this method serves as an opening towards various discursive possibilities,

whose dispersion in the autonomous practice of local professionals remains tied to the principle of rarity that is their source.

*Model economic analyses* of alternative forms of social and health care [are] *designed, tested and documented*. District managers are *already using the analysis themselves* in the formulation of budget and service plans. The comparative cost analysis for hospitals and medico-social care in the home formed the *basis of a training programme* for economists from every district of the republic. In each district now there is *at least one economist equipped with the basic skills* of economic analysis of health and social care costs.<sup>252</sup>

With the prepared “Action plan for short-medium-long-term improvements” the management of the municipalities and the DH companies have a *practical instrument*, which will guide their management processes during the coming years. The action plan assists managers in the *evaluation of priorities and costs of different measures* that are proposed and therefore supports the decision making process for planning and implementing projects with *maximum results and minimum costs*.<sup>253</sup>

The disciplinary function of economic analysis consists in inciting and enabling discourse, providing a point of entry into it and endowing enunciations with the status of truth, provided they are limited to the reactualisation of disciplinary rules. In this manner it appears possible to understand the recommendation of the Concluding Conference of the health care project that the districts that did not participate in the project use not merely the reform models, but also “the methods of research proposed by EU and local consultants”.<sup>254</sup>

In its disciplinary function, economic analysis serves as a foundation for truthful enunciation of policy proposals in a variety of areas. For example, the proposed interventions in *each* component of the health care project are grounded in, and rendered in terms of, a *generalised analysis of cost*. Overcoming the “lack of incentive for doctors to treat and not refer the patient”,<sup>255</sup> highlighting the need to end “the wasteful duplication of the parallel health and social care information systems”,<sup>256</sup> enhancing “public awareness of the population on the issues of health promotion”<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 27. Emphasis added.

<sup>253</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 26. Emphasis added.

<sup>254</sup> Recommendations of the International Conference “Reforms of Health Care and Social Protection in the Republic of Karelia” EDRUS9516, p. 2.

<sup>255</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 8.

<sup>256</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 27.

<sup>257</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 22.



– all these solutions address specific aspects of the policy of substitution, whose status as the primary text is grounded in economic analysis. Similarly, in the heating systems project the ‘emphasis on commercialisation’ is reactualised in all project components, be it the development of cross-border cooperation in emissions trading, the reform of accounting with a view to the transparency of financial flows, or the training programme emphasising business skills. Through installing economic analysis as a disciplinary primary text, the projects succeed in restructuring the local discourse on reform as a commentary on the entrepreneurial solutions they advocate.

However, the ‘enterprise basis’ is not the sole principle that grounds the enunciative possibilities of the discourse. The logic of economic rationality, delimiting the exterior boundaries of discourse, is in the aspect of its *content* articulated with other, apparently incompatible principles of rarefaction, which complicate the positivity of the object of enterprise. The parks project proclaims that a national park is “*not a typical business enterprise, though some rules are still valid*”<sup>258</sup>. In fact, in all three projects we are dealing with enterprises that are *untypical* in the sense of having surplus ‘public functions’, duly recognised in the project texts. It would therefore be overly simplistic to suggest that the installation of economic analysis as a primary text serves to render social or environmental questions economic, denying their specificity or difference from the ‘properly’ economic domain. It is rather precisely this *specificity* that is *cultivated* in the discourse, i.e. the objects of ESCO, general practice, national park are constituted *from the outset* as highly specific and inherently problematic forms of enterprise. Thus, the multiple specifications, caveats and possible contradictions that we identify in the discussion below of the way economic rationality is rarefied by rival grounding principles, are not per se damaging to the discourse, but form an inherent part of its work of constitution. In other words, it is not that parks, energy services and general practices are constituted as enterprises *despite* their manifest ‘untypicality’ but rather that they are constituted in the discourse as ‘untypical enterprises’, *their positivity being indissociable from the multiple specifications regarding their status and function*.

The first such specification concerns the limitation of economic rationality by the requirement of *benefit to the local population* as the project’s main objective. As discussed above, the parks development project problematises the absence or

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<sup>258</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 15. Emphasis added.

underdevelopment of specifically *local* tour operators and undertakes training activities to address this problem. “One of the problems in developing nature tourism in the whole of Karelia is the lack of tour enterprises which have skills in ecotourism. *Tourism can certainly be developed here also without local companies*, but if tourism would be left only in the hands of big companies in St. Petersburg, Moscow or Finland, *the benefit for local people, local settlements and the Karelian Republic would be of minor importance.*”<sup>259</sup> Thus, although the logic of economic rationality does not in principle disallow and possibly endorses the entry of big companies (as strong competitors) into the local market, this is discouraged by the requirement of the primary text of ecotourism that “tourism should benefit local people and the local economy of the region”.<sup>260</sup>

The national park should be *open for cooperation with the neighbouring communities*.  
This would maximise the benefits for both parts [sic!]. For example:  
Park *relies on accommodation, transport and other services of the villages nearby*.  
Park recruits workers from the region.  
Tourism is developed in *co-operation with local administration*.  
Park has *well-functioning liaison with local entrepreneurs*.<sup>261</sup>

Since ‘support to the local economy’ is posited as a principle of ecotourism, the logic of economic rationality is qualified by its limitation to specifically local communities as the beneficiaries of the income generated by tour operations. The limitation of economic rationality by its contribution to local livelihood is also accentuated in the heating strategies project, whose advocacy of the policy of substitution proceeds from the claim of enhanced local employment possibilities as a result of the development of local fuels.<sup>262</sup> In fact, these local socioeconomic benefits are, particularly in the case of peat production, deemed to override cost

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid., p. 6. Emphasis added.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>262</sup> According to Project Completion Report ERUS9701, 14 new jobs will be created by the development of peat production in Sortavala. (p. 29.) At the same time, however, the employment surplus generated by the renovation of boiler plants in Kalevala and Lahdenpohja apparently exceeds the number of new jobs created: “The existing boiler plants at Sadovaya St. 18, and Karl Marx St. 7 in Lahdenpohja employ a total of 28 staff. In the case of Kalevala, a total of 38 staff are now employed in the boiler houses to be decommissioned. It is anticipated that both pilot plants, when operational, will require 6 employees each. *This will result in a surplus of staff in both regions although the working environment for remaining staff should improve.*” (pp. 30–31. Emphasis added.)

considerations: “When only looking at the specific fuel price, peat is not always a least-cost option for supplying heat. However, there are *socioeconomic benefits that could outweigh the additional costs* of the peat fired heat supply options. [...] Local production would create *employment opportunities* and the wages and salaries paid would contribute to the benefit of *local economic life*.”<sup>263</sup>

The second type of rarefaction of economic rationality concerns the relation between the *substantive function* of the institution and the *entrepreneurial mode* of its operation. In the parks development this modality of rarefaction is specified as the ordering of the relation between promotion of tourism and nature protection in national parks. As discussed above, the project manifestly prioritises nature protection simultaneously with casting tourism into the position of ‘exclusive importance’. “The responsibility for the destination, nature and its protection *comes before economic profit*.”<sup>264</sup> Similarly, one of the ‘threats’, mentioned in the presentation of the results of the SWOT analysis undertaken in the protected areas, is that “the park will be developed *only on commercial terms* in order to *maximise profits*”.<sup>265</sup> Thus, in the rarefaction of the content of discourse the logic of economic rationality is articulated with and delimited by such primary texts as Ten Principles of Sustainability, Ten Commandments of Ecotourism and the Code of Conduct in National Parks.<sup>266</sup> The specific form of this articulation is the *liaison*, developed by the parks with private tour operators. At present, the already-operating Paanajärvi National Park is itself both undertaking and monitoring tour operations. In the Tourism Strategy this situation, whereby the park is both a market agent and a regulator of its potential competitors, is accepted only as temporary and liable to change insofar as tourism in the park increases.<sup>267</sup>

In the Vision 2010 for Paanajärvi the theme of partnerships with the private sector is accentuated strongly:

The Park has set up a *functioning cooperation with mutual benefit for tour operators*. The park staff is well-educated in client-oriented service. The park offers an opportunity for local tourist entrepreneurs to participate in training for tourist skills. [...] By *well-*

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<sup>263</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>264</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 15. Emphasis added.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32. Emphasis added.

<sup>266</sup> See respectively Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, pp. 7, 9, 119–120.

<sup>267</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 32. Emphasis added. See also *ibid.*, p. 53.

*organised cooperation* with tour operators and other stakeholders, the park can get support for its investment, rely on the *good quality of the services produced by the private operators* and *find its role as organiser of services and activities* of the national park. [...] *In order to safeguard the park against the harmful influences of growing tourism, the park should adopt guiding principles* (principles of ecotourism) on how nature and cultural values can be protected.<sup>268</sup>

In the logic of liaisons, those functions of the park that are to be governed by the logic of economic rationality are to be eventually separated from what is presented as the main function of the park. Two possibilities of this separation are presented: the establishment of the tourism department as a ‘tourism company’ within the park<sup>269</sup>, and the gradual *contracting out* of these functions to private entrepreneurs. In the former case, the untypicality of the park as an enterprise is dealt with by establishing within its structure a *proper, typical enterprise*, “which would operate on a *purely commercial* basis”<sup>270</sup> and thus not be subject to the limitations set by the park’s public functions. In the latter case, the untypicality of the park as an enterprise is resolved by devolving its entrepreneurial functions to ‘typical’ local enterprises, whose establishment is to be promoted by the park.

The Park is already collaborating with both domestic and foreign tourism operators, even on a regular basis. In the future, legislation permitting, it will be perhaps possible to develop collaboration into *business partnerships*.<sup>271</sup>  
The aim should be to *gradually build up the local capacity* to function as *independent tourism operators* or *subcontractors*.<sup>272</sup>  
There will be many kinds of partners available *whose reliability on conservation and protection should be investigated*.<sup>273</sup>  
*There is a risk that all activities are based on business, and sustainable development or environmental values will be forgotten*.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 34. Emphasis added.

<sup>269</sup> This option is presently not stipulated in the Russian legislation, according to which the national park can neither be an independent economic subject nor be a party to a joint venture. Since the park is a non-profit organisation, all its profits are to be invested in its own activities. See Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, particularly pp. 61–63 for the discussion of these restrictions.

<sup>270</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 33. Emphasis added.

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34. Emphasis added.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>273</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 85. Emphasis added.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114. Emphasis added.

This discussion of the role of the national park as a tourist enterprise is marked by the sense of urgency regarding the introduction of the strict Code of Conduct and the monitoring of all private sector activities in the park to avoid *impropriety* in the application of economic rationality.<sup>275</sup> Thus, the entrepreneurial logic, prevalent both in the solutions advocated in the Strategy (accentuation of marketing, consumer-oriented service, work experience in the private sector as a criterion in staffing policies) and in the ultimate criterion of successful park operation (the target of 80% of visitors being ‘commercial’ by 2010)<sup>276</sup> is throughout the text qualified by an anxiety regarding the proper operation of the park as an ‘untypical enterprise’. Conversely, there is a marked effort to ‘liberate’ the ‘proper’, ‘typical’, ‘purely commercial’ enterprise from the limitations of its public functions and thus establish a space *within* the structure of the Park that would at the same time be *outside* its institutional limitations. The articulation of the exclusionary logic of economic rationality and the primary text of ecotourism is never stabilised in the discourse, which oscillates between the two principles in a contingent manner. We may thus speak of a mutual rarefaction of economic and environmental rationalities through the intertwining of the respective primary texts. The two rationalities are, as it were, *contaminated* with each other, whereby the conservation functions of the park are penetrated by commercial imperatives and the commercial activities of tour operators in the park are limited by the environmental code of conduct. This logic of contamination is also well-illustrated by the heating systems project’s environmental programme, which simultaneously subjects the policy of fuel substitution to environmental sustainability *and* infuses environmental protection with entrepreneurial rationality in its design of the Joint Implementation programme.

The third type of rarefaction, most starkly manifested in the parks development project, concerns the invocation of romantic and emotive themes of local nature and culture that penetrate the overall economic logic of the discourse. These themes enter the discourse through what we have described in chapter 2.1.2.1. as the *scheme of authenticity* that valorises natural and cultural values of the parks, which are simultaneously constituted within the logic of economic rationality as *market products*.

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<sup>275</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 91, 106, 110.

<sup>276</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 45, 70, 81, 95, 110. The only exception is made for the Ladoga Skerries Park, where the figure is 51% due to the difficulty of limiting public access to the vast territory of the park.

The Kalevala Epic is known worldwide and belongs to the masterpieces of the world literature, and *this fame adds special colouring to places connected with its origin*. In this regard, it could be compared with the most eminent historic sites in Russia. *If the primeval forest is ruined, the spirit, sources, natural and historic background, against which the immortal epic was created, will be gone forever.*<sup>277</sup>

The forest of the White-Sea Karelia today, like a hundred years ago, *amazes travellers with its virginity*. A traveller may wander here for several days without seeing man's traces. [...] In all times forest has provided man with survival, food and protection. *Now, the Kalevala forest calls for protection.*<sup>278</sup>

Rapids Kivakkakoski on the trail between Fell Kivakka and Vartiolampi is a beautiful place to *rest and admire the magnificent beauty of the nature*. [...] Development actions in infrastructure and services: *1 tepee for preparing meals, 4 fire and rest places, [...] 2 toilets, bins for rubbish.*<sup>279</sup>

The Tourism Strategy repeatedly refers to the 'intact', 'virgin' and 'untouched' nature as the primary attraction of the parks<sup>280</sup> and its marketing plan features tour programs with titles such as "Dreams of Paanajärvi National Park" and "On the Footprints of Karelian Bard Singers".<sup>281</sup> However, the sentimental constructs such as the 'magnificent beauty of nature', the Kalevala 'virgin forest' that is 'calling for protection' and the 'spirit' of the 'immortal epic' that threatens to be 'gone forever' are invariably supplemented by the rather more mundane logic of product development, that requires such transgressions of virginal intactness as the installation of toilets and rubbish bins, and the much-valorised "local style in constructions" is conjoined with the demand that "all broken constructions shall be repaired immediately".<sup>282</sup> The paradox is evident both in the abundance of such examples and in the overall solution advocated by the project: after all, does not the affirmation of wilderness and intactness rather lead to endorsing the strong restriction on tourism suggested by the above-mentioned local 'ecological' position? Similarly, does not the valorisation of the "unique combination of wild nature, Karelian culture and Orthodox tradition"<sup>283</sup> contradict the ambition of training the local population in tour operation and client-

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<sup>277</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 27. Emphasis added.

<sup>278</sup> Proposed Kalevala National Park. Introduction: <http://parks.karelia.ru/kalevala/>. Emphasis added.

<sup>279</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 38. Emphasis original.

<sup>280</sup> See e.g. Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 35, 74, 90, 105.

<sup>281</sup> See respectively *ibid.*, p. 49, p. 84.

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79, 109.

oriented service and thereby ‘raising new entrepreneurs among these people’?<sup>284</sup> What is at stake in our discussion is not merely an ironic commentary on the doctrine of “existential tourism”,<sup>285</sup> with its curious penchant for manufactured “real life experiences”.<sup>286</sup> We are more interested in the ways in which this attitude is articulated with the logic of economic rationality to constitute the object of enterprise as ‘untypical’. The articulation of entrepreneurial rationality and local authenticity is based on the *penetration* of the latter by the former, with the paradoxical affirmation of *intactness* as the *effect* of entrepreneurial *interventions*. Authentic objects of nature and culture only emerge by virtue of a *marketing artifice* and as *marketing artefacts*. There are no ‘dreams’ dreamt in the Paanajärvi National Park or ‘footprints’ left by the Karelian bard singers prior to their stipulation by the Tourism Strategy.

The specific function of these emotive claims relates to the operation of natural and cultural objects within the domain of economic rationality as both *products to be marketed* and *limitations to the economic logic*.

The outer parts of the park territory are the *realm* of the Ladoga Ringed Seal, a *shy and beautiful animal*. In spite of the threatened position of this species, it can be seen fairly easily lying on the low grounds. The outermost shores of the archipelago form a strictly protected zone of the park. [...] Ladoga Seal is a unique animal, fairly easy to observe and can become a *symbol of the park which allures lots of ecotourists*.<sup>287</sup>

The Ladoga seal population is about 10 thousand animals. *It is reasonable to organise the Ladoga seal safari to observe it*.<sup>288</sup>

The commercial deployment of the Ladoga Seal, such as the product called “Ladoga Seal Trail, a 2-day boating trip by rowing and motor boats”,<sup>289</sup> and the use of the seal in advertising as a ‘symbol of the park’, is complemented by the invocation of the ecotourism principle of “Don’t sell their lives” that holds that “rare and timid animals can suffer from tourists who want to come too close”.<sup>290</sup> The shy and beautiful Ladoga Seal is both a marketing symbol, an object formed within the discursive field

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<sup>284</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 11, 13.

<sup>285</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 18.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60. Emphasis added.

<sup>288</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 40. Emphasis added.

<sup>289</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 68.

<sup>290</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 119.

delineated by the entrepreneurial logic, and is located on its outermost limit of this rationality, demarcating the possibility of its application. It is thereby endowed with a complex function of simultaneously 'alluring' tourists to the park and 'suffering' from their excessive advances, combining in a single figure the arts of seduction and the virtues of innocence. The Ladoga Seal is thus both an effect of the discourse of enterprise and the locus of authenticity that validates its untypicality.<sup>291</sup>

In all the three types of grounding that we have discussed, the rarefaction of discourse occurs through complementing the economic rationality by its apparent opposite: the valorisation of locality, the installation of environmental codes of conduct, the affirmation of local authenticity and intactness. The latter principles form the 'constitutive outside' of economic rationality, that which makes the object of enterprise both possible and 'untypical'. In Derridean terms, the discourse of technical assistance infuses its constitution of the object of enterprise with the *logic of supplementarity*, whereby the conditions of possibility of an object consist in the excess unsubsumable within it.<sup>292</sup> The two grounding principles of the discourse are permanently at work in mutual deconstruction: claims to authenticity turn out to be conditioned by the traversal of nature and culture by commercially-motivated interventions, while the entrepreneurial logic is penetrated by social and environmental imperatives not subordinate to it. To recall the fragments cited above, it becomes possible to claim simultaneously (and only simultaneously) that 'the main task of the national park is the conservation of the natural and cultural heritage' and that tourism is 'the goal towards which all efforts should be directed'. These two mutually exclusive statements are in fact *mutually conditioning* extremities of discourse, the space between them being the space within which discursive practices may disperse.

It is in this sense that the rarefaction of discourse is both enabling and constraining, making possible those, and only those statements, that serve as a *commentary* on the equivocal character of the dual options advocated by the projects, on the "difficulty of finding the right balance"<sup>293</sup> between biodiversity conservation and tourism

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<sup>291</sup> We may note a resemblance between the Ladoga Seal and the object of local agency: is not the Seal functionally equivalent to the local agent formed inside participatory indoctrination and conditioning the truth of the doctrine, the only difference being that the latter 'beautiful animal' has his 'shyness' problematised by the incitement to active discourse?

<sup>292</sup> See Derrida 1981, 1998 for the discussion of the principle of supplementarity. We shall discuss this principle in greater detail in chapter 4.1.

<sup>293</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 15.



development, district heating provision and the commercialisation of heating utilities, health and social care and the ‘gatekeeping’ policy for expensive institutions. In all three projects, it is the inherent *instability* of the advocated ‘untypical enterprise’ that requires the work of commentary on it. To recall Foucault’s stance on commentary, such a discourse is indeed both “plethoric yet absolutely poverty-stricken”<sup>294</sup>, doomed both to endlessly proliferate (since no final balance between entrepreneurial and ‘social’ logics is struck in the primary texts) and endlessly return in all enunciations to the dualism contained in the premise. For our purposes, it is important to reiterate that this undecidable rarefaction of discursive content is not a result of our critical operations. It is not that *we* conceive of the constitution of the object of enterprise as problematic on the basis of our textual evidence or theoretical disposition. It is rather that this object is construed as inherently problematic *within* the discourse itself, and that its problematic status is precisely what warrants continuous *restriction* of access to it to avoid improprieties in its utilisation.

#### 2.2.2.3. *Restriction of Access to Discourse: ‘Growing in the Project’*

As we discussed in chapter 2.1.2.3., the ordering scheme of restriction operates through a double subjection of discourse to the speaking subject and of the subject to discourse through pedagogical practices that we have referred to as participatory indoctrination. In the case of the object of enterprise, the pedagogical scheme is utilised in all three projects and operates on two distinct levels: on-site *training* of project counterparts and a *dissemination* programme that targets the wider audience. The focus on the *combinatory logic* of the training and dissemination programmes will permit us to specify the relation of double subjection between the discourse of enterprise and the local counterpart.

The training programme of the health care and social protection project is deployed in all its thematic components: financing, human resources, information systems and public relations management. The goal of training is “to provide the essential preconditions under which [the reform strategies] can be *successfully sustained* by the Karelian partner”.<sup>295</sup> According to the Report, “approximately 2000

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<sup>294</sup> See Foucault 1970, p. 30 and more generally chapter 2.

<sup>295</sup> Progress Report 3 EDRUS9516, p. 8. Emphasis added.

specialists have undergone training in the course of the project and [...] have been equipped with the *necessary skills for economic analysis, human resource planning, the management of an integrated social and health care information system.*"<sup>296</sup> These practices of training serve to subject the enunciative modalities of the professionals of the two sectors to a particular type of discourse of enterprise: non-institutional community-based medico-social care. Many of the enunciative modalities that have been newly formed in the course of training (e.g. general practitioners and medico-social nurses) owe their entire possibility to the policy of substitution, having had no place in the previous professional structure. This subjection of local agents to the discourse simultaneously enables autonomous discursive practice, whose rationality and authenticity have been validated by, respectively, economic analysis and the local character of training. In terms of project reporting, a total of 11 'enterprise' establishments (general practices, community medico-social centres, multi-professional teams) have been "identified as *models of good practice* in social and health care, for *study by other districts*".<sup>297</sup> Aside from the above-discussed emphasis on the practicality of the piloted economic models, the projects' reporting on training across the three projects strongly accentuates the specific effect of indoctrination on the *character* of the trainees' discourse, noting the newly found conclusiveness, clarity and comprehensive understanding:

The project has been successful in providing a framework for a much *clearer enunciation* of key reform strategies in health care.<sup>298</sup>

It has been this bottom-up approach that has allowed the project, and with it the reform process, to gather round itself a core group of *highly able, articulate* advocates of reform in the shape of social and health care managers and professionals from the districts. The majority of these individuals are in their *early or mid-careers*. They have *grown in the project* and are perhaps the republic's best guarantee of the sustainability of the reform process.<sup>299</sup>

Having worked closely with the European team on the pilot projects, the local experts have now already gained a *better technical and economic understanding of the choices available*. [...] *Comprehensive know-how* was gained on advanced technical, commercial, financial, organisational and management issues in the operation of boiler

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<sup>296</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>297</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 15. Emphasis added.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., p. 35. Emphasis added.

houses on biofuel. Based on the Action Plan for Short-Medium-Long-Term Improvements the management of municipalities and the DH companies have a *clear vision* for the necessary improvements in the short, medium and long term.<sup>300</sup>

Besides the formation of local ‘models of good practice’, the effect of training is held to be the *empowerment* of the local counterparts to autonomously utilise these models and the *quality* of their utilisation of these models. It is this clearly enunciated and articulate autonomous discourse of the local counterparts that stands in marked contrast to the indices of the problem established in all three projects, where the lack of a clear vision of reform and practical techniques of its implementation were cast as key problems. This effect of ‘growing in the project’ retrospectively vindicates the training programme (“It was necessary to *enable them to understand...*”<sup>301</sup>) simultaneously with pronouncing it successful in terms of the criterion of sustainability (“policies *which were once controversial* are now accepted as the *sensible way forward*”<sup>302</sup>). The projects thus explicitly link the acceptance of proposed policies with the bridging of what the heating systems project refers to as the “competence gap”.<sup>303</sup> This is an important notion, whose grasp enables us to understand the logic of restriction. On the one hand, the competence gap is an empirical positivity, established in the course of the projects in the course of the ‘training needs assessment’ in relation to the already chosen reform strategy. It is clear that this gap will *always* be possible to identify, if only because of the highly specific and syncretic nature of the proposed interventions that we addressed in our discussion of the ‘untypical enterprise’. However, the competence gap is also an *a priori* condition of technical assistance itself as a practice, since its absence removes the rationale behind the programme: an external technical assistance programme that proceeds on the assumption of complete adequacy and sufficiency of local knowledge would be a manifest absurdity. The presence of the competence gap is the condition of possibility of practices of assistance and is therefore the *inherent limitation* to the participatory approaches propounded by all the projects. In other words, the necessity of the competence gap to the practice of technical assistance entails that participatory activities will *necessarily* be entwined with practices of indoctrination.

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<sup>300</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, pp. 48–49. Emphasis added.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., p. 43. Emphasis added.

<sup>302</sup> Progress Report 3 EDRUS9516, p. 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>303</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 32.

Nonetheless, the pedagogical practices of participatory indoctrination comprise only the initial stage of restriction, the stage of *initiation*, in which the local counterparts are subjected to the discourse of ‘untypical enterprise’. The identification of effects of training as models of good practice reverses the relation of subjection, whereby the discourse of reform begins to be *subjected to the new enunciative modalities*, formed in the practices of indoctrination. The empowering effect of training is concretely exemplified by the deployment of the ‘models of good practice’ in the dissemination phase of the projects.

Any concern that the models of primary health care, health promotion and medico-social services established during the course of the project might remain as *isolated examples of good practice*, made possible by the resources of the Tacis programme and *unlikely to be replicated elsewhere* in the republic, has been much reduced in the extension phase. [...] The message of reform has been *taken persuasively* to managers and specialists in every district of the republic. *This has been done in the best possible way – by local consultants who themselves have direct and practical experience of bringing about change.* This conscious strategy of *peer group consultation* has proved *far more effective than the more traditional top-down approach* and has established *lasting cross-district links between both professionals and decision-makers.*<sup>304</sup>

This fragment demonstrates the way in which the *vertical* and *hierarchical* relation of pedagogy is reversed in the dissemination phase, whereby *the ‘trained’ become the ‘trainers’*, communicating the message of reform to the broader professional audience with the authority of their status of models of good practice. This *horizontal extension* of the proposed interventions via peer communication serves to ensure autonomous reproduction of project results and grounds the optimism of the project management expressed in the statement that “the Karelian partner *owns the process*. From this point of view, the *prospects for sustainability are excellent.*”<sup>305</sup> In a more general sense, this subjection of discourse to the new enunciative modalities is exemplified by the emphasis laid in the training programme on establishing the infrastructure of personnel management via ‘training of trainers’<sup>306</sup>. The effect of indoctrination in the training programme is the formation of a *core group*

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<sup>304</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, pp. 1–2. Emphasis added.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>306</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 28, Progress Report 1 EDRUS9516, p. 20.

of autonomous practitioners of discourse, whose subjection to the entrepreneurial discourse of reform is simultaneously their empowerment as ‘highly able’ and ‘articulate’ professionals and managers. The accentuation of their ‘growth’ or *maturation* in the course of the pedagogical practices serves to endow the core group with a *privileged* status based on the possession of the *qualifications* necessary to produce authentic and reasonable discourse. Secondly, we ought to note the *function* that the privileged ‘core group’ occupies in the broader space of professional and managerial practices. It is endowed with the role of ‘taking the message’ of reform and extending its application throughout the districts of the republic through ‘peer group’ consultation.

The dissemination phase might have been a rather mechanical process of information sharing and distribution, received with polite interest but not identified by republic districts as being of special relevance to their situations. Instead, largely because of the strategy chosen by the project management to *work through a team of local consultants able to talk from direct experience of the challenge of implementing reform*, the dissemination has become part of the reform process itself and has had the effect of *lifting the process to a higher gear*.<sup>307</sup>

In Foucauldian terms, we can approach this restrictive mechanism as the constitution of a ‘society of discourse’, a delimited region of its circulation, appropriation and distribution according to specified and ritualised rules, regarding both its holders and its application.<sup>308</sup> A society of discourse restricts its dispersion by the fixation of non-interchangeable roles for its practitioners. In our case, this fixation occurs via the formation of a privileged core group of mature ‘trained trainers’, endowed with the capacity of communicating the discourse of entrepreneurial restructuring to their ‘peers’. The connotations of equality of status, suggested by the term ‘peer group’, should not obscure for us the continuing presence of asymmetry in the circulation of discourse. Lifting the process of reform to a higher gear is made possible by the relation of asymmetry between those who have ‘direct experience’ in reforms (i.e. the local counterparts involved in participatory indoctrination) and those who do not. While the pedagogical scheme of participatory indoctrination

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<sup>307</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 35. Emphasis added.

<sup>308</sup> Foucault 1981, pp. 62–63.

invokes a *vertical asymmetry* between the trainer and the trainee, the ‘society of discourse’, instantiated in the dissemination phase, invokes a *horizontal asymmetry* between the core and peripheral groups of practitioners. Let us then term this scheme of restriction of access to discourse ‘*asymmetric dissemination*’.

This dual ‘training-and-dissemination’ scheme that invokes the themes of maturation, ‘growing in the project’ and the authorisation of the subject position of the former trainees is also at work in the parks project:

Altogether 37 seminars, training courses and study tours were realised during the project. Altogether 850 persons participated in the training. [...] *Besides the training organised by the project, the implementation process was extremely useful for all that participated. 27 Russian experts, 21 foreign experts and a great number of Russians were linked with the project. Development of technical and communication skills clearly increased among these people during the two project years. Many of them are now able to utilise their new contacts after the project too.*<sup>309</sup>

It should also be noted that the management plans for the proposed parks, that are the main output of the project, have been authored by local experts, trained in the course of the project. Their authorship demonstrates the success of the project in building up local professional and managerial capacity that is a guarantee of the sustainability of the conservation-and-tourism strategy after project expiry.

Similar enthusiasm about the success of the project’s training operations is exhibited in the heating systems project’s description of the dissemination phase seminar on the utilisation of local fuels.

During the seminar *a number of additional speeches were held by local representatives and experts*, e.g. Mr. Prudnikov “Possibilities of the Creation of SMEs for peat production”, Mr. Borisov “*Karelian Scientific Centre Uses the Tacis Methods for Wood Resource Evaluation for R&D Activities on Federal Level*” and Mr. Bykov “Use of Modern Wood Harvesting Technologies under Karelian Conditions”. [...] The seminar was a *milestone for the further development of the local understanding* of the possibilities and requirements of biofuel use for heat production, including modern energy technology, equipment and management issues.<sup>310</sup>

This fragment demonstrates the way the dissemination process operates *through the local consultants*, who have participated and been trained in project activities and are

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<sup>309</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 19. Emphasis added.

<sup>310</sup> Progress Report 5 ERUS9701, p. 17. Emphasis added.

subsequently recast in the role of trainers. The EU consultants' retreat into the background in the dissemination phase and their authorisation of local counterparts to practice pedagogical discourse exemplify the success of participatory indoctrination and its succession by asymmetric dissemination.

The examples offered so far illustrate the empowering operation of the restrictive scheme. The important question, however, is the reception in this order of discourse of the statements of the local counterparts that fail to reactualise the doctrinal content in their participation.<sup>311</sup> The example offered by heating systems project relates to the disagreement of the Kalevala administration, an active participant in the pilot project, with the results of the NEFCO- and Tacis-supervised tender for the selection of a contractor to supply the equipment for the pilot project. What interests us is of course not establishing which side in the disagreement was 'correct', but the way this attempt at a 'counter-discourse' is dealt with in the discourse of technical assistance.

NEFCO gave both projects a positive first evaluation and the consultant worked hard to clarify any outstanding issues. The NEFCO tender process was conducted for Kalevala and five bids were received. *The Consultant's evaluation of the bids was not accepted by the administration of Kalevala, who seemed to have their own idea on who had the best offer.* After several correspondences and meetings with NEFCO it was realised that *the opinion of Kalevala had no basis in technical or financial terms.*<sup>312</sup>

The NEFCO-financed part of the pilot project has been delayed due to the *beneficiaries' misunderstanding of how the international tender process should be carried out.* The problems have been *sorted out*, however a *significant delay* has resulted.<sup>313</sup>

Although during the seminar *some critical points were taken under discussion by the representative of Kalevala municipality* in regard to financial arrangements of the Kalevala project, the seminar and the meetings *went smoothly and in the atmosphere of mutual understanding.*<sup>314</sup>

This example demonstrates the way the statements that contradict the rarefied content of discourse are not taken into serious consideration and deemed to be

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<sup>311</sup> We ought to emphasise that this example deals with those local agents, who have from the outset subscribed to the reform option advocated by the project. As we have discussed with regard to the scheme of exclusion, the statements of those opposed to the economic rationalisation of the respective institutions are a priori excluded from the discourse as not conforming to its criteria of rationality. In concrete terms, this exclusion entails non-participation of the agents in question or their non-selection for the pilot status.

<sup>312</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66. Emphasis added.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17. Emphasis added.

temporary irruptions to the 'smooth' procession of the project. Despite the incitement of local counterparts to discourse, discussed at length in this and the previous chapters, those local statements that may hamper the efficient implementation of the project (the acquisition of the NEFCO loan) are cast in an entirely negative fashion as *groundless* both financially and technically. Our notion of double subjection permits us to understand the operation of this restriction: if reform discourse is subjected to the local counterpart on the condition of her subjection to its rarefied content, then 'impropriety' in discursive practice results in the cancellation of the enunciative privilege. A statement not grounded in the primary text of the 'untypical enterprise' indeed appears as a 'misunderstanding' with 'no basis' and thus as a mere disruption with an unfortunate effect of delay in project implementation. Interestingly, in this case 'seeming to have one's own idea', which in the logic of empowerment of local agency is an indisputable benefit, appears as an impudent audacity that only carries negative consequences for project operation. This example, however rare in the discourse, demonstrates that the endowment of local counterparts with the privileged enunciative modality in the scheme of asymmetric dissemination is conditioned by their continued adherence to the doctrinal principles that ground their discourse. The local counterpart therefore only 'owns' the discourse of reform by virtue of his permanent reiteration of its principles of rarity.

The constitution of the object of enterprise on the level of discourse of technical assistance is schematically presented in figure 10.

In conclusion, let us pose the question of the relation between the two objects we have so far reconstituted in the discourse of technical assistance: enterprise and local agency. Throughout our analysis of the object of enterprise we have re-encountered the themes of local participation, authenticity of local knowledge, the imperative of training and the measurement of the project's success by the capacity of local counterparts to autonomously utilise the doctrinal solutions. Recalling our discussion of the object of local agency, we may claim that in the case of the object of enterprise the incitement of the local public to participate in the reforms is necessarily accompanied by its prior subjection to the logic of economic rationality that both rarefies and affirms its discursive possibilities. The object of enterprise brings forth a specific conception of the local client of services as a *consumer* imbued with the faculty of *choice* and an *interest* in the maximal satisfaction of wants at a lowest possible cost. In the logic of enterprise patients or clients are recast as 'consumers', which presupposes *active* exercise of *autonomous* choice among the variety of *competitive*






Figure 10: Constitution of Enterprise in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

providers and dictates the above-discussed centrality of public awareness and participation.<sup>315</sup> The consumers are incited to actively express themselves, but *only as consumers*. It is not that the solutions advocated by Tacis may not be opposed in the discourse of technical assistance, but rather that this opposition must be inscribed in terms of 'consumer feedback'. It is not difficult to list the possible enunciations that are thereby bracketed off, be it the oppositional statements of the 'wild tourists' or local residents demanding unlimited access to national park territory, the health care

<sup>315</sup> It is only in this economic logic that e.g. non-institutional medico-social care may be cast as an optimal balance of cost and quality, provided, of course, that it is the consumer that pays for the services. From this perspective, the recommendation of the financial component of the project to develop "services for payments" (Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 28.) merely follows the overall logic of the entrepreneurial restructuring of the sector: the concern with supply-side efficiency must have its correlate on the demand side of the exchange. On the other hand, in the conception of the *patient* that arguably characterised Soviet health care, in which the question of cost was overshadowed by the question of access and autonomous choice had little place, a strategy of substitution does little more than deprive the client of a possibility of referral to a higher professional level of care.

clients' demand to be treated by a doctor rather than be offered a discourse on health promotion or the heating services users' reluctance to renounce their subsidies in order to finance the utilities' renovation. In short, the constitution of local agents as consumers carries obvious costs, which may either be expressed in concrete monetary terms (the insistence of the heating systems project on 'the consumer paying the whole bill'<sup>316</sup> is the best example of this) or consist in the disqualification of alternative enunciative possibilities (i.e. those of 'wild tourists' or 'social cases' requesting hospital treatment, whose 'feedback' is a mere disruption of the smooth flow of discourse). Yet, we ought not to ignore or dismiss as a sham the *local sense of empowerment and ownership* that this subjection may elicit, a sense whose actuality is not compromised by the manifest exteriority of the subjectifying doctrine to any kind of 'authentic experience'. Rather than rehearse a facile thesis of the 'colonisation' of authentic local experience by an impoverished economic rationality<sup>317</sup>, we may speak of the *specification and concretisation* in the discourse of enterprise of the theme of active and autonomous local agency. The empowerment of local agents thus takes the form of 'entrepreneurial subjectification' in terms of the modalities of 'provider' and 'consumer', their autonomy becoming equated with the mastery of economic analysis, the enhancement of business skills or the exercise of choice between a variety of service providers.

The link between the objects of enterprise and local agency is thus crucial to the constitutive effects of the discourse of technical assistance, since it forms a nexus of the *desire* for autonomy, self-expression and empowerment (nurtured in the formation of local agency) and specific *mechanisms* of institutional practice that seek to both

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<sup>316</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 53.

<sup>317</sup> See Callon 1998, 2002 for the critique of a facile 'anti-economism' in contemporary social theory that accuses economic theories of being culturally impoverished. According to Callon, "we have to get rid of this notion that economic goods are abstract, disembodied and need culture to be added to them. [...] They are richer products." (Callon 2002, p. 292.) Rather than criticise the impoverished nature of a calculative economic rationality or its 'repressive' function, it may be more fruitful to inquire about the ways, in which manifold forms of economic rationality are articulated with ethical imperatives and function to (re)constitute subjects as rational economic agents: "Yes, *homo economicus* really does exist. [...] He is formatted, framed and equipped with prostheses which help him make his calculations and which are, for the most part, produced by economics. *It is not a matter of giving a soul back to a dehumanised agent*, nor of rejecting the very idea of his existence. The objective may be to explore the diversity of calculative agencies, forms and distributions." (Callon cited in Barry and Slater 2002, p. 183. Emphasis added.)

rely on and satisfy this desire. In short, this articulation *gives the desire for self-actualisation a concrete entrepreneurial form*. At this stage, we may introduce in our discussion of the object of enterprise its primary meaning: “willingness to engage in daring action, initiative.”<sup>318</sup> What emerges in this nexus of enterprise and agency, then, is the common space between the two meanings of ‘enterprise’, the space of the interplay of the ethical and the economic, the movement of mutual concretisation and abstraction. In this movement, enterprising action marked by the desire for self-actualisation and autonomy is offered its corresponding technique in economic activity governed by the imperative of efficiency. *To be an enterprising subject is thus to govern one’s practices in accordance with the entrepreneurial concern for maximising efficiency*. Conversely, and rather less obviously, efficiency-enhancing economic models are in this nexus conditioned by the subject’s desire for autonomy and self-improvement. The construction of economically efficient models of practice no longer suffices, since *to make an enterprise work one first has to render its subjects enterprising*. “Most of the problems have their roots in people, in the level of their knowledge, skills and awareness. [...] Experiences all over the world show that sustained work will result in *favourable changes in attitudes and behaviour*.”<sup>319</sup> Rather than effect a crude reduction of the ethical to the economic, the articulation of agency and enterprise in the discourse of technical assistance serves to install a relation of *mutual subjection* between the *ethos* of local autonomy and empowerment and the *techne* of entrepreneurial practice. In this mutual subjection, ‘enterprise’ indeed becomes inherent to the domain of ‘culture’, and finding a ‘way of living, less dependent on state budgets’<sup>320</sup> is no longer a matter of economic necessity, but rather acquires a strong ethical significance.

What we observe in this articulation between the desire and the instrument of its satisfaction, the ethos of autonomous agency and the techne of economic practice is the formation of what we have called a *jurisdictional axis* of the dispositional diagram of technical assistance, whose effect is the dual constitution of the *enterprising*

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<sup>318</sup> Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com>. “Enterprise: 1: a project or undertaking that is especially difficult, complicated, or *risky*, 2: willingness to engage in *daring action, initiative*; 3a: a unit of economic organisation or activity; especially: a business organisation; 3b : a systematic purposeful activity.” (Emphasis added.)

<sup>319</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 15. Emphasis added.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

*subject* and the *subjectifying enterprise*. In our interpretation of the results of the analysis we shall discuss in detail the genealogical lineage of this axis. At this stage, we shall conclude our description of the constitution of the object of enterprise by reiterating that this formation is not equivalent to the effect of communicative interaction between Tacis and its local counterparts. Indeed, our textual analysis demonstrates that the rhetorical repertoire, utilised in the project's advocacy of entrepreneurial restructuring, is rather scant and repetitive. The workings of the discourse of technical assistance should, however, be distinguished from the labour of persuasive speech: it is not that the discourse of enterprise is, to rely on the projects' trope of 'ownership', somehow 'sold' to the subject through skilful rhetorical practice. It is rather the subject herself who is enfolded inside the discursive space and placed into the preconstituted enunciative modality, from which she will recognise this discourse as her own, sustain it and find in its prescriptions the expression of her intimate desire for self-expression. Herein consists the constitutive force of discourse: its capacity to render a manifestly external doctrine a source of subjective interiority. In the following chapter we shall discuss the ways, in which this folding operation serves to elicit the effects of government of the self and others.

## 2.3. Constitution of the Object of Government in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

### 2.3.1. Active Facilitative Government as a Central Concept: Preliminary Mapping of a Region of Interpositivity

The reporting of the three projects highlights the theme of restructuring the operations of *government* as both the goal of the planned reforms and the instrument of their implementation. In this chapter we shall demonstrate the way, in which the object of government (in the broad sense of 'the right disposition of things') is constituted in the projects' discussion of the themes of administration of the respective sectors, information and personnel management, monitoring of the population's activity, training and participation. In our textual analysis we shall focus on both the statements of the projects with regard to the governmental activity of the reformed institutions, and, since we have designated EU Tacis activities in terms of 'governmentalisation of government', the statements concerning Tacis's own operations as an agent of reform

insofar as the projects' activities in reforming the respective sectors are presented as *models* of government for the local counterparts to emulate.

### 2.3.1.1. *The Object of Government in Health Care and Social Protection Reform*

The health care and social protection project has as its main objective “the improvement of strategic and financial management of health and social welfare services”.<sup>321</sup> We have discussed the issues of financial management in our analysis of the object of enterprise where the key index of the problem concerned the lack of efficiency-enhancing approaches in management under the conditions of financial scarcity. In its discussion of strategic management in the sector, the project claims that the main cause of reform failure is “the *absence of a strategic view of the development of social and health care services in the republic*. Whilst there was *broad agreement on the need to move forward towards primary and non-institutional care*, this was nowhere expressed in any policy statements or legislation.”<sup>322</sup> The ‘strategic view’ is contrasted with the existing ‘broad agreement’ on the general direction of reforms and relates to *practical policy solutions*. Thus, the project notes the gulf between the policymakers’ declarations of intent and the actual managerial techniques employed: “In spite of a *broad intention to move towards non-institutional care, the emphasis in practice was inevitably very much towards institutional solutions*. In Kondopoga and Sortavala districts, for example, almost 25% of the population could expect to occupy a hospital bed at some point in any given year. *It was accepted practice* for local district doctors to *refer* to specialists rather than *treat* the condition themselves.”<sup>323</sup> The absence of a strategic vision of reform is thus causally related to acceptance and perpetuation, by default, of outdated practices. This linkage constitutes the index of *ineffective government*, incapable of constructive intervention in the health and social sectors.

The second aspect of the criticism of the absence of strategic vision concerns the lack of integration between social and health care services: “Four ministries [Ministries of Health Care, Social Protection, Education and the Committee on Families and

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<sup>321</sup> Progress Report 1 EDRUS9516, p. 4.

<sup>322</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 21. Emphasis added.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

Children] share responsibilities for service provision, *which weakens the attempts at formulating a consistent strategy of development.*"<sup>324</sup> This fragmentation of responsibilities disables the development of a reform strategy and causes inefficient utilisation of scarce resources. Besides its efficiency-enhancing potential, ministerial integration is also necessitated by the specific content of the policy of substitution advocated by the project: "The policy of open or non-institutional care *must rest on a complex of social and health care services* requiring *collaborative management of the two sectors.*"<sup>325</sup> Such practical innovations as medico-social care centres and multiprofessional teams in general practices are all based on the principle of combining health and social service provision within a single service agency. The lack of integration is thus causally related to the above-discussed paradox of non-institutional declarations coexisting with strongly institutional practices: the proclaimed reform strategy lacks a technological infrastructure as long as the two sectors operate autonomously and with little communication.

This gulf between declarations of intent and actual practices is also manifested in the project's assessment of the republican legislation in the sector. From the outset the project declares that "there is *no lack of laws*, but a case of *bad quality* of implementation arising out of a lack of financial resources and the *absence of an established system of management*".<sup>326</sup> After the inception period the project dissolved the separate working group on legislation, claiming that "an actual need for a separate working group for legislation was not seen at this stage".<sup>327</sup> Responding to the comment of the EU monitor about the lack of progress in the sphere of legislation, the project remarks that there is little need for technical assistance to the legislative process: "The draft law on general practice [prepared by a local consultant in the course of the project] demonstrates that *there is local capacity in the preparation of legislation.* The Karelian partner felt that *training to increase capacity was not a priority at the present time.*"<sup>328</sup> This positive assessment of local legislative capacity contrasts with an otherwise uniform problematisation of local managerial skills: "The Republic of Karelia lacks both *material resources* and *expertise* in

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<sup>324</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 3. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>325</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>326</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 3. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>327</sup> Progress Report 1 EDRUS9516, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>328</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, pp. 25–26.

realisation of such reforms, which is necessary for developing a *concept* of reforming health care and social protection and *its consistent implementation*.<sup>329</sup> We may thus conclude that the project's problematisation of a lack of strategic vision concerns neither the lack of commitment to reform nor the lack of capacity to legislate its broad directions, but relates to the domain of *policy*, comprising managerial techniques of designing and implementing reforms.

The lack of strategic policy planning is also emphasised in the sphere of human resource management. The project declares the existing workforce to be relatively skilled, particularly in the health care sector, but points to the absence of *personnel management* that would connect professional training with the declared priorities of reform.

*A skilled workforce, particularly in the health sector, but no agreed mechanism for relating human resource planning and management to the priorities of reform. Low prestige and poor morale among many professions in the social and health sectors. Staff planning was rigorously tied to federal or republic norms, which were frequently in conflict with the expressed desire to transfer resources from institutional to open care and to bring about closer integration of social and health care services. Some professions, notably nursing and social work, enjoyed low prestige, derisory rates of pay and poor morale.*<sup>330</sup>

This fragment points to two related problems in personnel management. Firstly, professional training is undertaken in isolation from the overall priorities of reform and according to the norms that contradict the declared transition to primary care. Secondly, the lack of active reform in personnel management results in the perpetuation of outdated staffing policies under ever-decreasing financing, which causes what the project refers to as the 'poor morale' of the professionals. This situation is deemed to be caused by the lack of understanding of the importance of personnel planning as a tool of reforms:

*It is difficult to imagine any reforms of health care and social protection without appropriately trained staff at management level and at the level of service provision.*<sup>331</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 5. Emphasis added.

<sup>330</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>331</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 20. Emphasis added.

A major achievement of the working group, with advice from an EU consultant, has been to *convince ministries and districts that human resource development is not simply a matter of devising a training strategy*, however important that might be. *Rather, it addresses the much wider questions of how decisions about staffing of services can be related to the overall priorities of reform.* This includes: decisions about the deployment of staff in and between the social and health care sectors; the problem of *how to relate staffing levels to need* rather than to the traditional prescribed norms; how *staff performance* can be measured and *motivation* increased.<sup>332</sup>

The index of ineffective personnel policy is thus formed by a causal linkage between the lack of human resource planning and performance management and the perpetuation of outdated practices, which leads to decreased salaries and low morale.

In addition to the lack of strategic planning, the project also problematises the process of *implementation* of reforms. The index of the problem concerns the relations between republican and local authorities. The project notes the lack of clarity in the division of competence between the two levels and the resulting conflicts between them that hinder effective policy implementation:

According to the law "On the Foundations of Local Self-Government" the role of Republican ministries in planning and managing the development of health care and social services for the population has changed. Many of their functions have been transferred to the local level. *The work on delimiting authority and responsibility in the sphere of health care and social protection must be continued and demands specification.*<sup>333</sup> *Generally weak relations* between republican ministries and local authorities. Republican-wide policies were *weakly developed* and based on a *top-down approach often resisted by district administrations.*<sup>334</sup>

The lack of clarity in the division of competence between the local and regional levels forms an index of ineffective government that causes reform failure. The project criticism maintains the general line of pointing the gap between proclamations and practice. Despite the devolution of some managerial functions to the local level, republican policies retain a top-down orientation, provoking local resistance instead of concerted reform efforts. This resistance, in turn, hampers the attempts to launch

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<sup>332</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>333</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 8. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>334</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.



the implementation of reforms at the local level, which results in the already described situation when proposed reform options are not tested in practice.

These problems are addressed in the project's proposed interventions. As we have already addressed the economic content of the policy of substitution, we shall now focus on the way this policy is presented as a *governmental strategy*, whose absence was criticised by the project. The project sets forth the following principles of its assistance to the reform process: realism, flexibility and dynamism, integration of policy and practice, and partnership. Let us briefly discuss each of these principles of government in turn.

Firstly, the policy of substitution is presented as a 'hard' but realistic choice to develop primary care through a transfer of resources away from the institutional sector, rather than through additional financial inputs, "which is not in any case realistic at the present time".<sup>335</sup> The principle of realism thus requires that a governmental strategy unfold within existing financial limitations and that the costs of a policy be clearly stipulated, hence the project's recommendation about the "re-affirmation of policy of developing primary health care and general practice, but through a *conscious policy of 'substitution'* for secondary care".<sup>336</sup>

The principle of dynamism and flexibility specifies the project's view of a clear reform strategy by contrasting strategic policy planning with the notions of 'doctrine' or 'master-plan'.

The Consortium is of the opinion that in order to function successfully, the institutions must be capable of *operating in a flexible way, depending on the needs and circumstances, and modify their style of operation in order to enhance efficiency.* This is a *key skill* and the project can offer experience in this regard to the Karelian colleagues. *For this reason, the Consortium doubts the utility of the concept of master-plan for information systems and human resource development, stipulated in the terms of reference.* This suggests a rather *static planning of future development.* It may be better to concentrate the efforts on the creation of an *institutional foundation for the viable development* of the policy of human resource development and information systems.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>336</sup> Progress Report 3 EDUS9516, p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>337</sup> Inception Report EDUS9516, p. 13. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

The project's approach to policy emphasises the skills of flexible response to variable circumstances for the purposes of efficiency enhancement. It therefore resists the idea of a master-plan that would specify governmental practices in detail and instead claims for itself the role of 'laying foundations'. In the final report, this activity is presented as the creation of 'living' and 'dynamic' frameworks of human resource and information management that may be utilised as 'practical tools':

The major strategy documents on human resource development and integrated information systems, both prepared by Republic of Karelia specialists, have provided managers with *practical tools – not 'masterplans' but living, dynamic frameworks for decision-making – to support and strengthen the process of integration.*<sup>338</sup>

With regard to human resource development, the practical tool offered by the project is the technique of *staffing analysis* that connects personnel management to the imperatives of reform.

Staffing analysis is a way of *evaluating how staffing levels are determined and budgeted for, and how staff performance is measured.* [...] The first republic level staffing study, in the Ministry of Health, was documented and presented to the ministry in April. A second study, in the Ministry of Social Protection, *was carried out mainly by local consultants with advice from an EU specialist.*<sup>339</sup>

The [staffing] studies gave a snapshot of the staffing resources available to management in each district or ministry and how these were currently deployed. *No such studies had been carried out before. Local and EU consultants worked with the personnel managers concerned and demonstrated to them how this kind of information could be used in future planning and in supporting the reform policy of closer integration of social and health care.* In the extension phase all districts of the republic have been introduced to the technique and a *manual has been prepared as a training aid for personnel managers.*<sup>340</sup>

With regard to information systems, the specific technical innovation introduced by the project is the 'medico-social client record', an integrated information system that serves both health care and social protection agencies at local and republican levels.

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<sup>338</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., p. 10. Emphasis added.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added.

The introduction and testing of an integrated medico-social client record in three primary health care ambulatories is of considerable significance, not only to the Republic of Karelia, but for the whole Russian Federation. *The record ends the wasteful duplication of the parallel health and social care systems by allowing data on the individual patient/client to be stored together.* This is in the interest of the *individual service user*, who no longer has to present him or herself to a variety of agencies who do not communicate with each other. It is also a *management tool, facilitating joint planning and more effective targeting of services*, for example medico-social home care services to elderly persons at risk of admission to hospital. The record is therefore an *essential element in the transition to non-institutional care.*<sup>341</sup>

The medico-social record exemplifies efficient utilisation of information in the process of management both generally by ending the wasteful practice of a coexistence of parallel systems and more specifically by enabling practical measures in the achievement of the proclaimed goals of reform: de-institutionalisation of care and effective targeting of service provision.

The emphasis on practicality is also evident in the third principle of the project's model of management: *integration of policy and practice.* "The project offers an opportunity to test the effectiveness of application of various policies through their testing at the local level in pilot experiments. The Consortium considers this approach *correct and reliable.* The project must be *firmly grounded in practical experience.* Such an approach suggests a focus on the *relations of the Republic and the districts in the context of the process of decentralisation.*"<sup>342</sup>

The principle of integration of policy and practice is most clearly manifested in the overall method of project implementation that posits pilot experiments as the *foundation* of policy proposals.

How many patients were receiving unnecessary hospital treatment? How much was it costing? What was wrong with them and what were the alternatives? How should those alternatives be put in place and what would it involve in terms of training and information technology? Did the solutions work? *These questions could only be answered by analysing specific areas, developing solutions and testing them.*<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Ibid., p. 27. Emphasis added.

<sup>342</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 13. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>343</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

The Concluding Conference of Karelian health and social sector professionals, where the results of the project were presented, authorises this bottom-up approach as a significant project achievement in its own right.

*The technique of reforming used by the Tacis project merits much attention: activities proposed at republican level are tested in specific districts and institutions (pilot projects) and, if the results are positive, the experience is disseminated all over the republic.<sup>344</sup>*

Although local piloting has been explicitly posited as a project principle in the Inception Report, subsequent reporting emphasises the Karelian counterpart's embrace and active promotion of this approach.

*It is important to note that it was the Policy and Management working group, which proposed that the initiative for policy development in the project should rest with the pilot districts. This followed EU consultant advice in October 1997 but the responsibility for this bold decision was the Karelian partner's alone.<sup>345</sup>*

*It cannot be stressed often enough that much of the above is largely the achievement of the Karelian partner, with Tacis consultants operating in a support role. This can only be good for the sustainability of the reform process in the longer term.<sup>346</sup>*

Since the sustainability of reform results is the main success criterion of the project, the agreement of the Karelian authorities with the method of implementation suggested by Tacis acquires the status of a 'bold decision'. According to the project, this decision has produced important results regarding project implementation:

*Fundamental change has occurred in attitudes to integrated working between social and health care sectors. At the inception stage pilot districts were sceptical of the policy of integration, which they saw as imposed from above. Two years later all three pilot districts have integrated their services to a greater or lesser extent. Other districts (for example Kostamuksha, Prionezhskii) have already begun to follow their example, without prompting from ministries.<sup>347</sup>*

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<sup>344</sup> Resolution of the International Conference "Reforms of Health Care and Social Protection in the Republic of Karelia" EDRUS9516, p. 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>345</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 25. Emphasis added.

<sup>346</sup> Progress Report 2 EDRUS9516, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>347</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

The bottom-up approach thus forms an exemplary model of effective and efficient implementation of reforms: while the top-down approach was claimed by the project to provoke local resistance and thus hinder reform implementation, the local piloting strategy, in which the districts are granted initiative, is taken to lead to the enthusiastic adoption of the *very same* reform strategy. Acceptance of project reform strategies is also more easily gained by *horizontal communication* between the pilot districts and the districts not involved in the project than by top-down decisions of the republican government.

[Dissemination] has created a *new set of horizontal links between managers and specialists in districts throughout the republic, links which certainly did not exist before and which provide the basis for continued mutual support and therefore sustainability*. Dissemination has therefore been shown to have a *strong developmental content*.<sup>348</sup>

*Networks of information exchange and mutual support* have been established between the 16 districts and the 3 pilot districts. *Inter-district cooperation on this scale is probably unprecedented in the republic and adds greatly to the prospects of sustainability*. Local steering groups of *key figures committed to reform* are also crucial to sustainability.<sup>349</sup>

The Inter-Pilot District Managers' Group, established in October 1998, has continued to function as an *important network for the dissemination of good practice*.<sup>350</sup>

Horizontal and networking mechanisms are thus held to exceed the vertical top-down approach both in the efficiency of policy implementation and the effectiveness of policy solutions, understood in terms of their grounding in 'practical experience'. The strategy of local piloting, combined with active dissemination of pilot project results with the help of local consultants, is claimed to generate a 'snowball effect', whereby new adherents of reforms are gained and assisted in their operation: "The process has not only disseminated the results of the Tacis project but *has given significantly increased momentum to social and health care reform in the republic as a whole*. The 'snowball' effect has been very apparent."<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Ibid., p. 35. Emphasis added.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid., p. 16. Emphasis added.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., p. 6. Emphasis added.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., p. 16. Emphasis added.

Finally, the principle of *partnership* relates to the important role that the project envisions for the local counterparts in policy design and implementation. The project's objective is to make "*a more systematic attempt to engage health care professionals in debate* about the direction of health care reform and the introduction of general practice".<sup>352</sup> The project therefore presents itself as an exemplary model of partnership-based government, to be emulated by the Karelian authorities after project expiry through a broader involvement of various social organisations in the process of management. The Conception of the Development of Health Care, approved by the project and officialised by the Karelian Ministry of Health Care, has as one of its tasks "the activation of the operation of professional associations"<sup>353</sup> and the "development of the new institutions of management (associations, senior specialist councils), [...] interaction with and coordination of the activities of social organisations"<sup>354</sup>.

The result of the policy of partnership is deemed to be the newly found enthusiasm regarding the reforms, both among professionals and, by implication, the broader audience. Due to its reliance on active cooperation with professionals and the focus on greater professional autonomy, the partnership model is taken to have effected a change in the way local professionals relate to their work. The Final Report notes that the training received in the course of the project not only improved the skills of the trainees through their practical exposure to the reform process<sup>355</sup>, but also enhanced their *status*, thereby addressing the problem of 'low prestige and morale' without any additional financial inputs:

The pioneering training courses for general practitioners, nurses and basic social workers *are not only producing specialists with new and improved skills: they also*

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<sup>352</sup> Progress Report 2 EDUS9516, p. 13. Emphasis added. Among the specific techniques deployed to achieve this goal are the following: "questionnaire survey of medical personnel to establish their chief sources of information on health care reform; feature page in federation-wide medical newspaper on primary health care reform in Karelia; Internet page on the project opened with assistance of University of Petrozavodsk; briefings on project work to polyclinics and professional associations; publication of project bulletins."

<sup>353</sup> Conception of the Development of Health Care in the Republic of Karelia, p. 24. Translation by author.

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9. Translation by author.

<sup>355</sup> In its training programme the project seeks to correct the excessively theoretical character of training through the organisation of "onsite training courses" and "follow-up coaching in the workplace" in addition to 'classroom studies'. See Progress Report 2 EDUS9516, p. 16.

*begin to address the problem of low prestige and morale, particularly among nurses and social workers.* It is no accident that nurses have recently taken the *confident step of forming their own association.* Similarly, properly accredited training courses and multi-professional teamworking with medical staff *have begun to improve the status of social workers.* The republic will shortly have its first group of qualified social work teachers, which also strengthens the emerging social work profession.<sup>356</sup>

The enthusiasm and a sense of empowerment are also argued to be visible on the level of the general population: “Whilst dissemination has been mainly to professionals, and to some non-governmental organisations, it is probable that *their enthusiasm to see and discuss the results of the project reflects something in the public mood also.*”<sup>357</sup> The changes in the public mood concern not only the abandonment of scepticism about the reforms, but a greater awareness of and interest in the practices of health promotion and ‘self-help’ which form an integral part of the non-institutional strategy espoused by the project.

*A health promotion program was elaborated.* The priorities were: *maternity and children’s protection, anti-smoking campaign, caries prevention, psychiatric care.* [...] Medico-preventive program on teenagers’ upbringing is being developed, work is being done on establishing and organisation of the “Asthma-school”, *voluntary societies* on diabetes, cardio-vascular and psychiatric diseases.<sup>358</sup> *Preventive medicine* received more attention. This included mother and child health, dental and mental health, and smoking was targeted with a *campaign* that included a competition. *Self-help groups* were developed for diabetes and for cardio-vascular and mental illness.<sup>359</sup>

Health promotion campaigns are central to enhancing public awareness of preventive medicine, which is necessary to decrease the recourse to institutional care. The enthusiasm that the project claims to have generated through partnerships and communication with the public is taken to be conducive to the reorientation of public *conduct* towards health promotion and thus supporting the effective shift to primary and preventive care.

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<sup>356</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., p. 30. Emphasis added.

<sup>358</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>359</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

Since both the indices of the problems in health and social protection sectors and the project's proposed strategic and technical solutions relate to the problematisation of the management of the sectors and its capacity to influence public attitudes and conduct, we may speak of the constitution in the project texts of the object of government. The scheme of this constitution and the verbal techniques at work in it are presented in the following figure.




Figure 11: Constitution of the Object of Government (EDRUS9516)

### 2.3.1.2. The Object of Government in Energy Management Reform

The heating systems project has the objective of “foster[ing] *operational improvements in the district heating system* in the border regions [that] would pave the way to a *total overhaul of the energy system* in the Republic of Karelia”.<sup>360</sup> We

<sup>360</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 4. Emphasis added.



have already discussed in detail the entrepreneurial character of the operational improvements advocated in the course of the project. We shall now focus on the way the project problematises the energy management system more generally and suggests possible avenues of its 'overhaul'.

The indices of the problems in energy management relate to the absence of a strategy that would address what the project identified as the key issue of the reform: the provision of heating services under the conditions of financial scarcity. Firstly, the project notes the lack of *strategic management* as such: managerial practices in the sector are depicted as 'firefighting', sporadic reactive responses to the economic crisis.

Overall, management in Russian administrations and energy companies is "firefighting" the adverse circumstances of an economy in turmoil. *It does therefore not come as a surprise that tackling daily problems has priority over long-term strategic issues.*<sup>361</sup>

Economic difficulties call for rapid responses to short-term problems and preclude long-term strategic policy design. The project notes the tendency among local managers to "focus on such actions where short-term benefits are expected, to the detriment of deeper and more ambitious reforms".<sup>362</sup> The lack of a long-term strategy of reform results in the perpetuation of ineffective and inefficient management practices that we described in our analysis of the object of enterprise.

Secondly, the index of ineffectiveness of the current managerial structure is formed by causally linking reform failure with the *fragmentation of responsibilities* in the sector.

In the local administration of every region there is a department or person responsible for energy supply/heat supply to individual sectors. These are responsible for all communal boiler houses, which deliver heat to the public sector. However, responsibility for the heat supply capacity of industrial boilers, which is reserved for local service, is often also taken care of by administration departments. They are also responsible for fuel supply and have a key function in the implementation of local fuels in heat production. The energy administration is *very complex, comprising of many organisations with high levels of involvement and very conflicting interests and ideas as to how development should*

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<sup>361</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 44. Emphasis added.

<sup>362</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 31.

*proceed. The regions' Energy Master Plan has been re-evaluated many times and its focus has changed considerably.*<sup>363</sup>

The complexity of current administration and the presence of conflicting views on the development of the sector serve to indicate the lack of a strategic vision of reform and the mechanism of its implementation.

Thirdly, the index of ineffective government is formed by the lack of a legal basis for transforming the ownership structure in the sector and, more generally, the *restrictive operations of bureaucracy*. Since the formation of SMEs in the energy sector is one of the main objectives of the project, excessive bureaucratic regulation of entrepreneurial activity is presented as a negative factor, an obstacle to the reform process, which is based on *facilitating* entrepreneurial practices.

The most difficult barrier to overcome, hindering successful implementation of the project mission in the field of institutional support, could be *the lack of a legal basis for substantially transforming the structure, ownership and management of local energy supply utilities. The orientation of centrally-ruled enterprises over the last eighty years in Russia is still present everywhere.*<sup>364</sup>

We did not realise two years ago that the *old bureaucratic* [sic!] *still controls any decision and that long delays, permits, licences, republican and federal approvals would be needed at every stage along the way.*<sup>365</sup>

The indices of restrictiveness and passivity are combined in the project's study of the utilisation of local fuels in the republic, heavily dependent on 'imported' coal and oil, whose transportation forms a major component of the fuel price. The non-utilisation of significant reserves of peat, which, alongside wastewood, is suggested by the project as a locally available alternative to coal and oil, forms the index of inefficiency of present management. "In spite of the large number of peat deposits peat extraction is insignificant, and mostly for agricultural needs."<sup>366</sup> The non-utilisation of local fuels is in turn deemed to be caused by complex bureaucratic procedures of licencing peat production.

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<sup>363</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid., p. 32. Emphasis added.

<sup>365</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>366</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 10. Emphasis added.

The present procedure for licensing fuel peat production is *not likely to encourage peat usage in Karelia*. A revised licensing procedure, which is more *conducive to fuel peat development*, is needed. With *proper planning and control procedures*, and co-operation between developers and the statutory authorities, peat production can be regarded as a sustainable use of a local natural resource.<sup>367</sup>

Present licencing practices are thus held to discourage rather than facilitate peat production and are, by implication, cast as ‘improper’ planning and control procedures. The passivity of enterprise managers compounded by excessive bureaucratic restrictions forms a vicious circle, whereby instead of promoting presently absent entrepreneurial practices, governmental agencies discourage their very emergence.

Let us now discuss the model of government that the project proposes as a solution to these problems and illustrates in its own activities. According to the project, “for the implementation of a more effective energy policy it is necessary to establish a feasible strategy for changing *administrative management procedures*.”<sup>368</sup> The first feature of this strategy is the embrace of an active governmental policy of establishing the presently lacking entrepreneurial structures that are held to enhance the efficiency of the energy system. The project’s objective is presented as “*creating fuel supply and transport SMEs*”.<sup>369</sup> Whether creation is understood literally as the establishment of a peat production company<sup>370</sup> or as ‘laying foundations’ for the establishment of ESCOs, the project advocates *active governmental intervention* into the energy sector for the purposes of its entrepreneurial restructuring. In relation to private business operation in the sector, government takes on the function of *external facilitation*. The project considers necessary the “*support of the municipalities for entrepreneurs to establish new SMEs for wood fuel supply and to set up competition*”.<sup>371</sup> It is therefore not only the potential entrepreneurs but also municipal managers that are the target of the project’s training programme, in which SME creation is the main focus.

The main focus [of training seminars] will be on SME creation, which will entail instruction on the basic core functions of an SME. [...] These will be to impart a *thorough*

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<sup>367</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., p. 21. Emphasis added.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>370</sup> Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, p. 3.

<sup>371</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 47. Emphasis added.

*understanding and appreciation of SME start-up and operation together with enabling the creation of SMEs from a knowledge and skills point of view.*<sup>372</sup>

One of the most important targets is to provide information to *enable the beneficiary to set up enterprises for peat production and transportation.*<sup>373</sup>

Active governmental intervention is also advocated beyond the domain of fuel production since efficiency-enhancing reforms require corresponding changes in *public attitudes and conduct*, i.e. the interest of the consumers in practicing energy saving.

Promotion of the use of western energy and environmental methods requires *involvement not only from private companies and/or local authorities in the development of the new energy sources, but from the whole social apparatus from the top to the bottom.*<sup>374</sup>

The involvement of the ‘whole social apparatus’ is practiced on two levels: the strategy of involvement of social organisations in the wide ‘forum’ of energy reform discussion that we addressed in our analysis of the formation of local agency and the attempt to foster energy-saving practices of individual consumers. With regard to the latter, the project proposes to reform the practice of *invoicing*. One of the proposals in the reform strategy prepared by the project consists in “invoic[ing] the consumer based on actual consumption”.<sup>375</sup> According to the project, such a measure would make it in the *interest* of the customer to practice energy saving and avoid heat losses:

An important factor in the planning of renovation procedures is district heating energy measuring. *Invoicing based on measured consumption will increase the consumers’ willingness to save considerably which will enable significant total energy saving.*<sup>376</sup>

Secondly, at present the customer does not pay the whole energy bill, but only 30–50%, the rest being subsidised by the state. According to the project, “the best way to give incentives for energy conservation is if the user is responsible for the total energy

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<sup>372</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 37. Emphasis added.

<sup>373</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 17. Emphasis added.

<sup>374</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 31. Emphasis added.

<sup>375</sup> Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, p. 19.

<sup>376</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 7. Emphasis added.

consumed.”<sup>377</sup> Fostering energy saving practices among the local population is thus deemed possible, firstly, through invoicing the consumer on the basis of measured consumption, and, secondly, by removing subsidies to the effect that the consumer is responsible for the total energy bill. The project thus authorises “changes which would lead to full cost responsibility being transferred to the consumer”.<sup>378</sup>

The second feature of the model of government promoted by the project is the importance granted to *international partnerships*, concretely exemplified by the programme of cross-border cooperation (CBC). International, and particularly cross-border cooperation is presented as both essential to ensuring the sustainability of reform results and required by potential foreign investors.

The CBC initiative has been increasing its intensity, *spurred on by the NEFCO requirement that it would like to see a sustainable level of Twinning Activities established to support any loan agreements it makes.*<sup>379</sup>

In support of the pilot projects CBC activities will be organised to *provide know-how transfer, training towards the sustainable development of the project after the pilot object has been built and started.* This last point is a *requirement of Many IFI's [International Financial Institutions] today to ensure that loan repayments are met and that the objectives of the pilot projects are fully realised.*<sup>380</sup>

The project will intensify in the development of cross border co-operation between the twinning municipalities [...] *to transform the project's guidance into sustainable growth* in the border regions.<sup>381</sup>

Cross-border partnerships are also presented as a way of combining the introduction of Western energy management models with 'local experience', the latter highlighted by the project as an essential component of its management change strategy.

It is vital from the point of view of the project to *continue efforts to bring the representatives of the Finnish and Karelian border communities closer to each other in order to activate cooperation and support local development* on both sides of the

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<sup>377</sup> Progress Report 4 ERUS9701, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>378</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 56.

<sup>379</sup> Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. Emphasis added.

<sup>381</sup> Progress Report 2 ERUS9701, p. 22. Emphasis added.

border and to integrate cross-border cooperation into the master plans for regions *while providing possibility to better understand local culture and traditions*.<sup>382</sup>

As we discussed above, the project proceeds from the need for a ‘careful synthesis’ of Western models and local experience, since the former are taken to ‘not always work in Russia’. The goal of the project is thus to introduce “best practice examples from Western Europe, pertinent to the local situation”<sup>383</sup>. To this effect, the project seeks to organise information and training workshops for the local counterparts in which comparative analyses of Western managerial practices in the energy sector are presented.

The Consortium has already elaborated in-depth comparative analyses for Russia of *prototype organisational patterns implemented in EU Member States towards an effective management structure*. [...] The survey and analysis of alternative organisational patterns will focus on the case studies of Finland, Germany and Ireland. The reasons for fairly different organisational structures will be discussed and put into relation to the economic system and the national energy system. In this way a *profound understanding of Western European patterns of public administration* in the energy sector will be achieved, with particular emphasis on the topic of energy conservation. [...] The specific deliverables in this action will be the *development of a management model to be gradually implemented into the management structure* of the Karelian energy sector.<sup>384</sup> The project team will support the municipalities of the project region in providing *organisational support to foster western management techniques and also support increased cross border co-operation*.<sup>385</sup>

The contents of the reform model are thus to be generated in the comparative analysis of energy management in a number of West European countries. However, the project also phrases its task as “creat[ing] a model from the implementation of pilot projects”,<sup>386</sup> which suggests that the model is to be generated or at least validated by local experience. The success of the pilot projects is then held to authorise the ‘replication’ of the piloted strategy in other districts: “Based on the experience of the

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<sup>382</sup> Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>383</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 20.

<sup>384</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 27. Emphasis added.

<sup>385</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>386</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 4.

implementation of the first pilot project in Kalevala, replication should be started in other regions.”<sup>387</sup>

Another way of maintaining attunement to local specificity while implementing reforms based on Western models is the active solicitation by the project of local *feedback* and its utilisation in the design of the training programme. The project has produced a “list of answers to questions and problems which arose during the Tacis work for assistance in helping to define investment needs and undertake preparatory and feasibility work for loan applications. [...] This list will allow the training session to *be tuned to local requirements in an optimal way*.”<sup>388</sup>

The final feature of the model of government advocated by the project is its emphasis on *transparency* and *accountability*. On the requirement of NEFCO, which makes financial transparency a condition of granting loans to the pilot districts, the project ventures to develop a new accounting system at the respective sites.

On the request of the International Financing Organisation NEFCO, the establishment of new computer-based accounting systems in the Municipal district heating companies in Kalevala and Sortavala are foreseen.<sup>389</sup>

A system of bookkeeping and accounting should meet *European standards*, to provide the financing institutions with a *transparent overview of financial flows of the invested funds*.<sup>390</sup>

The Consultant will assist the municipalities in establishing a *fully operational and transparent accounting system so that all transactions are recorded*.<sup>391</sup>

However, the importance of accounting techniques and financial transparency is not limited to fulfilling the foreign lender's demands. The project also casts accounting as a crucial tool of government, enabling effective planning and management. The new accounting system is expected to “lead to a higher quality not only in bookkeeping but also financial, material and personnel management and controlling”.<sup>392</sup> The accounting

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<sup>387</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 49.

<sup>388</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 20. Emphasis added.

<sup>389</sup> Progress Report 4 ERUS9701, p. 5. Emphasis added. According to Project Completion Report ERUS9701, the establishment of the accounting system was not envisioned in the original work programme but was only elaborated in response to NEFCO requirements. (p. 38.)

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>391</sup> Progress Report 3 ERUS9701, p. 3. Emphasis added.

<sup>392</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 48.

system is thus one of the guarantees of sustainability of reform results, though it requires “constant guidance and monitoring”<sup>393</sup> in the aftermath of the project to itself become sustainable.

Besides elaborating the model of a new accounting system to be installed in the pilot districts, the project also presents its own activities as *exemplary* in terms of transparency and the use of accounting and auditing techniques. The project’s reform proposals are based on the extensive *auditing* of all district heating sites in the region to acquire the information about its technical characteristics, managerial structure and financial situation – the information that was not available at all or was of unsatisfactory quality before the project.<sup>394</sup> The project also presents its own transparency policy as an exemplary model for the local counterpart: “The *remarkable characteristic of the project is its openness*. The data collected and processed within the framework of the Project is *available* and *accessible*.”<sup>395</sup> The transparency of the project is presented in contrast to the difficulties that it has had in acquiring information from local governments and companies.<sup>396</sup>

Insofar as the identified problems and the proposed reform solutions in the energy sector focus on the structure, functions and operation of managerial organisations, we can speak of the constitution of the object of government in the heating systems project. This constitution is schematically summarised in figure 12.

### 2.3.1.3. *The Object of Government in National Park Development*

In its evaluation of the current management of nature protection the parks development project proceeds from the problematisation of the existing managerial mechanisms. This problematisation takes shape in the following indices. Firstly, the project notes the absence of a *clear vision* or *strategy of reform* in the area of nature protection, and particularly the establishment of new national parks: “The new proposed parks seem to have *strong support* among local authorities in these districts, but at the same time *it is not yet clear, what the establishment of a national park means for an*

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
<sup>393</sup> Ibid.

<sup>394</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701. Appendix 1, p. 3.

<sup>395</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 76. Emphasis added.

<sup>396</sup> See Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 10, Progress Report 2 ERUS9701, p. 10.





*Figure 12: Constitution of the Object of Government (ERUS9701)*

*area.*<sup>397</sup> Describing the generally supportive attitude of the local authorities and the population to the establishment of the parks, the Socioeconomic Assessment, produced by the project, notes the lack of clarity about the concrete way of proceeding with this task: “What to start with, no one knows.”<sup>398</sup> The lack of clarity on reform objectives and techniques correlates with the perpetuation of Soviet-era centralised and state-budget-oriented managerial practices, which are deemed by the project to be unfit in the conditions of a market economy. The following fragment sums up this index of the problem:

*Under the command economy this approach to management of the protected areas worked successfully. Research was carried out, development occurred, salaries paid, the protected area protected. However, with the transition to the market economy, and the ensuing economic impacts, state support for protected areas has fallen dramatically.*

<sup>397</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>398</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 35.

[...] There is a need for protected areas to *adapt to this new situation and for the management of protected areas to better reflect these changes in circumstance*. The protected area management must have a *recognised and defined process of prioritising the protected area's development* and research activities.<sup>399</sup>

The index of the problem thus refers to the *passivity* of governmental institutions in the face of new market conditions and the continuing reliance on outdated practices. The Socioeconomic Assessment emphasises that despite the rising unemployment in the respective districts, there are few governmental efforts to actively promote new forms of employment such as tourism services and undertake retraining programmes for the local population.<sup>400</sup> Another example of governmental passivity concerns the many instances of 'wild tourism' in the territories provisionally reserved for conservation purposes. Rather than embark on an active course of *developing* and *regulating* tourism, the authorities refrain from any decision on park establishment, which results in the proliferation of the kind of tourism that brings no economic benefits and carries grave environmental costs.

The Tolvajärvi territory is already in recreational use. *Unfortunately, there can be seen the disadvantages of wild tourism*. Small forest fires have burned forest, trees are felled for firewood and construction, *sixteen illegal cottages – mainly in the most beautiful places – deteriorate the landscape and clutter along the shores is very common*. Hunting is supposed to be forbidden within the partial nature reserve, fishing is allowed, but *both activities commonly take place here without licenses*. *This uncontrolled tourism is very difficult to stop as long as there is no national park*. [...] If no improvement can take place, the *current wild life [sic!] together with some forestry activities will destroy the special values of the area*.<sup>401</sup>

In the sphere of management planning in national parks, the project notes the prevalence of abstract long-term strategies with no concrete 'action plans': "Many of the plans are *unrealistic in both inception and in potential to implement*. They do not contain an Action Plan."<sup>402</sup> More specifically, the project draws a distinction between 'legislation' and 'policy' and claims that the exclusive focus on preparing new legislation is insufficient insofar as it is not complemented with concrete managerial

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<sup>399</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 73. Emphasis added.

<sup>400</sup> Socioeconomic Assessment ENVRUS9704, p. 32.

<sup>401</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>402</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 74. Emphasis added.

practices that specify the overly general legislative directions: “At present it is believed that the legislation provides sufficient policy direction. However legislation is *in reality only the enabling mechanism by which policy may be implemented*. The absence of a *coherent integrated policy*, with a supporting *strategy for its implementation*, means that development of the zapovedniks [strict nature reserves] and the system as a whole remains *disjointed and dependent on personalities and not personnel*.”<sup>403</sup> The index of ineffective government is thus established with recourse to a causal linkage of ‘disjointed’ and ‘arbitrary’ management with the absence of concrete governmental reform strategies and the excessive focus on legislation at the expense of *policy*.

Although there has been a series of legislation passed for PA’s [protected areas], the most relevant being the 1994 legislation, there remains *no coherent overall federal government policy* on Protected Areas (zapovedniks, national parks, nature parks, zakazniks, etc). In the absence of such a policy, *the legislation is reduced in its effectiveness and provides only limited guidance for management*. The existence of a coordinated government policy for all protected areas and their management would benefit both the government and those agencies and individuals responsible for their management. [...] Such a policy, however, *would not necessarily require changes in the current structure of authority*. [...] However, the policy would have to *define the lateral and vertical linkages and responsibilities of all the relevant agencies and actors*. [...] Most importantly, the policy would need to *pragmatically reflect the current economic and managerial reality of Russia and provide a focused and realistic range of goals for the future*.<sup>404</sup>

The problematisation of the management of nature protection is thus related less to the broad legislative framework or the current structure of authority than to the lack of ‘policy’, understood in terms of a concrete definition of priorities and the responsibilities of various agencies, which would result in more realistic planning, both on the level of inception and in the process of implementation.

The second aspect of the problematisation of governmental activities relates to the excessively *restrictive* bureaucratic regulation. In the context of tourism development this criticism takes concrete shape in the claim that the regulations for tourism enterprise establishment and operation are too tight: “The park authorities are not able to build up a *constructive relationship* with private enterprises, but *try*

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<sup>403</sup> Ibid., p. 74. Emphasis added.

<sup>404</sup> Ibid., pp. 72–73. Emphasis added.

*to regulate tourism too tightly.*"<sup>405</sup> The project's final reporting notes that restrictive bureaucratic regulations were a serious obstacle to its own operation: "The role of all kind of regulations and bureaucracy, with which the Russian administration is dealing with, was underestimated."<sup>406</sup> The most frequently reported example of unanticipated bureaucratic hurdles is the restriction of the project's access to official maps that were to be utilised in the development of the Geographical Information System in the proposed parks:

This work met two unexpected difficulties: poor availability of forest inventory information and official maps. Goskomles, the State Forest Committee of Karelia informed the Project that it would hand over forest information only from existing parks to the Karelian Government and the Project. Consequently, this data was received only from the Paanajärvi NP, but not the other parks. The mapping authority of Northwest Russia firstly told that it can sell maps in all existing scales to the Project. But in spring 2000 they changed the view and stated that only the maps with scale 1:200 000 or smaller would be available for the Project if the secret information from them is removed. In practice, only from the Paanajärvi territory there were maps available also at scale 1:50 000.<sup>407</sup>

Tight regulations are also mentioned frequently with regard to the operations of the Border Guard Service, whose inflexibility impairs the development of cross-border tourism in the designated parks. "90% of the proposed national park [Tuulos] is in the restricted border zone, therefore at present visiting it is strictly limited. *Establishment of the park will only be feasible if the regime of visiting this area by Russian and foreign tourists is simplified.*"<sup>408</sup>

The tight and inflexible regulation of entrepreneurial activity exacerbates the problem of the lack of local tour operators, deemed by the project to be its main counterparts in the development of tourism. The project's reporting mentions as a 'constraint' on its operation the fact that "current legislation makes it very *difficult for people to set up a firm for any business*"<sup>409</sup>. In the report on its task of 'identification of potential tour operators', the project notes:

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<sup>405</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 36. Emphasis added.

<sup>406</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 21.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>408</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Tuulos National Park, p. 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>409</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 113.

Only a small number of local tour operators, mainly dealing with accommodation, have been identified. Some of them *have also shown deeper interest in co-operation and participated in the seminars*. However, the Russian legislation is not, at the moment, *favouring this kind of private business*.<sup>410</sup>

One of the main problems in tourism development in Karelia is the shortage, and in the remote areas even *lack of local tour operators*. With the help of tourism administration, *very few people and enterprises working with tourism were identified and invited*.<sup>411</sup>

The project strategy of ‘raising new entrepreneurs’<sup>412</sup> and thereby contributing to local livelihood is thus hampered by the absence of governmental support for or excessive intervention into newly emergent entrepreneurial activities.<sup>413</sup>

The second aspect of the criticism of ‘policing’ concerns the specific mode of nature protection presently applied in Russia. National parks, whose establishment is the goal of the project, are less widespread in Russia than the institution of *zapovednik*, or ‘strict nature reserve’, where such activities as tourism are entirely prohibited.

The Russian conception of PAs is different, in comparison with other countries. According to the Russian conception the main unit of a structure is a *zapovednik*, which is from the category of strong nature protection. The system of Russian *zapovedniks* has been working for 80 years and now is recognised all over the world. Traditionally, a *zapovednik* is a nature area with an *untouched status and forbidden for tourist use*. In other countries similar areas were established later, and the widespread category of state protected areas abroad is a national park. [...] In Russia the first NPs such as Sochinski and Losinoostrovski were established in 1983. NPs became a brand new category of nature protected areas, which could *combine the conservation of nature, cultural heritage and tourism development and provide sustainable park development*. Partly a national park is *open for the regulated attendance of visitors with recreational, educational and cultural goals* – that is the difference from a *zapovednik*.<sup>414</sup>

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<sup>410</sup> Progress Report 4 ENVRUS9704, p. 10. Emphasis added.

<sup>411</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>412</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 13.

<sup>413</sup> It is to be noted that the criticism of ineffective bureaucratic regulations not only targets the Russian authorities, but also the European Commission, whose complex and excessively centralised procedures have hampered the ‘investment’ component of the project, the construction of the Visitor Centre in the Paanajärvi Park: “*There is a myriad of all kind of rules and regulations to be followed, of which the contractor should be aware, but which are not easily, if at all, available in written form*. Trial and error method is time-consuming to identify them. [...] The EC procedure for works such as the Visitor Centre Construction is *very demanding and prone to delays. Had it been possible to decentralise and simplify the tender procedure and decision-making, the process could have been faster and cheaper*.” (Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 21–22. Emphasis added.)

