



JUKKA PIETILÄINEN

THE REGIONAL NEWSPAPER IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

Society, Press and Journalism
in the Republic of Karelia 1985-2001



ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of
the Faculty of Social Science
of the University of Tampere,
for public discussion in the Paavo Koli Auditorium
of the Pinni Building, Kanslerinrinne 1, Tampere
on October 5th, 2002 at 12 o'clock.

*University of Tampere
Tampere 2002*

Jukka Pietiläinen

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Media Studies

Academic Dissertation
University of Tampere,
Department of Journalism and Mass Communication
FINLAND

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Sales
Bookshop TAJU
P.O. BOX 617, 33014 University of Tampere
Finland
Tel. +358 3 215 6055
Fax +358 3 215 7685
email taju@uta.fi
<http://granum.uta.fi>

Cover design: Mikko Keinonen
Page design: Aila Helin

Printed dissertation
ISBN 951-44-5454-5

Electronic dissertation
Acta Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 209
ISBN 951-44-5463-4
ISSN 1456-954X
<http://acta.uta.fi>

Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy
Tampere 2002

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Preface

This book is the result of seven years of work, partly carried out alongside other research projects and tasks. The idea to study Karelian newspapers arose incidentally when I was offered the opportunity to visit Petrozavodsk in spring 1995 for one month as part of a research exchange. Since then I have been a regular visitor in Petrozavodsk, but also in Moscow and St. Petersburg when collecting material, having discussions with Russian scholars and journalists and getting to know Russian culture, everyday life and newspapers more thoroughly.

My research interest in Russia started with the changes occurring there in 1985 at the beginning of *perestroika*, when I also entered the University of Tampere for the first time, although I had studied Russian earlier. I started to focus more exclusively on Russian journalism at the beginning of the 1990s when I started to write my master's thesis. Then the economic recession in Finland and poor work prospects for journalists brought me back to the university and I started to write my dissertation, the first step of which was a licentiate thesis completed in December 1998. Now a decade of research has reached its final stage.

This book aims to be more all-inclusive than to concentrate on one separate problem and has therefore grown over normal dimensions. My interest in newspaper structures led to the question, who is reading these newspapers in Russia and to finding out how the texts have changed. Some less important parts were actually left out so that the book would remain within some limits.

Doing research on a foreign society always causes some problems. On the one hand, the differences may make it difficult to understand the nature of the society as the members of that society themselves understand it. On the other hand, the fact of being a foreigner may help to find out traits which have remained unnoticed by the citizens themselves. By asking 'stupid questions' and by being open and critical, a foreigner may notice much and by comparing the similarities and differences with his own society, he may find out something important. As an outsider I have no personal commitments or allegiances to Russian society or the newspapers in question. This makes the research easier; at least problems with commitments to this or that issue are not as important as in one's own society.

All translations from Russian or Finnish to English are mine if not otherwise stated. For the terminology of newspaper and journalism, both an English-Russian Dictionary of Mass Media (by E.I. Kuryanov) and a Finnish-

English glossary of newspaper terms (by Kaarina Melakoski and Mary McDonald-Rissanen available at <http://journalismi.uta.fi>) were useful sources of terms, although some terms were not easy to translate. The translation of news stories in Chapter 8 caused another set of problems. I wanted to preserve a sense of the original Soviet way of saying things, although in some cases this does not sound the same as news stories in English would sound. For the translations I am completely indebted to Joan Löfgren, who checked key passages in them. Oleg Vardanian and Svetlana Juskevits have assisted me when I have not understood the original Russian text correctly.

Part of the results were published in Finnish in my licentiate dissertation, which was completed in December 1998. Chapter 4 and parts of Chapter 5 were included in it, but for this dissertation they have been rewritten and expanded. The empirical material of the licentiate thesis included only material from September weeks in four years (1985, 1989, 1993, 1997), while this dissertation has used material from one week in both April and September over a time span of eight years.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Kaarle Nordenstreng, without whom this dissertation would not have existed (at least not within the current timetable). He has provided encouragement in moments when the task has seemed to be too heavy and has been active in finding funds for my research. I am grateful also to the community of mass media researchers in the Tullikatu building, which provided comments and encouragement during lunch and coffee breaks. This was important especially at the beginning of my work (later this research community was largely displaced and dispersed). Also other colleagues in the departments of journalism and mass communication, sociology and elsewhere have given me useful comments both in researcher seminars and at the lunch table.

In various stages of this work Kaarle Nordenstreng, Sami Borg, Jan Ekecrantz, Svetlana Juskevits, Risto Kunelius and Veikko Pietilä have read parts of the manuscript or its earlier versions and given useful comments. Joan Löfgren, as a language editor, was a most valuable commentator on the content as well, by pointing out if something had not been said clearly or if an idea was missing. Sami Borg from the Social Science Data Archive has provided useful comments on quantitative analysis. When finalising the manuscript I worked in a project headed by Professor of Sociology Harri Melin.

Many other colleagues in Tampere, Birmingham, Petrozavodsk, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Helsinki and Jyväskylä have helped me in formulating my thoughts as well as in various conferences of the International Association of Mass Communication Research, the European Sociological Association and the International Council of Russian and Eastern European Studies. The pre-reviewers Reader Brian McNair from the University of Stirling and Professor Elena Vartanova from Moscow State University provided useful comments during the final editing process.

The final writing period was started at the end of 2000 in Birmingham, Great Britain, where I could find a peaceful period of concentrating only on the production of the text. In particular, Professors Julian Cooper of the Russian and Eastern European Studies Department and Frank Webster of the Sociology Department provided me with assistance.

In Moscow, where I wrote and searched for material during one month (and several other times during short visits), Dean Yassen Zassoursky and Professor Elena Vartanova arranged housing for me at the University

dormitory and they and their colleagues were always ready to help. In Petrozavodsk similar help was provided by Dean Tamara Starshova of the Faculty of Finnish and Baltic Languages and Cultures.

I am grateful to the personnel of the libraries I visited in Tampere, Helsinki, Petrozavodsk, Moscow, Birmingham, London and Jyväskylä for good service and help. Especially the personnel at the local studies section of the Petrozavodsk National Library has been helpful for a Finn who is so interested in old papers. Also the journalists in Petrozavodsk have been ready to answer my questions and to collect material. Special thanks belongs also to Evgeni Klementiev and Aleksandr Kozhanov from the Karelian Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who helped me in the formulation of a questionnaire and organised the collection of the sample data in Petrozavodsk.

Also many other Russians, and Finns living temporarily in Russia in Petrozavodsk, Moscow, St. Petersburg and elsewhere, have helped me to understand Russian culture and society better. Although Russian society still gives me surprises I also have the feeling that I have learned a lot about how that society works and what is needed to survive and do research there.

When I decided to write the dissertation in English, I was not completely aware of the amount of work needed simply because of the language. Special thanks for making my English more readable belongs to Joan Löfgren and Virginia Mattila (Chapters 1, 2 and 9), who went through my text and corrected it.

Oleg Vardanian has provided consultation on Russian language problems/questions in cases in which I have been unsure about the original meaning and has provided useful knowledge about the hidden aspects of Soviet society. He has also assisted in the translation of the Russian summary, and we have together searched for better expressions. Osmo Buller made some corrections to my Esperanto summary, since although I know Esperanto significantly better than English, this knowledge has suffered because of working in English so extensively. Despite all this, only I am to be blamed for any mistakes or flaws remaining in the text.

The Finnish Cultural Foundation and its Paavo Koskinen Foundation, the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, the University of Tampere and the Finnish Academy have given me research grants that have made the financial part of this study possible. I have also been part of two research projects funded by the Academy of Finland during this study. The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Tampere has given me an office and services related to it. Aila Helin made the layout of the book and Mikko Keinonen planned the cover. The City of Tampere provided financial assistance for the publishing costs.

The Journalism Department secretaries, Sirkka Hyrkkänen and Marjatta Virtanen, have arranged various practical things during my work at the university and amanuensis Aarno Kakko has always been ready to solve computer problems.

I am especially grateful to my parents, Paavo and Raija Pietiläinen, for their support, also financially. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Tuula, for her love and for reminding me that everything is not research and dissertation writing.

Jukka Pietiläinen

Tampere, 9 September 2002

1. Introduction

1.1. Challenge of Russia

On 28 February 2002 the leading Finnish daily newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* published two items of news which together give an excellent picture of what is going on in the Russian media sphere. In the foreign news section the message was that “independent radio is also under the threat of state control”, while in the economics section the headline was “SanomaWSOY¹ aiming at the Russian market”. The story went on to state the timing for entering the Russian market was currently favourable. If the reality were as gloomy as could be assumed on the basis of the story in the foreign news section, it would be hard to believe that a Western market-based media company could be planning to enter the Russian market.

During the last 15 years of the 20th century, Russian society experienced a major political and social change from a centrally planned, authoritarian and unified Soviet society to a market-based, (at least partly) democratic and fragmented post-Soviet society. The nature of these changes is still very much discussed (Burawoy 1992, 1995, Fleron & Hoffmann 1993, Orlovsky 1995, Jacobsen 1998) as is the nature of socialism and Soviet society in general (Verdery 1995, 1996, Janos 1996). What is obvious is that many social institutions, like journalism and newspapers, are different from before, although some elements of the old social structure have been preserved.

In Russia, the change of media structure and content occurred in a context of major social change. Russia also poses a challenge to the sociological imagination: not all in Russia is the same as in the West. Therefore “students of Russia tend to emphasise the uniqueness of their object” (Kivinen & Sutela 2000, 16). This has led to a marginalisation of the research of Russian society, although problems, common in the study of Russia are similar to those in most societies except the stable and long-developed Western societies. Accordingly, the study of Russian society should not be isolated in its own pocket but it should have wider connections with the theoretical traditions and discussions which are going on in social sciences in general (e.g. Downing 1996, Tolonen 1992).