<sup>414</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 68. Emphasis added.

Though strict nature reserves are held to be ‘recognised’ all over the world, their excessively restrictive characteristics are problematised, particularly with regard to the current condition of financial scarcity. As strict nature reserves are incapable of generating income from tourism, they are resigned to ‘dependence on state budgets’, which, as we discussed in our analysis of the object of enterprise, is the focus of project criticism. Secondly, strict nature reserves prohibit local economic activities and therefore encounter local resistance, making it difficult to gain the acceptance of the governmental policy of conservation. Since “nature conservation can be carried out more successfully if there is strong local interest and participation”,<sup>415</sup> the limitation of the economic possibilities for the local population and its non-involvement in decision-making serves to jeopardise the policy of conservation. In contrast, the national park option as presented by the project claims both to rely on local participation and provide additional benefits to the local population while scarcely limiting their ‘traditional’ rights. At the same time, however, the national park possesses more instruments of enforcement than a ‘nature park’, a protected area under regional jurisdiction with little administrative authority.

The main differences between a national park and nature park are in *connection with the park administration*. [...] The land and waters of a national park are under the control of the park administration, while the *nature park administration cannot administrate the park territory*. The nature park *cannot independently decide for instance on cutting trees and the construction of summer cottages or effectively supervise the behaviour of visitors*. However, a nature park would, without any doubt, contribute to nature conservation in the territory, but many of the future threats for the nature cannot be solved by it.<sup>416</sup>

The problems of governmental passivity, ineffectiveness and restrictiveness are addressed in the reform solutions advocated by the project. Firstly, the dual strategy of nature conservation and tourism development is presented as an *active and facilitative policy course* that assists, rather than restricts, local entrepreneurial practices.

To develop the tourist infrastructure, the Park is establishing *partnerships with all stakeholders, enterprises, and entrepreneurs*. [...] *From the beginning the park*

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<sup>415</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>416</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, p. 36. Emphasis added.

*administration should have a keen sense of bearing to local points of view whenever they are not in contradiction with park objectives. [...] The national park should take seriously all local tourist entrepreneurs, who would like to take groups to the park. Instead of setting obstacles, the NP should encourage their activities within the limits of the park regulation.*<sup>417</sup>

The Park will provide the infrastructure for visitors inside its territory and the *framework of how the tourism is managed*. [...] *It shall not aim at having a monopoly of tourism in the area, it gives priority to local operators, and aims for high quality.*<sup>418</sup>

This fragment demonstrates the contrast made by the project between restrictive and facilitative operations of government. The strategy of *liaisons*, which we addressed as a way of dealing with the untypicality of the national park as an enterprise, acquires central importance in the formation of the object of government. Rather than ‘monopolise’ tourism in the area, the parks should facilitate the emergence of a local network of tour operators, thus establishing the presently lacking ‘constructive relationship’ with the private sector. According to the project’s 2010 vision for the Paanajärvi Park, it should be characterised by a “transparent working policy and people’s participation [as] the basement [sic!] of its collaboration with stakeholders”.<sup>419</sup>

These forms of partnership are central to the project’s commitment to provide additional employment to the local population. At the same time, partnership is conditioned by the specific requirements of ecotourism and the potential partners, including private tour operators, are also subject to *training* in the proper conduct of tourism in protected areas.<sup>420</sup> Facilitative government, whose *exemplary model*

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<sup>417</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, p. 56. Emphasis added. Identical formulations are used in the Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 45.

<sup>418</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 48. Emphasis added.

<sup>419</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 16. Besides advocating transparent relations between the park and private entrepreneurs, the project also addresses the theme of transparency more specifically with regard to the economic activity of a managerial organisation such as the national park. Transparency is required by the park’s ambiguous position as both an economic agent and a regulator of economic activity. The project’s strategy purports to achieve transparency by establishing tourism departments of the parks as separate ‘result units’ for budgetary purposes. The project also emphasises the need for *independent auditing* to monitor the transparency of financial flows. See Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 18, Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 52.

<sup>420</sup> Training activities for local entrepreneurs are listed in the project training programme, annexed to Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, pp. 36–44.

the project presents through its own activity in the four proposed parks, therefore carries not only economic but also *educational benefits* for the population, fostering both ‘enterprise culture’ and the commitment to nature conservation. The project team leader explicitly declares the goal of technical assistance to be not the provision of equipment but the programme of training:

*To provide the most efficient work of the park there is a need to train the park administration, entrepreneurs and the local population to improve the tourist development in the park. We are planning to hold a big programme of education, about 13 events, such as seminars, conferences and meetings. To my mind, the purchase of equipment is not the main goal of our Project but a training programme to promote the protected areas development.*<sup>421</sup>

Besides undertaking an elaborate training programme for the local counterparts, the project posits “investment in education”<sup>422</sup> as a more general modality of government that serves to successfully elicit “favourable changes in attitudes and behaviour”.<sup>423</sup> The success of the project’s dual strategy of nature conservation and tourist development is taken to depend on the capacity of the project to inculcate the necessary skills and attitudes in the local counterparts. “Education and training of *local population, administration staff* and *entrepreneurs* is of much importance. *Development of tourism is possible, provided they possess adequate knowledge and skills.*”<sup>424</sup>

Secondly, the problem of excessive restrictions is addressed through the *diversification of the regulation of behaviour* in national parks. Avoiding the extremes of highly limited access to ‘zapovedniks’ and the absence of administrative regulation in nature parks, the Code of Conduct in National Parks claims that “*effective supervision* is needed in every national park *but it must be carried out in a discreet way*”.<sup>425</sup> Instead of direct prohibition and control, the project favours a “*guiding and discussing* attitude of the rangers”.<sup>426</sup> In contrast to the ‘zapovednik’, which forms a unitary strictly protected zone, the project plans for national parks

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<sup>421</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 48. Emphasis added.

<sup>422</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 18.

<sup>423</sup> Development Strategy of the Paanajärvi National Park, p. 15. Emphasis added.

<sup>424</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 26. Emphasis added.

<sup>425</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 120. Emphasis added.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.



feature an elaborate *functional zoning* policy with a detailed gradation of restrictions of access and prescriptions of behaviour. In all four proposed parks the zoning follows the same logic of stratification:

The general structure of functional zones is the following:

1. *Strictly protected zones* are aimed for regeneration of particularly valuable natural complexes and sites where *no recreation or management is allowed*.
2. *Recreation zones where conditions for sightseeing and short relaxation are provided*. [...] Territories allocated for outdoor activities and tourism should be defined from the perspective of overall and educational values and availability for tourist actions, and minimising the threat to conservation values.
3. *Visitor service zones* where camping grounds, hotels, motels, tent camps, excursion bureau, nature museum, information centres, catering businesses, trade enterprises, other cultural and household facilities, playing grounds are located;
4. *Management zones* where management not discrepant with the objectives of the National Park is performed.
5. Other zones, based on the local conditions and peculiarities.

*Local conditions are to be taken into consideration when designing functional zones.* New zones can be drawn up whenever it is necessary. However, the functional zoning *should be simple enough for everyday management and for the visitors' understanding*.<sup>427</sup>

The requirement of simplicity is conjoined with the demand for the availability of zoning regulations to tourists for independent perusal.<sup>428</sup> The model of functional zoning presented by the project thereby both minimises the restrictive aspect of conservation and seeks to influence the visitors' behaviour without unnecessary prohibitions and control. Moreover, besides the regulation of the conduct of the visitors, the park authority is required by the Code of Conduct to actively solicit and utilise in its managerial activities the visitors' opinions, comments and requests:

*Ask for responses and comments from visitors:*

*Comments from visitors are essential in developing the park and its services.* It can be done [in] many ways:

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<sup>427</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, pp. 34–35. Emphasis added. For functional zoning in other proposed parks see Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, pp. 37–41, Proposal for the Establishment of the Ladoga Skerries National Park, pp. 44–49, Proposal for the Establishment of the Tuulos National Park, pp. 23–26.

<sup>428</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 120.

Regular inquiries at the park gates should be carried out every year.  
Guest books in cottages and www-pages can reveal many important things.  
*Be susceptible to the response*, that is the best way to develop the park.<sup>429</sup>

*Feedback* from visitors is thus cast as a key instrument in the management of nature protection. The importance of feedback is related to the entrepreneurial restructuring of the national parks, in which visitors become consumers, on whose choices the park income depends. However, it also relates to the attempt by the project to develop a less restrictive mode of regulation of behaviour that would actively *involve* the visitors in nature protection rather than merely *control* their activities.

Thirdly, the strategy advocated by the project places important emphasis on *information* as an instrument of government. The role of information is deemed to be high both in the management of nature protection activities in the parks and in promoting the parks as tourist attractions. In the first aspect, the project proposes and undertakes the establishment of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in the parks. "The Geographical Information System represents *advanced technology, which can be utilised in running the parks*. It produces *material for management planning* as well as for *visitor information*."<sup>430</sup> The GIS exemplifies integrated information management that results in greater accessibility of information and the possibility of accumulation of newly discovered data into a standardised format of inscription.<sup>431</sup>

The project also emphasises the importance of disseminating information *about* the parks as an instrument of their promotion as tourist attractions.

*The project invests in information*. Besides information combined with the establishing of the new parks and the information to be dealt with in developing GIS, *everyday information about the parks, their attractions and regulations is spread. Information regarding the parks shall be available through booklets and brochures, but also via Internet pages*. So both potential visitors at home, tourist agencies and the tourist on the spot can get all the information, which can reasonably be demanded. [...] Thanks to the information, *the parks could hopefully be more often seen as an opportunity to the development of distant areas and the whole republic*.<sup>432</sup>

'Investment in information' is justified as an effective way to advance the reform strategy and gain acceptance of the policies it prescribes as well as to 'market' the

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<sup>429</sup> Ibid. See also Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, pp. 59–60. Emphasis added.

<sup>430</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 18. Emphasis added.

<sup>431</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi National Park, p. 47. Emphasis added.

<sup>432</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 16. Emphasis added.

newly-emergent parks. The project casts itself as an *exemplary model* of a proper information campaign, whose content is described in the following fragment:

The basic information material of the NPs was produced: *a colourful leaflet, posters, post cards, web sites, all this from all the parks*. The leaflet is from two parks in Russian, English and Finnish, from three parks in Russian and Finnish, separate language prints were prepared. From each park 4000 leaflets, 500 posters and four times 500 post cards were printed. *They are strongly supporting the marketing of the NPs*. The Project itself was presented on the web site <http://parks.karelia.ru> with links to the web sites of each park. The project, its work in the territories, park plans and seminars were widely presented in the Karelian mass media, both radio, TV and newspapers.<sup>433</sup>

Since both the indices of the problems in current nature protection activities and the reform solutions advocated by the project refer to principles and techniques of the operation of managerial agencies, we may speak of the formation in the texts of the parks development project of the object of government. This formation is schematically presented in the following figure.




Figure 13: Constitution of the Object of Government (ENVRUS9704)

<sup>433</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 15. Emphasis added.

### 2.3.2. Governmental Construction and Local Empowerment: The Ordering of the Object of Government in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

The three project diagrams demonstrate the isomorphisms in the constitution of the object of government in the project texts that suggest that this formation unfolds in a common region of interpositivity. We may observe regular patterns in the verbal techniques of this formation (use of causal inferences in the formation of the indices of the problems in the sector; construction of rhetorical exemplary models of the proposed interventions) as well as in the overall thematic structure of problematising the passivity, restrictiveness and fragmentation in the operation of managerial agencies in the respective sectors. This thematic structure, operative across the three projects, may be presented in the following manner.

The problem of **strategy and practices of government** is:

- a) causally related to reform failure in that:
  - a1) absence of a *clear vision of reform* leads to perpetuation of *outdated* practices of *centralised* and *restrictive* bureaucratic administration;
  - a2) governmental *passivity* and non-utilisation of new managerial techniques results in the *gap between programmatic declaration of intentions* and *actual policy practices*;
  - a3) lack of *participatory* and *partnership* approaches results in *conflictual, ineffective* and *inefficient* government;
- b) is to be addressed in project interventions through:
  - b1) establishment of the model of *active, facilitative, participatory government* with a capacity to *influence individual and social conduct*;
  - b2) actualisation of this model in reforming priority aspects of government: *personnel and information management, financial transparency, (international) partnership policies*;
  - b3) *illustration of local feasibility* of the model through the projects' own operation and *experiments in pilot districts* that engage local counterparts in *participation* and *training*.

Having isolated the region of interpositivity, in which government is constituted in a unitary thematic structure through isomorphous verbal techniques, we may now proceed to the level of discourse by posing the question of the ordering schemes that specify the positivity of this object.

### 2.3.2.1. *Exclusion from Discourse: 'Translating Theory into Observable Practice'*

Let us begin with analysing the way in which the most elementary line of exclusion from discourse is drawn in the region of interpositivity of the three projects. The exclusionary function is performed by the very notion of a 'reform strategy', whose absence is a starting point for the projects' criticism of the current state of affairs.

In our discussion of the indices of the problems established in the three projects, we have noted how a lack of a clear 'strategic vision' of reform was problematised. Passivity and the perpetuation, by default, of outdated management practices under conditions of financial scarcity render government both ineffective and inefficient: failing to achieve positive socioeconomic changes and relying on wasteful practices in trying to do so. The very necessity of reforms and the imperative of *active* governmental policies of their pursuit thus form the exclusionary line delimiting the exterior of discourse.

This basic delimitation is concretised in a number of ways. First of all, the projects do not merely promote more active reforms but focus on their particular dimension: *managerial techniques of policy design and implementation*. To recall our discussion above: the parks development project criticises the priority granted to legislation at the expense of 'policy', the health care project contrasts the satisfactory local capacity in legislation with the problematic state of managerial skills, the heating systems project declares the need of a 'total overhaul' of energy management and develops a management change strategy that does not stipulate legislative changes. Regarding the relation between legislation and governmental practices, the projects make two types of problematisation. The first concerns a simple failure in the implementation of laws as in the health care project's claim of there being 'no lack of laws', but a problem of the 'poor quality of their implementation'. Governmental practices are here cast as techniques of implementation, *secondary* and *derivative* in relation to legislation. The second problematisation is more intricate and reverses this

relation between legislation and policy: the parks project's view of legislation as “only the enabling mechanism by which policy may be implemented”<sup>434</sup> grants governmental practices *autonomy* and *priority* to legislation. To use an example from the health care project, the preparation of the law on general practice *follows* rather than precedes the introduction of general practice in a number of districts in the republic, the establishment of the Department of Family Medicine and General Practice at Petrozavodsk State University and the elaboration of the economic incentive system at the ministerial level to make the choice of this specialisation more attractive to local professionals.<sup>435</sup> What is required of legislation is therefore the *officialisation of an already constituted practice*.

The latter relation between legislation and policy may be elaborated further with the help of another contrast: between abstract declarations of intentions and concrete practices. The health care project problematises this gulf most strongly: while the need for reform and its basic direction towards primary care is not questioned by the Karelian counterpart, this approach is not replicated on the level of policy practices, where the tendency towards institutional solutions is taken to persist. Legislation and statutory acts of the executive (including ‘master-plans’ pejoratively dismissed by the project) are thus downgraded in importance unless specified in the ‘policy’ register as concrete models of professional and managerial practice. As we have discussed, the projects’ assessment of their own significance concerns precisely this specification. The claim of the health care project to have produced not ‘master-plans’ but ‘living, dynamic frameworks’, the heating systems project’s promise of the most ‘practical, workable solution’ and the parks project’s view of the management plans it has prepared as “meeting very well the criteria set internationally for the management plans for national parks in Europe”<sup>436</sup> all point to the practicality and feasibility of the project output, positively contrasted with the situation before the project, summed up in the phrase ‘what to start with, no one knows’. Similarly, study tours undertaken by all the projects are guided by the goal of “translating theory into *observable practice*”.<sup>437</sup> The domain of ‘policy’ that the projects delimit can thus be defined as a space of *concrete governmental models* characterised by practicality and feasibility,

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<sup>434</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 74.

<sup>435</sup> Progress Report 3 EDRUS9516, p. 1.

<sup>436</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 17.

<sup>437</sup> Progress Report 2 EDRUS9516, p. 15. Emphasis added.

ensured through local testing of the proposed strategies. The exclusionary criterion of truth and rationality espoused in this delimitation is established through a *theory/practice dichotomy*, in which the latter term is a privileged member and is granted the characteristics of activity, vitality, concreteness, dynamism and flexibility that we have associated above with the principle of *local authenticity*. In the case of the object of government we may note that this principle does not simply prescribe local participation in reform practices (a theme that we encounter throughout the discourse), but rather endows the domain of policy with an *a priori authenticity* through a construction of its opposite in terms of ‘staticity’, lack of realism and excessive abstraction. In this manner, a *qualitative difference* is established between the situation in the sphere of government prior to the Tacis intervention and the activities and outcomes of the projects.

This exclusionary criterion of ‘practical policy’ may be specified on the basis of two examples from the parks development project. Firstly, the project criticises the current valorisation of legislation at the expense of policy by claiming that this tendency results in the management system being “disjointed and dependent on *personalities not personnel*”.<sup>438</sup> The opposition of personalities/personnel complicates the view of practical policy as concrete, case-specific generation of reform solutions at the local level. Despite the valorisation of local authenticity, the projects authorise the development of clear guidelines and standards in personnel management, specifying meticulously the enunciative modalities of both anterior and newly-constituted professional agencies: “There was a lack of *clear job descriptions, professions and qualifications had to be defined*. [...] There was a need also to provide staff with some sort of *career structure*, with opportunities for professional development. [...] There were no active professional associations which could have played a part in *monitoring standards*.”<sup>439</sup>

The emphasis on personnel management highlights an important feature of ‘policy’ as an exclusionary criterion: while the political domain of discussion and legislation of broad reform directions is, by definition, a pluralistic space where ‘personalities’ are important as advocates or opponents of reform, the domain of policy reverses the relation between subject and discourse: the practitioners of the

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<sup>438</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 74. Emphasis added.

<sup>439</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

discourse of policy are not ‘personalities’ in the strict sense of the “totality of an individual’s behavioural and emotional characteristics”.<sup>440</sup> It is not their *individuality* that defines their discursive practice, but rather the conditions of and access to discursive practice that constitute their professional *identity*. The move from personalities to personnel that is advocated by the projects can thus be understood as the task of the constitution of a discursive space with established limits, specified content and regulated access. Such a discourse, defined through exclusion, rarefaction and restriction, enables the formation of a variety of subject-positions of ‘personnel’, whose exercise of professional and managerial practice is entirely independent of their ‘personalities’ and rather depends on job descriptions, career structures and qualification standards, monitored by professional associations. The *authentic* character of policy should thus be distinguished from *personal* idiosyncrasies that find no place in the discourse of government.

The second distinction concerns the separation of the governmental from the political. A particularly significant example of this separation is provided by the parks project’s response to the request of the Karelian government for the review of the management plans for the proposed national parks prior to their official publication.

At the end of the Project, the representative of the Karelian Government came with a proposal, that the park plans should be approved by the Government before printing them. Unfortunately, this was not possible, due to following reasons: (1) the plans are *proposals made by experts, who have carefully listened to all the points of view during a long and profound planning process and combined different opinions*. On the other hand, the *political decision about the parks will be done based on a separate process, which is expected to utilise the material presented in the reports*, and (2) the proposal of the government came too late, it was not any more possible to start discussing again the content.<sup>441</sup>

Two claims made in this fragment are of particular importance. Firstly, the plans are presented as the work of *experts* that is *not liable to political review and evaluation*. The possibility of additions to or revisions of the plans by governmental officials is thus dismissed as unreasonable since the expert product is already a result of a ‘long and profound’ process of adaptation and combination of a variety of

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<sup>440</sup> Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com>.

<sup>441</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 17. Emphasis added.



opinions. At work in this exclusion is a distinction between *opinions*, which, as we discussed in the case of object of local agency, must be solicited but not always acted upon, and *expertise*, which, insofar as it utilises opinions at all, undertakes their *qualitative* transformation into a managerial strategy. This qualitative transformation endows the final model with the exclusionary criterion of ‘policy rationality’ that delimits it from the pluralistic space of political opinion.

Secondly, the management strategies are presented as both *distinct* from the ‘political decision’ on park establishment and yet *utilised* in that process. The expectation that the political decision will rely on the policy plans elaborated by the projects recalls the view of legislation as ‘merely an enabling mechanism’. The political decision is thereby reduced to the officialising gesture in relation to a governmental practice that is already constituted and therefore possible to present as pre- and non-political. On the other hand, such officialisation is rarely a simple automatic gesture of approval but rather involves complications leading to amendments of the original policy or even the abandonment of the reforms in question. In relation to these processes, the distinction between the governmental and the political serves to ‘insulate’ the domain of policy from political contingency and personal idiosyncrasy by presenting political decision as a separate process, for which Tacis is not responsible.

It is noteworthy that the establishment of the parks is *not directly included in the project objectives*; on the contrary, the assumption was that the four new parks are established already before the project start. The establishment is a *highly political process*.<sup>442</sup> *The final decisions on the establishment of the new parks are political and the Project cannot have a direct influence on them. The material prepared in the Project will form the basis for the establishment.*<sup>443</sup>

The project is thus not *responsible* for the political decision on park establishment, yet anticipates its work to form the *basis* of the final decision. The ‘highly political’ process of establishment is thereby cast as both exterior and posterior to the policy model to be decided upon, a process of negotiation and adaptation of the already-existing model. The domain of the governmental is thus not only delimited from the domain of the political but also granted *autonomy* and *priority* over it. In this act of depoliticisation, a separate space is carved out for government as an object of

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<sup>442</sup> Progress Report 4 ENVRUS9704, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>443</sup> Progress Report 3 ENVRUS9704, p. 8. Emphasis added.

discourse, endowed, through its distinction from vague declarations of intent, personal idiosyncrasies and political contingency, with the characteristics of *concreteness*, *generalisability* and the epistemic status of *expertise*. In this manner, the object of government emerges as a self-identical positivity only by virtue of the negation of the political in two senses. Firstly, the claim for the posteriority of the political to the governmental entails the reduction of the political process to the (non) authorisation of the antecedent policy model. Secondly and more importantly, the claim for the autonomy of the policy model from the political entails the erasure of its own political character, i.e. its constitutive force.<sup>444</sup> The hierarchical opposition of the governmental and the political thus rests as much on the subjugation of the latter to the former as on the effacement of the contamination of the former by the latter. By being progressively *dissociated* from declarations of intent, debates on reform legislation, arbitrary personality-based management and the contingent play of political opinions, the object of government ends up both *implicated* in the activities of legislation, political decision-making and individual managerial practices as their prescribed *foundation*, and *insulated* by the exclusionary criterion of policy rationality from any interference or questioning from these pluralistic domains. It is not that the ‘apolitical’ notion of policy triumphs over the ‘political’ ideal of collective deliberation. It is rather that the constitutive political force of policy models is effaced by the establishment of the distinction of the governmental and the political, which *depoliticises the governmental* domain of professional expertise, and, as it were, *governmentalises the political* as a caricaturised ‘defective’ domain, devoid of policy rationality and prone to contingency and idiosyncrasy that complicates policy authorisation and implementation. It is this act of disavowal (rather than the final process of policy officialisation) that is indeed ‘highly political’, insofar as “*depoliticisation is a political act in a particularly intense way.*”<sup>445</sup>

These schemes of exclusion delimit the domain of government as a space of concrete models of policy, endowed with ‘expert rationality’ and prescribing particular enunciative modalities for discourse-practitioners. We now proceed to the ordering of the inside of this space, i.e. the rarefaction of the content of discourse of government.

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<sup>444</sup> The elucidation of the political conditions of possibility of the governmental diagram actualised in the discourse of technical assistance will be the task of chapter 3 of our study.

<sup>445</sup> Schmitt 1998, p. 227. Emphasis added.

### 2.3.2.2. *Rarefaction of the Content of Discourse: The 'Living, Dynamic Framework'*

In our discussion of the rarefaction of discourse we shall analyse the schemes that order the specification of the object of government, externally delimited as a depoliticised domain of 'policy', in terms of the *epistemic grounding* of the content of governmental practices.

The specific type of this grounding may be isolated through the analysis of the relation between two principles at work in the reforms undertaken by the project: active governmental facilitation of desirable practices and valorisation of local experience. In our textual analysis above we have presented a number of examples of the active policy of construction of presently absent institutional structures (ESCOs, national parks, medico-social centres), professional practices (business planning in energy management and nature protection sectors, multiprofessional teams in health care and social protection) and the 'enterprise culture', which is supposed to ensure social support for the reforms and their sustainability after the expiry of Tacis assistance. This activity of construction need not be equated with the actual establishment of new institutions in the course of the projects, but rather consists in the installation of foundations for future decisions by the local counterparts.

The intention is to identify the needs in each region in relation to establishing an ESCO, *to do all the background work* regarding regulations, legal issues, scope of the project [...] and *to lay the foundation* on which an ESCO can be established, rather than actually establish an ESCO during this project.<sup>446</sup>

The Project is *expected to have contributed to the final establishment of parks*, but this remains to be seen in the near future. [...] This work was more like a *basic investment*, which can later on result in flowering nature tourism in five national parks and that way support the well-being of local people.<sup>447</sup>

These fragments point to the projects' own assessment of their activity as 'background work', 'laying a foundation', a 'basic investment' – practices that in our terminology serve to *ground* the discourse by installing the primary texts that rarefy its possible content. From the previous section we know that in the case of the object

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<sup>446</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 7. Emphasis added.

<sup>447</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 13. Emphasis added.

of government these primary texts are neither political declarations nor legislative acts but are rather exemplified by *concrete policy models*, observable practices for training and subsequent emulation by the local counterpart. Two modalities of *grounding by models* may be noted in the projects' discourse. Firstly, the discourse is grounded through the introduction of disciplinary *grids of inscription* of the object of government. Secondly, grounding proceeds with recourse to generation or validation of proposed policy strategies through *local experience*. Let us discuss these two modalities in turn.

As we have demonstrated in our textual analysis, the theme of information management is strongly highlighted in all three projects. Besides enhancing economic efficiency, such diverse techniques of information management as medico-social registers, functional zoning, accounting systems are posited as important in achieving effective government. We may refer to these techniques as *inscription devices*,<sup>448</sup> which serve to constitute *governable objects* of knowledge and action. Inscriptions are preconditions of a governmental practice insofar as they provide it with an appropriate object to be known and acted upon. Just as "scientists read the book of nature [...] only because they first transformed nature into a book"<sup>449</sup>, government may only govern the individual as a medico-social case or a protected area as a set of functional zones only by virtue of having first constituted them as such. The integration of medical and social databases, the establishment of functional zoning in national parks and the introduction of accounting systems in district heating enterprises thus provide the necessary material conditions for the deployment of such ethico-teleological constructs as the policy of preventive primary care, diversified supervision in protected areas or financial transparency of a managerial agency. Information and accounting systems therefore result in the *materialisation* of new objects, making governable a section of reality formerly not amenable to these practices. Furthermore, the formation of such objects enables more efficient and flexible government, as in the case of a medico-social profile of a client, which renders her amenable to a multiprofessional intervention at a single site. Similarly, the system of functional zoning solves the problem of combining two governmental imperatives in protected areas. On the one hand, the management plans envision that "inspection should be legal, having

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<sup>448</sup> See Rose 1996b, especially pp. 107–109.

<sup>449</sup> Rose 1996b, p. 107.

sovereign rights”<sup>450</sup> and that park managers have the “authorised right to arrest violators”.<sup>451</sup> On the other hand, we have shown above that the Code of Conduct in National Parks prescribes ‘discreet supervision’ with a ‘guiding, discussing attitude’. The system of functional zoning allows to combine these apparently contradictory goals by introducing a complex spatial structure, into which the visitor is inscribed and prescribed particular kinds of conduct, depending on the degree of the zone’s protection. Instead of a strict divide between the prohibited and the permitted, the visitor is cast into a system of functional differentiation of space, where no such clear distinction obtains. Instead, autonomy and control are united in the system of ‘discreet supervision’, where the ‘sovereign right’ of arresting violators is a mere extreme possibility, supplanted by a ‘guiding attitude’ informing the visitor on the requirements in each zone.

These examples illustrate the way in which such technical routines as changes in information management actively invent new possibilities to think and act upon the objects of government. “Such changes in the ways, in which inscriptions are produced, ordered, accumulated and circulated, do far more than make the storage and communication of information more rapid, precise and convenient.”<sup>452</sup> Though the managerial efficiency that these techniques enhance is not to be discounted, particularly considering the valorisation of entrepreneurial solutions that we have discussed, the actual force of these inscription devices is constitutive: they produce objects of knowledge and action in a way that enhances their calculability, visibility and amenability to intervention and thereby ground epistemically the operations of government, satisfying the criteria of concreteness and materiality associated with ‘policy rationality’.

The examples we have provided so far concern the deployment of inscription devices to constitute objects on which government is exercised. However, the discourse of technical assistance also deploys inscriptions in constituting government itself as an object of problematisation and intervention. The example of such ‘objectification’ of the governmental subjectivity is provided by the use of such frameworks as the already-discussed SWOT analysis or the ‘logical framework’ approach. The latter

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<sup>450</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 53.

<sup>451</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Tuulos National Park, p. 21.

<sup>452</sup> Rose 1996b, p. 113.

approach, used in project reporting, is presented as an exemplary model for policy planning to be emulated by the local counterparts.<sup>453</sup> While the three projects slightly diverge in their reporting formats, an important feature recurs in all the reports: the emphasis on the identification of “objectively verifiable indicators”<sup>454</sup> of policy practices and the consequent calculability or measurability of their outputs. Table 3 illustrates the logical framework matrix utilised by the parks development project.

The logical framework provides a surface of inscription of the governmental discourse that emphasises ‘objective verifiability’ of the planned outputs and the specification of all the factors that might negatively or positively influence their achievement. The effect of such grounding of policy discourse is twofold. Firstly, this inscription prioritises the ‘verifiability’ of indicators of success and failure, thereby proscribing statements whose verification may be problematic. Thus, in Table 3, the success of the project in establishing new protected areas is to be verified by the decisions on the establishment of new parks rather than the progress in ‘laying foundations’ for their establishment through training, preparation of managerial models and influencing public opinion. Since at the time of project expiry no decisions on park establishment have been made, this project activity is to be considered a failure in the ‘logical framework’ terms, the terms that paradoxically exclude what the project itself considers its main task: ‘creating the base’ for autonomous decisions by the counterpart. In a more general sense, the valorisation of ‘objective verifiability’ renders invisible the qualitative *outcomes* of the project (e.g. the change of the approach of local tour operators to ecotourism) that are impossible to inscribe as quantifiable *outputs* (e.g. ‘new tourist operators are established’).<sup>455</sup> In terms of the projects’ own goals, objectively verifiable and auditable *efficiency* overrides *effectiveness*, whose measurement is problematic and evaluation contestable.

Secondly, the logical framework device serves a more positive function: it is at work in rendering ‘objectively verifiable’ and, furthermore, quantitatively measurable,

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<sup>453</sup> Final Report EDRUS516, pp. 31–32. The logical framework approach (logframe), originally developed in the 1970s by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) structures project planning in terms of a matrix, whose vertical axis spells out the levels of project activity: goals, purposes, outputs, inputs, while the horizontal axis specifies the procedures of verification of these activities: objectively verifiable indicators, means of verification, important constraints or assumptions.

<sup>454</sup> Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 39.

<sup>455</sup> For this distinction between outcomes and outputs see Power 1997, pp. 115–118.

Table 3: Logical Framework of the ENVRUS9704 Project<sup>456</sup>

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Constraints, Assumptions and Risks
<p><b>Overall Objectives:</b> To improve the livelihood of local people by developing nature related tourism</p>	<p>Changes in the number of visitors Number of workers in tourism</p>	<p>Information from the local administration</p>	<p>Local interest exists in capacity building</p>
<p>To safeguard bio-diversity conservation by establishing a well managed network of protected areas in Western Karelia</p>	<p>Number of new protected areas established in the project's duration Number of new management plans and business plans</p>	<p>Statistics of Karelian Progress reports</p>	<p>Decisions needed for the establishment of the parks are done</p>
<p><b>Project Purposes:</b> A basis for sustainable tourism connected to the protected areas is developed, and new employment created</p>	<p>New tourist operators are established Increased number of visitors</p>	<p>Information from the local administration</p>	<p>Difficulties in setting up facilities and infrastructure in parks with no legal status</p>
<p>Information disseminated and the visitor services of the protected areas improved</p>	<p>Information available about the parks from many sources Better skills of staff, higher quality in work</p>	<p>Progress reports, feedback from visitors. Tender documents of the Paanajärvi Visitor Centre and the exhibition plan</p>	<p>Borders and legal status of the parks are clear enough</p>
<p>Legal establishment of four new protected areas</p>	<p>Decisions of establishment of new parks</p>	<p>Official documents of the Government</p>	<p>Lack of legal status impairs the aimed results</p>

those practices or events that are at first glance not amenable to such manipulations. The inscription of governmental practices in terms of 'objectively verifiable outputs' makes it possible to calculate their positive or negative deviations from the 'optimal

<sup>456</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 36.

Table 4: Output Performance Report ERUS9701<sup>457</sup>

Project title: Local Sustainable Heating Strategies for Karelia		ERUS 9701	Country: Russia
Planning period: 15/11/98-30/04/99	Prepared on: 15/05/1999	EC Consulting Planora Oy	
Outputs to be achieved and target dates indicated		Deviation original plan +0r - %	Reason for deviation
T1	Renovation of District Heating System		
A1	Appraisal of heating system	-20%	Delays in obtaining local information
A9	Development of CHP potential	40%	Finnish financial support
A10	Pilot project Implementation	20%	Good regional support – Kalevala
T2	Local Fuel Resources		
A11	Fuel identification/energy/balancing	-20%	Hampered by delays in Action 1
A12	Appraisal of local peat resources	20%	Mires were previously studied
A13	Extraction viability assessment	0%	
A17	Appraisal of local wood resources	0%	
T3	Support to Municipalities % DH Operators		
A21	ESCO Concept in the Border Regions	30%	Increased Regulation assessment
A26	Existing Regulations	-30%	Delayed by the ESCO concept
T4	Information & Training Programme		
A28	Assessment of Reports	0%	Will be completed in second period
T5	Environmental Protection Programme		

<sup>457</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 31.



performance'. The example, presented in Table 4, is a sample from the output performance report of the heating systems project at an early phase of project activity.

As Table 4 shows, the report both calculates performance deviations in percentage points and infers the causes of deviation. Thus, it is claimed that the 'good regional support' of the administration of Kalevala accounts for a 20% enhancement of output in pilot project implementation, while 'delays in obtaining local information' have caused a 20% negative deviation from the projected outcome in the appraisal of heating systems. The purpose of this discussion is not to problematise the evident arbitrariness of such calculations or the questionable objectivity of such 'objectively verifiable indicators' as e.g. 'better skills of staff, higher quality of work'. Since the discourse of technical assistance does not make a claim to scientificity, a critique of its epistemological presuppositions appears facile and redundant. The epistemological equivocality of such inscription devices as 'logframe' or SWOT does not dent their epistemic function of grounding and organising the discourse of government into a specific mode of knowledge. The main features of the mode of knowledge actualised in these inscription devices are univocal relations of causality, objectification of policy events in quantitative terms, verifiability of every policy action, modularity of inscriptions in the sense of their applicability to projects of entirely different kinds.<sup>458</sup> The effects that it produces relate not only to the objects of governmental practices but also to government itself as an object as it becomes liable to the assessment of its *performance* and its consequent *accountability*. Particularly in the case of the heating systems project, which establishes accounting systems in district heating administrations on the demand of the international financial institution, the activity of government becomes itself *liable to governmental interventions* that seek to reshape it in accordance with the same imperatives of transparency and accountability that are prioritised in the enterprise sector which it is the government's task to establish. Governmentalisation acquires a reflexive character, whereby government as a facilitator of entrepreneurial activity becomes indistinguishable from its object. "Accounting information systems do not simply describe a pre-existing economic domain but [...] serve to *constitute a domain of facts, to make a world of action visible and hence controllable in economic terms.*"<sup>459</sup> Inscription devices called forth to respond to the ethical imperative of governmental accountability and transparency are thus not

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<sup>458</sup> See Mosse 2001, Smith et al 2000.

<sup>459</sup> Power 1997, p. 94. Emphasis added.

applied to the opaque and unaccountable anterior domain. On the contrary, their very deployment precedes and conditions the very opposition of transparency/opacity: they constitute a domain amenable to accountability and thus liable to a positive or negative assessment in these terms.

To sum up: the grounding scheme of *inscription* serves to organise the content of discourse by installing specific technical routines for its production that result not merely in greater governmental efficiency but rather in the formation of the objects of government as visible, calculable, verifiable and modular, whereby their governability is enhanced. We may characterise this grounding activity as *phenomeno-technical*, since it “seeks to conjure up in reality the things it has conjured up in thought”.<sup>460</sup> In our Foucauldian terms, it develops the appropriate *techné* to materialise as objects of action the phenomena it has constituted in its *episteme* as objects of knowledge.

The installation of inscriptions is undertaken by the Tacis projects in order to construct an exemplary model for local emulation. It is therefore by definition a type of grounding that proceeds in a ‘top-down’ manner, endowing, through external facilitation, the local discourse with a ‘primary text’ that enables autonomous commentary. However, the rarefaction of the discourse of government also proceeds in a reverse, apparently ‘bottom-up’ direction, whereby the ground of possible enunciations is to be determined by local experience. This modality of grounding brings in the problematic of local authenticity whose relation to external facilitation we shall now analyse.

Let us begin with the example of the health care and social protection project, which, as illustrated repeatedly in our analysis, presents its ‘bottom-up’ approach to reform as its key achievement. Two apparently contradictory accounts of the specifics of this bottom-up approach are given. On the one hand the project claims that the “*initiative for policy development in the project should rest with the pilot districts*” and praises the republican government for this ‘bold decision’.<sup>461</sup> According to this understanding, local agents at the district level are to be entrusted with *policy generation*, i.e. the strategies of reform are to be the *outcome* of local experimentation. On the other hand, the project presents the role of pilot experiments in terms of testing an already-defined strategy: “Activities *proposed at republican level are tested in*

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<sup>460</sup> This term, originating in Gaston Bachelard’s epistemology of science, is used in the context of governmentality by Osborne and Rose 1997, p. 97. See also Rose 1996b, pp. 49–54.

<sup>461</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 25. Emphasis added.

*specific districts and institutions* and, if the results are positive, the experience is disseminated all over the republic.”<sup>462</sup> The following fragment lists in detail the expectations of the pilot projects.

The “Policy, legislation and management” Working Group has moved, and the Supervisory Board has approved a *proposal to implement the republican strategies in individual pilot projects*. The main objective [...] was to *collect experience* in social and health care reforms. *This experience should be put in the basis of republic-wide reforms*. [...] It was suggested that the pilot projects should:  
*test* the model of general practice, new approaches in preventive medicine and health promotion;  
*test* new models of open-care-oriented social institutions;  
*give a work-out* to the system of collaboration between health and social institutions on providing integrated medico-social care; [...]  
*establish new approaches to managing* health care and social welfare.<sup>463</sup>

As this fragment demonstrates, the function of pilot projects is both to ‘establish new approaches’ as the ‘basis of republic-wide reforms’ and to test the already-established approach of integrated primary care. A similar ambiguity is manifested in the heating systems project’s claim to ‘create a model from the implementation of pilot projects’, while simultaneously positing the model of substitution from the outset at the inception stage. In the parks development project no piloting in the strict sense is undertaken since the scope of the project covers all the designated protected areas, yet the claim to develop a reform model on the basis of local experience is also clearly manifested in the deployment of participatory management planning and the requirement of ‘realism’ for the management plans, contrasted with a dismissal of a merely theoretical ‘bookend’. Since local piloting as a means of grounding is highlighted in all the projects analysed in this study, it is important to pose the question of the function of piloting in the discourse of technical assistance. How exactly does a project get “firmly grounded in practical experience”<sup>464</sup>?

Let us begin with recalling the theme of ‘local knowledge’ that we have addressed at length in the discussion of the objects of local agency and enterprise. The parks

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<sup>462</sup> Resolution of the International Conference “Reforms of Health Care and Social Protection in the Republic of Karelia” EDRUS9516, p. 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>463</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>464</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 13. Translation by author.

development project makes two statements in this regard. On the one hand, “for successful management it is important to utilise the *skills and knowledge that local people have of the natural and cultural heritage of the park territory*. It is natural that local people who know the wilderness and its dwellers have a priority when field personnel is employed.”<sup>465</sup> This requirement recalls the theme of valorisation of authenticity of local knowledge. On the other hand, “local people have *shortage of traditions about how to behave in nature*.”<sup>466</sup> Furthermore, the project even establishes a training programme for current park employees, based on the assumption that “the *workers should understand* also the high value of the area, its *culture and nature*”<sup>467</sup>, which of course suggests that this understanding is presently missing. This entails that the local agents’ knowledge is somehow lacking in the very authenticity and naturality that delimit it as epistemically privileged. It therefore cannot be posited as a ground of enunciations but is rather itself grounded through training that installs a series of primary texts related to ecotourism.

We may thus conclude that local participation does not concern the *generation* of the content of the reform strategies, but rather the exercise of what we have called ‘commentary’ by the local counterparts on the externally posited primary texts. To recall the statement quoted previously in this study, “participatory planning will give the local inhabitants *training and practice in planning their development* and a feeling of responsibility.”<sup>468</sup> If participation is a means of training, it is only obvious that the trainees do not in fact participate in the development of the content of training. Similarly, local counterparts in the heating systems project participate in the preparation of loan applications only as trainees not experts, just as local health care professionals do not in fact produce the curriculum for general practitioners. The participatory pathos of the projects serves to efface this asymmetry of the pedagogical relation and present the process in terms of interaction between equal partners, a “*learning process in both directions*”.<sup>469</sup>

Since the local knowledge solicited by the projects is reducible to the reactualisation of the primary text installed in training practices, it is impossible to present local

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<sup>465</sup> Proposal for the Establishment of the Kalevala National Park, p. 44. Emphasis added.

<sup>466</sup> Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, p. 60. Emphasis added.

<sup>467</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 81. Emphasis added.

<sup>468</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 61.

<sup>469</sup> Inception Report ENVRUS9704, p. 19. Emphasis added.

experience gained through piloting and participation as a *basis for reform strategies*. Local knowledge is either an effect of *repetition* of the project strategies by the local counterpart or a euphemism for the collection by the local counterparts of data required to fill the strategic scheme.<sup>470</sup> Our argument for the secondary and supportive function of local knowledge should not, however, be equated with the criticism of technical assistance for its failure to properly utilise local knowledge or its discrimination by ‘external facilitation’. Such criticism is particularly unfit for our Foucauldian approach, which rejects the assumption of pure, extradiscursive experience and tries to “write a history of discursive objects that does not plunge them into the common depth of a primal soil”.<sup>471</sup> From this perspective, a policy ‘grounded in local experience’ appears impossible in principle, since there can be no ‘pure’ or ‘unmediated’ experience that could provide guidance to the way of proceeding about reform, if only because the very need for reform only emerges within a particular discourse of government. *There are literally no problems* in the spheres of health care, energy management and nature protection *prior to the constitution of a certain form of problematisation*, evaluating a state of affairs in terms of a certain governmental ethos (e.g. economic efficiency, governmental transparency, local participation). It is thus only obvious that the ‘bottom-up’ pilot projects are conditioned by a prior ‘top-down’ postulation of reform strategies. In the absence of this ‘strategic conceptualisation’ the state of affairs, summed up in the phrase ‘what to start with, no one knows’ would persist indefinitely.

What does it mean then to ‘create a model from the implementation of the pilot projects’, if the model is not *based* on local knowledge? Another function of local knowledge, highlighted in the health care project, is the *testing* of reform strategies

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<sup>470</sup> The use of local experts for the purposes of data gathering and translation is discussed in Goldman 2001, pp. 511. In the projects that form the scope of our study this fact-gathering function is best exemplified by the heating systems project. See Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 10, Progress Report 2 ERUS9701, p. 12.

<sup>471</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 48. Foucault’s archaeology can be read a critical reassessment of his earlier work on madness, in which he sought to uncover a ‘pure experience’ of madness behind its historical discursive constructions. “It would certainly be a *mistake to try to discover what could have been said of madness at a particular time by interrogating the being of madness itself, its secret content, its silent, self-enclosed truth; mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it and possibly gave it speech by articulating in its name discourses that were to be taken as its own.*” (Foucault 1989, p. 32.)

by local experiments. At first glance, the notion of testing is less problematic than the strong claim for ‘pure empiricism’ and more adequately descriptive of the actual procedure deployed by the projects.

The reform vision is immensely strengthened through being *based on practical, tested experience* on the ground. Policy-makers can *point to 6 working models of general practice, in both urban and rural areas*, and to a *variety of proven non-institutional approaches* to medico-social care and multi-professional working.<sup>472</sup>

The strategy, which will be proposed by the project, [is] the most *practical* and *workable* solution in the short and medium term. The proposals will be effected by the *outcome of the pilot projects, which will demonstrate the worthiness of the proposed strategy*.<sup>473</sup>

Local piloting of reform strategies is claimed to ‘prove’ their ‘worthiness’ and provide ‘concrete evidence’ about their effectiveness in the form of ‘working models’. It thus effects a qualitative transformation of a ‘strategic line’ into a ‘practical and workable solution’, which, as we argued above, is the exclusionary criterion of ‘policy rationality’. Let us refer to this effect of piloting as *authentication* of reform strategies in the sense of providing proof, confirmation and validation. We must then pose the question of what exactly is *proven* through pilot experiments. In all the projects, it is the economic efficiency of the proposed solutions: “The gatekeeper function has been amply demonstrated to be *effective* in *reducing referrals* to secondary care. *The ‘strategic line’ has been supported by hard evidence*.”<sup>474</sup> The reduction in referrals does indeed demonstrate the greater comparative efficiency of the policy of substitution. Yet, this demonstration does not thereby validate the policy itself, since the criterion of efficiency is *internal* to the strategy in question and not an external standard against which a variety of strategies may be tested. In other words, the ‘*worthiness*’ of the *strategy* is *not* ‘proven by local *experience*’, since the terms of discourse cannot be validated by the positive value a discursive practice acquires in those terms. The very distinction between ‘strategy’ and ‘experience’, which is reminiscent of the ‘theory/empirical basis’ distinction problematised in philosophy of science<sup>475</sup>, is dubious

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<sup>472</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>473</sup> Progress Report 5 ERUS9701, p. 18. Emphasis added.

<sup>474</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 22. Emphasis added.

<sup>475</sup> See Lakatos 1970 for the detailed critique of justificationist and (‘naïve’) falsificationist approaches in philosophy of science, both of which presuppose the existence of a demarcation between theoretical

since it ignores the intrinsic relation of the ‘objectively verifiable indicator’ to the strategy in question. The capacity of a reform model to solve problems depends on the mode of problematisation in which this model is articulated, which sets what counts as a problem, what counts as a solution and how the success of the solution is to be demonstrated. The relation between the ‘theoretical’ model and practical experience may then be reversed: it is the piloted model which sets the conditions under which its particular applications may be held true or false, successful or unsuccessful, practical or impractical. The model itself, however, is neither true nor false and can neither be verified nor refuted. This argument, brought forth in various ways in Michel Foucault’s conception of discourse as a ‘regime of truth’, Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm as immune to experimental refutations and Ian Hacking’s idea of a ‘self-authenticating’ style of reasoning<sup>476</sup>, emphasises the difference between the positivity of a practice and the discursive conditions that grant it positivity. The former may be a candidate for truth or falsity judgments, but only by virtue of being conditioned by the latter, which may not be such a candidate.

Propositions of the sort that necessarily require reasoning to be substantiated have a positivity, a being-true-or-false only in consequence of a style of reasoning in which they occur. [...] The propositions that are objectively found to be true are determined as true by styles of reasoning *for which in principle there can be no external justification*. A justification would be an independent way of showing that the style gets at the truth, but there is no characterisation of the truth over and above what is reached by the style of reasoning itself.<sup>477</sup>

For our purposes, this argument leads to the impossibility of the verification of the reform model by its local piloting and to the possibility, in contrast, to *assess local practices in terms of the reform model*. In the latter sense, local experience is retained as the epistemic ground of the reform strategy, though no longer in the sense

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and factual or observational statements, the latter granted the capacity to prove or disprove a theory. Lakatos’s claim is that no such demarcation exists, i.e. there is no observable fact that is not impregnated by an ‘observational theory’, which entails that all propositions are ‘theoretical’ and thus fallible. There can thus be neither conclusive proof nor disproof of a theory. Lakatos’s solution to this problem is of course a ‘sophisticated’ methodological falsificationism, which makes the ‘empirical basis’ a matter of conventional decision to render unfalsifiable by fiat a number of singular statements that may be held to constitute ‘unproblematic background knowledge’. See Lakatos 1970, pp. 93–98, 103–105.

<sup>476</sup> See Foucault 1984d, 1989, Kuhn 1970b, Hacking 2002a, 2002b.

<sup>477</sup> Hacking 2002b, p. 175. Emphasis added. See also *ibid.*, pp. 190–194.

of strategy-generation or strategy-testing. The link between a 'theoretical' strategy and a 'practical' pilot experiment does not concern establishing the 'proof' or 'worthiness' of the strategy, but rather its 'workability', 'concreteness', 'practicality', 'on-the-ground' *presence* that can be 'pointed to' by the reform advocates. *All that is 'proven' by piloting the model locally is its existence in practice.* Despite the evident tautology, this is indeed an important achievement that, furthermore, corresponds to the 'practicality' criterion that delimits policy from 'legislation' and 'politics'. Existence-in-practice refers to the governmental model's *phenomeno-technical* capacity, its power to bring into being the new objects it has conjured epistemically. The only 'test' of the governmental episteme that proceeds from active construction of new phenomena is the existence of its technical correlate, the actual construction of new objects: Ladoga Seal Trails, university departments of general practice, multiprofessional teams, ESCOs, medico-social client records, national park tour operators.

*The impact can be seen* at Girvas district hospital where head doctor Elvira Rogalja is able to provide a range of treatment including *primary surgery*, or at Haapalampi, where family doctor Galina Grekova and her nursing staff are *implementing preventative health care initiatives* including anti-smoking campaigns. It can also be seen at Kondopoga, where patients with erosive gastritis, acute bronchitis and different types of ulcer were treated as *outpatients* from the spring of 1998 cutting per capita costs by three quarters.<sup>478</sup>

This fragment presents as the achievement of the project not the 'proof' of the proposed models, but their actual existence on the ground: the visible 'impact' of the project is the emergence at the pilot sites of such objects as outpatients, primary surgery, preventive health care initiatives, etc. The piloting of reform models at local sites with the participation of local experts with local knowledge therefore does nothing to independently 'authenticate' a governmental practice, but rather enables its *self-authentication* by providing a technical correlate to its epistemic construction of new phenomena. The capacity of the model to produce practical effects turns it into a 'primary text' of policy, enabling rarefied commentary on its 'replication'.

We may now conclude our discussion of the rarefaction of the discourse of government by pointing to the relation between the two modes of rarefaction we have elucidated: the 'top-down' scheme of *managerial inscription* that installs the

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<sup>478</sup> Reform of Health and Social Care in Karelia. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.



technical routines that produce governable phenomena with enhanced visibility, verifiability and calculability, and the ‘bottom-up’ scheme of *local self-authentication* that installs as the ground of discursive commentary the locally constituted practical model that actualises these inscriptions in concrete practices. These two schemes, emphasising respectively ‘managerial’ and ‘local’ knowledge, may now be superimposed and found to coincide: whether we are talking about the processing of local practices through the grid of technical inscriptions or of the actualisation of a technical model in local practices, the operation of rarefaction is the same. What rarefies and grounds the formation of the object of government in the discourse of technical assistance is the *principle of phenomeno-technical constructivism*, according to which the ‘task’ and the ‘test’ of government consists in the production of new phenomena.

### 2.3.2.3. *Restriction of Access to Discourse: ‘Working in A New Way’*

Having described the exterior delineation of the domain of policy and its internal rarefaction through the dual grounding of the discourse by managerial inscriptions and local self-authentication, we now proceed to the final aspect of the formation of the object of government: the restrictions pertaining to its enunciative modalities. In our discussion we shall focus on two aspects of restriction: the formation of local agents as *self-governing subjects* in pedagogical practices and the formation of *subjects of government* through the process of dissemination.

Firstly, let us recall the assumption highlighted in the thematic structure of the object of government: the absence of *participatory* and *partnership* approaches results in *conflictual*, *ineffective* and *inefficient* government. In contrast, the projects’ participatory strategies are presented as having achieved not merely *compliance* with the proposed solutions but their *internalisation* and active autonomous *promotion*. The districts formerly opposed to the integration of health care and social protection institutions have, as a result of the project, undertaken such integration ‘without prompting from ministries’. National park establishment, initially viewed sceptically by the local population, acquires support after participatory planning seminars and public meetings. The reluctance of the local administrations of Pitkäranta and Sortavala to provide information for the heating systems project<sup>479</sup>

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<sup>479</sup> Progress Report 2 ERUS9701, p. 10.

disappeared after the project's promise of involving them in the pilot projects. The projects thus proceed on the assumption of a causal relation between *participation* and *acceptance* of policy that makes it possible to effectively elicit effects of government without excessive restrictions and regulations, but rather through voluntary and autonomous participation of the governed. The projects thus posit a highly specific relation between government and the governed: rather than act *on* the autonomy of the governed in order to restrict it, government acts *through* the autonomy of the governed to mould specific practices of its exercise that are consonant with the ends of government. Rather than cajole or coerce an anterior subject to adopt desirable practices, the strategy that we shall refer to as *autonomisation* produces the subject who will *desire* to adopt and perform these practices autonomously.

The pioneering training courses for general practitioners, nurses and basic social workers *are not only producing specialists with new and improved skills: they also begin to address the problem of low prestige and morale, particularly among nurses and social workers*. It is no accident that nurses have recently taken the *confident step of forming their own association*.<sup>480</sup>

*The implementation was strongly based on utilising local experts. Even if this contributed to the delays, it is regarded as a correct choice. Significantly increased capacity and knowledge remains in Karelia after the Project for future development. [...] The MEs [Municipal Entities] also commit the local administrations to the future park development. Directors of the MEs were first employed and trained by the project, which gave a start for the capacity building in each territory.*<sup>481</sup>

In these fragments, involvement of local professional groups in project activities results in, firstly, their acceptance and support for the reform strategies, and, secondly, by virtue of the received training, their enhanced capacity to sustain the reform process autonomously. The success of the projects in terms of sustainability and ownership is thus directly proportional to the *effacement of their constitutive function* after the projects' expiry, whereby the replication by the local agents of the advocated practices is no longer tied to the project in question. Exemplary in this regard is the article "Kalevala Park: A Glance into the Future" published in 2002 by the Director of the Municipal Entity "Kalevala National Park" in the major republican daily

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<sup>480</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>481</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 24. Emphasis added.

*Severn Kurier*, which, in recounting the history of the establishment of the Park, makes no mention whatsoever of the Tacis project that made possible both the park itself and the professional position of the author.<sup>482</sup> Matters of courtesy notwithstanding, this type of statement by the local counterpart demonstrates the success of autonomisation, whereby the external doctrine is internalised as the local agent's authentic discourse and the moment of external facilitation is actively forgotten.

The logic at work in autonomisation thus consists in governing through the autonomy of the governed in order to constitute them as active *subjects of their own government*. The specificity of autonomisation as a mode of participatory indoctrination is that this combination of participation and training is deployed in order to *elicit effects of government* in a most effective and efficient manner, avoiding conflict or resistance. Furthermore, autonomisation also entails a transfer of *responsibility* onto the governed in the aftermath of external facilitation. By being transferred the 'ownership' of the reform strategy, local agents become responsible for the effects of the specific model of (self-) government, since it is held to be established with their participation, on the basis of their local knowledge and is presently sustained in their autonomous practices. To paraphrase Foucault, autonomisation gives the local agents speech by articulating in their name the discourse that is to be taken as their own.<sup>483</sup> The effacement of the constitutive function of technical assistance thus leads to the effacement of the responsibility of the agent of assistance for the results of the reforms it has launched.<sup>484</sup>

This logic can be observed at both micro- and macro-levels. An example of autonomisation at the most immediate local sites is offered by the health care project's strategy of increasing the public awareness of health promotion by forming *self-help* groups for patients with chronic diseases and organising *information campaigns* against smoking and for "true family values"<sup>485</sup>. In the context of the policy of substitution, these measures seek to replace institutional interventions and costly hospitalisations with methods that are both more economical and more in line with the ethos of autonomous agency. On the macro-level of the republic, autonomisation may

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<sup>482</sup> See Demidov 2002.

<sup>483</sup> Cf. Foucault 1989, p. 48.

<sup>484</sup> Cf. Henkel and Stirrat 2001, p. 183.

<sup>485</sup> Report on the Outcomes EDRUS9516, p. 16.

be observed in the project's taking credit for fostering the emergence of a pro-reform standpoint on the level of the regional government:

It has been very encouraging to note the *positive and energetic approach of the new Cabinet of Ministers* [appointed after 1998 general elections], which has more than compensated for any delay caused by the changeover in the political leadership of the republic. The cabinet has already taken a number of initiatives, which indicate a *strong commitment to driving the reform process forward*. The Tacis project deserves some of the credit for this, in that it has given *consistent support to the advocates of reform and enabled them to maintain momentum and broaden their base of support*. [...] The programme of the new government of the Republic of Karelia *reflects clearly the values and principles of social and health care reform promoted in the course of the Tacis project*. [...] *Policies, which were once controversial, are now accepted as the sensible way forward*.<sup>486</sup>

The logic at work in this statement is similar to the case of self-help groups. The project may be considered a success since it has fostered, through the involvement of local counterparts in the relations of partnership and training, the emergence of a pro-reform oriented cabinet of ministers, which can be relied on to replicate the results of pilot projects independently and 'energetically', making unnecessary further interventions of technical assistance.

This example points to the deployment in the ordering of discourse of the principle of *self-help* in the more general sense of inciting the pursuit of self-improvement and autonomy<sup>487</sup>: the thrust of training programmes is to inculcate in the counterparts the skills of autonomous performance in line with the prescribed 'primary text'. Such training is complemented by the production for the more general audience of guidebooks and manuals that enable the autonomous practice of a rarefied discourse, exemplified by "10 short guides to specific areas of reform activity [...] for dissemination to a wide audience, entitled '*Working in a New Way*'".<sup>488</sup> The

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<sup>486</sup> Progress Report 3 EDRUS9516, p. 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>487</sup> See Rimke 2000, p. 61. We shall discuss the principle of self-help in greater detail in chapter 3.4.1.

<sup>488</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 17. Emphasis added. Other examples of such 'self-help manuals' include a "handbook on peat production" (Inception Report ERUS9701, p. 22.), Guide to Energy Efficiency Bankable Proposals (Ibid. Appendix 1, p. 9.), Code of Conduct in National Parks (Tourism Strategy for the Karelian Part of the Green Belt, pp. 119–120.), manual for staffing analysis (Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 10.).

purpose of pedagogical interventions is therefore not merely to reform local conduct in accordance with a certain governmental ethos but to achieve this reform of conduct through autonomous local performance.

The scheme of autonomisation does not at first glance restrict so much as incite and solicit active local participation. However, in this very solicitation it elicits effects of government, since autonomy is the *effect* rather than a *precondition* of participation and training. All three projects proceed on the assumption of the need for reforming, ordering, guiding and supervising local conduct in one way or another, therefore there can be no question of valorising the *anterior* autonomy of the governed. We need only recall the parks project's criticism of the 'current wild life' and the 'shortage of traditions about how to behave in nature' to understand how different the affirmation of local autonomy is from a demand for governmental non-intervention into local conduct. The principle of self-help is rather based on the *problematization* of one's conduct by external agents, though the solutions to the constituted problems are to be practiced autonomously through 'self-government'.

Secondly, in the very solicitation of participation the scheme of autonomisation establishes a distinction between those who have successfully participated in project activities (the Tacis trainees) and those who have not. As we have discussed in relation to the object of enterprise, such a distinction constitutes a 'society of discourse', an asymmetric structure of relations between the erstwhile trainees, now *empowered* as trainers, and their 'peers'. Let us now discuss the way, in which this asymmetry serves to elicit effects of government by tracing the process of empowerment through training and dissemination programmes.

All three projects highlight as their achievement the formation of a group of professionals or managers trained in the project and acting as a guarantee of the sustainability of its results. Initially, their participation and support is solicited with the help of the prospect of economic and expert assistance to the respective institutions in the course of pilot projects.

Although Tacis financing has been allocated to two pilot projects, *the consultant has given a commitment to support the implementation of a pilot project in each region. This commitment, formally agreed at a meeting in Sortavala on 13/5/99, has secured the full cooperation of all the municipalities in the project, in relation to the supply of very important technical and financial information about the present situation.*

Furthermore it has created a *positive feeling* among the regions, which will help the consultant to have the best possible effect during and after the project.<sup>489</sup>

Alexander Bizhon [Director of the Paanajärvi National Park] was *satisfied that this project has got the approval*. By all means this project will be very important for the Paanajärvi NP. Originally there were two applications: technical assistance for the Paanajärvi NP and development of protected areas. EC has united both proposals and it became a *wonderful, realistic idea to see development of PA on the Paanajärvi NP as an example. The financing within the framework of the project will be the 37-year-budget of the Paanajärvi NP*.<sup>490</sup>

These initial benefits of participation are complemented by the posterior designation of the trainees in terms of the privileged enunciative modality of skilful reform advocates, ready to be entrusted with the tasks of dissemination and autonomous reproduction of the reform practices. The reporting of the health care project is particularly vivid in this respect, repeatedly invoking the ‘33 local consultants’ as the newly-constituted driving force of reform.

*33 local consultants were appointed to advise the 16 ‘non-pilot’ districts on the preparation and implementation of their own reform strategies.*<sup>491</sup>

The skills and commitment of the *thirty-three local consultants as advocates of reform* have been much increased by the process of dissemination. *Many occupy influential positions at district and republic level – health and social care managers, senior doctors and nurses. They and the strong personal and professional links that the process has forged between them are central to maintaining the momentum of reform.*<sup>492</sup>

The enunciative modality of dissemination-phase ‘trainers’ is in these fragments restricted to the 33 advocates of reform, trained and ‘grown’ in the project. Such a horizontal strategy of dissemination is deemed a more effective way to elicit acceptance of the reform strategies by the non-participating districts than their officialisation on the level of the republican government: “The process has not only disseminated the results of the Tacis project but has given *significantly increased momentum to*

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<sup>489</sup> Progress Report 1 ERUS9701, p. 10. Emphasis added. These ‘pilot projects’ entail the provision of expert consulting to the concerned districts in applying for foreign loans, without any financial inputs on behalf of Tacis. See *ibid.*, pp. 12–13.

<sup>490</sup> Progress Report 1 ENVRUS9704, p. 19. Emphasis added.

<sup>491</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 15. Emphasis added.

<sup>492</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16. Emphasis added.

*social and health care reform in the republic as a whole.* The ‘snowball’ effect has been very apparent.”<sup>493</sup> The metaphor of the snowball effect sums up succinctly the operation of asymmetric dissemination in the case of the object of government: the direct exercise of a pedagogical operation of ‘external facilitation’ on a narrow group of professionals and managers, followed by their empowerment as ‘local facilitators’,<sup>494</sup> the *subjects* of the dissemination process, results in the indirect production of the effects of government through the growth of the circle of adherents to reform. This modality of restriction is therefore the project’s solution to the problem of governing “*in the context of the process of decentralisation*”,<sup>495</sup> whereby the imperatives of government are brought in alignment with the values of local autonomy.

The same operation is performed in the parks development project, which empowers the local counterparts through training and employing them in the project as ‘local consultants’ and subsequently appointing them as directors of ‘municipal entities’, sufficiently well-trained to independently promote park establishment and govern the protected areas after project expiry.

While the Karelian Government is now actively contributing to the process, there is no reason to believe that the Kalevala NP would not be established very soon. This attitude is also supported by the fresh decision of principle made by the Federal Government on March 1, 2001. Also the Ladoga Skerries Park is considered to be ready for establishment. *It has already now a widely recognised position and skilful staff, partially thanks to the good co-operation of the Sortavala Municipality, the Municipal Entity and the Project.* The situation in the Koitajoki-Tolvajärvi proposed park is also quite good, because *the Municipal Enterprise of Tolvajärvi is well organised, has skilful staff, good contacts to Finnish partners and good opportunities to be developed further.*<sup>496</sup>

The scheme of asymmetric dissemination that grants privileged enunciative capacity to the agents autonomised in the projects’ training practices, serves to constitute as *subjects of government of others* those already formed as *self-governing subjects*. The *empowerment* of local professionals and managers is thus conditioned by their prior *subjection* to the rarefied discourse of government and their subsequent *reiteration* of this discourse in their autonomous practices. The

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<sup>493</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16. Emphasis added.

<sup>494</sup> Cf. Cooke 2001, p. 119.

<sup>495</sup> Inception Report EDRUS9516, p. 13. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>496</sup> Project Completion Report ENVRUS9704, p. 19. Emphasis added.

example of the negative sanction enabled by this restriction is offered by the project's response to the Conception of the Development of Health Care in the Republic of Karelia, prepared by local experts in the course of the project and officialised by the Ministry of the Health Care. While the "hard policy [of substitution] has been accepted and this is explicit in the health care strategy document",<sup>497</sup> the question of sectoral integration at the republican level has encountered more ambivalent reception.

To date the conception document focuses mainly on health care reform rather than on an integrated approach with social care. This is the approach chosen by the health ministry. *This apparent imbalance will be corrected in the final document.*<sup>498</sup>

The project has been successful in providing a framework for a much clearer enunciation of key reform strategies in health care. [...] *The project has been less successful in relation to republic policy on social care. No similar strategic document has been prepared by the Ministry of Social Protection although this is undoubtedly needed.*<sup>499</sup>

The ambivalent reception of the project strategies on the ministerial level is demonstrated, by, firstly, the failure of the Ministry of Social Protection to produce an official conception of reforms based on the project's proposals, and, secondly, by the very fact that the one Conception that was produced is a document on the development of *health care*, prepared by the *Ministry of Health Care*, rather than an integrated document on health and social reform, originally envisioned by the project. This is not to say that questions of medico-social integration are not addressed in the Conception. It explicitly authorises "interministerial targeted programmes on prevention, treatment and development of services".<sup>500</sup> Nonetheless, structural integration, whose exemplary models have been constructed in the pilot districts is not stipulated in the Conception. This results in the project's characterisation of the Ministry's stance as an 'imbalance' that should be 'corrected', which suggests that this position is erroneous or a result of misunderstanding. This negative reception of the ministerial strategy is contrasted with the project's laudatory assessment of the districts' enthusiastic integrative

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<sup>497</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 23.

<sup>498</sup> Progress Report 2 EDRUS9516, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>499</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 24. Emphasis added.

<sup>500</sup> Conception of the Development of Health Care in the Republic of Karelia, p. 17. Translation by author.



activities, that are all the more important insofar as they occur ‘without prompting’, and even against the official position of the Ministries. It is thus primarily district health and social managers rather than republic-level officials that are presented as “the republic’s best guarantee of the sustainability of the reform process”.<sup>501</sup> This illustration of restriction highlights an important nuance related to the effects of autonomisation and empowerment. It is not that the autonomous subject-to-be is ‘forced’ to perform a specific discursive practice in order to be endowed with professional identity. New enunciative modalities are constituted entirely irrespectively of the way the agents in question choose to act<sup>502</sup>: the establishment of the positivity of an empowered ‘local consultant’ carves out a privileged figure out of the total population of local counterparts, thereby inadvertently and simultaneously constituting the ‘remainder’ in negative terms. ‘Advocates of reform’ are constituted by delimitation from its opponents, active participants are singled out and separated from passive observers, enthusiastic replication of pilot project results is contrasted with erroneous and imbalanced statements in need of correction. Since the restriction of discourse to privileged enunciative modalities occurs through a practice of *division* between the empowered subjects of (self-) government and other local agents, non-participation or lack of support for project initiatives also results in the specification of one’s enunciative modality, albeit in the negative terms of error, misunderstanding or the anti-reform position of the ‘old bureaucracy’.<sup>503</sup>

To sum up, in the case of the object of government the scheme of restriction operates through the formation of two linked enunciative modalities: the *autonomised subject of self-government*, that has internalised the rarefied content of discourse through participatory indoctrination and actualises its principles in her independent practice, and the *empowered subject of government*, endowed with the enunciative capacity of a local facilitator or trainer in the process of disseminating the results of pilot projects to the broader audience of her quasi-peers. Through these enunciative modalities, government unfolds as a facilitative, participatory activity, both leading towards the goal of enhancing autonomy and relying in its operation on the autonomy

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<sup>501</sup> Final Report EDRUS9516, p. 35.

<sup>502</sup> Cf. Goldman 2001, p. 514.

<sup>503</sup> Project Completion Report ERUS9701, p. 24.

of the governed. We can now summarise the overall ordering of the constitution of the object of government in the discourse of technical assistance in the following figure.




Figure 14: Constitution of Government in the Discourse of Technical Assistance

## 2.4. The Pedagogical Technology: The Structure of the Dispositional Diagram of Technical Assistance

We have completed our analysis of the formation of the objects of agency, enterprise and government in the discourse of technical assistance. Let us now address the question of the relation between these objects. In chapter 2.2.2.3. we have discussed the way, in which the objects of enterprise and local agency form, in a movement of mutual concretisation and abstraction, the veridictive (ethico-technical) axis of the discourse of technical assistance that specifies entrepreneurial practices as the appropriate technique for fostering autonomous agency and inscribes ethical characteristics of conduct in terms of concrete indicators of efficient performance. We

may now specify the links between respectively government and enterprise, and government and agency.

The relation between government and enterprise is characterised by the logic of *reflexivity*. We have seen how government in the discourse of technical assistance is *both* incited to actively construct concrete enterprises (SMEs, national parks, general practices) and the corresponding context of 'enterprise culture' *and* is to be guided in its own operations by the principles of efficiency, flexibility, accountability and transparency that are proper to the domain of the economy. Furthermore, the very object of enterprise that is constituted by government is recast as a *limit* to governmental practice, an object of facilitation and assistance rather than direct intervention. There is thus a movement from the constitution of the enterprise as an object of knowledge and action to its autonomisation as a subject of knowledge and action that forms a limit to governmental practice. The constitutive force of governmental practice is thereby disavowed in the recasting of the *effect* of government as an autonomous subject, endowed with an endogenous entrepreneurial rationality. Secondly, this rationality is folded back onto government itself, whereby government becomes problematised in terms of its own object. In the discourse of technical assistance the *techné* of government must coincide with the *telos* of reform: if it is the task of government to foster the emergence of enterprise culture, then it must itself be reshaped in accordance with its principles.

The relation between government and agency is characterised by a similar reflexive loop. Government is both actively constitutive of autonomous agency, specified in entrepreneurial terms, and is to be limited and guided in its operations by the very autonomy that it brings into being. The linkage between government and agency produces a dual effect of a 'subjectifying government' and a '(self-) governing subject'. In its constitutive practices government presupposes and effects as an object of knowledge a notion of autonomous agency understood as a construct of governmental practices. Once constituted, however, the constructed character of autonomy is disavowed in favour of its postulation as a limit to governmental activity. Furthermore, government begins to be problematised in terms of this very autonomy: if the empowerment of autonomous agency is the *telos* of governmental practice, then its techniques must be adapted to it, hence the prioritisation of participatory and partnership approaches in the discourse of government. In its linkages with the objects of agency and enterprise government therefore figures as both a *constitutive agent* and a potential *object of problematisation*. In the discourse of technical

assistance the space of possible criticism of government is thus formed in the gap between the telos of reform and government's own performance in terms of that telos.

While the linkage between agency and enterprise formed the jurisdictional axis of the discourse, the link between government and agency constitutes its veridictive axis that consists in the assumption of *governmental construction of autonomous identity*. The ethical imperative of autonomous local agency is concretised in terms of a governmental episteme whose primary principle is active construction of new phenomena. In the constructivist episteme of government, the identity of the local agent is not taken for granted as natural or given, but is rather established through a series of problematisations and interventions. At the outset of the projects, local agents are in fact endowed with a certain *non-identity*, a gap between the ethos of autonomy, marked by awareness, active participation and an enterprising character, and the present state of affairs, marked by ignorance, non-involvement and lack of enterprise. The identity of local counterparts as autonomous agents only emerges in the course of project interventions and acquires concreteness and materiality through epistemic inscriptions and technical piloting. Identity is thus quite literally a techno-epistemic *innovation*, invented in governmental practice as its ethico-teleological presupposition, deployed as its instrument, produced as its effect and ultimately, in a reflexive folding, recoded as a critical limit, employed to problematise and optimise governmental practices themselves.

In speaking about the veridictive regime of 'governmental constructivism' we seek to dissociate our argument from the wide and ill-defined field of 'social constructivism'. The phenomeno-technical constructivism that we have reconstituted in the discourse of technical assistance is quite distinct from the idea of social construction of intersubjective meanings. As we have demonstrated, the construction presupposed and effected in this discourse is more literal than metaphorical and is effected in the regularity of disciplinary frameworks and the monotony of training exercises rather than in the dialogical practices of persuasive speech. Governmental constructivism bypasses the dimension of intersubjectivity as such<sup>504</sup>: no new meanings

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<sup>504</sup> See Rose 1996b, Osborne and Rose 1997, 1999, Hacking 2000, 2000b, Callon 1998, 2002 for the articulation of a Foucauldian alternative to the phenomenological and language-oriented style of 'social constructivism'. Nikolas Rose (1996b) argues that 'social constructivism' retains at its foundation the phenomenological subject with a capacity for the constitution of meaning in cultural interaction, hence the tendency in constructivist accounts to focus on conversations or narratives. (See e.g. Holstein and

emerge in the interaction of EU Tacis and local counterparts and, as we have argued extensively, the final reform strategies are not (and cannot be) an ‘interdiscursive’ synthesis of ‘Western’ and ‘local’ knowledge. Neither is the resultant ‘ownership’ of these strategies by the local counterpart a result of successful rhetorical practices in an intersubjective exchange. We may, however, retain the notion of ownership, once we reverse its relation to the local counterpart: it is not the local agent who comes into possession of a reform discourse, but rather the discourse that comes into possession of an enunciative vehicle. Rather than the discourse becoming a *subject’s property*, it is the *properties of the subject* that are constructed in discursive practices that have a concrete technical and material dimension. Such technical artefacts as logical frameworks, questionnaire formats, training curricula, Geographical Information System inscriptions, medico-social registers, accounting software participate *directly*, i.e. unmediated by ‘ideational factors’, in the governmental construction of the identity of the local agent. The ‘constructivism’ at work here may thus be termed governmental, discursive or technological, but there is hardly anything ‘social’ about it, other than in a trivial sense.<sup>505</sup>

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Gubrium 2000.) Logically, this style of constructivism could never probe the construction of its own condition of possibility: the subject itself. In contrast, the Foucauldian approach, which is devoted precisely to the problem of the constitution of subjectivity, focuses on the veridictive and jurisdictional productivity of discursive practices and emphasises their ‘materiality’, i.e. their dependence on concrete technical procedures, devices and techniques. “In accounting for our history and our specificity, *it is not to the realm of signs, meanings and communications that we should turn, but to analytics of techniques, intensities, authorities and apparatuses.*” (Rose 1996b, pp. 178–179. Emphasis added.) The case for a ‘technological constructivism’ is also famously made in Foucault’s (1977a) argument on the ‘disciplinary technology’ which bypasses consciousness entirely: “Power relations can materially penetrate the body in depth without depending even on the mediation of the subject’s own representations. If power takes hold on the body, this isn’t through its having first to be interiorised in people’s consciousness.” (Foucault 1980d, p. 186.) In International Relations, a technological constructivist approach has been articulated, with reference to the work of Bruno Latour, in Walters 2002.

<sup>505</sup> See Hacking 2000, pp. 39–49 for the criticism of the superfluous or incoherent application of the attribute ‘social’ to ‘construction’. All ‘construction’ is obviously social in a trivial sense of usually not being a solitary activity of individuals. A non-obvious use of ‘social construction of X’ would require a conventional notion of X as either natural (e.g. ‘social construction of rocks’, see *ibid.*, pp. 186–207) or independent of social processes (e.g. ‘social construction of scientific facts’, see *ibid.*, pp. 63–100). In the case of the constructivist episteme at work in the discourse of technical assistance, we choose to speak of a *governmental* construction in order to stress the power relations involved in this process, to emphasise the specificity of the site of construction rather than dissolve it in the ‘social context’ and to point out the technological aspect of the process of construction, obscured in the intersubjective and interactional connotations of ‘social construction’.

We may now summarise the results of our analysis by schematically presenting the diagram emergent in the order of discourse of technical assistance. We shall do so with the help of two figures, the first presenting the *overall structure of discursive ordering* for the three objects of agency, enterprise and government, the second presenting the *structure of the governmental diagram* that emerges in the *pattern of relations between these three objects*.




Figure 15: Order(ing) of the Discourse of Technical Assistance

Figure 15 depicts the way, in which the order of the discourse of technical assistance is constituted in the threefold operation of *exclusion*, *rarefaction* and *restriction* that pertain respectively to the *ethos*, *episteme* and *techne* of its governmental rationality. The *ethos* of governmentality is established through a delimitation of an exclusive domain of valorisation (local autonomy and authenticity, policy government, entrepreneurial rationality). The *episteme* of governmentality is formed through the rarefaction of discourse by the installation of ‘primary texts’ that ground the local agents’ commentary (e.g. managerial inscriptions, the principle of local piloting, the supplementary logic of the ‘untypical enterprise’). The *techne* of

governmentality is actualised in a series of restrictive operations that constitute enunciative modalities of regulated discursive practice (participatory indoctrination of local counterparts, their subsequent autonomisation and ‘authentication’ as local consultants, guides, managers, and their empowerment through the asymmetric structure of the dissemination process). In this unitary ordering structure, the three objects of agency, enterprise and government are affirmed in their positivity only by virtue of the introduction of the regime of scarcity regarding the ‘things said’ about these objects.

This overall scheme of the order of the discourse of technical assistance is only a formal container for the practices of the formation of its objects. The specific structure of the dispositional diagram actualised in this discourse is to be discerned in the pattern of the *relations between the three objects* constituted in these ordering schemes. Such a scheme may be visualised as located *within* the triangular space of Figure 15, as a concrete actualisation of a formal order of discourse. This relational scheme is presented in Figure 16 below.




Figure 16: Structure of the Dispositional Diagram of Technical Assistance

This figure schematises the diagram of governmentality, actualised in the discourse of technical assistance, that we may now term a *pedagogical technology*, whose ethos is *autonomous enterprising agency*, whose episteme is *governmental construction of identity* and whose techne is *participatory indoctrination* into entrepreneurial professional and managerial practices and their *asymmetric dissemination*. In this figure the lateral sides of the triangle, GA and EA, represent the veridictive and jurisdictional axes of the diagram, formed in the linkages between local agency and, respectively, government and enterprise. The GA axis links governmental constructivism and the ethos of autonomous agency in a permanent oscillation between the constitution of local autonomy in governmental practices and its subsequent naturalisation as an authentic reality that forms a limit to governmental practice. The EA axis links the ethos of agency and the techne of entrepreneurial restructuring in a perpetual movement of mutual concretisation and abstraction between the desire for autonomy and the concrete entrepreneurial technique of its materialisation. The GE base of the triangle represents the *techno-epistemic* axis of the diagram that forms the basis of its *productivity*. This axis links the episteme of governmental constructivism with the techniques of entrepreneurial restructuring in a reflexive relation, whereby government is both an active facilitator of the formation of enterprises and is itself problematised and reformed in terms of its own entrepreneurial inscriptions.

Let us now discuss the axes drawn inside the diagram. The base vertices of the triangle function as *correlative supports* to the opposite laterals. The vector G–EA provides the epistemic correlate to the jurisdictional axis of entrepreneurial autonomisation: a constructivist episteme is essential to the pedagogical constitution of entrepreneurial practices, institutions and enunciative modalities. The vector E–GA provides the technical correlate to the veridictive axis of governmental constitution of autonomous agency: entrepreneurial indoctrination serves to actualise in concrete local models the constructivist assumption of agency constitution in governmental practices. The intersection of these vectors graphically demonstrates Foucault's thesis on the interdependence and mutual reinforcement of power and knowledge, simultaneously with pointing to their non-identity and irreducibility to one another.<sup>506</sup> These 'support vectors' endow the jurisdictional and veridictive effects of the diagram with *epistemic coherence* and *technical concreteness*.

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<sup>506</sup> See Foucault 1988b, Deleuze 1988.



The linkage between the summit and the base of the triangle (vector A–GE) represents the relation between the techno-epistemic productivity of the diagram and its ethico-teleological imperative of autonomous local agency. As we have already discussed at length in our analysis, this relation is highly problematic within the discourse of technical assistance, marked by the aporetic status of local agency as both *authentic* or quasi-natural and *artefactual* or governmentally constructed. The identity of autonomous local agency is both constituted in governmental practices and presented as their limit, insofar as governmental interventions are expected to protect and enhance autonomy through partnerships and participatory ‘bottom-up’ approaches, and to be ‘authenticated’ by local knowledge. The notion of identity as both a *construct* of and a *limit* to government places it at the limit of the diagram of technical assistance, which accounts for its undecidable status. As a limit object, autonomous agency is at once intra- and extra-diagrammatic, discursive and pre-discursive, a governmental construct and a condition of possibility of government. Its concrete positivity as an empirical effect of the diagram is mirrored on its outside by the transcendental figure of an authentic agent with local knowledge that conditions the possibility of diagrammatic governmental practices. As a doublet, local agency is never identical with itself and thus acquires only a ‘spectral’ presence within the diagram. Only when conjured as *exterior* to the diagram is it paradoxically characterised by authenticity in the sense of pre-discursive subjective *interiority*. On the other hand, when construed as an *intra-diagrammatic* object, it is entirely reducible to the *exterior* doctrinal forms imposed on it and thus ‘inauthentic’ and non-autonomous by definition. The local agent can thus only correspond to the internal construct presupposed by the diagram by being exterior to it.

It is this limit location of the ethos of autonomous local agency that accounts for the diffraction and dispersion within the discourse. In every moment of discursive practice, the triangular diagram, whose closure is achieved through the threefold ordering operation of exclusion, rarefaction and restriction, is in danger of self-deconstruction along the line of the A–GE vector. Ethical valorisation of autonomous agency as a source of authenticity jeopardises the dimension of techno-epistemic productivity of the diagram, recasting its operations as illegitimate violations of anterior autonomy. In this modality of critical discourse, the techno-epistemic base of the diagram is dissolved, resulting in the effacement of the constitutive force of discourse and its mutation into the literally bottomless and hence interminable abstract discourse on freedom and authenticity. Conversely, the explicit affirmation of

the techno-epistemic constitutive practices threatens at any point to unhinge the nexus of jurisdiction and veridiction at the vertex of the ethos of autonomy, exploding the closed triangular space of the diagram into an open incomplete square. Techno-epistemic productivity is thereby deprived of ethical value and teleological direction and reduced to a cynical and mechanical governmental construction. The diagram of technical assistance permanently navigates between the Scyllus of an ethical discourse without phenomeno-technical capacity and the Charybdis of an authoritarian imposition of managerial routines. The A–GE vector thus indicates the *line of fragility* within the diagram, both a source of dispersion within the discourse and, ultimately, the aporia that threatens its unity. However, this vector simultaneously defines the entire space of existence of technical assistance as a governmental practice. Technical assistance is only possible insofar as there is a gap between the governmental ethos and its techno-epistemic ground. The autonomy of local agency must be posited as presently absent, a lack to be supplemented, a property temporarily withheld from the agent in a pedagogical relation. Conversely, techno-epistemic construction must be posited as constrained in its operation by the knowledge and practices of local agents, a mere ‘facilitation’ to the autochthonous reform process. Ethico-teleological imperatives and techno-epistemic construction may therefore never coincide, neither through casting local agency as a pure governmental construct without remainder nor through its presentation as an authentic autonomous being, antecedent to governmental practice. In other words, the discourse of technical assistance is distinct from both a thoroughgoing governmental constructivism that recognises no naturalised identity and a quasi-phenomenological valorisation of ‘lived experience’ and constituent subjectivity. These two opposed options would in our graphic representation have the same result of the reduction of the altitude of the triangle to zero, its levelling into a one-dimensional segment. The line of fragility connecting phenomeno-technical construction and the valorisation of authenticity is therefore a constitutive principle of the discourse of technical assistance rather than an inconsistency to be criticised or corrected. The entire space of existence of the discourse is identical to the space of its potential dissolution.

We have now completed our archaeological reconstitution of the unity of the discourse of technical assistance. Our analysis so far has been purposefully limited to the reconstitution of a formal, ahistorical structure of the dispositional diagram of governmentality actualised in this discourse. In the following chapters, we shall seek to disentangle this complex structure to account for its historical conditions of

emergence. We have answered the question of ‘what’ diagram of governmentality is actualised in the discourse of technical assistance. Our task is now to account for the ‘how’ question, i.e. to probe the historical emergence of the governmental technology so singularly paradoxical and yet so self-evident that it hardly ever figures as a proper object of analysis. How is it that a discourse emerged, whose rules of formation are so idiosyncratic and yet are actualised with so little variation across the most divergent spheres? How is it that a practice came into being that valorises so strongly the authenticity of local knowledge, which, if taken seriously, would make redundant the entire programme of technical assistance? Conversely, what makes possible a practice which relentlessly problematises, intervenes in and reconstructs the identities of those very agents it marvels at as authentic representatives of local nature and culture, ‘shy and beautiful animals’? Why does it disavow in this very valorisation its own constitutive force, presenting itself as a mere facilitator and actively working towards a final self-effacement in the autonomisation and empowerment of its objects? What conditions the unstable and paradoxical combination of the asymmetrical relationship of pedagogy and the claims of partnership and participation that proceed from the manifestly untenable assumption of equality of Tacis and its local counterparts? What is the historical constellation of governmental rationalities that made possible this curious and fragile hybrid of the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’, the pedagogical installation of a uniform doctrine of entrepreneurial management and the Romantic naturalisation of local knowledge, the active and explicit phenomeno-technical constructivism and the sentimental penchant for authentic experience, the Ice Hammer and the ‘hearty words’? These are among the questions to be addressed in the following chapters.