1 This company publishes *Helsingin Sanomat*, a number of other newspapers in Finland, several magazines in many European countries and is one of the biggest Finnish book publishers.

I argue for the necessity of a comparative approach to the research of both the development of Russian society and the changes in newspaper structure and journalism. A comparative approach has been used e.g. in the analysis of the changes in the British and French press (Chalaby 1996b), media in Gaullist France and post-Soviet Ukraine (Chalaby 1998b) and in the analysis of the role of the media in transition (Jones 2000, comparing media in transition in Nicaragua, Jordan, South Africa and Russia).

A comparative approach, however, does not work without the proper conceptual tools and a theoretical understanding of the changes that are taking place. On the other hand, excessively theoretical approaches (often non-comparative or only normatively comparative) which neglect reality are not particularly useful. Such approaches often lead to the analysis of Russian society as something fundamentally different and strange, although similar phenomena may be common elsewhere, but not in the imaginary construction of the researcher.

The basic questions and problems which a researcher of post-Soviet Russia will encounter are the nature of the Soviet system, the nature of transition or transformation and the nature of the post-Soviet social system. These questions lead further to a theoretical discussion that should, at least partly, form the basis for the analysis of the change of social institutions. Much of the recent theoretical discussion on the nature of the Soviet system is closely tied to the concepts of modernity and modernisation. Therefore, the concept of modernisation will be addressed first, not least because of the close ties modernisation has with the development of newspapers and media (see Thompson 1995, Ekecrantz 2001).

The nature of post-Soviet transformation is no doubt one of the factors which should be taken into consideration. The concepts of transition and transformation have been discussed widely (e.g. Bryant & Mokrzycki 1994, Offe 1996, Markwick 1996, Hughes 2000, Elo 2001) and it is often suggested that transformation is more appropriate than transition, especially because the real development has shown that there is no simple, rapid and straight route from one social system to another. As the references indicate this discussion has emerged notably during the second half of the 1990s.

In this respect, the differences between most parts of the Soviet Union (or at least Russia) and East Central European countries are obvious. While in the Eastern European situation there is evidence to support the idea of political revolution according to which the political leadership was changed while there were important continuities in the economic structure (Sparks & Reading 1998, 105-106), the Russian reality gives more support to arguments emphasising continuity in both economic and political spheres.

Although this dissertation is focused only to the development of newspapers and journalism, it is based on the idea that journalism is part of society and that the forms of journalism also reveals something essential about the structure of society. The changes in journalism become understandable in the context of social changes and they may even initiate and accelerate these changes, or accelerate them.

The change in the Russian press, or media in general, has been addressed by numerous authors, both in Russia and outside it. These previous studies will be reviewed in Chapter 4 (see also Pietiläinen 2001a), but it is already worth pointing out that the change in Russian journalism itself has not been investigated much either in Russia or outside it. Partly this is because research interests, the changes in political economy and political battles around the media have been more interesting than journalism, especially in the Moscow-based national media. Partly this is due to insufficient language skills, or even inability to approach the changes in journalism. Some authors have substituted analysis with empirical presentation of Russian journalism and its changes in some of the media. Also, a general weakness among many authors has been the failure to connect the changes in Russian media with the changes in Russian society in general and/or with the changes in the media elsewhere.

This study aims to explore these previously hidden connections and areas. It also focuses on one usually neglected aspect of Russian media, namely on the regional level. Russia is made up of 89 rather different regions, varying from large and prosperous cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg to mainly rural and poor areas like the republics of Tuva or Ingushetia, or from densely populated, small areas like those around Moscow and in the southwest to sparsely populated areas like most of the regions of northern Russia (Regiony Rossii 1998; Pietiläinen 2000). To choose one of the regions would not do justice to all of them, however, choosing Karelia as an empirical object of analysis is, as I will prove in Chapter 4, no worse than a random choice might be. The choice, however, has not been made randomly but is based on both practical reasons (being close to Finland) and institutional reasons (co-operation between universities which helped to start and carry on this study).

In order to understand the nature of change it is also necessary to compare the Russian development with the changes in society and journalism elsewhere. Therefore this study begins with a theoretical discussion of modernisation, the role of the media (especially newspapers) in it and of the nature of Soviet society in the context of modernity. The role of the media as a part of the process of change is also important.

The media, journalism and modern society are inextricably interwoven and journalism has even been perceived as “the sense-making discourse of modernity” (Hartley 1996).

Both journalism and modernity are products of the developments of European societies in the last few centuries. They are both associated with researching the world, scientific thought, industrialization, political liberation, and imperialistic expansion. Both favour concepts such as freedom, progress and universal enlightenment and they are associated with the breaking down of the traditional system of knowledge, with capitalization and consumerism, with market expansion and the separation of the product and the buyer (Ekecrantz 2001, 20-21).