### 3. INFRA-LIBERALISM: STRATEGIC LOGIC OF THE DIAGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

#### 3.1. Technical Assistance and Participatory Development: Beyond the 'Hypocrisy Hypothesis'

In this part of the study we shall attempt to provide a genealogical interpretation of the conditions of emergence of the dispositional diagram of governmentality that we have reconstituted in our analysis of the discourse of technical assistance. As we argued in the Introduction, the interpretive task of the genealogical disentanglement of the strategic logic of the diagram is distinct from 'situating' a specific set of governmental practices in the inexhaustible social or cultural context that may make them meaningful or finding a correlate to a governmental practice in the domains of 'theory', 'ideas' and 'ideology'. The problem with 'sociocultural' interpretations and such 'causal' notions as the spirit of the times, social change, influence, dismissed by Foucault as "magic fog",<sup>1</sup> is their excessive generality: "They are pitched at too general a level and propose a mysterious, even occult, relation between general social processes or events (e.g. globalisation, postcolonialism, the emergence of postmodernity) and features of identity."<sup>2</sup>

Of course, we do not wish to deny the trivial fact of any practice's 'embeddedness' in a wider context. We do, however, question, firstly, the possibility of strictly separating the socio-cultural dimension from the governmental field (which is

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<sup>1</sup> Foucault cited in Davidson 1997, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Dean 1996a, p. 218.

necessary to rely on the former for explanatory force) and, secondly, the utility of dissolving the specificity of a practice in a vaguely defined aggregate context.<sup>3</sup>

Society is imagined as a context or a frame. Society is out there, and you imagine how to put this strange beast [...] in this frame. It's another version of the infrastructure and superstructure metaphor. [...] You must not imagine society as a context for different types of activities, [...] you have to imagine a process through which collective relations are constructed. So, it is a reversal of the approach. *The notion of embeddedness has been very useful, but now we have to rid of it.*<sup>4</sup>

With its rejection of the notion of embeddedness, the genealogical point of departure of the governmentality approach reverses the direction of interpretation: instead of asking how the particular practice or event is made possible by the general social context, we ask the question of how this practice comes into play in producing this general context. In other words, our interest in the governmental 'construction of the social' makes it logically impossible to interpret the dispositional diagram of governmentality as a 'social construction'. The conditions of emergence of the diagram of technical assistance will thus be sought *within* the space of governmental rationalities, i.e. rather than (mis)recognise these governmental practices as manifestations of 'deeper' processes we shall seek to disentangle them as surface assemblages of contingent historical events.

Secondly, the 'embeddedness thesis' presupposes what Mitchell Dean refers to as the 'general figure of the self', which is determined and transformed in various ways by the historico-cultural context, but retains its basic self-identity.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, our goal is to disentangle the positivity of agency formed inside the dispositional diagram without falling back on the transhistorical figure of the subject traversing in his empty sameness the historical variety of governmental diagrams that 'embed' him. Genealogical interpretation practices what Foucault refers to as the *dissociative* use of history, "directed against identity and oppos[ing] history given as continuity and representative of a tradition".<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For the critique of the 'sociocultural embeddedness' approach, see the work of Michel Callon (1998, 2002). See also Barry and Slater 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Callon 2002, p. 292. Emphasis added.

<sup>5</sup> Dean 1996a, p. 217.

<sup>6</sup> Foucault 1984a, p. 93. For the more detailed account of the non-identitarian conception of history see *ibid.*, pp. 94–95.

Necessarily we must dismiss these tendencies that encourage the *consoling play of recognitions*. Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on 'rediscovery', and it emphatically excludes the 'rediscovery of ourselves'. *History becomes effective to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being*. Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity.<sup>7</sup> The diagnosis does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that *we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks*.<sup>8</sup>

Our interest thus consists in questioning the conditions of possibility of the practices of diagrammatic constitution in all the irreducible specificity of their irruption in discourse, the conditions that are of the same ontological order as the conditioned practices. At no point, therefore, do we escape the surface of the emergence of the diagram in question. At the same time the reconstitution of the diagram of technical assistance, a structural model that is in principle transferable and replicable beyond the site of its immediate production, makes it both possible and imperative to involve in our interpretation not merely the relations of technical assistance, in which the model in question is transferred to the Russian counterpart, but also the political conditions of emergence of the model itself that are irreducible to the immediate domain of its actualisation. The specificity of the site of technical assistance will in our study only provide an immediate starting point for the genealogical disentanglement of its dispositional diagram. In this chapter we shall dwell at this starting point in order to tentatively identify the historical location of the diagram of technical assistance in the wider discursive network of 'participatory development', discuss the contemporary criticism of the 'participatory' tendencies in development policy and open an alternative path of critique that focuses not merely on the relations involved in the *transfer* of the governmental model in the context of development assistance but on the genealogy of the emergence of the model itself.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 88. Emphasis added.

<sup>8</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 131. Emphasis added.

### 3.1.1. Technical Assistance and the Discursive Network of 'Participatory Development'

As we discussed at length in the previous chapters, the distinctive feature of the dispositional diagram of technical assistance is its *valorisation of participation*, both as the ethos of the proposed reforms and as the techne of their implementation. We have demonstrated how the asymmetric practices of *pedagogical indoctrination* are supplemented in the discourse with the participatory pathos that connotes the relations of *equality* and *partnership*. In the epistemic aspect, local participation and the 'bottom-up' approach to the design of reform strategies are valorised as a guarantee of the endowment of the final reform proposals with the *authentic* status of *local knowledge*, whose 'exclusive importance' carries exclusionary consequences for the ordering of discourse. Finally, we have seen how participation of local agents in the practices of government is presented as an instrument of their *autonomisation* and *empowerment*, i.e. their internalisation of effects of government as autonomous choices emanating from their subjective *identity*.

This assemblage of ethical, epistemic and technical instruments and effects, linked by the nodal concept of participation, locates the diagram of technical assistance within the vast discursive network or 'associated field'<sup>9</sup> of contemporary global development policy. Similarly to the regulative framework of the EU Tacis programme<sup>10</sup>, participation and empowerment have, throughout the 1990s, been increasingly highlighted as both means and ends to development in the strategies of such global agents of development assistance as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme.<sup>11</sup> Participatory approaches have been propounded in the official discourse of these institutions as a corrective response to the criticism of 'traditional' development practices, which are retrospectively presented as top-

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<sup>9</sup> Foucault 1989, pp. 97–100.

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. Council Regulation Concerning the Provision of Assistance to the Partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (WWW-document.), National Indicative Programme 2004–2006. (WWW-document.)

<sup>11</sup> Some of the primary texts that ground the discourse of these institutions on participation include: The World Bank and Participation (1994), World Bank Participation Sourcebook (1996), Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation (1998), Strengthening UNDP's Collaboration with Civil Society Organisations: An Operational Handbook. (1998)

down, hierarchical, exclusive, centred on cooperation with state agencies in the recipient country and indifferent to the local knowledge of the beneficiaries.<sup>12</sup> The frequent failure of these practices is contrasted with the benefits that active local participation offers for the process of development: “People’s participation can ensure *sustainability*, it can make development activities more *effective* and it can help to *build local capacities*.”<sup>13</sup> The prioritisation of participation is also linked with the general reorientation of the problematic of development from macro-economic restructuring towards democratisation, social change and local empowerment: “Development [is] a process that must enlarge the range of people’s choices and enable them to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.”<sup>14</sup>

The basic principles of what in the official discourses of the UNDP and the World Bank is referred to as ‘participatory development’<sup>15</sup> may be summed up as follows: the ‘bottom-up’ orientation, the focus on empowerment, the emphasis on local knowledge and the accentuation of learning in the process of development. Let us now discuss each of these principles in their relation to the structure of the diagram of technical assistance.

Firstly, various participatory approaches are presented as a *bottom-up* alternative to ineffective ‘top-down’ imposition of development doctrines on the ‘beneficiaries’, a “fundamental shift – both in attitudes and methodology – [...] to break decades of top-down, non-participatory practice”.<sup>16</sup> The frequent failure of development projects has been explained by the lack of incentives for the beneficiary to participate in the process, whose direction is determined from the outside.

People’s participation can increase the *efficiency* of development activities in that, by involving *local resources and skills*, it can make better use of expensive external costs. It can also increase the *effectiveness* of such activities by ensuring that, with people’s involvement, they are based upon *local knowledge and understanding of problems* and

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<sup>12</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 1 (WWW-document.), The World Bank and Participation. (WWW-document.)

<sup>13</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation. Introduction. (WWW-Document.) Emphasis added.

<sup>14</sup> Conserving Indigenous Knowledge – Integrating Two Systems of Innovation. (WWW-document.) See Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001 for the discussion of this expansion of the problematic of development.

<sup>15</sup> See Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 1 (WWW-document.), World Bank Participation Sourcebook. (WWW-document.)

<sup>16</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 1. (WWW-document.)



will therefore be more *relevant to local needs*. [...] Crucially participation can help to secure the *sustainability* of the activities as the beneficiaries assume *ownership* and are more likely to maintain its momentum.<sup>17</sup>

In our analysis, we have repeatedly noted the linkage made in the discourse of technical assistance between local participation and the acceptance and sustainability of the proposed interventions. However, the valorisation of the ‘bottom-up’ approach exceeds its utilitarian benefits. Besides the more narrow sense of participation as a means to effective policy implementation, such ‘primary texts’ of global development policy as the 1998 UNDP Guidebook to Participation and the 1996 World Bank Participation Sourcebook also propose participation as a goal in itself:

This goal can be expressed as the *empowering* of people in terms of their acquiring the skills, knowledge and experience to take *greater responsibility* for their development. People’s poverty can often be explained in terms of their *exclusion* and the lack of *access* to and *control* of the resources, which they need to sustain and improve their lives. Participation is an *instrument of change* and it can help to break that exclusion and to provide poor people with the basis for their more *direct involvement* in development initiatives.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly to the diagram of technical assistance, this ‘transformative’<sup>19</sup> value of participation is granted an axiomatic status in the discourse, being cast as an *ethos* of governmental practices rather than a mere technical instrument deployed to gain the acceptance of the proposed reforms and facilitate their implementation.

Secondly and relatedly, participatory development seeks to achieve the *empowerment* of the beneficiaries and thereby correct the allegedly economy-centric character of ‘traditional’ development policies, which obscures social and political inequalities in developing societies and the violence incurred by local cultures in the projects centred on stimulating economic growth: “Participation can be seen as a process of empowerment of the deprived and the excluded.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. Due to its focus on empowerment, participatory development tends to privilege ‘marginal’ or ‘excluded’ groups as its beneficiaries: the poor, women, ethnic minorities or local communities as opposed to the central government. See Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapters 1, 2 (WWW-document), World Bank Participation Sourcebook (WWW-document), UNDP Policy on

*Good governance*, decentralised democratic processes that enable the *strengthening of human capacities* and a reduction of their vulnerabilities have been acknowledged as people's entitlements. [...] 'People's power' is now recognised as a vital driving force in development efforts. [...] A sound partnership and alliance with civil society organisations is a prerequisite for participation. *It is the only way that people's realities and needs can be addressed legitimately.*<sup>21</sup>

As an alternative to the economy-centric approach, 'empowerment' is an umbrella concept for a wide range of initiatives emphasising the involvement of non-governmental organisations, the stimulation of the development of civil society, the redress of gender inequalities, etc.<sup>22</sup> In all these initiatives participation is posited as more than a mere adaptation of development practices to allow for greater local involvement and, consequently, more effective and efficient policy implementation:

Projects must seek to promote a *real and authentic involvement* of people in the development process and not merely seek to make the more common, top-down and technocratic approach to project development more participatory.<sup>23</sup> *Participatory processes should not be used to market Bank or Government goals; they should be used to elicit community goal-setting and leadership.* [...] Participation

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Collaboration with Civil Society: Building Partnerships for Sustainable Human Development. (WWW-document.) See Rankin 2001, Brigg 2001, Goldman 2002 for the studies of the empowerment of women and indigenous groups in developing societies in the programmes of the World Bank and other international financing institutions. In the diagram of technical assistance, the valorisation of marginality is tempered by the lack of a clear victim of exclusion in the postcommunist Russian society. It is nonetheless observable in the parks project's claim that the local population has been sidelined in the discussions on park establishment, its 'traditional rights' jeopardised by non-participatory approaches and in need of reassertion with the help of external facilitation. Women and young people are also presented as disadvantaged and marginalised due to the high level of unemployment among these groups in the Republic of Karelia, which makes new livelihood options introduced by the projects (tourism, local fuel development, etc.) particularly beneficial for them. Finally, the problematisation of exclusion is evident in the projects' strong commitment to the involvement of local district administrations, whose present relations with republican authorities are considered to be conflictual and based upon a top-down imposition of policies.

<sup>21</sup> UNDP Policy on Collaboration with Civil Society: Building Partnerships for Sustainable Human Development. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. UNDP Policy on Collaboration with Civil Society: Building Partnerships for Sustainable Human Development (WWW-document.), Participation in Development Assistance (WWW-document.), Strengthening UNDP's Collaboration with Civil Society Organisations: An Operational Handbook (WWW-document.), Social Development Update: Monitoring Civic Engagement in Bank Lending and Policy Instruments. (WWW-document.)

<sup>23</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 1. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

should focus on *engaging and empowering communities to decide on their own priorities*. This is a different focus from getting local people to buy into the donor's and government's project for the purpose of improving economic sustainability. The former focus for participation is *transformative*; the latter is *instrumental*.<sup>24</sup>

The mechanisms of empowerment, specified by the World Bank in the 1994 Report, include “*capacity-building* for stakeholder organisations, strengthening the financial and legal *status* of stakeholder organisations, handover and *self-management* by stakeholders, support for new *spontaneous initiatives* by stakeholders.”<sup>25</sup> Similarly to the diagram of technical assistance, empowerment is offered as a path to *autonomy*, understood in terms of the ‘objectively verifiable’ local capacity to reproduce the advocated practices after project expiry. This understanding of empowerment is also evident in the UNDP Guidebook’s identification of the latter with the ‘ownership’ of reform results, “[whereby] beneficiaries are both willing and able to sustain and further develop the initiatives begun by the project”.<sup>26</sup> The notion of empowerment as an effect of ‘transformative’ participation points to what we have referred to as a ‘governmental constructivist’ episteme at work in the discourses of participatory development, whereby local autonomy is held to be constituted in governmental practices of engagement, stimulation, facilitation and organisation of participation.

Thirdly, discourses of participatory development grant epistemological privilege to ‘*local*’ or ‘*indigenous*’ *knowledge* and, to a varying extent, depreciate the ‘scientific’ or ‘expert’ knowledge of external consultants as lacking in authenticity. “People’s knowledge and skills must be seen as a potentially positive contribution to the project. [...] Participation is to do with developing people’s capacities and this can be best achieved by building on and strengthening their existing knowledge and expertise.”<sup>27</sup> While ‘orthodox’ development doctrines tended to view local and traditional knowledge as a ‘hindrance’ to the transfer of more ‘modern’ practices,

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<sup>24</sup> The World Bank and Participation, annex VI. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

<sup>25</sup> The World Bank and Participation. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

<sup>26</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 2. (WWW-document.) In a similar manner, the World Bank Participation Sourcebook conceives of empowerment in terms of a process, in the course of which passive ‘beneficiaries’ of development become, firstly, the active ‘clients’ of development services, and, ultimately, the ‘owners’ of the results of development projects. World Bank Participation Sourcebook, chapter 1. (WWW-document.)

<sup>27</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 2. (WWW-document.)

participatory development promotes variously construed ‘mutually enriching’ syntheses of local and expert knowledge that would graft technological sophistication onto cultural authenticity: “What is needed is not a stand-off between two entirely different systems, but a broad approach that allows and respects the contributions of each.”<sup>28</sup> In our analysis we have discussed at length the complex and problematic relation of the discourse of technical assistance to ‘local knowledge’, its simultaneous valorisation and rarefaction through managerial inscriptions and pedagogical practices. This combination of the valorisation of local knowledge and the focus on the ‘external facilitation’ of local discourse is strongly accentuated in the primary texts of the UNDP and the World Bank regarding participation, the methods and techniques of ‘participatory planning’ emphasising the facilitators’ role in ‘catalysing’, structuring and organising local participation.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, global development policy discourses emphasise *learning* as a constitutive principle of participatory development. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook states that learning on behalf of the local counterpart is a feature that distinguishes ‘proper’ participation from a mere involvement of the local population in development projects:

We fully support and advocate consultation and listening – especially with the poor and the disadvantaged. But we do not equate this with the process called ‘participation’. Instead we recognise consultation and listening as important *prerequisites* for participation, because, no matter how good the sponsors and designers are at consultation and listening, what is still missing is *learning* on the part of the people in the local system. [...] Development experience has shown that when external experts *alone* acquire, analyse and

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<sup>28</sup> Conserving Indigenous Knowledge – Integrating Two Systems of Innovation. (WWW-document.) See Ming 1998 for a detailed analysis of the historical shifts in the ‘doctrines of development’ leading to the current valorisation of local culture at the expense of scientific knowledge.

<sup>29</sup> See Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 3 (WWW-document.), World Bank Participation Sourcebook, appendix 1 (WWW-document.) for the detailed discussion of the ‘methods of participatory development’, which recall the modalities of rarefaction and restriction deployed in the discourse of technical assistance: installation of substantive and procedural rarefying grids, facilitated ‘participatory planning’ meetings and workshops, asymmetric dissemination, etc. The common characteristic of the methods of participatory development is the requirement for the external facilitation of local discourse in order to “translate client needs and demands into operationally meaningful terms and activities”. (World Bank Participation Sourcebook, appendix 1. (WWW-document.) The Sourcebook sums up the functions of the external consultant as follows: “initiating, facilitating, participating, sharing expertise, observing, navigating and nurturing.” (Ibid. Chapter 3.)

process information and then present this information in reports, social change usually does not take place; whereas the kind of 'social learning' that stakeholders generate and internalise during the participatory planning and/or implementation of a development activity *does* enable social change.<sup>30</sup>

The recourse to the pedagogical modality of restriction is thus maintained in the participatory approach notwithstanding the valorisation of the authenticity of local knowledge. Similarly to what we have referred to as 'participatory indoctrination' in the diagram of technical assistance, pedagogical practices are presented as integral to the empowering or 'transformative' participation, while participation is in turn advocated as an effective means of achieving local acceptance of pedagogically transmitted reform solutions:

Participation does not eliminate the role of experts in the field of development. It just *changes the way experts communicate their expertise to the other stakeholders*. It also increases their effectiveness. [...] In a participatory stance, what development experts have to offer has a *much better chance of being accepted and used* than when they rely on reports and briefings to share their expertise.<sup>31</sup>

We may thus conclude that the pedagogical technology, actualised in the diagram of technical assistance, functions as a paradigmatic node in the wider discursive field of 'participatory development', with which it shares the *ethos of autonomisation and empowerment*, the *techné of participatory indoctrination* and the *epistémè of governmental constructivism*. We ought to emphasise that the identification of this discursive network, in which the diagram of technical assistance is a concrete artefact paradigm, is strictly tentative insofar as we make no claim about the identity of the specific diagrammatic structure of technical assistance, actualised in particular projects, and the vast and dispersed field of development practices engaged in by the EU, the UN, the World Bank and other numerous agents of global development policy. Secondly, it must be stressed that this identification does not in itself suffice as a designation of the strategic logic of the diagram of technical assistance: the dispersed network of participation-oriented development policies defines not the political

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<sup>30</sup> World Bank Participation Sourcebook, chapter 1. (WWW-document.) Emphasis original. See also Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapters 1, 3, 5. (WWW-document.)

<sup>31</sup> World Bank Participation Sourcebook, chapter 3. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

conditions of *emergence* of the diagram but its conditions of (*co*)*existence* in the wider domain of discourse that, for our purposes, grant concrete historical content to the formal diagrammatic structure that we have reconstituted in our analysis.

### 3.1.2. The Criticism of Participatory Development and Its Shortcomings

The localisation of the diagram of technical assistance as a node within the historical discursive network of contemporary participatory development policy makes the *critique* of the discourse of ‘participatory development’ in contemporary development studies relevant for our genealogical disentanglement of the diagram. Nonetheless, we shall argue that the present modalities of this critique are both insufficient and counter-productive, unwittingly fortifying rather than problematising their target. In this chapter we shall briefly summarise, in the form of four theses, the critique of participatory development, articulated only recently in response to the latter’s apparent becoming a ‘new orthodoxy’<sup>32</sup>, attempt to outline its shortcomings and open an alternative pathway of genealogical criticism, no longer tied to the discursive domain of development policy but rather focusing on the historical constellation of governmentality to which this discourse owes its conditions of emergence.

Firstly, participatory development is criticised as an *instrumental solution* to the problem of efficient project implementation rather than a ‘genuine’ avenue of ‘transformative’ empowerment. Participatory practices are held to be conditioned by the prior installation by the ‘external facilitators’ of specific frameworks for policy planning and discussion that we have referred to in our analysis as ‘primary texts’. Despite their apparent neutrality, these disciplinary grids subject local agents to a particular kind of discourse, effecting a transformation of ‘local’ knowledge into the managerially acceptable format of ‘deliverable outputs’.<sup>33</sup> Participatory development thus turns out to suffer from the same ‘disempowering’ faults as the ‘top-down’ approach it attempts to supersede. Its difference from this approach consists not in the democratisation and empowerment it enables but in its greater effectiveness and

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<sup>32</sup> Henkel and Stirrat 2001, p. 170. See also Brigg 2001, 2002, Rankin 2001, Bryant 2002, Goldman 2002, Cooke and Kothari 2001.

<sup>33</sup> Mosse 2001, p. 20. See also Henkel and Stirrat 2001, pp. 172–173, Mohan 2001.

efficiency in eliciting the desired effects of government, while *concealing the power relations* involved in it. In our analysis we have noted this feature of the participatory approach in the discussion of the restriction of the enunciative modalities in the discourse of technical assistance: the formation in the pedagogical practices of autonomised and empowered local agents serves to elicit effects of (self-) government in a less conflictual and more effective way and thus avoid the excessive restrictions and regulations that this discourse problematises. In this version of criticism the participatory pathos is regarded as a '*mask*' or '*veil*' for the *perpetuation of 'traditional' approaches to development*, a 're-colonisation' under the guise of empowerment.<sup>34</sup> According to this thesis, 'participatory development' is thus quite simply a sham, a mockery of the *otherwise noble goal of empowerment*.

Secondly, participatory development is claimed to *transfer the responsibility for project results onto the local counterpart*, since it is his knowledge and participation that are presented as the main ingredient of the proposed strategy of intervention. According to Henkel and Stirrat, the troubling feature of the discourse of participatory development is its immunity to criticism.

While old-fashioned top-down modernisers were *generally aware* of what they were trying to do and *open about their objectives*, the followers of the *new orthodoxy* are perhaps less aware of their objectives or at least the results of their activities. One of the attractions of participatory approaches to the development industry is that it *shifts the responsibility for the consequences of these projects away from the agencies and the development workers onto the participating people*. By *disowning* the process they initiate, development agencies thus set themselves up as *only 'facilitating'*. In other words, the authors and practitioners of PRA [participatory rural appraisal] tend to avoid the necessity for taking on the responsibility for the outcomes of their interventions.<sup>35</sup>

This transfer of responsibility, which we discussed in our analysis of asymmetric dissemination in the discourse of technical assistance, casts the agents of assistance into a merely supportive role and presents the results of reforms as consensual and corresponding to authentic local knowledge. While the 'top-down' approach was at least liable to criticism and resistance due to its 'authoritarian' methods and disregard of local knowledge, development practices that advocate participation, empowerment

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<sup>34</sup> See e.g. Mosse 2001, Mohan 2001, Kothari 2001.

<sup>35</sup> Henkel and Stirrat 2001, p. 183. Emphasis added.

and inclusion paradoxically effect a suffocating closure of critical reflection about development. Indeed, insofar as the models proposed in technical assistance are presented as developed *with the participation of local agents, on the basis of local knowledge* and *validated at local sites*, it becomes difficult to understand how such a model could in principle be rejected by local agents *at all*. In contrast to the ‘top-down’ approach, candid about the exteriority of its proposed models, the discourse of technical assistance invests immense rhetorical force precisely in disavowing this exteriority or, more precisely, enfoldng it in the constitution of the subjective interiority of the local agents as the ‘owners’ of the model in question.

Thirdly, it is the *experts’ role in relation to local knowledge and participation* that is subjected to criticism. The critics of participatory approaches have noted two ways in which such contribution has been articulated in this discourse. Firstly, ‘participatory development’ acquires the status of a therapeutic or epiphanic experience for the ‘development practitioners’ themselves. This epiphany consists in the ‘radical change’ in the experts’ worldview that takes place in their “commitment to turning many of the previous approaches to development *upside down*”<sup>36</sup>: the ‘bottom-up’ triumphing over the ‘top-down’, the ‘marginal’ trumping the ‘central’, local authenticity overriding expert knowledge.<sup>37</sup> This wholesale reversal of hierarchies, associated with the ‘traditional’ concept of development, makes participatory projects beneficial for the ‘self-improvement’ of their practitioners as much as for the actual beneficiaries.<sup>38</sup>

On the other hand, a number of authors have presented empirical criticism of the doctrinal valorisation of local knowledge, claiming that the statements of local counterparts only become endowed with the status of *knowledge*, when processed through the grids of inscription established by the development practitioners. “Needless to say, ‘the locals’ have a vocabulary for an understanding of their situation and mental categories for grasping their ambience before the facilitator enters the scene. However, [...] this understanding *does not become local knowledge* before it has

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<sup>36</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 5. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Francis 2001, pp. 79–81.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. The World Bank and Participation (WWW-Document.), World Bank Participation Sourcebook, chapter 2. (WWW-document.) These texts emphasise that ‘genuine’ participatory practices unfold in the absence of a blueprint and, notwithstanding exhaustive methodological prescriptions for facilitating participation, must be mastered through ‘experiential learning’ in authentic encounters with the local counterparts.



been passed through the *participatory therapeutics initiated by the facilitator*.<sup>39</sup> Similarly to the diagram of technical assistance, the methodological prescriptions of the primary texts of participatory development feature elaborate technical rituals that process 'authentic' local knowledge and enable 'open' and 'informal' participation by "[setting] in motion a process of reflection, self-enhancement of positive values and motivation to act".<sup>40</sup> The role of external facilitators thus begins to resemble the function of a shaman,<sup>41</sup> a charismatic figure with esoteric skills, whose practices make his audience undergo an inner spiritual transformation.

Both of these roles of external facilitators, the subjects of ecstatic conversion experiences and shamanic performers of such conversions in others, are deemed by the critics of the participatory approach to displace the problems of development into a self-indulgent therapeutic practice that "at once recalls a self-improvement manual and a mythical text".<sup>42</sup> As our analysis demonstrates, the discourse of technical assistance does not emphasise the conversions and reversals in the experts' own perspectives, aside from rare and vacuous references to the 'learning process in both directions'. However, the shamanic function of external facilitation is articulated quite strongly in the claim for the beneficial effects of technical assistance not merely on the level of substantive knowledge and skills of the local counterparts in specific policy areas, but also on the enhancement of local autonomy and responsibility, morale and social status, the clarity of one's vision and the lucidity of one's discourse. The articulation of this claim with the insistence on the merely secondary, supportive and facilitating role of consultants casts technical assistance as an almost mystical ritual of exhortation of local agents to discover their own inner truth, knowledge and identity. In this description, it is no longer the 'local' but rather the 'expert' knowledge itself that begins to appear quaintly exotic.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001, p. 73. Emphasis added. See also Kothari 2001, Francis 2001.

<sup>40</sup> World Bank Participation Sourcebook, appendix 1. (WWW-document.) See also Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 3 (WWW-document.), World Bank Participation Sourcebook, chapter 3. (WWW-document.) The latter text is particularly explicit about the artificiality of the technical procedures deployed in participatory planning, proclaiming 'breaking the normal mood' as the condition of proper, 'learning'-based participation.

<sup>41</sup> See Francis 2001.

<sup>42</sup> Francis 2001, p. 82.

<sup>43</sup> Ironically, this 'mystical' function of external facilitation in participatory development correlates with the insistence of that discourse on 'demystifying' research and expertise through greater reliance on local knowledge. See e.g. Organising Participatory Processes in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

Finally, a number of critics have noted that, rather than being a benign gesture, the incitement to participation on the terms of a pedagogical relationship operates as a *normalising practice*, simultaneously enforcing a particular type of conduct as both rational and ethical and *stigmatising non-participation* and *self-exclusion* of local agents from the development process as a form of deviance.<sup>44</sup> Conversely, this incitement also intervenes in local power relations in the positive sense, authorising the successful participants in the projects as ‘local consultants’ or ‘facilitators’. In our analysis, we have discussed both positive and negative sanctions made possible by participatory indoctrination, i.e. its capacity to constitute a privileged ‘core group’ of reform advocates and to assign negative enunciative modalities to the agents who fail to actualise the doctrine in their discourse or refuse to participate in the reforms on the projects’ terms. The problem that such criticism highlights is a crucial one: in the absence of a positive alternative to participation, which has acquired a degree of self-evidence as an undeniable good, such strategies of resistance as refusals to participate end up cast in solely negative terms. “There is a general failing among development practitioners to recognise or acknowledge the capacity of individuals and groups to resist inclusion, resist projection about their lives, retain information, knowledge and values.”<sup>45</sup>

The last critical thesis provides us with a point of departure for critically reassessing the critique of participation itself. We may suggest that the diverse strands of criticism outlined above share a common assumption of the *insincerity* of the discourse of participatory development and a *suspicion* about its ‘real’ motives, operation and consequences. Let us call this assumption the ‘hypocrisy hypothesis’, which may be presented in the following formula: *X is bad (false, wrong, etc.) because it is not (X) enough*, where X is an empirical positivity and (X) a theoretical concept or a normative ideal. Participatory practices are measured against a certain standard or ideal and are found wanting in its terms. Critical alternatives are subsequently presented as more ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ strategies for “deeper empowerment”.<sup>46</sup> Due to the lack of a positive alternative to participation and

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(WWW-document.), World Bank Participation Sourcebook, appendix 1 (WWW-document.), Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapters 1, 3. (WWW-document.)

<sup>44</sup> See Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001, Brigg 2001, Rankin 2001, Cooke 2001, Kothari 2001.

<sup>45</sup> Kothari 2001, p. 151. We shall address the function of non-participation as a form of resistance to diagrammatic constitution in chapter 5.4.1.

<sup>46</sup> See Mohan 2001.

empowerment, their criticism only appears possible in terms of a negative assessment of a concrete actualisation of a practice in terms of its concept. This is not to deny that participatory rhetoric may be applied as a mere efficiency-enhancing instrument enabling easier extraction of information, or that it is frequently used to legitimise reform proposals based on external doctrines quite at odds with whatever we take to be 'local knowledge'. However, the hypocrisy hypothesis weakens the force of criticism in a number of ways, unwittingly fortifying its target. Firstly, it is at least questionable to place excessive analytical value on the 'insincerity' and 'hidden' ulterior motives of development practitioners. The derivation of the *hidden presence* of these motives from their *manifest absence* in the discourse is a gesture as epistemically dubious as the shamanic therapeutics of participatory development that this critique ridicules. In the absence of empirical evidence regarding these motives and intentions, this type of criticism is reduced to a politically prejudiced polemic.

Secondly, the critique of participatory development as an 'ideology' masking the perpetuation of 'neo-colonial' practices suffers from the faults of 'ideology critique' summed up famously by Foucault. It presupposes a reality that is concealed by superstructural 'ideological representations' and an anterior subject whose consciousness is falsified by these representations, which are thus logically defined in opposition to 'truth'.<sup>47</sup> Thus, participatory discourses are held to legitimise economic exploitation, dominate or repress anterior local subjects and are to be opposed with a 'counter-discourse' that is a priori granted the status of truth. In this manner, 'participatory ideology' is assigned a purely negative value and its *productive* operations are ignored in the search for the manifestations of its 'underlying' reality. The indicators of the 'neo-colonial' affinities of participatory development, whose derivation may be dubious, are thus granted more importance than the *surface effects* of these practices. Instead of focusing on the modes of *knowledge* constituted in participatory development, this knowledge is simply dismissed as a lie. Rather than trace the positive constitution of local *agency* in these practices, the agents in question are posited by the criticism of participatory development as a priori 'repressed', irrespectively of their perspective on the matter. Instead of analysing participatory *techniques* in their irreducible specificity, they are presented as derivative of more 'global' processes of exploitation. Excessive critical force is thus invested not in the analysis of concrete operations and effects of participatory development, but in the

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<sup>47</sup> Foucault 1984d, p. 60. Cf. Brigg 2002.

effort to ‘unveil’ or ‘unmask’ its ‘deeper’ truth.<sup>48</sup> In this passionate unveiling, the veil itself and the inscriptions on it are not deemed worthy of attention.

Thirdly, the hypocrisy hypothesis disables the generation of meaningful alternatives to the object of criticism. If participatory development is ‘bad’, because it is not participatory enough, then the pathway to improvement is in the direction of greater, better, more ‘genuine’ participation. For all the oppositional pathos of the critics of participatory development, they effectively exculpate their target and end up demanding ‘more of the same’. If the problem with participatory development practices is their disjunction from the ideal concept of participation, criticism appears both trivial and superfluous, easily dismissible with a claim that ‘nobody’s perfect’: reality is never exhausted by its concept and, conversely, the concept is never entirely actualised in practice. To criticise a governmental practice for its lack of conceptual purity, i.e. its failure to fully conform to its theoretical prescription, merely serves to stimulate the further development of the practice in question. Recalling Foucault’s analysis of the complicity of the criticism of prisons in their emergence as a dominant penal technology<sup>49</sup>, we may note that the *utopian duplication* of the object of criticism, exemplified by the desire for ‘deeper’ or more ‘genuine’ empowerment, both leaves intact the dominant discourse (the insulated (X) in our formula) and ensures its technological refinement by keeping constant the demand for more sophisticated knowledge and the amplification of the techniques of power. In this manner, the ‘external’ oppositional discourse on development becomes reinscribed as ‘internal’ reflexive self-criticism, abundant within the field of participatory development that valorises reflexivity.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, the official policy frameworks of the UNDP and the World Bank appear both to anticipate and reiterate the criticism of participatory practices as ‘tokenistic’, ‘efficiency-oriented’, ‘formalised’, ‘instrumental’ or otherwise ‘not truly’ participatory and declare the need to “keep an open mind to new methods, allowing experimentation and permutation of methods, [and] reinvent organisations and approaches in order to introduce the dynamic and excitement lost”.<sup>51</sup> The discourse of participatory development and the discourse of its critics thus appear increasingly indistinguishable.

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001.

<sup>49</sup> Foucault 1977a, pp. 265–270.

<sup>50</sup> See Cooke and Kothari 2001, pp. 6–7.

<sup>51</sup> Empowering People: A Guidebook to Participation, chapter 5. (WWW-document.) See also World Bank Participation Sourcebook, chapter 3 (WWW-document.), Participation in Development Assistance (WWW-document.), the World Bank and Participation, annex VI. (WWW-document.)

Finally, let us suggest that it is precisely the ‘insulated’ status of the concept of participation in critical thought that enables its ‘abuses’ noted above. Participation and empowerment may be deployed as ‘masks’ or ‘guises’ for more contestable practices *only insofar as they are themselves incontestable*. The ‘misapplication’ of the discourse of participatory development in the projects whose participatory and empowering credentials are dubious is in large measure due to the fact that the only criticism that has been advanced against this discourse merely problematises the *practices* of participatory development in terms of their valorised *concept*. To paraphrase the title of a recent volume dedicated to the critique of participatory approaches, ‘Participation: The New Tyranny?’<sup>52</sup>, critical discussion has revolved around the question of whether participation is ‘in fact’ *not* participation at all, *but rather* an exercise of tyranny. Simultaneously with the empirical practices of participation being dismissed as ‘actually’ tyrannical, the concept of participation remains insulated in its self-evidence and purity, its *inherent* or *structural* ‘tyrannical’ potential left unexplored and obscured. In other words, the excessive focus on the ‘hypocrisy’ in the deployment of the participatory discourse serves to efface the way participation and empowerment, even in their ‘pure’ and ‘genuine’ form, *necessarily* produce effects of subjection and make possible such negative sanctions as exclusion, stigmatisation and marginalisation.

In the following chapters we shall attempt to present an alternative to such interpretations of participatory development by abandoning entirely the hypocrisy hypothesis and the assumption of depth that it proceeds from. In Foucauldian terms, we wish to evade ‘the politics of inverted commas’ by denying the existence of any ‘other’ or more ‘genuine’ participatory governmentality than its actually existing practices.<sup>53</sup> Although the four critical theses on participatory development presented above are largely valid for the diagram of technical assistance, our task does not lie in exposing its falsity but in extricating the conditions of its truthfulness. In accordance

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<sup>52</sup> Cooke and Kothari 2001.

<sup>53</sup> Foucault 1980b, p. 136. Foucault deploys this phrase in the context of his criticism of the strategy of the Western Left to dissociate the reality of Soviet socialism from the idea of ‘true’ socialism, “attempting to evade the problem by putting inverted commas, whether damning or ironic, round Soviet socialism in order to protect the good true socialism. [...] *Actually the only socialism which deserves these scornful scare-quotes is the one which leads the dreamy life of ideality in our heads.*” (Ibid. Emphasis added.) By the same token, our abandonment of the hypocrisy hypothesis entails the denial of the existence of any mode of participatory governmentality other than the positivity formed in the practices of the kind that we analyse in this study.

with our Foucauldian points of departure we shall interpret the diagram without a presupposition of a 'remainder' to it, a more fundamental discourse or a hidden meaning veiled by the participatory rhetoric. We are thus interested neither in the documentation of the faults of the participatory practices of technical assistance on their own terms nor in grounding our criticism in an a priori postulation of the 'neo-colonial' domination involved in assistance projects, from which a wholesale rejection of the discourse of participation and empowerment may be derived.

Furthermore, we consider it necessary to investigate not merely the ways in which 'Western' participatory models are proposed or deployed but also, and more importantly, how these models, with their valorisation of local authenticity and their reliance on elaborate technical rituals to construct autonomous agency and the 'culture of participation'<sup>54</sup>, have themselves emerged as privileged objects in the 'West' – a question rarely addressed in the critique of participatory development. Nothing in the discourse of technical assistance could be explained away as determined by the ulterior motives of 'colonisation' or 'exploitation'. There is no reason to suspect that the model of government proposed by EU Tacis for the Republic of Karelia is not, in principle, *identical* to the ones at work in the donor countries themselves. On the contrary, the constitutive principles of the diagram accord with what the 2002 European Commission's White Paper on Governance sets forth as the principles of *good governance*: "openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence".<sup>55</sup> In the interpretation of this diagram it is therefore necessary to go beyond its immediate localisation as a node in the discursive network of participatory development policy and inquire about its genealogical descent in the wider field of contemporary 'Western' governmentality. Thus, our strategy of interpretation attempts to answer the following question: what is the *historical constellation of governmental rationalities* that conditions the emergence of the diagram of technical assistance, i.e. what has made possible this system of dispersion, the "distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits and divisions"<sup>56</sup> that we identified in our archaeological description. In the following chapter we shall begin to address this question with recourse to the Foucauldian studies of liberal governmentality.

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<sup>54</sup> The World Bank and Participation. (WWW-document.)

<sup>55</sup> European Governance. A White Paper, p. 10.

<sup>56</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 119.

## 3.2. The Illiberality of Liberalism: Pedagogy and the Constitution of Liberal Autonomy

### 3.2.1. The Liberal Field of Visibility

Let us begin by recalling the *functions* of the three objects of agency, enterprise and government in the discourse of technical assistance. Local participation constitutes an important *instrument of governmental practice*, whose function is to ensure *less conflictual* and *more qualitative* government through the minimisation of top-down governmental restrictions. Secondly, the claim that participatory approaches promote local responsibility and planning capacity entails that *local autonomy* is granted a certain finality in and of itself as a *telos* of reform. As we have seen, this telos is specified and concretised through casting autonomy in terms of *entrepreneurial* activity, which in turn acquires an ethical dimension as a means of autonomisation and empowerment. Thirdly, the pedagogical techne that seeks to endow local counterparts with autonomous managerial capacities casts local agency as the eventual *subject* of its own government. Local agency is therefore simultaneously an *instrument*, a *telos* and a *subject of government*. In relation to local agency, government is endowed with a *facilitative* function, which both enables active intervention for the purposes of *construction* of presently absent *entrepreneurial* structures and the appropriate ‘enterprise culture’ and restricts this intervention by the demand for the involvement of local agents and the utilisation of local knowledge in governmental practices. The diagram of technical assistance is thus centred on the problem of *enhancing local autonomy* through the *promotion of enterprise* and finding the appropriate *governmental disposition* and the *technical instruments* for this task.

What is at stake in the governmental rationality of technical assistance is thus the question of *inclusion* of a broad array of social groups in the policy process, justified both in *instrumental* terms of optimising present government and in *teleological* terms of effecting autonomous capacities of the agents. The limitation of focus to the *programmatic* statements in the discourse, i.e. the thematic structure of the objects of agency, enterprise and government, would lead to an unproblematic identification of the discourse of technical assistance with the principles of *discussion* and *openness* that in the famous argument of Carl Schmitt are constitutive of liberal

democracy.<sup>57</sup> This identification of the immediate connection between the diagram of technical assistance and a broadly liberal democratic conception of government would amount to little more than the reiteration of the programmatic rationality of EU Tacis, whose commitment to the promotion of liberal democracy, market economy and civil society we have addressed in the Introduction. Since it is fully congruent with the regulatory basis of the Tacis programme, this affinity is in itself of little surprise or interest, unless addressed in terms of *governmental rationality*. In the Introduction we have already dwelled upon the specificity of 'liberal governmentality' as an interpretive tool. Let us reiterate at this point that as a mode of governmentality, 'liberalism' is not reducible to either liberal political philosophy or the programmatic representation of liberal practices of rule. The space of 'liberal governmentality' charted in post-Foucauldian studies of liberalism<sup>58</sup> is first and foremost a critical, genealogical construct, which is both philosophically heterogeneous to liberalism and critical of the liberal version of the history of liberal rule. Mitchell Dean has argued against the increasing tendency to conflate the problematic of governmentality with the widening field of 'governance studies',<sup>59</sup> which uncritically celebrates the innovations in liberal governmental technologies rather than disentangle their conditions of possibility.<sup>60</sup> The strongly empirical character of studies in governmentality and their avoidance of sweeping normative criticism have created the impression of their 'confirmation' of, if not complicity with, the governmental techniques they focus on.<sup>61</sup> However, the Foucauldian points of departure of this approach place it at a critical distance from the (re)invocation of liberal rationalities of government and make it possible to trace the operation of the latter as forms of power relations, and thus as irreducibly *political* and *constitutive* in character, which, as we have seen above, is contrary to the manner of appearance espoused by the practices of technical assistance, and, as we shall see below, does not accord with the programmatic self-representations of liberal governmental practices.

We may begin our discussion of the relation between the diagram of technical assistance and the tenets of liberal governmentality by focusing on the way liberalism

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<sup>57</sup> See Schmitt 1985b.

<sup>58</sup> See Rose 1996a, 1998, Dean 1999, 2002a, 2000b, Hindess 2001, Cruikshank 1996, 1999.

<sup>59</sup> See e.g. Pierre 2000.

<sup>60</sup> See Dean 2002b.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.



historically reconfigures the overall governmental *field of visibility*<sup>62</sup> towards the affirmation of the *exteriority* of government to its objects. Foucault has traced the emergence of liberalism in the critique of 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century governmental rationalities, which were based on the doctrines of *raison d'état* and *Polizeiwissenschaft*.<sup>63</sup> The doctrine of *raison d'état* was a departure from both Christian doctrines of government and the Machiavellian doctrine of the sovereignty of the prince, since it located the rationality of government in the nature of the state itself, which was conceived as distinct from the figure of the ruler and independent from the moral principles prescribed by Christianity.<sup>64</sup> The conception of the rationality of government as grounded only in the nature of its object, the state, leads to the constitution of a specific field of concrete, precise and measured knowledge that provides the grid of intelligibility of the nature of the state.

This field of knowledge, produced by 'police science' (*Polizeiwissenschaft*), had the objective of rendering *transparent* and *intelligible* the nature of the objects of the state's rational activity. The notion of 'police' in its 18<sup>th</sup> century meaning covered not a functional mechanism within the state but a broad range of techniques of government that exceeded far beyond the state into the private domains of philanthropy, medicine and education, dealing with three main objectives: maintenance of order, growth of wealth, preservation of health, each broken down into multiple further categories: "The objects which it embraces are in some sense indefinite."<sup>65</sup> This indefinite character of the objects of police is due to the fact that its "true object is man": "*Life is the object of the police*; the indispensable, the useful and the superfluous. That people survive, live, and even do better than just that, is what the police has to insure."<sup>66</sup> The emergence of the manifold new objects of knowledge in the 'police-scientific' objectification of life had a jurisdictional correlate of the active invention of new techniques of regulation, or what Pasquale Pasquino calls the "spontaneous creation of law, or rather the demand for order that outreaches law and encroaches on domains never previously occupied".<sup>67</sup> This series of veridictive and

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<sup>62</sup> See Dean 1999, p. 27. See also Deleuze 1988, 1992, Foucault 1976.

<sup>63</sup> See Foucault 1991a.

<sup>64</sup> Foucault 1988d, pp. 74–83.

<sup>65</sup> Duchesne quoted in Pasquino 1991, p. 109. See Foucault 1988d, pp. 80–82 for the analysis of police regulations in the 18<sup>th</sup> century France and Germany.

<sup>66</sup> Foucault 1988d, p. 81. Emphasis added.

<sup>67</sup> Pasquino 1991, p. 111.

jurisdictional effects, the “endless lists and classifications and omnivorous espousal of the governed reality”<sup>68</sup> served to constitute the domain of the social as a governmental positivity: “This is what science of police is about: *a great effort of formation of the social body*, [...] an undertaking whose principal result will be something which we today call society.”<sup>69</sup> In the episteme of police science, the ‘social’ domain is wholly transparent to authority since its entire existence is, without remainder, contained in the governmental ordering practices which constitute it. “The assurance of order in the police is assurance of the order it has itself created.”<sup>70</sup>

The radical innovation of liberal governmentality, which has emerged as a *critique* of police science and the police state,<sup>71</sup> is the reinscription of this order in terms of *socioeconomic processes*, which are cast as *anterior* and *exterior* to political authority. In the *episteme* of classical liberalism, socioeconomic processes are *quasi-natural*, *self-regulating* and have an *intrinsic* logic of their own that is not directly accessible to knowledge by authority: “Inscribed within the very logic of liberalism is a certain *naturalism*.”<sup>72</sup> In contrast with police science, liberal economic science affirms the finitude of the state as a knowing and acting subject and rejects the possibility of a complete and transparent *representation* of economy and society.<sup>73</sup> In the affirmation of governmental agnosticism, liberalism discards the ‘police science’ conception of the social as a transparent grid of ordered representations and affirms, in line with the modern episteme of the positive sciences of man, the *opaque* character of processes of life, which have their locus in the naturalised reality of ‘the social’ or ‘civil society’.<sup>74</sup> The naturalisation of the social entails its ontological priority to any act of government: a liberal ‘civil society’ is never *founded*, it is always already there as a foundational presupposition.<sup>75</sup> The ‘dispositional arrangement’ of

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<sup>68</sup> Gordon 1991, p. 10. See also Hindess 1996b.

<sup>69</sup> Pasquino 1991, p. 111. Emphasis added.

<sup>70</sup> Gordon 1991, p. 11.

<sup>71</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 49–51 for the discussion of the critical origins of liberal governmentality. Following Foucault’s comments on liberalism in unpublished lectures, Dean claims that as an ethos of critique of government, liberalism is irreducible to any single set of ideas and rather has a limitless capacity of self-renewal through ‘auto-critique’.

<sup>72</sup> Barry et al 1996, p. 9. See also Foucault 1990a, 1991a, Dean 1999, chapter 6, Burchell 1991.

<sup>73</sup> See Gordon 1991, p. 15.

<sup>74</sup> See Foucault 1991a, 1988d, Pasquino 1991.

<sup>75</sup> Burchell 1991, p. 134. Note that this discussion focuses on the concept of civil society in the classical liberal discourse. The same concept has been deployed in quite a different manner in the post-Marxist left-communitarian discourse. See Cohen and Arato 1992. The latter approach presupposes a *substantive*

the governmental field of visibility acquires a *density* lacking in ‘police science’ utopias, a density that makes the object of government non-identical with the acts of governing and inaccessible in full transparency to the demands of knowledge, making it necessary to involve the social in its own government by granting it capacities of agency, a status of a *subject* of knowledge and power. From this *generalised agnosticism* follows the central tenet of liberal government: the suspicion that ‘one always governs too much’.<sup>76</sup> As we have discussed in our analysis of the objects of government and agency in the discourse of technical assistance, this suspicion brings in both the problematisation of existing governmental operations as excessively restrictive and regulatory and the imperative of involving local agents and local knowledge in the practices of government, that are thereby both *limited by* and *driven forward* by the opaque and partial character of their own field of visibility. The solution to the problem of ‘governing too much’ is thus not merely ‘quantitative’ in the sense of minimising the area of government, but rather qualitative in the sense of adapting the techniques of government to the principles found in the naturalised reality of the social. This accounts for the relation of reflexivity that we noted between government and the objects of agency and enterprise, whereby the characteristics of the latter are folded back on the government as its own operating principles.

Thus, the opacity of the liberal field of visibility does not prevent active governmental interventions in the domain of the social but rather reorients these activities from a self-consciously constitutive to a *securitarian* mode. “Liberalism fosters the social by conceiving of the government of the state as *securing the processes that constitute a society separate from the state*.”<sup>77</sup> The task of government is thus no longer to order the realm of transparent representations but to secure what it conceives of as a *sui generis* reality, ontologically and ethically prior to the state. Government is *grafted* onto anterior social relations and thus *limited* to the role of securing that which has been there *originally*, the processes of the social. Furthermore, the naturalisation of civil society entails the claim that government should not merely be

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*identity* of civil society as a political *agency* that may confront the ‘colonising’ mechanisms of the political-economic ‘system’. In contrast to liberalism that conceives of civil society as an *empirical space* of autonomy, heterogeneity and difference (See Keane 1998), post-Marxist theory casts civil society as a *agent*, constituted by a substantive ethico-political consensus, arrived at rationally via communicative action according to the rules of discourse ethics.

<sup>76</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 41.

<sup>77</sup> Dean 1999, p. 147. Emphasis added.

disallowed to impose its rules on society, but is itself accountable to, and ultimately governable by, the moral and political principles operative in the '*system of natural liberty*' that postulate a limit to its legitimacy.<sup>78</sup> It can be concluded that it is the liberal invention of the social that gave rise to what Foucault called the juridico-discursive conception of power, exterior and negative in relation to the object of its practice.<sup>79</sup> It is in this 'naturalisation of the social' that the diagram of technical assistance grounds its exclusionary principle of the authenticity of local knowledge. In a most basic sense, liberal governmentality valorises local knowledge as something authentic simply because it was present prior to the activity of rule: *authenticity lies within the social, which is also natural*. The participation of local agents in governmental practices becomes not only an ethical imperative, but also an epistemic requirement. Thus, the valorisation of and the injunction to participation in the diagram of technical assistance must not be conceived either narrowly, as mere instruments to development project implementation, or too broadly, as an integral feature of Western 'modernity'.<sup>80</sup> Instead, participation is a condition of possibility of the techno-epistemic effects of liberal government. In the next chapter we shall discuss the way the injunction to participation is articulated in liberal governmentality with the governmental disposition of existence and the production of veridictive and jurisdictional effects in the domain of the social.

### 3.2.2. Pedagogy and the Inherent Illiberality of Liberalism

The historical emergence in liberal governmentality of civil society as a 'system of natural liberty' does not entail discontinuation of disciplinary regulation of individuals, but redirects this regulation towards governing *through granting liberties* to individuals under the condition that this liberty is to be exercised in a *responsible* and *disciplined* manner. Liberal policies of *laissez-faire* are therefore not a passive abandonment of an aboriginal reality to its own devices, but an elaborate *activist* and *interventionist* course with the objective of the constitution of the domain in question as *self-governing* and securing the conditions under which it can *function autonomously*.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Hindess 1996b, p. 70. See also Burchell 1991, Koselleck 1988, Foucault 1991a, Weintraub 1997.

<sup>79</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 82.

<sup>80</sup> See Henkel and Stirrat 2001 for the latter argument.

<sup>81</sup> See Burchell 1991, Gordon 1991, pp. 17–18.

In Foucault's words, "liberty is registered not only as a right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power [...] but as an indispensable element of governmental rationality itself."<sup>82</sup> What we have referred to in our analysis as practices of autonomisation and empowerment are thus liberal solutions to the problem of excessive government, the solutions that recast the *anterior* liberty of the social agents as a governmentally granted and conditioned *entitlement*. This positive specification of autonomy in terms of responsibility and discipline points to what Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess have termed the 'illiberality of liberalism' or the 'liberal government of unfreedom'<sup>83</sup>, a systematic practice of constituting, via historically variable 'dividing practices', groups whose 'capacity' for autonomy is problematised and whose endowment with autonomy is preceded and conditioned by disciplinary interventions: women, colonial populations, homosexuals, etc.

It is important to distinguish within this 'illiberality' a number of categories: the abject groups that were beyond redemption and were to be contained and in the extreme case exterminated (madmen, Native Americans), the populations liable to being 'forced to be free' in authoritarian disciplinary practices (colonial populations, deviant social groups), and finally the groups capable of improvement with educational (as well as medical or social) assistance.<sup>84</sup> The latter group is of course modelled on *children*, undisciplined and irresponsible in their early years but optimistically regarded as possible to mould and improve. It is in relation to this group that a *pedagogical strategy*, which we have discussed extensively as the ordering scheme in the discourse of technical assistance, has been deployed.<sup>85</sup> Foucault presents modern

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<sup>82</sup> Foucault quoted in Gordon 1991, p. 20.

<sup>83</sup> Dean 1999, pp. 131–149, Hindess 2001.

<sup>84</sup> This distinction draws from Hindess 2001. In this study we are most interested in the latter category of 'subjects of improvement': while the two former categories testify to the frequent recourse of liberalism to violent and disciplinary interventions, characteristic of its 'rivals', the pedagogical technology of autonomisation appears to be a singular liberal invention.

<sup>85</sup> For the discussion of the centrality of education to liberal political philosophy see Berlin 2002, pp. 170–172, 284–285. For the early critique of the illiberality of liberal pedagogy as an instrument of evading democratic equality see Schmitt 1985b, chapters 2, 3. See also Foucault 1991a, 1988b, Gordon 1991, Hunter 1996, Deacon 2002, Kivinen and Rinne 1998 for the genealogy of modern pedagogy, which has its point of descent in the articulation of disciplinary practices of the modern state on the pastoral power of Christian schooling. "The school system emerged through a piecemeal series of exchanges between a state that conceived of the school as a bureaucratic instrument for social governance of citizens and a Christian pastorate that saw it as a means for spiritual disciplining of souls." (Hunter 1996, p. 164.) This account mirrors Foucault's general thesis about the combination of totalising and individualising forms of power in modern governmentality.

pedagogy as genealogically linked to the secularisation of the Judaeo-Christian 'pastoral power'. Pastoral power is oriented towards individual salvation, aims at directing and reshaping individuals' lives and implies thorough knowledge of individuals' conscience. Foucault refers to this type of power as a '*shepherd-flock game*' that can be contrasted with the '*city-citizen game*' of the ancient Greek polis.<sup>86</sup> This set of metaphors permits to distinguish important differences between the two modes of exercise of power. Firstly, the shepherd's power is exercised not over the land, but the flock, i.e. its prime object is the population, not territory. Secondly, in contrast to the city-citizen game, characterised by the government of *law*, which presupposes a community with a life of its own that the law restricts and regulates, the notion of the flock indicates a constitutive function of government: *the flock does not exist without the activity of the shepherd*. Thirdly, the shepherd-flock game has no place for the question of legitimacy, since the shepherd is a *superior type of being* without a need for consent or approval of his activity by the object he brings into being. Fourthly, while the city-citizen game is totalising and unifying with respect to the governed, the shepherd's activity caters to the *individual* needs of the members of the flock.<sup>87</sup>

The resurgence of pastoral power as a technique of government was a result of the disintegration of the two dominant medieval regimes of regulation of conduct. The disintegration of the feudal society of estates meant that matters of individual conduct could no longer be regulated by heteronomous networks of dependency, prescribing conduct towards both superiors and inferiors, while the Reformation and the Westphalian compromise on the question of religion meant that the Church could no longer prescribe the norms of secular conduct. Thus, the emergent modern state, no longer grounded in the Christian cosmology but possessing an irreducible reality of its own, appropriated for itself the techniques of spiritual rule, previously in possession of its rivals. In a sense, pastoral power became grafted onto its very opposite, the 'reason of state', the result being the appearance of *care of individuals as state duty*,

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<sup>86</sup> See Foucault 1988d, pp. 64–65 for the discussion of the low prominence of the theme of 'shepherd power' in Greek thought. The 'city-citizen game' posits a much more limited function of the ruler, who, like the shepherd, is distinct from and above the ruled, but, unlike the shepherd, is only entrusted with maintaining the city's unity and security, not with spiritual guidance and care of the ruled. See also Gordon 1991, pp. 8–9, Dean 1999, pp. 74–76.

<sup>87</sup> See Foucault 1988d, pp. 60–63. See also Hindess 1996b.

a combination of the individualising power of the shepherd-flock game and the totalising power of the city-citizen game that Foucault referred to as a ‘demonic’ project of modern governmentality.<sup>88</sup> Despite the critical attitude of liberalism to the unlimited government of the fully transparent domain, authorised in the doctrines of *raison d’état* and police science, pastoral motives are central to liberal governmental rationality and are best exemplified by its reliance on pedagogical interventions into the domain of natural liberty.

Liberal pedagogy conditions the endowment with autonomy by the mastery by the subject in question of the historically varying rules of discipline and responsibility. In our terminology, the practices of liberal autonomisation proceed through the installation of the primary texts that rarefy this autonomy by giving it a positive form and the pedagogical indoctrination of the subjects into the practice of the grounded discourse. This moment of subjection recalls Foucault’s emphasis on the disciplinary practices of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as “the technical and real, immediately material counterpart”<sup>89</sup> of the contemporaneous discourses of rights, social contract and the rule of law. The illiberality of the asymmetric relation of pedagogy recalls the paradox we have identified in the paradigmatic figure of the local agent as a ‘guided guide’: liberal government manifestly seeks to indoctrinate into the norms of ‘natural liberty’ those already living in natural liberty, thereby violating the very natural liberty, which it valorises. Yet, this form of illiberality is at first glance not fatal to liberalism due to its temporary character as a pedagogical intervention. Aside from the unfortunate, deemed beyond redemption, the *objects* of liberal indoctrination are eventually endowed with autonomous agency and thereby are transformed into the *subjects* of liberal (self-) government, all the while remaining the *instruments* of governmental rationality. Liberal pedagogy is therefore a form of interventionism that presupposes, as a finality of intervention, its own *retreat*. In the diagram of technical assistance this retreat is exemplified by the Tacis consultants’ effacement of their constitutive function in the reliance, particularly in the dissemination phase, on ‘local consultants’ as autonomised and empowered agents, capable of independent discursive practice.

However, these pedagogical practices also point to the more fundamental illiberality of liberalism that is not confined to specific groups but rather conditions the liberal

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<sup>88</sup> Foucault 1988d, p. 71. See also Gordon 1991, p. 8, Simons 1995, pp. 38–41, Burchell 1991, pp. 121–122.

<sup>89</sup> Foucault 1977a, p. 303.

diagram more generally. The pedagogical mode of intervention that institutes the ‘natural liberty’ of the subject points to the *inherent ambiguity* in the central concept of liberal government: civil society as a space of autonomy is posited as both *essential* and *artefactual*, both an antecedent reality that poses a limit to governmental action and a positivity to be attained in the practices of liberal governmentality.<sup>90</sup> In Claude Lefort’s formulation, “the liberal state is at once distinct from civil society, is shaped by it and is a force which shapes it.”<sup>91</sup> To paraphrase this sentence in terms of the discourse of technical assistance: *government is both distinct from local agency, is driven by the participation of local agency and is a force that shapes this agency as a positivity*. Thus, what we have identified as an aporetic disjunction between the valorisation of local authenticity and the governmental techno-epistemic artifice in the order of the discourse of technical assistance is not a result of a local discursive incoherence, but an aporia that lies *at the foundation* of all liberal government: *the antecedent naturalised space of civil society, cast as ethically and ontologically anterior to government, is of liberalism’s own making*.

The crucial disjunction between liberal political philosophy and liberal governmentality now becomes clear. While liberal ‘theory’ focuses on the justification of the distinction between state and society, the public and the private, in the terms that serve to essentialise and naturalise the exterior of liberal government in terms of ‘negative’ liberty,<sup>92</sup> liberal governmental practice addresses the problem of positively furnishing this domain in ‘pastoral’ pedagogical practices, which logically requires transgressing its exteriority. Liberal government finds its condition of possibility in the *generalised illiberality of pedagogical interventionism*, of which its specific contemporary forms are historical traces. Yet, the very identity of liberal government is in turn conditioned by the effacement of this illiberality, whereby the artefactual is recast as essential and valorised as authentic. As we have observed in our presentation of the overall diagram of technical assistance, the line of fragility between the ethos of authentic autonomy and the techno-epistemic ground of constructivist governmentality is simultaneously the entire space of the existence of this discourse. This paradox of

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<sup>90</sup> Hindess 1996b, pp. 68–75.

<sup>91</sup> Lefort 1988, p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> See Berlin 2002. We shall discuss the notion of ‘negative liberty’ in greater detail in chapter 5.2.2. For the discussion of the liberal construction of the public/private distinction see Weintraub and Kumar 1997.



liberalism makes its relationship with ‘authoritarian’ government far more complicated than liberal political theory allows. ‘Liberal illiberality’ is neither an effect of hypocrisy nor an extreme exception, but rather the condition of emergence and existence of liberal government. According to Mitchell Dean, the paradoxical combination of naturalism and artefactualism in the liberal episteme makes it possible to extend governmental practices infinitely and indefinitely while maintaining the appearance of the unobstructed operation of natural processes. In Dean’s words, this paradox makes liberalism a potentially ‘total’ modality of government: “Liberal government is total, not because it is equivalent to authoritarian rule, or because it is completely successful in the realisation of its aims. Rather it is total because its program of *self-limitation* is linked to the *facilitation and augmentation of the powers of civil society* and its use of these powers, in conjunction with the sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical powers of the state itself, to establish a *comprehensive normalisation of social, economic and cultural existence*.”<sup>93</sup> The naturalisation of a certain artefactual conception of the social permits further interventions in the name of its natural values, thereby disavowing the constitutive character of governmental practices. In Dean’s argument, such interventions may take three forms: *explication*, the unfolding of governmental mechanisms into the sphere of the ‘social’ through partnerships and liaisons of the kind we have described in our discussion of the object of enterprise; *implication* or the enfolding of ‘social’ processes into the dispositional diagram through the governmental construction of new phenomena, such as enterprises, professional and managerial practices or local enunciative modalities; and *replication* or refolding of the ‘natural’ characteristics of the social domain into the governmental diagram, that we have discussed in terms of the relation of reflexivity between government and its constructs of agency and enterprise.<sup>94</sup> Through all these interventions, which we will address in more detail below, liberal government is able to transgress its own limitations and reactualise, in a tacit manner, its originary illiberality. Pedagogical interventionism that appeared as a residual or exceptional illiberal measure practiced by liberal government may now be considered its indispensable *condition of emergence*.

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<sup>93</sup> Dean 2002b, p. 129. Emphasis added.

<sup>94</sup> See Dean 2002a, especially pp. 44–46.

### 3.3. The Space of Infra-liberalism: Politics of Emergence and Neoliberal Governmentality

At this point we may narrow down our scope of interpretation by venturing that the political conditions of possibility of the diagram of technical assistance are to be found in a particular historical constellation of liberal governmentality, namely its *moment of emergence*. In this chapter we shall proceed by advancing three theses regarding this juncture, which will help us specify the strategic logic of technical assistance as a governmental practice.

Firstly, at its point of emergence liberal governmentality faces a set of problems that are distinct from and inaccessible to the naturalistic, securitarian modality of ‘already-existing’ liberalism. These are the problems of *its own institution* rather than the problems of securing its operation. Faced with a problem of its institution, liberal governmentality operates with a *logic of foundation* of liberalism, whose relationship to the logic of liberalism itself is that of *constitutive exteriority*. This means that we should describe the problem-space conditioning the diagram of technical assistance not in terms of the limits to government that are internal to liberalism but rather as a *situation of ‘limitation’*, that point of emergence of liberalism, where it is not yet limited by what it itself institutes as a limit. This is the point, at which liberal government must first traverse its exterior to positively fashion it in a way that will subsequently permit its naturalisation. Concretely, this entails the suspension of the *naturalist-securitarian* ethos and the adoption of a *pedagogical mode of intervention*, which ‘already-existing’ liberal government only deploys as a sector-specific, exceptional technique. The illiberality we now speak of is no longer of the order of temporary transgression of liberal principles, but of the order of their institution: logically a practice may not be founded on that which it founds, just as the institution of the limit is not itself limited.<sup>95</sup> In Carl Schmitt’s expression, a founding practice always “emanates from nothingness”<sup>96</sup> and is by definition extra-diagrammatic. “This founding [...] moment of law is, *in law*, an instance of *non-law*. [...] It is the

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<sup>95</sup> These themes are addressed in detail in Carl Schmitt’s discussion of the exception, sovereignty and decisionism. See Schmitt 1976, 1985a, 1998, 1999. See also Derrida 1992, 1996, Ojakangas 2000, Doucet 1999, Žizek 1999b.

<sup>96</sup> Schmitt 1985a, p. 12.

moment in which the foundation of law becomes suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone.”<sup>97</sup> The notion of the moment of emergence of liberal governmentality attunes us to the presence *within* liberal governmental rationality of the irreducible illiberal excess that forms the periphery of its more sedimented forms. Let us sum up this thesis by stating that the *logic of institution of liberalism is not itself liberal*. In a strict sense, this illiberality may not be conceived as ‘anti-liberal’ or ‘opposed’ to liberal principles of government, since it conditions the emergence of these very principles and is thus anterior to the very opposition between liberalism and anti-liberalism.<sup>98</sup> This illiberality finds its locus in the undecidable infrastructure of the moment of foundation. The diagram of technical assistance, by addressing the problematic of the foundation of specific liberal modes of governmentality, logically recalls the conditions of emergence of liberalism itself.

Secondly, we must complement this ‘conceptual’ thesis with the identification of the concrete historical point of emergence: the *foundational moment of postcommunism*. The ambiguous relationship between government and its objects in classical liberalism cannot be sustained in the postcommunist condition, marked by a radical discontinuity and the experience of the contingency of political foundations. The *naturalist ethos* of classical liberalism is inoperable in the postcommunist transformation, where it is precisely the *constitution* of the domains of the market and civil society that is problematised as a task of radical socioeconomic reforms. Neither autonomous subjectivity nor private enterprise can be posited as a natural limit, an aboriginal reality prior to governmental practice that the latter must merely *secure*. It is rather of necessity cast as a result of practices of reform that seek to mould, shape, fashion, cultivate, construct liberal forms of agency, enterprise and government itself. The logic of postcommunist liberal reforms can thus be termed *constructivist*<sup>99</sup> as opposed to the naturalist logic of classical liberalism. The historical condition of the postcommunist politics of emergence entails the rise to *centrality*, within the liberal mode of governmentality, of the constructivist pedagogical technology that is exceptional and peripheral to the naturalist-secular regime of classical liberalism. The diagram of technical assistance is made possible by, and finds

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<sup>97</sup> Derrida 1992, p. 36. Emphasis added.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>99</sup> Dean 1999, p. 160.

its entire justification in, the transgression via pedagogical interventions of the constitutive boundary of liberalism precisely in order to install it.

In the simultaneous absence of this constitutive boundary and the presence of its teleological presupposition we shall term the historical problem-space conditioning the possibility of the diagram of technical assistance *infra-liberal*.<sup>100</sup> As an infrastructural practice of laying foundations, postcommunist *infra-liberalism* faces most acutely the aporia of *producing its own limitations*, installing as governmental artefacts the objects of autonomous agency and private enterprise that it must simultaneously valorise as natural. On its veridictive axis the *infra-liberal* diagram must therefore combine both a naturalistic episteme and a radical governmental constructivism regarding its telos of autonomy. As we have noted in the conclusion to our analysis of the discourse of technical assistance, autonomous and authentic local agency thereby assumes a spectral presence within its diagram: it is certainly a property of the discourse, but a literally *lost property*, whose reclamation has to be deferred to retain the liberal identity of the diagram. In Slavoj Žižek's terminology, local agency designates a locus of 'inherent transgression' in the diagram. Inherent transgression refers to the notion that "the very emergence of a certain value which serves as the point of ideological identification relies on its *transgression*, on some mode of taking a distance towards it – the gap is *original* and *constitutive*, it is inherent to the symbolic order as such."<sup>101</sup> This gap entails that the ethically valorised authentic local agency can only be present in a deferred, obscure, spectral form, since an all-too literal identification of local counterparts with the authentic subjects of natural liberty disables governmental interventions in their practices. In Žižek's view, a valorised object of discourse always emerges as an already 'lost property', i.e. the moments of its emergence and loss coincide, the Fall being contemporaneous with the 'Golden Age' before it.<sup>102</sup> In the *infra-liberal* diagram, authentic and autonomous local agency is similarly only present in its absence, the absence that makes necessary

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<sup>100</sup> The notion of *infra-liberalism* is intended to connote the infrastructural character of the mode of institution of liberalism. An infrastructure is what precedes the internal structuration of an order and rather conditions it in its holistic exteriority. In this sense, *infra-liberalism* refers to the moment of the political as that which precedes and exceeds the formation of order, acting as its constitutive outside. A similar concept of infrastructure is developed with reference to Derridean poststructuralism in Torfing 1998, see particularly pp. 57–60.

<sup>101</sup> Žižek 1998, p. 3. Emphasis added.

<sup>102</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 2–3. The best example is the discourse of nationalism, which constituted the object of 'nation' as a 'lost property', an authentic primordial community lost and to be recovered.

the constructivist intervention, which in turn renders absent the naturalness of the resulting construct. The aporias and indeterminate oscillations that we have identified in the discourse of technical assistance are thus due to its historical deployment in the infra-liberal politics of emergence, in which the 'illiberal foundations' of liberalism can no longer be disavowed but come into play in concrete governmental practices on par with the 'positive' principles of actually existing liberalism that form the programmatic rationality of reform. The specificity of postcommunist transformation, thoroughly effaced by the postulates of the 'transitionalist' discourse, is that any movement of 'transition' must necessarily be undertaken on the ground that stirs beneath one's feet.

Thirdly, in its adoption of governmental constructivism the infra-liberal diagram of technical assistance carries an affinity with what in the governmentality literature receives the name of *advanced liberal* or *neoliberal* government.<sup>103</sup> The specificity of neoliberalism as a mode of governmentality deserves a closer focus since it permits to discern important convergences between postcommunist infra-liberalism and contemporary Western governmental rationalities.

In Dean's definition, neoliberalism is characterised by the '*governmentalisation of government*', whereby the operation of government proceeds from the reflexive problematisation of its own mechanisms.<sup>104</sup> The formation of neoliberal rationalities of government takes place in the post-World War II context of the criticism of the welfare state. The philosophical underpinnings of neoliberalism lie in Friedrich Von Hayek's conception of freedom as an *artefact* of civilisation, discipline and restraint, rather than a characteristic of the natural domain of society.<sup>105</sup> In contrast to both classical liberalism and social-welfarism<sup>106</sup>, the idea of the market and civil society as

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<sup>103</sup> The edited volumes of Barry et al (1996) and Hänninen (1998) offer the most detailed theoretical and empirical exploration of neoliberal governmentality. For the studies of technologies of neoliberal governmentality see also Brigg 2001, Stenson and Watt 1999, Bryant 2002, Lemke 2001, Rose 2000, Salskov-Iversen et al 2000. The notion of neoliberalism, espoused in the studies of governmentality, is rather broad and includes the Anglo-American 'Chicago School' liberalism, German post-war *Ordoliberalen*, and various neoconservative or neopopulist trends emerging as a critique of the welfare state.

<sup>104</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 55–59, 149–175.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Hayek cited in Dean 1998, p. 213: "We owe our freedom to the restraints of freedom." See also Gordon 1991, pp. 36–46, Burchell 1996.

<sup>106</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 53–55, Burchell 1996, Hindess 1996b, Rose 1996a for the argument that 'social government' or welfarism has been made possible by the liberal regime of government. The governmental intervention for the purposes of social protection would not have been thinkable, were it not for the

quasi-autonomous domains of 'natural liberty' is absent in neoliberal governmentality that instead deploys elaborate techniques of the *construction* of quasi-market domains in the social space.<sup>107</sup> In these domains autonomous subjectivity, specified in terms of *entrepreneurial rationality*, is not *liberated* as an anterior *given*, but *fashioned* as a contrived *style*, in which the notion of 'enterprise' in its primary meaning of a 'creative and daring endeavour' is deployed as an *ethical value*.<sup>108</sup> The objects of agency and enterprise thus emerge in the neoliberal discourse as not merely ethically privileged limits to government, but also as styles of existence to be actively constructed in and by governmental practices.

This abandonment of the classical liberal thesis of 'natural liberty' took two historical forms. The *Ordoliberalen* circle in West Germany, taking its point of departure in the Weimar-period Freiburg School of economics, rejected naturalistic assumptions about economy and society and instead advocated *positive governmental intervention* to establish both the market economy and the overarching 'market society' in order to sustain entrepreneurial rationality as a generalised ethos.<sup>109</sup> In contrast to 'critical theorists' who perceived the phenomenon of National Socialism as a *consequence* of capitalism, Ordoliberals viewed it as a result of the *lack* of liberal economic and social policies in the Weimar period and sought to develop an active policy of intervention in the society in order to *install* the principles of conduct, compatible with and conducive to entrepreneurial rationality: "The whole ensemble of individual life is to be structured as the pursuit of a range of different enterprises."<sup>110</sup> As opposed to the welfarist government of the economy in the name of the social, German neoliberalism 'governed the social in the name of the economic'.<sup>111</sup> The market was thus epistemically conceived as "a reality which can exist and be maintained in existence only by virtue of activist policies of political intervention, by legal measures designed to safeguard the game of free competition, and by socio-legal

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liberal construction of the social as a reality *sui generis*. Welfarist governmentality is thus a continuation of liberal government through anterior social processes that utilises an enhanced array of techniques of intervention. It can thus be understood as the transgression of the original liberal confines *in the name* of the liberal construct of society.

<sup>107</sup> Burchell 1996, p. 27. See also Dean 1998, pp. 203–212, Dean 1999, pp. 154–158.

<sup>108</sup> See Dean 1999, p. 160, Burchell 1996, pp. 23–25.

<sup>109</sup> See Gordon 1991, 1993, Lemke 2001.

<sup>110</sup> Gordon 1991, p. 42.

<sup>111</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 56–58, Dean 1998, p. 206. See also Gordon 1993, Lemke 2001.

measures designed to propagate and diffuse *throughout the social body*, and not only within the narrowly conceived limits of strictly economic activity, an *ethos of enterprise*".<sup>112</sup> In Thomas Lemke's phrase, German neoliberalism attempts a "universalisation of the entrepreneurial form",<sup>113</sup> the creation on the basis of economic rationality of a general model of social relations and its replication in a variety of domains, including those of ethics and morality. "The key feature of the neoliberal rationality is the congruence it endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational actor."<sup>114</sup> Thus, the valorisation of entrepreneurial practices in Ordoliberalism is accompanied by the dismantling of the naturalistic edifice of economy and civil society, the abandonment of economic determinism and the assertion of the *politically constituted* character of the capitalist economic order.<sup>115</sup> The maintenance of the ethos of liberal government in the post-World War II period was made possible by this fundamental restructuring of its techné and episteme. The link between autonomous agency and entrepreneurial practices and the imperative of their active governmental construction that we have identified in the diagram of technical assistance are thus constitutive of Ordoliberal governmentality, whose post-war emergence has, similarly to the postcommunist moment, acutely posed the challenge of constructing in practice those phenomena that serve as foundational presuppositions of liberalism.

The Anglo-Saxon variety of neoliberalism, drawing on Hayek's criticism of both naturalism and positive governmental interventionism, goes even further in the extension of 'entrepreneurial culture'.<sup>116</sup> This extension proceeds by two steps. Firstly, the distinction between the social and the economic, still present in German neoliberalism despite a clear valorisation of the latter, is effaced entirely, which results in the radical generalisation of the notion of economy. "The area covered by the

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<sup>112</sup> Gordon 1993, p. 29. Emphasis added.

<sup>113</sup> Lemke 2001, p. 195. As a result of this universalisation, economic efficiency became not merely the value of the 'properly' economic domain but also the source of legitimation for the West German state, a state *founded on* the basis of economic liberty and assessed in terms of its capacity to provide economic prosperity, a "state that refused to adopt any transcendent perspective and solely guaranteed the rules of economic exchange". (Ibid., p. 196. Emphasis added. )

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 201.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., pp. 193–195.

<sup>116</sup> Gordon 1991, p. 36. See also Dean 1999, pp. 156–162, Burchell 1996, Rose 1996a, 1998, Cruikshank 1998.

economy embraces the *entirety of human action* to the extent that it is characterised by the allocation of scant resources for competing aims. [...] Social relations and individual behaviour are deciphered using economic criteria and within *economic terms of their intelligibility*.”<sup>117</sup> With the generalisation of economy as a ‘science of human conduct’, human conduct becomes conceived as amenable by manipulations by economic mechanisms that modify the costs and benefits of particular actions.<sup>118</sup> Secondly, the distinction between the state and society also begins to blur, insofar as “government itself becomes a form of enterprise whose task it is to universalise competition and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions”.<sup>119</sup> This dissolution of the state-society distinction is manifested in the increasing popularity of the term ‘*governance*’ as a privileged alternative to ‘government’, traditionally conceived in statist terms.<sup>120</sup> The ambiguous concept of ‘governance’ refers to a plurality of governing agencies beyond the state, frequently conceived in terms of ‘networks’ or ‘partnerships’, and emphasises the aspect of voluntary and autonomous ‘self-government’ in contrast to the ‘top-down’ and ‘coercive’ image of state government.<sup>121</sup> The classical liberal state-society distinction is thereby supplanted by the image of a multiplicity of self-governing ‘communities’.<sup>122</sup> Secondly, the statist notion of government is displaced in the extension of the notion of governance to the international domain, exemplified by the discourses of economic globalisation and international institutionalisation that are taken to embody ‘governance without government’<sup>123</sup>.

In both versions of neoliberalism, the ambiguity involved in the classical liberal oscillation between essentialist and artefactualist conceptions of economy and society is resolved by the adoption of the self-consciously constructivist approach. Agency and enterprise are recast as *artefacts of governmental practice* that seeks to shape

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<sup>117</sup> Lemke 2001, pp. 197–198. Emphasis added.

<sup>118</sup> See Gordon 1991, pp. 43–44.

<sup>119</sup> Lemke 2001, p. 197.

<sup>120</sup> In this study we will use the term ‘governance’ in quotation marks to emphasise it as a specific approach to *government*, a discursive innovation characteristic of neoliberalism, rather than a generic term, frequently deployed as an alternative to the ‘narrow’ concept of government. In other words, in our approach ‘governance’ is not a successor or an alternative to ‘government’ but its specific modality.

<sup>121</sup> See Pierre 2000, Du Gay 2002. We shall discuss the notion of ‘governance’ in greater detail in chapter 3.6.

<sup>122</sup> See Du Gay 2002, p. 13.

<sup>123</sup> This is the title of Rosenau and Czempiel 1992.



conduct within the quasi-market domains of ‘untypical enterprise’ that it contrives beyond the properly economic sphere. The crucial difference between German and Anglo-Saxon neoliberalisms is that the former retains the constitutive distinction of state and society, whereby the state as the marketising agent of government is not itself marketised.<sup>124</sup> In contrast, the latter modality of neoliberalism displaces the binary state-society relationship into *a horizontal multiplicity of relations of government* between a variety of agencies, modelled on market subjects, and thus effects the dissolution of the very distinction between the state and society and the disappearance of the social as an object of discourse, epitomised in Prime Minister Thatcher’s well-known claim of there being ‘no such thing as society’.<sup>125</sup> Economic rationality in this version of neoliberalism is neither a natural limit to governmental power-knowledge nor an ethico-teleological principle guiding governmental practices, but rather a ‘permanent economic tribunal’<sup>126</sup> for government itself, a principle in terms of which governmental practices must be assessed.

In both its versions, neoliberalism introduces two radical transformations in the liberal art of government. Firstly, it reverses the relation between government and the economy, conceiving of the latter as an *active principle* of governmental practice rather than a *passive limit* to it, and an effect of governmental practices rather than an anterior presence to be secured by it.<sup>127</sup> Secondly, it reverses the relation between government and agency, reconstructing autonomous agency as an artefact of governmental rationalities rather than their exterior condition of possibility. Neoliberalism is therefore a paradoxical combination of a politically *conservative* defence of the virtues of entrepreneurial conduct, responsible autonomy,

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<sup>124</sup> This is not to say that German neoliberalism retains the *sanctitude* of the state/society boundary. The very notion of a governmental policy of the promotion of the ‘ethos of enterprise’ makes the transgression of this boundary a routine rather than an exception. However, while authorising governmental intervention into the social, German neoliberalism resists the reverse relation, the ‘reflexive’ folding back of the entrepreneurial principles back on the state. We shall return to this difference in chapter 4, when we discuss the functioning of the diagram of technical assistance in the strategic field of Russian socioeconomic reforms.

<sup>125</sup> Dean 1999, p. 149. See also Rose 1996a, 1998, Dean 1999, pp. 206–207.

<sup>126</sup> Foucault cited in Lemke 2001, p. 198.

<sup>127</sup> In Foucault’s lecture on neoliberal governmentality (presented in Lemke 2001), he links this transformation to a change in the priorities of liberal government. If classical liberalism developed its governmental rationality against the background of the all-powerful absolutist state (hence the urgency of the question of the *limit* to governmental authority), neoliberalism, particularly in the German version, sought to *establish* the new form of state on the basis of the ethos of economic freedom.

competitiveness and efficiency and a *radical reformist* programme of the multiplication and extension of the domains, in which these virtues would be operative.<sup>128</sup> In Nikolas Rose's terms, the radicalism of particularly the Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism is that it seeks to 'de-governmentalise' the state and 'de-statise' government.<sup>129</sup> In this formulation, neoliberalism may be appreciated as more than the "vicissitudes of a single political ideology, [...] but something with a more general salience, which underpins mentalities of government from all parts of the political spectrum"<sup>130</sup>, a restructuration of the entire diagram of governmentality rather than a temporary ideological vacillation.

The dispositional diagram of technical assistance shares a number of features with both versions of neoliberalism. The problematisation of the 'lack of enterprise' and the focus on active governmental intervention for the purposes of the construction of 'enterprise culture' aligns this diagram with German neoliberalism. On the other hand, the prioritisation of economic analysis and business planning as essential *governmental* skills and, more generally, the reflexive refolding of entrepreneurial principles back onto the object of government accords more with the radical generalisation of economic rationality that characterises Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism. However, since the two versions are simplified analytical constructs, there is little sense in trying to choose between them for a single interpretive frame for the diagram of technical assistance. The conditions of possibility of this diagram find their locus in the postcommunist infra-liberal problematic of emergence, which poses the same types of problematisation and calls for similar techniques of intervention as these two strands of neoliberalism. What we observe in the relation between neo- and infra-liberalism is not contextual embeddedness, but a proximity of historical problematics.

What aligns neoliberalism with the infra-liberal problem-space of the diagram of technical assistance is its deployment of a *governmental constructivist* approach to *agency* and *enterprise*. In his analysis of neoliberal governmentality Mitchell Dean distinguishes between two types of governmental technology, central to contemporary neoliberalism, the 'technology of agency' and the 'technology of performance' that

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<sup>128</sup> See Dean 1998, pp. 199–200, Dean 1999, pp. 166–168. On the linkages between neoliberalism and conservatism see Cruikshank 1998, Cristi 1998.

<sup>129</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 41.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

pertain respectively to the constitution of what we have termed the objects of agency and enterprise.<sup>131</sup> On the basis of our analysis of the formation of the object of government we are also able to isolate the third type of technology that we shall term the ‘technology of rule’. In the following chapters, we shall rely on these three technologies as interpretive tools in order to disentangle the conditions of emergence of the positivities of agency, enterprise and government within the diagram of technical assistance and trace the convergences between this infra-liberal diagram and the governmental rationality of neoliberalism.