The context of modernity is also essential for the understanding of both the peculiarities of the Soviet media and journalism and the changes that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In this study, the Russian development is compared with and made understandable through the development in other countries. The focus is not only on a comparison of Russia with developed Western European and Northern American societies but also with the developments in peripheries in Europe and elsewhere. The Latin American experience, being both part of European modernity and not part of it, “neither purely endogenous nor entirely imported” (Larrain 2000, 6), is important in this respect.

The Chinese development of the press and journalism also offers an excellent opportunity for comparison. Moreover, the Chinese development is well reported in English, even in comparison with the studies on Russian journalism, and in contrast to with the Russian case, the Chinese development has been reported almost completely by Chinese scholars who are familiar both with Chinese journalistic culture and with foreign (Western) academic research and discussion on journalism.

1.2. Research object

Although the Russian media have been studied by numerous authors (see e.g. Pietiläinen 2001a) too little attention has been paid to journalism itself and the concrete media texts, not only as the coverage of some case, but as themselves and as constructions of society. This study aims to do that at the level of regional newspapers in one of the Russian regions.

The development of Russian newspapers and journalism will be investigated in the social and historical context of the late Soviet and post-Soviet period. Therefore it is essential to understand the nature of the Soviet

system and the system which has followed it. As stated above, this study is based on the idea that the Soviet Union was a partly modernised society where an important share of pre-modern structures and practices remained although others were forcefully destroyed and that these premodern features undermined the real socialist society and contributed to the collapse of the social system. This collapse (together with the collapse of the economy) lead, on the one hand, to the new manifestation of premodern features and to the remodernisation development based on markets and democratisation, on the other. On the global level Russia has returned to the status of periphery of Western Europe, the status which had been abolished by the broke of economic relations after the October revolution. The current Russia is at the same time an heir of the Soviet system, a part of the underdeveloped periphery of Europe and a part of the universal modernising and globalising developments.

A comparative analysis which pays attention both to the Soviet legacy and to the development of modern forms of newspaper and journalism in the Western world seems to be an appropriate tool for the analysis of post-Soviet reality. Modernisation theory, as it has been applied in the development of newspapers and journalism, offers the necessary theoretical tools for understanding the development and the factors influencing it. The development of the press and journalism will probably not follow the development in the West but it will certainly have common elements, which are linked with factors like market economy, civil society and democracy.

A particular problem is caused by the crisis of modernity in the West. The newspapers reflect the particular historical formation: modern society, which in some significant respects is no longer with us (Ekecrantz 2001, 15). Newspapers operated in national public spaces and were closely linked with nation state, national capital and political democracy. With the globalisation and decline of both nation states and the political democracy linked to them, the point of reference for Russian development is declining. Eastern European social changes have been seen as 'post-modern revolutions' which "break with the logic of modern revolutions established in 1789" (Müller 1995, 286).

Russian society is becoming "part of the world already under postmodern condition" (Bauman 1993, cit. Müller 1995, 286), but "in the West post-modernity is really a subtype of the modern, whereas for Russia the opposite is true" (Kapustin 2000, 21). Lagerspetz (2001, 11) has pointed out that the principles of modern civil society are eroding in the West as well and that in modern society loyalties are based on universalism, while in post-modern society they are based on "particularism, fragmenting the society into potentially conflicting networks or 'post-modern tribes'".

In spite of different emphasis between modernisation and postmodernist theories, the concept of modernity can be used as a point of reference, from which the development is analysed. The development of the press and journalism as part of the essence of modern societies has its national peculiarities, but much of it is common to all modern societies. Moreover, the factors influencing the development of the press and journalism are the same in very different societies. One set of these elements will more likely produce a kind of newspaper (media) system and a type of journalism than another set of these elements.

This study is based on the idea that the development of the press and journalism in Russia have common elements with the development of the press in other societies, that Russian journalism has borrowed, and will borrow, as journalisms in other countries have done, from the experience of those countries in which journalism developed first. The diffusion of cultural practices, in many cases very concretely, as journalists studied new practices abroad, has made journalism more and more similar in different countries. On the other hand, the national peculiarities, dependent on the given social situation, will likewise have a great impact on the development of journalism.

The study of Russian or Soviet journalism should not be based on ideological prejudices on the basis of which the Soviet slogan has been taken as the starting point of analysis, with either an approving or rejecting attitude. As Jeffrey Brooks has pointed out, the Western view according to which the Soviet press functioned as “a voice of central authority or a vehicle of interest groups and factions among the leaders” tallies “with Lenin’s idea of the press as a propaganda tool and organizer, but it fails to include the reluctance of elite party members to go into journalistic work or the medium’s complexity. All newspapers are inherently pluralistic and open to hostile counter-readings” (Brooks 1992, 1435).

This study is based on the conviction that “the concepts of sociology are applicable to the analysis of Russian society — provided that one recognizes the historical distinctiveness of Russia” (see Kivinen 2002, 241). What are these special historical conditions and how are they related to the development of journalism and the press? First, Soviet tradition and Soviet ideas about the press are important. The pre-Soviet Russian development of the press should also be taken into consideration, but even more important is the current social reality of Russia and the Soviet legacy for the social development. The development of modern society in the Soviet Union occurred differently from the West. Soviet modernisation was in many aspects incomplete and many traditional elements were preserved. In the present situation society is starting a modernisation development again. This

development is based on the Soviet past, the partial retraditionalisation of society after the collapse of the Soviet system and to the adaptation of the foreign elements.

The aim of this study is to investigate the transformation of journalism during the political and social change in Russia in the 1990s. In the Western societies, the transformation of the journalistic field was caused by the decline of the old discursive norms and practices and by the emergence of new discursive norms, practices and strategies. Starting in the second half of the 19th century the transformations in Western journalism turned journalism into a discursive genre of its own.

While some of the discursive practices and norms of journalism linked with the formation of a journalistic field were present in the Soviet press, others were not. Therefore I suggest that there was no independent journalistic field in the Soviet Union but journalism was rather an extension of political and literary fields. The practices which constrained the formation of the journalistic field in the Soviet society included political dependence, the extensive use of non-staff authors, the intellectualisation of journalists and the fact that economy did not define the rules of the game in journalism. Because of these elements, the Soviet press was rather close to the Western press of the pre-journalistic period, when there was public discourse instead of journalism and publicists instead of journalists (cf. Chalaby 1996a, 3). In contemporary Russia, where the limitations to the development of the journalistic field have been largely abolished, it is possible to ascertain if a formation of the journalistic field is ongoing and how this development is evolving.

I would like to emphasise that the factors influencing the development of the newspaper press and journalism are mostly the same in all societies. The differences have been caused by the fact that not all the factors have been present or developed as far as in certain other countries. However, in similar conditions some developments are more likely than others. Especially important are market forces, which were largely non-existent in the Soviet Union but have now been established in Russia. The Soviet form of newspaper press and concept of journalism formed a basis for further development and the social, political and economic structure are among those factors which will have a great impact on the development of the newspapers in Russia. Useful points of reference have also been offered by other non-Western societies, like Latin America, China or Korea, where the development of the media has progressed through rather similar trends.

Although this study is mainly a study of the development of newspapers and journalism it must also refer to the political and economic developments

as well as changes in the social structure. One of the most important elements in this respect is the change in the public sphere occurring during the last years of Soviet state and after its collapse. The aim of this study is, however, not to go deeply to the theoretical discussions or empirical evidence of the political and economic developments but to point out the connections they have with the development of the press.

For many of the authors reviewed in Chapter 3 the research has also been linked with media criticism. Research has been used as a tool for qualified journalism critique. While this aim seems reasonable when doing research on the journalism of one's own journalistic culture, it is a more unrealistic task for a foreign researcher, therefore I leave media and journalism criticism to Russian scholars and confine my study to the changes in Russian journalism and to the conceptualisation of these changes.

1.3. Structure of the book

The book is divided into nine chapters. Following this introduction the second chapter presents the context of the study as a whole: modernisation theory and modernisation development as a theoretical perspective from which the changes in media have been analysed. Social changes, not only in Russia and Eastern Europe but also elsewhere, have caused new discussions around the theories of modernity and modernisation, which have been both revised and used as analytical tools in understanding what has happened in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the former system.

The third chapter presents recent selected studies on the development of the press and journalism elsewhere in the world and also highlight some ongoing developments in other peripheral countries. The aim of this chapter is to provide a basis for the investigation of the Russian press and journalism and to point out the possible universalities of this development.

The fourth chapter presents the development of the Soviet press system and its peculiar form of journalism and focuses on the development of the press after the collapse of the Soviet Union on a general level. The main purpose of this chapter is to present the state of the Soviet press before the political changes of the 1980s and 1990s and to present the development of the press in general and to shed light on the developments of the regional press in general.

The fifth chapter pays attention to the newspapers from 1985 to 2001 in Petrozavodsk, the capital of the Republic of Karelia. During these 16 years, the press was transformed from a small number of rather frequent newspapers

(3 or 6 times a week) to a large number of mainly weekly newspapers. In this chapter, the main focus is on the structural change of the press and the changes occurring in individual newspapers.

The sixth chapter presents the current newspaper situation in Petrozavodsk. It also presents the structure of the audience and analyses how newspaper reading is structured in a new media situation. This chapter is based on a survey conducted in Petrozavodsk in February 2000. In this chapter, the aim is also to test the suitability of various statistical analysis methods in analysing readership structures.

The seventh chapter provides an empirical examination of at the changing journalism in two newspapers, one published in Russian and one in Finnish, in Karelia from 1985 to 1999. A sample of two weeks' issues was collected every second year. This chapter presents the content and the changes in these newspapers in general while the eighth chapter goes further into the development of the journalism both quantitatively and qualitatively. Its focus is on the structure of the newspaper, on the sources used, on topics, geography and the time of the stories, on the presentation of social problems and on the narrative structures of the texts.