### 3.4. Technology of Agency: The Injunction to Identity

The disjunction between classical and neo-liberal rationalities of government emerges most starkly in their construal of autonomous agency. Dean’s notion of the ‘technology of agency’ emphasises the neoliberal recasting of autonomous agency as a techno-epistemic artefact of government rather than a natural property of the subject. Similarly to our construct of ‘infra-liberalism’, the pedagogical technology, indispensable but marginal to classical liberalism, is extended in neoliberal governmentality to all domains of experience so that we may characterise the neoliberal governmental disposition as a *generalised pedagogy*, an infinitely applicable and replicable strategy of reconstituting ‘targeted populations’ as ‘active citizens’.<sup>132</sup> While classical liberalism construed and valorised its contemporary society as the ‘system of natural liberty’, neoliberalism proceeds from the problematisation of current social and individual practices in terms of moral decline<sup>133</sup> and attempts to rectify the situation through a programme of pedagogical interventions that seek to (re)constitute autonomous agents as proper objects of liberal government. Let us now discuss in greater detail the convergence of the neoliberal technology of agency with the pedagogical constitution of agency in the practices of technical assistance along the veridictive and jurisdictional axes of the diagram.

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<sup>131</sup> Dean 1999, p. 167.

<sup>132</sup> Dean 1998, p. 212. See also Kivinen and Rinne 1998, Rose 1998, Cruikshank 1996, Marinetto 2003.

<sup>133</sup> See Cruikshank 1998, 1999.

### 3.4.1. The Veridictive Axis: Self-Help and the Reservoir of Subjectivity

The key veridictive innovation of neoliberalism, strongly accentuated in the diagram of technical assistance, is the deployment of subjective *identity* as the object of governmental practices that seek to achieve autonomisation and empowerment.<sup>134</sup> The paradigmatic example of this deployment is the industry of *self-help*, whose emergence coincides with the political triumph of neoliberalism. The principle of self-help presupposes and effects a ‘psychologistic’ form of subjectivity,<sup>135</sup> preoccupied with its ‘inner’ truth, and engaged in a project of ‘self-discovery’ and ‘self-liberation’. “A ‘psy’ ontology has come to inhabit us, an *inescapable interiority* that hollows out, in the depths of the human, a psychic universe with a topography that has its own characteristics.”<sup>136</sup> The key feature of diverse self-help discourses is the assumption of the existence of the *interior reservoir of subjectivity* that the individual must mobilise, with the help of expert advice, in order to achieve fulfilment and empowerment as both an *autonomous* and an *authentic* agent.<sup>137</sup> The subject is thus incited to find the truth of her being in her freedom and experience freedom through the knowledge of her inner truth. It is in these practices that the inner depths of subjectivity, otherwise known as the ‘soul’, are produced:

It would be wrong to say that the soul is in illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, *it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of power.* [...] This real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge. [...] On this reality-reference, various concepts

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<sup>134</sup> See O’Malley 1996, Cruikshank 1999, Dean 1999, pp. 166–167.

<sup>135</sup> See Rose 1990, 1996b for the discussion of the role of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the formation of a highly specific form of subjectivity in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. See also White and Hunt 2000 for the discussion of the shift in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century from a ‘character-based identity’, understood as the self’s conformity to public virtues, inculcated through the formation of habits, to the notion of ‘personality’ as the unique sense of individuality, developed through practices of self-realisation and relatively independent from public virtues (though not from external expertise). While the former modality of subjectification proceeded through disciplinary mechanisms, the latter exemplifies the turn towards the mechanisms of seduction and incitement, a governmental mobilisation of the individual’s will to freedom.

<sup>136</sup> Rose 1996b, p. 190. Emphasis added.

<sup>137</sup> Rimke 2000, p. 64.

have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.: on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses and moral claims of humanism.<sup>138</sup>

The notion of identity specified in terms of subjective interiority is therefore the veridictive instrument-effect of the neoliberal technology of agency, neither an ideal concept nor an empirical reality, but, in Dean's expression, a "materiality drenched in thought".<sup>139</sup> The identity of the autonomous local agent in the diagram of technical assistance has no existence apart from such empirical objects and technical artefacts as questionnaires, curricula, energy bills, national park leaflets and self-help manuals for asthmatic patients; yet these devices only produce local identity, insofar as they are deployed within a veridictive regime that authorises and valorises this production as a path towards autonomy and authenticity.

This valorisation of authentic subjectivity suggests that the genealogy of neoliberal governmentality is irreducible to the political ascendancy of the Right in the late 1970s. In Dean's argument, the neoliberal technology of agency is genealogically entwined with the left-libertarian critique of welfare state bureaucracy and the valorisation of public participation, as well as the general emphasis on autonomy, authenticity and self-realisation that unites 'counter-cultural trends' of various kinds, from hippies to New Age.<sup>140</sup> According to Dean, neoliberalism itself may be understood as a 'counter-Enlightenment cultural critique'<sup>141</sup> that draws on a multiplicity of problematisations of the 'modern' routinisation and bureaucratisation of life and advances an ethos of personal self-fulfilment. The neoliberal veridictive constitution of autonomous identity is thus as much genealogically entwined with yoga and fitness practices as it is with monetarist economics, and is invoked as much in Paolo Coelho's New Age bestseller *The Alchemist* as it is in the manuals on SME establishment. The

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<sup>138</sup> Foucault 1977a, p. 29. Emphasis added.

<sup>139</sup> Dean 1996b, p. 223.

<sup>140</sup> See Dean 1998, 1999, chapter 8. The possibility of redeployment of left-wing counter-cultural discourses of empowerment, self-actualisation and 'community' in conservative governmental programmes testifies to what Foucault refers to as tactical polyvalence of discourse. (Foucault 1990a, p. 100.) See also Stenson 1998, Rose 1998, Stenson and Watt 1999. The same technologies have more recently been reactualised in the discourse of the 'Third Way' that according to Nikolas Rose (2000) both descends from neoliberalism and is discontinuous with it, displacing its entrepreneurial ethos by the intensification of moral pathos that Rose terms 'etho-politics'.

<sup>141</sup> See Dean 1998.

contradiction identified by the critics of participatory development between the valorisation of local knowledge and participation and the inexorable advance of neoliberal reform proposals is thereby displaced, since the conditions of emergence of these apparently divergent discourses are identical. The distinct feature (and the advantage) of neoliberalism is that it has successfully reconstructed the ‘emancipatory’ rhetoric of self-discovery, self-knowledge and self-fulfilment as concrete technical models of ‘autonomisation’. “It is the Right, rather than the Left, that has managed to articulate a rationality of government consonant with this new regime of the self, to develop programmes that translate this ethic into strategies for the regulation of precise problems [...] and to invent the technical forms that promise to give effect to it.”<sup>142</sup>

Let us now discuss the ways in which autonomous and authentic agency functions as an object of a governmental technology. The neoliberal discourses of self-help and empowerment combine the injunction of individuals to self-actualisation through self-expression with the epistemic rarefaction of their discourse through the installation of procedural and substantive primary texts that provide concrete models of autonomy to be emulated.<sup>143</sup> This operation of government is exemplified by the already-cited claim of the parks development project: “We do not give advice, we *create the base*.” The task of self-liberation is thus to be addressed through the ‘work on the self’ with the help of authoritative foundational expertise that provides concrete models or images of ‘autonomy’ that serve as a *template* against which the agents are to assess themselves and in accordance with which they are incited to reshape their lives.<sup>144</sup> The existence of such grounding templates is crucial to the functioning of self-help as a technology of government. In Nikolas Rose’s argument, the governmental ‘regulation of images’ of successful or ‘normal’ subjectivity generates individual anxiety, self-scrutiny, dissatisfaction and a search for guidance, provided by experts. In this manner, governmental imperatives are internalised and the agent in question becomes committed to particular practices as expressions of her innermost desires.<sup>145</sup> In the diagram of technical assistance, this operation is performed through the identification of the ‘competence gap’ that presents local agents as professionally deficient and in

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<sup>142</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 60. See also O’Malley 2000, p. 481, fn. 2.

<sup>143</sup> See Rimke 2000, Rose 1990, 1996b.

<sup>144</sup> See Rose 1990, Donzelot 1979, Rimke 2000.

<sup>145</sup> See Rose 1990, pp. 111–115, 130–132, 208–209.

need of pedagogical assistance. The gap is replicated in the final stage of the projects, when the retrained agents are presented to their professional peers as ‘models of good practice’ to be emulated. As we discussed above, for technical assistance the competence gap is an intrinsic principle, which makes the misalignment between the ‘image’ of authentic autonomy and actual local practices inevitable and opens the clearing where ‘external facilitation’ may unfold. In this manner, local agents are “bound into the language and evaluations of expertise at the very moment that they are assured of their freedom and autonomy”.<sup>146</sup> At the site of self-help, the aporia of authenticity and artefactuality that we have identified as constitutive of the diagram of technical assistance emerges in full force: in order to be endowed with authentic subjectivity, the agent must emulate a model, internalise a governmental artefact or master external expertise. Authentic life thereby appears equivalent to the simulation of a simulacrum.<sup>147</sup>

The deployment of the principle of authenticity in the neoliberal technology of agency deserves special attention, due to the latter’s suspension of the naturalist epistemology. At first glance, in the diagram of technical assistance the status of local and self-knowledge appears to be of little value, since the very rationality of the programme presupposes the existence of a competence gap and the need for a constructivist governmental intervention. However, the valorisation of authenticity and locality in this diagram is not reducible to a means of legitimation of the practices proposed by Tacis but is inherent to neoliberal governmentality more generally.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>147</sup> See Rose 1990, p. 239. The ambiguous position of local agency in the discourse of technical assistance is similar to the position of the family in Rose’s study. Cf. Rose 1990, p. 172: “On the one hand, the family tie appears as natural, on the other, parents can only carry out their task effectively when educated, supplemented and in the last instance supplanted by psychologically trained professionals.”

<sup>148</sup> The valorisation of authenticity may be argued to be crucial to legitimising the practices of technical assistance as *international* governmental practices. EU technical assistance exemplifies most starkly the *divorce of the practices of government from the institution of the state*, which makes it impossible to conjure, for the purposes of legitimation, the image of a political community, whom the agencies of government can be said to *represent* or *serve*. The strategic logic of the diagram of technical assistance is certainly *liberal*, but by definition not *democratic*, since the international character of this practice deprives it of a *demos* that could be its point of reference. This point of reference may however be sought in the construal of a relationship of identity between the statements instantiated from the two enunciative modalities, external consultants and local agents. This identity is established through the endowment of the enunciations of the trained local agents with the status of authentic discourse, thus conferring legitimacy on the substantive proposals of external technical assistance.

We may account for the privilege accorded in the Tacis discourse to local authenticity by addressing the neoliberal *critique of professional reason*, particularly the expertise of a broadly 'sociological' character, which is regarded as hierarchical, unaccountable, paternalistic and disempowering.<sup>149</sup> This critique renders professional knowledge epistemologically dubious and politically suspect and rather valorises 'local', 'folk' or 'alternative' knowledge, albeit objectified through various managerial inscriptions. Thus, simultaneously with rarefying procedural and substantive discursive possibilities, the neoliberal technology of agency also confers value on the very fact of autonomous self-expression, similarly to the participatory planning method in the Tacis discourse, which prescribes 'writing opinions on the board', however 'aggressive' and 'wishful' they are and calls on the participants to be 'open, honest and truthful'. The governmental technology of agency is not exercised on the mute object, but on the speaking subject, and incites the desire for self-expression as a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the authentic self. Following Barbara Cruikshank's studies of self-esteem and empowerment, we may suggest that in the valorisation of (guided) self-expression, neoliberalism deploys a non-naturalist ethos of agency that we shall call *expressionism*. This ethos retains the liberal essentialisation of authentic subjectivity, but rather than deploy it passively as an anterior quasi-natural lifeform to be defended from governmental intervention, it recasts it as an effect of active exercise, the *work of discourse*, whereby the truth of the self *comes forth*.<sup>150</sup> The neoliberal episteme thereby disqualifies professional expertise from two directions: the 'top-down' installation of unitary managerial inscriptions that effaces the specificity of discrete

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<sup>149</sup> See Dean 1999, p. 163. Dean cites Hayek's claim that "there seems [...] to exist no more justification for the theoretical discipline of sociology than there would be for a theoretical discipline of naturology". Indeed, with Margaret Thatcher's claim of there being no such thing as society, sociological knowledge is deprived of its very object, let alone its justification. A concrete manifestation of this anti-sociological epistemology is the rejection by neoliberalism of the notion of *social causality* in e.g. the accounts of deviance and crime, which results in a renewed stress on individual responsibility and a practical shift from correctional to punitive penal technologies. Conceived by neoliberalism as a rational actor, a criminal need no longer be reformed, because there is 'nothing wrong with him', but must simply be punished for his transgression, much as the offender in the monarchic period described by Foucault (1977a). On the dissolution of social causality see also O'Malley 1996, pp. 198–203, Rose 1998, pp. 78–80, Stenson 1998.

<sup>150</sup> See Cruikshank 1996, pp. 233–236. See also Rose 2000 for the discussion of 'therapeutic individualism' in the contemporary discourse of the 'Third Way'. See Taylor 1986 for the defence of subjective expressionism (and more generally, the very notion of identity) against Foucauldian criticism.



professional domains and the ‘bottom-up’ valorisation of local or self-knowledge that is granted epistemic privilege over professional expertise. Thus, in the three Tacis projects in entirely different spheres, the veridictive principles of discourse are fully identical and consist in the combination of managerial inscriptions and locally piloted models without assigning privileged enunciative capacity to sector-specific professional knowledge.

As we discussed in the previous chapters, the acquisition in the pedagogical practices of the doctrinal mastery grants the newly constituted local agency the authority of *autonomous* exercise of *authentic* discourse. In this sense, participatory indoctrination does indeed ‘autonomise’ the subject in his positivity, albeit the specific character of this positivity is not itself an effect of autonomous choice. It is this subjectifying effect that is most original about the neoliberal technology of agency. While the objectification of governed populations through disciplinary practices is characteristic of a variety of authoritarian and ‘totalitarian’ regimes, neoliberalism is practically unique in making *subjectivity* an individual’s *duty* and a *governmental task*: “The self *is to be a subjective being*, it is to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal fulfilment in its earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility, *it is to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts of choice.*”<sup>151</sup> The ethical injunction to be an autonomous subject is a singular feature of neoliberalism that distinguishes it from its classical predecessor, whose *naturalisation* of liberty entailed the absence of its *problematization*. By recasting freedom as a task of government, neoliberalism enfolds the ‘system of natural liberty’ back into the domain of government – an operation that Dean refers to as *implication*.<sup>152</sup> The very desire for and enjoyment of freedom thus paradoxically become a governmental injunction. Slavoj Žižek has phrased this injunction in terms of an ironic reversal of the Kantian ethical imperative: “You must *because you may!*”<sup>153</sup> Recast as a governmental ‘grant’ rather than a natural limit to government, the subject’s freedom becomes an obligation, and, furthermore, an obligation to be *enjoyed* as a personal project of self-actualisation rather than simply a *duty* to be fulfilled. Moreover, the epistemic presupposition of a deeper, fundamental identity to be actualised in self-expression turns the practice of freedom into a hard labour of

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<sup>151</sup> Rose 1996b, p. 151. Emphasis added.

<sup>152</sup> Dean 2002a, pp. 44–45.

<sup>153</sup> See Žižek 2001a.

anxious self-scrutiny. One of titles of self-help manuals, cited by Rose, urges the subject “to be *that self which one truly is*”.<sup>154</sup> It is at the moment of the presupposition of the existence of a ‘true self’ that is contrasted with one’s ‘empirical self’ that the injunction to freedom becomes equivalent to the subjection to external expertise, the ‘technical assistance’ that promises to point the pathway for the ‘project of identity’ between one’s empirical and one’s true self.

The ‘illiberality of liberalism’ or the ‘tyranny of participation’ that may be discerned in the pedagogical technology of agency is thus twofold. Firstly, the specific content of autonomy is externally postulated in the governmental primary texts that provide detailed guidance to self-help practices. Secondly, the very telos of autonomy is posited as a moral *obligation* by external authority and as a result of an external problematisation: it is only through a critical assessment of the present situation that local agents are constituted as *deficient beings* in need of empowering correctional intervention.<sup>155</sup> Local agents, autonomised and empowered in the discourse of technical assistance, are thus subjected both to a particular desire and the specific means of its fulfilment. “The self that is liberated is *obliged to live its life tied to the project of its own identity*.”<sup>156</sup> Recalling our remark that liberalism actively produces the juridico-discursive conception of power, we may claim that while classical liberalism focuses on the *juridical* aspect of power by establishing limits to governmental authority, neoliberalism valorises the *discursive* aspect, whereby autonomy becomes the achievement of the work of discourse.<sup>157</sup> While classical liberalism emphasises the liberation of the self from government, the neoliberal

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<sup>154</sup> Rose 1990, p. 242. Emphasis added.

<sup>155</sup> As Barbara Cruikshank (1996, p. 238.) remarks, currently widespread techniques of self-esteem, self-help and empowerment have originally been deployed in highly specific settings, such as correctional institutions for criminal offenders and juvenile delinquents.

<sup>156</sup> Rose 1990, p. 254. Emphasis added.

<sup>157</sup> For the detailed discussion of the juridico-discursive conception of power see Foucault 1990a, 1982, 1988a, 1988c. The ‘discursive’ aspect in this conception refers to the idea that power, being merely prohibitive, negative, limiting and exterior, may be defeated and its object liberated by the practice of unconstrained discourse. In Foucauldian terms, our notion of expressionism corresponds to the incitement to discourse in the confessional technology, of which psychoanalysis is the contemporary manifestation. Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality (1990a) derisively demonstrates how this conception of power resulted in the endowment with the status of a transgressive revelation of the ‘sexual liberation’ discourse, which merely reiterated the maxims of the very regime of truth it thought itself to oppose, “bent on ending the rule of silence, regarding what was the noisiest of our preoccupations”. (Foucault 1990a, p. 158.)

technology of agency construes a veridictive relation of the *liberation of the self from the self by the self*, a “subjection that is all the more profound because it appears to emanate from our autonomous quest for ourselves, it appears as a matter of our freedom”<sup>158</sup>. The combination in the discourse of technical assistance of the incitement to autonomy and its systematic rarefaction is therefore conditioned by the ethos of expressionism at the heart of neoliberal governmentality and its veridictive deployment of identity conceived in terms of subjective interiority. The original contribution of the governmentality approach to the study of this technology of subjectification is that, in contrast to the discourses on participation in development studies, it dispenses with the problem of whether the valorisation of autonomy, participation and local authenticity is itself genuine and ‘authentic’ or a mere conspiratorial cover-up, whether local ‘identity’ is ‘truly’ empowered or ‘actually’ repressed. What is at stake is rather the question of “how we have come to *invest so much in all this talk about identity, the self and subjectivity*, how we have come to locate the truth of being in what we take to be the deeper structures of our self”.<sup>159</sup> When the ethical quest for autonomy and authenticity is located *within* the neoliberal governmental diagram, the ‘contradiction’ between the valorisation of local authenticity and neoliberal reform solutions no longer obtains, the former being the necessary epistemic correlate of the latter.

#### 3.4.2. The Jurisdictive Axis: Lifelong Learning and the ‘Pleasure of Analysis’

The veridictive construction of agency as endowed with subjective interiority finds its jurisdictive correlate in the pedagogical techniques of reconstitution of local agents as autonomous subjects. As we have discussed in our analysis of participatory indoctrination in the discourse of technical assistance, autonomisation and empowerment of local agents are conditioned by the *correct* and *proper* exercise of

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<sup>158</sup> Rose cited in Cruikshank 1996, p. 235. In this figure, liberation ‘from the self’ refers to the problematisation of ‘dependency’ and ‘low self-esteem’ that in the neoliberal episteme supplants social causality as the primary explanation of crime, deviance and poverty. See Brigg 2001, Rankin 2001, Macleod and Durrheim 2002, Bryant 2002, Goldman 2001 for the discussion of this problematisation in the context of development assistance. See also Edwards et al 2001, Atkinson 1999, Marinetto 2003.

<sup>159</sup> Dean 1996a, p. 212. Emphasis added.

their assigned enunciative modality. Besides the formal training programme undertaken in all three projects, pedagogical techniques are at work in other project operations: the incitement to discourse in the SWOT framework of policy design, guidance in drafting investment proposals, installation of managerial reporting formats, preparation of handbooks and manuals for non-participating districts, etc. All these technical routines serve to organise, structure and guide the local autonomous discourse and thereby enhance 'local responsibility' and autonomous 'planning capacity'.

The key feature of these pedagogical techniques is their irreducibility to the transfer of specific professional knowledge and skills. Instead, the telos of participatory pedagogy is the formation of an autonomous, active, self-aware and self-governing agent, presupposed in the neoliberal episteme. This feature aligns participatory indoctrination with the principles of 'lifelong' and 'learner-managed' learning that have become increasingly widespread in the neoliberal management of education.<sup>160</sup> According to Nikolas Rose, in neoliberal governmentality education is no longer confined in space and time to institutional sites of compulsory schooling, but is rather a matter of "ceaseless training", whereby one's entire life becomes a "capitalisation of the self".<sup>161</sup> The increasing prioritisation of *adult education* proceeds from recasting knowledge and skills as '*human capital*' and the consequent understanding of education as a form of *enterprise*. Besides this *spatio-temporal extension*, pedagogy also becomes *functionally expanded*, the goal of learning being not merely 'capitalisation' in the strictly economic sense, but also, as the studies of neoliberal techniques of self-esteem and empowerment demonstrate, self-investment with knowledge as a practice of *ethical self-formation*.<sup>162</sup> "Individuals are to become *experts of themselves*, to adopt an educated and knowledgeable relation of self-care in respect to their bodies, minds, forms of conduct, etc."<sup>163</sup> This extended and expanded notion of pedagogy is best exemplified by the discourse of 'lifelong learning', which became dominant in the theory of education during the ascent of neoliberalism in the 1980s.<sup>164</sup> Lifelong learning emphasises the centrality of education to enhancing both individual autonomy and operational efficiency, prioritises the development of flexible, transferable skills that could be applied in various

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<sup>160</sup> See Harrison 2000.

<sup>161</sup> Rose 1998, p. 69.

<sup>162</sup> See Cruikshank 1996, 1998, O'Malley 1996, Dean 1998.

<sup>163</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 59. Emphasis added.

<sup>164</sup> See e.g. Harrison 2000, Wilson 1999, Wain 2000, Edwards et al 2001, Edwards 2002.

socioeconomic sectors and stresses the learner's own rational interest in and responsibility for his continuous education. Secondly, learning is posited as central to active self-formation as a subjective being. According to its critics, 'lifelong learning' is a "type of new age discourse, wherein the harnessing of emotions, attitudes and values is emphasised over the requirement of rigorous argument, evidence and debate".<sup>165</sup> The following sample from a British government policy text on education illustrates the correspondence between the *techné* of lifelong learning and the episteme of subjective interiority: "Learning offers *excitement* and the *opportunity for discovery*. It stimulates *enquiring minds* and *nourishes our souls* [...] Learning contributes to social cohesion and fosters a *sense of belonging, responsibility and identity*."<sup>166</sup>

The neoliberal technology of agency thus depends on the techno-epistemic linkage between pedagogical practices and the conception of 'deep' identity. Since learning is posited as 'lifelong', the agent's autonomy is throughout her lifetime conditioned by expert facilitation and assistance that specifies and concretises the ethos of freedom. In the neoliberal governmental discourse this condition is referred to as a 'culture of learning' or a 'learning society'.<sup>167</sup> These terms exemplify most starkly the distance between classical and neo-liberalism: the formerly peripheral practice of pedagogical interventions into the lives of adults is in the neoliberal diagram generalised as the main operational principle of government. The pedagogical technology of agency is thus best summed up as '*giving form* to the life of the people'<sup>168</sup> by mobilising their desire for autonomy. In this manner, neoliberal government unfolds into its own presumed exterior in what Dean refers to as the operation of *explication* of government.<sup>169</sup> We ought to reiterate that this operation is not 'disguised' by the discourse of lifelong learning, but is positively constituted by it.<sup>170</sup> Contrary to the 'progressive' criticism of pedagogy as failing to realise the noble

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<sup>165</sup> Nikoll and Edwards 2000, p. 467.

<sup>166</sup> U.K. Secretary of State for Education and Employment cited in Nicoll and Edwards 2000, p. 468. Emphasis added. See also Edwards 2002.

<sup>167</sup> See Edwards et al 2001, Wain 2000.

<sup>168</sup> Ottmar von Verschuer cited in Rose 2001, p. 2. Emphasis added. This phrase has originally been offered as a definition of politics by the German National Socialist scholar in the 1930s. Cf. Lemke 2001, p. 202: "Neoliberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form."

<sup>169</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 45.

<sup>170</sup> Cf. Wilson 1999, p. 85: "This paper presents an argument that the rhetoric of lifelong learning and the learning society *are really a disguise* for the exercise of power."

ideal of human self-realisation and practicing discipline *rather than* enabling autonomy and empowerment, we shall venture that it is only *because of* the exclusionary, rarefactional and restrictive character of pedagogical interventions that the positivity of the 'self-actualising subject' has become possible at all.<sup>171</sup>

The second feature of the neoliberal pedagogical techne concerns the relation between the learner and the educator in a pedagogical relationship. The principle of *learner-managed learning* sets as the goal of education not merely the transfer of knowledge and skills, but rather self-improvement and personal development, which requires the learner's awareness of her educational needs and her active participation in pedagogical practices. In this learner-centred approach, the role of the pedagogue consists in the incitement of the learner to active self-expression and the provision of techniques and forms of knowledge, which will assist her in achieving self-actualisation.<sup>172</sup> The emphasis on the learner's active participation in her own learning aligns neoliberal pedagogical practices with what Foucault referred to as a confessional technology. According to Foucault, the procedure of confession, originally an element of the Christian tradition, has been redeployed in a secular fashion at a variety of sites (most paradigmatically in psychoanalysis, but also in education, literature, intimate relations, etc.) as the primary modern 'technique of the self': "Western man has become a confessing animal."<sup>173</sup> In Foucault's genealogy of sexuality confession is the procedure for extracting the deepest truth, the essence of individuality in the form of verbalisation of bodily desires. What is crucial in this technology for our purposes is less the curious link it establishes between sex and the truth of one's being than the assumption it makes about this truth as residing within the *depths of subjectivity*, unbeknownst to the subject in question, always 'in hiding' and in need of a complex procedure of expert extraction. In the technique of confession, the epistemic assumption of 'deep' authentic subjectivity finds its concrete vehicle of materialisation: the path to true freedom lies in active and voluntary

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<sup>171</sup> Cf. Hunter 1996, p. 161: "Capacities of a reflexive person emerge only when he is initiated into the arts of self-inspection and self-regulation." In Hunter's argument, the positive operation of modern pedagogy consists in the installation of organising routines, disciplines, rituals and relationships that make possible the formation of the reflexive subject, in whose name current 'critical' discourses articulate their onslaught on pedagogical practices.

<sup>172</sup> See Harrison 2000.

<sup>173</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 59. For the importance of the practice of confession and the hermeneutics of the self for the constitution of individuality in Western culture see Foucault 1988d, 1988f, 1990a.

participation in discourse, a verbal rendition of experience, which in itself is anticipated to liberate.<sup>174</sup>

The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us that we longer perceive it as an effect of power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, *lodged in our most secret nature*, 'demands' only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it down and *it can finally be articulated only at a price of a kind of liberation*.<sup>175</sup>

The crucial difference of confession from Foucault's more famous notion of the 'disciplinary technology' is that, in contrast to the panoptic mechanisms of discipline, the confessional technology does not involve individuals as docile objects, but on the contrary proceeds by their *incitement to active discourse*, which, with the help of *experts* with due *interpretive capacity*, will reveal the truth of their individuality. The practice of confession thus articulates the acquisition of self-knowledge with *both* autonomous discursive practice *and* the presence of an authoritative figure of a mentor or a shaman to extricate the truth of one's subjectivity from the mass of individual enunciations. "The confession is a ritual of discourse, in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence [...] of a partner, who is not simply an interlocutor, but the authority."<sup>176</sup> This "link between total obedience, knowledge of oneself and confession to someone else"<sup>177</sup> is most

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<sup>174</sup> The contemporary illustration of the operation of the confessional technology is provided by the tendency to valorise 'reflexivity' as a crucial 'liberating feature' of late- or post-modernity. See e.g. Giddens 1992, Beck 1997. Giddens's work on sexuality is most exemplary in this regard since it is a clear manifestation of Foucault's notion of a 'repressive hypothesis' about sexuality that posits unconstrained discourse on sex as a liberating experience and in itself a pleasure comparable to those provided by the object of discourse. Foucault's ironic remarks seem to have anticipated this valorisation of reflexivity: "It is often said that we have been incapable of imagining any new pleasures. We have at least invented a different kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it, of captivating and capturing others by it, of confiding it in secret, of luring it out in the open, the specific pleasure of the true discourse on pleasure." (Foucault 1990a, p. 71.) For a discussion of the contrast between Giddens's and Foucault's conceptions of sexuality see Temkina 2002.

<sup>175</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 60. Emphasis added.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>177</sup> Foucault 1988i, p. 69.

starkly realised in neoliberal ‘participatory pedagogy’, which at the site of technical assistance is exemplified by local participatory planning meetings, where local counterparts are both actively incited to express themselves and assisted in the interpretation of the results of self-expression. It also clarifies (without resolving) the key aporia of technical assistance: its endless oscillation between the valorisation of local authenticity and the governmental pedagogical constructivism.

If one had to confess, this was not merely because the person to whom one confessed had the power to forgive, console and direct, but because *the work of producing the truth was obliged to pass through this relationship if it was to be scientifically validated*. The truth did not reside solely in the subject, who, by confessing, would reveal it wholly formed. *It was constituted in two stages: present but incomplete, blind to itself, in the one who spoke, it could only reach completion in the one who assimilated and recorded it*. It was the latter’s function to *verify this obscure truth*: the revelation of confession had to be coupled with the *decipherment of what was said*.<sup>178</sup>

The pedagogico-confessional constitution of authentic autonomous agency is a two-stage process that complements the active, willing and unconstrained self-expression of the agent in question, which is a ‘raw material’ still lacking in authenticity, with the interpretive, evaluative and guiding labour of the expert, who, paradoxically, renders authentic discourse *complete* by the ordering operations of exclusion, rarefaction and restriction. Thus, the authentic truth of one’s individuality cannot be elicited in solitary techniques of the self, but is, in a literal sense, a ‘social construction’, an outcome of an asymmetric pedagogical relationship between the ‘confessors’<sup>179</sup>. “The individual [was] *authenticated by the discourse of truth* he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of *individualisation by power*.”<sup>180</sup> It is thus the confessional technology that is marked by the feature erroneously attributed to ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘postmodern’ thought: the valorisation of discourse as a source of creative, constitutive force, the means of self-discovery and self-liberation. It is by *rendering her life into discourse* that the authentic agent *comes to life*. In its

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<sup>178</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 66. Emphasis added.

<sup>179</sup> The term ‘confessor’ denotes both “the one who confesses” and “a priest who hears confessions”. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com>.

<sup>180</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 58. Emphasis added.



operation at such sites as ‘participatory planning’ meetings, the confessional technology incites local agents to be ‘open, honest and truthful’, urges one to express oneself, ‘talk about it’, ‘break the ice’ – in short, it *hammers in* the injunction to ‘*let it out*’.

Furthermore, the very pedagogical relationship becomes, for the newly autonomised and authenticated subject a source of fulfilment and self-realisation, “the delight of having one’s words interpreted, [...] a *pleasure of analysis*”.<sup>181</sup> The injunction to enjoy one’s subjection that we discussed as an ethico-epistemic feature of the technology of agency has as its correlate the jurisdictional effect of recasting the very process of subjection (a pedagogical relationship) as a liberating and ‘therapeutic’<sup>182</sup> experience.

One has to be completely taken in by this internal ruse of confession [...] in order to believe that all these voices [...] *repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does*, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking – are speaking to us of freedom.<sup>183</sup>

The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our ‘liberation’ is in the balance.<sup>184</sup>

This pedagogico-confessional approach, combining the incitement to self-expression with authoritative guidance and interpretation, is in the neoliberal technology of agency replicated in a multiplicity of diverse settings: self-esteem enhancement programmes, ‘urban regeneration’ projects, health promotion campaigns, programmes against welfare ‘dependency’, self-help manuals, group therapy, lifestyle magazines, talk shows, etc.<sup>185</sup> This generalised form of ‘technical assistance’ serves to render material and concrete the ethico-epistemic figure of the ‘expressionist’ subject by introducing specific inscription devices, training exercises, assignments and assessments that chart the path to one’s self-actualisation.

In this epistemically grounded and pedagogically assisted discursive practice, the neoliberal subject emerges in its positivity, realising and expressing through the

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<sup>181</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 71. Emphasis added. See also Rose 1990, p. 257.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67. See Rose 2000 for the discussion of ‘therapeutic individualism’.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60. Emphasis added.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>185</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 167–168, Burchell 1996, pp. 28–30, Cruikshank 1996, 1999, O’Malley 1996, Rose 1990, 1996a, 1996b, 2000, Brigg 2001, Coveney 1998, Rankin 2001, Rimke 2000, Atkinson 1999.

autonomous work of discourse the truth of its subjective interiority. Its autonomy is thus not simply a sham, but the effect of an “arduous, haphazard and contingent concatenation of problematisations, strategies of government and techniques of regulation”.<sup>186</sup> Most importantly, this effect is *indissociable* from the practices of subjection that made it possible: the subjection of local agents in the diagram of technical assistance is not a lowly ‘pre-history’ of their eventual liberation, but is entirely coterminous with this liberation. Similarly to Sorokin’s parable of the Ice Hammer, freedom becomes indistinguishable from the violence that went into its constitution, just as authenticity becomes indistinguishable from the labour of technological artifice.

The notion of ‘enfolding of authority’, central to Gilles Deleuze’s reconstruction of Foucault’s work, permits to pinpoint the singularity of autonomous identity as a governmental artefact of neoliberalism.<sup>187</sup> It would be too facile to make an ontological statement that subjective interiority does not exist, that *there is no* ‘deep’ identity to be found. What is more precise is that the entire existence of this interiority is owing to the ‘folding’ of the governmental forces inside the self, whereby subjective identity turns out to be derivative from the external relations of power.<sup>188</sup> It is this operation of folding that illustrates most vividly the intertwining of heteronomy and autonomy, the outside and the inside, surface and depth in one concrete figure: the autonomous subject has a real existence, but only as a fold on the surface of a governmental diagram.

The diagram of the fold describes a figure in which the inside, the subjective, is no more than a moment, or a series of moments, through which a ‘depth’ has been constituted within human being. The *depth and its singularity, then, is no more than that which has been drawn in to create a space or series of cavities, pleats and fields*, which only exist in relation to those very forces, lines, techniques and inventions that sustain them.<sup>189</sup>

In terms of Foucault’s fourfold concept of ethics<sup>190</sup>, we may summarise the neoliberal technology of agency, at work in the diagram of technical assistance, in the

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<sup>186</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 61.

<sup>187</sup> See Deleuze 1988, particularly pp. 115–121.

<sup>188</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 118. For the visual representation of the operation of folding see *ibid.*, p. 120. See also Dean 1996a, 2002a for the application of this concept.

<sup>189</sup> Rose 1996b, p. 188. Emphasis added.

<sup>190</sup> Foucault 1990b, pp. 26–28.

following way. Its *ethical substance* (the problematised domain of existence) is constituted by the conception of identity understood in terms of subjective interiority. Its *mode of subjection*<sup>191</sup> is governmental constructivism, an epistemic principle that posits the amenability of individual existence to positive fashioning through governmental interventions. Its *askesis*<sup>192</sup> or prescribed ‘ethical work’ consists in spatio-temporally extended and functionally expanded pedagogico-confessional practices. Finally, its telos is one’s self-actualisation as an autonomous subject, which is equivalent to the discovery and expression of one’s authentic subjective identity, ‘that self which one truly is’. In the next chapter we shall discuss the way this ethical programme is articulated with the valorisation of entrepreneurial practices.

### 3.5. Technology of Performance: The Transparency of Quasi-Markets

The constructivist orientation of neoliberalism is evident in its innovative approach to economic rationality and entrepreneurial practices. As we discussed above, classical liberalism construes the economy as an antecedent domain with its own laws and dynamics, a domain, which is a limit to government precisely because it is distinct from it. This non-identity of government and the economy prescribed a policy of non-interventionism into economic activity for any other purposes than securing its unobstructed operation. In contrast, neoliberalism proceeds from recasting economic rationality as not merely proper to the domain of the economy, but as a general human faculty.<sup>193</sup> This entails the effacement of the distinction between the domains of government and the economy, which both enables the practices of active governmental intervention into the domain of the economy and makes it imperative for government itself to be guided by the logic of economic rationality. In Mitchell Dean’s terms, these two features of neoliberalism constitute its ‘technology of performance’. Let us address in greater detail the veridictive and jurisdictional aspects of this technology insofar as they relate to the effects elicited in the discourse of technical assistance.

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<sup>191</sup> Foucault 1984b, p. 353.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., p. 355.

<sup>193</sup> See Dean 1999, chapter 8, Lemke 2001, Gordon 1991, Rose 1996a.

### 3.5.1. The Veridictive Axis: Managerial Science and the Universalisation of Economic Rationality

Along the veridictive axis, the neoliberal technology of performance effects a radical epistemic innovation. In our discussion of the technology of agency we have already touched upon the neoliberal suspicion of professional expertise and its dual valorisation of managerial and local knowledge. While welfare state liberalism is taken by the studies of governmentality to have relied on enclosed domains of professional expertise that endowed its practitioners with superior status in relation to their ‘clients’, neoliberalism, aligning itself on this point with the left-libertarian critique of professionalism, displaces “the trust previously accorded to professional credentials”<sup>194</sup> in favour of a meta-professional knowledge of ‘managerial science’, to whose ‘performance monitoring’ professional knowledge is subjected.<sup>195</sup> In Nikolas Rose’s terms, neoliberalism dissolves ‘substantive’ governmental expertise in the ‘formal’ regimes of ‘managerial science’:

The powers once accorded to positive knowledges of human conduct are to be transferred to the *calculative regimes of accounting and financial management*. And the enclosures of expertise are to be penetrated through a range of techniques for exercising critical scrutiny over authority – *budget disciplines, accountancy* and *audit* being three of the most salient. These certainly do rely upon a claim to truth but it is one that has a different character from that of the social and human sciences: these ‘grey sciences’, these know-hows of enumeration, calculation, monitoring, evaluation, manage to be *simultaneously modest and omniscient, limited yet apparently limitless* in their application to problems as diverse as the appropriateness of a medical procedure and the viability of a university department.<sup>196</sup>

In the discourse of technical assistance this epistemic shift is exemplified by the reconstruction of professional agencies in the three project sectors as ‘enterprises’,

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<sup>194</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 55. See also O’Malley 1996, pp. 201–203.

<sup>195</sup> See Rose 1996a, pp. 55–56, Rose 1998, pp. 68–70 for the discussion of the replacement of professional ethics with the ethos of managerialism and the subordination of social science to ‘management science’. See also Hänninen 1998 who discusses the devaluation of social sciences in expert government that exemplifies a “fundamental displacement of the social way of thinking about politics”. (Hänninen 1998, p. 257.)

<sup>196</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 54. Emphasis added.

albeit 'untypical' ones, and the clients of their services as 'consumers', no longer subordinated to the professional authority of the expert, but rather exercising their fundamental faculty of rational *choice* between competing service providers. Specifically, this shift is brought about by the rarefaction of professional discourse through the introduction of such primary texts as economic analysis and such managerial inscriptions as logical frameworks and SWOT tables. This rarefaction installs in the professional discourse formal calculative or 'metrological'<sup>197</sup> regimes that reconstitute professionals as primarily calculative agents, engaged in the search for the most cost-effective solutions. The reporting formats employed and advocated in the discourse of technical assistance also emphasise objective verifiability and quantitative assessment of professional practices, which serves to re-orient 'performance' towards the fulfilment of only those goals that can be rendered in the economic terms of quantifiable outputs.<sup>198</sup> Such rarefaction of professional discourse has consequences both for the mode of problematisation and the proposed interventions, as diverse policy sectors are thereby endowed with identical problems and prescribed similar remedies, entirely irrespectively of their 'substantive' content.

This veridictive regime can be summed up in terms of *quasi-market constructivism*. The valorisation of economic rationality as a general human faculty makes it both possible and necessary for neoliberal government to intervene in the social domain not merely to secure the operation of already-existing economic mechanisms but also to install economic mechanisms where they may have never existed. In all three projects we have analysed, the quasi-marketisation of professional discourse is a manifest novelty, most notably in the health care and social sectors.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> See Barry 2002, Callon 1998.

<sup>198</sup> See Dean 1999, pp. 169–170.

<sup>199</sup> See Armstrong 1993, 1995 for the Foucauldian historical study of discontinuous forms of medical discourse and regimes of public health. The preventive and non-institutional modality of health care, promoted in the discourse of technical assistance, is referred to by Armstrong as 'surveillance medicine' that transcends the enclosed confines of the hospital space to enfold the entire social domain within its field of visibility. Surveillance medicine is characterised by the erasure of the clear distinction between the normal and the pathological, which places every individual (no longer simply healthy or ill) at risk and requires the adoption of preventive and vigilant practices. In the absence of its constitutive distinction medicine becomes dispersed and disseminated, increasingly linked with 'social' and 'economic' discourses in its promotion of a 'healthy lifestyle', prudent behaviour and personal responsibility for one's health. For the linkages between neoliberal governmentality and changes in medical practice see also Coveney 1998 and more generally Rose 1990.

This novelty illustrates the discontinuity between classical and neo-liberalism regarding the object of enterprise: the logic of economic rationality is no longer an *epistemic obstacle* to governmental practices, a source of opacity of the social realm to governmental knowledge, but rather an *epistemic construct* of governmental practices, a set of innovative inscriptions, metrological devices and reporting formats that government can deploy to transform the conduct of its objects. We may note a peculiar affinity of neoliberalism with the dispositional episteme of police science that assumed a complete identity between the objects of government and the acts of government and viewed the governed order through the grids of its own making.

The concrete example of this affinity is the valorisation in neoliberal governmentality of the notion of *transparency*. Professional expertise is of course not transparent by definition, i.e. it is professional because it is inaccessible to those not initiated into the profession. The crucial innovation of neoliberalism is the practice of managerial *audit* that serves to make these opaque professional domains visible, intelligible, accountable and amenable to intervention. According to Michael Power, the proliferation of auditing beyond the economic domain makes it possible to speak of the formation, in the last 20 years, of an ‘audit society’ in European and North American countries.<sup>200</sup> The introduction of audit mechanisms of assessing and monitoring performance has profound effects on professional practices in the audited domains, displacing ‘informal’ trust-based professional relations through the introduction of inscription devices that make the domain in question amenable to performance policing, accountability to the ‘public’ and managerial interventions.

Michael Power’s study of the ‘audit society’ emphasises the practice of auditing as a *ritual of verification*,<sup>201</sup> whose dubious technical efficacy and epistemic status are less significant than the positive transformation it effects in the audited domain. “Audit functions less as a practice of verification and more as an explicit vehicle for change in the name of ideals such as ‘cost-effectiveness,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘quality,’ etc. [...] *Audits work because organisations have literally become auditable*; audit demands the environment, in the form of systems and performance measures, which makes a certain style of verification possible.”<sup>202</sup> The requirement of transparency

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<sup>200</sup> Power 1997. See also Shore and Wright 1999 for the case study of the impact of auditing on British higher education.

<sup>201</sup> See Power 1997.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91. Emphasis added.

and the deployment of auditing serve to constitute new fields of visibility, in which entrepreneurial criteria of evaluation and assessment may then be applied. Such examples from the discourse of technical assistance as the introduction of accounting systems in energy utilities, the restructuring of tourism departments in national parks as separate budgetary units and the introduction of a contract-based staffing policy in health care are all conditioned by the prior reconstruction of the professional domains in question as transparent to economic, cost-analytical problematisations and amenable to the interventions proper to the private sector. Furthermore, since this reconstruction entails concrete transformations in professional conduct, it serves the purpose that Power refers to as “internalising governance”,<sup>203</sup> abandoning the top-down imposition of policy on the resistant domain in favour of reshaping the domain itself, making the desired conduct, ‘the auditable performance’, a part of mundane professional routines.<sup>204</sup> This is not to say that this internalisation is ever either complete or automatic. One of the consequences of the proliferation of auditing, noted by its critics, is what Power calls a strategy of ‘decoupling’<sup>205</sup>, in which the ‘auditees’, resisting the ‘colonisation’ of their domains by economic rationality, create internal ‘buffer zones’ insulating their practices from the auditors’ interventions. Other critics note the increasing recourse to cynical staging of ‘performances’ for auditors, making auditing a ritual in the full sense of the word.<sup>206</sup> However, these governmental failures or strategies of resistance occur in an already transformed domain, making auditing practices successful in their constitutive activity, if not in their operational efficiency. Despite the mundane character of such managerial innovations, they effect a profound reconfiguration of the liberal episteme. Recalling our discussion of liberal governmental agnosticism, grounded in the conception of the opaque and dense domain of the social, unknowable in its entirety by government, we may claim that the *ideal of transparency is irreconcilable with liberalism in its classical version*.<sup>207</sup>

The formation of new fields of visibility through economic and managerial inscriptions is thus not conceivable in the classical liberal regime of veridiction, which was instead marked by the effort to graft governmental rationality onto the logic of

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>204</sup> See Shore and Wright 1999, pp. 565–566.

<sup>205</sup> See Power 1997, chapter 5.

<sup>206</sup> Shore and Wright 1999, p. 570.

<sup>207</sup> See Osborne 1996, pp. 100–101.

antecedent socioeconomic processes. In contrast, there is little in neoliberal 'managerial science' that is in principle different from Foucault's well-known account of disciplinary technologies and particularly the project of the Panopticon, which in the neo-liberal parlance would be the epitome of transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, there is one significant difference between the neoliberal valorisation of economic rationality as the universal epistemic grid and the 'police science' of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, namely, the relation between the mode of knowledge and its subject. In the universal table of order constituted in police activities there was no place for 'government' as the positive object of knowledge. In contrast, neoliberalism, particularly in its Anglo-Saxon version, makes economic rationality a grid of intelligibility for governmental performance itself. Thus, the strategy of quasi-marketisation also enfoldes the activities of government in what Dean refers to as the operation of *replication*<sup>208</sup>: the mirroring by government of what it holds to be the rationality of the extra-governmental realm. In the diagram of technical assistance this reflexive refolding results in the difficulty of distinguishing between the objects of enterprise and government. Governmental construction of quasi-enterprises in the respective sectors is followed by the problematisation of governmental operations in terms of economic rationality and the demand for the entrepreneurial restructuring of governmental agencies through the grounding of governmental discourse by economic analysis, training in business and loan negotiation skills and the marketisation of certain departments of the governing agencies. Rarefied through the grid of economic rationality, government itself begins to appear as a kind of enterprise, providing such services as the construction of enterprises.

### 3.5.2. The Jurisdictional Axis: Techniques of 'Entrepreneurial Government'

These veridictive effects of the neoliberal technology of performance find their technical application in the strategy of quasi-marketisation that, in addition to the direct establishment of new enterprises, takes the form of competitive and contractual arrangements, privatisation, partnerships and liaisons. The totality of such techniques

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<sup>208</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 45.



has come to be known as ‘new public management’ or ‘(good) governance’.<sup>209</sup> The following statement of the key features of this approach recalls the techniques that we have discussed extensively in our analysis of the discourse of technical assistance:

*Entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. They empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy into the community. They measure the performance of their agencies focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. [...] They redefine their clients as customers, and offer them choices – between schools, between training programmes, between housing options. They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than simply offering services afterwards. They put their energies into earning money, not simply spending it. They decentralise authority, embracing participatory management. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services but on catalysing all sectors – public, private and voluntary – into action to solve their community’s problems.*<sup>210</sup>

This description illustrates the way in which the extension of the entrepreneurial model makes government virtually indistinguishable from an enterprise. A crucial technique in this fusion is the ‘decentralisation’ of authority through participatory approaches, of which liaisons with the private sector are the most important. According to the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance, “implementation of certain European policies could be better achieved by target-based tripartite contracts.”<sup>211</sup> If government is merely a special type of enterprise, then many of its tasks can well be performed by ‘proper’ enterprises, provided that the obligations of the partner are contractually specified. A similar strategy of ‘contractual implication’ is performed in the ‘voluntary’ sector of non-governmental organisations, which are endowed with governmental authorisation in exchange for fulfilling the duties of partnership. Particularly in the British context, this policy has led to the proliferation of QUANGO’s (quasi-non-governmental organisations).<sup>212</sup>

The partnerships proposed and instituted in the discourse of technical assistance exemplify both tendencies. We have discussed above the restructuring of tourism departments in national parks as private tour operators, the proposal to operate fuel

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<sup>209</sup> See Salskov-Iversen et al 2000.

<sup>210</sup> Osborne and Gaebler cited in Du Gay 2002, pp. 17–18. Emphasis added.

<sup>211</sup> European Governance. A White Paper, p. 13.

<sup>212</sup> See Rose 1996a, 1998 for the discussion of the function of QUANGO’s in neoliberal governmentality.

production and supply ‘on an enterprise basis’, with the role of administrations limited to supporting competition among heating enterprises, and the shift of general practices to contractual arrangements with district medical authorities. These examples illustrate the *formation* of entrepreneurial agencies both within governing bodies and in the domain of ‘society’. Secondly, we may recall the importance granted in the discourse to the facilitation of the establishment of professional associations that monitor new performance standards in the health sector and the establishment of liaison arrangements with the existing local enterprises to take over a part of the monitoring functions of the national parks. Such arrangements illustrate the *devolution* of governmental authority to these ‘autonomous’ agencies that simultaneously subjects them to a particular type of enunciative modality. Furthermore, as we have discussed in relation to the local agents empowered in the process of dissemination, the devolution of authority to new governing agencies (often paradoxically referred to as ‘*non-governmental* organisations’) also serves to reshape them in accordance with governmental imperatives. Similarly, in its advocacy of a “reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” and “partnership arrangements”, The EC White Paper on Governance states that “these arrangements will prompt civil society organisations to tighten up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity and prove their capacity to relay information or lead debates in the member states”.<sup>213</sup> This quotation illustrates most starkly the way in which effects of government (positive remoulding of civil society partners) are elicited in the very act of devolving governmental authority.

The second feature of ‘entrepreneurial government’ that is strongly articulated in the discourse of technical assistance is the role of government as a *catalyst*, facilitating autonomous efforts in resolving the identified problems. Nikolas Rose refers to this role of government as ‘animator’<sup>214</sup>, no longer required to solve all individual and social problems but ethically obliged to provide guidance and training to individuals and communities entrusted and ‘responsibilised’ to do this autonomously. This desire to ‘*govern at a distance*’<sup>215</sup> is presented as an entrepreneurial alternative to ‘state government’ which, in the phrase of the EC White Paper on Governance, is

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<sup>213</sup> European Governance. A White Paper, p. 17.

<sup>214</sup> See Rose 2000.

<sup>215</sup> See Rose 1996a, 1998, 2000, Dean 1999, 2002a, 2000b, Burchell 1996, Hindess 1996b.

taken to be both “remote and intrusive”<sup>216</sup>. The very definition of ‘governance’, espoused in this document, incorporates these principles: “Governance means rules, processes and behaviours that affect the way in which powers are exercised [...], particularly as regards *openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence*.”<sup>217</sup> ‘Entrepreneurial government’ therefore seeks to govern *through* the liberties of the subjects, at the same time as it seeks to shape that liberty in a particular manner. In the discourse of technical assistance this self-distanciation of government is best exemplified by what we referred to as asymmetric dissemination, which simultaneously empowers local agents as subjects of government of others and subjects them to a certain regime of self-government, the deviation from which leads to the withholding of the enunciative privilege. In other words, “the [neoliberal] state is constituted by a promise: ‘We will assist you to practice your freedom as long as you practice it our way’.”<sup>218</sup>

More specifically, the substantive interventions deployed by EU Tacis seek to enable the local counterparts to find ‘a way of living less dependent on state budgets’ through a programme of education into the operation of market mechanisms. The principle of ‘self-help’ that we have discussed above reappears in the technology of performance in the specified entrepreneurial form that is manifested, for instance, in the prioritisation of health promotion and awareness campaigns that have a preventive emphasis.<sup>219</sup> With the efforts of governmental bodies restricted to the provision of preventive skills and advice, the health of the individual becomes her own *responsibility* and personal investment in one’s health a matter of *choice*. The same logic is operative in the energy project’s demand to make the *consumer* responsible for the whole energy bill in order to make energy conservation an economically motivated *choice*. We may thus observe a mutual ‘commercialisation’ in the relation between professionals and their clients, which recasts them as providers and consumers in a quasi-market space. In this manner, entrepreneurial techniques are articulated with the technology of agency in the positive formation of local subjects as ‘rational economic agents’ that find in entrepreneurial practices the fulfilment of the desire for autonomy that is

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<sup>216</sup> European Governance. A White Paper, p. 3.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8, fn. 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>218</sup> Dean 1998, p. 217.

<sup>219</sup> For the study of health promotion as a technique of neoliberal governmentality see Coveney 1998. See also O’Malley 1996.

instilled in them by the pedagogical technology of agency.<sup>220</sup> In Nikolas Rose's terms, the result of this articulation of the celebration of 'deep' subjectivity with the prescriptions of economic efficiency is the reconstruction of the very notion of one's "life as a skilled performance",<sup>221</sup> defined through a series of choices in pursuit of various enterprises.

The technology of entrepreneurial performance thus serves to install the 'enterprise form' in individual, social and governmental domains and thereby to "bring about a cultural renewal in the way in which individuals understand their lives and in which institutions are to be organised and managed".<sup>222</sup> Quasi-marketisation is therefore irreducible to the negative operation of 'rolling back' state obligations in the social realm. On the contrary, it enables the characteristically liberal 'government through liberties' by modelling governmental operations on the extra-governmental economic processes. Secondly, entrepreneurial innovations, presented in the discourse of technical assistance as 'models of good practice', have an important cultural effect: market mechanisms are presented as "educators in sound rules of conduct",<sup>223</sup> concrete correlates of the ethos of self-actualisation. It is thus crucial to take seriously the neoliberal neologism of 'enterprise culture'. The figure of the autonomous agent, formed in the articulation of the technologies of agency and performance, is manifestly *not* the culturally impoverished 'rational actor', conjured in the critiques of neoliberal 'economism'. As Michel Callon remarks, such critiques either try to 'enrich', 'give a bit more soul' to the rational economic agent by 'contextualising' him in 'values' and 'culture' or simply deny his very existence, denouncing this figure as the 'ideological' fiction of neoliberalism.<sup>224</sup> Instead, our analysis demonstrates, firstly, that there is no lack of ethical content or concern with the 'soul' of the agents constituted in the neoliberal technology of performance, and, secondly, that the agents thus constituted are *both* artefacts of governmentality *and* have a 'real' material existence. The thesis of 'impoverishment' is particularly misplaced: if anything, the technology of entrepreneurial performance is marked by a remarkable empirical richness by virtue

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<sup>220</sup> See Rankin 2001, Brigg 2001 for the discussion of the formation of entrepreneurial subjects in the development programme of microcredit.

<sup>221</sup> Rose 1990, p. 237.

<sup>222</sup> Dean 1998, p. 202.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>224</sup> Callon 1998, pp. 50–51.

of the concreteness of its technical models that may be favourably contrasted with the excessively abstract meditations on social and cultural ‘embeddedness’.<sup>225</sup> In Gordon’s terms, this technology successfully “symbiotises aptitude with self-awareness and performance with self-realisation”.<sup>226</sup> Its practitioners are therefore entirely worthy of the title that Joseph Stalin once endowed the Soviet writers with: ‘engineers of human souls’.<sup>227</sup>

The novelty and inventiveness of neoliberalism thus consists precisely in its capacity to connect ethical and cultural meditations to concrete entrepreneurial models, to offer a *paradigm of autonomy* in the sense of the concrete exemplar of its practice, generalisable and replicable across a variety of domains. The capacity to make ‘culture’ operable as a form of enterprise is central to the political success of neoliberal governmentality and the persistence of its models in other ‘ideological’ contexts.

### 3.6. Technology of Rule: Governance without Government

Finally, let us discuss the neoliberal technology of rule that conditions the formation of the object of government in the diagram of technical assistance. In our analysis we have already addressed the way in which current governmental practices in the Republic of Karelia are problematised as top-down, restrictive and non-participatory, which accounts for their ineffectiveness and inefficiency. The interventions proposed in the discourse attempt to restructure the domain of government as a space of autonomous actions by local agents, with governing agencies cast in the facilitative and empowering role. Government as a process of conducting conduct is thereby dispersed and, in the Tacis terminology, ‘disseminated’ into the ‘social’ domain. Nonetheless, this dissemination by no means reduces the intensity of the ‘conduct of conduct’ but rather permits to elicit the effects of government in a more effective and less conflictual manner. The self-effacement of the *identity* of government as a positivity, distinct from

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<sup>225</sup> Cf. Callon 2002, pp. 300–302.

<sup>226</sup> Gordon 1991, p. 44.

<sup>227</sup> Stalin cited in Berlin 2002, p. 82, fn. 2. The theme of ‘soul engineering’ is addressed in detail in the works of Nikolas Rose, particularly 1990, 1996b.

the domain of its exercise, therefore results in the extension of its reach and the expansion of its objects. In this chapter we shall attempt to extricate the conditions of possibility of this idiosyncratic technology of rule.

### 3.6.1. The Veridictive Axis: 'Governance' and the Headless King

The veridictive dimension of the neoliberal technology of rule is constituted by a highly specific construal of the relationship between government and its objects. The key feature of this relationship is the disappearance of society as an object of discourse. Indeed, in the case of the discourse of technical assistance Margaret Thatcher's famous dictum holds true: *there indeed is no such thing as society in this discourse*, and, furthermore, the relational structure of the diagram actualised in it precludes this object from appearing. Government is no longer the government *of society*, in the sense of an external reality with its own laws and dynamics, but rather a relationship between governing agencies, increasingly indistinguishable from enterprises, and individual or collective agents, whose entrepreneurial transformation is the government's task. The studies of neoliberal governmentality point to the exceedingly polymorphous *ensemble of governing agencies*, practicing the same governmental rationality of entrepreneurial autonomisation in the absence of any apparent connection to state agencies: "Neoliberalism relies on a range of technologies that install and support the civilising project by shaping and governing the capacities, competencies, wills of subjects, yet are outside formal control of public powers [...]: documentary and soap opera, opinion polls [...], the regulation of lifestyle through advertising, marketing and the world of goods, and the experts of subjectivity. These technologies do not have their origin or principle of intelligibility in 'the State', but none the less have made it possible to govern in an advanced liberal way."<sup>228</sup> The discourse of technical assistance, confined to specific project areas, obviously illustrates only a small area of such dispersion. Nonetheless, we may recall the way, in which its governmental strategies sought to initiate and catalyse this dispersion of authority

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<sup>228</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 58. See also Cruikshank 1999, Bryant 2002, Brigg 2001, Rimke 2000 for the discussion of the plurality of governing agencies in the neoliberal diagram.

through partnerships with professional and social organisations: from the broad social campaign for ‘true family values’ to the contractual implication of private enterprises in monitoring the standards of sustainability in national parks we invariably observe the progressive pluralisation of governing agencies. ‘Asymmetric dissemination’ that we have addressed as a specific scheme of restriction of access to discourse now appears to be central to the technology of rule in the neoliberal diagram more generally. Neoliberalism governs through the *dissemination* of its practices into a plethora of domains, making direct intervention superfluous and ‘government-at-a-distance’ possible. The contemporary discourse of ‘governance’ celebrates the dismantlement of top-down governmental arrangements in favour of ‘networks’ constituted through contractual and participatory management models: “The linear model of dispensing policies from above must be replaced by the virtuous circle, based on *feedback*, *networks* and *involvement* from policy creation to implementation at all levels.”<sup>229</sup> The clear-cut state-society distinction thus gives way to a circular movement of governmental practices, whereby it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between the governors and the governed.

The dissolution of society elicits two crucial veridictive effects. Firstly, the disappearance of one member of the opposition logically entails the disappearance of the other, namely government or ‘the state’. Government thus loses its own identity insofar as it loses a clearly defined exterior. Secondly, since in the liberal episteme the figure of the social functioned as a limit to state knowledge and action, its disappearance from the discourse makes governmental intervention potentially limitless. Neoliberalism may thus “incite and justify a will to govern that imposes no limits on itself”.<sup>230</sup> Let us discuss these features of the neoliberal governmental episteme in greater detail.

The mutual dynamics of explication of governmental agencies into the ‘social’ domain and the replication of the ‘social’ entrepreneurial arrangements within the formal sphere of government dissolve the opposition of state and society central to classical liberal governmentality. The political-philosophical problem of the legitimate domain of state intervention is thereby displaced. On the one hand, “government increasingly impinges upon individuals in their very individuality, in their practical

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<sup>229</sup> European Governance. A White Paper, p. 11. Emphasis added. See also Pierre 2002. For a critique of the discourse of governance see Du Gay 2002.

<sup>230</sup> Rose 2000, p. 1406.

relations to themselves in the conduct of their lives; it concerns them at the very heart of themselves by making its rationality the condition of their active freedom.”<sup>231</sup> On the other hand, it becomes increasingly difficult to oppose these interventions, both because they are presented as means towards the enhancement of authentic autonomy and because ‘government’ itself is simultaneously subjected to them: the values of transparency, efficiency, accountability and openness are both instruments of governmental practice and instruments of problematisation and criticism of the government’s own operation. The very expansion of governmental practices into new domains through partnerships and contractual implication also enables their disavowal *as* governmental practices and their presentation in terms of autonomous ‘self-governance’ of the civil society.

Nonetheless, this technology of rule *does* feature a certain contraction or diminution of authority, though of a specific kind, namely the *sovereign power* of the state. In Dean’s argument, all liberal government is characterised by an inner fracture between “the constitutionally defined legal-political order of limited government and a liberal police established by a knowledge of spheres, processes and agencies outside this domain”.<sup>232</sup> Neoliberalism can be understood as the gradual expansion of the latter domain at the expense of the former, whereby the ‘proper’ formal governmental sphere is increasingly deprived of autonomy in relation to the domains of ‘economy’ and ‘society’. Such deprivation takes a variety of forms, from the claims of decentring of statehood by the processes of economic globalisation<sup>233</sup> to the attempt, evident in the discourses on ‘governance’, participation and civil society, to re-moralise the state through its subjection to ‘social’ values, whether economic or ‘civic’. The latter trend is referred to by Paul Du Gay as ‘re-sacralising government’<sup>234</sup> through the displacement of the Hobbesian divorce of state legitimacy from ethical or religious principles.

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<sup>231</sup> Burchell 1996, p. 30.

<sup>232</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 57.

<sup>233</sup> For the discussion of the impact of the problematic of globalisation on neoliberal governmentality see Dean 1999 (chapter 8), Dean 2002a, 2000b, Salskov-Iversen et al 2000.

<sup>234</sup> Du Gay 2002, p. 21. The parallel process of the obliteration of the distinction between the public and private is the increasing tendency to problematise and governmentalise the ‘private sphere’, most importantly the relations of intimacy, in accordance with ‘democratic’ imperatives. See Giddens 1992 for the theorisation of the ‘democratisation’ of intimacy through its restructuration as a reflexive and discursively negotiated project, invoking such notions as rights, responsibilities and conditionality – principles that are regulative of the public space and appear thoroughly opposed to the more romantic notions of unconditional and non-calculative love. In this dual process of the democratisation of



The more the state becomes part of society, in a sociological and political sense, not something above or beyond it, then the freer people will be to exert 'personal agency' and the more creative, innovative and dynamic all sectors of society will be. [...] There is a significant problem here, though: in making the state simply part of society, the state becomes something different from what it is in its own terms. *It stops being a state.* [...] To actively attempt to de-autonomise the state under the aegis of its status as a social 'construct' or the imperatives of moral expressivism, is effectively to *re-theologise it.*<sup>235</sup> Far from failing to base itself on such absolute moral principles as moral perfection or the 'just state', the administrative State emerged, in part, from a sustained intellectual and political campaign to banish such principles from the sphere of government. [...] The unprecedented carnage fuelled by such non-negotiable principles eventually discredited their claim to provide ultimate foundations for government.<sup>236</sup>

If the modern sovereign state owes its condition of possibility to the distinction between the domain of sovereign power divorced from ethical foundations and the sphere of society in which a plurality of ethical values is affirmed and tolerated, then the subjection of the state to a particular set of ethical principles, be it entrepreneurial rationality or the self-actualising community, effectively dismantles the principle of sovereignty as an early modern solution to religious and civil strife and poses anew the question of the constitution of social order. "The contemporary love affair with decentralised and privatised forms of governance in public administration raises serious and far-reaching questions of political authority."<sup>237</sup> In fact, some of these questions relate to the foundations of the liberal order itself, particularly political rights and liberties: "Significant private freedoms associated with liberal societies, far from being the expressions of democratic institutions or popular resistance, were means by which the administrative state pacified and governed fratricidal

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intimacy and the sacralisation of democracy the distinction between the domains of the public and the private is effaced or at least reduced to the residual formality.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23. Emphasis added. In Du Gay's argument, 'moral expressivism' refers to the doctrine according to which the state must express certain moral ideals to be recognised as legitimate.

<sup>236</sup> Hunter 1996, p. 152. See Koselleck 1988 who argues that the emergence of absolutist states and the doctrine of *raison d'état* in the aftermath of religious strife and warfare, which divorced the state from its transcendental religious or ethical grounds, resulted in the split between the public domain of sovereign power and the private domain of society that comprised individuals as moral subjects, and the consequent appropriation by 'civil society' of the capacity of moral judgement in the struggle against the state.

<sup>237</sup> Du Gay 2002, p. 24. For Foucault's critique of facile anti-statism see Foucault 1991a, pp. 102–104. See also Gordon 1993, 1996.

communities.”<sup>238</sup> If we agree that “the standard tropes of modern liberal thought do not function as transcendental limits on state action but are rather the product of action by sovereign states”,<sup>239</sup> then it becomes difficult to reconcile the anti-statism of contemporary neoliberalism (including its communitarian strands such as the ‘Third Way’<sup>240</sup>) with the defence of the liberal freedoms that the state makes possible. This problem illuminates the more general question of the relation between liberal governmentality and the principle of sovereignty. Foucault has famously dismissed the problematic of sovereignty in contemporary political theory with his call to ‘cut off the head of the king’ and the argument for the decentred character of power. Unfortunately, this criticism of sovereignty has, in the studies of governmentality, overshadowed Foucault’s own analyses of sovereignty and its relation to other forms of power.<sup>241</sup> Furthermore, the discussion of the novel forms of government through liberty in these studies has tended to take neoliberal claims of decentring sovereignty at face value and thus ignored the interdependence between (neo)liberalism and other forms of government such as sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics. Let us briefly recall Foucault’s concept of sovereignty and discuss its relation with neoliberalism.

In his *History of Sexuality* Foucault presents a distinction between two forms of power that characterise respectively the monarchical and the loosely defined ‘modern’ period. The negative and deductive power of the sovereign that consisted in the *right to decide life and death*, to take life or let live was transformed into a productive ‘power over life’, a power “to foster life or disallow it to the point of death”<sup>242</sup>. This transformation was simultaneously a move from the transcendent character of power to its immanence within the social order, from law to norm, from prohibition to regulation, from the spectacular punishment of violations to the continuous modulation of mundane conduct.<sup>243</sup> If the rationality of sovereignty is circular (i.e. it takes the

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<sup>238</sup> Hunter 1996, p. 153. See also Du Gay 2002, p. 23: “Despite proclaiming themselves as the protectors of individual rights and community freedoms, anti-statist advocates of governance cannot be consistent defenders of these rights and freedoms because rights and freedoms are an enforced uniformity, enforced, that is, by sovereign states.”

<sup>239</sup> Du Gay 2002, p. 15.

<sup>240</sup> See Rose 2000.

<sup>241</sup> For the criticism of the lack of attention to the problematic of sovereignty in the studies of governmentality see Stenson 1998, Dean 2002b.

<sup>242</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 138.

<sup>243</sup> See Foucault 1977a, 1980a, 1980d, 1988c, 1988e, 1990a, Donzelot 1979, Dean 1999, Berard 1999, Simons 1995 (chapter 5).

sovereign's hold over the territory of his principality as the end of the exercise of power), governmental power over life possesses an external finality in the 'things' that it 'disposes' so as to lead to a 'convenient' end, be these things individual bodies (anatomy-politics) or populations (bio-politics).<sup>244</sup> It is important to note that despite the dismissal of the problematic of sovereignty in political theory, Foucault never presented the development of new forms of power as a simple linear succession:

We need to see things not in terms of the replacement of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, *sovereignty-discipline-government*, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.<sup>245</sup>

Despite being relatively ignored by Foucault, the domain of international relations offers a most potent illustration of the interdependence of sovereignty and governmentality. On the one hand, governmentality is made possible by sovereignty, which in its *parergonal function*<sup>246</sup> of delimitation of the spaces of the domestic and the international, inside and outside, constitutes that territorially defined domain in which practices of governmentality may take place: "Governmentality is [...] critically reliant [...] on the *forceful delimitation of the spaces in which it can operate*. These of course are precisely what all the spectacles, assertions, legislative, territorialising and identifying practices of sovereignty help to furnish and establish."<sup>247</sup> On the other hand, the maintenance of sovereignty is conditioned by the constitutive practices of government of individuals and collectivities, which endow the domain of the inside with a positive identity, actively producing that which sovereign power

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<sup>244</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 139. The notion of biopolitics has been utilised in two senses. In the more general sense it is synonymous with governmentality as a designator of modern 'power over life' exercised on populations on the basis of the knowledge made possible by the formation of human and social sciences. In the more specific sense, the notion of biopolitics refers to the exercise of power on the *physical existence* of individuals and has been deployed in the studies of governmentality in such specific domains as health care, reproductive processes and familial relations, etc. For the application of this narrow concept of biopolitics see Rose 2001.

<sup>245</sup> Foucault 1991a, p. 102. Emphasis added.

<sup>246</sup> See Bartelson 1995, pp. 50-52 for the explication of the idea of sovereignty as a 'parergon', a frame that conditions the existence of the two domains of 'inside' and 'outside' that it demarcates, itself being part of neither domain. The problematic of the constitution of the domains of inside and outside, domestic and international politics, in practices of sovereignty is also addressed in Walker 1993, Biersteker and Weber 1996.

<sup>247</sup> Dillon 1995, p. 333. Emphasis added.

enfolds. “The sovereignty of states [...] is never simply *there*. It has to be made to *work*.”<sup>248</sup> It is made to work precisely in those multiple and heterogeneous governmental practices, in which the political community takes concrete, substantive and positive shape. To sum up, “sovereignty inaugurates a political community [...] as governmentality orders the conduct of its population.”<sup>249</sup> Thus, it appears possible to concur with Michael Dillon’s comment on Foucault’s accusation of political theory being slow to behead the king: “Governmentality seems to need its kings as much as kings and princes need governmentality. [...] The orders of sovereignty and governmentality combine in the modern manifold of power in ways that still remain obscure because the *combination* has not received much attention.”<sup>250</sup>

We may therefore conclude that the neoliberal claim to have dispensed with sovereignty through the internal ‘re-moralisation’ of the state and its external ‘globalisation’ needs to be supplemented with an account of the location of neoliberal rule in the wider field of power relations.<sup>251</sup> We shall discuss a specific type of a combination of sovereign and governmental power in chapter 4, when we address the functioning of the diagram of technical assistance in the contemporary Russian political field. At this point, we shall merely suggest that rather than effect a succession of sovereignty by ‘governance’, neoliberalism institutes and unfolds in the zone of their increasing *indistinction*. The counter-Foucauldian argument for the ‘conceptual’ indistinction of sovereignty and biopolitical governmentality has been offered by Giorgio Agamben, for whom ‘power over life’ or “the production of bare [biological] life”<sup>252</sup> has not merely been intrinsic to sovereignty from its origin, but is in fact the *constitutive* principle of sovereign power. Relying on the Schmittian definition of sovereignty as the decision on exception, Agamben argues that the “original political relation” is the sovereign ‘ban’, an unfounded foundational decision that transforms the physical existence of individuals into a political state of exception, in which man emerges as *homo sacer*, a being exposed to death at the will of the sovereign.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Walker 1995, p. 26. Emphasis original.

<sup>249</sup> Dillon 1995, p. 360.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 328. Emphasis original.

<sup>251</sup> Dean 2002b, pp. 130–134.

<sup>252</sup> Agamben 1998, p. 181.

<sup>253</sup> See *ibid.*, part 2. “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life – that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in this sphere.” (*Ibid.*, p. 83.)

Though we may debate the utility of the dissolution of the *conceptual* distinction between sovereignty and governmentality, the argument for their *empirical indistinction* at specific sites and moments is highly relevant to understanding the neoliberal relation to sovereignty.

A number of studies have suggested that the displacement of sovereignty by economic globalisation and the 'remoralisation' of the state by the pathos of the self-governing community have not limited the state's capacity for action but, on the contrary, enable far more direct, coercive and far-reaching government.<sup>254</sup> Dissemination of governmentality is therefore not identical with the loss of its force and intensity. On the contrary, the dissolution of the state-society distinction and the pluralisation of governing agencies enable the production of effects of government in the domains previously insulated from it by their location in the opaque domains of society or private life. Dissemination of authority through the networks "whose roots reach down deep into society"<sup>255</sup> permits governmental practices to probe the 'depths' hitherto unexplored. Thus, "liberal government offers the most fundamental and enduring extension of the powers of the government of the state so far witnessed."<sup>256</sup>

Yet, this extension, taking the shape of explication of governmental practices into the formerly social domain through partnership arrangements, implication of 'social' agencies in governmental practices and the replication of 'social' values and principles within the governmental sector, occurs against the background of the discourses of the decline of the state and the critiques of 'big government'. At the same time as sovereign statehood is increasingly problematised and theorised into decline<sup>257</sup>, dispersed and disseminated mechanisms of neoliberal 'governance' proliferate and intensify in the absence of critical reflection on them. Furthermore, in the case of neoliberalism we witness a modality of power that happily dispenses with itself, devolves itself to the individual and the community, problematises itself in the form of big government and effaces itself through its privatisation – in short, it invests its forces in the transformation of the exterior governmental apparatus of limited sovereign statehood into an immanent 'will to (self-) govern' that *knows no limits*. The disappearance of the

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<sup>254</sup> See O'Malley et al 1997, Stenson 1998, Dean 2002a, 2002b.

<sup>255</sup> European Governance. A White Paper, p. 18.

<sup>256</sup> Dean 2002b, p. 130.

<sup>257</sup> See e.g. Biersteker and Weber 1996, Campbell 1992, Walker 1993, Connolly 1991.

transcendent figure of the sovereign does not disable government, but rather disables its criticism by displacing the conventional focus of criticism and making governmental practices less visible and more difficult to localise. Slavoj Žižek has drawn attention to the way the objects of consumption are successfully promoted through being deprived of their ‘dangerous substance’: “beer without alcohol, meat without fat, coffee without caffeine, [virtual] reality without reality.”<sup>258</sup> In the same manner, ‘governance without government’ is presented as a process deprived of its active agent, the sovereign state, done away with as a potentially dangerous excess to the smooth operation of governmentality. Mitchell Dean has claimed that “liberal modalities of government work as a double: the [state] government and its other(s)”<sup>259</sup>, the latter exemplified by the plethora of agents of non-state ‘governance’. We may then propose that in the epistemic displacement of the state-society distinction ‘the government’ loses its distinctly statist characteristics and becomes identical to its ‘others’, i.e. ‘government’ and ‘governance’ enter a *zone of indistinction*. Paradoxically, the disavowal of sovereignty results in the formation of the space, paradigmatic of sovereign power, the space of unlimited authority, the authority that is decentred, dispersed and depersonalised, but no less *total* in its desire and capacity to ‘give form to the life of the people’. Neoliberalism therefore “can act to install as comprehensive a police as anything imagined by the German police scientists in the eighteenth century and to advance as ‘total’ a specification of appropriate forms of life as that of state socialism and fascism in the twentieth”.<sup>260</sup> It should be stressed that to speak of a ‘total’ character of neoliberal government is definitely not to effect a wholesale reduction of neoliberalism to its antithesis of ‘totalitarianism’, itself a conceptual construct of liberal government. On the contrary, our goal is to offer a more specified and nuanced description of the neoliberal technology of rule. In the following chapter we shall proceed with this task by discussing the jurisdictional correlate of the epistemic constitution of the zone of indistinction between state and society with the help of Carl Schmitt’s conception of total government.

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<sup>258</sup> Žižek 2001a, p. 1.

<sup>259</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 52.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

### 3.6.2. The Jurisdictional Axis: Dissemination and Quantitatively Total Government

A useful point of entry into the discussion of the ‘totality’ of government is provided by Carl Schmitt’s distinction of quantitative and qualitative modalities of the ‘total state’. A qualitative total state, whose advancement is central to Schmitt’s entire oeuvre, is constituted by the sharp state/society distinction, in which the ‘totality’ of state sovereignty is owing to its transcendent status in relation to the society and is thus *made possible* by a policy of *non-intervention* in the socio-economic domain.<sup>261</sup> “[The concept of sovereignty] does not imply that a political entity must necessarily determine every aspect of a person’s life or that a centralised system should destroy every other association or corporation.”<sup>262</sup> On the contrary, “only a strong state can remove itself from non-state affairs.”<sup>263</sup> Furthermore, this self-removal is not a negative gesture of limitation, diminution or disavowal of sovereignty, but its very manifestation, a “painful surgical intervention” that asserts the force of the political in the constitution of a depoliticised domain.<sup>264</sup> Renato Cristi refers to this political design as ‘authoritarian liberalism’, in which the ‘freedom’ of the domains of economy and society is constituted by the sovereign decision of the state and ensured by the state’s *active* policy that combines *non-intervention* with the assertion of its *monopoly* on the political.<sup>265</sup> We may note that this design has an affinity with the Ordoliberal version of neoliberalism, which retains the state-society distinction and resists the entrepreneurial problematisation of the state.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> See Schmitt 1998, 1999, Freund 1995, Cristi 1998.

<sup>262</sup> Schmitt 1976, p. 38. See also Schwab 1976, Freund 1995 for the discussion of the anti-totalitarian character of Schmitt’s thought. For a contrary view, which pronounces Schmitt to be a proponent of the totalitarian *Führerstaat* and aggressive militarism see Wolin 1992a.

<sup>263</sup> Schmitt 1998, p. 213.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227. Emphasis added.

<sup>265</sup> See Cristi 1998, particularly chapters 6, 7, 8. In Cristi’s argument Schmitt’s authoritarian liberalism has been re-articulated in the post-World War II period by such political philosophers as Friedrich Von Hayek. For the critical discussion of the affinities between Schmitt and Hayek (and American conservative thought, more generally) see Scheuerman 1999. See also Schwab 1992, McCormick 1997, Ulmen 2001.

<sup>266</sup> See Cristi 1998, chapter 7, 8 for the discussion of the influence that Schmitt’s thought had on the Ordoliberalen group.

In contrast, the quantitative total state, the object of Schmitt's criticism, is total precisely by virtue of its *limitless* interventionist policies, which in Schmitt's argument are due to the democratisation of politics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the increasing loss of state autonomy to the plurality of 'social' and party interests.<sup>267</sup> "This kind of total state is one that penetrates all domains and all spheres of human existence, one that knows of no state-free sphere *because it can no longer discriminate*. It is *total in a purely quantitative sense*, in the sense of *pure volume* and not in the sense of *intensity* or political *energy*. [...] This totality in the sense of volume is the opposite to force and strength. The present German state [1932] is total due to weakness and lack of resistance, due to its incapacity to resist the onslaught of parties and organised interests."<sup>268</sup> The reduction of the state to a figure derivative from variously understood social or 'community' interests, its engagement in interdependent 'partnerships' and the extension of economic rationality to the governmental domain, celebrated in contemporary discussions of 'governance', are for Schmitt a dangerous symptom of 'quantitative totality': "The state's weakness [...] has led to the confusion of the state and the economy, to the confusion of the state and other non-state spheres. Only a very strong state would be able to dissolve this *dreadful coalescence* with all kinds of non-state businesses and interests."<sup>269</sup>

The relation between totality and pluralism is thus more complicated than it might appear at first glance. In a quantitative total state the demands of plural social forces take over the unitary sovereign state, whose interventionist policies eventually serve to homogenise the social domain through the overtaking of all the other functional sectors of the social order by the political subsystem. On the other hand, the affirmation of sovereignty in its most radical decisionist version<sup>270</sup> simultaneously affirms social pluralism, if only by way of its distinction from the sovereign domain: "The unity of state has always been a *unity of social multiplicity*."<sup>271</sup> We may venture that Schmitt's political realism is more faithful to the classical liberal epistemic construction of the social as the domain of pluralism than interventionist

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<sup>267</sup> See Schmitt 1976, 1985b.

<sup>268</sup> Schmitt 1998, p. 218. Emphasis added. For the importance of the notion of intensity as a constitutive criterion of the political see Schmitt 1976.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221. Emphasis added.

<sup>270</sup> See Schmitt 1985a. For the discussion of Schmitt's decisionism see e.g. Žižek 1999b, Scheuerman 1999, Hirst 1999, Mouffe 1999, 2000b, McCormick 1997.

<sup>271</sup> Schmitt 1999, p. 201. Emphasis added.



neoliberalism.<sup>272</sup> As we shall discuss in more detail in the following chapter, any possible resurgence of *classical* liberal rule must logically traverse a ‘Schmittian moment’ of a radical assertion of sovereign transcendence in order to reinstall the state-society distinction that makes the idea of the autonomy of civil society meaningful.

In contrast, the distinct feature of neoliberal governmentality is its disavowal of sovereignty and the retention of the zone of *indistinction* between state and society, and the consequent limitless expansion of governmental mechanisms. Such expansion is diametrically opposed to a Schmittian ‘authoritarian liberalism’, but accords with another form of authoritarianism, the ‘police state’ in the early-modern meaning. The uncanny resemblances between the two modalities of government that we have encountered above (the valorisation of transparency, the displacement of discreet domains of professional knowledge with managerial ‘universal science’, etc.) lend support to Dean’s notion of a ‘liberal police’<sup>273</sup> as a ‘double’ of liberal *state government*. In Dean’s terms, the neoliberal technology of rule is directed towards its own progressive self-effacement as the transcendent locus of ‘the government’ and the correlate enhancement of the capacities of its immanent ‘double’. It is certainly ironic that so much critical effort is presently spent on what Jens Bartelson refers to as ‘state-bashing’<sup>274</sup> precisely at the moment of the state’s retreat into the secondary role in relation to disseminated ‘governance’. No less ironic is the belief that the decline of the state carries a promise of ‘liberation’, when what it effects is the intensification of quantitatively total government.

In Schmitt’s argument the ‘quantitative totalisation’ of government is an indicator of weakness. However, our analysis of the diagram of technical assistance has demonstrated that participatory, partnership-based, ‘autonomising’ government does not merely achieve the extension of the governmental diagram, but is not lacking in constitutive force and intensity, actively at work in the construction of new phenomena, practices, subject-positions and institutions. Paradoxically, the manifest disavowal of sovereignty in neoliberalism, far from annulling sovereign power, serves to enhance its effects while depriving it of its transcendent form through the constitution of a zone

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<sup>272</sup> See Schmitt 1976, pp. 69–79, Schmitt 1999. Of course, Schmitt’s notion of pluralism accentuates the irreducibly antagonistic nature of social life. For the contemporary application of this understanding of pluralism in ‘radical democratic’ political theory see Mouffe 1999, 2000b.

<sup>273</sup> See Dean 2002a, 2002b.

<sup>274</sup> Bartelson 2001, p. 28.

of indistinction. We may recall Foucault's claim that the majestic transcendence of sovereign power also functions as its 'stumbling-block'<sup>275</sup>: despite the authoritarian connotations of 'supreme and unlimited authority', sovereign rule is *empirically limited in its governmental instruments* by virtue of the very transcendence in relation to the social that makes it limitless *conceptually*. In contrast, the dissolution of the state-society dualism into the blank zone of indistinction enables a quantitatively total, limitless interventionism with a view to the detailed specification of life in accordance with a certain model of authentic autonomy. Herein consists the uncanny discovery of neoliberal rule: *it is the headless king that rules most effectively*. The crucial jurisdictional effect of the neoliberal technology of rule is thus the 'quantitatively total' modality of governmental intervention that decentres sovereign rule without a reduction in either the scope or the intensity of governmental practices.

To sum up, the disseminative techniques of 'government-at-a-distance' serve to actualise in practice the veridictive displacement of the state-society dualism into a zone of indistinction through the constitution of a polymorphous field of multiple governing agencies in practices of autonomisation, 'responsibilising' partnership arrangements and the installation of asymmetric structures of dissemination. We do not mean to suggest that this plurality is reducible to a single governmental centre, a proverbial 'head of the king' that is concealed by the rhetoric of 'governance'. On the contrary, our notion of the neoliberal technology of rule emphasises the paradoxical combination of dispersion and totality that the formation of the zone of indistinction between the state and society enables.