The ninth chapter summarises the findings and links them with the formation and development of the journalistic field elsewhere and with the role of the press in transition. It also presents a prognosis of the future development of the Karelian press.

2. Media, modernity and Russia

2.1. The foundations of modern society

Modern society has been characterised by a set of fundamental institutional transformations, which began to take hold in Europe in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. These transformations were dependent on specific historical conditions, but once they were under way, they acquired a momentum of their own. They happened first in the urban centres of Europe, but other parts of the world were increasingly drawn into this process of institutional transformation. Besides economic changes (the emergence of the capitalist system of production and exchange), the development of new kinds of political institutions (nation-states, centralised system of taxation and administration) and the concentration of military power in the hands of nation-states, the cultural domain also experienced systematic transformations. (Thompson 1995, 44-51)

In this cultural domain, besides the fragmentation of religious authority and the gradual expansion of the systems of knowledge and learning that were essentially secular, the development of media industries was “a third important shift in the social organization of symbolic power” (Thompson 1995, 52).

The newspaper press has been defined as one factor in the formation of nation-states and the imagined society on which they have been based (Anderson 1983). However, according to the criticism by Thompson, there is “a considerable gulf (...) between the emergence of a plurality of reading publics” and “the emergence of various forms of national identity and nationalism” (Thompson 1995, 62) and the main explanation for the rise of nationalism is likely to be provided by other factors. In any case, the development of the media and journalism has enabled the formation of wider communities and by so doing they have further modernised the society.

Newspaper, and mass communication in general, is the social bond which connects the people, and only connected people form groups, communities and societies in a sociological sense. Perhaps without newspaper, or media in general, there is not and can not be, a modern society. As Pietilä and Sondermann (1994) provocatively define the society: “take in to your hand a newspaper — here is the binding agent, here is the society.”

Modernity and modern society are concepts which have been given various meanings and contents. There is also great disagreement on the

beginning of modernity; some equate the start of modernity with the Enlightenment, and some extend it to the fourth century (Smart 1990). Berman (1983) has identified three distinctive phases in the development of modernity. The first from the beginning to the end of the eighteenth century, during which time people began to experience modern life. The second period begins with the French Revolution and the third phase is the global diffusion of the process of modernisation and the development of a 'world culture of modernism'.

The different opinions on the starting point of modernity have an impact on the content of modernity itself. Modernity is a process, which originated in the urban centres of some Western European countries and little by little spread to other countries and to the rural areas. The diffusion of modern society has been a process with conflicts between new, modern culture and traditional culture. The contrast between modern and traditional is, however, not so abrupt.

The mass communication media have transformed the features of the traditional culture, challenged and undermined them, but they can also be used to extend and consolidate traditions. The media have deritualised, depersonalised and delocalised the traditions but they have also led to the invention of traditions, some of the traditions are, in fact, relatively recent innovations. (Thompson 1995, 187-199). Moreover, "a modern society is a society which transforms the old to the new without destroying it" (Touraine 1995, 321).

The question is not only about the forms of culture but also about the content. Modern society has destroyed the traditional sacred and replaced it with a better sacred, the modern one. This change has been given different definitions. For Durkheim, it meant that mechanic solidarity was displaced by organic solidarity, for Tönnies the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and for Weber the distinction between the rational and the traditional (see e.g. Therborn 1995, 5). For Marx and Engels modern society does not mean the replacement of traditional order with a new one, but the order is replaced by continual change:

All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned. (The Communist Manifesto 1848, cited according to Berman 1982, 95)

Despite criticism against the bourgeois economy, Marx saw the development of bourgeois society as a positive one: he enthusiastically embraced the personality that this society produced, individualism, self-development, the

dynamics of capitalist development and hoped “to heal the wounds of modernity through a fuller and deeper modernity” (Berman 1982, 98).

According to Piirainen (1997) there is broad consensus concerning features that are attributed to modern societies by Max Weber. The four basic features of modern societies include first, the development of the industrial mode of production, second, the evolution of rational forms of domination and administration (the development of rational bureaucracy), third, a developed civil society with powerful institutions such as independent media, that are able to criticise and control the political and legislative institutions, and, fourth, an increasing autonomy of the individual which is produced by the dissolution of the traditional bonds of religion, family and locality. (Piirainen 1997, 16, based on Weber 1972 and Srubar 1991).

For Habermas the essence of modernity was the separation of science, morality, and art into autonomous spheres, each with its own internal logic. As a result, the distance between the culture of experts and that of the wider public has grown (Habermas 1981, 8).

The development of modern society has included fundamental changes: the bureaucratisation of the administration, the use of money, industrialisation, urbanisation, the secularisation of culture, the formation of the positive legal system. While the process of modernisation has progressed further, the state has taken a more active part in economics and education. The modern state was not anchored in regional, religious, ethnic and class-like organisations, but in the competition of pluralistic interest groups (Müller 1992, 114-115). The consequence of the competition and the need to channel it was the further importance of the democratic system of government through which the various groups could negotiate and take part in the governance of the state.