*Neoliberalism presents itself as a series of paradoxes.* Its hostility to notions of a government of society and consequently to social reform appears inconsistent with its desire to restructure and reform institutions and the invocation it makes that society itself is undergoing enormous changes. [...] Furthermore, and most strikingly, neoliberal strictures against excessive government can be posed against the way in which it has recourse to a *permanent motive for governmental interference*.<sup>276</sup>

Yet, these paradoxes only appear as damaging inconsistencies against the background of the presupposition of a state-society distinction, constitutive of classical

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<sup>275</sup> See Foucault 1990a, pp. 135–138, Foucault 1977a, pp. 32–73.

<sup>276</sup> Dean 1998, p. 201. Emphasis added.

liberalism. Recasting this distinction as in itself always already an instrument and an effect of liberal government permits to appreciate these paradoxes in their productive force. If classical liberalism focuses on *securing* and *stabilising* its own political invention (the autonomy of the socioeconomic domain) through the gestures of naturalisation and essentialisation of the state/society distinction, neoliberalism, whose origins lie in the problematisation of the social domain as deficient or corrupt, is characterised by the perpetual *destabilisation* of this distinction, the erasure and redrawing of the dividing line, which logically results in periodic traversals of the zone of indistinction. Particularly in its more conservative political forms, neoliberalism may well be conceived as a project of liberalism 'beginning anew', a permanent *replay of the situation of emergence* that recalls the Gnostic pathos of the cult of the Ice Hammer. In the words of Newt Gingrich, "we simply need to reach out and *erase the slate* and *start over*."<sup>277</sup> The metaphor of the 'clean slate' is an apt description for the zone of indistinction constituted in neoliberal governmentality, a blank space in which no dividing lines have yet been drawn, no limits to rule established, a space *wholly amenable* to governmental practices.<sup>278</sup> Of course, the same metaphor accurately describes our construct of the infra-liberal dispositional diagram, an as-yet-undifferentiated domain in which the foundational principles of liberal rule are to be installed. The neoliberal technology of rule can thus be characterised by a regular *relapse* into the infra-liberal problem-space, which enhances and extends the capacity of government indefinitely.

The affinity of the dispositional diagram of technical assistance with the neoliberal technologies of agency, performance and rule is thus a more complex relationship than the susceptibility of EU Tacis expert teams to the *influence* of the modality of government prevalent in contemporary Europe and North America. We cannot *derive* the infra-liberal diagram, actualised at the site of technical assistance, from

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<sup>277</sup> Gingrich cited in Cruikshank 1998, p. 148. Emphasis added.

<sup>278</sup> Agamben presents the image of the concentration camp as the paradigm of the zone of indistinction, the basic structure of biopolitical space. (Agamben 1998, part 3.) However, his concept of the camp is devoid of connotations of the enclosed space of confinement and is rather defined as the "the space opened up when the state of exception begins to become the rule". (Agamben 1998, p. 168.) Thus, the zone of indistinction need not be construed as the space of arbitrary, unlimited and violent exercise of power. The latter practices are merely a contingent variation of the basic characteristic of the zone of indistinction as the space of *infinite political possibility*. For the application of Agamben's notion of the zone of indistinction in IR studies see Edkins 2000.

neoliberalism as a general form of government, a 'spirit of the times' or the contemporary sociocultural context. The relation between this diagram and neoliberal governmentality is not 'contextual' but rather *infrastructural*. The conditions of possibility of the dispositional diagram actualised in the discourse of technical assistance are located in the infra-liberal problem-space, a zone of indistinction in which the pedagogical illiberality of liberalism is generalised as a technology of the constitution of the liberal order in its entirety. This very same infrastructure is conjured as a basic presupposition of neoliberal governmentality whose technology of rule proceeds from the permanent relapse into the 'clean slate' of the moment of emergence. The diagram of technical assistance is thus made *possible* by an infrastructural constellation that is *necessary* to the neoliberal governmental constructivism in relation to the symbiosis of subjective autonomy and entrepreneurial practice. The identity of the technologies of agency, performance and rule deployed in the diagram of technical assistance and neoliberal governmentality is owing to their location in the same infra-liberal problem-space that defines their conditions of existence. Thus, as we conclude our interpretation by proposing that the *strategic logic of technical assistance finds its locus within a neoliberal diagram of governmentality*, we ought to reiterate that this is not because neoliberalism is 'posited', programmatically or strategically, as the *goal* of technical assistance, an optimal or preferable *model* of government to follow. For the diagram of technical assistance, neoliberalism is not a teleological horizon of 'development' or the ideality of the model of 'transition'. The infra-liberal problem-space is not defined by a certain *lack* to be rectified in the progressive movement toward neoliberal governmentality, but is rather a *positive figure* that neoliberalism itself presupposes and invokes in its governmental practices. The diagram of technical assistance is thus not an embryonic, nascent or prehistoric form of neoliberalism but, on the contrary, its *paradigm*, a concrete artefactual exemplar of neoliberal technologies of agency, performance and rule that chart anew the clean slate of the infra-liberal zone of indistinction. In the following chapter we shall continue the discussion of the relation between neoliberalism and postcommunism by posing the question of the integration of the diagram of technical assistance into the overall strategic field of socioeconomic reforms in contemporary Russia.

## 4. THE DIAGRAM AND THE SOVEREIGN: STRATEGIC INTEGRATION OF THE DIAGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

### 4.1. The Obscene Lexicon of the Sovereign: The Putin Presidency and the Logic of the Supplement

The discussions of the presidency of Vladimir Putin by both Russian and international commentators rarely fail to invoke a certain ambivalence in his image. At the time of his election, President Putin was relatively unknown politically and his policy plans were subject to intense speculations and suspicions. However, Putin apparently “remains a mystery and a point of controversy”<sup>1</sup> after three years in office and after having initiated a wide range of substantive socioeconomic reforms that could be expected to provide a firm answer to the proverbial question of ‘who is Mr. Putin’. Even disregarding the interpretive exercises that pander to the Cold War fear of the KGB and construe complex conspiracy theories about Putin’s rise to power,<sup>2</sup> we may note that the reception of the Putin presidency has been generally ambivalent, combining the affirmation of his credentials of a liberal reformer with the accusations of the establishment in his presidency of a semi-authoritarian regime of ‘managed democracy’.<sup>3</sup>

A number of observers have also paid attention to a curious stylistic dualism in the president’s image. On the one hand, Putin’s style has been deprived of any trace of ‘revolutionary’ (or counter-revolutionary) political charisma, so characteristic of

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<sup>1</sup> Herspring and Kipp 2001, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Mendelson 2000, Shlapentokh 2000.

<sup>3</sup> See Shevtsova 2002, Gudkov 2002, Herspring and Kipp 2001.

the political elite of the early 1990s.<sup>4</sup> The ‘carnival style’ of Yeltsin-era politics, characterised by intense political divisions and mass media controversies, has given way to the technocratic and business-like style, thoroughly devoid of the political pathos of the ‘Perestroika’ period and early post-communist politics. In a number of interviews and speeches, Putin has repeatedly presented himself as a ‘hired manager’, providing ‘services to the population’.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the Putin presidency has been marked by the decline of interest in the elevated and elusive ‘national idea’ as the ethico-political foundation for the new Russian state. In a number of public appearances, Putin has offered as his vision of the national idea ‘the idea of effective and efficient statehood’.<sup>6</sup> Critical commentators have correctly pointed out that this answer simply evades the question, offering the *achievement* of desired goals in the least costly manner as the *definition* of these very goals.<sup>7</sup> Putin’s political rhetoric is marked by the lack of recourse to any transcendent telos, which is to be achieved ‘effectively’ and ‘efficiently’. As a number of Russian political analysts have pointed out, a wide range of radical reforms in such areas as labour relations, land ownership, the legal system, natural monopolies, centre-regions relations, that have constituted the prime sites of political antagonism during the abortive attempts at their implementation in the Yeltsin presidency, are presently undertaken in a routine and business-like fashion without much controversy or polemic over their goals: “The sharp contrast between the scale and depth of the new round of reforms and the relative dullness of their public manifestation is the main feature of the social perception of the beginning stage of the Grand Reform.”<sup>8</sup> The increase of the momentum and the efficiency of the reform process in the absence of political confrontation has been described as the main

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<sup>4</sup> Public opinion surveys in Russia have demonstrated that despite extremely high approval ratings (75–85%), the President’s figure stirs very little public emotion or passion, receives no ‘admiration’ or ‘love’. The public opinion of the President is rather ‘positively indifferent’. See Zudin 2002, Nicholson 2001.

<sup>5</sup> The latter expression was used by Putin to describe his ‘occupation’ during his televised participation in the census poll in October 2002. See e.g. <http://www.izvestia.ru/community/article24971>. Translation by author.

<sup>6</sup> The Russian word *effektivnost’* is used to denote both effectiveness in the sense of “production of desired effects” and efficiency in the sense of “effective operation as measured by a comparison of production with cost”. (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com>.) In this study we will translate the Russian *effektivnost’* as ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ in the cases where it is not clear, which of the two meanings is intended.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Remizov 2003b.

<sup>8</sup> Bunin et al 2001a, p. 2. Translation by author. See also Fedorov 2001, Zudin 2002, Bunin et al 2001b.

achievement of the Putin presidency and a sign of political consolidation and stabilisation in postcommunist Russia. More specifically, this stabilisation has been interpreted as the emergence of a 'hegemonic' or dominant political discourse that combines the intensification of liberal reforms with the project of state strengthening and is frequently referred to as 'liberal conservatism'<sup>9</sup>.

On the other hand, this political stabilisation and technocratic routinisation is regularly punctured by none other than the president himself, known for his curious verbal outbursts that contradict the dispassionate, blank and business-like style he himself has introduced and championed. The already legendary promise to 'waste [Chechen terrorists] in their outhouses', the ominous claim that 'whoever hurts us has three days left to live' and the insistent offer to a French journalist, sympathetic to the cause of Chechen separatism, to undergo 'a circumcision, after which nothing will grow back on [sic!]'<sup>10</sup> are merely some of the verbal performances, stylistically at odds with the technocratic austerity of the contemporary Russian political discourse. Maxim Blant has drawn an analogy between Putin's dualistic discursivity and R.L. Stevenson's famous 'loss of identity' novella "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde".

There are moments when the progressive and liberal head of state turns, in strict accordance with Stevenson's novella, into his own exact opposite. The reasonable President Jekyll, who is well aware that there is no alternative to liberal reforms and integration with the West, suddenly turns into the retired lieutenant colonel Hyde with all the prejudices ingrained in his former line of work.<sup>11</sup>

This analogy avoids the facile attribution to President Putin of a 'latent', 'concealed' or 'dormant' authoritarianism, characteristic of his critics inside and outside Russia and operative in the formation of the ominous 'myth of origin' concerning Putin's rise to prominence in the aftermath of terrorist acts in Russian cities in the autumn of 1999. After all, the evil Mr. Hyde can hardly be argued to be a more *fundamental* or 'real' identity of the gentle and decent Dr. Jekyll. What interests us in this analogy is not the value-laden contrast between the good 'liberal Putin' and the evil 'KGB Putin', but the coexistence within the figure of the president of the image that is *constitutive* and *emblematic* of the new political order and the image, which stands in a relation of

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<sup>9</sup> See Polyakov 2000, Pavlovsky 2000a, Zudin 2003.

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.newsru.com/world/11nov2002/obrezanie.html>. Translation by author.

<sup>11</sup> Blant 2002, p. 1. Translation by author.

*exception* and *excess* to it. While this part of our study focuses on the explication of the interface between the diagram of technical assistance and the strategic field of Russian postcommunist governmentality, dominated by the positive 'norm' introduced in the Putinian project of socioeconomic reforms, we shall follow Schmitt in starting with the exception as that which proves the existence of the norm. "The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its *existence*, which *derives only from the exception*. In the exception the *power of real life* breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition."<sup>12</sup>

Let there be no misunderstanding about the function of the exception. The exception does not demonstrate the non-existence of the rule by violating it; on the contrary, it illuminates the existence of the normal order in its totality by assuming a position of exteriority in relation to it. It is not that the president's eccentric quips *contradict* his otherwise professed liberal-managerial stance and thus devalue the latter as a mere hypocritical 'façade', beneath which one encounters the very opposite of liberalism. It is rather the fact that it is *exclusively* the president's *own* discourse that is punctured by the exceptional forays into the domain of the *obscene* that should interest us. In Schmitt's famous definition, "sovereign is he who *decides on exception*."<sup>13</sup> Sovereignty is thus defined not as the *positivity* of the exercise of power, its scope or intensity, but as a negative operation of *transgression*, the capacity to suspend the normal functioning of order in a constitutive decision. "As the decision that establishes the border, the political decision is *always itself in excess of that border*."<sup>14</sup> We may thus reformulate the definition of the sovereign as the *transgressor in relation to herself*. Sovereign is s/he who is simultaneously *inside* the space of order as the source of its foundational principles and *outside* it as something that cannot be subsumed under these principles, a surplus that *in relation to the order in question* is always unfathomable, monstrous and obscene. Sovereignty exemplifies what Schmitt referred to as the 'concrete' or 'borderline' concept<sup>15</sup>, the *supplement*

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<sup>12</sup> Schmitt 1985a, p. 15. Emphasis added.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. Emphasis added.

<sup>14</sup> Norris 2000, p. 7. Emphasis added.

<sup>15</sup> Schmitt 1985a, p. 5, 20. Schmitt's 'borderline concepts' have an affinity with the Derridean notion of the supplement, that combined the two meanings of the term: the addition of a surplus, "a plenitude enriching another plenitude" and the compensation for a certain internal lack, which "insinuates itself in-the-place-of, [...] fills the void". (Derrida 1998, p. 144.) The supplement is therefore an external



that forms the irreducible *excess* of any order but is nonetheless *indispensable* for its emergence.<sup>16</sup>

Sovereignty operates at the outermost sphere; it is here, at the borderline, that it establishes and violates limits. [...] The question of the sovereign is the question of the limit. If sovereignty decides upon its own limits, *its decision cannot be bound by those limits*. [...] The sovereign is the unlimited power that makes limits, or in other words, *the ungrounded ground of the law*.<sup>17</sup>

We may thus offer another definition of sovereignty as the *obscene double of order*. A sovereign Dr. Jekyll *owes* his sovereignty to his double in Mr. Hyde.

It is in this sense that President Putin's regular recourse to the obscene lexicon appears more than a curious eccentricity, though certainly less than a momentary surfacing of his deep illiberality: what we observe in such incidents is the very *consummation of sovereignty* through the manifestation of the infinitesimal yet irreducible gap between the president and his positive 'regime'. We ought to stress that speaking of consummation of sovereignty entails that these acts are, *in and by themselves*, practices of sovereignty, with no semantic remainder to the scant content expressed in them. The obscene lexicon of the sovereign does not *symbolise* anything other than itself; there is no deeper meaning behind it to decode, no tradition or context to locate it in.<sup>18</sup> One may even wonder whether such verbal performances *mean* anything at all other than the fact of their exteriority to the normal order. The

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surplus that makes whole something that "ought to lack nothing at all in itself" (Ibid.), the condition of possibility of something and simultaneously the condition of the impossibility of its completeness, closure or self-immanence.

<sup>16</sup> See Ojakangas 2000 for the explication of Schmitt's 'philosophy of concrete life', which, as Ojakangas argues, is distinct from the 'philosophy of life' (*Lebensphilosophie*) that Schmitt's thought is often associated with. (See e.g. Wolin 1992a.) According to Ojakangas, Schmitt's notion of the concrete as an exterior condition of possibility is neither immanent nor transcendental, referring neither to the inside nor to the outside, but always simultaneously *both*. Schmitt's borderline concepts of decision, sovereignty and exception may thus be considered precursors to the 'undecidable' concepts in Derrida's deconstruction (supplement, hymen, pharmakon, etc.), "unities of simulacrum, false verbal properties that can no longer be included within a philosophical opposition but which, however, *inhabit* philosophical oppositions, *resisting* and *disorganising* them, without ever constituting a third term". (Derrida 1981, p. 43. Emphasis added.) The conceptual logic at work in the two approaches is identical and can be formalised as 'neither X, nor Y, but always simultaneously X and Y'.

<sup>17</sup> Norris 2000, p. 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Schmitt 1985a, p. 31: "The decision becomes instantly independent of argumentative substantiation and receives an autonomous value."

limit location of the sovereign in relation to his order is replicated on the level of language in the sovereign's statements that press language against its limits, blocking it, making it stumble and ultimately collapse in the manner of the Derridean notion of 'dissemination' as the force of disruption of meaning.<sup>19</sup> In the Schmittian formula, more recently incorporated into poststructuralist discourse, the condition of possibility of order is simultaneously the condition of its impossibility: what grounds the 'system' is the unsystematisable excess that escapes from it, that can not be expressed in its discourse in any other manner than a monstrous obscenity. Yet, this literally absurd character of the sovereign's discourse is not the effect of deconstructive criticism, but the manifestation of sovereign power in its full force, unfathomability being the necessary aspect of a properly transcendent character of power.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the most disconcerting and frightening aspect of power in Kafka's *The Trial* and *The Castle* is precisely its manifest absurdity, its utter impenetrability to understanding and its obscene indifference towards the subject whom it summons to face it.<sup>21</sup>

However, recalling our discussion above of Foucault's notion of sovereignty, we may also note that its very transcendence is simultaneously a stumbling block that makes impossible productive governmental interventions and reduces power to a negative, deductive and prohibitive operation. As we have claimed above, the strategic logic of neoliberal governmentality at work in the diagram of technical assistance seeks to displace sovereignty as a mere source of excesses and irregularities, an obstacle to the formation of a fully self-immanent space of 'governance'. We may therefore suggest that the *visibility* of the sovereign excess in contemporary Russian politics, exemplified by President Putin's recourse to the 'obscene lexicon', marks an

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<sup>19</sup> Derrida 1981, p. 14, 45.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Bartelson 2001, who argues that the critique of the state in its pluralist, post-Marxist and poststructuralist forms unwittingly serves to reproduce and reinforce statism. By depriving the state of its unity, supremacy and autonomy and rendering it contingent upon discourse, this critique progressively dismantles all the foundations of sovereign statehood and reduces it to an unfounded assertion of constitutive force, thereby affirming what in the Schmittian approach is precisely the sole (quasi-) essence of sovereign power, which, moreover, is thoroughly immune to anti-foundationalist criticism, logically incapable of being founded since it is itself that which founds.

<sup>21</sup> See Žižek 1991, pp. 238–242 for a slightly different, psychoanalytic interpretation of this 'obscene indifference' of power, drawing on the episode in Kafka's *The Trial*, where Joseph K. discovers a pornographic picture hidden in the pages of the 'law books' in the Interrogation Chamber. See also Eagleton 2001 for the discussion of the function of the Lacanian concept of the Real in Žižek's philosophy as the void at the limit of order, the sovereign force of irruption that internally fractures every system.

interesting contrast between the governmental discourse of the Putin presidency and the neoliberal strategic logic that we have reconstituted in our genealogical disentanglement of the diagram of technical assistance. In this part of the study we shall pose the question of the interface that obtains between the dispositional diagram of technical assistance and the strategic field of socioeconomic reforms undertaken in the Putin presidency. We shall proceed by discussing the affinities and divergences between the two diagrams in the three governmental technologies of rule, performance and agency. As we begin this discussion of the strategic integration of the diagram of technical assistance, let us bear in mind the obscene extremity of the sovereign's enunciative modality. As we focus in detail on the positivity of the strategic governmental diagram, constituted in and by the Putin presidency, let us not forget that it is both "shaped and undermined by a strange difference which constitutes it by breaching it"<sup>22</sup>. In this manner we shall be able to answer the question of what accounts for this insistent yet frustrated consummation of sovereignty, the overt manifestation of that which the neoliberal diagram of 'governance' denigrates to the status of ignoble obscenity.

## 4.2. Technology of Rule: 'If Someone Doesn't Like the Word 'Strong' ...'

Let us begin with the outline of the technology of rule, deployed in the Putin presidency. Firstly, we ought to pose the question of the *problem-space of governmentality* established in Putin's project of 'reconstitution of the state'<sup>23</sup> and, more specifically, in the long-term reform strategy of the Russian government. Relying on a wide range of analyses of contemporary Russian politics,<sup>24</sup> we may venture that the problematic of reconstitution of the state emerges as a reaction against what we have termed the dynamics of vertical and horizontal displacements of state authority in Russia in the

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<sup>22</sup> Derrida 1998, p. 198.

<sup>23</sup> See Sakwa 2000a, 2000b.

<sup>24</sup> See e.g. Sakwa 2000a, 2000b, Gaman-Goluvina 2000, 2001, Gaidar 2001, Gudkov 2002, Polyakov 2000, Tretyakov 2000, Ulykaev 1999, Ryabov 2001, Bunin et al 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, Zudin 2002, Fedorov 2001, Pavlovsky 2000a, 2000b, 2001a.

1990s, the *regionalisation* and *privatisation* of the state, which have effected the disappearance of the very distinction between the state and society, the public and the private, that is a pre-requisite of classical liberal socioeconomic order. Let us briefly discuss the unfolding of these events within the Russian politics of emergence in the 1990s and the response of the Putin presidency to the challenges that they have posed.

#### 4.2.1. Shadow Statehood and the Lingering of the Political

It is necessary to locate the question of reconstitution of the Russian state within the problematic of postcommunism as a *revolutionary* moment of foundation. In this study we rely on Claude Lefort's understanding of revolution as the reinscription of the *mise en forme* of the social order or, in our terms, its overall diagrammatic structure: "Revolutions are not borne out of an internal conflict between the oppressed and their oppressors; they occur at the moment when the transcendence of power and its symbolic efficacy is destroyed. It is not only the political authority which is shaken, [but] the *validity of conditions of existence* and the modes of behaviour, beliefs and norms, which affect every detail of social life."<sup>25</sup> The demise of the constitutive principles of the Soviet order (the rule of the Communist Party, the planned economy and the state of the Soviet Union) has posed the task of founding, in a Schmittian decision that "arises from a normative void and a concrete disorder",<sup>26</sup> the new infrastructural conditions of existence, of which statehood is one. The question of statehood in the Russian postcommunist transformation appears particularly salient,

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<sup>25</sup> Lefort 1988, p. 92. Emphasis added. This notion of revolution is of major importance in redefining the problematic of change in the analysis of postcommunist politics of emergence since it reorients the analysis away from compiling a balance sheet of 'change' vs. 'continuity' by noting the degrees of transformation in particular sectors towards the study of the transformation of the *mise en forme* of the overall social order, including its internal mode of sectoral structuration. In this sense, we may speak of the 'totality' of postcommunist transformation in spite of the 'continuous' existence of institutions, practices, concepts or any other aspects of the former order, since what change refers to in this conception of revolution is the *relational structure* of diagrammatic objects rather than their independent existence. We may thus speak of a revolution in the situations when no new objects, concepts, themes or institutions appear, yet the function of the existing ones is displaced with the reconstitution of the overall *mise en forme*. An example of the latter possibility is offered by Thomas Kuhn's discussion of the Einsteinian scientific revolution, which displaced the Newtonian conceptual universe without introduction of any new concepts *at all*. See Kuhn 1970b, pp. 99–102.

<sup>26</sup> Schmitt cited in Cristi 1998, p. 97.

since, unlike the sovereign states of Central and Eastern Europe or the Soviet republics endowed with ceremonial attributes of statehood, Russian statehood was dispersed in the Soviet power structures and had to be created entirely anew simultaneously with the liberalising and democratising project.<sup>27</sup>

The institution of Russian statehood may be conceived as a series of foundational acts in the period of 1990–1993, which culminated in Presidential Decree 1400 on Gradual Constitutional Reform and the violent confrontation with the nationalist and the communist opposition that ensued from it on October 3–4, 1993. Decree 1400 has dissolved the Congress of People’s Deputies, elected in the late Soviet period, and announced the referendum on the new Constitution and the first post-Soviet parliamentary elections.<sup>28</sup> The events of September–October 1993 provide a paradigmatic example of the political *event* – the irruption of a constitutive decision, which instantiated the new norm, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, in its act of exception from the Soviet-era Constitution of the RSFSR. The political qualities of this foundational act are manifested in the impossibility to apply to this decision the normative criteria of any *already-existing* political order. The accusations of the ‘violation of constitution’ appear truistic if it is taken to account that to violate, and moreover, to abolish the Constitution of the RSFSR was precisely the point of the president’s decree. To challenge the foundational with recourse to the foundations, displaced in these acts, is to miss the specificity of the event: the decision taken in Decree 1400 is quite literally *beyond* the question of legitimacy since it annuls the grounds of legitimacy, itself emanating from the Schmittian ‘nothingness’. A foundational decision that produces law cannot be based on law; instead it redefines the political *mise en forme*, installing its own conditions of legitimacy in the act of violation of those it displaces.

The important feature of the post-1993 politics of the Yeltsin presidency was the lack or failure of the attempts at a depoliticising sedimentation of the new ‘political

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<sup>27</sup> See Hughes 2000, pp. 35–38.

<sup>28</sup> Among the foundational acts which led to the emergence of the Russian state we may enlist the Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR of 1990, the defeat of what has retroactively been termed the August Coup of 1991 and the formation in December 1991 of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which decided the Soviet Union out of existence. The dissolution of the Soviets in September 1993 is given priority in our study, since it has been of primary significance in instituting the *constitutional order*, along the lines of which Russian statehood is presently (re)constituted.

principle' of statehood into the *grounds* of a *system of politics*. Throughout this period, the depoliticising quest for the 'stabilisation' of the new order was mired by the persistent presence of the radical openness that conditioned its emergence.<sup>29</sup> The practices that we referred to as horizontal and vertical displacements of the state took place as a result of tactical alliances of the presidency, embattled by the oppositional legislature, with business and regional elites, and, rather than working to consolidate the constitutional order, were in themselves *para-constitutional* with the effect of making every aspect of politics tactically negotiable, contingent on the decision and therefore chronically unstable.<sup>30</sup> We may refer to this situation as the 'lingering of the political', the failure to complete the double movement of the appearance of a founding decision and its occultation through its reinscription as a stable foundation delimiting the positive socio-political order.

While this experience of the displacement of statehood was marked by undeniable pluralism, it was hardly conducive to the success of liberal reforms, proclaimed by the state. The incapacitation of state authority has been problematised as the disappearance of the very agent of liberal reforms, and thus the main reason for their stagnation in the 1990s.<sup>31</sup> President Putin's first Address to the Federal Assembly in Summer 2000 presents state-(re)building as the paramount task, on which the success of socioeconomic reforms depends. The title of the address, 'The Way to an *Effective State*', launches the formulation that has since then become a trademark of Putin's discourse, and, as already remarked above, his version of a long-sought after 'national idea'. Effectiveness is offered as both an equivalent and a specification of the notion of a 'strong state', which is thereby deprived of alleged 'authoritarian' connotations.

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<sup>29</sup> This 'failure' to consolidate the new order is best exemplified by the refusal of the presidency to undertake a sharp delimitation of the political space in the aftermath of the events of October 1993. Such a delimitation, including the ban on communist and nationalist political parties, implicated in the violent mutiny of October 3–4, was demanded in the well-known address of the Russian intelligentsia, tellingly entitled 'Let us not be benign and indecisive!' (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13.10.1993.)

<sup>30</sup> See Sakwa 1999b, 2000a, 2000b. Sakwa uses the distinction between the formal constitutional 'system' and the informal 'regime' to discuss the specificity of the Yeltsin presidency. The para-constitutional nature of the displacement of the state is best exemplified by the practice of power-sharing treaties between the Federation and its subjects, which depended on the political weight of the governor in question and manifestly contradicted the constitutional equality of the subjects of the federation. Along the horizontal axis, para-constitutionalism is evident in the formation of oligarchic financial-political groups as autonomous centres of power that privatise the public institution of the state.

<sup>31</sup> See Ulykaev 1999, Mau 1999, Mau and Starodubrovskaya 2001, Gaidar 2001.

The answer to this and many other challenges cannot be given without the strengthening of the state first. *Not a single national task can be fulfilled without it.* And although the strengthening of the state had been proclaimed the priority goal of the Russian policy for quite a few years now, we have not moved beyond declarations and fine phrases. [...] Our key task is to *learn to use the instruments of the state for ensuring freedom.* The freedom of the individual, the freedom of entrepreneurship, and the freedom of the development of the institutes of a civic society. The dispute about the balance of power and freedom is very old. Old as hills. And it still engenders speculations about dictatorship and authoritarianism. Our stand is absolutely clear. *Only a strong, effective – if someone does not like the word ‘strong’, we will say that only an effective and democratic state can uphold civil, political and economic freedoms.*<sup>32</sup>

This fragment succinctly sums up the veridictive construction of the problem-space of the technology of rule in the Putin presidency. The state and, by implication, the state-society distinction are presented as the fundamental or infra-structural precondition of reform policies. In contrast to the neoliberal dissemination of government into ‘governance’ that envelops the whole social domain, Putin’s strategy valorises the state precisely in its *difference* from other domains, such as society or economy, and locates the ‘roots’ of current problems in the obliteration of this difference that we have referred to as the ‘privatisation of the state’ by what in the popular parlance are referred to as ‘oligarchs’:

The *vacuum of power* has led to the *takeover of the state functions by private corporations and clans.* They have acquired their own shadow groups, groups of influence, and dubious security services, which use illegal ways to obtain information. *But the state functions and state institutions differ from the entrepreneurial ones by the fact that they must not be bought or sold, privatised or granted for use, let out on lease.* Professionals for whom the law is the sole criterion of activity are needed in state service. Otherwise, the state opens the door to corruption, and a moment may come when it will simply *degenerate, stop being democratic.*<sup>33</sup>

The state is therefore only identical with itself by being distinct from society – a theme that accords with the Schmittian notion of qualitative totality and is strongly at odds with the disseminative neoliberal technology of rule.

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<sup>32</sup> Putin 2000, pp. 3–4. Emphasis added.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9. Emphasis added.

The second veridictive effect of Putin's discourse on the state concerns the relation between the autonomised state and freedom. The valorised state-society antithesis does not render the state antagonistic to freedom, which characterises the social domain. In Putin's statement above the effective state is posited as the necessary *guarantee* of upholding 'civil, political and economic freedoms'. This 'resolution' of the 'age-old' debate about power and freedom recalls the Ordoliberal conception of the state as the *agency of liberalising society*, which is at the same time distinct from society. More specifically, Putin's notion of the state as a guarantor of freedom is articulated against the background of the horizontal displacement (privatisation) of the state in the 1990s and emphasises that the weakening of the state and the reduction of its powers have not entailed the enhancement of freedom: "There can be not only state censorship and administrative interference."<sup>34</sup> The argument that the privatisation of the state by multiple oligarchic clans in the mid-1990s has, despite the nominal increase in elite pluralism, resulted in the formation of the semi-authoritarian 'shadow state' has been advocated most vocally by Gleb Pavlovsky, the political advisor to the president. In Pavlovsky's rhetoric, the democratic revolution of August 1991 has been expropriated by a "privately financed shadow quasi-statehood" or 'State-2' that subverts and undermines the constitutional order, a quasi-statehood that takes the form of 'private democracy' for regional and oligarchic 'barons', armed with private security services.<sup>35</sup> "The offensive potential of shadow politics is strong, more centralised and consolidated than that of the federal level. Private security armies, stormtroopers' services, regional and corporate censorship, organised journalist groupings that practice the de-communication of society – an organised high-technology political environment."<sup>36</sup> The criticism of 'privatised' quasi-statehood is not unique to the analysts close to the Putin administration and figures in a number of studies of Russian politics in the second half of the 1990s that emphasise such aspects of the displacement of the state as the diffusion of violence, the heterogeneity of political agencies existing on par with the state (from informal regional coalitions

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Pavlovsky 2000b. (WWW-document.) At the time of its publication, the argument was directed at Vladimir Gusinsky, the former owner of the Media-Most holding, who was (in)famous for his massive security service, headed by the former Deputy Director of the KGB of the Soviet Union. For the discussion on the privatisation of the state's 'monopoly on violence' see Volkov 1999.

<sup>36</sup> Pavlovsky 2000b. (WWW-document.) Translation by author.



to media corporations), the attempt of the economic elite to assert its primacy over the political elite, etc.<sup>37</sup> In Richard Sakwa's remark from 1999, "in an ironic perversion of Frederik Engels' idea, the [Russian] state is indeed withering away."<sup>38</sup>

In this context, the claim for an effective (or even a strong) state as a guarantor of freedom begins to appear in a new light. Firstly, the criticism of Putin's statism confuses the quantitative expansion of state powers (which, as we shall see below, is entirely contrary to the president's policy) with the qualitative delineation of a distinct domain of statehood *as such*: what is at stake in the 'reconstitution of the state' is not the *specific* question of strengthening state authority in particular domains but the *general* question of the state's *effective presence as a self-identical positivity*. The much-maligned metaphor of the 'single vertical of power' and the notion of *mono-centrism*<sup>39</sup>, developed in Russian political science as a key feature of 'Putin's regime' in contrast to the 'poly-centric' Yeltsin presidency, must therefore be qualified. While it is undeniable that the political autonomy of regional and business leaders has decreased since 2000, one can hardly speak of the increasing concentration of power solely in the figure of the president at the expense of legislative and judicial branches or of the modification of the constitutional order inaugurated in the Yeltsin presidency. Instead, Putinian 'mono-centrism' may be defined as the elimination of the para-constitutional excesses of the politics of the 1990s, which serves to depoliticise and consolidate as a foundation the constitutional order established in 1993. In this sense,

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<sup>37</sup> See Fadin 1995, Holmes 1997, Sakwa 1999b, 2000a, Volkov 1999, Gaman-Golutvina 2000, Nicholson 2001, Shevtsova 2002, Markov 2000, Zasursky 2000, Zudin 2002, 2003. In terms of the discourse of 'privatisation of the state' the term 'oligarchy' acquires a more specific meaning than a ruling circle of financial-industrial elites and refers not to the *influence* of economic elite on the political process but to the formation of a *financial-political nexus* that displaces the very oppositions of public/private and politics/economy.

<sup>38</sup> Sakwa 1999b, p. 24. See also pp. 23–25 for the argument that while Russian history had been plagued by excessive state-centrism, during the 1990s the pendulum swung sharply in the opposite direction.

<sup>39</sup> See Bunin et al 2001a, Zudin 2002, 2003. While the politics of the Yeltsin era was characterised by the irreducible pluralism of formal and informal centres of power, with the presidency functioning as a merely nominal centre (*pace* the criticism of Yeltsin's alleged 'super-presidentialism'), the Putin presidency is deemed to be marked by the appearance of a single centre of power, personified by the president himself and the reduction of the political autonomy of regional and non-state elites. This notion of mono-centrism indicates the end of the situation of 'subjectless-ness' (*bessubjektost'*) of the political process, which was noted by a number of analysts in the 1990s. (See e.g. Fadin 1995, Kapustin 1995, Sakwa 1999b, Gaman-Golutvina 2000.) See also Shevtsova 2002 for a conceptually similar yet more ideologically biased notion of 'bureaucratic authoritarianism'.

Putin's reconstitution of the state has its genealogical point of descent in the foundational decision and the violent confrontation of October 1993, although this contingent and violent origin has been disavowed repeatedly in the recourse to Imperial and Soviet history as the 'pre-history' of the current Russian Federation:

On the 4<sup>th</sup> of October *power has proven that it is power and on that day Russia became a state again*. [...] October 4 marks the beginning of the countdown to Putin's times. *Putin stands for precisely the strong state that defends the freedom to a normal life. In 1993 there was born that very state that voted for Putin in 2000, the state we live in now, the Russia that we gained*. But Russia does not know its descent and shies its origin. In its search for the roots of the new Russian statehood, the authorities look everywhere, except where these roots are.<sup>40</sup>

Secondly, the experience of the horizontal displacement of the state supports Foucault's key insight about power relations being irreducible to the state and inherent in the non-state domain of 'society'. The reassertion of state autonomy against the oligarchic quasi-statehood therefore does not result in the reduction of freedom *per se* and, considering the *ipso facto* non-democratic character of 'shadow statehood', may indeed be preferential to it as a guarantor of the liberal-democratic constitutional order. Nonetheless, the reconstitution of the state does not in itself appear to entail the *enhancement* of freedom. In terms of Oksana Gaman-Golutvina's distinction of 'bureaucracy' and 'oligarchy'<sup>41</sup> as two opposed and competing principles of government, the autonomisation of the state through the elimination of the oligarchic quasi-statehood merely involves the correlate enhancement of bureaucratic powers; hence the importance of the *positive* modality of government to be espoused by the reconstituted state in the Putin presidency. If the "indecision of power and weakness of the state reduce economic and other reforms to zero",<sup>42</sup> what is content of the reforms, which the new strong and decisive state will be able to advance?

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<sup>40</sup> Editorial of the 'Civic Club' (*Grazhdansky Klub*) Internet Forum, October 4, 2002. <http://www.globalrus.ru/comments/90504>. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>41</sup> See Gaman-Golutvina 2000 for the distinction of bureaucracy and oligarchy, conceived as diametrically opposed, respectively politico-centric and economy-centric modes of government.

<sup>42</sup> Putin 2000, p. 9.

## 4.2.2. Deregulation and the Minimal State

In accordance with the thesis that state reconstitution is the condition of possibility for all other reforms, President Putin's specific socioeconomic reform programme was articulated in detail only in the second year of his presidency. The 2001 Address to the Federal Assembly opens with the statement that this primary task has largely been fulfilled:

The strategic task of the previous year was to strengthen the state. The state in the person of all institutes and all levels of government. *It was obvious that without the solution of this key task we could not achieve successes either in the economy or in the social sphere.* We set ourselves the aim to put in place a precisely functioning vertical of government. [...] Today it can already be said that the period of the disintegration of statehood is already behind us. *The disintegration of the state, that was mentioned in the previous Address, has been stopped.*<sup>43</sup>

Nonetheless, the declaration of successful state reconstitution is followed by the intense criticism of the existing state institutions and the mode of government they practice. Throughout the presidency, Putin's discourse has been marked by the problematisation of the current mode of government in Russia as *excessively restrictive and interventionist*.

As of today, the state *keeps interfering too actively* in the field of property, business and, partially, consumption. On the contrary, *the state behaves rather passively in the context of creating a common economic space*, ensuring the unfailing observance of laws, as well as the protection of property rights. *Economic growth is being mostly hindered by sky-high taxes, bureaucratic arbitrary rule and rampant crime.* The solution of these problems depends upon the state. However, an *expensive and extravagant state* is unable to slash taxes. A corruption-ridden state lacking clear-cut prerogatives won't rid businessmen of bureaucratic arbitrary rule and the underworld's influence. I'm absolutely sure that an *ineffective state constitutes the main cause of that lengthy and profound economic crisis*, whose manifestations are here for everyone to see. [...] We must learn our lessons from such experience, also admitting that, doubtless, the *state's key economic role boils down to defending economic freedom.*<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Putin 2001, p. 1. Emphasis added.

<sup>44</sup> Putin 2000, p. 6. Emphasis added.

Enterprises have largely been privatised but the old habits of command have remained. *Ministries continue to direct their 'efforts' to 'subjugate', financially and administratively, the enterprises and organizations.* As a result of such *administrative excesses*, the pursuit of civilised business in the country is exceptionally difficult.<sup>45</sup>

These fragments present the current governmental regulation in a strictly negative manner as 'expensive and extravagant', the *cause* of the protracted economic crisis, the *obstacle* to economic growth and a *violation* of the 'state's key economic role' which is presented as 'defending economic freedom'. The pathos of deregulation in Putin's discourse is quite intense: "Businessmen must be rid of the *bureaucratic oppression*."<sup>46</sup> State interference is also deemed to be *causally* related to corruption: "The current organization of the state apparatus is unfortunately conducive to corruption. *Corruption is not a result of the absence of repressions, I would like to emphasise this, but a direct result of the restriction of economic freedoms.* Any administrative barriers are overcome with the help of bribes. The higher the barrier, the more bribes and the more officials that take them."<sup>47</sup> The logical consequence of this claim is that the reduction of the scope of state intervention automatically minimises the level of corruption. Putin's 2001 address envisions a number of radical deregulatory measures in this direction.

We should start preparation for the administrative reform, in the first place reform of the government, ministries and agencies and their territorial bodies and we should revise not only or largely their structure and staff charts but mainly the *functions of government bodies*. [...] This year the government has prepared a package of laws on *de-bureaucratisation and minimisation of the state's administrative interference in the affairs of enterprises*. We should work to further reduce the list of the types of activities subject to licensing. Even in its reduced form that list is still far too long. We must vigorously introduce order in other spheres as well where there is excessive government intervention. [...] I am speaking about the presently excessive mandatory certification of output, about all sorts of permits, registrations, accreditations and other norms and rules that are not provided for by our legislation but are persistently introduced by all sorts of instructions.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Putin 2002, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 8. Emphasis added.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 5. Emphasis added.

<sup>48</sup> Putin 2001, p. 7. Emphasis added.

The programme of deregulation casts state interference in a strongly negative light, reminiscent of classical liberalism: “It is necessary to *remove* what still *binds* people in their life and work.”<sup>49</sup> Both the presidential addresses and the government’s programme advocate *reduction* or *elimination* of certain state functions, a conscious policy of the state’s *self-limitation*:

The state *must concentrate its limited resources on fulfilling its basic functions* [and] minimise the use of budgetary resources in sectors where state participation is not necessary or efficient.<sup>50</sup>

We must finally carry out an analysis of the current state functions and *keep only those that are necessary*.<sup>51</sup>

The priority task of the next three years is the *self-limitation of the state in order to reduce the inefficient intervention* in the economy and the social sphere as well as to lower the taxation burden on the entrepreneurial activity.<sup>52</sup>

At the same time, the reform programme also envisions a more positive and productive role for the state apparatus, which is conditioned by the acquisition of a new ‘strategic vision’ of government and the consequent change in governmental practices – the requirements that, as we have discussed, are central to the problematisation of government in the discourse of technical assistance.

At present the colossal potential of the country is blocked by the *cumbersome, clumsy and ineffective state apparatus*. [...] The main problem is not the number of these structures, but that their work is poorly organized. The present functions of the state apparatus are *not geared to solving strategic tasks*. And the knowledge by officials of the *modern science of management* is still very rare. I have already spoken about the need for an administrative reform. It must result in a *state adequate to our times* and goals faced by our country. And the state apparatus must be *effective, compact and performing*.<sup>53</sup> The *range of governmental actions is too narrow* and their *mechanism is ineffective and inefficient*. Administrative procedures are *vaguely defined* and leave room for the official’s discretion, which leads to corruption.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Putin 2002, p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 5. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>51</sup> Putin 2002, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>52</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 14. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>53</sup> Putin 2002, p. 3. Emphasis added.

<sup>54</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 39. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

State intervention is thus not fully delegitimised, but rather made dependent on the transformation of the governmental apparatus of the state in accordance with the ‘modern science of management’ that would gear it up to solving strategic tasks. The fragment cited above also specifies the areas, in which governmental regulation is necessary and is presently lacking: the creation of a common economic space, ensuring the observance of laws and protection of property rights.<sup>55</sup> More generally, we might refer to these functions as ensuring the common ‘rules of the game’ in the economic domain. Another formulation of these tasks is offered in the 2002 Address:

The main thing now is to *create conditions, under which the citizens of Russia can earn money, to earn money and invest it with benefit to themselves in the economy of their own country.*<sup>56</sup>

It is the *direct obligation of the state to establish conditions for the development of economic freedoms.*<sup>57</sup>

Two important features can be discerned in this statement of strategic governmental tasks. Firstly, in comparison with the abortive attempts at formulating an elevated ‘national idea’ in the 1990s, the task of ‘making it possible for citizens to earn money’ is surprisingly modest and mundane. Similarly, the presentation of the state’s task in terms of defence and development of economic freedoms points to a highly limited conception of the state. In the 2001 Address, President Putin offers an even stronger formulation of this economy-centred concept of the state: “We must really ensure, if

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<sup>55</sup> The notion of the common economic space pertains to the problematisation of the situation that existed until 2000–2001, when regional legislation and statutory acts stipulated, in violation of the federal constitution, the establishment of regional economic ‘barriers’, obstructing e.g. the free movement of goods. Putin’s 2000 Address discusses this problem at length and in no uncertain terms: “The federal establishment is responsible for ensuring a common nationwide economic environment. But the thing is that territorial administrations often ban grain deliveries to other parts of the country, also restricting alcohol trade, hindering the establishment of “alien” banks’ subsidiaries and impeding the free movement of capital, goods and services. This is a *real shame and disgrace*. All these apparently profitable actions are *leading us toward disaster*. [...] Any actions on the part of regional authorities that aim to restrict economic freedom must be *thwarted as something unconstitutional*; and the concerned officials guilty of doing this must be *punished*.” (Putin 2000, p. 7. Emphasis added.) The establishment of seven Federal Districts, headed by plenipotentiary presidential envoys, has had, among its other functions, the prevention of such constitutional violations by the regions. See Nicholson 2001, Hyde 2001.

<sup>56</sup> Putin 2002, p. 3. Emphasis added.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4. Emphasis added.

you want, a *servicing of the interests of the Russian economy*.”<sup>58</sup> The second feature is the presentation of the task of government as the establishment of the *conditions of possibility* for socioeconomic practices that would subsequently be undertaken *autonomously*. This notion specifies the one modality of state intervention that is not disqualified by Putin’s criticism, a modality that accords with the neoliberal restructuring of the domain of society in accordance with economic rationality and the ethos of entrepreneurial autonomy. It is within this relatively narrow domain that the proverbial ‘unitary vertical of power’ is advocated: federal market reforms depend on ensuring the existence of identical rules of the game within the federation.<sup>59</sup>

The state’s self-limitation to the creation and maintenance of the rules of the game also entails the reduction of direct state interference in the economy for the purposes of ‘social assistance’. From the outset of his presidency, Putin has explicitly rejected a “paternalist” approach:

Today the policy of universal state paternalism is *economically impossible* and *politically inexpedient*. Renunciation of it is dictated by the necessity of the most effective use of financial resources, as well as by *striving to switch on the stimuli of development, to set man’s potential free, and to make man responsible for himself, for the sake of well-being of his near ones*.<sup>60</sup>

It is highly important that the reduction of the state’s social obligations is presented as not merely a matter of economic necessity (a ‘necessary evil’) but also as a matter of political expediency, and thus a ‘necessary good’. The renunciation of paternalism is necessary to ‘switch on the stimuli of development’, ‘to set man’s potential free’ and to ‘make man responsible’ for the well-being of himself and others. This linkage of autonomisation and responsabilisation recalls the justification of participatory and entrepreneurial reform solutions in the diagram of technical assistance, particularly

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<sup>58</sup> Putin 2001, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>59</sup> See Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 22, vol. 2, p. 84. The term ‘unitary vertical’ is unfortunate since it connotes the hierarchical subordination of the lower levels of government to upper ones, which in contemporary Russia is made impossible by the federative constitutional structure and the direct elections of local and regional authorities. What is at stake in Putin’s reforms in centre-region relations is rather the elimination of the para-constitutional excesses, practiced by regional authorities, which does not modify the federative power-sharing arrangement, inscribed in the Constitution.

<sup>60</sup> Putin 2000, p. 8. Emphasis added.

in the aspect of endowing negative economic measures, such as the reduction of the state's social obligations, with positive ethical significance. The retraction of excessive social obligations is strongly advocated in the government's long-term strategy, which proceeds from the "low effectiveness" of present social policy: "The system of social assistance, based on universal social transfers, subsidies and categorical benefits is *in principle incapable* of solving the problem of redistribution of resources towards the neediest."<sup>61</sup> The programme notes that at present (2000) over 70% of the population are entitled to various social benefits and payments, which results in \_ of the payments being granted to households whose income exceeds the 'life minimum'.<sup>62</sup> The programme envisions the strict limitation of social assistance to households living below the 'life minimum' and a general reorientation of social policy towards "providing for the economic conditions allowing the working population to raise the level of social consumption, including comfortable living conditions, better quality of education and health services, an adequate level of life in the old age, *from their own incomes*".<sup>63</sup> Such conditions involve the development of the "competitive basis" for the provision of such services, involving "non-state enterprises".<sup>64</sup> These premises constitute the "restructuring of the system of social protection on the basis of the principle of targeting" and generate such policy proposals as the introduction of strict compulsory means-testing for all forms of benefits, limitation of the total number of benefits that could be received by one household, transfer of most benefits into monetary form to be included in the salaries, etc.<sup>65</sup>

The second type of problematisation of the current social functions of the state pertains to the 'hypocrisy' involved in maintaining 'non-financed federal mandates'<sup>66</sup>, perpetuating the illusion that the state is responsible for certain social benefits that are in fact not paid. The universal system of social benefits that does not stipulate means-testing is maintained despite its evident inefficiency in principle and the impossibility to implement it in practice.

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<sup>61</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 1. Translation by author.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 2. Translation by author.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., pp. 47–50. Translation by author.

<sup>66</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 4. Translation by author.



The present system of social support, based on address-free social allowances and privileges, is organised in such a way that it *scatters state funds, and allows the rich to use social benefits at the expense of the poor*. The *formally free education and health services are, in effect, paid for and are sometimes inaccessible to people in low income brackets*. The children's allowances are scanty and are not paid for years, and pensions are meagre and are not tied to the real labour contribution. A *state lie has become firmly established*. [...] *We adopt numerous laws, being aware that they are not ensured by real financing*. We simply press one or another decision because of the political situation, and that is all. We have no other way out but to *reduce the excessive social obligations and to strictly fulfil those, which we will retain*. This is the only way to restore the people's trust in the state.<sup>67</sup>

The main focus of the president's criticism in the 2000 and 2001 Addresses is the reiteration of the slogans of 'free education' and 'free health care' that manifestly contradict the existing practices.

The reorganization of the system of medical assistance has been very slow. The growing number of paid services leads to *hidden commercialisation* of state and municipal hospitals and health-building [sic!] institutions.<sup>68</sup>

To this day we have an antiquated Labour Code adopted back in 1971. The gap between present-day civil legislation, which is essentially market-oriented, and the old Labour Code is widening. And it stimulates the development of *shadow labour relations*, which are not under the control even of the trade unions.<sup>69</sup>

Education cannot be geared solely to the distribution of resources through the budget. Off-budget financing of education institutions, in other words, payment for education – let us face it – has in many ways become the norm. But *this market is far from being transparent*. It is an *illegal market*. School principals use it at their own peril. The *professedly "free education" which is in fact education for a fee tends to corrupt the pupils and the teachers alike*.<sup>70</sup>

These fragments relating to three different spheres (health care, labour relations, education) are marked by the same logic: the lack of reforms in these social sectors did not lead to the preservation of the Soviet practices of universal state support but to the formation of an illegal (or, more strictly, a meta-legal) market space, *not*

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<sup>67</sup> Putin 2000, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>68</sup> Putin 2001, p. 10. Emphasis added.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 12. Emphasis added.

*transparent to governmental regulation*. Similarly to the ‘privatisation of the state’ by oligarchic quasi-statehood, the weakness and the lack of state activity in these spheres resulted not in their ‘liberation’ but in the formation of ‘shadow’ structures of authority, which, along with the cynically professed slogans of free medicine and education, tend to ‘corrupt’ the agents involved in these sectors and hence weaken the people’s trust in the state.

The advocated solution to this problem is the active governmental policy of a *clear-cut distinction* between minimal state obligations and the domain of the market: “Every citizen of our country should know exactly what he has the right to get from the federal authorities free, what he can get from the regional authorities and what he should purchase himself.”<sup>71</sup> The government’s programme prescribes the undertaking of “the inventory of all state financial obligations and the *evaluation of their effectiveness and efficiency*”.<sup>72</sup> As a result of this inventory, “excessive obligations must be reduced and restructured, while obligations not amenable to suspensions must be *unconditionally fulfilled*”.<sup>73</sup> The same logic of distinction animates the programme’s advocacy of the policy of deregulation in the private sector:

The state must find an optimal balance in the relations with private entrepreneurs and gradually abandon the practice of excessive intervention into business activities, which would permit a *clear delimitation of the domain of state regulation and enhance its effectiveness*.<sup>74</sup>

These statements offer good examples of what we consider to be the central principle of the technology of rule in the Putin presidency: the mutual constitution of state and society by drawing the *distinction* between them that establishes the limits of state authority and responsibility and, simultaneously, positively constitutes the ‘state-free’ socioeconomic domain.

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<sup>71</sup> Putin 2001, p. 11.

<sup>72</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>74</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 73. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

### 4.2.3. The Dictatorship of the Law and the Emergency State

It is in this context of constitutive practices that the president makes recourse to the much-maligned phrase ‘dictatorship of the law’. “We are insisting on only one dictatorship – *dictatorship of the law*, though I know that many do not like this expression. That is why it is so important to *show the confines of the field in which the state is a full-fledged and the only master*, to say in no uncertain terms where it is the last arbiter and to *mark the spheres in which it must not interfere*.”<sup>75</sup> This principle accords with Schmitt’s notion of a qualitative total state, which derives its strength from its sovereign self-limitation rather than from the enveloping of more and more spheres in its practices of government. For the purposes of our study, the notion of ‘dictatorship of the law’ is interesting due to its contrast with the dominant theme of (neo)liberal governmentality, strongly accentuated in the diagram of technical assistance: the proliferation of non-state, *extra-legal* forms of regulation.<sup>76</sup> The Putin presidency is, on the contrary, marked by the valorisation of the law as the quintessential instrument of sovereignty, presented as the necessary alternative to ‘departmental norm-setting’ by the executive branch.

*Departmental norm-setting is one of the main brakes in the development of entrepreneurship.* Government officials are used to acting according to instructions that often clash with laws that follow them. And yet, they are not cancelled for years. This has been noted already hundreds of times but in practice there is no progress at all. The government, the ministries and agencies should at long last take *radical measures in respect of departmental law-making*, up to and including the *total abolition of the*

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<sup>75</sup> Putin 2000, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>76</sup> See Foucault 1977a, 1990a, 1991a for the discussion of this feature in the context of classical liberal governmentality. In *Discipline and Punish* (1977a), Foucault famously argues that disciplinary forms of power have *displaced the juridical in favour of the normative and the administrative*. The emergence and consolidation of the prison as the apparatus for correction and transformation renders it superior to the judiciary: while the judiciary operates with a restrictive power of deprivation of liberty, the prison administration is concerned with designing positive procedures through which ‘correction’ is to be achieved. It is this increase of the profile of the administration that Foucault refers to as the ‘declaration of carceral independence’. (Foucault 1977a, p. 247.) In *The History of Sexuality* (1990a), Foucault interprets these changes in terms of the development of governmental ‘power over life’ as the successor to sovereign power: “Law can not help but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it replies [...] with that absolute menace. *The law always refers to the sword*. But a power whose task is to take charge of life needs *continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms*. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty,

*corps of departmental acts* in those cases when direct action federal laws have already been adopted.<sup>77</sup>

The same devaluation of extra-legislative regulation is accentuated in the government's programme, whose criticism of state regulation of the economy focuses precisely on mundane administrative procedures such as licensing, registration, standardisation and inspection as "excessive and inefficient regulation of economic activity"<sup>78</sup> to be replaced by self-regulation and insurantal mechanisms.<sup>79</sup> The programme offers a reformulation of the principle of the 'dictatorship of the law': "The foundation of the policy of regulation, a *natural* and *strict limit* to the excessive activity of officials and state governmental bodies is the introduction of the constitutional norm that fixes a legal principle: '*For a state body, organisation or official everything that is not stipulated by law is prohibited.*'"<sup>80</sup> Since it is precisely 'departmental norms' that are the primary instrument of governmentality in Foucault's understanding<sup>81</sup>, Putin's valorisation of law may appear as a wholesale renunciation of governmentality in favour of sovereign rule. However, this would be too simplistic: the key divergence of the 'Putinian' technology of rule from neoliberalism rather consists in its active effort to '*presentify*' the state as the *sovereign subject of governmentality*. In contrast to neoliberal 'governance', which renders the state indistinct and invisible through a policy of dissemination of governmental practices throughout society, the Putin presidency seeks to enhance the *visibility* of the governing agent *external* to society. At the same time, the sovereign is also presented as distinct from the multiplicity of governing agencies. Putin's discourse is characterised by the harsh criticism of bureaucratic agencies as *obstacles* to the reforms that he introduces:

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but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise and hierarchise. [...] The judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative and so on), whose functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalising society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life." (Foucault 1990a, p. 144. Emphasis added.)

<sup>77</sup> Putin 2001, p. 4. Emphasis added.

<sup>78</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 86. Translation by author.

<sup>79</sup> Putin 2002, p. 9. On the importance of insurantal techniques to neoliberal governmentality see O'Malley 1996, 1999, Rose 1998, Ericson et al 2000.

<sup>80</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 88. Emphasis added. Translation by author. Cf. Programme 2003–2005, p. 37, which proposes the establishment of a legal principle that the requirements for and restrictions on entrepreneurial activity may be imposed only by legislative acts.

<sup>81</sup> Foucault 1991a, pp. 102–103.

For already two years we have been talking about the reduction of the redundant functions of the state apparatus. *Agencies hold on and will hold on to these functions for reasons that are well understandable. But this is not a reason to postpone reforms.*<sup>82</sup>

Governmental agencies are presented as having an immanent and inert logic to their operations, which is distinct from and antagonistic to the more properly *political* logic of reform, personified by the sovereign, exterior both to the governing agencies and their domain of intervention.

However, this exteriority does not disable constitutive interventions of the state into the socioeconomic realm. The ‘theoretical’ paradox of liberal governmentality, according to which society as a ‘system of natural liberty’ only emerges as a result of governmental intervention, finds an abundance of empirical illustrations in the governmental practices of the Putin presidency that we shall discuss in the following chapters. The emphasis on the state-society distinction and the delimitation of the narrow zone of the state’s exclusive competence should not obscure the fact that the correlate ‘state-free’ domain is not an aboriginal reality that awaits its liberation but is formed in the practices of governmental intervention, albeit the type of intervention that may be described in the negative terms of ‘exit’ or ‘retreat’. Putin’s discourse on the state thus formulates a technology of rule that is simultaneously state-centric and interventionist, and minimalist and deregulatory. This technology goes beyond the conventional opposition of the classical liberal ‘nightwatch state’ with largely securitarian functions and the actively interventionist redistributive welfare state. Instead, it accords well with the metaphor, proposed in the programmatic article of one of the leaders of the liberal Union of Right Forces in the election campaign of 1999. In the article entitled ‘The Right Turn’, Alexei Ulykaev, presently the deputy finance minister, proposed that the state be conceived as an ‘emergency state’, a *fire brigade*, a lean and minimal structure with the right of intervention limited to exceptional situations that disrupt the ‘normal’ current of social life, which for Ulykaev is exemplified by the functioning market economy.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Putin 2002, pp. 4–5. See also Zudin 2003.

<sup>83</sup> See Ulykaev 1999, p. 8. Translation by author. The Union of Right Forces (SPS), formed in 1999 as a coalition of a number of small liberal parties, supported Putin’s candidacy in the presidential elections of 2000. In May 2000 the party leader Sergei Kirienko was appointed the President’s plenipotentiary envoy in the Volga Region and other party figures (e.g. Alexei Ulykaev, Alexander Pochinok) received cabinet posts in the new government. For the discussion of the affinities between Putin and the liberal

The intervention of the state into the everyday current of our lives and the dependence of our lives on the state must become not a routine but an emergency. *The Right insists on modifying the very principle of the exercise of state power: from permanent administration to targeted intervention.* The state must not resemble either the tedious and tiring bureaucrat, interfering in the most minute affair, or the powerless and somewhat comical night guard. *The state is rather the fire brigade or the rescue team:* where the normal current of social life is for some reason disturbed or threatened, there must appear highly professional and effective state services.<sup>84</sup>

The principle, according to which governmental intervention is to be an exceptional emergency rather than the norm, is actualised in the government's reform programme as well, which, by analogy with the judicial presumption of innocence, refers to it as the "presumption of *non-necessity* of state regulation in any given sphere"<sup>85</sup>. In the logic of the 'fire brigade' the scope of intervention, whether minimal or universal, is never *fixed* once and for all, but is rather restricted to emergency situations, aside from which state intervention finds no justification *at all*. If state intervention is cast as *in principle* unnecessary, the criteria for 'state strength' may no longer be found in the scope and degree of state control. For Ulykaev, the strength of the state is in fact inversely related to its domain of interference. Dismissing the Hobbesian image of the Leviathan, Ulykaev claims that "there is nothing more disgraceful for the state, than the situation in which it resembles a clumsy monster. [...] In order for the state to fulfil those tasks that it alone can fulfil, it must be freed from those tasks that can well be performed by others."<sup>86</sup> On the other hand, contrary to the image of the 'night guard', whose authority in the case of emergency is only vaguely stipulated, the fire brigade is endowed with *sovereign authority* that is limited only in the temporal sense. It is no coincidence that Ulykaev's metaphor of choice for the 'emergency state' is the *sword*, conceived by Foucault as the quintessential symbol and instrument of sovereignty: "The state must not resemble either the *machine* that grinds all that lives or the sticky

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reformers of the 1990s see Gaidar 2001, Polyakov 2000, Sakwa 2000a. In the late 1990s the formerly absent theme of state-strengthening began to be strongly accentuated by such prominent liberal politicians as Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. The Union of Right Forces has as its primary political objective '*peresozhdanie gosudarstva*', an awkward phrase that is literally translated as 'reconstitution of the state'. See 'Materialy Sjezda SPS', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, no. 94 (2404).

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>85</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 42, 44. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>86</sup> Ulykaev 1999, p. 7. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

and treacherous *swamp* that it is today. It must rather remind us of the *light, firm and precise sword* that has always been the eminent symbol of state power.”<sup>87</sup>

The notion of the fire brigade is a fitting metaphor for the technology of rule in the Putin presidency that practices sovereign intervention for the purposes of the constitution of the autonomous social domain.<sup>88</sup> It also permits us to displace the apparent paradox of state-led liberal reforms<sup>89</sup>: the infra-liberal politics of emergence is *ipso facto* an exceptional situation of emergency, in which no ‘normal current’ of market operation obtains. While the naturalist episteme of classical liberalism would presuppose market mechanisms to emerge naturally and spontaneously, the infra-liberal constructivism rather authorises wide-ranging governmental interventions for the purposes of laying the foundations of the liberal socioeconomic order that may then be anticipated to be internalised in the autonomous practices of social agents. We need only supplement the notion of a fire brigade with the Schmittian insight on sovereignty as the constitutive decision on exception: *it is up to the fire brigade to decide whether there is a fire*. The ‘fire-brigade’ state is thus limited only by virtue of its own self-limitation, the possibility of intervention always remaining open and not conditioned by any *externally given* emergency situation.

Let us now sum up the main features of the technology of rule articulated in the official discourse of the Putin presidency. Similarly to the neoliberal diagram of technical assistance, Putin’s problematisation of government is conditioned by the logic of infra-liberalism, whose telos is the institution of liberalism rather than the optimisation of its anterior functioning. In terms of internal distinctions within neoliberalism, Putin’s project of reconstitution of the state exhibits greater affinity to

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis added. Translation by author. Cf. Foucault 1990a, p. 144.

<sup>88</sup> The notion of the ‘fire brigade’ emergency state might account for the high proportion of government offices in the Putin presidency being filled by professionals with a background in security services. It also helps to understand the apparently paradoxical structure of the pro-Putin coalition, which has been referred to in Russian media as the unlikely alliance of ‘liberals and generals’. Insofar as the former follow the Ordoliberalen in not seeking to extend the liberal logic of marketisation and privatisation to the domain of the state itself, and the latter do not attempt thoroughgoing state regulation of the socioeconomic domain, there is nothing that is *in principle* contradictory about this alliance. Whether it is feasible in contemporary political practice is a different question that prior to the controversy over the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO of the Yukos oil company, in October 2003, could be answered in a cautiously affirmative manner. See e.g. Zudin 2003, Remizov 2003. At the time of writing it remains to be seen whether the Yukos affair may ultimately undermine the heterogeneous coalition that constituted ‘Putin’s Regime’ and bring into being a different diagrammatic configuration.

<sup>89</sup> See Sakwa 2000a, 2000b, Nicholson 2001.

the governmental constructivism of German neoliberalism, which, though “paying homage to the values, rationality and rules of conduct of the market, [...] keeps them at arm’s length as something exterior to its own enterprise”.<sup>90</sup> We can thus identify the basic convergence of the diagrams of governmentality of EU Tacis and the Russian federal government in their adoption of the constructivist ethos, prescribed by the infra-liberal problem-space. Both diagrams are marked by the presupposition of their domain as a zone of indistinction, a clean slate, in which the constitutive distinctions of the liberal order are yet to be drawn. In the diagram of technical assistance the slate to be erased is constituted by the uniform problematisation of current governmental practices in a variety of sectors in terms of their ineffectiveness, inefficiency, restrictive and non-participatory character. In Putin’s discourse, this slate is exemplified by all the ‘shadow’ governmental agencies and practices that have flourished in the Russia of the 1990s: from the oligarchic quasi-statehood to the covert commercialisation of ‘free’ social services.<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, the crucial divergence between the technologies of rule deployed in the two diagrams concerns the relation that government establishes with itself, its modality of self-presentation within the diagram that it constitutes. The diagram of technical assistance attempts to efface the exteriority of its governmental practices (and thus their very *status* as governmental practices) through participatory and partnership-based management strategies and the dissemination of project results through the newly-autonomised local agents. Governmental innovations are thus held to be *immanent* to the ‘social’ space and *indistinct* from the expressions of the local agents’ authentic autonomy. In contrast, Putin’s valorisation of what we refer to as the qualitative totality of the state actively presentifies it as the sovereign

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<sup>90</sup> Dean 1998, p. 218.

<sup>91</sup> Speaking of Putin’s recourse to the ‘clean slate’ presupposition, we must issue an important caveat. While Putin’s rhetoric is marked by the intolerance of the horizontal and vertical displacements of the state, the presidency is also characterised by its resolute allegiance to the 1993 Constitution. From the beginning of the Putin presidency, the discussion of radically amending or replacing the Constitution (that was a permanent fixture of the oppositional discourse in the 1990s) has all but entirely ceased. All the ‘re-centralising’ reforms initiated by Putin have, for all their political radicalism, nonetheless unfolded strictly within the constitutional space. We can therefore speak of Putin’s radical reformism in relation to the empirical ‘quasi-statehood’ of the 1990s and of his ‘conservatism’ in relation to the constitutional order established in the Yeltsin presidency. Another point of continuity between the two presidencies is Putin’s outright rejection of the proposals for the revision of the results of the privatisation process of the early 1990s. (Putin 2001, p. 8.) See also Treisman 2002 for the discussion of the continuities between the Yeltsin and the Putin presidencies.



subject of governmentality, exterior (by virtue of its own active practice of self-delimitation) to the domain of the social. Putin's discourse is thus marked by a far greater *political intensity* than the self-consciously depoliticised discourse of technical assistance.<sup>92</sup> However, it would be a mistake to interpret this difference in intensity as the indicator of a more 'authoritarian' character of Putin's governmental strategy. We shall rather suggest that, at least in terms of the authoritarian *potential*, the reverse holds true. We have noted repeatedly how Putin's discourse centres on the question of *limits, boundaries* and *distinctions* between the state and 'social' spheres, between the state's social obligations and market services, between the permitted and the prohibited. Although both the diagram of technical assistance and the diagram of reconstitution of the state take as their point of departure the infra-liberal zone of indistinction, they diverge on its subsequent utilisation. While the neoliberal diagram of technical assistance makes of the zone of indistinction a *positive* figure of 'governance' through its dissemination of governmental practices, Putin's reconstitution of the state privileges the sovereign act of *installing* new distinctions as a way of constituting the transcendent singularity of the agent of government. This concern with the autonomisation of the state as the subject of political intervention has, as its obverse side, the establishment of clear *legal limits* to such intervention. Paradoxically at first glance, the strong and effective state as it is constituted in the Putinian discourse is simultaneously a guarantor of *limited government*. Similarly, Putin's active problematisation of governmental regulation of economic activity is marked by the classical liberal anxiety about 'governing too much'. On the other hand, the neoliberal diagram of technical assistance, in which the question of sovereignty is entirely

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<sup>92</sup> While the disseminative rationality of the diagram of technical assistance diverges from the strategy of reconstitution of the state, we may note its curious resemblance to the situation that Putin's project seeks to remedy, namely the displacement of the state in the 1990s. Decentralisation and devolution of authority, the blurring of the distinction between the private and the public, the formation of politico-economic liaisons and partnerships, the introduction of entrepreneurial values into the domain of government – all of these developments may be claimed to have characterised the Russian politics of the 1990s. The key difference between that period and the neoliberal turn in Western governmentality (a difference that may account for the complete absence of enthusiastic endorsement of the Russian experience in the Western literature) is that the latter developments have been undertaken by political *design*, while the displacement of statehood in postcommunist Russia has manifestly occurred by *default*, as a result of the weakness and incapacity of state authority. In other words, while neoliberal practices of dissemination of government unfold *as part of* the governmental strategy and *within* a single governmental rationality, the Russian experience of the displacement of the state was marked by the decentring of governmental rationality itself.

displaced, practices a technology of rule where government is *quantitatively total but qualitatively indistinct* from the social domain of autonomy. What is lost in the valorisation of dispersed and decentred ‘good governance’ based on participation, partnership and autonomisation is the very problem of limited government that is at the heart of classical liberalism. The dissemination of government throughout the social and the displacement of its transcendent agent makes it meaningless to ask whether ‘one governs too much’ precisely since *there is no ‘one’* whose will to govern could be limited.

The questions posed by classical and neo-liberalism are indeed quite distinct: the classical liberal affirmation of limited government is marked by the lack of concern with whether government is ‘good’, if not the denial of the very possibility that government may be anything better than a ‘necessary evil’. In contrast, the neoliberal probing of the question of ‘good governance’ displaces the problem of limits: if governance is good, why should one try to limit it? There is thus an inverse relationship between the initial focus of problematisation and the ‘totality’ of the resultant diagram: the classical liberal focus on the *quantitative* delimitation of state authority eventually produces the diagram of a *qualitatively* total limited state, while the neoliberal concern with the *quality* of ‘governance’ enables its *quantitative* totalisation. We may conclude that despite its characteristically neoliberal governmental constructivism, the technology of rule deployed in the Putin presidency diverges from the diagram of EU technical assistance in establishing a relation to itself that is more in accordance with a classical liberal concern with the problem of limits and a Schmittian assertion of the sovereign character of their institution.

## 4.3. Technology of Performance: ‘Market-Based and Therefore Resistant to Corruption’

### 4.3.1. Globalisation and the Principle of Competition

In this chapter we shall discuss the relation between the technologies of performance deployed in the diagram of technical assistance and the strategic field of socioeconomic reforms undertaken in the Putin presidency. The reform programme articulated in the 2001 and 2002 Presidential Addresses is framed by the understanding of the

contemporary international environment as a space of competition. Consequently, *competitiveness*, generalised to embrace a wide range of social spheres, is posited as the paramount goal of governmental policy.

*Tight competition is a norm in the international community and in the modern world, competition for markets, investments, economic and political influence. Russia must be strong and competitive in this fight. Today countries compete with each other on all economic and political parameters: tax pressure, the level of security of the country and its citizens, property protection guarantees. They compete in making the business environment more attractive, in developing economic freedoms, in improving the quality of state institutions and the efficiency of the legal and judicial system. Competition has indeed become global. [...] The conclusion is obvious: no one is going to war with us in the modern world. No one wants this, and no one needs this. But no one is really waiting for us either. No one will help us specially. We have to fight for our place under the 'economic sun'.<sup>93</sup>*

*To put it concretely, we must work for Russia's competitiveness in all the meanings of this word.<sup>94</sup>*

The processes of economic globalisation serve, in these fragments, to re-orient governmental rationality towards the goal of enhancing Russia's competitiveness in the 'fight for the place in the sun'. Globalisation is presented by Putin as a process with its own immanent logic than can no longer be resisted by state governments, though it is possible to adapt to the realities of globalised economy to one's own advantage:

*We should learn to take advantage of the new state of the world economy. Obviously, whether or not to become integrated in the world economic space is no longer a problem for us. The world market is already here and our market has become part of the world system. [...] The WTO is an instrument. He who knows how to use it grows stronger, he who doesn't know or doesn't want to use it, he who doesn't want to learn, he who prefers to sit behind a fence of protectionist quotas and duties — he is doomed, absolutely doomed strategically. [...] WTO membership should be an instrument to protect the national interests of Russia in the world markets and a powerful external stimulus for the solution of the tasks that we have to solve anyway.<sup>95</sup>*

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<sup>93</sup> Putin 2002, p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>94</sup> Putin 2001, p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>95</sup> Putin 2002, p. 12. Emphasis added.

Although the presentation of economic, administrative and legal reforms as a response to the challenges of international competition appears at first glance to make ‘globalisation’ an external determining principle of governmental policy, we ought to locate the problematic of globalisation within the dispositional diagram. According to Mitchell Dean, the ‘problem of competitiveness’ posed by globalisation is *internal* to neoliberal governmentality as its instrument for restructuring the apparatus of government: “Given the zero-sum game between parts of the global economy, the promotion of economic efficiency and competitiveness becomes the paramount goal in what amounts to a new liberal problematic of security. All other activities of government [...] must be assessed first in terms of the availability of resources, and second as to whether they contribute to or inhibit economic efficiency.”<sup>96</sup> Globalisation is not the ‘objective’ process external to neoliberal governmentality, but its internal *instrument of problematisation* that in Western societies has been deployed to reassess and restructure the welfare state along the lines of quasi-market constructivism.<sup>97</sup> For Dean, the rationality of economic globalisation has enabled “comprehensive government of life”, by “providing a standing reason for the reformation of all aspects of individual and collective conduct to make them more efficient and competitive”.<sup>98</sup> The ‘naturalisation’ of globalisation as a process with its own immanent logic, not amenable to governmental resistance, has served to legitimise the neoliberal technology of entrepreneurial performance as a universally applicable ‘model of good practice’. If ‘tight competition is the norm’, then the *normal* type of individual and social practice is competitive, entrepreneurial behaviour and the overall governmental task is “the increase of competitive advantages of the economy”.<sup>99</sup> This emphasis on models of competitive performance is explicit in the 2002 presidential address.

A fundamental feature of the present-day world is *internationalisation of the economy and society*. And under these conditions the *best world models become key criteria of success*. Models in everything – in business, science and sports, in the rate of economic growth, the quality of the work of the state apparatus and competence of the decisions that we take. It is only when we will not just match the best models in the world, but *when we*

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<sup>96</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 54.

<sup>97</sup> See Dean 1999, 2002a, 2000b.

<sup>98</sup> Dean 2002b, p. 131.

<sup>99</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 24. Translation by author.

*will ourselves set these best models, it is only then that we will have a real chance to become wealthy and strong.*<sup>100</sup>

The prioritisation of models is important in two ways. Firstly, the president emphasises as the criterion of success, of ‘becoming wealthy and strong’, not the abstract national idea, values or even interests, but the possession of concrete exemplars of good practice that are competitive on the international level. This standpoint accords well with the emphasis in the discourse of technical assistance on the priority of concrete ‘policy models’ to political deliberation and the presentation of Tacis’s own contributions as providing tangible models of ‘good practice’. Secondly, the notion of competition through model-setting serves to justify the enhancement of governmental intervention in order to institute the best models that is at first glance incompatible with the very idea of ‘globalisation’ and the decline of the state. Dean has formulated the central paradox of government in the framework of globalisation in the following manner: “Under explicit authorisation of a discourse that claims a significant diminution of the sovereign powers of states, we have a view that national governments must do or become all sorts of things, and that it is necessary to resort to more direct and even coercive measures upon certain sectors of their own and other populations.”<sup>101</sup> Indeed, it is *within* the rationality of globalisation that allegedly places ‘sovereignty at bay’<sup>102</sup> that the neoliberal universalisation of the entrepreneurial form through the construction of quasi-markets is articulated as the appropriate technology of governmental and ‘social’ performance.

This valorisation of competitiveness is strongly accentuated in the government’s reform strategy. The 2003–2005 midterm programme of socioeconomic development radically generalises the principle of competition, positing as the long-term goal of socioeconomic reforms the enhancement of competitiveness of what in our terms are the objects of government, enterprise and agency:

- The *enhancement of the competitiveness of state government* (state regulation, state services, management of state property);
- The *enhancement of the competitiveness of business*: the increase of the efficiency of production (including productivity and energy-efficiency), the innovational direction,

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<sup>100</sup> Putin 2002, p. 16. Emphasis added.

<sup>101</sup> Dean 2002a, p. 55.

<sup>102</sup> See Vernon 1971.

- the exit of a significant share of businesses 'out of the shadow', the enhancement of the quality of corporate management;
- The *enhancement of the competitiveness of the 'human capital'*: the formation of an internationally competitive system of education, providing for the demands of the economy for qualified specialists, capable of sustaining the scientific potential of the country, retaining and enhancing the average level of education among the population, as well as the modernisation of the systems of health care and social assistance to the population.<sup>103</sup>

In the remainder of this chapter we shall discuss the ways these principles of 'competition policy'<sup>104</sup> take concrete shape in the reform solutions elaborated by the programme.

Let us begin by noting the untypical order of presentation in the government's reform programme, whereby the wide array of 'social reforms' assumes priority over the economic policy to the point that the activities in the sphere of sports and physical training are discussed prior to taxation reform or macroeconomic restructuring. This priority granted to social issues contrasts sharply with the hierarchy of priorities in the 1990s, in which social sector reform was relegated to the secondary status with the consequence of the dysfunctional maintenance of many of the Soviet features of social policy in the new market conditions. The alleged inattention of previous reformist governments (e.g. the Gaidar and Kirienko cabinets) to the restructuring of the social sector is manifestly reversed in the new reform programme, incidentally prepared with the participation of the same expert institutions that consulted the former cabinets (Higher School of Economics, Institute of Transitional Economies, etc.).<sup>105</sup> Putting the 'social question' first is justified not only as a corrective measure, but also as a necessary *ground* that sustains economic liberalisation: "Social reform must ensure necessary social stability as a factor of the reduction of entrepreneurial risk."<sup>106</sup>

We may briefly summarise the features of the social reform programme in the following way. Firstly, the programme proceeds from the need to *monitor and enhance the efficiency of state services* in such domains as education, health care,

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<sup>103</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 9. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18. See Tompson 2002 for the detailed discussion of the structural reforms of the Putin presidency, aimed at the enhancement of competitiveness.

<sup>105</sup> See the list of experts participating in the work of the Strategic Designs Centre at: <http://www.csr.ru/partners/index.html#experts>.

<sup>106</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 74. Translation by author.

social protection, labour relations, etc.<sup>107</sup> Consequently, the main problems identified in these sectors are “organisational-economic”,<sup>108</sup> involving such issues, familiar to us from the analysis of the discourse of technical assistance, as the lack of skills and practice of financial analysis, absence of long-term strategic planning, non-transparent financing, lack of incentives for efficiency-enhancing practices of the personnel.<sup>109</sup> In specific sectors, such as health care and energy policy, we can also observe the identity of concrete reform proposals with those stipulated in the discourse of technical assistance. The strategy of health care and social protection reform proceeds from the problematisation of current institutional forms of care as expensive and inefficient and advocates the “transfer of a portion of assistance onto the ambulatory level, [and] ending the practice of artificially maintaining an enormous and irrationally utilised hospital bed fund”.<sup>110</sup> Medico-social integration is also strongly advocated and given concrete shape in the proposal to establish ‘medico-social insurance’ as the single scheme of financing the services in both sectors.<sup>111</sup> Similarly to the EU Tacis proposals, the government’s programme focuses on personnel management as the key aspect of the reform process<sup>112</sup>, prescribing the (re)training of particularly the managerial personnel and proposing a shift towards per-capita and result-based financing of the sector, whereby there appear economic incentives for professionals to actively undertake efficiency-enhancing reforms and “planning becomes *part of the market process of the selection of the most efficient forms of medical assistance*”.<sup>113</sup>

Although national parks, and environmental protection in general, are not highlighted in the programme<sup>114</sup>, the mode of problematisation, through which their establishment was advocated in the discourse of technical assistance, is invoked in relation to the so-called mono-industrial or mono-profile towns: just as the Tacis proposals claimed the necessity of economic diversification, the programme stipulates

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<sup>107</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 74.

<sup>108</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 20, 31, 48. Translation by author.

<sup>109</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 20–21, 31–32, 26–27. See also Programme 2003–2005, p. 65.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26. Translation by author. See also Programme 2003–2005, p. 81 for the discussion of the development of non-institutional forms of care for the elderly and the disabled.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>112</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 44. Translation by author.

<sup>113</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 26. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>114</sup> See the brief and very general discussion of environmental policy in Programme 2003–2005, pp. 48–50.

the need to install “a mechanism of change, adequate to the market economic system and thereby facilitative of the independent development of these areas and their flexible adaptation to the changes in their environment without constant recourse to the state budget”.<sup>115</sup> This task of autonomisation of the local population that enables their independent flexible adaptation to market realities recalls the parks project’s affirmation of a ‘way of living less dependent on state budgets’.

By the same token, the reforms envisioned in the sphere of energy management invoke many of the solutions proposed in the discourse of technical assistance. The increased ‘energy efficiency’ is posited as a key instrument of the overall economic development of the country, enabling the diversification of the structure of the economy, which is posited as crucial to the achievement of the paramount task of enhancing Russia’s competitiveness.<sup>116</sup> The overall goal of reform in the energy sector is the “enhancement of investment potential in the sector”, while its specific measures involve the “stimulation of efficient energy-saving procedures”, “stimulation of the establishment of specialised energy service companies”, “reduction in the costs of energy supply” and the removal of various subsidies to energy users.<sup>117</sup> More generally, the logic of energy sector reform is phrased in the following way: “The key factor in investment attraction is the implementation of *institutional reforms*, aimed at the development of *relations of competition*.”<sup>118</sup> The president’s 2002 Address similarly affirms the “competition principle” in housing reform: “Only then will the consumer get a stimulus to save electricity and heating, and the provider to apply energy-saving equipment and install meters to measure the consumption of resources.”<sup>119</sup>

Similarly to the diagram of technical assistance, the federal reform programme proceeds from the extension into the problematic domain of the social of the ‘enterprise basis’. These proposed interventions suggest that the prioritisation of social issues by no means entails a shift to a ‘social market’ or some form of welfarist modality of government, which seeks to govern the economic in the name of the social. On the contrary, and in accordance with the tenets of Ordoliberalism, what is

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<sup>115</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 26. Translation by author.

<sup>116</sup> Programme 2003–2005, p. 96. Translation by author.

<sup>117</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, pp. 54–57.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 57. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>119</sup> Putin 2002, p. 11.



problematised in the programme is the social, which is to be *produced in a way compatible with the economic*. This problematisation resonates with the index established in the discourse of technical assistance: while the economic reforms of the 1990s have largely succeeded in the formation of the market order, there has been no restructuration of the ‘social’ sector in accordance with new economic imperatives. In other words, in both diagrams of governmentality the social is constituted as a problematic object against the background of the universalised and valorised entrepreneurial form. As the concluding chapter of the programme proclaims, the anticipated result of the implementation of the proposed reforms is the “increase of the role of *market mechanisms* in the activities of *economic agents*.”<sup>120</sup> It is crucial that, in contrast to the reform discourses of the early 1990s, ‘market mechanisms’ do not figure in the programme as contestable objects of advocacy and legitimation, but are rather posited as self-evident and self-explanatory guidelines to the restructuring of the social domain. This self-evidence of the market is most strikingly manifested in Ulykaev’s programmatic article:

It is incorrect that the Right advocate ‘market economy’ and ‘private property’, just as it is incorrect to say that teachers are the supporters of the school of thought according to which 2 by 2 equals 4. There is no ‘market’ and ‘non-market economy’, and there is no ‘private’ and ‘non-private property’. *There is just economy and a parody thereof, there is property and there is thieving*. We have no need to solve the question of how much of a market economy we need in Russia. *We simply need to make sure that our economy is not disfigured by any socialist exercises, and it will become a market economy automatically*. [...] The government may only have an economic policy in one sense of the word, as the *designer and the guarantor of the rules for equal subjects of economic activity*.<sup>121</sup>

This formulation is the most extreme manifestation of the naturalisation and ‘normalisation’ of market mechanisms, whereby the latter no longer appear as a politically contested alternative among others but are rather cast as, firstly, the sole expression of rationality contrasted with ‘perverse’ socialist experiments and, secondly, emerging in an ‘automatic’ manner when state interference is reduced and restructured. In a less extreme way, the government’s reform programme shares this pathos of the

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<sup>120</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 76. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>121</sup> Ulykaev 1999, p. 13. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

self-evidence of the market, although the assumption about its automatic emergence is tempered by the prioritisation of active governmental efforts to *create* a 'competitive environment'.

While market mechanisms are approached as unproblematic and self-evident objects of valorisation, 'economic agents' are cast as effects of constitutive governmental activity that installs relations of competition in the domains formerly not amenable to them, alters the mode of operation of social institutions through the reforms of their 'organisational-economic' dimension and makes policy planning a part of the 'market process'. What is at stake in both the 'social reform' of the federal government and the entrepreneurial reform proposals of EU Tacis is thus the *establishment of quasi-markets, in which entrepreneurial rationality is the guiding principle of performance*. The rationality of economic globalisation is therefore not functioning as a dire necessity or an objective determinant, which would clearly contradict the pathos of state autonomy exhibited in the Putin presidency. Instead, its function is to *essentialise* as natural and self-evident the 'competition principle', which the state actively *asserts* as a valorised course of policy. To recall the president's expression, globalisation is an "external stimulus for the solution of the tasks that we have to solve anyway"<sup>122</sup>, an additional external validation of the policy of quasi-marketisation. In the following chapter we shall discuss the relation of the governmentally constructed quasi-markets with the presently existing forms of economic activity.