Much of the discussion around modernity is caused by the various definitions given to this concept. For some modernity means mainly the current form of society in Western countries, some link it with technology and science; others point out cultural changes, which makes modern society different from traditional society. First, “modernisation is seen from a materialistic and collectivistic viewpoint as a developmental process of industrialisation, rationalisation and urbanisation” and second, “emphasise the individualistic, abstract and, in a way idealistic side of modernity considering personal freedom, unpredictability and the multitude of choices as the main properties of modern life.” (Hakamies 2001, 277-278).

Contemplating the different definitions from the point of view of media and journalism research modernity might mean universal literacy, the vast circulation of newspapers, high utilisation of media technology and high

penetration of television or radio. A more profound approach to the changes the media have caused would pay attention not only to technology and use but also to the cultural changes the use of the mass media has brought with it. In order to understand these changes, it is not enough to count how many televisions or newspapers a country has, but to find out if they have been used in a way which transforms the traditional communication networks and transmission of information to a modern one. Therefore modernisation should not include only the formal consumption of media but also the changes which this use promotes. Journalism is both a product of a modern society and also machinery to produce and to maintain the modern society (Kunelius 2001).

In modern society, the task of the media is to keep society together, establish links between various groups and transmit information and knowledge, and the question is not only about the transmission of information through the mass media, but also how this information is perceived by the audience: in modern society the information from the media is taken for granted and it is often thought to be more reliable than other sources of information.

With the development of the media, social interaction is separated from the physical locale. This gives rise to new forms of interaction which are extended in space and in time and which differ from face-to-face interaction. The media has established social relations to which Thompson refers as “mediated quasi-interaction”. This kind of interaction differs from other forms of interaction in terms of its orientation towards an indefinite range of individuals and its monological character (Thompson 1995, 84-85).

2.2. Problems with modernity and modernisation theory

Theory of modernity was in the 1950s and 1960s accompanied with the theory of modernisation, which emphasised the change from traditional to the modern society. Several authors (Lerner 1964, Inkeles 1976, 1983) analysed the routes the developing countries should follow in order to become modern and tried to measure individual modernity. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, this theory was subjected to considerable criticism on the basis of ethnocentrism and false premises. Modernisation theory was seen “as an ideological defence of the dominance of Western capitalism over the rest of the world” (Giddens 1982, 144). The expansion of the capitalist world system had led to the peripheration of economic structures, the creation of weak state structures and a number of pressures at the level of culture (Wallerstein 1983, 82).

However, the second wave of modernisation theory appeared in the mid and late 1980s in order to explain democratisation in southern Europe and Latin America and this was further strengthened by the changes in Eastern Europe (Holmes 1997, 40). Recently, modernity has been conceptualised from the planetary horizon “as the culture of the center of ‘world-system’”. “Modernity is not a phenomenon of Europe as an independent system, but of Europe as a center” (Dussel 1998, 4).

Among the later critics, Samuel Huntington maintains that “modernity involves industrialisation, urbanisation, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilisation, and more complex and diversified occupational structures”, but that “the distinguishing characteristics of Western society” are the “legacy of classical civilization, catholicism and protestantism, European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, the rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies and individualism” and they developed hundreds of years before the West modernised (Huntington 1996, 29-35, see also Huntington 1998, 69-71).

However, Huntington’s criticism fails to account for the relationship between the universal traits of modernity and some of the purely western ones. It seems that Huntington’s concept of modern society is too narrow, since he perceives the economic modernisation as something apart from cultural development. Moreover, many features which Huntington defines as Western had not spread universally over the Western world before the 19th century. Huntington’s idea of the clash of civilisations has been criticised even from the Russian point of view (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 1998, 33).

Other critics have tried to conceptualise modernisation from the non-European point of view. This should be able to accommodate forms of development where the capitalist mode of production is either strongly peripheralised or subordinated to logic emanating from non-economic institutional spheres (Mouzelis 1999, 142). Mouzelis defines modernity as a type of social organisation which

is characterized by an unprecedented level of social mobilization/incorporation into the centre; and (...) unprecedented level of institutional differentiation. This type of mobilization and differentiation leads to the destruction of segmental localism and to the creation of broader, highly differentiated economic, political, social, and cultural arenas (...) within which the practices of individual subjects are constituted / regulated by such institutional complexities as the nation state, national markets and / or national planning agencies, national systems of welfare and population surveillance / management, mass literacy and nationalist ideologies. (Mouzelis 1999, 156).