#### 4.3.2. Quasi-Markets vs. the 'Shadow Economy'

Of course, the entire project of postcommunist socioeconomic reform may be conceived as the formation of quasi-markets, insofar as the policies of liberalisation and privatisation in the early 1990s have installed market mechanisms of exchange where they previously did not exist. The disjunction between the 'proper' market domain and the newly-constructed 'quasi-markets', characteristic of Western neoliberalism, is considerably more vague in postcommunist Russia, where the neoliberal constructivist principle rather describes the *overall* logic of liberal reforms. By the same token, the distinction between 'typical' and 'untypical' enterprises,

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<sup>122</sup> Putin 2002, p. 12. Emphasis added.

articulated in the discourse of technical assistance, is also not clear-cut since the very 'typical' paradigm of the private enterprise is a relative novelty. Thus, the overall logic of postcommunist quasi-marketisation is invariable across the wide range of sectors: from heating systems to the cultural sector we observe the problematisation of the inefficient utilisation of scarce resources and the lack of economic incentives for the personnel, and the advocacy of such solutions as the introduction of the contract system of employment, expansion of the economic autonomy of the respective institutions, introduction of financial analysis into the managerial process, establishment of the principle of competitive equality of state and non-state providers, ensuring the transparency of financial streams through auditing, etc.<sup>123</sup> The 'untypicality' of the new enterprises is only stressed in very few sectors such as science and the defence industry, yet even in these domains the president advocates a "healthy commercialisation"<sup>124</sup> of (particularly applied) science and the government's programme envisages the development of the 'competitive environment' in the defence sector.<sup>125</sup>

This logic also transcends the divide between state-owned and privatised enterprises. The introduction of the 'competition principle' and the goal of the formation of the 'effective market' of professional services *level the difference* between state and private providers in such spheres as education, health care and social protection.<sup>126</sup> Such measures as the 'contractual implication' of state providers of services in these sectors and the establishment of possibilities for consumers to choose their own providers from a variety of state and non-state enterprises, which are to be given equal access to state financing,<sup>127</sup> purposefully obliterate this difference, making the *entrepreneurial form* entirely independent of the *form of property*. Similarly to the neoliberal technology of performance, entrepreneurial rationality is universalised as *the* appropriate form of performance, thus displacing the public-private distinction.

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<sup>123</sup> See Main Directions, vol. 1, pp. 30–32, vol. 2, pp. 5–7. Similar solutions are advanced in education (vol. 1, pp. 3–19), health care (vol. 1, pp. 20–26), social protection (vol. 1, pp. 47–55), natural monopolies such as gas and electricity companies (vol. 2, pp. 41–53).

<sup>124</sup> Putin 2002, p. 12.

<sup>125</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, pp. 57–59.

<sup>126</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 19, 28, 55.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50. Programme 2003–2005, p. 80.

Similarly, the reform of the natural monopolies in gas, electricity and railway industries focuses less on their privatisation than on “creating the conditions for the introduction of market mechanisms”<sup>128</sup> through drawing the distinction between the narrow “strictly monopoly area” and the “potentially competitive segment”,<sup>129</sup> the latter to be gradually deregulated, autonomised and enfolded in the relations of competition. Similarly to the social sector, the programme advocates the introduction into the state domain of the *model* of the private enterprise. This uniform principle of the reform of natural monopolies serves as a paradigm of quasi-market establishment by governmental ‘institutional reforms’ and exemplifies the link of the technology of performance with the above-discussed technology of rule: government actively intervenes into the domains formerly not amenable to economic forms of problematisation, radically alters their mode of functioning and eventually retreats from these domains.

This constitutive function is also strongly accentuated in the discussion of governmental assistance to the emergent new enterprises. As we have noted in the previous chapter, the president’s problematisation of government proceeds from the claim that the present legal framework of state regulation hampers rather than assists the fragile emergence of new enterprises, particularly in the SME sector: “We often say that the starting businesses have an acute need for a possibility to stand firmly on their feet. In the meantime, the rash or unfinished drafts frequently put our entrepreneurs not firmly on their feet but rather force them to hectically run around.”<sup>130</sup> The government’s programme proclaims the key task of economic policy to be the “creation of mechanisms that ensure freedom of economic initiative” that takes shape in three main activities: “deregulation of the economy, guarantee of property rights and the establishment of equal conditions of competition.”<sup>131</sup> Concrete instruments in the reorientation of state activity towards the facilitation of enterprise include the simplification of licensing and registration procedures and the reduction of the list of economic activities subject to licensing,<sup>132</sup> removing administrative barriers to

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<sup>128</sup> Main Directions, vol. 2, p. 48. Translation by author.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 41. Translation by author.

<sup>130</sup> Putin 2002, p. 9. See also Programme 2003–2005, pp. 37–39 for the list of specific governmental activities with regard to the task of facilitating the establishment of SMEs.

<sup>131</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, pp. 74–75. Translation by author.

<sup>132</sup> Putin 2000, p. 7, Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 86.

market entry, reforming the taxation regime to enhance economic incentives for emergent enterprises,<sup>133</sup> delimiting the activities of various supervisory bodies.

Interestingly, such facilitative governmental intervention is also advocated in the domains where ‘market mechanisms’ *already exist*, albeit in a shadow, covert and non-transparent form. We need only recall the problematisation by the president of the ‘hidden commercialisation’ of health care and education, in which it is not the market principle per se that is criticised, but rather the fact that this principle has emerged spontaneously in an extra-governmental fashion. Bracketing off the question of illegality of such ‘shadow markets’, we may suggest that the very figure of *shadow economy* corresponds to the veridictive construct of classical liberal governmentality, an *opaque* domain with a *sui generis* logic not amenable to governmental knowledge and action. In the rationality of classical liberalism, the constitutive features of the ‘shadow economy’ are in the strict sense the object of *valorisation*: since the opacity of the domain renders economic sovereignty, envisioned by police science, impossible, government needs to be grafted onto these anterior ‘shadow’ processes. In contrast, neoliberal governmentality, actualised both in the diagram of technical assistance and in the president’s reform strategy, takes ‘market mechanisms’ not as anterior and exterior to its operations but as *its own modus operandi*, thereby depriving them of any residual naturalness or spontaneity. The development of shadow market relations that *are* in a certain sense spontaneous and ‘natural’ is thus problematised as ‘corruption’ in the strongly ethical sense of the word. As already cited above, President Putin claims that the development of covert and non-transparent commercialisation in education ‘corrupts pupils and teachers alike’. The situation is similar in the health care sector: “In fact, a *hidden but almost legalised* system of paid medical services was created within the network of medical institutions financed from the budget. This system is often characterized by *lawlessness and total lack of social justice*.”<sup>134</sup>

In Putin’s discourse corruption appears to be a result of two processes, characteristic of respectively classical and neo-liberalisms. Firstly, corruption is simply the name for unsanctioned market operations, the spontaneous formation of market relations in the unreformed social sector. In a strong formulation, a practice is corrupt by virtue of its being *extra-governmental* and must be rendered *transparent*

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<sup>133</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, pp. 75, 85–86.

<sup>134</sup> Putin 2001, p. 10. Emphasis added.

to government to acquire legitimacy, even if its substantive operating principle remains the same. Secondly and more specifically, corruption is the name for the connections established between the public and the private, the governmental and market zones, resulting in their increasing indistinction: “In some cases, the *functions of state-administration agencies have become mixed up with those of commercial organisations*. This *intolerable situation* must be rectified.”<sup>135</sup> The sharply negative attitude to the arrangement that is, in principle, a neoliberal commonplace, recalls Schmitt’s criticism of the ‘dreadful coalescence’ of the state and plural economic interests. In this understanding, corruption finds its locus in the space of indistinction between the state and non-state domains, whether it is a case of bureaucratic interference in the economy or the overtaking of the state domain by economic interests. Consequently, the struggle against corruption is similarly twofold, taking shape both in the already discussed horizontal reconstitution of state autonomy and, more importantly at this point, in the policy of governmental economic deregulation. It is thus not the market mechanisms per se that generate corruption, but, on the contrary, their absence or ‘impurity’: at one point in the 2002 Address the president speaks of the need for governmental mechanisms that are “market-based and *therefore* resistant to corruption”.<sup>136</sup> To recall the claim cited above, corruption is presented as a ‘direct result of the restriction of economic freedoms’. State interference in the domain of economic freedom is thus *in itself* a corrupt(ing) practice, since it violates the distinction between the two domains, contaminating the purity of a properly entrepreneurial practice. The valorisation of this distinction accounts for a general pathos of radical *deregulation* in Putin’s discourse and the government’s reform programme. Yet, to deregulate is not to leave to their own devices the already-existing shadow economic relations, but to reconstitute them as *transparent* to governmental knowledge and hence amenable to governmental powers. The sole difference between ‘regulation’ and ‘deregulation’ is the positive regulatory principle at work, which in the case of the reform programme of the Putin presidency is the model of the private enterprise. The technology of performance espoused by the presidency and elaborated in the government’s reform programme may be thus summed up as the institution of positive, transparent and autonomised quasi-markets

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<sup>135</sup> Putin 2000, p. 7. Emphasis added.

<sup>136</sup> Putin 2002, p. 9. Emphasis added.

through governmental interventions that eradicate the shadow zones of indistinction, constituted by both spontaneous commercialisation and bureaucratic intervention. The technologies of rule and performance are thus entangled in the project that seeks to disentangle the 'dreadful coalescence' of the state and the market and thereby to *autonomise both*. In the strategic diagram of the Putin presidency, 'the enterprise' is therefore an object, whose valorisation is indissociable from the reassertion of state autonomy, even if the state in question is thereby shrinking both in its sphere of intervention and its own proper domain (as state services themselves are enfolded in the relations of competition with other providers).

At this point we encounter a tension between the technology of rule based on the sovereign distinction between state and non-state domains and the technology of performance that universalises entrepreneurial rationality and installs 'enterprise culture' as the ethos of operation of governmental agencies as well as 'private' ones. It appears that the universalisation of the entrepreneurial model of performance leaves no diagrammatic space for the reconstituted and autonomised state as the 'non-marketisable' subject of marketisation. If competitive and efficient models are central to contemporary 'governance', if all efforts must be directed towards competitiveness and efficiency both in the 'social' realm and in governmental operations, then what *are* those state functions that are, according to the president, *qualitatively different* from entrepreneurial ones and 'must not be bought or sold, privatised or granted for use, let out on lease'? If economic considerations are paramount in the neoliberal technology of performance, espoused by the Putin presidency, what is this remainder that is not amenable to the mechanisms of economic exchange, yet so essential to the policy of their institution? What is it that cannot be exchanged? Only that which has no value, the worthless, the impractical – in short, the obscene excess that we have designated as the 'quasi-essence' of sovereign power. This obscene status of sovereignty is not merely conceptual, but finds a concrete empirical manifestation in the tension between its *political assertion* and *governmental disavowal* in the reforms of the Putin presidency. As the entrepreneurial technology of performance disseminates economic rationality throughout the diagram, the assertion of sovereignty in the technology of rule functions as a solely formal gesture of demonstrating the gap between the sovereign and the diagrammatic positivity that he institutes.

We may then speak of a certain ‘inescapability’ of the Schmittian conceptual logic of the primacy of sovereign exception to any constituted order.<sup>137</sup> That which on the inside of the diagram is an obscene non-value is simultaneously the exterior condition of possibility of the diagram, and, conversely, the sovereign institution of the diagram undermines the latter’s self-immanence in the very act of its assertion.<sup>138</sup> Might not we then say that sovereign power is *entirely* contained in this formal gesture of obscene self-redoubling at the limit of the diagram, the designation of the excessive and exceptional enunciative modality, which is infrastructural rather than substantive and thus completely independent of any normative content. If the sovereign excess is infrastructurally necessary to the governmental diagram, we may claim that sovereignty is not a stubborn anachronism, a superfluous residue in relation to neoliberal (or any other) mode of governmentality. On the contrary, the constitution of the diagram simultaneously produces both the zone of the regular and the sovereign locus of the exception, the latter being necessary to the diagram in its being superfluous to it. In the combination of the technologies of rule and performance in the Putin presidency sovereignty is subjected to a simultaneous infrastructural affirmation and substantive denial in relation to the neoliberal diagram of government. In the programme of deregulation, marketisation and privatisation, the state is progressively reduced to a bare formal minimum, which in turn is affirmed in its full force of sovereign transcendence. It is not that the sovereign wears the mask of a liberal reformer, beyond

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<sup>137</sup> To speak of the inescapability of the Schmittian political logic is to accentuate the formal, infrastructural function of the sovereign locus as a condition of possibility of any positive order. The figure of the sovereign is thus merely a formal ‘stand-in’ for the infra-structural void, from which the decision on the constitution of the diagram emanates. This locus may be negated, as it is in e.g. neoliberal ‘governance’, but is not thereby annulled. This reading of Schmitt (see e.g. Zizek 1999b, Norris 2000) rejects the identification of Schmitt’s valorisation of sovereignty with any substantive political doctrine, however it is defined (conservatism, traditionalism, fascism, etc.). (Cf. Wolin 1992a, McCormick 1997.) Schmitt’s decisionism is, in Zizek’s argument, purely formal and distinct from any kind of traditionalism. “What is properly modern in Schmitt’s notion of the exception is the violent gesture of asserting the *independence of the abyssal act of free decision from its positive content.*” (Zizek 1999b, p. 19. Emphasis added.) The same formalism concerns the epitome of a political decision, the friend-enemy distinction. Contrary to ‘nationalist’ readings of Schmitt (See Mouffe 2000b), neither friends nor enemies pre-exist the act of their distinction. The decision “asserts that this difference is one that it creates, and not the one whose reality it respects and attempts to preserve”. (Norris 2000, p. 16.) When stripped of all attributions of substantive value, the decisionist logic is inescapable as the infrastructural condition of emergence of any type of order.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Norris 2000, p. 16.



which we can occasionally glimpse the obscene grimace of the authoritarian leader (the ‘real’ Putin). It is rather that this obscene grimace is always already a mask that conceals precisely that it doesn’t have anything behind it to conceal, that it is fully exhausted in its obscene lexicon. Let us then propose that the neoliberal heeding of Foucault’s injunction to decapitate the king does not succeed in stabilising the self-immanence of the diagram of universalised enterprise, which remains doomed to the everlasting spectacle of the return of the king, not with the solemn lyricism of a ghost, but in a rather more unsettling and macabre manner as the severed head periodically comes rolling back in, screaming obscenities at its persecutors.

## 4.4. Technology of Agency: ‘Investment in Man’

### 4.4.1. Education as the Realisation of the ‘Resource of Freedom’

Finally, let us discuss the technology of agency, articulated in the programme of socioeconomic reforms of the Putin presidency. To recall the order of presentation in the government’s reform programme, its first volume is dedicated to social reforms, presented as a necessary grounding for economic liberalisation. Within this ‘social’ segment of the programme the sphere of education is granted the status of a top priority: “The unconditional priority of social policy is *investment in man*.”<sup>139</sup> The text posits education as ‘a national growth point’,<sup>140</sup> the precondition of successful reforms in all other sectors. The preservation by Russia of its place among the countries “capable of influencing world processes” is deemed to depend on the “quality of *human capital*”.<sup>141</sup> The president’s 2000 Address is similarly marked by the prioritisation of ‘investment in man’ as the task of social policy: “A social policy means not only assistance to the needy but also investments in the future of man, in his health, in his professional, cultural and personal development. That is why we will

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<sup>139</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 3. Translation by author.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

give priority to the development of the sphere of health services, education and culture.”<sup>142</sup>

The notion of ‘investment in man’ points to a key veridictive aspect of the governmental technology of agency that the Putin presidency shares with the neoliberal diagram of technical assistance. To speak of a policy of *investment* in man is to presuppose a constructivist notion of subjective identity as a product of governmental practices, an object formed by the investment of force in its constitution. The constructivist orientation is also evident in the notion of ‘human capital’ which posits the features of the subject’s identity in terms of skills “acquired as the result of investments in the corresponding stimuli: nutrition, education, training, and also love, affection, etc”.<sup>143</sup> We may observe an immediate link between this notion of identity and the technology of entrepreneurial performance: the emphasis on human capital renders ethical efforts at self-formation as a form of ‘enterprise of oneself’, an exercise of autonomy and a matter of individual responsibility.

The same assumption about identity as a surface effect of practices of (self-) investment with ‘human capital’ is at work in other sectors discussed in the programme. For instance, the chapter on sports and physical culture follows the discourse of technical assistance in advocating an active policy of health promotion as a substitute for the narrowly ‘medical’ strategy of health care. This policy is entrusted with “increasing the *prestige* of versatile physical training and the enhancement of one’s control over one’s body, the level of knowledge of hygiene and physical culture”.<sup>144</sup> Within the logic of self-enterprise, such governmental practices serve to make a particular set of physical skills more marketable and thus attractive to the individual. Nonetheless, although the establishment of economic incentives for the autonomous choice of desirable practices is crucial to the reform strategy, the constructivist principle also seeks to mould agency in the more basic sense of the investment of governmental forces prior to and for the purpose of the very constitution of the autonomous subject of choice: “The physically cultured [sic!] *lifestyle* must be formed from the earliest age of the child, since *it is precisely children that are best at receiving the incoming information, internalising it in depth and thus easily*

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<sup>142</sup> Putin 2000, p. 9.

<sup>143</sup> Lemke 2001, p. 199.

<sup>144</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 34. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

*acquiring cultural habits and needs.*"<sup>145</sup> Besides indicating a specific policy-area convergence between the discourses of Tacis and the Russian government, this citation also provides us with a paradigm of the constructivist technology of agency at work in the two diagrams. The privileged object of any governmental technology that seeks to positively mould and shape subjectivity, rather than manipulate its autonomous choices, is indeed a *child*, more amenable to external investment, psychologically more capable of internalising external expertise as a personal habit, and, of course, least likely to resist such investment. It is also important to note that the problem of the constitution of the autonomous subject, so characteristic of neoliberalism, arises in a (quasi)natural way in the case of a child, temporarily deprived of autonomy from the moment of birth to the historically variable moment of 'maturation'. The pedagogical technology of agency may thus be considered a paradigm of governmental constructivism, its most concrete and exemplary form. The replication of this technology in other domains than the upbringing of children is necessarily accompanied by the transfer to these domains of the constitutive pedagogical presuppositions regarding the agents in question: the present lack of necessary skills, receptivity to external inculcation and the unproblematic status of temporary deprivation of autonomy. In the terms we have introduced in chapter 3.6.2., a *pedagogical constructivism must presuppose its object as a clean slate*, thereby problematising, devaluing or simply ignoring the present features of one's subjectivity. Similarly to the shadow markets in health care and education, whose main deficiency is their 'being there' prior to the acts of government that seek to introduce positive market arrangements, the pedagogical technology must reduce the subject that is its object to its originary figure of a child, either lacking the prerequisites of autonomy or in need of guidance in its practice. Let us now discuss in greater detail the way the pedagogical technology operates in the federal reform programme.

Firstly, the reform strategy follows neoliberal governmentality in effecting a spatio-temporal extension and a functional expansion of education. According to the president, "the rate of the development of the economy, science and information technologies calls for *life-long education*. I think the approach to education should change. In the era of *globalisation* and new technologies *this is not just the social*

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<sup>145</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 33. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

*sphere, it is investment in the future of the country*, the future involving companies, non-governmental organizations and all citizens without exception.”<sup>146</sup> The rationality of globalisation is important in the formulation of the new priorities of education. According to the government’s reform programme, the first priority of education policy is the “facilitation of *socialisation in the market environment* through the formation of such values as *responsibility* for one’s own well-being and the state of society, the acquisition by the younger generation of the [...] *practical skills in economic and social relations*”.<sup>147</sup> Since the market environment is posited as the unproblematic given both internationally and domestically, the task of socialisation into it accords with the Ordoliberal remoulding of the social in the name of the economic, i.e. producing entrepreneurial forms of subjectivity proper to the market environment.

Secondly, and relatedly, education reform seeks to “facilitate social *mobility* through the support to the most talented and *active* young people, irrespectively of their social origin, in their acquisition of the *capacity of a quick shift between various social and economic roles*”.<sup>148</sup> This principle exemplifies the operation of the liberal ethos of autonomous self-formation: individuals of all ‘social origins’ are incited to become active and mobile entrepreneurs of themselves, involved in the quasi-economic exchange of roles and identities that form their ‘human capital’. Particularly in its discussion of continuous adult education, the programme prioritises the skills of adaptation and flexible response to the new ‘market environment’: “The need to develop continuous professional education is owing to the accelerating process of knowledge becoming obsolete and the necessity for a more *flexible* and *quick response* to the *new demands of the market for knowledge, skills and relations*.”<sup>149</sup>

Finally, the programme makes a linkage between education and individual freedom, deploying the former as the means of actualisation of the latter: “Education must *realise the resource of freedom*, the *field of choices* for every individual, who is learning and investing in himself.”<sup>150</sup> Self-investment with knowledge and skills

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<sup>146</sup> Putin 2001, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>147</sup> Main Directions, p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 18. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 3. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

expands the 'field' of possible choices for the individual and is thus deemed necessary to the practice of freedom, entrepreneurially posited as a 'resource'. This understanding of the role of education parallels what we have called a functional expansion of the pedagogical technology in neoliberalism. Pedagogy is no longer reducible to the acquisition of knowledge and skills but is articulated with the ethical practice of self-formation as an autonomous subject. The view of education as a realisation of the 'resource of freedom' also instantiates what we have described as the central paradox of the neoliberal technology of agency: freedom is posited as a *duty* that, furthermore, consists in *submission* to external authority, one's autonomy emerging through one's involvement in an asymmetric and heteronomous pedagogical relationship.

Let us now discuss in greater detail the positivity of agency that is to be formed in pedagogical practices. The programme states the following substantive priorities of education:

The modernisation of the state and the formation of civil society require that the system of education *form a conscientious citizen effectively participating in the democratic process*. For the solution of this task the following skills are set as priorities:

- capacity for *self-organisation*, ability to defend one's *rights*, *participate* in formation and activities of social organisations;
- *tolerance* of a different opinion, *capacity for dialogue* and search for substantive compromise solutions;
- *legal culture*, knowledge of the foundational legal norms and the *capacity to utilise the state legal system*.<sup>151</sup>

According to the strategy, the individual to be produced in governmental practices is to be a 'conscientious' (*soznatelny*) citizen, a term whose elaboration will assist us in specifying the ethical content of the pedagogical technology of agency. The notion of *soznatelmost'* was an integral element of the Soviet discourse of individuality<sup>152</sup> and the replication of the cliché 'conscientious citizen' (*soznatelny grazhdanin*) in the postcommunist governmental strategy may arouse a sense of 'continuity' with the Soviet tradition. However, the dual character of the term *soznatelmost'* that in Russian denotes both 'consciousness' and 'conscience' may also illustrate a crucial divergence

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p. 4. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>152</sup> See Kharkhordin 1999, pp. 57–61 for the explication of the religious background of this term, which gained great currency in the self-cultivating practices of Russian revolutionaries and the collectivised 'work on the self' in the Soviet period.

from the Soviet pedagogical practices. According to Oleg Kharkhordin, the constitution of individuality in Soviet governmentality proceeded via *mutual horizontal surveillance* through purposefully installed public forums ('collectives') and *self-fashioning* through submitting the self to the consideration and judgment of the relevant group ('public penance').<sup>153</sup> Both the objectifying and the subjectifying aspects of the production of individuality have thus involved the presence of an evaluative and corrective '*public gaze*', measuring the actions of individuals against a certain moral standard of *conscience*.<sup>154</sup> Furthermore, and in accordance with Foucault's notion of the polyvalence of discourse, this conception of 'publicised' individuality has persisted in the 'shadow society' emergent in the 'mature socialism' of the Brezhnev era and was actualised in e.g. dissident circles, subcultures or networks of friendship.<sup>155</sup> The term *soznatel'nost'* in its Soviet application is thus best translated as 'conscientiousness' to highlight the connotations of dedication, diligence, perseverance and reliability that the term in its Soviet application implies.

It is the aspect of the 'public gaze' and the 'higher conscience' that is manifestly missing from the discussion of the components of *soznatel'nost'* in the government's programme of education reform, which operates with what appears to be a self-conscious *ethical minimalism*. The individual is still to be produced as a moral agent and an active participant, yet the skills he is to acquire in this process are cast as an end in themselves, not an instrument towards a *higher social goal* that marked the Soviet practices of subjectification and the anti-Soviet subcultures of dissent. In fact,

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<sup>153</sup> See *ibid.*, chapters 3, 5.

<sup>154</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>155</sup> See *ibid.*, chapter 8. In Kharkhordin's argument, the ritualisation of the 'official' public sphere in the Brezhnev period entailed the gradual monopolisation of the function of moral evaluation by the informal sphere, where official techniques of subjectification of both collectives and individuals (e.g. mutual horizontal surveillance, revelation of one's individuality by the subjection of one's 'deeds' to the scrutiny of the relevant group, practices of hero identification and self-planning) were redeployed in the absence of the ideological edifice within which they were originally articulated. The consequence of this redeployment is the unsettling similarity of dissident circles and state-sanctioned 'collectives' in the aspect of ideological dogmatism, recourse to mutual surveillance and high emotional agitation, and their paradoxical alliance in opposing the 'alternative' modes of individuation that began to take shape in the 1960s (consumerism, self-fashioning through style and possessions, etc.): "The establishment and the democratic opposition joined ranks in the common fight against 'surrogate individualisation'." (Kharkhordin 1999, p. 347.) By the same token, the 'confessional prose' of the 1960s, despite its alleged 'anti-establishment' orientation, "almost seems to follow official Soviet guides' recommendations for working on oneself". (*Ibid.*, p. 345.)

the programme states explicitly that education is no longer to be geared only to solving 'social' or 'state' tasks but must be guided by the "sum total of the *private interests* of families and enterprises".<sup>156</sup> The 'conscience' connotations of *soznatelnost'* are discarded in favour of a more 'consciousness'-oriented meaning. The individual produced is to be 'self-organised', *conscious* of his actions, *aware* of his legal rights and *capable* of realising them in personal and collective action. This pedagogical technology does not produce a revolutionary saint or a builder of socialism<sup>157</sup>, but an autonomous individual, whose only ethical obligation appears to be an active and responsible exercise of the granted autonomy, the *duty of freedom* that we have discussed in relation to the neoliberal technology of agency.

This 'ethical substance' is specified in the programme's discussion of the new methods of education. The text proclaims the need to "alter the methods of education, placing more weight on those that mould *practical* skills of analysing information and *self-learning*, to increase the role of *independent learning* by students".<sup>158</sup> Within secondary education, the programme calls for a "*personal orientation* and the *individualisation* of the educational process"<sup>159</sup> as well as a more "practical orientation and instrumental direction".<sup>160</sup> The emphasis on the individualisation of education locates the thrust of the pedagogical investment at the level of one's subjective identity. Rather than being a homogeneous and homogenising supplement to the anterior subjectivity of the student, the content and the methods of education must be geared to the task of the formation of the autonomous subject, discovering and actualising his authentic individuality in the process of learning. The emphasis on the practical and instrumental direction of education connects the ethical pathos of self-formation with the injunction to entrepreneurial performance by recasting the content of education in terms of marketable 'human capital', connected to the demands of the market environment and empowering one in the project of self-enterprise.

To sum up, the pedagogical technology deployed in the federal reform programme presupposes and effects the notion of agency as a construct of governmental practices, a sum total of invested habits, skills and attitudes; valorises and facilitates the

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<sup>156</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 3. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>157</sup> Cf. Kharkhordin 1999, chapter 5.

<sup>158</sup> Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 5. Translation by author.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 11. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p. 12. Translation by author.

formation of the self-actualising autonomous subject, engaged, on the basis of the practical skills that constitute his 'human capital', in the 'enterprise of himself' in the 'market environment'; effaces the standard of a 'higher conscience' in the constitution of individuality, making the enterprise of oneself its own goal. This 'ethical minimalism' accords well with the more general displacement of the transcendent telos in the Putin presidency that we have noted at a number of occasions: the tautological 'national idea' of effective statehood, the presentation of the paramount policy task as the creation of the conditions under which Russian citizens 'can earn money and invest it with benefit to themselves' and, finally, the following statement by President Putin of his vision of Russia's future at the end of his 2002 Address:

We should make Russia a *prosperous* and *well-to-do* country so that it should be a *comfortable and safe place* to live in. So that people could *work freely, earn for themselves and their children without limitations and without fear*. So that they should seek to come to Russia and not to leave Russia. *To raise their children here, to build their home here.*<sup>161</sup>

#### 4.4.2. Dissimulation and the Folding of Interiors

The ethical minimalism of the technology of agency at work in the reforms of the Putin presidency may appear surprising against the background of the 'traditionalist' discourse on Russia, in which the absence, lack or underdevelopment of 'individualism' and the valorisation of community and collectivism, often rendered by the esoteric Russian term *sobornost'*, appear to be a self-evident axiom. However, when the question of 'individualism' is posed in the context of governmentality, whatever remains of the opposition between 'Russian collectivism' and 'Western individualism' appears to be no longer a conflict between two forms of culture, but between two *modalities of government* that both deploy a certain technology of agency constitutive of human individuality and thus produce different versions of what may be termed 'individualism'.<sup>162</sup> For our purposes, we shall rely on Oleg Kharkhordin's genealogy

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<sup>161</sup> Putin 2002, p. 16. Emphasis added.

<sup>162</sup> See Kharkhordin 1999, chapters 1, 9 for the critique of this dichotomy and its application to present Russian practices. Kharkhordin's study demonstrates the ways in which manifestly 'collectivist' practices of horizontal surveillance and public penance (cf. Foucault's theses (1977a, 1990a) about vertical



of postcommunist individualism in order to illuminate the conditions of possibility for the deployment of the ethically minimalist technology of agency in the Putin presidency.

In Kharkhordin's account, the postcommunist resurgence of liberal individualism has its point of descent in the late-Soviet practices of *self-fashioning in the private sphere*, where a number of 'official' technologies of individualisation (e.g. 'revelation by deeds', self-planning, hero identification) were adapted by individuals without the adoption of the official telos, self-fashioning itself gradually becoming its own goal.<sup>163</sup> The deployment of official individualising techniques with no regard for the 'higher conscience' to which they were directed has helped furnish the 'informal' domain of individuality, constituted and sheltered from the omniscient public gaze by widespread practices of *dissimulation*. Dissimulation was not only practiced against external state authority, but also, since Soviet governmentality was based on mutual horizontal surveillance between the members of the 'collective', against one's peers, thereby effacing the very possibility of 'social solidarity' that could emerge as a result of resistance to the more traditional, top-down authoritarian government.<sup>164</sup> With the relaxation of the terror of purges in the late 1950s, the 'mature' Soviet order no longer sought to reveal and punish dissimulation, but merely required full participation in the official displays of loyalty, which has led to the proverbial ritualisation of public life in the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union. In Kharkhordin's description of late Soviet society, "the collective of saints turns out to be the collective of accomplices who merely produce a saintly image of themselves while consistently demanding the display of loyalty to these images both at work and at home."<sup>165</sup> On the other side of this dissimulative subjectivity there was formed "the secret sphere of intimate life", constituted by 'closing off' a narrow domain of individual existence from the ubiquitous

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surveillance and private confession as the conditions of emergence of the Western individual) have produced an intense ethical discourse about the individual's relation to himself and enabled a postcommunist reassertion of individualism that is neither indebted to a superficial change in ideological fashion nor is a case of the triumph of a dormant primordial individualism repressed in the Soviet period but is rather a phenomenon, whose conditions of possibility were provided by Soviet practices, including, quite paradoxically, those directly opposed to individualism.

<sup>163</sup> See *ibid.*, chapters 5, 6.

<sup>164</sup> See *ibid.*, chapters 3, 4 for the analysis of the *kollektiv* as a structure of horizontal surveillance that may be contrasted with Foucault's seminal figure of the Panopticon, the paradigm of vertical surveillance. See also Pfaff 2001 for the discussion of the limits of coercive 'Panoptic' surveillance in the case of the German Democratic Republic.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.

public gaze.<sup>166</sup> In Kharkhordin's crucial argument, dissimulation did not *preserve* anterior individuality from official surveillance, but *produced* this very individuality by marking off from the domain of ritualised publicity a shadow zone gradually furnished through the displaced and transformed techniques of subjectification.<sup>167</sup> Thus, the New Soviet Man, whose formation was the utopian task of the revolution, was in fact created, albeit to the eventual disappointment of its makers: "Soviet society did succeed in creating a new individual, though not precisely the one intended. The goal was to construct a new society that would make saintly zeal its central organising principle; the result [...] was a society whose key constitutive practice was a pervasive, and in the long run, increasingly cynical dissimulation."<sup>168</sup>

In the Foucauldian and Deleuzian terminology of the fold that we have introduced in chapter 3.4.2., this dissimulative retraction into the secret sphere exemplifies the creation in the diagrammatic fabric of subjectification of interior folds, not amenable to its logic. In these practices, subjective interiority was formed as a result of active practices of *folding interiors*, concealed spaces of existence in the diagram that laid claims to totally enfolding the individual. This formulation permits us to conceive of the most secret, intimate and innermost aspects of individual subjectivity as neither anterior to governmental practice (as an originary locus of the essential subject) nor wholly constituted by it (as a 'social construct' without remainder), but as an effect of active operations of the diagrammatic subject on the surface of the diagram, a Foucauldian act of immanent *resistance*.

The notion of 'secret life' is crucial as a specification of the expression 'private life' which in the Soviet discourse has been fractured in two (ethically diametrically opposed) objects: 'personal' life (*lichnaya zhizn'*) and, in a strict translation, 'private' life (*chastnaya zhizn'*). While the former was accepted as a legitimate object

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 357. Kharkhordin utilises the intricate difference between two Russian words for 'dissimulation' to stress its constitutive function. While the dissimulative practices of Soviet citizens have long been noted in the literature, they were largely discussed in terms of 'hypocrisy' (*litsermerie*), which connotes playacting, 'changing faces' and thus presupposes the existence of the anterior subject who chooses multiple 'faces' or 'roles' in his dissimulative game. In contrast, the word '*pritorstvo*' refers to the practice of 'closing off', retraction or concealment. The latter sense of dissimulation accords with Kharkhordin's thesis on dissimulation as being *productive* of the private domain rather than *protective* of it. See *ibid.*, chapter 6, particularly pp. 270–274.

<sup>167</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 270–278.

<sup>168</sup> Kharkhordin 1997b, p. 335.

of Soviet discourse and constituted in such practices as the horizontal surveillance of the lives of the members of the collective and the public revelation of their possible misdeeds, the latter was, in Kharkhordin's fortunate phrase, "discursively assassinated" as an ideologically unacceptable vestige of the pre-Revolutionary order.<sup>169</sup> In our terms, the 'personal life' of the Soviet individual is a positivity formed in the governmental practices of subjectification that took a radically 'collectivist' and interventionist shape. On the other hand, one's 'private life' did not exist as an object of discourse at all but was in a strict sense *extra-diagrammatic*, unrepresentable within the Soviet discourse, the obscene double of the New Soviet Man. Discursively assassinated, private life was reincarnated at the exterior limit of the diagram as a secret domain, unspoken of and hence literally *non-discursive*.

In this manner, late-Soviet practices have *produced the dichotomy of public/private* and conditioned the possibility of emergence of post-Soviet individualism, once the simulative and ritualistic character of the public, 'official' discourse was sufficiently discredited and the primacy of the private sphere that was its by-product was asserted.<sup>170</sup> "This proliferation of secret, intimate spheres, created and controlled only by individuals, prepared the way for the easy public assertion of the value of *privacy* after 1991."<sup>171</sup> By the same token, the displacement of Soviet individualising techniques into this private realm, stripped of any ideological identification or any other form of 'higher conscience', entailed that self-fashioning became an end in itself, generating the ethical minimalism abhorred by both the official and the dissident establishment. This "spread of practices of autonomous self-fashioning contributed to a preparation of grounds for an easy and almost natural assertion of *autonomy* as one of the ultimate values of human existence in the post-1991 discourse."<sup>172</sup> Relying on Steven Lukes's definition of individualism as a combination of the values of privacy, autonomy and self-development<sup>173</sup> (the latter being integral to Soviet practices from the outset), Kharkhordin claims that all that was necessary for

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., pp. 343–346, 357–360.

<sup>170</sup> See Kharkhordin 1999, chapters 7, 8. An example of expansion of the mechanisms of the private sphere into the public is offered by the great salience of informal networks of exchange (*blat*) in political and economic activity in postcommunist Russia. See Ledeneva 1997.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., p. 357. Emphasis added.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., p. 358. Emphasis added.

<sup>173</sup> See Lukes 1973.

individualism to emerge in postcommunist Russia was merely a “bare reversal of the ideology of official collectivism”.<sup>174</sup>

Contrary to the general impression, it is thus not the private, but the ‘public’ sphere that is presently lacking a positive identity,<sup>175</sup> hence the tragicomic quest for the National Idea or any another variant of the discourse of community and solidarity in the Russia of the 1990s. To reiterate, the late-Soviet public/private distinction marked off the highly ritualised ideological space of compulsory participation and mutual surveillance from the secret and intimate private sphere. Neither of these spaces has any resemblance to the concept of the ‘social’ or ‘public’, utilised in contemporary communitarian accounts of civil society<sup>176</sup> – the former due to its repressive basis and a self-consciously ‘inauthentic’ character, the latter due to its origin in the disavowal of any ‘higher conscience’ as well as the impossibility of grounding social solidarity in the emotional intensity of intimate relations that formed the substance of this sphere. In Marc Garcelon’s terms, “communism spawned a hypertrophied public realm in the sense of state sovereignty and officialdom but an atrophied public realm in the sense of republican citizenship and political society.”<sup>177</sup>

The postcommunist ‘problem’, identified by a number of scholars, is therefore not the absence of individualism but its abundance, correlated with a lack of any ‘collective’ identity in the triumphant shadow society of ‘dissimulating individualists’. Garcelon has noted the tendency in postcommunist studies to conceive of this private space as a merely negative, residual concept, embracing all that can not be included in the realm of ideological officialdom.<sup>178</sup> Yet, in his own account he only partially breaks with this tendency, defining the shadow society negatively in terms of “rampant unregulated particularism” against the background of ‘Western’ “civic particularism”.<sup>179</sup> In the argument of Alexei Kara-Murza, this type of post-Soviet individualism is characterised by ‘unproductive individuality’, a situation in which

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<sup>174</sup> Kharkhordin 1999, p. 358.

<sup>175</sup> See Kapustin 1995, Kara-Murza 1995 for the discussion of the character of individualism in contemporary Russian society.

<sup>176</sup> See Cohen and Arato 1992 for a post-Marxist theory of civil society centred on the Habermasian notion of communicative action. For a critique of communitarian approaches to civil society see Meadwell 1995, Keane 1998.

<sup>177</sup> Garcelon 1997, p. 311.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315, 322.

atomised individuals are not engaged in civic relationships, but “become rolling stones, elements of [a] chaoticised system”.<sup>180</sup> Lev Gudkov posits as the main obstacle to ‘democratic transition’ the “socio-anthropological type created by the late Soviet conditions, [...] a ‘cunning slave’, all of whose thoughts are directed towards survival in adverse conditions”.<sup>181</sup> Similarly, Vadim Volkov, in his discussion of the possibility of ‘civil society’ in postcommunist Russia notes that the post-Soviet ‘shadow society’ is unfit as a foundation of that project due to its thorough negation of solidarity and collective action: “These relations held society together beyond the reach of the state, forming a paradoxical sphere that was *common* but *private*. It did not contribute to the formation of civil society but rather tended to undermine it by *substituting private consumption for common public action*.”<sup>182</sup> Finally, Slavoj Žižek claims that dissimulation and ‘private’ cynicism of late communist societies was the very mechanism by which the ‘system’ reproduced itself and that the ‘real’ danger to these regimes was rather an all too literal ideological identification with them.<sup>183</sup> Thus, the dissimulative structure of the postcommunist individual receives an almost universal normative condemnation.

Nonetheless, it appears that what is scornfully dismissed as unproductive and dangerous by theoreticians is enthusiastically appropriated by the practitioners of governmentality. Let us firstly note that the figure of the ‘common private sphere’ has considerable resemblance to the object presupposed by neoliberal governmentality, for which there indeed is no such thing as society and the explication of ‘private’ modalities of performance into the ‘public’ realm of the social is the central technological innovation. We shall also recall our argument above that neoliberalism effects the transformation of ‘private consumption’ and other entrepreneurial practices into a ‘culture’ and an ‘ethos’, thereby offering concrete models of ethical self-actualisation in place of a highly abstract discourse on ‘higher’ community values.

The deployment of the neoliberal mode of individualisation in the technology of agency in the Putin presidency therefore appears less an external imposition of an ‘alien’ ideology, detached from the transcendental foundations of the ‘Russian tradition’ than a restructuring of the mode of governmentality in the manner, isomorphous with

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<sup>180</sup> Kara-Murza 1995, p. 6. Translation by author.

<sup>181</sup> Gudkov 2001, p. 18.

<sup>182</sup> Volkov 1996, p. 94. Emphasis added.

<sup>183</sup> Žižek 1999a, p. 5.

late-Soviet and post-Soviet practices, i.e. discarding the 'collectivist' telos and grafting the governmental rationality onto the individualist 'shadow society' that is a 'side effect' of Soviet practices of subjectification. To recall our statement in the introduction to this study, postcommunist governmentality unfolds in the *topography of the ruins*, having at its disposal not the infinite richness of Imperial and Soviet 'traditions' but, rather less eminently, the products of their decomposition. It is thus the individualism, constituted in the late-Soviet practices of dissimulation that offers a possibility for the construction of a civil society defined in the ethically minimalist terms of autonomous self-enterprise.<sup>184</sup> Indeed, many of the reform programme's requirements for the newly formed subject, e.g. the capacity to easily shift socioeconomic roles in accordance with market demands, flexibility, mobility and self-organisation, accord very well with the chameleonic skills acquired in the dissimulative practices in the Soviet shadow society. The absence of any tribunal of 'higher conscience' and the recasting of self-development as its own goal similarly parallel the processes of displacement of Soviet subjectifying techniques into the informal private realm. Aside from one crucial demand that we shall shortly address, there is little in the construct of agency espoused by the programme that is not satisfied by the figure of the 'postcommunist individual (ist)' emerging from the ruins of the Soviet order.

This understanding provides a new perspective on the incessant discussion about the possibility of 'civil society' in Russia.<sup>185</sup> In spite of its 'socialist' or 'collectivist' credentials, the Soviet era can rather be conceived as the period of the atomisation of the social, the dissolution of anterior social, economic and cultural networks, their replacement by organised collectives as means of horizontal surveillance and the consequent augmentation of interpersonal distrust and the retreat into the private sphere. While this inheritance of the Soviet period makes problematic the emergence of a 'civil society' conforming to the social democratic discourse on social movements and communicative action, it presents conditions of possibility of the realisation of the neoliberal project that bypasses and autonomises the 'social'. Paradoxically at first

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<sup>184</sup> See Dean 1999, chapter 8, O'Malley 1996, Burchell 1996 for the discussion of the problematic status of 'civil society' in the neoliberal diagram, which seeks to dissolve 'the social' in the plurality of quasi-market domains. Within the social space presupposed and effected by neoliberal governmentality 'civil society' can only be articulated in minimalist terms as a realm of individual autonomy.

<sup>185</sup> See e.g. Kapustin 1995, Kara-Murza 1995, Fadin 1995, Volkov 1996, Kharkhordin 1997a, Alapuro 1993, Patomäki and Pursiainen 1999.

glance, the ‘communist’ experience of the Soviet Union makes impossible any project of reconstituting the social on ‘socialist’ or otherwise communitarian principles but readily provides the types of individuality and sociality consonant with the most radical versions of liberalism.

Therefore, the pedagogical technology of agency at work in the reforms of the Putin presidency can hardly be characterised as a spiritually impoverished imitative project to be contrasted with the authenticity, depth and esotericism of the ‘Russian tradition’. Its crucial difference from the more arcane versions of this ‘idea’ consists in the fact that instead of conjuring an abstruse mythology, it utilises the concrete effects of Soviet governmentality to actively shape the social in the way compatible with the emergent economic order. Although the reconstitution of the neoliberal subject on the ruins of the Soviet dissimulative ‘split subjectivity’ entirely lacks the lyrical ring of Romantic communitarianism, it successfully resolves the problem that plagues any attempt to articulate an alternative mode of subjectivity on the basis of the ‘tradition’, namely translating the ‘magic fog’ of such arcane concepts as *sobornost* into productive practice. It appears that the only fact that escapes the traditionalist fascination with the more exotic aspects of the Imperial and Soviet cultures is the fact of these orders’ *demise*, and thus, the manifest *non-existence* of the valorised vestiges of tradition.<sup>186</sup> Ironically, the neoliberal constructivism of the reformers of the 1990s and the present government is far more ‘embedded’ and ‘indigenous’ than the ‘traditionalist’ effort of imitating the simulacrum, constituted in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian adaptation of European romanticism.<sup>187</sup>

Furthermore, this technology of agency acquires a crucial locus of tactical support from such local-level practices as EU technical assistance that endow the governmental pedagogical design with concrete technical paradigms. From our description above it is evident that the pedagogical technology of the Putin presidency is relatively rudimentary and lacks such technically elaborate instruments of subjectification as continuous (re)training schemes, participatory planning routines, SWOT and logframe tables, algorithms of asymmetric dissemination, etc. The neoliberal technology of agency at work in the diagram of technical assistance offers more concrete and sophisticated instruments to incite participation and autonomous

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<sup>186</sup> Cf. Mau 1999, p. 17.

<sup>187</sup> See Walicki 1980, chapters 6, 10, 12.

discourse, involve the subject in a pedagogical relationship, empower the newly trained subjects as autonomous practitioners and authorise the resulting governmental construct as the expression of authentic autonomy. Against the background of incessant philosophical debates about what 'true' Russian 'identity' or 'tradition' *is*, such technical practices work to shape, mould, construct postcommunist subjectivity at the most local and material sites such as district heating operators' accounting offices, medico-social care centres, town meetings in national park areas. Furthermore, by virtue of their paradigmatic concreteness these subjectifying routines may be subsequently replicated, generalised and extended to various settings by Russian governmental agencies.<sup>188</sup> The tactical diagram of technical assistance thereby offers the federal-level governmental strategy concrete means to enfold and instrumentalise in its operations the autonomous subject, which was originally formed as an extra-diagrammatic shadow figure in the late-Soviet practices of dissimulation.

Nonetheless, the continuity between the late-Soviet object of the 'dissimulating individual(ist)' and the positivity of agency presupposed and effected in the reform strategy of the Putin presidency should not obscure for us a crucial difference between them, a difference that is both trivial and fundamental. As the governmental technology of agency attempts to graft itself onto and instrumentalise in its reforms the 'shadow' postcommunist individualism, it thereby performs an operation that inverts the practice of the emergence of the latter by *bringing the shadow object out into the open*. The sole feature of the anterior individualism denied by the governmental diagram is the feature that made it possible, namely dissimulation itself. "It is our duty to put an end to the *meaningless contest between the people and the authorities*

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<sup>188</sup> The technological concreteness and replicability of the governmental models, combined with the contingency of the effects of their deployment, permits us to displace the opposition of transitionalism and traditionalism (i.e. 'imitative' and 'indigenous' approaches) as a set of alternatives for the Russian postcommunist transformation. If the practical deployment of a governmental model necessarily produces contingent effects (Foucault 1991c, Gordon 1980), then the debate about the 'correct' model of transition is fruitless: any model chosen will function in an unpredictable manner in the environment of its deployment. By the same token, if the implementation of any governmental model necessarily depends on the presence within the domain of application of minimal conditions of its possibility, then the facile opposition to reform models as a violation of the living tradition is unfounded, unless, of course, one's version of 'tradition' is not *itself a model*, albeit of an alternative type. In short, from the perspective of governmentality, one may never confront a 'disreputable', 'culturally impoverished' model with the solemn force of Tradition: irrespectively of whether one's reform vision is articulated in terms of quantifiable indicators of efficiency or epic poetry, one remains within the dimension of the governmental model and its technical implementation.



*when the authorities generate a law and people invent ways to dodge them.* The creative activities of people should be directed not to “optimising” the tax schemes, but to developing their own business *by using the norms that we offer them.*”<sup>189</sup> This formulation succinctly sums up the government’s simultaneous adoption of postcommunist individualism as the ethical model of agency and the reversal of its constitutive principle. The ‘meaningless contest’ lamented by the president is a perfect description of the late-Soviet situation, which is popularly characterised as a perverse ‘social contract’ between the authorities and the population that promised relative governmental non-interference into one’s private life in exchange for ritual displays of loyalty to the system. As we have already discussed with reference to the technologies of rule and performance, it is the vestiges of this generalised *pretence*, from the mindless repetition of the slogans of ‘free’ health care and education to the maintenance of non-financed federal policy mandates, that the president finds most intolerable. Instead, Putin proposes a significant downsizing of state functions and the radical reduction of the zone of state interference simultaneously with ensuring that these minimal rules are observed strictly and without exception. By the same token, entrepreneurial creative activities of the population are incited and promised governmental facilitation, but only on the condition that they unfold not in the uncontrolled shadow domain but in the newly formed diagrammatic space delimited by business-friendly rules of the game.

We may thus suggest that the Putin presidency offers a new type of ‘social contract’: *liberty in exchange for transparency.*<sup>190</sup> The postcommunist subject is offered a way out of the shadow and onto the pedestal as the ethical model of government, but at the price of abandoning her constitutive practice of dissimulation and subjecting herself to governmental practices that reinscribe her as transparent to authority. The technology of agency, espoused by the reform programme, is thus simultaneously modest and radical. On the one hand, there is little in the *content* of the pedagogical model of the active autonomous agent that contradicts or violates the anterior postcommunist individuality. On the other hand, the transformation of this

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<sup>189</sup> Putin 2002, p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>190</sup> The phrase ‘new social contract’ is actually used in the government’s programme. (Main Directions, vol. 1, p. 74. Translation by author.) The contract metaphor that echoes the ‘Contract with America’, offered by the US Republican Party in their victorious election campaign of 1994, was launched by the Union of Right Forces (SPS) in the 1999 parliamentary elections.

individuality from a shadow non-discursive excess of the Soviet collectivist diagram into the valorised intra-diagrammatic positivity, whose 'socialisation into the market environment' is pedagogically facilitated, radically alters the character of this individuality. The specific character of this alteration may be illuminated with the help of a brief consideration of a well-known historical anecdote.

In the late 1980s, during the Soviet-American rapprochement and the increased openness of the Soviet Union towards the outside world, one of the most popular television broadcasts was the talk show called 'TV Bridge' linking Soviet and American audiences, encountering one another for the first time and with mutual fascination. On one of such shows, a member of the American audience brought up the topic of sex, only to receive the puzzling answer from a lady in the Soviet audience: "There is no sex in the Soviet Union." The noise of ridicule that accompanied the recollection of this incident during the following decade should not obscure for us the significance of this quintessentially Foucauldian statement. Bracketing off a crude naturalism according to which the very existence of the author of this study is sufficient to falsify this statement, we ought to agree with the anonymous speaker that in the Soviet Union sex did not indeed exist as an object of discourse. Secondly, our Foucauldian orientation entails the denial of any possible existence of sex *outside* of discourse: "We must not make the mistake of thinking that sex is an autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold effects of sexuality over the entire length of its surface of contact with power. On the contrary, sex is the *most speculative, most ideal and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality*."<sup>191</sup> In a strict sense, relations of physical intimacy were extra-diagrammatic and non-discursive within the curiously puritan Soviet order, functioning as the obscene excess that escaped discursive articulation and, for this very reason, *escaped its governmental deployment* that, according to Foucault, has accompanied the formation of sex in discourse.

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<sup>191</sup> Foucault 1990a, p. 155. Emphasis added. We rely here on Foucault's seminal thesis in *The History of Sexuality* (1990a) about sex as the object formed *within* a discourse of sexuality rather than a natural object, *about* which this discourse is articulated. "Sexuality must not be thought as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network, in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power." (Foucault 1990a, p. 105.)

There is thus a clear structural similarity between Soviet 'sex' and the Soviet 'individual(ism)' that we have discussed. Both objects were located in the same narrow space at the exterior limit of the diagram (and thus understandably intersected, making relations of intimacy a paradigm of shadow quasi-sociality). We may therefore hypothesise about the effects of the 'transparentisation' of the postcommunist subject, relying on the effects of the discursive rendition of sex in the post-Soviet Russia. The veritable explosion of the discourse on sex in the 1990s, its relentless verbalisation that passionately sought to prove the proverbial talk show participant wrong, appears to follow D.H. Lawrence's injunction that Foucault, in his critique of the 'repressive hypothesis', found so curious: "There has been so much action in the past, especially sexual action, a wearying repetition over and over, without a corresponding thought, a corresponding realisation. Now our business is to realise sex. *Today the full realisation of sex is even more important than the act itself.*"<sup>192</sup> In relation to Russian postcommunist experience, Anna Temkina's study demonstrates that this relentless 'realisation' of sex has produced effects that accord with Foucault's critique of sexuality as an instrument of governmental regulation: the reduction of the manifold relations of intimacy to the monotony of physio- and psychological discourse, displacement and transformation of pleasure into the pleasure of reflexive discourse about pleasure, technicisation and professionalisation of the relations of intimacy through their subjection to the authority of expert models, offering 'technical assistance' to one's pursuit of sexual 'self-fulfilment'.<sup>193</sup>

*In short, sex became governmentalised at the very moment it emerged as a positivity.* Temkina's research into Russian women's perceptions of sexuality provides testimony of the jurisdictional effects of this discursive rendition: the pedagogical injunction to sexual identity and the technicisation of sexuality have, for a number of respondents, elicited discomfort, resistance, a sense of trivialisation of intimacy and, most importantly, a feeling of *nostalgia*, though not a nostalgia for Soviet puritanism but for the *freedom* that the latter unwittingly allowed. "The lost forbidden sexuality of the Soviet times is represented as free and especially attractive."<sup>194</sup> This paradoxical

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<sup>192</sup> D.H. Lawrence cited in Foucault 1990a, p. 157. Emphasis added.

<sup>193</sup> See Temkina 2002.

<sup>194</sup> Temkina 2002, p. 340. Translation by author. As one of the respondents in Temkina's study put it: "it's not like there is more of [sex] now, on the contrary, it has all become rather boring really, because it is no longer prohibited." (Ibid. Translation by author.)

experience of freedom is not exhausted by the proverbial attraction of the forbidden fruit – in a strict sense, Soviet authorities did not go as far as to *ban* the actual intercourse, which, incidentally, would have placed it squarely *within* the diagram as a ‘taboo’ object. Yet, the ‘discursive assassination’ of physical intimacy that did take place made it impossible to *govern* these relations, problematise, promote, optimise, mobilise, channel, regulate and direct them, endow them with the privileged status of the kernel of the truth of one’s being and offer access to that truth through the injunction to the generalised and ubiquitous confession – in short, put them into play within a dispositional diagram as an object of knowledge and power. If ‘there was no sex in the Soviet Union’, then, by definition, it could neither be known nor acted upon by government. With regard to the object of agency, Kharkhordin concludes his discussion of the emergence of the Soviet dissimulating individual with a similar point: having discursively assassinated the private sphere, Soviet governmentality simultaneously disarmed itself in relation to it, no longer being able to contain it, simply because it could not see it.<sup>195</sup> It is this effacement of the subject from the governmental field of visibility that allowed a sense of freedom at the same time as it precluded the formation of one’s positive identity. Conversely, the grafting of the ‘free subject’ onto the pedagogical technology of agency in President Putin’s reforms, supported by the EU practices of technical assistance, promises the proliferation of the discourse on freedom and the technical models of its facilitation, and threatens to elicit the same sense of nostalgia as that presently experienced with regard to that non-existent Soviet sex. Yet, what is this strange notion of freedom that is not merely negative in the classical Berlinian sense,<sup>196</sup> but has negativity and absence as its very kernel and disappears at the moment of its discursive rendition? We shall attempt to answer this question in the final chapter of the study. At this point, let us complete the discussion of the integration of the diagram of technical assistance into the strategic field of contemporary Russian socioeconomic reforms with the summary of the interface of these governmental diagrams and a brief discussion of its more general implications for the Russian postcommunist politics of emergence.

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<sup>195</sup> Kharkhordin 1997b, p. 360.

<sup>196</sup> See Berlin 2002. We shall discuss Berlin’s two concepts of liberty in detail in chapter 5.2.2.

## 4.5. 'The Normal Human Logic': Depoliticisation and Governmental 'Enlightenment'

### 4.5.1. 'Managed Democracy' and the EU-Russian Interface

Our outline of the strategic diagram of governmentality at work in the socioeconomic reforms launched by the Putin presidency demonstrates a strong affinity with the diagram of technical assistance that we have reconstituted in our analysis. The practically identical character of the three governmental technologies of rule, performance and agency in the two diagrams points to the functioning of technical assistance as a *local support* to the federal reform programme, an instance of a literally *technical assistance* to the federal policy that shares with it the basic diagrammatic structure. In terms of Foucault's notion of 'double conditioning' of strategy and tactics we may claim that the governmental diagram of the Putin presidency conditions the possibility of the deployment of tactical practices of technical assistance by reconfiguring the overall strategic field as *the infra-liberal space of constitutive governmental intervention* for the purposes of autonomisation of postcommunist subjects as entrepreneurs of themselves. Concrete neoliberal proposals advocated in the Tacis projects may thereby unfold in the same diagrammatic space to which they owe their own conditions of emergence. Conversely, tactical practices of technical assistance condition the formation of the strategic diagram by providing the federal government with *concrete exemplary pilot models* produced in accordance with the rationality identical to the one deployed in the government's reform strategy. Of course, a Foucauldian approach attunes us to the polyvalent character of discourses and governmental practices, which makes the identity of the two diagrams in question strictly momentary and, in principle, subject to destabilisation. However, our analysis has not resulted in the identification of any *empirical* instances of such destabilisation but rather suggests that the governmental models instituted in the practices of technical assistance provide tangible support to the ambitious reform programme of the Putin presidency.

This relationship of identity suggests that the deployment of characteristically neoliberal problematisations and interventions in both diagrams is due neither to their 'inherent' value and validity nor to the ideological preferences of particular politicians and experts. Instead, this deployment, both strategic and tactical, is

conditioned by the historical conjuncture of postcommunist politics of emergence: the infra-liberal problematic appears to *call for* the deployment of precisely that mode of governmentality, which is marked by a *constructivist technology of government*, a *pedagogical technology of agency* and an *entrepreneurial technology of performance*. Indeed, the genealogy of neoliberalism in the critique of welfarism as a betrayal of the liberal ethos and its quasi-conservative rhetoric of *return, renewal* and *reactivation* of liberal principles of self-reliance, autonomy and independence<sup>197</sup> attune us to the affinity between *advanced* liberal governmentality and the postcommunist mode of government whose problem is the very *institution* of liberalism. As we have suggested above, neoliberalism may well be conceived as a permanent replay of the situation of emergence of the liberal order, a traversal of the blank zone of indistinction in an attempt at ‘beginning anew’. This connection makes it easier to understand why the reform solutions, conditioned by and articulated in contemporary Western neoliberalism, appear so fitting for the infra-liberal problematic of the constitution of the liberal order.

We may thus conclude that the two diagrams of governmentality at work in the EU-Russian interface are *archaeologically identical, but genealogically distinct*.<sup>198</sup> While Western neoliberalism finds its point of descent in the critique of welfarism from a politically conservative standpoint and the radicalisation of the liberal principles of government through their artefactual extension to new domains, the genealogy of Russian neoliberalism may be traced to the process of the demise of the Soviet order and the specificity of the postcommunist moment of foundation. Of course, the very claim about the deployment of neoliberalism by the Russian government may appear controversial, particularly in the light of frequently sensationalist critiques of the Putin presidency and caricaturised portrayals of Russian (political) culture.<sup>199</sup> Our conclusions suggest the fruitfulness of the focus on the domain of governmental

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<sup>197</sup> See e.g. Rose 1998, pp. 64–65, Cruikshank 1998, Dean 1998, 1999, chapter 8.

<sup>198</sup> In this formulation we rely on Foucault’s account of the relation between archaeological and genealogical dimensions of historical ontology: “The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms [of problematisation] themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyse their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter.” (Foucault 1990b, p. 12.) The archaeological identity of the two diagrams we are studying therefore refers to their ‘synchronic’, (infra)structural features, while the difference of their genealogies refers to the ‘diachronic’, historical conjuncture that conditioned their emergence.

<sup>199</sup> See e.g. Shlapentokh 2000, Herspring and Kipp 2001 for the example of both tendencies.

rationality, where the issues of Russian postcommunist transformation may be approached in the absence of either the teleologisms of transition to democracy or the traditionalist postulation of ‘cultural’ continuity. In this domain, we have identified the problem-space of infra-liberalism that enables us to understand and appreciate the prevalence of neoliberal solutions in Russian governmental practices throughout the 1990s, starting from the cabinet of Yegor Gaidar (1991–1992) and persistently resurfacing, despite the lack of social support and the repeated pronouncements of demise, in various periods of postcommunist Russian history: e.g. the ‘Young Reformers’ team in 1997, the Kirienko cabinet in 1998, the Kasyanov cabinet in the Putin presidency. Indeed, even during the periods of apparent ideological disgrace of neoliberal reforms, such as the brief reign of Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister, observers have noted the stubborn resuscitation of particularly the economic policies of the discredited ‘young reformers’.<sup>200</sup> The three technologies of agency, performance and rule that we have reconstituted in our description of the Putinian governmental diagram can be conceived as concretised adaptations of the three foundational principles present in the official slogan of Russian neoliberals since the early 1990s: “freedom, property, legality”.<sup>201</sup>

On the other hand, the ‘social democratic’ or ‘welfarist’ variant of reform, ideologically predominant in the late Soviet period and incessantly advocated during the Yeltsin presidency, has neither found a successful political expression nor materialised in concrete governmental practices. The discourses of ‘social market economy’ that did circulate in the 1990s carry only a nominal resemblance to Western social democracy: the programme of restricting market mechanisms to the limited sector of small business and enhancing administrative state regulation of other economic processes rather brings to mind the disastrous project of the late-Soviet ‘Perestroika’.<sup>202</sup> The notion of infra-liberalism as well as our discussion of the topography of the ruins of Soviet governmentality permit us to venture that the frequently noted absence or marginality of socialist or social-democratic political

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<sup>200</sup> See Mau 1999, p. 18.

<sup>201</sup> The most recent version of this slogan, “Freedom, Property, Effective State”, presented in the 2003 programmatic article by Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right Forces, resonates even stronger with the reform project of the Putin presidency. See Nemtsov 2003.

<sup>202</sup> For a detailed critique of ‘neo-Soviet’ discourses of ‘social market’ see Mau 1999, Aleksandrov 2001a, Gontmaher 2001.

forces in contemporary Russia is not a matter of curious neglect, but a *conceptual* and *technological impossibility*. There is, strictly speaking, no domain of 'the social' to be found in the postcommunist landscape, in which (and in the name of which) governmental practices, consonant with welfarism, could unfold.<sup>203</sup> In contrast, the existence of both shadow markets and shadow subjects that Russia inherited from the demise of the Soviet Union offers a domain which, if governmentalised and thus made transparent, is in full accordance with the minimalist concept of society presupposed by neoliberalism.

Finally, we ought to briefly address the relationship of the mutually reinforcing EU-Russian infra-liberal interface of governmental practices to the largely negative image of the Putin presidency in Europe. There is a noticeable puzzle in the fact that the practically complete convergence of the modes of governmentality espoused by EU Tacis and the Russian government coexists with Western, and particularly European, criticism of the policies of the Putin presidency as 'authoritarian' and 'illiberal', a criticism that makes use of the concepts of 'guided' and 'managed' democracy to designate the *deficiency* of Russian politics.<sup>204</sup> We should note that in its original articulation in the Russian discourse the proverbial term 'managed democracy'<sup>205</sup> has not figured as an aberration of the mythical 'true' democracy, but rather was used to designate the dynamic of socio-political consolidation that does away with the revolutionary flux and thereby makes possible 'normal politics' of the kind practiced in contemporary empirical liberal democracies.

Ironically, the very terms 'managed', 'regulated' or 'guided' liberal democracy may well be used as *accurate* and *in no way derogatory* designators for the infra-liberal practices of EU technical assistance, which, as we have demonstrated, generalise the inherent illiberality of liberalism by deploying the constructivist pedagogical technology in the constitution of local agents as autonomous enterprising subjects

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<sup>203</sup> For the studies of the rise and fall of social forms of governmentality and their relation to liberalism see Rose 1998, Hindess 1996b, Hänninen 1998, Donzelot 1979, 1991. See Dean 1999, pp. 53–55 for the argument that 'social government' or welfarism has been *made possible* by the liberal constitution of the social as an autonomous domain with its own rationality. From this perspective, the emergence of a 'social' form of governmentality in postcommunist Russia is ironically 'premature', disabled by the underdevelopment of the liberal domain of society.

<sup>204</sup> See e.g. Mendelson 2000, Shlapentokh 2000, Herspring and Kipp 2001, Gudkov 2001, Shevtsova 2001, 2002. For an alternative perspective see Zudin 2002, Bunin et al 2001a.

<sup>205</sup> See Tretyakov 2000, Markov 2000.



through their participatory indoctrination into the externally grounded discourse. Furthermore, in the EU-Russian interface it is precisely the Tacis practices that *contribute* to the *manageability* of the instituted order by supplying it with *tactical loci of support* (e.g. medico-social establishments in Karelia that anticipate the proposed federal-level health care reform), *concrete technical models* of the proposed reforms of social sector institutions on an ‘enterprise basis’ (e.g. blueprints for the establishment of ESCOs and contract-based general practices, ‘entrepreneurial’ management plans for national parks, exemplary curricula for reformed professional practices), *specific enunciative modalities* for the practice of the reform discourse (e.g. newly (re)trained and empowered ‘advocates of reform’ and ‘local consultants’). In relation to the governmental rationality of Putin’s reform project, the diagram constituted in the EU practices of technical assistance has the status of the *paradigm* in the ‘specific’ Kuhnian sense of an *exemplar of a problem-solution*.<sup>206</sup> In Kuhn’s well-known account, the emergence of a paradigm marks the transition from ‘revolutionary’ to ‘normal’ science. By the same token, we may observe in the Putin presidency a move from revolutionary politics of emergence to the ‘normal’, depoliticised order of ‘management’ of economy and society, the order whose possibility is conditioned by the existence of such paradigms of governmentality as those provided by EU Tacis.

One may therefore debate whether Western criticism of ‘guided democracy’ in Russia is an instance of a reflexive auto-critique of liberalism or a systematic misrecognition of the character of Russian postcommunist transformation. What appears definite is the existence, at the concrete site of the EU-Russian interface that we have reconstituted in our analysis, of a basic identity in governmental rationalities,

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<sup>206</sup> The Midterm Programme of Socioeconomic Development for the period of 2003–2005 explicitly proclaims that, despite many successes in the implementation of the reforms designed in the ‘Main Directions’, many of the planned reforms have stalled or lost momentum not because of political resistance but due to the absence of *concrete mechanisms* and *models* of policy implementation. See Programme 2003–2005, pp. 4–7, 92–93. As we have seen, it is precisely such mechanisms and models that are formed in the discourse of technical assistance. The Programme also stipulates the undertaking of *experiments*, in which new “methods and principles of government” could be *piloted* and *tested*. (Ibid., p. 44. Translation by author.) EU technical assistance projects offer a concrete site for such experiments, whose results, insofar as they are deemed successful, may be presented as ‘tangible’ evidence in favour of the federal ‘strategic line’. An indicator of the latter possibility is the membership of the nationwide Tacis project on health care reform in the expert team of the Strategic Designs Centre. See <http://www.csr.ru/partners/index.html#experts>.

an identity all too easily obscured in the fashionable trend to collapse questions of political divergence into problems of 'culture' and 'identity'. In his incisive critique of the 'theory of democratic peace' Ido Oren has reversed the postulated causal relationship between the 'democratic identity' of a country and its pacific foreign policy by demonstrating the way the designation of a country as 'democratic' is both historically variable and contingent upon a multitude of momentary political factors. In a concluding hypothesis, Oren claimed that "the American view of the democratic or non-democratic identity of Russia will continue to depend on the peacefulness of their foreign policies more than their foreign policies will depend on their democratic identity."<sup>207</sup> Taking into consideration the hegemony of the (variably construed) 'democracy' as a political form in contemporary world politics, one is tempted to concur with this thesis and suggest that the withholding of 'democratic identity' from postcommunist Russia or its 'qualification' through the proliferation of ad hoc adjectival adjustments have little relation to the quasi-cultural 'depth' of Russia's transformation but are rather the effect of surface-level political divergences that need not be traced back to the originary 'source' of identity.

Nonetheless, there is one crucial difference between the diagrams of EU Tacis and the Russian government that merits closer attention. This difference concerns the relation of the dispositional diagram to the political, and, more specifically, to the sovereign act of its institution. As we have discussed at length, the neoliberal technology of rule at work in the diagram of technical assistance is marked by the attempt to efface sovereign transcendence through the dissemination of 'good governance' that dissolves the very distinction between government and its objects and thus displaces the very problem of limits, central both to the Schmittian problematic of sovereignty (as a discourse about the institution of limits) and classical liberal governmentality (as a discourse about their preservation). By virtue of this displacement, neoliberal 'governance' appears as a self-immanent diagram with no 'outside' or 'remainder' to it and hence with no capacity to accommodate the locus of sovereign decision, which, as we have argued, is always marginally exterior to the diagram that it institutes. We have also suggested that this *effacement* of sovereignty does not in fact *annul* sovereignty: depoliticisation is according to Schmitt "in actuality a typical,

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<sup>207</sup> Oren 1995, p. 17.

though unusually intensive way of pursuing politics”.<sup>208</sup> The sole consequence of the attempt to banish sovereign decision is the increasing indistinction of the two forms of power, whose entanglement generates what Dean refers to as ‘total’ liberal government. The interpretation of this disavowal of sovereignty in contemporary Western neoliberalism is a complex question beyond the scope of this study, a question whose future genealogy would undoubtedly benefit from both Schmitt’s incisive critique of the philosophical anthropology of liberalism<sup>209</sup> and Foucault’s studies of the emergence of biopolitical power over life and generalised disciplinary government that supplanted discontinuous and irregular sovereign ‘carnivals of atrocity’.<sup>210</sup> Sovereignty, the constitutive force of unfounded decision that *ipso facto* manifests itself in a bizarre, discontinuous, irregular and obscene manner, has, according to these authors, been disavowed as a mere superfluous excess of the order in whose emergence it was necessarily implicated.<sup>211</sup> What we seek to contribute to this critique of the depoliticising tendency in liberalism is only the claim that this tendency

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<sup>208</sup> Schmitt 1976, p. 21. See also Strauss 1976, p. 82: “Liberalism negated the political; by so doing liberalism did not banish the political from the world but merely concealed it. Liberalism brought about that *politics is carried on by means of antipolitical speech*. Liberalism has not killed the political, but merely killed understanding of the political and *sincerity* regarding the political.” (Emphasis added.)

<sup>209</sup> See Schmitt 1976, 1985a, 1985b. Schmitt’s famous assertion about man’s being as “problematic”, “dynamic and dangerous” (Schmitt 1976, p. 61.) does not necessarily amount to any ‘foundationalist’ claim about human nature but rather points to the *existential condition* of pluralistic antagonism, to which ‘anthropological optimism’ scarcely applies. Schmitt’s critique of liberalism proceeds from this irreducibility of antagonism to argue for the ineradicability of ungrounded decision that liberalism seeks to displace in its ideal of open discussion and rational consensus: “The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half-measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion.” (Schmitt 1985a, p. 63. See also Schmitt 1985b, pp. 33–51 for the critique of the notion of discussion.)

<sup>210</sup> See Foucault 1977a, 1990a. See Miller 1990 for the provocative discussion of Foucault’s Nietzschean ethical preference for outward and visible forms of violence as opposed to the technicised and sanitised regularity of disciplinary technologies that Foucault discovers as the counterpart of the liberal narrative of ‘humanisation’.

<sup>211</sup> Cf. Foucault 1990a, p. 88: “Criticism of the 18<sup>th</sup> century monarchic institution [...] was not directed against the juridico-monarchic sphere as such, but was made on behalf of a *pure and rigorous juridical system* to which all the mechanisms of power could conform, *with no excesses or irregularities*, as opposed to a monarchy, which, notwithstanding its own assertions, continuously overstepped the legal framework and set itself above the laws. Political criticism availed itself [...] of all the juridical thinking that had accompanied the development of the monarchy, in order to condemn the latter.” (Emphasis added.)

is not *inherent* to liberalism and that a properly *political* (i.e. avowedly sovereign) assertion of liberalism remains possible.

As we have seen, the 'Putinian' infra-liberalism is marked by the persistent *display* of the sovereign excess, even as the substantive scope and intensity of state intervention is to be radically diminished in the advocated socioeconomic reforms.<sup>212</sup> In a gesture reminiscent of Ordoliberal governmentality, the presidency both explicitly valorises the principles of enterprise and autonomous agency and sets itself aside from the domain, in which these principles are to be deployed. This display of sovereignty may be understood against the background of the experience of the displacement of statehood as the act of reassertion of the identity of the agent of government through the forcible institution of limits, the effort of 'self-presencing' or 'self-constitution' in

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<sup>212</sup> The avowedly sovereign character of Putinian infra-liberalism is vividly illustrated by the ongoing controversy around the oil corporation Yukos and the arrest in October 2003 of its CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky on charges of fraud and tax evasion, committed during the privatisation process in the 1990s. While this affair (still unfolding at the time of writing) is worthy of a detailed analysis in its own right, a brief remark should suffice to point out its significance in relation to the argument of this chapter. In our terms, the decision to prosecute Yukos exemplifies the display of sovereign transcendence to the diagram that the sovereign himself institutes. It is crucial to recall that the official position of the Presidency consists in insistently maintaining the continuity of the 'rules of the game' and the course of liberal socioeconomic reforms and casting the prosecution of Yukos as a 'one-off', a singular case, an *exception* to the policy line that opposes the revision of the results of privatisation. Thus, *pace* many critical commentaries on the incident in and out of Russia, we are dealing *not* with a political rupture of the diagram, i.e. the shift of the policy course of the Presidency towards de-privatisation and re-nationalisation, but with the sovereign decision on taking exception from the positive principles of the diagram, a decision that has both particular and universal dimensions. In its particular aspect, this decision targets a specific 'oligarchic' group with alleged political ambitions to reassert, in an exemplary manner, the state monopoly on the political. More importantly, in its universal aspect, this decision displays the *ever-present possibility* of sovereign exception and thereby supplements (and thus, in the Derridean logic, undermines) the very positivity of order that Putin's regime installs. The position of the presidency that combines taking exception from the rules of the game with maintaining their continuity must thus be distinguished from the more straightforward stance of e.g. the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which has advocated full-scale re-nationalisation of big business and thus a complete *dismantlement* of the (neo)liberal diagram. In contrast, the presidential decision is more accurately analysable in terms of the *deconstruction* of the diagram, whereby no new positivity is produced but the existing one is undermined by its opening to the sovereign supplement. Irrespectively of whether the rationale behind this decision consisted in political antagonism, particular economic interests or personal animosity, its effect has been the *re-politicisation* of the neoliberal diagram and the correlate break with the sociopolitical stabilisation that was the key feature of most of Putin's presidential term. It is no coincidence that a widespread reaction of Russian commentators to this affair was the hope for the 'return of politics' to Russia after the technocratic management of 2000–2003. See e.g. Remizov 2003a.

the face of the indistinction of state and society, the public and the private. Indeed, in contrast to the diagram of technical assistance which poses and provides an answer to the question of 'good governance', the quality of government is secondary in Putin's discourse to the question of *limits*, both limits *to* governmental activity and the limits that mark the irreducible space of the state's sovereign identity, however narrow and formal. We may thus conclude that although the diagrams of governmentality involved in the EU-Russian interface are *substantively identical*, the difference between them is of the order of self-presentation, i.e. their relation to the sovereign supplement that conditions them. The claim about the alleged 'statism' of Putin's project is thus only plausible within this formal infrastructural dimension and could only be deployed in the domain of substantive policies by virtue of wilful ignorance of the scale of the advocated and implemented reforms. Let us suggest that the misrecognition of the (neo)liberal character of Putin's reform project is owing to the fallacy akin to what we have referred to as the 'assumption of depth': it is certainly tempting to conceive of the formal display of sovereign transcendence, whose paradigm is provided by the obscene verbal performances with which we have started this chapter, as the indicator of something beyond itself, an interpretive clue or even that rare moment in which the observer is granted a peak beyond the façade of representation to glimpse the 'true face' of power. Of course, if we recognise that the 'meaning' of these performances is exhausted by the fact of their enunciation, it appears more important to focus one's critical efforts not on the displays of sovereign exteriority but on the interiority of the diagram that they delimit. What *takes place* in the constitution of postcommunist governmentality, and more specifically, what are the *stakes* of this constitution?

#### 4.5.2. The End of Transition and the Loss of Virginity

Let us recall the figure that we have identified as a basic presupposition of the infra- and neo-liberal diagrams of governmentality – the *clean slate*. As we have argued above, this presupposition is structurally necessary to and constitutive of what we have called the pedagogical technology, in which liberal autonomy and the ethos of enterprise are to be inculcated in the agent, whose present existence is problematised and deemed in need of external intervention for the purpose of his eventual autonomisation and empowerment. The primary feature of this presupposition is a *devaluation of anteriority*, understood simply as a state of affairs that precedes

governmental intervention rather than a locus of quasi-natural authenticity.<sup>213</sup> The devaluation of anteriority is thus not equivalent to the denial or repression of one's authentic identity but rather consists in problematising the actuality of one's existence as flawed, erroneous or insignificant and thus a *non-value* in relation to the advocated transformation. In the Russian context, this position recalls the famous problematisation of Russia as a 'non-historical nation' by the 19<sup>th</sup> century philosopher Petr Chaadaev. In the following brief exposition of Chaadaev's classical theses on historicity and constitution, authenticity and artifice we shall not, of course, seek to establish a facile quasi-cultural connection between this originary moment of Russian political philosophy and the foundational moment of postcommunism but merely attempt to illuminate the basic structure and outline the implications of the constructivist pedagogical technology.

The first of Petr Chaadaev's 'Philosophical Letters', *Necropolis*, famously begins with pronouncing Russia as "standing out of time, belonging to neither the West nor the East and *having no tradition of either*".<sup>214</sup> Contrary to the emergent Slavophile trend in intellectual fashion that advanced a critique of 'Westernising' governmental practices with recourse to the alternative, 'Eastern' tradition to which Russia belonged, Chaadaev refuses any positive identification of Russian tradition and rather asserts its specificity in terms of lack, absence and fissure: "I never cease being amazed at this *absence*, this perplexing *severance* of our social being."<sup>215</sup> Faced with this absence as the constitutive characteristic of Russian existence, Chaadaev is equally critical of both proto-Slavophile traditionalists and pro-European 'reformers'. With regard to the former Chaadaev issues a stinging accusation of irrelevance that continues to be timely in the contemporary context: "These days lousy writers, talentless antiquaries and a few failed poets [...] self-assuredly portray and resurrect the times and mores, which nobody remembers or likes anymore."<sup>216</sup> With regard to the latter Chaadaev ridicules what he calls the "nonsensical proposition [...] that we can appropriate this

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<sup>213</sup> We ought to emphasise that our notion of anteriority has no connotations of authenticity or naturalness: 'that-which-is-there' before any given governmental practice is in all probability always an effect of another governmental practice or, as is the case with the postcommunist individual, its marginal side effect that achieved primacy in the aftermath of the dissolution of the mode of government in question.

<sup>214</sup> Chaadaev 2002b, p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>216</sup> Chaadaev 2002a, p. 6. Translation by author.

progress of the peoples of Europe without bothering even to find out how it took place".<sup>217</sup> This accusation appears to place Chaadaev squarely within the ranks of numerous sceptics about Russia's capacity to emulate 'European', 'Western' or any other external economic, social or political practices due to the differences in the 'historico-cultural context'. His discussion of the virtues of 'European man' stresses their irreducibility to 'moral principles' and 'philosophical propositions' that could presumably be adopted in Russia with relative ease. Instead, Chaadaev focuses on the infinitesimal details that constitute a "*well-ordered life*"<sup>218</sup>, the habitual and self-evident practices that belong not to the consciousness but to the "*physiology of European man*".<sup>219</sup> It is in this aspect of 'authenticity' that Russians are found wanting: in a well-known expression that discomfotingly resonates with Sorokin's image that accompanies us in this study, "that which for other peoples is merely a habit, an instinct, *has to be hammered into our heads*".<sup>220</sup> It is thus the 'inherent inauthenticity' of the Russian individual, the impossibility of ever approaching the 'physiological' threshold of internalisation of a culture that constitutes his curse of 'non-historicity'. Lacking any positive cultural identification and endlessly doomed to the emulation that will never fully succeed in reaching the point of complete identification, Russians are resigned to forever remain 'strangers to themselves'.

Our memories do not go any further back than yesterday; we are, as it were, *strangers to ourselves. We traverse time so remarkably that, as we move forward, the past escapes us forever. This is a natural result of a culture, wholly based on borrowing and imitation. We completely lack internal development and natural progress, old ideas are swept aside by new ones, because the latter do not arise from the former but appear among us from God knows where. We accept only fully readymade ideas, therefore the indelible traces, which the gradual development of thought leaves in the mind [...], make no furrow on our consciousness. We grow but we do not mature, we advance, but obliquely, in a direction that does not lead to any goal. We resemble those children that were not taught to reason independently, so that when they grow up, they have nothing of their own, all their knowledge is superficial, all of their soul is external to them.*<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Chaadaev 2002b, p. 6. Translation by author.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

Of course, the originality of Chaadaev's thought consists in the subsequent reversal of this dire assessment of Russian existence that makes of the curse of non-historicity a unique and valuable opportunity. *The Apology of a Madman*, a response to the overwhelming criticism of the *Necropolis* theses, leaves intact the diagnosis of non-historicity and the absence of tradition, but this time presents them as the *condition of possibility* of Peter the Great's radical reforms and the source of all hope for Russia's future. "With his mighty blow, [Peter] swept away all our institutions, carving out an abyss between our past and our present, and threw all of our legends down into it."<sup>222</sup> Yet, the very possibility of this sovereign act of the constitution of the new order was, according to Chaadaev, *owing to that radical non-identity* that he previously identified as Russia's defect:

Would the country allow having its past taken away from it and having Europe's past, as it were, imposed on her? [...] Let us not be misguided: however great the genius of this man and the incredible energy of his will, what he did was only possible in a nation, whose past did not powerfully point to the path which it must follow, whose traditions were powerless to create its future, whose reminiscences the courageous lawmaker could erase with impunity. If we were so subservient to the voice of the Sovereign, this is obviously because there was *nothing in our past that could justify resistance*.<sup>223</sup>

What was anterior to Peter's reforms is thus presented as literally a clean slate, or in Chaadaev's own expression, a 'blank sheet': "Peter the Great found at home only a *blank sheet of paper*, and with his strong hand wrote 'Europe' and 'the West' on it, and from then onwards we belong to Europe and the West."<sup>224</sup>

This argument is of course nothing less than a forceful assertion of the very 'nonsensical proposition' that Chaadaev ridiculed in *Necropolis*. The reversal undertaken by Chaadaev makes the 'authentic' or 'indigenous' *pattern* of Western development no longer necessary to the successful emulation of the final *outcome*. In other words, the institution of a governmental diagram does not require the traversal of all stages of its genealogy. On the contrary, the 'natural' historical process is

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<sup>222</sup> Chaadaev 2002a, p. 2. Translation by author. For the discussion of Chaadaev's reversal see Walicki 1980, pp. 88–91. Walicki notes that the assumption of the 'clean slate' with regard to Russia has also been characteristic of a number of European philosophers, including Leibnitz and Diderot. See also Etkind 2002 for the discussion of the function of the 'clean slate' assumption in Russian imperial history.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., p. 3. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added. Translation by author.



devalued as imbued with accidents, errors and the resistance of old ‘prejudices’. “We have no need to suffocate in our history and muddle, like Western peoples did, through the chaos of national prejudices, the narrow paths of local ideas, the trenches of aboriginal traditions – we must master our destiny through the free drive of our internal forces, the energetic effort of national consciousness.”<sup>225</sup> In a critical reappraisal of the formerly fetishised ‘European man’, Chaadaev notes that the non-historicity of Russians spares them from petty interests, conflicts and prejudices that have accompanied European development: “We do not have these passionate interests, these readymade opinions, these settled prejudices: we encounter every new idea with a *virgin mind*.”<sup>226</sup> It is important to note that the presupposition of Russian ‘non-identity’ renders the otherwise violent character of Peter the Great’s reforms rather more benevolent, the unsettling scene of hammering European habits into resistant heads supplanted by a more placid image of the sovereign’s inscription of new practices on a virgin mind.

Let us suggest that Chaadaev’s diagnosis of Russian non-historicity and its productive redeployment as the condition of possibility of constitutive sovereign intervention is structurally similar to the strategic logic of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface. The difference between *Necropolis* and *The Apology of a Madman* is the difference between a philosophical meditation on the ‘passion of the real’ with its valorisation of authenticity and scepticism about the possibility of successful ‘physiological’ emulation of external habits and norms, and a prototype of a constructivist governmental strategy that ventures to achieve this ‘physiological’ internalisation of desirable practices through concrete technical interventions. While in the former text the non-historicity of Russia is presented as the *condition of impossibility* of its authentic identity which accounts for the tragic pathos of perpetual unsuccessful emulation, the latter text redeploys the originary Russian non-identity as a blessing for successful appropriation of external practices, i.e. the *condition of possibility* of constitutive governmental interventions. Authenticity no longer relates to the positive features of the identity to be emulated – Chaadaev’s account of Peter the Great’s reforms clearly asserts the manifest exteriority of the implemented ‘model’. Instead, authenticity is deemed by Chaadaev to consist in the

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid. Translation by author.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., p. 7. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

very *absence of positive identity*, i.e. Russia is presented as *authentically non-identical*, its only 'tradition' being its childlike 'virgin mind'.

The notion of virginity appears to be crucial in understanding the place and function of the authentic in any constructivist governmental diagram that has the notion of the 'clean slate' as the precondition of its operations, be it Petrine reforms, Putin's liberalisation or the interventions of EU Tacis. Perhaps, the whole 'substance' of authenticity is exhausted by the paradoxical valorisation of virginity as intactness that is to be violated, something valuable only by virtue of its imminent loss. Within the diagram of a pedagogical technology 'authenticity-as-virginity' is actualised in the structurally necessary construction of the objects of governmentality as naïve and child-like, caught in the pseudo-natural state but receptive to new influences that serve to shape and mould these 'shy and beautiful animals'. The following statement by Chaadaev's contemporary, Nikolai Nadezhdin, offers a most stark illustration of this fetishisation of childlike authenticity as the condition of possibility of governmental artefactualism:

We are children and this childhood is our happiness. With our *simple, virgin, infantile nature*, not spoiled by any prejudices everything can be done *without any labour and without violence*: it is possible to *mould all the forms of true perfection out of us, as if out of pure soft wax*. Oh, what an unimaginable supremacy over the Europeans this sacred blissful childhood gives us!<sup>227</sup>

This notion of authenticity as a property to be *lost* rather than (re) gained in governmental practices is reconcilable with the pedagogical orientation of the infra-liberal diagram and is considerably more sincere than the vacuous references to local knowledge that we encounter in the Tacis discourse. In fact, the interesting difference of the diagram of the Putin presidency from the diagram of technical assistance is precisely the avoidance of such quasi-naturalist rhetoric. One of the novelties of contemporary Russian politics, which emerged in full force in the election campaign of 1999, is the proliferation of so-called 'political technologies', a concept that moved beyond the narrow domain of electoral campaign strategies to cover the broader field of constitutive governmental interventions.<sup>228</sup> The logic of 'political technology' is

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<sup>227</sup> Nadezhdin cited in Etkind 2002, p. 183. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>228</sup> One of the key players in the market of 'political technologies' is the Effective Politics Foundation (FEP), headed by Gleb Pavlovsky. Pavlovsky's writings exhibit a strongly explicit constructivist stance that recognises no quasi-natural obstacles to governmental interventions.

practically identical to the operations of governmentality as elaborated in the Foucauldian approach, emphasising the productivity of power and, consequently, proceeding from the possibility, denied and reaffirmed by Chaadaev, to *institute politically*, i.e. in an act of sovereign decision, the presently absent forms of agency, enterprise, government, etc. For such an approach, the ‘clean slate’ is both the condition of possibility of governmental interventions and the index of the problem that calls for them. The paradigmatic example of this stance is offered by the already cited view of Gleb Pavlovsky, articulated with regard to the Civic Forum, a major congress of non-governmental organisations, supported by the government as a means to the development of ‘civil society’: “Where there should be a society, there now gapes a hole.”<sup>229</sup>

This striking formulation may be read in two discursive registers, introduced by Chaadaev. In the ‘philosophical lamentation’ genre of *Necropolis*, this thesis on the non-existence of society leads to a sense of resignation and pessimism about the possibility of the development of ‘civil society’ in Russia, generating complex ruminations on Russia’s cultural specificity. However, within the ‘proto-governmental’ discourse of the *Apology*, the present ‘non-existence’ of society simply entails the demand for its construction and poses not cultural but *technological* questions, the answers to which have more in common with the pilot designs produced by EU Tacis projects than with the quest for the ‘Russian idea’. As we have discussed in detail in the previous chapters, in the infra-liberal diagram of the Putin presidency these technological solutions are instituted in a self-consciously political manner, unfolding ‘in the presence’ of the sovereign as both the dominant political force within the newly constituted order (the positive agent of liberal governmentalisation) and the outside condition of its possibility (the formally transcendent sovereign subject).

Putin persistently works towards the reduction of uncertainty and unpredictability, *all the while remaining unpredictable himself*. [...] Putin introduces the state to Russia in the same way as the potato was introduced 300 years ago, *by a number of unnoticeable, almost embarrassingly infinitesimal steps*. This is obviously not a ‘dictatorship’ of any kind [...] but something like ‘domination’ that Gramsci spoke of [sic!]: *the environment of new facts, catchphrases and doubtless advantages that permeates everything*.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> This is the title of Pavlovsky 2001b. Translation by author.

<sup>230</sup> Pavlovsky 2000a. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added. Translation by author.

Nonetheless, the assertively political character of Putin's reforms should not obscure for us their function of the depoliticisation of the foundational moment of postcommunism, i.e. the disavowal of the groundlessness from which the sovereign decisions on the new grounds emanate. In the absence of the rhetoric of quasi-natural authenticity, the Putin presidency invokes a similar yet distinct gesture of 'normalisation', which in the postcommunist context entails the 'discursive assassination' of both 'revolutionary' and 'transitional' tropes. The political stability gained in the Putin presidency is presented as the conclusion of the process of 'transition' to liberal democracy, market economy, federalism, etc. "After a turbulent decade of reform we are entering a period when our will, our qualifications and stamina will determine the long-term success of the whole nation. *Measures of a transitional character have been exhausted.*"<sup>231</sup> In our terms, this claim is equivalent to the proclamation of the end of the foundational moment of radical openness and its supercession by the ordered, managerial politics that unfolds within an already constituted diagram. Thus, it would be erroneous to present Putin's project in terms of 'counter-revolution' or 'reaction' against the Yeltsinite politics of the 1990s. On the contrary, there is a marked continuity between the two periods, a substantive continuity regarding the direction of reforms that is only punctured by the different relation of the two presidencies to the political. While the Yeltsin presidency *initiated* the political rupture of the anticommunist revolution and subsequently attempted to introduce elements of the liberal order in a permanent political confrontation amid the displacement of statehood,<sup>232</sup> the Putin presidency arguably attempts a *closure* of the unlimited political field and its *grounding* through the installation of the infrastructure of the liberal diagram that excludes, rarefies and restricts political possibilities and simultaneously stabilises contingent modalities of agency, enterprise and government as according with the 'logic of normal life'. As the following fragment from Putin's 2001 Address illustrates, what is at stake in the presidency is not a *counter-revolution*

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<sup>231</sup> Putin 2001, p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>232</sup> The contrast between the Yeltsin and the Putin presidencies may be pinpointed with the help of the example of the 'obscene lexicon' that we began this chapter with. The (in)famous eccentric acts of President Yeltsin can hardly be conceived as a 'sovereign exception', simply because one could barely observe in the 1990s the existence of the norm, in relation to which these acts are a transgression. Like blasphemy in a thoroughly secularised society, a transgression without a corresponding norm is an empty and a merely embarrassing gesture. The reason why Putin's relatively infrequent obscene quips are noticeable is precisely the existence of the diagram of 'normality' that they violate.

against the anarchic excesses of the Yeltsin era, but, perhaps more radically, a *break with the revolutionary logic as such*:

I would like to say clearly that we are not afraid of changes and should not be afraid of them. [...] Of course, public expectations and apprehensions do not grow out of thin air, they are based on the *known logic that after a revolution there usually comes a counter-revolution*, after a reform there comes a counter-reform and after that a search for those guilty of revolutionary excesses, and punishment. *The more so that Russia's own historical experience abounds in such examples.*

But it seems to me that *it is time to say firmly that this cycle is over. There will be neither a revolution nor a counter-revolution.* [...] *And it is long time [sic!] to learn to live according to this normal human logic.* It is high time to understand that prolonged and hard work lies ahead. Our main problems are far too deep and they cannot be solved at one stroke, but only by *daily qualified work*. But stability is not the same thing as stagnation under a bureaucracy. We will need bold and well-thought-out decisions, we will need *skilled specialists* among entrepreneurs and civil servants. [...] Power in Russia should work to make *a renunciation of democratic freedoms impossible and to make the economic course that has been charted irreversible.*<sup>233</sup>

This fragment demonstrates that, rather than abandoning the liberal reforms of the Yeltsin presidency, Putin's reform project consolidates their advance by reinscribing the overall liberal-democratic order as an *irreversible* gain, a secure foundation, upon which sector-specific reforms proceed as 'daily qualified work', undertaken by 'skilled specialists'. In the argument of Yegor Gaidar, Russia's first reformist prime minister, the Putin presidency offers a possibility for an *evolutionary* course of liberal reforms that would derive their momentum and effectiveness from the overall socio-political stabilisation and consolidation.<sup>234</sup> Leonid Polyakov points out the same reinscription in his discussion of Putin as a 'liberal conservative' and the injunction for market-oriented liberals that in the Russian political jargon are referred to as 'young reformers' to become 'young conservatives'.<sup>235</sup> Finally, Igor Bunin notes as the peculiarity of the liberal reforms of the Putin presidency the managerial efficiency of their implementation and suggests that Putin's project may, in case of its success, displace the age-old dualism between 'reforms' and 'order', according to which the

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<sup>233</sup> Putin 2001, p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>234</sup> See Gaidar 2001.

<sup>235</sup> See Polyakov 2000.

periods of reform in Russia have always been marked by chaos and illegality, while the subsequent restoration of order entailed the abandonment of all reformist activity.<sup>236</sup> Indeed, Putin's presentation of the synthesis of liberal reforms and the state-centred emphasis on order in terms of a 'normal human logic' is rather ironic since such a synthesis is almost historically unprecedented in Russia.<sup>237</sup>

We have already discussed the way in which this logic of normality is actualised in the three governmental technologies, particularly with regard to economic globalisation and the consequent universalisation of economic rationality. At this stage, let us address the more general implications of this normalisation. One of the crucial indicators of successful depoliticisation through the installation of the diagrammatic foundations of the liberal order is the relative decline of the discourse on the 'national idea', so characteristic of the 1990s but also arguably typical of modern Russian history more generally.<sup>238</sup> According to Mikhail Epstein, Russia's cultural peculiarity has consisted in its willingness to *repeatedly* pose the question of its existence (and thus, put its existence in question): the manifest discontinuity of Russian history is due to the fact that every positive order emerged only by virtue of the denial as 'inauthentic' of the 'national idea' that preceded it. In Epstein's eloquent metaphor, Russia is a unity of the Sphinx and the Phoenix, a combination of the

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<sup>236</sup> See Bunin et al 2001a. We ought to note that in this discussion we focus on the *governmental rationality* deployed in the reforms of the Putin presidency. We therefore bracket off the question of assessing or evaluating the progress and the prospects of this 'grand project' of synthesising 'reforms and order'. Neither do we wish to construe this project in teleological terms: as a diagram of governmentality, 'Putin's project' functions in a wider political field and encounters considerable resistance and opposition from e.g. the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, regional leaders or business interests. The outcome of the reforms is thus entirely contingent on a multitude of political factors, whose consideration is beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, with regard to specific policy proposals of the government's reform programme, our focus is on their strategic logic, the successes and failures of their implementation in particular policy areas being of no relevance to our conclusions. In short, our task in this study has been to present an outline of the strategic diagram of the reform project of the Putin presidency, whose validity does not depend on the ultimate success of this project.

<sup>237</sup> More precisely, such a synthesis arguably lacks a precedent in political practice. In Russian political theory the liberal-conservative synthesis has been advocated by the proponents of the 'legal' school of liberalism in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Boris Chicherin) and in the critique of revolutionism by the (former Marxist) philosophers associated with the *Vekhi* collection (e.g. Petr Struve, Semen Frank). See Walicki 1980, pp. 397–406, 435–440. See also Sakwa 2000a, p. 35 for the discussion of the relevance of these liberal-conservative orientations to Putin's project of the reconstitution of the state.

<sup>238</sup> See e.g. Neumann 1996 for the study of the debates concerning Russia's relation to Europe.

insistent existential anxiety about its own identity and the renunciation of every determinate answer in a permanent resurrection of the question at the very moment it appears to be resolved: “Russia is a rare case of an existential society, which permanently seeks itself, projects itself as a task, as the object of reflection and questioning.”<sup>239</sup> In Epstein’s term, Russia may thus be conceived as an *existe-nation*,<sup>240</sup> whose only identity is the question(ing) of its identity, which consequently makes any positive answer to the question of identity *ipso facto* wrong. Such ‘existen(a)tional’ anxiety was particularly explicit and intense in the foundational moment of the 1990s, in which the dissolution of the Soviet diagram and the *political* assertion of liberalism never resulted in the consolidation and stabilisation of any new diagram of order that could resolve the ‘question of identity’.

Arguably, the novelty and the potential significance of the Putin presidency consists precisely in installing (neo)liberal governmentality as the functioning diagram, offering a positive and determinate answer to the question of Russian identity and stabilising it in terms of the ‘logic of normal life’. Putin’s promise of the break with the revolutionist logic is equivalent to the expiry of the existe-nation and the cessation of the very concern with the ‘Russian idea’: discourses can not speak of their own conditions of possibility and foundations may only be questioned when they are unstable or have ceased to exist. Gleb Pavlovsky has eloquently summed up this sense of the newly-found stability and security, associated with the Putinian depoliticisation: “The end of the revolution often resembles it, sometimes receiving the name of the ‘second revolution’. Yet, there is one distinguishing feature: the country on the run stops and discovers that it is no longer being pursued by anyone, all of the chasers having fallen behind and gone home.”<sup>241</sup> The completion of what has been referred to as ‘transition’ simply consists in the realisation that there is nothing to run from and escape, that *there is no destination that must be reached in order to qualify for existence*. The criticism of the Putin presidency as having effected the ‘death of the political’<sup>242</sup> is thus fully valid, but only insofar as we conceive of the political in terms of the radical openness and undecidability, a moment of emergence, which is by definition neither permanent nor necessary, but rather temporal and rare. In Jacques

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<sup>239</sup> Epstein 2001, p. 4. Translation by author.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>241</sup> Pavlovsky 2002a. (WWW-document.) Translation by author.

<sup>242</sup> See e.g. Kolerov 2002.

Ranciere's concept of politics (which accords with what we refer to as 'the political' in this study), "its existence is in no way necessary, [it] occurs as a provisional accident in the history of the forms of domination, [...] an *exception* to the principles according to which this gathering [of people into communities] operates."<sup>243</sup> In this sense, the depoliticisation brought about in the Putin presidency is indeed an instance of the 'death of the political', which is simultaneously the return to the 'logic of normal life'. "The return of the 'normal' state of things [is] that of *politics' non-existence*. The 'end of politics' is the ever-present shore of politics that, in turn, is an activity of the moment and always provisional."<sup>244</sup>

The metaphor of a country on the run that suddenly finds out that it is no longer being chased can be extended to Russia's relation to its own past. While the Yeltsin presidency was marked by a troubled and haunted relation to the immediate past, in which the Soviet *past was actively present* as a viable political alternative to the reformist present, the Putin presidency has exhibited a strong sense of security regarding its relation to the Soviet past, successfully reinscribing (and neutralising) it as 'past proper', a fact of history given its due in the adoption of the melody of the Soviet anthem for the new Russian national anthem. This incorporation of the Soviet symbols into the overall symbolic triad, also comprising 'Byzantine' and 'Imperial' symbols, deprives them of their *present* relevance and forcibly relegates the Soviet period into history.<sup>245</sup> This relegation simultaneously abolishes the attribute 'post-Soviet' as the identification of the new Russian state, no longer dependent for its identity on that which it has displaced, having become more than a merely negative space of revolution, a territorially delimited political void. In his programmatic article 'Farewell to Belovezha' (the Belorussian locality in which the Soviet Union was

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<sup>243</sup> Ranciere 2001, p. 7. Emphasis added. Ranciere's concept of politics refers to the constitutive antagonism that precludes the possibility of the identification of the 'people' (the political subject) with the 'population' (the object of governmentality). In this sense, politics exists only at the moment of a society's non-identity with itself, the rupture of the logic of internal structuration of order and the manifestation of the 'litigiousness' that cannot be accommodated within it. "The essence of politics resides in the modes of dissensual subjectification that *reveal the difference of a society to itself*." (Ibid., p. 14. Emphasis added.)

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p. 14. Emphasis added.

<sup>245</sup> This approach of the president to state symbols has drawn criticism from observers interested in a clear historical identification as a means of re-establishing historical continuity, either with the Imperial or the Soviet Russia. See e.g. Tsipko 2000 for the critique of Putin's 'abstract patriotism' that proceeds from a 'salad bar' approach to history.



decided out of existence in December 1991), Pavlovsky conjures the new entity, a Russia ‘without adjectives’, ‘simply Russia’ or ‘Russia proper’ (*prosto Rossiya*):

The Belovezha agreements did not create Russia but merely *delimited it as a territory of unbound revolution*. [...] Frequently repeating the phrase ‘post-Soviet space’, the Russian political elite has learned not to notice that it entails a *non-substantiality of Russia*. [...] Belovezha is no longer equivalent to the ‘dissolution of the USSR’, because *for Russia the USSR is no longer relevant*. The USSR has been merely an unprofitable deal that for us has only entailed bad government. *Russia refuses to be a post-Soviet (or an anti-Soviet) state. Russia is simply Russia, which has to be taken into account.*<sup>246</sup>

This figure of ‘Russia Proper’ permits to understand another extravagant claim made by Pavlovsky in 2001 on the occasion of the *eleventh* anniversary of the Russian declaration of state sovereignty: “This is the *first* year of our independence.”<sup>247</sup> The independence of the Russian state, received with incredulity throughout the 1990s as meaningless in the absence of a clear object, from which Russia supposedly became independent, begins in the Putin presidency to be endowed with positive value. The new valorisation of independence accords with the reconstitution of the state as the locus of sovereignty, which, in the Schmittian sense of the decision on exception, entails precisely the declaration of independence from *anyone and anything at all*.<sup>248</sup> For ‘Russia proper’, independence entails the formation of the new positivity, detached from an antagonistic relationship to the no longer existing state, unwilling to be plagued by the demons of the past, no longer anxious about its identity, its fears dissolved in the light of newly-found clarity and certainty.

The final metaphor is neither accidental nor arbitrary. As we conclude our discussion of the depoliticisation effected in ‘Putin’s project’ and given concrete technical support by the EU Tacis practices, we may suggest that its paradigm, replicated in the three technologies of agency, performance and rule, consists in the

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<sup>246</sup> Pavlovsky 2000a. (WWW-document.) Emphasis added. Translation by author. See also Holmogorov 2002 for a same-titled article (‘Prosto Rossiya’) with a similar argument. Holmogorov argues that the opposition to President Putin from both ideologically orthodox communists and radical pro-Western ‘liberal humanists’ is owing to the President’s *purposefully abstract patriotism*, a valorisation of “Russia without adjectives”, whether ‘Soviet’ or ‘democratic’, as opposed to the more doctrinal orientations on both the left and the right, characterised by the principle “Russia without X (communism, liberal democracy, monarchy, etc.) is no Russia at all and should cease to exist”.

<sup>247</sup> This is the title of Pavlovsky 2001a. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>248</sup> See Schmitt 1985a, p. 12.

act of *elimination of all the 'shadow' phenomena*, anterior to governmentality, through their grafting onto governmental rationalities, a grafting that literally drags them into the open, renders them transparent, knowable and amenable to action – in short, places them within the *governmental field of visibility* and thereby constitutes them by, quite literally, *enlightening* them.<sup>249</sup> This logic of 'enlightenment' should be distinguished from the more familiar notion of 'colonisation', which presupposes the existence of an authentic local 'lifeworld' with its anterior 'identity' to be taken over by the alien mechanisms of the governmental 'system'. As we have discussed in detail, the distinctive feature of postcommunist shadow domains (be it subjectivity, the market or quasi-statehood) is their *non-identity*, their unrepresentability within a *discourse* and thus their *extra-diagrammatic* character. It is not that one positive identity is supplanted by the violent imposition of another one – after all, there is little *substantive* difference between shadow and 'proper' markets, shadow and transparent individuals, and even between the shadow quasi-statehood and the reconstituted sovereignty. Indeed, the Putin presidency is *least disposed* to radically intervene in the 'social' for the purposes of the construction of a 'new man', a 'new economy' or a new kind of state. It is rather that the extra-diagrammatic *void* of non-identity is progressively embraced and filled by the extension of the diagram to its shadow margins, not so much for the purposes of *transformation*, but rather for the sake of *disposition* in the sense espoused by 'police science', which, as we have seen, maintains a ghostly presence in the most anti-authoritarian varieties of liberalism. Jacques Ranciere, who opposes 'politics' as constitutive rupture and dissent to 'police', succinctly sums up the constitutive principle of the latter, that, we suggest, is operative in all forms of governmentality: "The police is a partition of the sensible, whose principle is the *absence of a void and of a supplement*. [...] The essence of the police is neither repression nor even control over the living."<sup>250</sup> The phrase 'partition of the sensible' recalls the classical definition of government as the 'right disposition of things' and refers to the type of diagrammatic arrangement, in which no remainder is left unsubsumed by governmental rationality and unfounded by its principles of positivity:

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<sup>249</sup> Cf. Deleuze 1988, p. 52: "Visibilities are not forms of objects, nor even forms that would show up under light, but rather forms of luminosity *which are created by the light itself*." According to Deleuze, the positive visibility of an object is the function of the particular 'form of luminosity' that characterises a diagram or, in our terms, the specific modality of governmental 'enlightenment'.

<sup>250</sup> Ranciere 2001, p. 8. Emphasis added.

Society consists of groups dedicated to specific modes of action, in places where these occupations are exercised, in modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places. *In this fittingness of functions, places and ways of being there is no place for a void.* It is this *exclusion of what 'there is not'* that is the police principle at the heart of statist practices.<sup>251</sup>

It is evident that this police principle of governmentality is entirely irreducible to the opposition of the public and the private, and particularly the relation whereby the former engulfs the latter. On the contrary, liberal modes of governmentality, from classical liberalism to Putinian infra-liberalism, tirelessly valorise the private domain and progressively devolve a substantial share of public authority to it. Governmental depoliticisation may well proceed from the internal assumption of ontological and ethical anteriority of the private domain and therefore proscribe direct governmental intervention into it, yet this valorisation should not obscure for us the always already *governmentally constituted* nature of that domain. What the dispositional logic of governmentality abhors is therefore not the existence of the autonomous private realm that it helped create and furnish but the existence of the void on the margins or inside the diagram, the shadow, non-transparent and unfathomable void that subverts and destabilises the diagrammatic order(ing) of existence.

In this sense, the paradigm of governmental 'enlightenment' accords with a disposition that Milan Kundera in his *Book of Laughter and Forgetting* has attributed to the *angels*: "Angels are partisans not of Good, but of *divine creation*. The devil, on the other hand, is the one who refuses to grant any rational meaning to that divinely created world."<sup>252</sup> As partisans of order, angels "are fearful of obscurity, dragging everything into *luminous significance* and *instant legibility*".<sup>253</sup> The angelic stance may be described as 'categorical agreement with being',<sup>254</sup> the affirmation of the essential goodness of the human condition and thus the possibility of the elimination of evil from the order of things. Categorical agreement with being is the diagrammatic ethos par excellence, the ethos of order, meaning and positivity, animated in its constitutive technological practices by the promise of realising the perfection of divine creation. Kundera's angels are thus the guardians of the 'last men', whose advent was

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<sup>251</sup> Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis added.

<sup>252</sup> Kundera 1996, p. 86. Emphasis added.

<sup>253</sup> Eagleton 2001, p. 44. Emphasis added.

<sup>254</sup> Kundera 1999, p. 245.

prophesied by Nietzsche's Zarathustra: "'We have invented happiness', say the last men, and they blink."<sup>255</sup>

The angelic disposition is clearly marked by the abhorrence of anything that testifies to the defects in divine creation, anything that is opaque, unfathomable, absurd and obscene. Such defects are, on the contrary, the province of the devil, who delights in everything that is 'out of joint' and expresses himself in *laughter*, which for Kundera is *originally devilish*, yet cynically and laughably reappropriated by the angels in order to rejoice in being.

*Things deprived suddenly of their supposed meaning, of the place assigned to them in the so-called order of things [...] make us laugh. In origin, laughter is thus of the devil's domain. It has something malicious about it (things suddenly turning out different from what they pretended to be) but to some extent also a beneficent relief (things are less weighty than they appeared to be, letting us live more freely, no longer oppressing us with their austere seriousness). The first time an angel heard the devil's laughter, he was dumbfounded. [...] The angel clearly understood that such laughter was directed against God and against the dignity of his works. He knew that he must react swiftly somehow but felt weak and defenceless. Unable to come up with anything of its own, he aped his adversary. Opening his mouth, he emitted broken, spasmodic sounds in the higher reaches of his vocal range, [...] but giving them an opposite meaning: whereas the devil's laughter denoted the absurdity of things, the angel on the contrary meant to rejoice over how well ordered, wisely conceived, good and meaningful everything here below was.*<sup>256</sup>

The angelic police deploys the originally extra-diagrammatic laughter as a governmental instrument inside the diagram, in the manner similar to liberal governmentality's deployment of freedom as its technical modality. "Their imitation of laughter and (the devil's) original laughter are both called by the same name. Nowadays we don't even realise that the same external display serves two absolutely opposed internal attitudes. There are two laughters, and we have no word to tell one from the other."<sup>257</sup> Let us suggest that this unison of two laughters is due not merely to the lack of an alternative term but also to the existence of a clearly identifiable locus, from which this unison of the angelic and the demonic resounds, the structural

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<sup>255</sup> Nietzsche 1961, p. 9.

<sup>256</sup> Kundera 1996, p. 87. Emphasis added.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

position of the sovereign at the limit of the diagram. Isn't the sovereign simultaneously the angel of police, the subject of ordering the diagrammatic space with no tolerance for any shadow void of anteriority that subverts the rationality of his creation *and* the obscene demonic figure at the exterior limit of the diagram, ultimately the only legitimate locus of originary laughter, the sole force that is anterior to the diagram since it is that which creates it? By the same token, isn't the sovereign the sole figure who may legitimately transgress the diagram and manifest in his obscene lexicon the disagreement with the order of things, the only subject who escapes the penetrating rays of governmental enlightenment and is thus *free in relation to the diagram of his creation* (as opposed to being free as a creation of the diagram)? The diagrammatic depoliticisation of the postcommunist moment is therefore a *double gesture of endowment and withholding*, whereby the individuals, rendered visible and transparent by the angelic light, are granted the positive identity of 'free subjects' simultaneously with being denied the *freedom of non-identity* that may be associated with the devilish laughter, the non-existent Soviet sex or the obscene lexicon of the sovereign. Just as there are two kinds of laughter, there appear to be *two kinds of freedom*, thoroughly at odds with one another, yet so difficult to disentangle, the plethoric discourse on the diagrammatic liberal freedom muting the barely audible affirmation of its devilish double. In the final part of the study we shall attempt to elaborate in detail the type of freedom that is withheld from the subjects enfolded in the liberal diagram and discuss the possibilities of its reaffirmation in the practices of resistance to the governmental disposition of existence.

## 5. ON TWISTING LOOSE: AN AUSTERE ONTOLOGY OF FREEDOM

The final chapter of our study attempts to articulate an ethical critique of technical assistance as a governmental practice and outline the possibilities for potential resistance to the depoliticising effects elicited in the infra-liberal interface of the strategic diagram of 'Putin's project' and the local-level diagram of EU technical assistance. Prior to this discussion we need to issue an extended caveat regarding the function of the specific type of criticism that we are embarking on. First of all, we ought to state that there is *no reason whatsoever* to suggest that one *should* necessarily be critical of the effects of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface. The abandonment of the exclusively negative conception of power and the understanding of the way in which autonomy and empowerment function inside the dispositional diagram entail dispensing with a facile view that power should always be resisted and emancipation promoted. *The possibility to criticise must also mean freedom not to criticise, otherwise it means nothing.* Similarly, any resistance, worthy of the name, is an ethical choice, which must not be normatively predetermined. Our archaeological reconstitution of the diagram of technical assistance and the genealogical retrieval of its conditions of emergence *complete* the task of the explication of the strategic logic of governmentality at work in these practices, the task that constitutes the governmentality problematic as a largely descriptive enterprise, marked by a strong normative neutrality towards its object.<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that the results of these

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<sup>1</sup> See Gordon 1991, 1993, Dean 1999, chapters 1, 2. See Dean 2002b for the attempt to highlight the critical potential of the governmentality problematic that discusses the risk of its dissolution into a complacent 'thick description' of regimes of government. Indeed, a distinguishing feature of the studies of governmentality is the difficulty of inferring the author's 'opinion' on the diagram of government she

operations do not lend themselves to normative-critical use, but merely to point out that *what* use they are put to is an entirely *personal choice* that is of no concern or consequence to us.

It is absolutely true that when I write a book I refuse to take a prophetic stance; that is, the one of saying to people: here is what you must do, and also: this is good and this is not. I say to them, roughly speaking, it seems to me that things have gone this way; but I describe those things in such a way that the possible paths of attack are delineated. Yet, even with this approach I do not force or compel anyone to attack. So then, it becomes a *completely personal question*, if I choose, *if I want*, to take certain courses of action with reference to prisons, psychiatric asylums, this or that issue. But I say that political action belongs to a category of participation completely different from these written or bookish acts of participation. It is a problem [...] of *personal and physical commitment*. [...] *The essence of being radical is physical*: the essence of being radical is the *radicalness of existence itself*.<sup>2</sup>

As we have already remarked in the Introduction, Foucault's philosophical attitude is marked both by the unwillingness to engage in the 'indignity of speaking for others' by legislating universal normative ideals, in the name of which governmental practices could be denounced, and by the reluctance to be constrained in one's critical endeavour by any positive notion of the Good and the True, any substantive conception of the subject or any ideal form of social order. Foucault's historical ontology may instead be grasped as an ethically charged critique of governmentality *qua* governmentality, a form of criticism that is *ipso facto* impossible to phrase in the language of 'alternatives', insofar as the latter are understood as substantive projects located on the same plane as the governmental diagram but advocated as more *preferable* in terms of a certain criterion. Instead, this type of criticism is animated by a sense of *disappointment* in the very discourse structured around alternative diagrams, a sense that something is invariably *lost* in such a discourse, a loss that finds

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has reconstituted. Although in the Kantian sense of 'critique' these studies definitely constitute a critique of liberalism, it is fully unfounded to regard them as in any way 'anti-liberal'. In our case, the conclusions about the infra/neo-liberal character of both the diagram of technical assistance and the strategic project of the Putin presidency *may* be utilised for such divergent purposes as advancing normative criticism of both diagrams from e.g. a 'leftist' political standpoint or defending the Putin presidency from facile attributions of an 'authoritarian' and 'illiberal' political programme to it.

<sup>2</sup> Foucault 1996b, p. 261. Emphasis added.

no discursive positivity and diagrammatic localisation but for this reason is the source of critical energy that disturbs governmental diagrams and discourses.<sup>3</sup>

What is it that is lost in the specific case of the infra-liberal governmental diagram that makes *freedom* its technical modality and the positive content of subjective identity? Paradoxically at first glance, it is nothing other than freedom itself, albeit the kind of freedom that cannot be easily accommodated within a liberal discourse and rendered in terms of identity. In this chapter we shall attempt to elucidate the outlines of this notion of freedom and suggest its relevance not as an ‘alternative’ to the infra-liberal diagram, centred on the autonomisation of identity, but as a *line of flight* that grants one *relief* from the discursive weight of identity and autonomy. To reiterate, speaking in terms of relief makes the discussion below self-consciously discretionary, the offered lines of flight relevant only insofar as the reader shares our problematisation of the diagram in terms of the unbearable gravity of its effects, our sense that *there is all too little freedom in the liberal diagram*.

## 5.1. Unhappy Positivism: Is There a Foucauldian Freedom?

To speak of a Foucauldian critique advanced in the name of freedom may appear controversial. After all, Foucault’s work is frequently read as denying the very possibility of freedom, both empirically in its thesis on the ‘carceral’ society and conceptually in its premonition of the ‘death’ of the very being called Man to whom freedom apparently refers.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* convincingly derides the emancipatory discourses associated with ‘sexual liberation’ as complicit in the strategies of power they denounce and highlights the way in which ‘liberation’ functions as the seductive promise of the diagram of government.<sup>5</sup> In a Foucauldian approach discourses of freedom must therefore be treated at least with suspicion. Nonetheless, we shall argue that a ‘certain kind’ of freedom, that requires neither a concept of the anterior subject nor a teleology of liberation, is the central ethical

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gordon 1996. See also Critchley 1997, particularly p. 2 for the argument that “philosophy begins in disappointment”.

<sup>4</sup> See respectively Foucault 1977b, 1970.

<sup>5</sup> See Foucault 1990a.



presupposition of Foucault's historical ontologies. Prior to elaborating this notion of freedom in detail let us briefly consider three accounts of a 'Foucauldian freedom' in the plethoric commentary on his work that for our purposes serve to elucidate three possible responses to the question of the loss of freedom in infra-liberal diagrammatic constitution.

### 5.1.1. What Is There to Liberate?: A Liberal Critique of Foucault

The first mode of discourse denies the very existence (or the possibility) of a concept of freedom in Foucault's philosophical approach. A number of eminent critics, including Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Richard Rorty, read Foucault primarily as a theorist of confinement, both literal and figurative.<sup>6</sup> Irrespectively of whether Foucault's theses on confinement are viewed as legitimate, exaggerated or outright false, these authors deny the possibility of a Foucauldian affirmation of freedom that would not slip into a contradiction with his theses on the ubiquity of power relations. According to Paul Patton, this genre of criticism proceeds from the postulation of a diametrical opposition between freedom and power, whereby the latter is always an infringement of the former and therefore the former can be achieved only through a 'liberation' from the latter.<sup>7</sup> Foucault's notion of a productive rather than repressive power and his notion of subjectivity as a construct of that power appear to make meaningless both the notions of 'repression' and 'liberation': if power does not repress, one can not liberate oneself from it. Yet, if liberation is disqualified, so, according to the critics, is the very notion of freedom, which must presuppose an anterior subject repressed by power in order to be intelligible at all.<sup>8</sup> "Since the very concept of a self-constituting subjectivity is anathema to Foucault, the notion of human emancipation becomes nonsensical."<sup>9</sup> Foucault's anti-naturalism with regard to

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<sup>6</sup> See Rorty 1986, 1992, 1995, Walzer 1986, Habermas 1986, Taylor 1986, Megill 1985, Wolin 1992b.

<sup>7</sup> See Patton 1995, 1998. Of course, this presupposition invokes the very 'repressive hypothesis' about power relations that Foucault sought to abandon. Foucault's critics may thus be taken to read his work through the lens of a theoretical approach that this work disqualifies. See Berard 1999, Smart 1995, pp. 204–205 for a similar argument.

<sup>8</sup> Taylor 1986, p. 90.

<sup>9</sup> Wolin 1994, p. 263.

subjectivity and his radical constructivism with regard to power are thereby held to disqualify him from any discourse on freedom. From this perspective, Foucault's later writings on Ancient Greek techniques of self-fashioning and discussions of freedom in a number of interviews<sup>10</sup> are only accepted as implicit admissions of past misconceptions. When Foucault's critics do notice the affirmation of freedom in his earlier texts (e.g. the writings on modern literature<sup>11</sup>), it is usually presented as restricted to the narrow domain of aesthetics and often disqualified on normative grounds as a dangerous and 'immoral' 'aesthetic decisionism'<sup>12</sup>, "rhetorically inflated and drained of moral distinctions".<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the lack of these 'distinctions', i.e. Foucault's persistent and consistent refusal to articulate a positive ethical programme, in the context of which power relations could be condemned and freedom affirmed, results in accusations of anarchism and nihilism:

When Foucault is an anarchist, he is a moral as well as a political anarchist. For him morality and politics go together. [...] To abolish power systems is to abolish both moral and scientific categories: away with them all! But what will be left? Foucault does not believe, as earlier anarchists did, that the free human subject is a *subject of certain sort, naturally good, warmly sociable, kind and loving*. Rather, there is for him no such thing as a free human subject, no natural man or woman. Men and women are always social creations, the products of codes and disciplines. And so Foucault's radical abolitionism, if it is serious, is not anarchist so much as *nihilist*. For, on his own arguments, either *there will be nothing left at all*, nothing visibly human; or new codes and disciplines will be produced, and Foucault gives us *no reason to expect that these will be any better* than the ones we now live with. Nor, for that matter, does he give us *any way of knowing what 'better' might mean*.<sup>14</sup>

We shall return to the question of Foucault's 'nihilism' in more detail below.<sup>15</sup> At this point, let us merely note that the 'exclusion' of Foucault from the discourse on freedom rests on his critics' demand for a number of presuppositions that are allegedly necessary to ground a meaningful concept of freedom. Firstly, freedom is

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<sup>10</sup> See Foucault 1990b, 1990c, 1982, 1988a, 1988c.

<sup>11</sup> Foucault 1977b, 1977c, 1987, 1997.

<sup>12</sup> See Taylor 1986, p. 99, Wolin 1994, 1992b, pp. 187–193, Megill 1985, chapter 6.

<sup>13</sup> Walzer 1986, p. 53.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61. Emphasis added.

<sup>15</sup> For the discussion of accusations of nihilism in relation to Foucault see Sawicki 1994, Berard 1999, Veyne 1992. For an original reading of the philosophical problematic of nihilism see Critchley 1997.

held to be a necessary *property* of a self-actualising subject, ontologically prior to power relations and *for this reason* justified in his resistance to it. In other words, subjective identity, that Foucault considers to be an artefact of power relations, is, particularly in Charles Taylor's account<sup>16</sup>, presented as an ontological precondition for freedom. In a good example of the incommensurability of different paradigms, Foucault is required to posit as a ground of freedom that which in his account is precisely antagonistic to freedom. By the same token, such critics as Taylor, Walzer and Rorty accuse Foucault of the lack of any "positive evaluation of a liberal state"<sup>17</sup> as a guarantor of freedom, while it is precisely the forms of subjectivity installed by this type of state that are the subject of Foucault's criticism.

Secondly, what is demanded of Foucault is a set of universal and normative (rather than particularist and aesthetic) criteria, in terms of which the question of 'better' codes and disciplines could be posed. As Nancy Fraser claims, "what Foucault needs, and needs desperately, are normative criteria for *distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power*"<sup>18</sup> (and consequently of resistance) to avoid slipping into the nihilist 'wholesale rejection of modernity'. As Foucault is taken to reject 'humanism', he is required to offer "some alternative, posthumanist ethical *paradigm* capable of identifying objectionable features of a fully realised autonomous society".<sup>19</sup> In short, the only form a discourse on freedom can take is that of a *paradigmatic positivity*, an alternative to the present disciplinary and confessional society, located on the same ontological plane. In other words, the order of the discourse on freedom established by Foucault's critics offers a highly limited choice of two enunciative modalities: a 'positive evaluation' of what is basically a liberal modality of freedom (with its assumptions of subjective anteriority and interiority) or the elaboration of a positive alternative to 'liberal humanism' (which, of course, could then be dismissed as normatively unacceptable).

A more nuanced version of this choice is offered by Richard Rorty's deployment of the public/private distinction in order to present Foucault as confused between the roles of a 'public liberal' ("trying to achieve the same political consequences which

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<sup>16</sup> Taylor 1986, pp. 95–97.

<sup>17</sup> Walzer 1986, p. 62. See also Rorty 1992, Taylor 1986.

<sup>18</sup> Fraser 1995, p.147. Emphasis added.

<sup>19</sup> Fraser 1994b, p. 185. Emphasis added.

a good humanitarian bourgeois liberal would wish to achieve”<sup>20</sup>) and a ‘knight of autonomy’, preoccupied with a private quest for self-fashioning that had nothing to do with other people. “I wish that Foucault had been more willing to separate his two roles – more willing to separate his moral identity as a citizen from his search for autonomy. [...] We should not try to find a societal counterpart to the desire for autonomy.”<sup>21</sup> In terms of Rorty’s own intellectual autobiography, Foucault is held to have embarked on an impossible and dangerous project to “reconcile Trotsky and the orchids”,<sup>22</sup> the ‘public’ vision of social justice and solidarity and the ‘private’ quest for the beauty of existence, which resulted in what Rorty refers to dismissively as ‘quasi-anarchism’.<sup>23</sup> Of course, Rorty’s own solution to this problem has been to abandon all attempts at such reconciliation of the universal and the idiosyncratic (as well as abandon Trotsky entirely) and rather posit a constitutive distinction between the liberal social order, which is held to deserve loyalty and valorisation, and private projects of self-fashioning, which this order protects without intervening in them.<sup>24</sup> For Rorty, then, Foucault’s idiosyncratic private quest for freedom is in principle possible to *accommodate* within the liberal order as Rorty construes it: “The point of a liberal society is *not to invent or create anything*, but simply to make it as easy as possible for people to achieve their widely different private ends without hurting each other.”<sup>25</sup> Thus, in this version of a pregiven set of alternatives in the discourse on freedom, a Foucauldian ‘aesthetic decisionism’ is allowed to flourish in the private realm on the condition that it is insulated from the ‘liberal state’ and the critique thereof. Whatever a ‘Foucauldian freedom’ might be, its locus is not in the domain of the political.

Thus, the first answer to the question of a ‘Foucauldian freedom’ *disqualifies* Foucault from the discourse on freedom, or at least, as in Rorty’s case, from the

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<sup>20</sup> Rorty 1992, p. 330. We leave aside the question of whether Foucault’s actions in the public space (e.g. his fascination and support for the Iranian revolution) can be so easily assimilated under the rubric of a ‘good humanitarian bourgeois liberal’.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331. See also Caputo 2000, chapter 4 for the detailed discussion of Rorty’s identical manoeuvre with regard to Jacques Derrida, split between a public liberal and a private ‘ironist’.

<sup>22</sup> Rorty 1999, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> Rorty 1992, p. 331.

<sup>24</sup> See Rorty 1999. For the discussion of Rorty’s distinction of private ironism and public liberalism see e.g. Dooley 1999, Mouffe 2000a.

<sup>25</sup> Rorty 1992, p. 331. Emphasis added.

discourse on *political* freedom, on the grounds of his radical constructivism with regard to subjectivity and his refusal to render freedom in terms of a positivity that would be an alternative to a liberal diagram. With regard to the question of freedom in the case of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface, this disqualification entails a highly restricted choice between the celebration of the liberation undergone by the governed in the process of their autonomisation or empowerment and, in the absence of such celebration, the demand to specify in positive terms the 'alternative' diagram of 'true' freedom. Similarly to the 'hypocrisy hypothesis' that, as we suggested, pervades the critique of participatory development, the liberation involved in the diagrammatic interface is either genuine (in which case the question of the loss of freedom need not arise) or a sham (in which case there is presupposed the option of a 'true' or 'deeper' liberation). In relation to the conclusions of our study the position of Foucault's liberal critics is therefore in principle incapable of elucidating the stakes and the losses involved in the diagrammatic constitution of liberal subjects.

### 5.1.2. The Subject of the Diagram: Freedom in the Studies of Governmentality

The second type of answer to the question of a 'Foucauldian freedom' is given by the studies of governmentality that we already discussed at length in this study and will therefore merely recapitulate briefly at this stage. Such authors as Mitchell Dean, Nikolas Rose, Barbara Cruikshank and Colin Gordon<sup>26</sup> focus on freedom as an internal modality of power relations within a (most notably, but not necessarily liberal) governmental diagram, rather than an extra-diagrammatic property of the anterior subject. The crucial contribution of the governmentality problematic is the rejection of the view of 'liberal society' proposed by Rorty: the manifold empirical studies of liberal government demonstrate precisely that a 'liberal society' (or, more concretely and correctly, a liberal diagram) *does* 'invent' and 'create' and, furthermore, that it creates particular kinds of subjective identity and prescribes particular 'practices of freedom'. This governmental activity of, in Ian Hacking's term, 'making

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<sup>26</sup> See Rose 1990, 1996b, Dean 1996a, 1999, Cruikshank 1999, Gordon 1991, 1996.

up people'<sup>27</sup> disturbs Rorty's version of the public/private distinction, in which the constitution of a plurality of idiosyncratic forms of subjectivity is relegated to the realm of individual existence, whose sanctity is guaranteed by the non-interfering state. The notion of freedom deployed by the studies of governmentality thus displaces the two demands of Foucault's critics. Firstly, freedom is self-consciously posited as the *effect* of governmental practices and thus not anterior to power relations. Secondly, the normative neutrality of these studies entails the absence of any suggestions for an *alternative* diagram of governmentality. In a crude summation, 'freedom' in these studies is a *positivity* formed inside a liberal governmental diagram, which makes it an inappropriate locus of resistance to governmental practices but does not thereby make it a sham.<sup>28</sup> In the previous chapters we have relied on this approach to describe the autonomy that the infra-liberal diagrams of EU technical assistance and the reform project of the Putin presidency endow their objects of subjectification with. Neither 'genuine' and 'authentic' nor merely 'hypocritical', the diagrammatic construct of freedom is a complex positivity formed in the order(ing) of discourse that excludes, rarefies and restricts the possibilities of its practice. A multiplicity of alternative constructions of 'freedom' are possible within other diagrams that introduce a different regime of 'scarcity of affirmation'. Yet, since 'freedom' remains an object internal to the diagram, it is logically impossible to adjudicate between these constructions without fallaciously deploying a particular (e.g. liberal) diagram as a universal normative criterion.

Nonetheless, the account of freedom offered by the studies of governmentality, despite being empirically rich and successful in abandoning the 'hypocrisy hypothesis', is not fully satisfactory for the following reasons. Firstly, the 'happy positivist', descriptive orientation of many studies of governmentality may make them unwittingly complacent about (neo)liberal 'governance through liberties'. Indeed, if the governmental construction of autonomous subjectivity is 'all there is' to freedom, if freedom is cast as diagrammatic 'without remainder', then the critique of

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<sup>27</sup> See Hacking 2002, chapter 6. Hacking's version of historical ontology follows Foucault's archaeology in tracing the constitution of objects through 'styles of reasoning' (See *ibid.*, chapters 1, 12.) and connects with the problematic of governmentality in its concern with the constitution of individuals as objects and subjects of knowledge and action through technical practices of identification, measurement, classification, distribution, etc.

<sup>28</sup> Rose 1996a, p. 61.

governmentality becomes rather hollow, similar to what Nancy Fraser described as the ‘immanentist’ style of Foucauldian critique: “It offers no solutions of its own, but only an extremely keen nose for sniffing out hypocrisy, cant and self-deception.”<sup>29</sup> In other words, if there is no remainder to the diagrammatic construct of autonomous subjectivity, there is little to criticise in the liberal diagram, other than its naturalising rhetoric and its aporias of ‘constructed authenticity’. Moreover, with regard to a more self-consciously political infra-liberalism of the Putin presidency, whose constructivism is manifest and has a clear locus in the self-presencing of the sovereign, the denaturalising pathos of critique is weakened if not entirely disabled. Secondly, if no possibility for non-diagrammatic freedom is allowed for, the objections of Foucault’s critics reappear with full force, though in a new light: what is it exactly that is ‘wrong’ with *any kind* of governmental subjectification *at all*? The challenge to the problematic of governmentality appears to consist in articulating a response to the question of ‘what is lost?’ without reinvoking the decidedly un-Foucauldian essentialist and normative assumptions. In other words, the challenge is to offer a notion of freedom that is non-diagrammatic and hence irreducible to a *positivity* and impossible to phrase in the language of ‘alternatives’. On the other hand, this notion of freedom must be divorced from any notion of authentic *identity* that *precedes* governmental practices. To sum up, the critical purchase of the studies of governmentality consists in their contribution to what Foucault called the “undefined work of freedom”<sup>30</sup>, i.e. the affirmation of freedom that resists the impulse for its specification.

### 5.2.3. Concrete Freedom: A Life that Resists Power

The third response to the question of a Foucauldian freedom, drawing on Foucault’s writings on art, transgression and ‘aesthetics of existence’, attempts precisely this task of dissociating freedom from the positivity of identity. Such authors as Gilles Deleuze, James Bernauer, Jon Simons, John Rajchman, Paul Patton and Thomas Dumm<sup>31</sup> argue not merely for the possibility of a Foucauldian discourse on freedom, but for the

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<sup>29</sup> Fraser 1994a, p. 12.

<sup>30</sup> Foucault 1984f, p. 46.

<sup>31</sup> See Deleuze 1988, Bernauer 1990, Simons 1995, Rajchman 1985, Patton 1995, 1998, Dumm 1996.

*centrality* of freedom to Foucault's historical ontology. Rajchman distinguishes between two notions of freedom at work in Foucault's discourse. Foucault's nominalist histories of e.g. madness, medicine or sexuality disentangle the processes of the formation of what Rajchman refers to as 'nominal' freedoms that in our terminology are discursively constituted, positive properties of a diagrammatically specified identity. According to Rajchman, exposing the constituted character of such freedoms serves to enhance one's "real freedom", which is understood as a practice rather than a final state, a practice that consists in one's 'revolt' against the instituted identity.

For every *instituted conception of freedom* we apply a nominalist reversal and attempt to determine the larger practice within which it figures; that practice is then what involves our 'real' freedom, *something asocial which cannot be instituted or guaranteed*. Thus our real freedom does not consist either in our telling true stories and finding our place within some tradition or ethical code, in completely determining our actions in accordance with universal principles or in accepting our limitations in authentic self-relation. We are, on the contrary, really free because we can identify and change those procedures or forms through which our stories become true, because we can question and modify these systems which make (only) particular kinds of action possible, and because *there is no "authentic" self-relation we must conform to*. [...] Our real freedom is found in dissolving or changing the polities that embody our nature, and as such it is asocial or anarchical. *No society or polity could be based on it, since it lies precisely in the possibility of constant change*. Our real freedom is thus *political*, though it is never finalisable, legislatable or rooted in our nature.<sup>32</sup>

In this approach, a Foucauldian 'real' freedom or, in Foucault's own (and arguably less contentious) expression, 'concrete freedom'<sup>33</sup> is characterised by the following features. Firstly, and recalling Rorty's idea of a 'private' quest for autonomy, this freedom is 'asocial' and 'anarchic', irreducible to any social order but rather implicated in every project of its transformation. It is thus clear why it is impossible to satisfy the demand of Foucault's critics for a positive alternative to a liberal diagram. Whatever such alternative could be conjured, 'real' freedom would still relate to the project of its *transgression* rather than be fully actualised within its utopian diagram. Nonetheless, *pace* Rorty, this notion of freedom is explicitly *political* in the sense that

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<sup>32</sup> Rajchman 1985, pp. 122–123. Emphasis added.

<sup>33</sup> Foucault 1988b, p. 36. As we shall see below, a Foucauldian 'concrete' freedom also satisfies Schmitt's above-discussed criterion of the concrete as that which belongs to order but cannot be included within it.



we have relied on in this study, since it is actualised in the moment of radical openness and has the force of a constitutive decision that takes exception from the positivity of the diagram. Freedom therefore consists in an active practice of resistance rather than a retreat into the governmentally sanctioned private space. According to Foucault, freedom is an “*art* [rather than a state] of *not being governed* quite so much”.<sup>34</sup>

*Liberty is a practice.* The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to serve it. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because ‘*liberty*’ is what must be exercised. *The guarantee of freedom is freedom.*<sup>35</sup> One will know that freedom is alive not when the interests emerging in a society are allowed to express themselves, be represented and be pursued, not even when dissent and heresy are allowed to manifest themselves, but when *contestation, unruliness, intractability are not yet abolished, when the recalcitrant is not yet transformed into the dutiful.*<sup>36</sup>

Similarly to the notion of the political, concrete freedom consists in a momentary act rather than a permanent condition or state of affairs: “It is occasion, spark, challenge. It is risk, it is not guaranteed, backed-up or assured: it always remains without an end.”<sup>37</sup> Concrete freedom is thus simultaneously political and extra-diagrammatic or *non-dispositional*.

Secondly, this notion of freedom is entirely divorced from any assumption of authenticity and the correlate projects of self-discovery or self-actualisation that we have discussed in relation to the neoliberal technology of agency. In Foucault’s phrase, “the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Foucault quoted in Chambers 2001, p. 116. Emphasis added.

<sup>35</sup> Foucault quoted in Gordon 1991, p. 47. Emphasis added. See also Veyne 1993 for the discussion of Foucault’s conviction of the “futility of rationalisations and ratiocinations” with regard to political struggle: “Human freedoms and rights are based more surely on the actions of men and women committed to putting themselves into power and to defending themselves than on the doctrinal affirmation of reason or on the Kantian imperative.” (Veyne 1993, p. 4.) The absence of any discourse on human rights in Foucault’s work is owing to the *strategic* conception of power that he utilises: rights exist only insofar as they are *claimed, fought for* and *attained* in a specific configuration of power relations and therefore need no philosophical (or any other) justification other than the desire to attain them and the willingness to struggle for them.

<sup>36</sup> Pizzorno 1992, p. 207. Emphasis added.

<sup>37</sup> Rajchman 1985, p. 123.

<sup>38</sup> Foucault 1982, p. 216.

Insofar as subjective interiority is always an effect of governmental practices of subjectification, freedom consists in the *resistance* to “the administrative *inquisition* which determines who one is”<sup>39</sup>, “a *refusal to contract into an identity*, a continual *twisting loose* from the historical forms of life by which it is always already shaped”.<sup>40</sup> Yet, what is it that refuses, resists and twists loose, if not the anterior subject whom, according to Foucault’s critics, Foucault must presuppose to make his discourse on freedom meaningful? It is crucial to emphasise that to posit the subject of resistance is not to endow him with a certain pre-political authentic identity. According to Nikolas Rose, resistance is rather located in the gap between one’s actual existence and the positivity of identity that specifies it in discourse: “*Human being – like all else – exceeds all attempts to think it.*”<sup>41</sup> Similarly, in Paul Patton’s argument, Foucault needs only a minimal and austere ontology of human being as a “material to which techniques [of subjectification] are applied and which resists [this application]”.<sup>42</sup> The ontological precondition of freedom is thus not an anterior subjectivity but a capacity to act, be acted upon and resist force; in other words, a Foucauldian subject resists as a *living being*. “It is not a question of advocating such resistance, of praising autonomy or blaming domination as respective exemplars of a good and evil for all, but simply of understanding why such resistance does occur. *Foucault does not think that resistance to forms of domination requires justification.* To the extent that it occurs, such resistance follows from the nature of particular human beings. It is an effect of human freedom.”<sup>43</sup> The vitalist overtones of this understanding of freedom have been elaborated in Gilles Deleuze’s reconstruction of Foucault’s concept of biopolitics:

*Life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object. [...] When power becomes bio-power, resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power that cannot be contained within [...] the paths of a particular diagram. Is not the force that comes from*

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<sup>39</sup> Bernauer 1994, p. 258. Emphasis added.

<sup>40</sup> Caputo 1993, p. 255. Emphasis added.

<sup>41</sup> Rose 1996b, pp. 35–36. Emphasis added. See also Patton 1998.

<sup>42</sup> Patton 1995, p. 359. See also Connolly 1998.

<sup>43</sup> Patton 1998, p. 73. Emphasis added. See also Pizzorno 1992, p. 207: “The subject of freedom can no longer be identified with the individual bearer of interests and pursuer of ends; the responsible individual of the liberal view. Rather, what stands opposed to power and ends up either free or subjected (normalised) are acts, gestures, states of mind and of body. Among them is to be found the recalcitrant, resistant, unyielding material that normalising power may fail to reduce.”

*outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism, in which Foucault's thought culminates? Is not life the capacity to resist force? [...] There is no telling what man might achieve 'as a living being', as a set of forces that resist.*<sup>44</sup>

Although this notion of life as an ontological precondition of freedom appears to betray a residual naturalism in Foucault's otherwise strongly anti-essentialist approach, it is necessary to note the nuances in this conception of freedom. While Foucault occasionally affirms the apparently natural 'bodies and pleasures' as the locus of 'genuine' practices of freedom in opposition to the discourse of sexual liberation, it would be erroneous to conclude that this affirmation reintroduces the principle of authenticity with regard to a certain prediscursive primal matter.<sup>45</sup> The 'free subject of resistance' for Foucault is not an anterior vital force *that* resists but that which emerges *in* the act of resistance to diagrammatic enfolding. Freedom therefore does not consist in letting the primal forces of life be but in their confrontation with that which threatens to enclose them within a discursive domain of positivity. Similarly to our description of the formation in dissimulative practices of the secret intimate sphere of Soviet individuality, resistance is not protective but constitutive of freedom as "something one has and does *not* have, something one wants, something one conquers".<sup>46</sup> For this reason, freedom can never be a foundation of any social order, since it exists and manifests itself solely in the acts of resistance to "self-constituting practices" that this order prescribes and can never be "a state-of-being within a society that would accord with our moral nature, noumenal or social-historical".<sup>47</sup> Yet, on the other hand, freedom can never exist apart from the social order, since it is only activated in the transgression of the identities constituted by the diagram. We may therefore sum up the third response to the question of freedom in Foucault's work as the advancement of the notion of concrete freedom, which *involves* the diagram without being reducible to its operations and is extra-diagrammatic not because it *precedes* the diagram but because it *confronts* it. To paraphrase Foucault, we may term this attitude to freedom 'unhappy positivism', a sense of disappointment in and

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<sup>44</sup> Deleuze 1988, pp. 92–93. Emphasis added.

<sup>45</sup> See Foucault 1990a, p. 157. For the discussion of the problematic of 'bodies and pleasures' in Foucault's work see Horowitz 1995.

<sup>46</sup> Nietzsche 1977, p. 271. Emphasis original.

<sup>47</sup> Rajchman 1994a, p. 193.

dissatisfaction with the positive diagrammatic constitution of freedom that animates permanent resistance to it without a hope of finding final relief from it.

## 5.2. The Diagram and its Outside: Spatialising Concrete Freedom

### 5.2.1. 'One Never Lives Elsewhere': Heterotopia and the Practice of Transgression

Let us now address in greater detail the question of the localisation of concrete freedom in relation to the dispositional diagram. It should be clear by now that Foucault's rejection of the 'assumption of depth' does not permit the metaphorical invocation of a 'deeper' stratum of minimal subjectivity that underlies diagrammatic constitution. As Hayden White remarks, "Foucault's discourse is wilfully superficial [...] it is all surface, and intended to be so."<sup>48</sup> Similarly, Maurice Blanchot claims that Foucault was in search of a discourse that is "all surface and shimmering, but bereft of mirages".<sup>49</sup> Foucault's critique seeks to establish not the 'ground' but the 'space'<sup>50</sup> of constitution, resistance and potential transformation. According to Thomas Flynn, Foucault's work is an exemplar of 'spatialising thought', in which spatial metaphors are used not merely for illustrative purposes but as modes of problem formulation<sup>51</sup>: "Working on the surface of things, Foucault displaces metaphysics with a topology of social practices, charting the limits, exclusions and specific conditions of existence of these practices in their actual occurrence."<sup>52</sup> With regard to freedom, we might venture that it is 'spatialised' in the relation of the *diagram and its outside*. There is no *underground* to be found in Foucault's thought, but rather a two-dimensional space that is nonetheless not fully positive, discursive and diagrammatic.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> White 1994, p. 48.

<sup>49</sup> Blanchot 1987, p. 67.

<sup>50</sup> White 1994, p. 50.

<sup>51</sup> Flynn 1991, p. 170. See also Rajchman 1994b, Deleuze 1988, Flynn 1999.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Deleuze 1988, p. 51: "There is nothing behind knowledge, but [...] there are things *outside* knowledge." (Emphasis added.)

Deleuze's reconstruction of Foucault's thought isolates three elements of this space: solidified *strata*, the discursive forms of enunciability and visibility that form the archive that archaeology addresses, *strategies*, or the non-stratified 'knots' of power relations disentangled by genealogy, and the 'outside', the space of what Deleuze refers to as 'savage' forces, not integrated into forms or strategies.<sup>54</sup> If the 'happy positivist' type of immanent criticism discussed above in relation to the studies of governmentality exemplifies a movement *from strata to strategies* (demonstrating the conditioning of forms of knowledge by power relations), Foucault's thought of 'concrete freedom' marks the movement from the strategic space towards the outer limits of the diagram itself, i.e. it is 'anti-strategic'<sup>55</sup>. The outside is inhabited by the 'vital forces' that are literally unnameable since they are neither integrated into positive governmental *strategies* nor sedimented into identities within discursive *forms*.<sup>56</sup> In Deleuze's account, it is from the outside that the diagram itself emanates (much as Schmitt's political decision that arises out of the void), and it is ungrounded origin that it seeks to disavow by attempting its own closure against the forces of the outside, which in relation to the diagrammatic stability are always the forces of resistance:

It is *from the outside that a force affects*, or is affected, by others. The diagram, as the *fixed form* of a set of relations between forces *never exhausts force*, which can enter into other relations and compositions. [...] In this way, *the outside is always an opening to the future*: nothing ends, since nothing has begun, but everything is transformed. In this sense, force displays *potentiality with respect to the diagram containing it*. [...] Moreover, the final word on power is that *resistance comes first*, to the extent that power relations operate completely within the diagram, while resistances necessarily operate in a *direct relation with the outside* from which diagrams emerge.<sup>57</sup>

The outside is the negative space, *from which* resistance derives its forces and *towards which* the diagrammatic subject directs its "force of flight"<sup>58</sup>. We may begin

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<sup>54</sup> See *ibid.*, especially pp. 120–122.

<sup>55</sup> Foucault quoted in Bernauer 1990, p. 175.

<sup>56</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 86.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90. Emphasis added.

<sup>58</sup> This is the title of Bernauer 1990.

to appreciate the austerity and scarcity of Foucault's ontology<sup>59</sup>: that which precedes and exceeds diagrammatic constitution is quite literally *the void*, the 'background of emptiness', whose only characteristic is its radical *difference* from *any* diagram, which in turn renders it the source of the force of resistance to discourse, identity and governmentality. Yet, to posit *transcendence as absence* is obviously the opposite of postulating, in a positivist manner, the *absence of transcendence*, which is equivalent to the effacement of the radical openness of the political and the subscription to the diagrammatic assertion of self-immanence.<sup>60</sup>

At the same time, the resistance to and the transgression of the diagram do not consist in the leap out of the diagram into the outside, which, of course, is a space impossible to inhabit. *There is nothing* on the outside that could be valorised and presented as an *alternative* to diagrammatic positivities.<sup>61</sup> Transgression as a

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<sup>59</sup> See May 2000, Hallward 2000 for the discussion of the 'austerity' of Foucault's ontology, arising from his "denial of as many ontological constraints as possible. [...] If our ontology is thin, that allows us to create our conceptual worlds in many different ways, according to the ways we may try to create ourselves." (May 2000, p. 229.)

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Foucault 1977b, p. 32: "The death of God does not restore us to a limited and positivistic world, but to a world exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which transgresses it."

<sup>61</sup> This notion of the outside permits us to fully appreciate the austerity of Foucault's ontology in comparison with other practitioners of poststructuralism and 'continental philosophy' more generally, for which the notion of the Other or otherness is a constitutive concept. Simon Critchley (1997, chapter 1.) has drawn a contrast between two constructions of 'otherness': the Levinasian-Derridean notion of alterity as 'personal' and 'ethical', the openness to or even 'possession' by the Other being presented as a priori 'good' in an almost theological way and Maurice Blanchot's notion of alterity as a neutral, impersonal, empty and indifferent space of the 'there is', with which one can have no relation at all in the strict sense of the word and the experience of which is not ethical but simply terrifying. Critchley (1997, p. 82.) refers to the latter sense of alterity as 'atheist transcendence', "the primal scene of emptiness, absence and disaster". Foucault's notion of the outside is undoubtedly closer to the latter sense of alterity, the notions of absence, emptiness and the void being crucial to his writing. Deleuze's reconstruction of the outside as a space of *savage forces* may be read to unwittingly 'populate' this empty and neutral space, although it is important to recall that these forces only come into play on the boundary of the diagram and its outside. One never dwells on the outside and is therefore incapable of finding out *what there is there*. In Deleuze's admission, to speak of savage forces is distinct from invoking "savage experience", since the savage is "that which does not enter relations or allow itself to be integrated [and] can't be absorbed into experience". (Deleuze 1988, p. 117.) There is nothing to say about the outside other than that 'there is' one, but the practices that unfold at the opening to it may nonetheless be described, though in a non-positive way. Critchley (1997, p. 176.) discusses this 'proximity to the void' through an elaboration of Beckett's phrase "absence supreme good and yet", in which the '*and yet*' is precisely the qualification of the affirmation of absence, a moment of holding back the desire for the leap into non-being or ultimate meaninglessness.

passage towards the outside is therefore not the valorisation of ‘otherness’ in any positive sense but rather the affirmation of the *possibility* of being-otherwise: “Transgression has its *entire space in the line that it crosses*.”<sup>62</sup> Foucault’s notion of transgression may therefore be spatialised as, literally, ‘thought from outside’<sup>63</sup>; the experience of ‘concrete freedom’ has its locus in the *opening onto the outside at the limit of the diagram*. It is this engagement with limits, both analytical and practical, that, according to such authors as Jon Simons and James Bernauer, constitutes the ethical drive of Foucault’s work.<sup>64</sup> In Simons’s argument, that makes use of Milan Kundera’s distinction between weight and lightness of being,<sup>65</sup> Foucault proceeds from the unbearable gravity of discursive specification of existence in terms of identity and advocates as a strategy of *relief* an ‘ethics of permanent resistance’ that transgresses limits both through the ‘theoretical’ explication of the contingency of every diagrammatic order and through the ‘practical’ effort of self-fashioning through artistic, political or sexual experimentation *in the face* of the modes of subjectification instituted by the diagram. “Our fight is our freedom, our struggle is our art, and *our resistance is our existence*.”<sup>66</sup> Taking the latter claim seriously entails dispensing entirely with the demand of Foucault’s critics for the criteria of ‘acceptable’ resistance: transgression needs no justification other than its own existence, since to stop resisting is to cease to exist.

By the same token, James Bernauer notes as the central motif in Foucault’s writing the sense of *confinement*, both literal (as in the case of prisons, hospitals and asylums) and figurative (as in the case of humanism and the discourse of identity), which may be *escaped* through ‘ecstatic’ practices of thought that “dispossess oneself of the routines of thought and action that eventually become one’s identity”.<sup>67</sup> This type of ‘ecstatic thinking’, reminiscent of apophatic or negative theology,<sup>68</sup> may be summed up as a ‘nonpositive affirmation’ of life in the face of the limits of identity.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Foucault 1977b, p. 34. Emphasis added.

<sup>63</sup> See Foucault 1987, Bernauer 1990, pp. 46, 57–60, Deleuze 1988, pp. 70–93.

<sup>64</sup> See Simons 1995, Bernauer 1990, Bennett 1996.

<sup>65</sup> See Kundera 1999.

<sup>66</sup> Simons 1995, p. 87. Emphasis added. See also *ibid.*, chapters 7, 8.

<sup>67</sup> Bernauer 1990, p. 20.

<sup>68</sup> See Bernauer 1990, chapter 6. Foucault discussed the parallels of his thought with negative theology in Foucault 1987, particularly pp. 16–19.

<sup>69</sup> Foucault 1977b, p. 36.

Yet, it is crucial to recall that this ecstatic transcendence *involves* the void of the outside without *leaping into* it, the latter option exemplified by madness, drug-induced dissolution of consciousness or suicide – states of non-being that we bracket off from our discussion of freedom.<sup>70</sup> We might therefore speak of the transgression of limits as a practice that unfolds in *proximity to the void* of the outside. If the space of transgression is exhausted by the line that it crosses, then one may concur with Jacques Derrida that “one is never installed within transgression, *one never lives elsewhere*”.<sup>71</sup> There are no ‘other places’, alternative to the diagram, that one could reach via transgression: *transgression* should therefore be distinguished from the more general notion of *transcendence*, which may connote the hope of liberation of authentic being from all power relations.

Transgression does not seek to *oppose one thing to another*, nor does it achieve its purpose through mockery or by upsetting the solidity of foundations. [...] Transgression contains nothing negative but it *affirms limited being* – affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone of existence for the first time. But correspondingly, *this affirmation contains nothing positive: no content can bind it, since, by definition, no limit can possibly restrict it*. Perhaps it is simply an affirmation of division, but only insofar as division is not understood to mean a cutting gesture, or the establishment of a separation or the measuring of a distance, only retaining that in it which may designate the existence of difference.<sup>72</sup>

Furthermore, and *pace* the self-gratifying liberationist discourses and practices of the 1960s that we have designated as complicit with the contemporary neoliberal regime of self-actualisation, there may never be a ‘transgressive’ identity, politics or lifestyle that one could specify in positive terms. *Transgression has identity and lifestyle as its objects not as its forms*. “Transgression is not a site beyond limits but a non-space devoid of positive content. [...] There are only acts and moments of transgression rather than firm grounds and secure sites.”<sup>73</sup> Finally, as we have already

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<sup>70</sup> See Foucault 1997 for the discussion of madness as the ‘absence of work’, the absolute break with the work of art, the indifferent silence of the void. In contrast, the work of ‘mad’ poets and philosophers, which so attracted Foucault, was produced *at* the limit rather than beyond it, transgressing the limits *by being positioned at them*. See also Simons 2000, 1995, chapter 6, for the discussion of Foucault’s linkage between transgression and modern art.

<sup>71</sup> Derrida 1981, p. 12. Emphasis added.

<sup>72</sup> Foucault 1977b, pp. 35–36. Emphasis added.

<sup>73</sup> Simons 2000, pp. 52–53.



hinted above, it is not even clear whether transgression as a practice of freedom is subject to a discourse about it and what the content of this discourse might be: “*There is nothing to be said about freedom*, except that within its space we construct our ethics and our lives.”<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, were the freedom-enhancing forces of the outside to be *named* and *identified*, they would lose their resistant qualities and enter the dispositional diagram:

*Resistance functions as the ‘unsaid’ of power*, which, however, as soon as it becomes articulated or ‘said’, changes sides and itself assumes the status of power. It seems that resistance fails precisely at the very moment when it becomes power, instantaneously calling up and effecting its own shadow resistance.<sup>75</sup>

*What the individual should be is none of Foucault’s business*. More importantly, the very business of coming up with normative ideas of what the individual should be, and of developing administrative practices and professional competences to see to it that such individuals are in fact produced, is *precisely the problem, not the solution*, it is precisely what these struggles are against.<sup>76</sup>

Nonetheless, if transgressive resistance to diagrammatic constitution *does not* liberate the subject in his authenticity, take him beyond the limit into the bliss of ‘better places’ or even point out a lifestyle to opt for, what *does* it do?

Let us suggest that the effect of the practices of transgressive freedom is not the establishment of ‘other places’ outside the diagram but rather the transformation of the diagram itself into an ‘other’ place of the kind that Foucault has referred to as *heterotopia*. Dispositional diagrams of governmentality are, in their programmatic rationality, paradigmatic of a *utopian* construction of space that presupposes and effects a fully *ordered* domain *transparent* to the “unimpeded empire of the [governmental] gaze”<sup>77</sup>, since its inhabitants are fully exhausted in their identity by the governmental work of constitution. “Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality, there is nevertheless a fantastic untroubled region, in which they are able to unfold, [...] where life is easy even if the road to [it] is chimerical.”<sup>78</sup> The utopian dimension is integral to the very notion of government and constitutive of its basic

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<sup>74</sup> Hacking 1995, p. 26. Emphasis added.

<sup>75</sup> Ziarek 1998, p. 11. Emphasis added.

<sup>76</sup> Caputo 1993, p. 250. Emphasis added.

<sup>77</sup> Foucault 1976, p. 39.

<sup>78</sup> Foucault 1970, p. xvii.

presupposition that human existence is in principle amenable to ordering, reshaping and specification in terms of a certain rationality. According to Foucault, utopias are inherently *discursive*, having the structure of a *fabula*, making it possible to speak interminably and prolifically about what positive form the order of being should take, according to what criteria and normative principles, through what techniques and forms of knowledge and with what construct of the subject as the angelic carrier of the authenticity of the new order. In contrast to this utopian pathos, Foucault presents the notion of heterotopia as a ‘fundamental disorder’ that “silently questions the space in which we live”,<sup>79</sup> not an ‘other space’ outside the utopian diagrammatic construct, but rather a (non-)space established in the relation between the diagram and its outside, the order and its transgression. In this relation, the diagram is revealed as a contingent form of utopian ordering amid the generalised disorder of the outside which surrounds it, perceived as a container and a limit to freedom rather than its site, and displaced as a positivity, whose effects, including the ‘deep’ conception of subjective interiority and authenticity, are merely the folds on its surface.

There is a worse kind of disorder than that of the incongruous, [...] the disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the dimension of the heterocline: things are laid, placed, arranged in sites so very different from one another that *it is impossible to find a place of residence for them*. [...] Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they *secretly undermine language*, because they make it impossible to name this *and* that, [...] because they destroy syntax in advance. [...] Heterotopias *desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source, they dissolve our myths and sterilise the lyricism of our sentences*.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Flynn 1991, p. 169.

<sup>80</sup> Foucault 1970, p. xvii. Emphasis added. We ought to distinguish the notion of heterotopia from the spatial structure of ‘heteronomy’ that, according to John Ruggie (1998, pp. 171–195.), characterises the ‘postmodern’ multi-perspectival polity. Heteronomy is a space characterised by the decentring of sovereignty and the coexistence of a plurality of overlapping authorities in ‘extraterritorial’ spaces. This space, however decentred and pluralistic, is nonetheless diagrammatic and in fact corresponds to the disseminative and dispersed diagram of neoliberal ‘governance’. Contrary to the celebratory spirit that animates the ‘critical’ IR discourse on heteronomy and multiperspectivalism, a Foucauldian approach, in which sovereignty is merely one mode of exercise of power, whose eradication is of no consequence to the continuing existence of power relations, finds little cause for enthusiasm in the dispersion of power throughout the diagram. In contrast, the notion of a heterotopia is not marked by a coexistence of *authorities* but by a series of gaps, voids and lacunae within the diagram that makes the very notion of *coexistence* problematic. In a heterotopian space we are dealing not with an *interpenetration* of

The heterotopia is thus a devilish space in Kundera's sense, the space in which things (and words) are out of joint, in which discourse is pressed against its limits and the meaningful and transparent diagrammatic order is revealed as merely an illusory attempt at evading the brute meaninglessness of the outside. "The heterotopia shows the *constant impossibility of closure* that follows from the rise of an open and infinite space and hence the terms through which we might learn how to resist the utopian. [...] The heterotopia is distinguished from other spaces in that it is the *very expression of transgression*."<sup>81</sup> If the positivity of the utopian diagrammatic space itself is identified as a 'problem', then the salutary effect of the conception of concrete freedom is not the formation of new spaces endowed with forms of knowledge, discourses of 'liberation' and clear-cut criteria of acceptability, but rather that very sense of 'paralysis' that Foucault's critics considered his thought to elicit,<sup>82</sup> a paralysis that "brings about that certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or at least no longer so unhesitatingly, performed".<sup>83</sup>

The practice of concrete freedom therefore does not consist in breaking out of the diagram into a quasi-natural site of 'real freedom', but in inhabiting the diagrammatic space as a heterotopia, i.e. locating oneself in proximity to the void at its limit and thereby *externalising* its effects, 'refusing what one is' in diagrammatic terms. In this sense, a Foucauldian concrete freedom is a possibility that always remains open, irrespectively of the positive form of order, away from which its force of flight is directed. "We can see the effects of [transgressions] everywhere we choose to look, but the question for us is whether we will so choose."<sup>84</sup> Thus, it is possible to understand and appreciate Foucault's own claim that his works, in addition to explicating the subjection involved in the diagrammatic constitution of 'free subjects', *also* "show people that they are much freer than they feel".<sup>85</sup> Concrete freedom no longer appears as something a certain governmental diagram can *guarantee* through its positive intervention or a commitment to non-intervention but rather as something the diagram 'enables' by its very presence as an object of transgression. In this manner

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governmental spaces (akin to the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface that we focus on this study) but with the *intrusion* into the governmental space of the extra-diagrammatic forces of the outside.

<sup>81</sup> Dumm 1996, p. 44. Emphasis added.

<sup>82</sup> Foucault 1991c, pp. 82–85.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>84</sup> Dumm 1996, p. 46.

<sup>85</sup> Foucault 1988h, p. 10.

the proverbial 'free subject' makes a comeback in Foucault's work, but not at all as a result of abandoning earlier conceptions, but as their *culmination*: "Foucault's fundamental idea is that of a dimension of subjectivity *derived* from power and knowledge without being *dependent* on them."<sup>86</sup>

### 5.2.2. Two (More) Concepts of Liberty: Towards a 'Properly' Negative Freedom

Let us conclude our discussion of the spatialisation of a Foucauldian 'concrete freedom' by its brief comparison with the influential account of two concepts of liberty offered by Isaiah Berlin. Berlin has famously distinguished between negative and positive liberty as responses to two distinct political questions. The idea of positive liberty, which Berlin discusses critically as fraught with dangers, poses the question of "what, or who is the *source of control or interference* that can determine someone to do or be this rather than that?"<sup>87</sup> Berlin's key insight is the association of this notion of freedom with the tendency to split the individual into 'higher' and 'lower', rational and empirical selves and subject the latter to the former. In a number of historically variable ways this tendency has resulted in positing as the 'rational' ideal a certain version of a 'truer' or 'higher' freedom, which empirical individuals must be indoctrinated into in order to fully appreciate and be able to practice it. "Once I take this view, I am in a position to *ignore the actual wishes* of men and societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf of, their '*real*' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – the free choice of his 'true', albeit often *submerged* and *inarticulate*, self."<sup>88</sup> Berlin's critique of this aspect of the discourse on positive freedom in many ways parallels Foucault's deconstruction of subjectivity as an effect of subjection to a certain regime of power-knowledge: "Enough manipulation of the definition of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes."<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 101. Emphasis added.

<sup>87</sup> Berlin 2002, p. 169. Emphasis added.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180. Emphasis added.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181. See also Dumm 1996, chapter 2 for the discussion of the parallels and divergences between Foucault's and Berlin's notions of freedom.

The specific object of Berlin's criticism is the notion of self-realisation, which we have discussed as the constitutive veridictive principle of neoliberal governmentality. Self-realisation is viewed by Berlin as "total self-identification *with a specific principle or ideal* in order to attain [freedom]".<sup>90</sup> In our terms, this self-identification consists in the injunction to identity installed by the diagram, a positive specification of the content of 'true' freedom through a series of exclusions, rarefactions and restrictions. At the very moment freedom is veridictively linked with the notion of truth, there opens an infinite possibility for pedagogical technologies of indoctrination that promise to guide the empirical individual to the realisation of his true or higher self. "To force empirical selves into the right pattern is no tyranny but liberation. [...] *Liberty, so far from being incompatible with authority, becomes virtually identical with it.* [...] Clearly, [individuals] must be educated. For the uneducated are irrational, heteronomous, and need to be coerced. [...] But the uneducated cannot be expected to understand or co-operate with the purposes of their educators."<sup>91</sup> The very notion of 'true freedom' therefore permits the deployment of the pedagogical asymmetry that cancels out the immediate experience of freedom in the name of its 'true' acquisition in the practices of indoctrination.

If the individual is ignorant, immature, uneducated, mentally crippled, denied adequate opportunities of health and development, he will not know how to choose. *Such a person will never know what it is he really wants.* If there are *people who understand what human nature is* and what it craves, and if they do for others, perhaps by some measure of control, *what these others would be doing for themselves* if they were wiser, better informed, maturer, more developed, are they curtailing their freedom? *They are interfering with people as they are, but only in order to enable them to do what they would do if they knew enough,* or were always at their best, instead of yielding to irrational motives, or behaving childishly, or allowing the animal side of their nature the upper hand. Is this then interference at all? [...] Surely not. Teachers and parents are *bringing out their submerged or real selves,* and catering to their needs as against the transient demands of *the more superficial self* which greater maturity will slough off like a skin. *If you substitute for parents a Church, or a Party or a State, you get a theory on which much modern authority is based.*<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., pp. 194–195. Emphasis added.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 284. Emphasis added.

This thesis parallels Carl Schmitt's critique of the 'educational theory' involved in the valorisation of liberal democracy: "The people can be brought to recognise and express their own will correctly through the *right education*. This means nothing else than that the educator identifies his will at least provisionally with that of the people, not to mention that the content of education that the pupil will receive is also decided by the educator. The consequence of this educational theory is a dictatorship that suspends democracy *in the name of a true democracy that is still to be created*."<sup>93</sup> Similarly, Berlin notes the tendency in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century political thought to deploy 'positive freedom' as the legitimisation for oppressive and even tyrannical practices of rule: "What had begun as a doctrine of freedom turned into a doctrine of authority and, at times, of oppression, and became the favoured weapon of despotism."<sup>94</sup>

Berlin refers to the 'sleight of hand' involved in the veridictive linkage between freedom and truth as the claim to possess a 'final solution',<sup>95</sup> the belief in the possibility of achieving total harmony and the complete fulfilment of all human ideals through the pursuit of a certain avenue of liberation or the construction of an ideal governmental diagram. More recently, John Caputo has discussed the same tendency in his critique of the 'hermeneutics of the Secret', the self-gratifying belief that one has "surpassed the limits of offering a mere mortal interpretation" and instead has uncovered the locus of the truth of human being, and consequently the pathway to real freedom, which the "poor existing individuals" must tread to realise their inner truth.<sup>96</sup> Although the notions of the 'final solution' and 'being in on the Secret' evoke a most extreme sense of 'angelic' self-certitude, the basic presupposition of a link between freedom and truth is operative at the most mundane diagrammatic sites, from self-help manuals to participatory empowerment projects of technical assistance, and invariably calls forth the jurisdictional effects of subjection. Berlin's solution to this problem of the 'final solution' is the strong affirmation of pluralism and the contingency of all foundational principles: "Since no solution can be guaranteed against error, no disposition is final. And therefore a loose texture and toleration of a minimum of

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<sup>93</sup> Schmitt 1985b, p. 28. Emphasis added.

<sup>94</sup> Berlin 2002, p. 37. Berlin comments with appreciation on Hobbes's frankness regarding the loss of freedom involved in the subjection to the sovereign, a frankness that is lacking in contemporary political theory: "Hobbes was at any rate more candid: he did not pretend that a sovereign did not enslave; he justified this slavery but at least did not have the effrontery to call it freedom." (Ibid., p. 210.)

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>96</sup> Caputo 2000, p. 3. See *ibid.*, chapter 1 for the discussion of the notion of a 'poor existing individual' as a purely empirical being without any anterior identity.

inefficiency, even a degree of indulgence in idle talk, idle curiosity, aimless pursuit of this and that without authorisation – conspicuous waste itself – allow more spontaneous, individual variation [...] and will always be worth more than the neatest and most delicately fashioned imposed pattern.”<sup>97</sup> Berlin therefore rejects the possibility of a ‘rational consensus’ and the reconciliation of divergent values even as an ideal regulative principle and affirms the irreducibility of antagonism thoroughly at odds with the utopian spatial consciousness of governmentality: “Since some values may conflict intrinsically, the very notion that a pattern must in principle be discoverable in which they are all rendered harmonious is founded on a false a priori view of what the world is like.”<sup>98</sup> By the same token, Caputo presents as the solution to the claim to know the Secret a greater sense of humility and a stronger evaluation of the actual empirical individual rather than his imaginary ‘submerged’ and ‘real’ double: “The aim is not to edify ourselves.”<sup>99</sup>

In Berlin’s work, this affirmation of pluralism, which in principle accords with Foucault’s claim for the ‘indignity of speaking for others’ and the critique of the subjection involved in all positive, identity-based constructions of freedom, finds its correlate in the valorisation of ‘negative liberty’, summed up by the following question: “What is the *area* within which the subject – a person or a group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, *without interference* by other persons. [...] Political liberty in this sense is simply *the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others*.”<sup>100</sup> Similarly to Foucault’s affirmation of the possibility of being otherwise (rather than an injunction to be someone else), Berlin insists that “the freedom of which I speak is opportunity for action rather than action itself”.<sup>101</sup> Berlin is particularly critical of the tendency by ‘positivise’ freedom by equating it with concrete material and social conditions of its exercise: “Useless

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<sup>97</sup> Berlin 2002, p. 93.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 43. Berlin’s insightful argument is that the very presupposition of the possibility of a rational consensus implies the potential *dispensability* of the freedom of choice and thus of liberty as such: “Once such perfection has been reached, the need for choice between alternatives withers away. On this view choice, like the party system, or the right to vote against the nominees of the ruling party becomes obsolete in the perfect Platonic or theocratic or Jacobin or communist society, where any sign of the recrudescence of basic disagreement is a symptom of error and vice.” (Ibid., p. 44.)

<sup>99</sup> Caputo 2000, p. 55. See also *ibid.*, p. 1: “When we open our mouths it is *we who speak*, not something bigger and better than we.” In Talleyrand’s maxim, cited by Berlin, “Above all, gentlemen, no zeal whatsoever!” (Talleyrand cited in Berlin 2002, p. 92.)

<sup>100</sup> Berlin 2002, p. 169. Emphasis added.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

freedoms should be made usable, but they are not identical with the conditions indispensable for their utility.”<sup>102</sup> Governmental interventions for the purposes of empowerment or social assistance may well provide the ‘necessary’ conditions for the exercise of freedom while withholding freedom itself in permanently traversing the boundary between the public and the private in these acts of endowment. Berlin’s defence of negative liberty is thus an attempt to retain the gap between individual existence and the positive governmental ethos, the effacement of which substitutes for freedom *from* society a fully diagrammatised ‘free society’, which, akin to the neoliberal concept of ‘good governance’, does not concern itself with its self-limitation.<sup>103</sup>

At first glance, Berlin’s notion of negative liberty as freedom *from* government accords with a Foucauldian concrete freedom that takes the form of a practice of transgression, an experience of not being governed. However, our analysis of liberal governmentality in the preceding chapters also points to the resemblance of negative liberty to the diagrammatic construct of liberal freedom. We may specify this resemblance by addressing the way Berlin construes the *space*, area or domain within which negative liberty resides. The first feature of that space is its apparent *naturalness*: “What then must that minimum be? That which a man cannot give up without offending against the *essence of his human nature*.”<sup>104</sup> Despite his recognition that this essence is a matter of “infinite debate”,<sup>105</sup> Berlin refuses to conceive of the boundaries of negative liberty as contingent and artificial, (re)drawn in various ways in liberal governmental practices:

There are frontiers, *not artificially drawn*, within which men should be inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms so long and widely accepted that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is to be a *normal human being*, and therefore, also of what it is to act *inhumanely* or *insanely*. [...] The freedom of a society, or a class or a group, in this sense of freedom, is measured by the strength of these barriers, and the number or the importance of *the paths which they keep open* for their members – if not for all, for at any rate a great number of them.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 285. Emphasis added.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 173. Emphasis added.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p. 211. Emphasis added. Only on one occasion does Berlin make a concession for the possibly artificial character of the constitutive boundary between the public and the private: “[What makes



This fragment simultaneously posits openness, or the possibility of being otherwise, as the main value of negative liberty *and* effects a closure of this openness in deploying the logic of *normality* to stabilise the particular form of the public/private distinction. This “absolute stand”<sup>107</sup> appears to be not an alternative to but a *variation* on the theme of the ‘final solution’ associated with the idea of positive liberty. Berlin’s gestures of naturalisation and normalisation permit to invoke as the sanctified *ground* of authentic freedom the contingent construction of a *space* in a governmental decision.<sup>108</sup> The area of negative liberty is therefore not an opening of the diagram onto its outside but a governmentally delimited and guaranteed space of possibilities that are *ipso facto specified and restricted*.

Berlin’s advocacy of negative liberty corresponds to the effort of classical liberal governmentality to stabilise its construction of the domain of ‘natural liberty’ rather than the neoliberal replay of the constitutive act of redrawing this boundary in the project of ‘good governance’. What is crucial for our purposes is that the construct of negative liberty ought to be considered a ‘*special case*’ of *positive liberty*, its area being always already a *positive* space, constituted in the governmental act of installing the borderline between the public and the private and sanctified by the deployment of the ‘final’ principles of naturality and normality. While this delimitation may in principle guard against unlimited ‘quantitatively total’ government, it also disables any understanding of the way, in which the natural and normal features of the subject (his ‘positive authenticity’) are inculcated in governmental practices and subsequently used to sanctify these practices as being in accordance with the natural and the normal.

The ideal of the normal enables its agents not to question the ground of their self-existence as political beings. Normalcy, coupled with the wall of privacy secured by the practices

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human beings human is the demand] to be accorded an area, *artificially carved out, if need be*, in which one is one’s own master, a ‘negative’ area in which a man is not obliged to account for his activities to any man.” (Ibid., p. 52. Emphasis added.) Yet, this admission is the exception that proves the rule: admitting the artificiality of the space of negative liberty entails the need to probe the question of its historical constitution in a multitude of contingent ways, displaces the pathos of the sanctity of this space and ultimately contradicts the construction of this space as ‘negative’.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Dumm 1996, p. 55: “Here Berlin succumbs to the temptation, born of a horrible knowledge of the dangers associated with exploring the ground upon which the standards of humanity are built, to revert to the absolute categories of which he is justly suspicious.”

establishing the neutral space of negative liberty, enables all sorts of *practical exercises of power* that will shape and discipline selves into inviolable human beings. [...] The proliferation of normalcy is a *confinement of freedom* enabled by the very evasion of the politics entailed in the construction of space as neutral.<sup>109</sup>

In other words, what is lost in the valorisation of the liberal ‘negative liberty’ is the political character of the constitution of the liberal subject as natural and normal, that very ‘manipulation of the definition of man’, that Berlin criticised with regard to positive liberty. From the preceding chapters of this study it should be clear that the pedagogical technology, which Berlin associates with theocratic and authoritarian regimes, is empirically widespread and structurally indispensable to liberal government itself. The following description by Berlin of ‘paternalist’ governments applies with full force to the technology of agency deployed by the most radical proponents of ‘autonomisation’: “All paternalist governments, however benevolent, cautious, disinterested and rational, have tended, in the end, *to treat the majority of men as minors*, or as being too often incurably foolish or irresponsible; or else as maturing too slowly as not to justify their liberation at any clearly foreseeable date (which in practice means at no definite time at all).”<sup>110</sup> Even if the ‘date of liberation’ were to be specified, one ought to bear in mind that the subject thus liberated is, firstly, ‘free’ only on the condition of her continuous invocation of the rarefied grounds of her subjection and, secondly, rarefied in her own being by the identity to which she is subjected.

Insofar as we conceive of negative liberty as a specifically classical liberal version of positive (i.e. diagrammatic, discursive and identity-based) freedom that exists on par with such other possible constructs as ‘communist’ or ‘nationalist’ positive freedoms, we may concur with Thomas Dumm’s understanding of it as a “*beteronomously free* space, that is a space that is only *secondbandedly free*, free in contrast and by virtue of its submission to external principles of governing legitimacy”.<sup>111</sup> Berlin’s two concepts of liberty may therefore be conceived as two versions of what may be termed *diagrammatic freedom*. Instead, the notion of concrete freedom that we have articulated above appears to be a more fitting example

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 56. Emphasis added.

<sup>110</sup> Berlin 2002, p. 54. Emphasis added.

<sup>111</sup> Dumm 1996, p. 60. Emphasis added.

of a '*properly negative*' freedom, which does not owe its locus to an anterior diagrammatic spatialisation and is therefore *non-dispositional*; which resists positive specification and is therefore *non-discursive*, insofar as all discursive forms are always already stratified within a diagram; which it is animated by the passion for the *non-identical*, insofar as identity is always already an effect of diagrammatic subjectification. The dissociation of freedom from identity is perhaps the most complex aspect of the conception of concrete freedom. In the following chapter we shall discuss the possibility of such dissociation and the possibilities that it opens.

## 5.3. Infamous Life: Displacing the Question of Identity

### 5.4.1. A Freedom Spared From Knowledge: Non-Identity and Aesthetics of Existence

The nonpositive affirmation of non-identity is arguably the most controversial feature of Foucault's thought on freedom that, furthermore, is rarely addressed in the commentary on Foucault's work.<sup>112</sup> Let us suggest that this affirmation proceeds in two distinct steps. Firstly, the veridictive *link between freedom and truth* (and knowledge more generally) is dissolved by the Foucauldian emphasis on 'refusing who we are' or, in Caputo's formulation, the admission of the fact of "not knowing who we are".<sup>113</sup> Caputo's notion of a 'cold' or 'devilish' hermeneutics that he associates with Foucault, seeks to affirm an "anti-essentialist open-endedness, [...] a happy minimalism about who we think we are"<sup>114</sup> and thus supplant the pathos of *self-discovery* and *self-realisation* by the practices of *self-fashioning* or *self-creation*,

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<sup>112</sup> Despite being central to Foucault's philosophical thought, the notion of non-identity is rarely explicated in the studies of governmentality. For the rare discussions of 'non-identitarian criticism' in this field see Burchell 1996, p. 31, Dean 1996a, p. 212.

<sup>113</sup> This is the title of Caputo 1993. See also Bernauer 1994 for the discussion of Foucault's 'ecstatic thinking', which attempts not to discover oneself, but on the contrary, to "get free of oneself". (Foucault 1990b, p. 8.) Foucault's late interest in Greek aesthetics of existence is also motivated by his attempt to displace the concern, descending from early Christian practices and presently redeployed in psychoanalysis, with the 'hermeneutics of the self', "the recognition that there is a truth in the subject, that soul is the place where this truth resides". (Bernauer 1994, p. 257.)

<sup>114</sup> Caputo 2000, p. 6.

which require the experience of 'not knowing' to be worthy of the name. "It is the philosophy for a practice in which what one is capable of being is *not rooted in a prior knowledge of who one is*. Its principle is freedom, but a freedom which does not follow from any postulation of our nature or essence."<sup>115</sup> In the absence of any *knowledge* about who one *is*, freedom takes concrete shape in the cultivation of a style of existence, a sensibility that is *aesthetic* rather than *epistemic*: "What is required is an aesthetic attitude in which the *cultivation of a style takes precedence over any curiosity about the true nature of the experience* being stylised."<sup>116</sup>

This attitude is best elucidated with the help of Foucault's discussion of Ancient Greek erotics. While the pre-Socratic erotic is taken by Foucault to problematise the 'use of pleasures' in terms of activity and passivity, self-restraint and moderation, reciprocity and honour, the Platonic erotic shifts the object of problematisation from the practical questions of amorous behaviour or 'conduct in love' towards "love in its very being", thus posing for the first time the vexing question of the nature of 'true love'.<sup>117</sup> "As soon as one undertakes to speak of love in a discourse that aims to *define its nature* instead of praising that which one loves,"<sup>118</sup> the very object of discourse is thereby displaced from the erotic to the epistemic space. In Platonic erotics the epistemic anxiety about the nature of 'true love' is resolved through recasting love itself as the "love of truth": "Beyond the appearances of the object, love is a relation to truth."<sup>119</sup> In this displacement love became subjected to metaphysics and metaphysics was in turn eroticised, paving the way for the 'deployment of sexuality' with its curious penchant for the auto-affective discourse about pleasure. By the same token, the plethoric yet repetitive discourse on 'true freedom' inevitably threatens the loss of its object, the practice of freedom suffocated under the weight of enunciations that put it before the epistemic tribunal. The parallel of love and freedom may be taken further. As John Caputo notes, love is structured by a permanent excess and exceptionality, a non-calculability or unconditionality that makes it impossible to love "up to a point" or "in certain respects": "The measure of love is love without measure."<sup>120</sup> Secondly, love is necessarily in excess of all reasoning, explanation and interpretation, being an

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<sup>115</sup> Rajchman 1994a, p. 192. Emphasis added.

<sup>116</sup> White 1994, p. 75. Emphasis added.

<sup>117</sup> Foucault 1990b, pp. 233, 236–237.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237. Emphasis added.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>120</sup> Caputo 2000, p. 183.

experience “without why”<sup>121</sup> that happens “for no reason”<sup>122</sup>, something which, like religious faith, must be *spared from knowledge*.<sup>123</sup> By the same token, freedom ought to be conceived as *singular* and *supplementary* in relation to knowledge, always exceeding any horizon of expectation and always extraneous to the positive figures of knowledge.

To speak of the singularity of freedom is also to displace the question of normative or ‘ethical’ criteria for its practices. The singular is always in excess of the regular and is therefore literally *unprecedented*, an event to which no normative principle may apply.<sup>124</sup> Despite the dangers and discomfort involved in dispensing with moral principles at the opening onto the outside, this dangerous experience forms the very content of freedom as a *stylistic transgression* rather than the application of the rule, the approximation of the normative ideal or the concretisation of an ethical schema.<sup>125</sup> Rather than unwittingly justifying or celebrating whatever is referred to as ‘nihilism’, this stance in proximity to the void enables the *ethical* practice of freedom that Foucault conceives of in terms of ‘aesthetics of existence’ that takes its point of departure from the absence of a moral code or a general normative schema.<sup>126</sup> In his studies of Greco-Roman culture Foucault articulates a type of *ethics* which is simultaneously an *aesthetic* relationship, an ‘art of existence’, which does not emphasise the recovery of the underlying deep truth of one’s subjectivity in the

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>122</sup> See Critchley 1997, p. 136.

<sup>123</sup> Caputo 2000, p. 10.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 190: “Ethics ends where singularity begins, which means where existence begins since singulars are the sole existents. [...] When things get difficult and the way is blocked, ethics is nowhere to be found. Just when we need ethics the most, we find that ethics has tipped its hat, politely made its excuses, and quietly slipped out the back door, leaving us poor existing individuals to face the worst.”

<sup>125</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 181–183 for Caputo’s discussion of the ‘end of ethics’ and the thought of the singular as exceeding both the *techné* of implementing an ethical programme and *phronesis*, i.e. practical ethical reasoning that concretises and enriches an anterior ethical schema.

<sup>126</sup> Foucault introduces a distinction between three aspects of morality: moral behaviour, the moral code (with which behaviour may be consonant or dissonant) and, most originally, the “kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rapport a soi*, which I call *ethics*, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions”. (Foucault 1984b, p. 352. Emphasis added.) For a more detailed discussion of this threefold distinction see Foucault 1990b, pp. 25–32. For the discussion of Foucault’s late work on ethics and aesthetics of existence see Connolly 1998, Allen 1998, Bernauer 1992, Rajchman 1992, Simons 1995 (chapters 6, 7, 8), Bennett 1996. See also Deleuze 1988 for the reading that conceives of this problematic as the culmination of Foucault’s thought, his ‘discovery’ of a “place where a sense of serenity would be finally attained and life truly affirmed”. (Deleuze 1988, p. 96.)

practice of 'hermeneutics of the self', but rather focuses on active self-fashioning, "those intentional and voluntary actions by which men [...] seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria".<sup>127</sup>

The crucial importance of the aesthetic reconstruction of the domain of ethics in Foucault's work is that it serves to uncouple the veridictive axis of the diagram, thereby dissociating self-fashioning from the knowledge of one's true identity: "It is not at all necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific knowledge."<sup>128</sup> Moreover, the relation of aesthetics of existence to the ethico-epistemic axis of the diagram is that of opposition and antagonism: as Foucault remarks in his discussion of Baudelaire, the aesthetic techniques of the self do not "have any place in society itself, or in the body politic. They can only be produced in another, a different place which Baudelaire calls art."<sup>129</sup> It must be emphasised that in the 'aestheticist' worldview that, according to Alan Megill, characterises Foucault's work, art does not denote a functional sector contrasted with other domains of experience, but, in an interesting parallel to the Schmittian notion of 'the political', is rather a source of all experience.<sup>130</sup> Just like any practice acquires a political character, when it carries an intense constitutive force, any material, including one's everyday existence, can become enveloped in an aesthetic project of creating oneself as a 'work of art'. It is also important to note that, contrary to the criticism of Foucault's 'aestheticism' as elitist and narcissistic<sup>131</sup>, self-creation as a work of art "is to be taken in the sense of the Greeks for whom an artist

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<sup>127</sup> Foucault 1990b, p. 10.

<sup>128</sup> Foucault 1984b, p. 349.

<sup>129</sup> Foucault 1984d, p. 42.

<sup>130</sup> Megill 1985, pp. 2–5. See also Simons 2000, Bennett 1996, Ziarek 1998 for the detailed discussion of Foucault's understanding of aesthetics, which rejects the reduction of the aesthetic or 'poietic' dimension to a functional sector of social life. According to Ziarek (1998, p. 3.), Foucault seeks to break out of the following narrow alternative: "Either [aesthetics] is to be rejected as mere fantasising that has nothing to do with practical life or it has to be defined entirely in relation to its institutional status [...] as a sector of culture." Foucault's solution is the reinscription of aesthetics as a sensitivity towards the possibilities of being otherwise, generalisable to a variety of domains and contrasted not with other 'functional' sectors of life but with alternative dispositions of existence, e.g. disciplinary or confessional subjectification.

<sup>131</sup> See Wolin 1995 for the most extreme version of such criticism that claims that Foucault's position is indistinguishable from that of a "narcissistic child" (p. 257.) and that the 'realisation' of his ethical project would bring about what Wolin refers to as "a Hobbesian state of nature with a flair for style". (p. 262.) See Bennett 1996, Berard 1999, Simons 2000 for the discussion and response to this type of criticism.

was first of all an *artisan* and a work of art was first of all a *work*".<sup>132</sup> Far from being a vacuous valorisation of 'creativity' and 'self-expression', Foucault's ethics thoroughly de-glamorises self-fashioning as a dangerous and open-ended encounter with the outside, the 'folding' of the forces of the outside inside the self, whereby subjectivity is formed as "the inside of the outside".<sup>133</sup> Rather than being a case of a narcissistic assertion of the originality of one's identity, self-fashioning finds its very condition of possibility in the non-identity of the outside, whereby interior zones, akin to the secret life of the Soviet individual, are folded at the boundary between the diagram and its outside and in this peristaltic movement one's existence is endowed with a non-identical double.

What is highlighted in Foucault's ethics is thus not the introduction of new ethical principles but the style or relationship to oneself that one establishes *in opposition* to the ethos of the diagram, which is never lacking but is rather thoroughly suffused with normative guidelines and regulative principles. In this sense, Foucault's ethics of non-identity and self-creation proceeds from what Simon Critchley, in his readings of Blanchot and Beckett, calls 'meaninglessness as an achievement', the understanding that it is the *plenitude* rather than the *absence* of meaning in the world that gives life its unbearable gravity:

If meaninglessness were a fact, then the theological solution to this situation would make sense; it would be the very making of sense, the redemption of meaning in a meaningless world. [...] However, the situation would seem to be precisely the opposite: *the world is overfull with meaning and we suffocate under the combined weight of the various narratives of redemption* – whether they are religious, socioeconomic, political, aesthetic or philosophical. What passes for the ordinary is cluttered with illusory narratives of redemption that conceal the very extraordinariness of the ordinary and the nature of its decay under conditions of nihilism. [...] But what remains after we have been saved from salvation, redeemed from redemption? *What remains? Nothing? Almost.*<sup>134</sup>

A Foucauldian version of this 'almost' is precisely the aesthetic divorce of freedom from epistémico-moral certitude, the dissolution of the veridictive axis that grants one's being a dimension of lightness, and thus freedom, in the face of the

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<sup>132</sup> Veyne 1993, p. 7. Emphasis original.

<sup>133</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 97, 118. For the visual representation of the operation of folding see *ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>134</sup> Critchley 1997, pp. 179–180. Emphasis added.

omnipresent gravity of the diagrammatic ordering of existence. “What remains is to live and to want what one wants without justifying oneself and saying that one is right.”<sup>135</sup>

### 5.3.2. ‘A Happy Limbo of Non-Identity’: Towards a De-Specification of Oneself

The second step in the displacement of identity consists in supplementing the epistemic affirmation of ‘not knowing who we are’ with an ethical and aesthetic sensibility marked by the absence of any *concern with identity*, the attitude of ‘not caring who we are’. This sensibility deserves to be explicated in detail to elucidate its contrast with the prevalent poststructuralist attitude that conceives of identity as ‘always in question’, permanently in the process of contestation and reconstruction.<sup>136</sup> The argument for the contingency and ungroundedness of identity and its governmentally constituted character may serve to displace the epistemic-moral certitude with which one’s identity is invoked, but it does not, in itself, displace the concern with identity, the desire for its ‘discovery’ and the anxiety about its ‘authenticity’. Epstein’s above-discussed conception of Russia as an *existe-nation*, historically preoccupied with the questioning of its identity, illustrates well the way in which ‘identity-anxiety’ has served to generate a plethoric discourse about ‘true freedom’ (e.g. the recurring debate between the proponents of liberal individualism and the communitarian advocates of the collectivist tradition of *sobornost*), in which the increasingly polemical contestation of rival claims to authenticity did little to enhance freedom but rather resulted in the crystallisation of competing identity-claims into ever more stringent spaces of confinement of the ‘virginal’ subjects, whose liberation requires the ‘autonomising’ governmental ingression.

The presupposition of authentic identity and the anxiety about its realisation therefore inevitably call forth the acts of constitutive violence in the name of that very identity. Slavoj Žižek has noted that the ‘passion of the real’ necessarily leads to the

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<sup>135</sup> Veyne 1992, p. 343. Emphasis added.

<sup>136</sup> In the field of IR studies this position is best exemplified by the work of David Campbell (1992, 1998a).



*destruction of the actual* in the hope of finding, beneath appearances and artifice, the kernel of authentic being, complete in and of itself.<sup>137</sup> Sorokin's parable of the Ice Hammer proceeds from the same logic: the dissatisfaction with the empirical existence of humans as 'meat machines' and the promise of the utopian communion of the 'originary light' result, in their combination, in a violent orgy of hammering into empirical individuals the authenticity of their being. In the manner of the Derridean supplement, the 'real', the 'natural' and the 'authentic' only emerge through the infinite chain of violent, technical and artefactual additions, natural immediacy derived from technological mediation.<sup>138</sup> The 'passion of the real' is therefore doomed to the spiral of constitutive violence in its endless return to the originary moment in an attempt to erase the slate and start over on a solid foundation of authenticity.<sup>139</sup> The more passionate the quest for the originary, the more violent the effort of its constitution and the more frustrating the manifest artificiality of the final outcome, one's rejoicing in authenticity marred by the fatigue from the work of technological supplementation: "The presence that is thus delivered to us is a chimera. The enjoyment of the thing itself is undermined by frustration. [...] The supplement is maddening because it consequently *breaches both our pleasure and our virginity*."<sup>140</sup> We may note a disconcerting linkage of the demand of Foucault's

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<sup>137</sup> See Zizek 2001b, p. 1: "The fundamental illusion here is that, once the violent work of purification is done, the New Man will emerge *ex nihilo*, freed from the filth of past corruption. Within this horizon, 'really-existing men' are reduced to the stock of raw material which can be ruthlessly exploited for the construction of the new."

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Derrida 1998, p. 157.

<sup>139</sup> This position is exemplified in the contemporary Russian discourse by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Since his return to Russia in 1994, Solzhenitsyn has advanced a wholesale critique of present Russian politics, society and culture, taking as his point of departure the 'shadow' or 'criminal' origins of the new Russian state and advocating a return to its constitutive moment to start all over again. The following statement from a 2000 interview is exemplary of Solzhenitsyn's stance: "I suffer from the fact that our state is founded upon theft and an ideology of theft. [...] We still cannot heal ourselves from this originary moment and until we correct that originary foundation, we can never redeem our reputation in the world. We need to get rid of it, it is a huge problem that hangs above us." (*Russkaja Mysl'*, no. 4334, 2000. Translation by author.)

<sup>140</sup> Derrida 1998, p. 154. Emphasis added. For Derrida, this frustration is not merely characteristic but constitutive of pedagogy, which affirms the natural authenticity of the child and practices the perpetual supplementation of nature: "*Pedagogy illuminates perhaps most crudely the paradoxes of the supplement*. How can nature ask for forces that it does not furnish? How is a child possible in general? [...] Education will be regulated by this necessary evil – *supply what is lacking and to replace nature*." (*Ibid.*, p. 146. Emphasis added.)

critics for a positive notion of the authentic pre-political subject that is to be liberated and the diagrammatic constitution of that very positivity. The very assumption of a pre-political authentic identity generates the infinite diagrammatic effort to ‘liberate’ and ‘fulfil’, through technical supplements, that which is already posited as complete in and of itself. Yet, isn’t it possible to simultaneously affirm freedom and abandon all positive specification with regard to the subject, dispense with the very notion of identity rather than merely point to its ‘constructed’ character?

Let us suggest that the resistance to diagrammatic constitution that is the substance of concrete freedom consists not in questioning or contesting identity, affirming a ‘hybridity’ of identities or their ‘multiplicity’, let alone opposing ‘marginal’ identities as authentic in opposition to the ‘dominant’ ones. Foucault’s famous call for the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’<sup>141</sup> may be appreciated in his own minimalist terms, insofar as the ‘subjugated knowledges’ in question are entirely exhausted by the knowledge of their subjugation. The effect of this knowledge is not the anxiety about finding an authentic, local or marginal alternative to one’s diagrammatically constituted identity but in *displacing the concern with identity as such*, following Foucault’s cryptic summation of his method: “What is the answer to the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? *By displacing the question.*”<sup>142</sup> The task is therefore to define non-identity otherwise than negatively or in terms on a binary opposition. To speak of a non-identitarian freedom is therefore not to *oppose* identity to difference or (in an impossible gesture) affirm non-identity as an *alternative* to identity. Neither is it to invoke the experience of a ‘loss of identity’, since, as an exterior diagrammatic construct, identity is never one’s own to possess or to lose. It is rather to *de-problematise* identity, admit happily to ‘not knowing who we are’ *and* to renounce all interest in such knowledge, shrugging one’s shoulders indifferently in response to the question of one’s identity. In Foucault’s expression, it is to enter a “happy limbo of non-identity”<sup>143</sup> that renders one immune to the diagrammatic seduction.

Insofar as one renounces the interest in the authenticity of one’s identity and the techniques of its ‘liberation’, the promise of diagrammatic liberation begins to be

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<sup>141</sup> Foucault 1980e, p. 81.

<sup>142</sup> Foucault 1977d, p. 185. Emphasis added.

<sup>143</sup> Foucault cited in Dews 1995, p. 168.

received with a mild and somewhat uncomprehending amusement, akin to that of the child in Sorokin's *Ice*, who on discovering the segment of the ice hammer in his apartment, involves it in his play, along with other toys (most appropriately, a Superman), and finally leaves it to melt down under the blankets. The 'authenticating' violence of the extraterrestrial Ice and its power to seduce and attract either a Gnostic cult or, in the second part of the novel, a horde of consumers, interested in a 'real life experience', thereby literally *evanesces* at the end of the text in an indifferent and innocent play. In an interview on the publication of the novel Sorokin has suggested that the innocence of the child disarms the most violent 'passion of the real': "In his innocence, the child is still (or already) in paradise, and to achieve that *he requires no effort and does not have to batter his chest with an ice hammer.*"<sup>144</sup> Let us venture that what is at stake in this statement is less the re-entry of the notion of authenticity through the back door than the displacement of the question of authentic identity as such. After all, the difference of the child from the practitioners of the Ice cult consists not in his greater, or more 'authentic' authenticity but in his lack of preoccupation with authenticity as a *question* and hence the non-existence for him of authenticity as a *problem*. Thus, if one *does* want to experience the bliss of natural immediacy, she can do no better than abandon the ritual of chest beating and gibbering meaningless 'hearty words' and follow the child in relinquishing all concern with authentic identity. To displace the question of identity is to redirect the very effort of thought away from the imagined depths of interiority onto the outside, towards the space of possibilities as yet neither visible nor enunciable, and hence unthinkable in the positive terms of identity. In John Rajchman's terms, Foucault's 'art of seeing' is first and foremost the "art of looking *out onto the outside* [...] to transform or displace one's instituted, assigned identity"<sup>145</sup>.

One of the concrete modes of the affirmation of non-identitarian freedom is the appreciation of *anonymity* as a mode of resistance to diagrammatic subjectification. If, as we have discussed at length, governmental power relations operate through designation, nomination and specification of a positive identity through a series of constitutive exclusions, rarefactions and restrictions, then practices of freedom are enabled by withholding the knowledge of oneself, resisting the injunction to a

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<sup>144</sup> Sorokin 2002b, p. 2. Emphasis added. Translation by author.

<sup>145</sup> Rajchman 1994b, p. 246. Emphasis added.

'confessional' self-expression, declining the incitement to active participation in the governmentally sanctioned discourse. Anonymity may then serve "to encourage freedom by [...] increasing the scope of actions not susceptible to official observation, records and interpretation".<sup>146</sup> Reversing the clichéd opposition between the impersonal and anonymous modern existence and the authentic project of self-discovery and self-fulfilment, let us suggest that it is a certain *de-specification* of the 'self', the *evasion* of discovering and fulfilling oneself that conditions the practices of freedom that we have been discussing. Foucault's own stance and writing style are marked by this elusion of identity, as the following famous passage illustrates:

What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not preparing – with a rather shaky hand – a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and reform its itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. *I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same:* leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.<sup>147</sup>

This quest for anonymity, the unwillingness to be confined within (even a 'self-chosen') identity, to be pinned down and constrained by what one allegedly *is*, is a strategy that need not be restricted to the domain of transgressive art or writing but can be generalised as a mode of 'nonpositive affirmation' of one's existence in the face of exterior subjection. In the infra-liberal context of postcommunism this strategy may be conceived as a refusal of the promise of 'liberation', insofar as what is 'liberated' in this emergent diagram is not one's existence but one's diagrammatic positive double. The example of 'Soviet sex' and its subsequent 'liberation' that we have discussed above is felicitous in this respect since it permits to pinpoint precisely what is at stake in the quest for anonymity, i.e. the effort to retain and expand the secret, intimate, opaque, blank or virginal zone of existence, which, owing to these very

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<sup>146</sup> Hooke 1994, p. 298.

<sup>147</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 17. Emphasis added. See also Foucault 1977c, 1987 for his discussion of self-effacing writing in the French literary avant-garde. See also Simons 1995, 2000.

qualities, is not amenable to government *at all*, simply because in diagrammatic terms it does not *exist* as something *visible* and *sayable*. Sexually (i.e. in the positive terms of the discourse of sexuality), Soviet individuals remained literally virginal by virtue of the absence of the diagrammatic penetration of this zone of existence. This desire for anonymity is clearly different from the assertion of one's extra-diagrammatic authenticity. Instead, if anything at all is affirmed in the strategy of 'anonymisation', it is the very assumption that forms the 'technological a priori' of a pedagogically constructivist governmentality, summed up in the metaphors of the *clean slate* or the *virgin mind*. Practices of concrete freedom proceed from happily affirming the diagnosis that runs in its sameness throughout a historical succession of governmental diagrams, from Chaadaev's Necropolis to the site of technical assistance: 'yes, we *are* a clean slate; yet, this is what we *desire* to remain'. Our affirmation of non-identity makes it impossible to invoke authenticity with regard to the extra-diagrammatic subject, but it simultaneously disqualifies any claim to authenticity *within* the diagrammatic discourse and the compensatory technological supplementation undertaken in the name of this authenticity. We may observe immediately the redundancy of any claims to authenticity, naturality or 'historicity' as means of resistance to governmentality: does not the greatest violence consist in penetrating and filling *the empty space*, thereby thoroughly altering its character? Isn't diagrammatic ordering of existence 'delegitimised' sufficiently by the fact that governmental inscriptions are drawn on a 'blank sheet' or that the 'mind' drawn into the diagram and endowed with subjective interiority thereby loses its 'virginity'?<sup>148</sup> It appears that any resistance to government *qua* government must *necessarily* have as its locus the limit-space of non-identity.

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<sup>148</sup> As we deploy the notion of virginity in the 'affirmative sense' let us emphasise that we do not seek to posit it as an extra-discursive presence. On the contrary, the object of virginity emerges inside a diagrammatic mode of problematisation, as a designator of a certain gap between discourse and its sought-after object of desire, the gap between desire and its consummation that gives no satisfaction to the effort of diagrammatic subjectification. In other words, in the practices of concrete freedom the affirmation of virginity functions in the active modality of resistance rather than the passive modality of abstinence.

### 5.3.3. 'To Be Out of the Camps': Michael K and the Austerity of Freedom

The affirmation of anonymity may be elaborated further with the help of Foucault's notion of 'infamy'<sup>149</sup>. In contrast to the prevalent meaning of infamy as notoriety, disgrace or ignominy, Foucault conceives of infamy as, literally, 'absence of fame', good or ill, a quality of not being known or being resistant to knowledge by authority. Foucault's 'infamous men' are those who find their anonymity violated by governmental intervention and identification, "insignificant, obscure, simple men, who are spotlighted only for a moment by police reports or complaints".<sup>150</sup> The violence of identity inquisition is particularly noticeable in the case of these existences, "momentarily *dragged into the light* and *made to speak* by their encounter or clash with power".<sup>151</sup> Lacking any identity prior to such governmental 'enlightenment' and unwilling to assert an 'alternative' identity in the struggle for a 'better' diagram, 'infamous men' affirm nothing but "an anonymous life that shows up only when it clashes with power, argues with it, exchanges 'brief and strident words' and then fades back into the night".<sup>152</sup>

A hyperbolic example of 'infamous life' is offered by the protagonist of J.M. Coetzee's novel *The Life and Times of Michael K*. Throughout the novel Michael K traverses the landscapes of the civil war-torn South Africa without identification papers, is repeatedly confined in and successfully escapes from the 'camps' set up by the warring parties. In contrast to Agamben's notion of the concentration camp as the paradigm of the biopolitical space of 'modernity', "a materialisation of the state of exception",<sup>153</sup> in which human existence is confined as 'bare life' at the mercy of sovereign, Coetzee's 'camps' are rather the spaces, diagrammatic par excellence, in which 'bare life' is to be transformed into 'good life', spaces of order, positivity and identity, beyond which, on the *outside*, lies the disorderly space in which exception is the rule and life is indeed reduced to a fragile physical existence.

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<sup>149</sup> See Foucault 1979.

<sup>150</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 145, fn. 3.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82. Emphasis added.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>153</sup> Agamben 1998, p. 174. See *ibid.*, part 3 for the detailed discussion of the problematic of the camp in terms of Agamben's notion of biopolitical sovereignty.

“This isn’t a prison”, said the man. *Didn’t you hear the policeman tell you it isn’t a prison?* This is Jakkalsdrif. This is a camp. Don’t you know what a camp is? A camp is for people without jobs. [...] They put all the people like that together in a camp so that they won’t have to beg anymore. You say why I don’t run away. *But why should people with nowhere to go run away from the nice life we’ve got here? From soft beds like this and free wood and a man at the gate with a gun to stop the thieves from coming in the night to steal your money?* [...] Where do you want to go anyway?’ He dropped his voice. ‘You want to go to the mountains?’<sup>154</sup>

Michael K does indeed flee the camp and end up in the mountains, living at an abandoned farmhouse, nearly starving to death yet animated by “a deep joy in his physical being”.<sup>155</sup> It is important to note that Michael K’s force of flight cannot be rendered in positive terms: he did not flee the camp *in order to* live in solitude in the mountains and it is not clear whether he actually *seeks* solitude. The very figure of Michael K seems to epitomise non-identity: purposefully *nondescript*, never resorting to ‘inner monologue’, apparently not prone to reflection at all, Michael is indeed insignificant, obscure and simple. In his encounters with others he actively resists the ‘confessional’ incitement to narrate his existence to a compassionate audience excited about his ‘authenticity’: “Everywhere I go there are people waiting to *exercise their forms of charity on me*. [...] They want me to *open my heart* and tell them the story of a life lived in cages.”<sup>156</sup> When arrested and taken away to yet another camp, Michael K practically refuses to speak at all, which results in his ‘identification’ by camp authorities as ‘Michaels’, as *identity* bestowed by administrative *mistake*. This erroneous identity is the only knowledge the camp doctor is able to extract from Michael despite his incitement to discourse:

We brought you here to talk, Michaels. [...] You see how easy it is to talk, now *talk*. Listen to me, listen how easily I fill this room with words. [...] *Give yourself some substance, man, otherwise you are going to slide through life absolutely unnoticed*. You will be a digit in the units column at the end of the war when they do the big subtraction sum to calculate the difference, nothing more. You don’t want to be simply one of the perished, do you? *You want to live, don’t you? Well then, talk, make your voice heard, tell your story!* We are listening! Where else in the world are you going to find two polite civilised

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<sup>154</sup> Coetzee 1985, p. 86. Emphasis added.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181. Emphasis added.

gentlemen ready to listen to your story all day and all night, if need be, and take notes too?<sup>157</sup>

Although Michael K clearly has a desire to live, he refuses to *confuse life with discourse*,<sup>158</sup> is disinclined to give himself substance through telling his life story and does not seem to mind ‘sliding through life unnoticed’. Furthermore, since his life appears to consist solely in a series of confinements and escapes, he does not seem to have a story to tell, a self to ‘express’ or ‘fulfil’. There is, in Michael K, *nothing to confess*. In the initial opinion of his doctor, “he is a simpleton, and not even an interesting simpleton [...] There is nothing there, no story of the slightest interest to rational people.”<sup>159</sup> His desires appear exhausted by the desire for freedom, not a freedom to pursue one’s desires but merely to be ‘out of the camps’. The figure of Michael K may thus be said to epitomise a *bare life of freedom* that, in contrast to Agamben’s notion, no longer appears caught up in the sovereign act of exception that exposes it to death but rather *is* an act of exception that exposes *itself* to death in the flight from the camps. In Deleuzian terms, Michael K’s flight is directed towards the line of the outside, “a terrible line that shuffles all the diagrams, above the very raging storms. [...] But however terrible this line may be, it is a *line of life*, that can no longer be gauged by relations between forces, *one that carries man beyond terror*, [...] where one can live and indeed where Life exists par excellence.”<sup>160</sup> The following passage asserts the possibility, *pace* Foucault’s critics, of the desire for freedom that has nothing to liberate and is protective of nothing but its status of a ‘clean slate’.

I was mute and stupid in the beginning, I will be mute and stupid at the end. *There is nothing to be ashamed of in being simple. They were locking up simpletons before they locked up anyone else.* Now they have camps for children whose parents run away, camps for people who kick and foam at the mouth, camps for people with big heads and people with little heads, camps for people with no visible means of support, camps for people they find living in storm-water drains, camps for street girls, camps for people who can’t add two and two, camps for people who forget their papers at home, camps for people who live in the mountains and blow up bridges in the night. *Perhaps the truth is that it is enough to be out of the camps, out of all the camps at the same time.* Perhaps

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid., p. 140. Emphasis added.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. Foucault 1989, p. 211.

<sup>159</sup> Coetzee 1985, pp. 141–142.

<sup>160</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 122. Emphasis added.



that is enough of an achievement, for the time being. *How many people are there left who are neither locked up nor standing guard at the gate?* I have escaped the camps; perhaps if I lie low, I will escape the charity too.<sup>161</sup>

Yet, in all his apparent passivity Michael K presents a far greater danger to the diagram of the camp than the rebels, with whom he was initially confused. The second part of the novel, narrated by the camp doctor, demonstrates how the very presence of Michael in the camp, his gestures of a quiet refusal of food, conversation and charity, bring inside the diagrammatic space the trace of the unfathomable outside that alone can reveal the violence that the camps exercise *both* on those 'locked up' and the 'guards at the gates'. The doctor that treats Michael K, initially curious about and impatient with Michael's passive resistance, gradually begins to appreciate Michael's utter heterogeneity to the space of the camp and the force of his desire for freedom, a force that becomes unbearable for the doctor himself. It is in the presence of a figure like Michael K that the camp begins to be perceived as a zone of confinement, and the dialogue with a polite and friendly doctor as an interrogation. *Power relations become unacceptable not by virtue of an external criterion but simply when (ever) they are not accepted.*

Listen to me, Michaels. I am the only one who can save you. I am the only one who sees you for the original soul that you are. I am the only one who cares for you. I alone see you as neither a soft case for a soft camp, nor a hard case for a hard camp but *a human soul above and beneath classification, a soul blessedly untouched by doctrine, untouched by history*. [...] Only you, following your idiot light, *evading the peace and the war*, skulking in the open where no one dreamed of looking, have managed to live in the old way, drifting through time, observing the seasons, *no more trying to change the course of history than a grain of sand does*. We ought to value you and celebrate you [...] but that is not the way it is going to be. The truth is that you are going to perish in obscurity and be buried in a nameless hole in a corner of the racecourse [...] and no one is going to remember you but me *unless you yield and at last open your mouth*. I appeal to you, Michaels: *yield!*<sup>162</sup>

In the end, Michael K does not yield but flees once more, but not without a trace. The trace he leaves is his force of flight, the passion of resistance so strong it stands

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p. 182. Emphasis added.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., p. 152. Emphasis added except for the last word.

as a monument to the impossibility of containing life within the diagram, a gesture not of condemnation of power (which remains fascinated with it) but of a stubborn *indifference* to it. As opposed to Kafka's Joseph K, caught up, in fearful fascination, before the gaze of a transcendent and unfathomable sovereign power *indifferent to him*, Michael K's dispassionate transgression is marked by the indifference to the governmental power, from which he twists loose and which, in contrast, gazes at him in frustrated fascination, attempts to seize, enclose and identify him, incites him to speak and desires to know him. In this reversal, it is Michael K, the elusive *object of power*, that assumes the limit locus of the immanent and transcendent *subject of sovereignty*, if only in relation to his own bare life. It is in this sense that Michael K emerges victorious in his contest with the diagram, opening it up to its outside and leaving the clearing of freedom for others, most notably his doctor, to follow.

From the moment you arrived, Michaels, I could see that *you did not belong in any camp*. I was the only one who saw that you were more than you seemed to be. Slowly, as your persistent No, day after day, gathered weight, I began to feel that you were more than just another patient, another casualty of the war. [...] Your stay in the camp was merely an allegory, if you know that word. It was an allegory – speaking at the highest level – of *how scandalously, how outrageously a meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in it*. Did you not notice how, whenever I tried to pin you down, you slipped away? [...] The garden for which you are presently heading is *nowhere and everywhere except in the camps*. It is another name for the only place where you belong, Michaels, where you do not feel homeless. It is off every map, no road leads to it that is merely a road, and only you know the way.<sup>163</sup>

'Residing within a system without becoming a term in it' – does not this formulation sum up our notion of 'concrete freedom'? After all, the ultimate success of Michael K's flight is a happy hyperbole, and one is never entirely 'out of the camps', never fully on the outside of the diagram. Although his passion of flight forms the *ethos* of concrete freedom, the actual *practices* of freedom are likely never to leave the camps all too far behind. What is exemplary is therefore Michael K's dwelling inside the diagrammatic space while resisting his own diagrammatisation, eluding his seizure by discourse and indifferently shrugging off the question of his identity. We suggest that this character exemplifies most starkly the divorce of practices of freedom

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid., pp. 164–166. Emphasis added.

from the concern for identity, from the interrogation of one's subjectivity in the search for the inner truth of one's being and the reliance on pedagogical practices to liberate oneself in one's authenticity. Gilles Deleuze summed up the latter disposition with the help of Melville's metaphor of the 'central chamber': "We follow the fissure in order to reach an interior of the world: as Melville says, we look for a central chamber, afraid that there will be no one there, and that man's soul will reveal nothing but an immense and terrifying void."<sup>164</sup> In its affirmation of the austere ontology of freedom, the story of Michael K demonstrates that one need not fear to encounter the void where the truth of one's identity was sought. This void is merely an expanse of the space of possibilities, a dangerous space that is nonetheless the only site of freedom. In the encounter with the line of the outside, in proximity to the void, at the limit of the diagram yet never wholly out of it, one's concrete freedom is fashioned in a life of resistance through folding interiors, non-diagrammatised blind spots within the diagram: "The most distant point becomes interior, by being converted into the nearest: *life within the folds*. This is the central chamber, which one need no longer fear empty, *since one fills it with oneself*."<sup>165</sup> Paradoxically at first glance, it is only at the void of non-identity that one can establish a sovereign relation to oneself. In the following chapter we shall elaborate this notion of sovereignty and suggest pathways of its affirmation at the site of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface.

## 5.4. Sovereign to Oneself: The Lateral Logic of Transgression

Let us begin by elaborating a curious connection that has accompanied us throughout this chapter, the resemblance of the Foucauldian concrete freedom to the Schmittian notion of sovereignty, which we have discussed above in relation to the Putin presidency. The similarity in question is *structural*: both the subject of concrete freedom and the Schmittian sovereign dwell at the exterior limit of the diagram, are simultaneously present inside and outside it, have as the content of their practices the decision on 'taking exception' from the diagrammatic positivity. While we have defined the sovereign as the (sole) transgressor in relation to himself as the creator and the

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<sup>164</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 121.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123. Emphasis added.

guarantor of the diagrammatic order, we may define a 'free subject' in the Foucauldian sense as a *sovereign in relation to herself*. Mika Ojakangas has argued that, initial appearances notwithstanding, there is a philosophical connection between Schmitt's valorisation of sovereignty and Foucault's famous hostility to it. Ojakangas claims that the approach of both authors is marked by the same conceptual logic that locates the foundation of order in the 'founding rupture' of the exception that forms its 'constitutive outside', "that, which constitutes form by escaping from it".<sup>166</sup> The two authors' specification of this constitutive outside is nonetheless different: for Schmitt it consists in the sovereign decision on exception, while for Foucault it is contained in the resisting figure of the 'plebs', the 'counter-energy' of power that in our terms exemplifies the 'force of flight' from the diagrammatic domain. Yet, although Schmitt and Foucault diverge in their account of the exception, the former opting for a top-down conception of power relations and the latter famously developing an original bottom-up conception<sup>167</sup>, the structure of the relation in question is identical: the self-immanence of the positive diagrammatic order is destabilised and disrupted by the figures located at the exterior limit of the diagram, be it the subject of its institution or the subject instituted by it.

Secondly, for both Schmitt and Foucault this 'sovereign locus of transgression' is supplementary in relation to the diagram, both a manifestation of the ultimate *impossibility* of complete diagrammatic ordering *and* a condition of its *possibility*: just as there is no order before a sovereign decision has installed it, there are no power relations, unless the subjects in question are 'free' in the non-identitarian sense that we have sought to restore to this term. "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and

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<sup>166</sup> Ojakangas 2001, p. 36. In this understanding, the concept of sovereignty is irreducible to the activity of supreme rule or even the act of rule-creation, but rather consists in the relation of *exteriority* between the sovereign and the positivity of his order. The logic of the concept is thus *anarchic* rather than 'authoritarian' and the *sovereign* in the Schmittian sense ought to be distinguished from the *begemon*, located wholly *within* the diagram of order as the source of its foundational principles. See also Hirst 1999, Zizek 1999b.

<sup>167</sup> This appears to be a dominant reading of Schmitt's political realism. However, once the problematic of sovereign decisionism, articulated in Schmitt's critique of liberalism, is transferred from the level of the state(sman) to the level of the individual, it may also be conceived as a prolegomenon to a style of existence, consonant with our notion of 'concrete freedom', that affirms life against the confinements of the diagrammatic order. See Prozorov 2002 for the attempt at a Foucauldian 'ethical' reconstruction of Schmitt's political realism in a reading of an episode from Milan Kundera's 'Unbearable Lightness of Being'.

only insofar as they are free. [...] At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.”<sup>168</sup> Both the sovereign and the subject of freedom are ‘borderline’ or limit figures that are indispensable to the formation of the diagram and the loci of resistance to the positivities constituted in it. The two figures both *exemplify*, in their instituted identity, the angelic and utopian character of the diagrammatic space with no tolerance for the void and *undermine* it in their transgressive practices, transforming the utopian space into a heterotopia, in which the devilish laughter of non-identity is able to resound. It is evident that the parallel of the sovereign and the subject of freedom only goes so far: after all, the defining attribute of the sovereign is the possibility to commit transgression with impunity – an option not granted to the resisting subjects of freedom. Nonetheless, the structural identity of the two figures points to the possibility of a type of resistance that is not tied in its content to the positivity of the diagram, but affirms concrete freedom through a generalised transgression of the diagrammatic disposition. We have already seen how transgression is enacted by the obscene gestures of the sovereign. Let us now address the transgressive possibilities available to the subjects enfolded in the infra-liberal diagram of technical assistance, with a caveat that these possibilities are offered with no prescriptive intention whatsoever, but solely in order to affirm their *existence* as such.

#### 5.4.1. A Heterotopia of Technical Assistance?: The Lateral Displacement of the Order of Discourse

In our discussion of dissimulation as a constitutive characteristic of Soviet individuality we have noted the folding of impenetrable secret zones of interiority as a modality of practicing freedom in the diagram, marked by the extreme degree of valorisation of publicity and transparency. Despite the autonomising liberal ethos of the diagrams of technical assistance and the Putin presidency, this valorisation is also present there, particularly in the injunction to participation in the former diagram and the general orientation towards the ‘enlightenment’ of shadow spaces in the latter. The first crucial consequence of our reconstruction of the Foucauldian notion of concrete freedom is

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<sup>168</sup> Foucault 1982, pp. 221–222.

the renewed appreciation of *non-participation*. As we have already suggested with regard to the critique of participatory development in chapter 3.1., non-participation, frequently stigmatised in terms of passivity or the ‘heritage’ of the ‘tradition’ of authoritarianism, may in fact be an *active* practice of resistance to diagrammatic subjectification.<sup>169</sup> Insofar as the space of discourse, in which participation is incited, is initially delineated through the schemes of *exclusion*, one may wilfully reject the incitement to participate in order to practice the excluded discursive possibilities ‘anonymously’ and ‘infamously’. By the same token, the resistance to the infra-liberal reforms of the Putin presidency may take the form of resisting the offer of ‘liberty in exchange for transparency’ in the effort to maintain the shadow spaces of subjectivity, enterprise and power relations. Shunning participation and withholding information, a *self-exclusion* from the diagrammatic order of discourse do not function as diminutions, handicaps or perversions of freedom: there is no reason whatsoever why one should only practice one’s freedom within the governmental field of visibility.

Secondly, within the diagrammatic space, in which the content of discourse is *rarefied*, practices of freedom may consist in the recourse to commentary that does not invoke or outright violates the instituted ‘primary texts’ in a discourse, which, in the words of the Tacis project’s assessment, ‘has no basis’ and is therefore obscene in relation to its positive order. In contrast to the former strategy of ‘self-exclusion’, the resistance to rarefaction proceeds from entering the diagrammatic domain of discourse without recognising the enunciative limitations that it institutes. What is at stake is not the *change* of the rarefactional principle (in which case we would be dealing with a depoliticised debate over the appropriate governmental diagram) but its *relaxation*, which sacrifices the clarity and coherence of the ‘strategic vision of reform’ for the sake of a lighter, less ‘meaningful’ and thus more bearable existence. In the case of both the projects of technical assistance and the reforms of the Putin presidency, such practices would target less the *political* principle of the two diagrams (i.e. their infra-liberal orientation) than the *depoliticisation*, which ensues from its transformation into a governmental *technology*.

Finally, practices of concrete freedom may target the mechanisms of *restriction* of enunciative modalities operative in the order of discourse, particularly the hierarchies and asymmetries that this order establishes. In the case of the discourse of technical

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<sup>169</sup> Cf. Kothari 2001.

assistance the target of resistance is the distinction drawn, firstly, in the course of projects, between external facilitators and local counterparts that are the objects of participatory indoctrination, and, secondly, in the aftermath of the projects, between the newly trained 'local consultants', the 'advocates of reform' and their quasi-peers, placed in the passive position of the recipients of new knowledge. The non-recognition of pedagogically installed hierarchies and the refusal to practice one's discourse in accordance with a preconstituted enunciative modality serve to destabilise the self-evidence of the new governmental models, the veridictive certitude of their invocation and the smooth flow of their dissemination. Any discursive practice that violates and disrupts the specifications of its enunciative modality fulfils this 'heterotopian' function.

It is evident that such practices do not produce *alternatives* to the reforms undertaken in the diagram of technical assistance, a task that is fully legitimate, but, as we have argued repeatedly, is best left to the subjects in question to decide upon. Yet, for all the lack of 'constructive' resistance, let us suggest that the transgressive practices outlined above do perform a highly important function, whose point tends to elude one as long as one is committed to the identification, criticised by Berlin in his discussion of positive liberty, of individual freedom and a harmonious social order.<sup>170</sup> This 'angelic' disposition, proceeding from the possibility of the utopian ordering of existence without an obscene remainder, may be referred to as, in Foucault's phrase, *transcendental narcissism*,<sup>171</sup> according to which one's freedom, happiness or any other value require a validation of their universal or transcendental status to be worthwhile. Transcendental narcissism finds empirical individuality insufficient and supplements it with the construction of chimerical entities ('humanity', 'community', etc.) onto which one projects one's vision of 'true freedom', in whose image the *world* (rather than merely one's own self) must be re-ordered.<sup>172</sup> In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* Milan Kundera refers to this attitude as 'kitsch' and

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<sup>170</sup> Cf. Berlin 2002, p. 172: "Everything is what it is: *liberty is liberty*, not equality or fairness or justice or culture or human happiness or a quiet conscience." (Emphasis added.) See also *ibid.*, p. 49 for Berlin's argument about the *specificity* of freedom and its *heterogeneity* to other human values, and the criticism of the frequent practice of "so reformulating the definition of freedom that it is always represented as *something good without qualification*".

<sup>171</sup> Foucault 1989, p. 203. See Connolly 1998, p. 126, note 18: "The transcendental narcissist loves the image of itself that it projects into a transcendental command or direction."

<sup>172</sup> Cf. Schmitt 1999, p. 201.

provides the following formula to distinguish the moment, at which one's empirical humanity turns into transcendental narcissism:

Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: How nice to see children running on the grass! The second tear says: *how nice to be moved, together with all mankind*, by children running on the grass. It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch. *The brotherhood of man on earth will be possible only on the basis of kitsch.*<sup>173</sup>

It therefore appears that the violence of transcendental narcissism may be avoided precisely by holding back the 'second tear', by refusing to identify one's own desire for freedom and one's practice of it with a form of a social (or global) order that could be founded on it: one need not change the world in order to be free. In Thomas Dumm's terms, the task of concrete freedom proceeds from dispensing with Marx's famous Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers [...] have transformed the world in various ways, to make it unrecognisable, and for too many of us, unlivable. *The point is not to change the world but to live in it.*"<sup>174</sup> From this perspective, the task is not to denounce a particular governmental diagram *in toto* (in the name of a better or an 'ideal' one) but to fashion the possibilities of life that release one from its grasp or at least *relieve* one from the weight of its veridictive and jurisdictional effects, from the "fearsome laughter of the angels [that] rings out, drowning all our words with its jangle"<sup>175</sup>.

The modalities of resistance that we have suggested serve precisely this function of relief through the *externalisation* of particularly those diagrammatic effects of technical assistance that claim to liberate the local subjects in their authentic identity. It is clear from the preceding discussion that such externalisation requires not an affirmation of a *more* bottom-up and participatory orientation (which inevitably results in 'more of the same') but a thorough break with the very logic of *verticality* with its highly restrictive choice between the 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up'. Instead, the affirmation of concrete freedom calls for what we may term a horizontal or *lateral* logic, in which the diagram of technical assistance would be presented and perceived

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<sup>173</sup> Kundera 1999, p. 248. Emphasis added. In Kundera's argument, one of the consequences of transcendental narcissism is the extreme valorisation of the *transparency* of all spheres of existence as a means of 'publicising' and thus validating the truth of one's being. See *ibid.*, pp. 89–90, 111–113.

<sup>174</sup> Dumm 1994, p. 322. Emphasis added.

<sup>175</sup> Kundera 1996, p. 106.



as an external model with *no relation* to ‘local knowledge’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘liberation’. As an external model, the diagram may be received by the subject not in its depoliticising confinement of non-identity within a triangle of truth-power-ethics, but in its no longer disavowed constitutive force of an *event*, i.e. as simultaneously *political* in the Schmittian sense and *aesthetic* in the Foucauldian sense. In this aspect the diagram is *neither true nor false, neither good nor bad, neither emancipatory nor repressive*, but is rather the content of an ungrounded decision in which these very distinctions are drawn in a particular manner. In other words, *the event of the institution of the diagram is not itself diagrammatic*.<sup>176</sup>

Just as every depoliticisation is made possible by the political moment of radical openness that it disavows, a certain aesthetic dimension is always present even in the technological ordering of existence, associated with the diagrammatic disposition. A Foucauldian aesthetics of existence may then be understood as the affirmation of the ‘ontogenetic’<sup>177</sup> or ‘etho-poietic’<sup>178</sup> character of every event in the face of its enfolding into diagrammatic apparatuses of ordering that conceals this constitutive aspect. This affirmation *highlights that within technology, which is not technological*, and thereby opens it to its constitutive outside, transforming the utopian space of diagrammatic constitution into a heterotopia. That which is not technological in the diagram of technical assistance is of course its demonstration of the possibility of being otherwise. Ironically, from the ethical standpoint of concrete freedom, the sole value of technical assistance consists in precisely that which this discourse so strongly

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<sup>176</sup> Cf. Heidegger cited in Ziarek 1998, p. 12: “The essence of technology is nothing technological.” A similar distinction is made by Schmitt, who distinguishes between technology and the “religion of technicity [which can not] be confused with technology itself”. (Schmitt 1993, p. 138.) Ziarek’s discussion of the relation between *techne* and *poiesis* in the work of Heidegger and Foucault emphasises that a certain constitutive, event-like dimension is inherent even in the technological ordering of existence: “If technology works as a modality of revealing, then it participates in *physis* and seems to be a kind of *poiesis*. [...] Technology is *poiesis* in the sense that it brings forth, it instantiates the actual as what it is, but it instantiates in a manner that ‘enframes’ the actual technologically and transforms it. [...] In this way, *techne* belongs to and yet does not happen as *poiesis*: it conceals *poiesis*, instituting the technological as the sole standard of what obtains as real.” (Ziarek 1998, p. 9.) This relation parallels the relation between the political and depoliticisation that we have invoked repeatedly in this study: a constitutive decision (e.g. the institution of a governmental diagram) is simultaneously depoliticising (in the aspect of the positivity that it installs) and carries a political force (as an event of constitution that ‘emanates from nothingness’).

<sup>177</sup> See Megill 1985, pp. 20–25, 35–36.

<sup>178</sup> Foucault 1990b, p. 13.

disavows: its manifest exteriority and novelty, its radical heterogeneity to anything like 'local knowledge', the beguiling strangeness and unnaturalness of its orchestrated practices (pilot projects, participatory planning meetings, local consultant-led dissemination). In the lateral logic, the diagram of technical assistance functions as a demonstration model alongside potential others (and alongside the existing state of affairs), a *plane of potentiality*, of which it is meaningless to ask the questions of truthfulness, morality or legitimacy, since its positive content is entirely beside the point. Its value is strictly speaking 'added value', the demonstration of yet another possibility of transformation and the concrete technical mechanism of its implementation, comprising new objects of problematisation and intervention, enunciative modalities of its practitioners and the exercises of the 'work on the self' required to practice it.

If one were to offer an 'alternative' to the diagram of technical assistance from this 'lateral' perspective, it would clearly consist in the very opposite of the demand for 'greater and more genuine participation'. If the value of the model is its novelty and exteriority, then its construction is the task and the responsibility of the external consultant, while the function of the local counterparts is rather that of an engaged audience, which is eventually to *decide* on the adoption of the model in question, and in this manner *exercise power* rather than be 'empowered'. Instead of being stuck with a model presented as always already their 'own', the local counterparts in this logic entertain an aesthetic relation to the diagram as a potential mode of fashioning their existence. This aesthetic relation displaces the asymmetries involved in the pedagogical technology of the installation of the diagram and its internalisation by the subjects in question. The lateral approach is of course hardly conceivable as a 'technical' proposal for the restructuring of the Tacis programme: for all its apparent modesty, it would require a thorough revision of technical assistance as a practice. Most importantly, it dispenses with the criteria of the success of the projects, presently formulated in terms of ownership and sustainability of project results. In a lateral approach the rejection of the proposed and piloted model is as much a 'success' as its wholehearted espousal: a possibility of being otherwise is valuable in its own right, entirely irrespectively of whether it is resorted to or not.

The lateral displacement of the diagram of technical assistance, in which it figures as an *object* of the practice of concrete freedom rather than the locus of its positive constitution, also permits us to move beyond the opposition of managerial 'professionalism', in which the pedagogical technology at work is explicit, and

participatory, local knowledge-based ‘nativism’, which, as we have discussed, either functions as professionalism in exotic ‘authentic’ robes or collapses under the weight of its aporias. The question at stake is not ‘who knows best’ the way to proceed, the external consultants or the local counterparts. In a lateral approach this question does not arise at all, since there is nothing about the diagram that can be ‘known’ better or worse, its value no longer owing to its ‘truth’ but to the enhancement of possibilities that it offers. Once the veridictive claims of the diagram have been displaced, it no longer appears able to exert its jurisdictional authority, its ordering function displaced into the disorderly space of heterotopia: “Only the stratified formation [of knowledge] gives [the diagram] a stability which it does not itself possess, for in itself it is *unstable, agitated and shuffled around*.”<sup>179</sup>

This heterotopian transformation leaves the discursive structure of the diagram (i.e. the scheme presented in Figure 16 in chapter 2.4.) intact, aside from one crucial modification. The upper vertex of the diagram, the ethico-teleological nexus upon which its jurisdictional and veridictive axes converge, is now uncoupled to reveal a slight gap between the diagrammatic area and the summit that designates the ethos of autonomy. In this manner, the diagram is opened to its outside, while the outside penetrates the diagram, precisely at that point where closure was to be achieved, where the techno-epistemic effects would find their internalisation in the identity of the autonomised subject. Insofar as we take ‘identity’ to refer to the identity sought between the diagrammatic ethos and the practices of techno-epistemic construction, between the subject and his subjection, we may conceive of non-identity, the locus of concrete freedom, as the narrow opening of the upper vertex of the diagram. It is this infinitesimal gap that nonetheless makes all the difference, since it *marks* the difference between one’s diagrammatic and extra-diagrammatic existence, between one’s positivity as a governmental object and one’s transgressive position of a sovereign subject, between the utopian order and the heterotopian abyss, between the constant angelic smile and the occasional devilish smirk.<sup>180</sup>

Nothing about these practices of freedom carries an air of the lyricism of liberation, the theatricality of ‘revolution’, the self-complacent comfort of ‘return to

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<sup>179</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 85. Emphasis added.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. Derrida 1998, p. 257: “A nearly non-existent force is a nearly infinite force when it is strictly alien to the system it sets going. *The system offers it no resistance, for antagonistic forces play only within the globe*. [...] The slight push is almighty because it shifts the globe in the void.” (Emphasis added.)

Europe' or the utopia of a rational consensus emergent in a well-policed participatory discourse. Besides being an open-ended and a never-ending practice, twisting loose is arguably not a pretty sight and (keeping in mind the obscene lexicon of the sovereign) not so pleasant to the ear. Yet, as one frequently fails to keep in mind in the post-Cold War world of triumphant 'democratisation', practices of freedom are not intended to entertain a well-meaning audience or satisfy its urge for authentic experience. As we have insisted throughout this chapter, if freedom requires justification at all, it is never normative but solely existential<sup>181</sup>, arising out of the unwillingness or impossibility to live *like that* in the here and now. This desire to twist loose no longer recognises any 'correct' pathway to freedom and the need to be or become 'shy and beautiful animals' for the enjoyment of the other: "After all, it's not our fault for being woodworm."<sup>182</sup>

#### 5.4.2. A Freedom that Has Been: Tarrying with the 1990s

The same lateral logic of transgression may be deployed on the strategic level with regard to the diagrammatic constitution in the reform project of the Putin presidency. It is clear from the preceding chapters that we do not subscribe to the criticism of the 'authoritarian' tendencies of the Putin presidency or its wholesale stigmatisation as 'anti-liberal'. On the contrary, we suggest that 'Putin's project' that we have attempted to outline above offers the most coherent and technologically sophisticated mode of liberal reforms in postcommunist Russia so far. However, it is precisely the diagrammatic coherence and the technological capacity of this project that threaten the disappearance of the radical openness of the moment of the political. The fear of the 'loss of freedom' associated with the reconstitution of the state in the Putin presidency is intelligible as long as it refers precisely to concrete freedom, a freedom that *necessarily* falls victim to any depoliticising diagram of government, including the one that makes freedom its primary modality, namely liberalism. Insofar as it is concrete freedom that is at stake in the critique and the resistance to the governmental practices of the Putin presidency, its affirmation ought to proceed not from a normative criticism of these practices from the standpoint of an alternative diagram but from a lateral displacement of the diagram

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<sup>181</sup> Cf. Schmitt 1976, pp. 48–49.

<sup>182</sup> Barnes 1990, p. 30.

into a heterotopia, in which the project of the infra-liberal reconstitution of the state is revealed as a unity of the political event and technological depoliticisation, an ungrounded decision that installs grounds. To recall Schmitt, the political moment may be negated but never annulled, therefore it necessarily contaminates the most stable diagrammatic orders so that the self-praising posture of veridictive certitude and jurisdictional 'stabilisation' is little more than a momentary effacement of the political, behind which one always hears '*the distant roar of battle*'.<sup>183</sup>

The latter formulation permits to pinpoint the significance of the notion of the political for the task of enhancing concrete freedom. In contrast to the contemporary poststructuralist reconstruction of freedom and democracy as 'always to come', an infinite utopian task of the future, an incessantly deferred promise,<sup>184</sup> our notion of concrete freedom finds its locus at the moment of the political as a moment of foundation, marked by the absence thereof. Since it is from the void of the outside that the diagram itself emerges, concrete freedom is implicated in its very existence if only as an object of disavowal. This relation therefore requires the application of a different grammatical tense with regard to freedom: concrete freedom is not *always to come* but rather *always has been*. The Present Perfect is used to indicate a link between the present and the past and describes an action or situation that started in the past and continues in the present.<sup>185</sup> For our purposes, the crucial feature of the present perfect tense is its *inclusive character* that consists in its reference *both* to the past and to the present. In this sense, the possibility of concrete freedom always *has been* at the foundation of any diagrammatic order *and persists in the present*, permanently at work in unravelling the illusion of self-immanence, destabilising epistemological and moral certitude, revealing the contingent, unfounded and decisionist character of all diagrams of governmentality.<sup>186</sup> *This perfective structure of the concept of freedom extends the possibility of its practice in the present.* The purpose of

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<sup>183</sup> Foucault 1977a, p. 308.

<sup>184</sup> Critchley 1992, p. 240. See *ibid.*, chapter 5 for the discussion of the Derridean poststructuralist conception of democracy as always 'to come'. See also Mouffe 2000b, Edkins 1999 for the discussion of poststructuralist reconstructions of democracy.

<sup>185</sup> English Grammar online: <http://www.edunet.com/english/grammar/Tenses4.cfm>.

<sup>186</sup> This understanding of the perfective structure of freedom and its relation to the moment of the political owes to Claude Lefort's conception of democracy as a condition characterised by the "dissolution of markers of certainty" (Lefort 1988, p. 19.) and the consequent political *undecidability* that prevents the closure of democracy into a self-immanent diagram.

a properly *political* criticism and resistance thus consists in amplifying the ‘distant roar of battle’ and thereby maintaining in the present the heterotopian undecidability that lies at the moment of foundation.

In relation to the infra-liberal project of the Putin presidency the locus of such criticism is of course the experience of the foundational moment of the 1990s, in which liberalism figured as the object of *political* struggle rather than a *depoliticised* diagrammatic order. The difference between the political assertion of liberalism and its operation as a mode of governmentality has been famously summed up by Nietzsche: “Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: subsequently there is nothing more harmful to freedom than liberal institutions. [...] As long as they are still being fought for, these same institutions produce quite different effects; they then in fact promote freedom mightily.”<sup>187</sup> The disappointment in liberal governmentality, summed up in the question ‘how is it that there is so little freedom in liberalism’, therefore generates neither an ‘anti-liberal’ discourse on an alternative diagram nor a futile technical effort of making the liberal diagram ‘more liberal’ but rather a task of tarrying with the moment of political openness that has preceded the contemporary liberal depoliticisation.

Similarly to the affirmation of freedom in general, the affirmation of the 1990s that we propose is markedly non-positive: it is not a question of positing as an alternative to the Putinian reconstitution of the state the condition of its horizontal and vertical displacement or valorising the contingent, arbitrary and chronically unstable practices of the Yeltsin presidency. Nonetheless, what these presently disavowed and discredited moments<sup>188</sup> have unwittingly effected is the impossibility of sedimentation, crystallisation or closure of the governmental diagram, thereby retaining its externality in relation to the governed subjects. If, according to Deleuze, “[diagrammatic] strata merely collect and solidify the visual dust and the sonic echo of the battle raging above them”,<sup>189</sup> the lingering of the political in the 1990s has served to perpetuate that

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<sup>187</sup> Nietzsche 1977, p. 271.

<sup>188</sup> For the comparisons between the Yeltsin and the Putin presidencies that construe the former in largely negative terms see e.g. Markov 2000, Pavlovsky 2000a, 2000b, Fedorov 2001, Romanenkova and Babochkin 2000. In a typical gesture of disavowal of origins these accounts obscure the genealogical descent of the Putin presidency from the complex dynamics of politico-financial alliances during President Yeltsin’s second term and the affinity of Putin’s positive reform programme with the policies launched by the ‘Young Reformers’ cabinet in 1997–1998.

<sup>189</sup> Deleuze 1988, p. 121.

moment, in which power relations are marked by a radical openness and have not yet taken the consolidated form of a governmental technology, the moment in which concrete freedom finds its most stark manifestation. Contrary to the transitionalist teleologies of liberalisation, the enhancement of concrete freedom is therefore served not by the progressive governmental reforms leading towards a 'bright future' (it should be clear by now that freedom actually tends to thrive in darker, shadowy places), but in clinging on to the immediate past, which, despite being an unlikely source of inspiration, is nonetheless the opening to the outside, into which the contemporary governmental diagram must be displaced in order to find relief from its veridictive and jurisdictional effects.

The relief that the lateral operations of 'heterotopian transformation' grant the postcommunist subjects consists not merely in loosening the hold of the diagram on the subject but also in the *de-problematisation* of identity, authenticity and 'liberation' that permits one to evade the diagrammatic seduction of governmental enlightenment. As a result, the empirical actuality of one's existence, that a constructivist diagram devalues as a clean slate and violates through the inscription of a new positivity on the 'virgin mind', becomes the locus of resistance to diagrammatic constitution. One thereby not merely creates but rather *becomes* the heterotopian blind spot within the diagram that destroys every hope of its success. In this manner one creates out of and for one's self the locus of devilish laughter that testifies to the utopian angelic space being 'out of joint'. This is the laughter that may take many forms, depending on one's temper and disposition: a bitter and somewhat hysterical Foucauldian laughter, a cold and sardonic laughter of Sorokin's deconstruction of 'sacred texts' or a tired and impotent yet undefeated laughter of Michael K.<sup>190</sup> In all its forms, this is a blissfully devilish laughter, a *last laugh* that affirms, nonpositively to be sure, the possibility for the governed to become sovereigns to themselves by dwelling *in*, but *in excess of*, the diagram, by eluding identity and finding "redemption from redemption"<sup>191</sup> of their authenticity, by keeping an infinitesimal but crucial gap between their lives and the diagram that takes them as their object, the gap that is our best hope against the onset of Nietzsche's 'last man'. 'We have been spared from salvation', say the sovereign subjects of freedom, and wink wickedly.

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<sup>190</sup> Cf. Critchley 1997, p. 159 who conceives of laughter as a "site of uncolonisable resistance" and a "node of non-identity".

<sup>191</sup> Critchley 1997, p. 27.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Our study has attempted to locate the interface between the EU practices of technical assistance and the socioeconomic reforms of the Putin presidency in contemporary Russia within the Foucauldian problematic of historical ontology and pose the question of the constitution, in this interface, of new forms of postcommunist governmentality that complete and efface what we have termed the foundational moment of the political. Throughout the study our way of proceeding has been both *descriptive* and *critical*, aiming both to describe the positivity of the emergent dispositional diagram of governmentality and to elucidate the conditions of its emergence.

Firstly, we have undertaken the *regrouping* of the textual surface of the three EU Tacis projects in the Republic of Karelia that comprise the empirical scope of our study into a unity of what we have termed the 'discourse of technical assistance', a space of dispersion whose ordering schemes operate isomorphously across the thematic project spheres and suggest the irreducibility of technical assistance as a practice to specific policy areas. In this discursive order the dispositional diagram of technical assistance is actualised in the relational scheme of the formation of three objects of discourse: the agency of the local counterpart, the model of the enterprise and the apparatus of government. The critical function of this archaeological regrouping has been to disturb the epistemic coherence of the diagram by demonstrating that it is conditioned by the aporias that permanently threaten to undo its unity and prevent its coagulation. The main conclusion of this stage of analysis may be summed up in the following manner. The dispositional diagram actualised in the order of the discourse of technical assistance instantiates a *pedagogical governmental technology*, whose ethos of *autonomy* and *empowerment* is specified in *entrepreneurial* terms and



deployed as the goal of practices that subject local agents to an *asymmetric initiation* into the *externally grounded* discourse of 'entrepreneurial' reforms with a view to their subsequent formation as *autonomous discourse practitioners*. The space of the existence of this discourse is defined by what is simultaneously its line of fragility: the *gap* between autonomous local agency, posited as a *locus of authentic identity* and valuable local *knowledge*, and the techno-epistemic operations of *governmental construction* that 'liberate' and 'authenticate' this very agent in pedagogical practices. The aporia of governmental *artefactuality* and extra-governmental *authenticity* is constitutive of the discourse of technical assistance and cannot be done away with by opting for one of the opposed assumptions without dissolving the identity of technical assistance as a practice, the valorisation of authenticity rendering it superfluous and the affirmation of artefactuality delegitimising it as a cynical and authoritarian imposition.

Since the same aporia is evident in the discourse of participatory development, with which technical assistance shares its basic principles, and also resurfaces on the theoretical level in the oscillation between transitionalism and traditionalism in the study of Russian postcommunism, we may suggest that the relation of artefactuality and authenticity (and more generally, the 'passion of the real' that animates this question and constitutes it as a *problem*) deserves to receive more attention, both empirical and theoretical. This question assumes particular importance in IR studies, insofar as this field is presently both concerned with the reconstruction of the *identity* of the other in the drive for global 'democratisation' and the development of 'civil society' and is fascinated with the *difference* of the other in its increased focus on the role of 'culture' and 'tradition' in international encounters. Our reconstitution of the diagram of technical assistance suggests that these two strands of discourse (affirming respectively 'identity' and 'difference') may in fact be more closely intertwined and mutually implicated than it may appear and that *both* of them are at work in instituting a *regime of scarcity* while affirming autonomisation and empowerment.

Our second step has been to *retrieve*, in a genealogical interpretation, the *conditions of emergence* of the diagram of technical assistance. Departing from the liberal orientation of the programmatic rationality of EU Tacis and relying on Foucauldian studies in the genealogy of liberalism, we have located the diagram of technical assistance in the problem-space of *infra-liberalism*, the political moment of the emergence of liberal order, in which its internal distinctions remain to be drawn and stabilised and the *entire* diagrammatic space remains amenable to governmental

intervention that constitutes in pedagogical practices the subsequently delimited zone of 'natural liberty'. We have also pointed out the infrastructural connection between this problem-space and contemporary *neoliberal* governmentality, which is distinguished from its classical predecessor by a self-consciously constructivist orientation and a permanent replay of the infra-liberal moment in its project of optimising 'governance'. The critical function of the genealogical retrieval of the political conditions of emergence of the governmental diagram of technical assistance consists in the foreclosure of the possibility of its sedimentation into a purely technical and depoliticised form through the explication of the power relations involved and disavowed in diagrammatic constitution.

Our study of the three neoliberal technologies of *agency*, *performance* and *rule*, deployed in the diagram of technical assistance, has disentangled the conditions of the discursive formation of the objects of *local agency*, *enterprise* and *government* and isolated three lines of potential further inquiry into the operations of (neo)liberal governmentality. The first of these is related to the technology of agency and concerns the governmental constitution of autonomous identity in *pedagogico-confessional practices* (self-help, lifelong learning, participatory indoctrination, etc.) that recast the empirical actuality of one's existence as a *clean slate* on which the positivity of identity is to be inscribed. Our study both contributes to and partially diverges from the manifold studies in 'identity construction' by pointing out the way the veridictive regime of 'deep identity' and 'self-actualisation' finds its jurisdictional correlate in *technical* routines, in which the discovery and the fulfilment of one's identity are effected in an asymmetric pedagogical relationship, where autonomy both figures as a duty in itself and is conditioned by the duty to reactualise in one's discourse the grounds of one's subjection. We therefore suggest that the intersubjective, 'meaning-oriented' constructivism ought to be supplemented with a more 'technique-oriented' approach to the constitution of subjectivity that helps to concretise the process of 'construction' and elucidate the power relations involved in it.

Secondly, our discussion of the *entrepreneurial technology of performance*, deployed in the diagram of technical assistance, opens up the theme of the relation between the governmental construction of quasi-markets (including the entrepreneurial form of the subject) and the reflexive refolding of the ethos of enterprise back onto government itself in the project of optimising 'governance' in accordance with the principles of economic rationality. This permanent relay between the *governmentalisation of the enterprise* and the '*economisation*' of *government* exemplifies

the practical correlate of the universalisation of the entrepreneurial form in neoliberal economic theory and makes 'enterprise' function as, indeed, a 'culture' that installs new models of individual and social performance that concretise the ethos of autonomy, rather than colonise and impoverish the anterior and more 'authentic' lifeworld. Our study demonstrates the constitutive and innovative aspects of the entrepreneurial technology that grants neoliberalism an advantage over the more abstract discourses of self-actualisation.

Thirdly, a potentially fruitful line of inquiry relates to the veridictive and jurisdictional aspects of the technology of 'governance' based on the *disavowal of the transcendent locus of sovereignty* and the *dispersion* and *dissemination* of governmental practices throughout the social space, which thereby emerges as a zone of indistinction, amenable to *quantitatively 'total'* liberal government. While the decentring of sovereignty has been the object of intense discussion and speculation particularly in 'critical' IR theory, the conclusions of our study may serve to temper the enthusiasm regarding these processes by conceiving of them not in terms of a momentous 'postmodern' transformation but as a reconfiguration of a governmental technology of rule, *internal* to the (decidedly 'modern') neoliberal diagram. The understanding of novel forms of participatory, decentralised and partnership-based 'governance' in terms of 'quantitative totality' that effaces the *limits* to governmental practice, constituted and valorised in classical liberal governmentality, makes it possible both to appreciate the specificity and novelty of neoliberalism and to 're-politicise' its practices that derive their force precisely from the depoliticisation involved in the dissemination of 'governance' throughout the diagram.

The third step in our inquiry addressed the *integration* of the local-level tactical diagram of technical assistance into the strategic field of the socioeconomic reforms undertaken in the Putin presidency. Our discussion of the relation between the technologies of agency, performance and rule, deployed in the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface, demonstrates, *pace* the criticism of the 'anti-liberal' tendencies of the Putin presidency, a basic identity of the diagrams with regard to the *constructivist approach to government*, the universalisation of the *entrepreneurial model of competitive performance* and the *pedagogical technology of the constitution of autonomous subjects*. Furthermore, it is precisely the local models piloted in the EU Tacis projects that endow the federal level reform designs with *concrete technical paradigms* that contribute to the 'manageability' of the proverbial 'managed democracy' that the Putin presidency allegedly installs. Nonetheless, we have also isolated a crucial

divergence of the two diagrams with regard to their *relation to the political* and, more specifically, to the sovereign locus of their institution. While the diagram of technical assistance proceeds from the effacement of the political by positing the *self-immanence* of 'governance' in its valorisation of publicity, participation and the 'origin' of governmental practices in 'local knowledge', a Putinian infra-liberalism, characterised by the attempt to reconstitute state autonomy, is marked by a persistent *display* of sovereign transcendence as a formal locus of decision, from which the positivity of the diagram emanates. More consonant with classical than with neo-liberalism, the reform project of the Putin presidency affirms less the *quality* of 'governance' than the *limits* to government, instituting the distinction between the space free from governmental intervention (yet constituted *as free* by governmental intervention) and the space of exclusive state authority, autonomised from both regional and private interests. Since the 'substantive' scope of state sovereignty is at the same time reduced dramatically in the governmental programme of socioeconomic deregulation to the extent that it becomes a purely formal locus, the affirmation of the sovereign excess of the diagram exemplifies not an attempt at a synthesis of liberalism and (a presumably illiberal) 'statism' but a more avowedly *political* modality of liberalism.

Nevertheless, the effects of *diagrammatic depoliticisation* are also manifest in 'Putin's project', most notably in the recourse to the 'logic of normal life' in order to sediment and stabilise the newly instituted forms of government, enterprise and agency. This depoliticisation proceeds by what we have termed *governmental enlightenment*, a devaluation of the 'shadow', extra-diagrammatic domains of statehood, economy and subjectivity as 'clean slates', amenable to governmental inscription, and their consequent elimination by placing them within the *governmental field of visibility* and (re)constituting them as diagrammatic positivities. This project is obviously distinct from radical socioeconomic transformation and is only intelligible in terms of the distinction between 'the political' and 'politics' as the manifestation of the effacement of the former by the latter in the increasing governmental disposition of existence, the specification of identity and the ordering of the sociopolitical space. We have argued that this strategy of depoliticisation constitutes the 'end of transition', in which the non-identity of postcommunist Russia is erased by the inscription on this clean slate of the diagrammatic positivity of 'Russia proper', no longer related, either affirmatively or antagonistically, to its Soviet past. In this inscription, the revolutionary politics of emergence is left behind and Russian politics begins to unfold in an

evolutionary manner within the bounds and on the secure foundations of the infra-liberal governmental diagram.

Finally, we have ventured to supplement the archaeological description and the genealogical disentanglement of the EU-Russian diagrammatic interface with a type of critique that makes no recourse to normative principles and eschews the formulation of alternatives but rather focuses on the affirmation of the *freedom* that is *lost* in the process of diagrammatic constitution. The question of freedom is of particular interest in the case of the infra-liberal governmental diagram, in which freedom functions as both an ethos and a technical modality. In order to make intelligible the loss of freedom in the institution of the diagram that so valorises freedom we have advanced a Foucauldian conception of ‘concrete freedom’ as an *extra-diagrammatic, non-discursive* and *non-identitarian* practice of transgressive resistance, which is unrepresentable in the positive terms of any diagram, but rather consists in displacing the diagram itself, opening it up to its outside and thus transforming it into a *heterotopia*.

The crucial characteristic of this notion of freedom is the *affirmation of non-identity* in the sense of abandoning the epistemic anxiety about the truth of one’s being, dispensing with self-discovery in favour of aesthetic self-fashioning and relinquishing all concern with identity as such. Insofar as it is the ‘passion of the real’ that animates the most bizarre technological artifice, the affirmation of one’s non-identity as a ‘clean slate’ both delegitimises the diagrammatic effort of one’s positive ‘authentication’ and enables one to ‘twist loose’ from the instituted identity in order to enhance the open space of possibilities of *being otherwise*. Such practices of freedom neither seek to replace the liberal diagram with a non-liberal alternative nor attempt an impossible task of doing away with government as such. Instead they effect what we have termed a *lateral displacement* of the diagram into a heterotopia that restores to it its constitutive political force of an event and recasts it in terms of *potentiality*, as one (more) possibility of being otherwise, valuable not for its authentic roots but, on the contrary, for its utter heterogeneity to the actuality of one’s existence. The critical function of lateral displacement consists in the *externalisation* of the veridictive and jurisdictional effects of the diagram that provides *relief* from the gravity of the governmental disposition of life. It is our contention that the notion of concrete freedom and the associated modalities of resistance that we have elaborated assume particular urgency in the contemporary condition of the practically

unchallenged predominance of liberal-democratic forms of government and the intense effort of their worldwide 'promotion'. Rather than attempt to generate alternatives to these forms of government through visionary exercises and theoretical speculation, we consider it more fruitful to highlight and affirm that which is lost in the global spread of liberal governmentality and suggest minor and mundane tactics that spare one from the diagrammatic promise of redemption and make life within the folds of the diagram more bearable.

'Making life bearable' – isn't that a modest yet salutary effect of the thought of historical ontology, the thought animated by the 'pessimistic activism' of permanently twisting loose from diagrammatic enfolding, while being perfectly aware about the absence of any 'other places' to escape to and strongly explicit in its denial of any extra-governmental realm of authenticity that could be posited at least as an ever receding utopian horizon if not an actual destination? The conclusions of our exercise in the historical ontology of Russian postcommunist politics of emergence offer neither endorsement nor condemnation, posit no alternatives or proposals for change, provide no reassurances or consolations. Due to the modesty and open-endedness of these conclusions the road to them might now appear as having been fruitlessly exhausting. The meticulous reconstitution of the discourse of technical assistance and the painstaking genealogical disentanglement of its dispositional diagram have portrayed a complex and contradictory historical structure, which our final reflections on freedom have attempted to leave behind or, rather, to *push aside* without complacently deluding ourselves as to our capacity to push it too far back. Why take this effort of a patient reconstruction of the diagram in tedious detail, if all we want to do is break away from it, *if we could*? And why break away from it if *there is nothing out there*?

It seems that these questions contain their answers already. One tries to break out of the diagram precisely *because* there is nothing beyond it, and it is this 'nothing', the outside, the void of non-identity, that makes *lighter* the existence of those in proximity to it. Secondly, it is precisely because we remain focused on the *outside* of the diagram that it has been so important to describe its discursive form and genealogical lineage, since its conditions of possibility are simultaneously its points of fragility and thus the avenues of its potential heterotopian transformation. Yet, we know of no recipe of a complete and final flight 'out of the camps' but rather conduct and conclude our own discourse lingering at a close distance from the diagram, which is however no small achievement. From this locus the diagram no longer appears as the empire of the

unimpeded governmental gaze but as one more effort of angelic construction in the never-ending series of diagrammatic utopias, a tireless effort that will nonetheless always fail by leaving something or someone unsubsumed under it. That someone, be it the sovereign or the subject of concrete freedom, will be able to perceive, with amused incredulity, the veridictive and jurisdictional effects of diagrammatic constitution as little more than the somewhat unintelligible *sound* of discourse and the *fury* of the will to govern, little more than talk and violence, the violence of talk that shies away from talking of its own violence but persists in the blind regularity of its force, much as the day that ruthlessly invades the night.

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