This excludes capitalism and the development of monetary relations from the concept of modernisation, which has been one of the key issues in the discussion of the unmodern nature of real socialism. On the other hand, some critics of modernisation have perceived the Soviet system as a part of the capitalist world system:

The USSR was in effect the subimperial power of the US for eastern Europe, and quite an efficient one at that. (...) The Soviet bloc was “unneeded” for the immediate economic expansion of the world-economy. The US had all it could handle with the economic “reconstruction” of western Europe and Japan. Hence, it was quite happy to be relieved for the moment of discursive obligations to the Soviet bloc, knowing that it would be no problem later to pull the zone back into the commodity chains of the world-economy (Wallerstein 1991, 7).

Some scholars have defined modernisation simply as ‘westernisation’ (e.g. Ester, Halman & Rukavishnikov 1997, 237). Such an approach to modernisation has been regarded either as a severe threat to Russian sovereignty and national dignity or as uncritical approval and acceptance of the Western socio-economic models. The definition of modernity simply as westernisation is too simple, which, for example, Japanese modernisation shows: modernisation does not necessarily mean the uncritical approval of foreign models but a development in which foreign economic, political and cultural impacts have been applied to domestic conditions.

The modernisation paradigm has also been criticised by reason of its idea of linear development. This criticism has to do mainly with the modernisation development in the Third World, which did not proceed in the way the ideologists of modernisation described (see e.g. Toivonen 1995). This idea has been replaced by an idea of undulatory development rather than a linear one. This idea has been thought to be especially productive in the case of Russia, where waves of liberalisation have been followed by waves of antiliberal countermodernisation and reforms with counter-reforms (Pantin & Lapkin 1998, 40).

Still, according to another criticism modernity can be defined only retrospectively, “what makes the society closer to the current (Western capitalist) state of affairs”. To call the current development modernisation (or post-modernisation) is only another way to say that these societies are becoming more similar with the West. (Lagerspetz 1998, 50)

Actually, the modernisation theorists have described the expansion of the capitalist world system (see e.g. Wallerstein 1983) to peripheries and therefore the concept has been used in a normative sense. The concept, however, could have been used as a descriptive, ideal type category by which reality can be analysed, rather than as a model (see Holmes 1993, 33).

The differences of modernisation development in the Western world should not be underestimated either. The development in the core states of Western civilisation (the Western part of Europe, USA) was in many ways different than on various peripheries. The development in northern Europe was different from that in Britain and both of them differed from Southern European modernisation. Therefore it seems somewhat strange that the main reasons to exclude Russia and some other countries from the applicability of Western concepts have been the different religious tradition and authoritarian legacy. However, no cultural frontline has been set between the Protestant and Catholic countries of Western Europe, although the differences in cultural forms between Sweden and Italy might clearly exceed the differences between Russia and the common traits of all the Western European countries.

2.3. Modernisation and peripheries

The aim of this study is not to discuss the concept of modernity and modernisation in general, but to concentrate on Russia and peculiarities of Russian modernisation and to point out that the Soviet Union and Russia can be understood through the tools the concept of modernity provides. Some others accept Russia as part of European civilisation without questioning, e.g. Parsons has stated that both the United States and Soviet Russia have basically European cultural traditions and have interacted closely with Europe for centuries (Parsons 1971, 134).

Other scholars, not least Russians, have pointed out some problems in the unproblematic understanding of modernisation. On the other hand Russia has much in common with other peripheries of European civilisation and many features of Russian modernity which differ from the core states of modernity are the same as in other peripheries. Russia, however, is much closer to European modernisation than many Asian countries, to the research of which the ideas of modernity have been applied successfully.

A special case highly relevant in the case of Russia is the modernisation development in peripheries, and not only in peripheries which the modernisation paradigm and policy of the 1950s intended to modernise (e.g. Turkey) but also in countries like Finland and Sweden, Japan and the Central Eastern European countries. The study of Latin American societies also offers an interesting point of comparison, especially in the case of Russia. "Modernity is not absent from Latin America, nor is it inauthentic or the same as European modernity. It has its own historical trajectory and its specific characteristics although it shares many general features." (Larrain 1999, 201).

In Latin America there has been “a manifest tendency to consider modernity as something external and in opposition to identity” (ibid.). The same has been the case in Russia. The modernising impulses have been not only a result of internal dynamics and development but also a result of adaptation of Western ideas and practices. The conflict between tradition and modernity has been understood in Russia (as in other peripheral countries of Eastern Europe) as a conflict between outside influences and traditional values. Modernisation, more than in the Western European core countries of modernisation, has been directed by the state (although the state has not been absent from the process of modernisation in many Western European countries either) and the aim of modernising society has been more consciously defined.

According to Larrain Latin American modernity has produced certain specific features and characteristics which are 1) “clientelism or cultural and political personalism”, 2) “ideological traditionalism in which leading groups accepted and promoted changes necessary for development in the economic sphere but rejected changes required for such a process in other spheres”, 3) authoritarianism, 4) masked racism, 5) lack of autonomy and development of civil society, 6) relative depolitisation of society (a relatively recent feature during the military dictatorships), 7) revaluation of, and renewed interest in, political democracy and human rights on the part of intellectuals and popular majorities (Larrain 1999, 196-201).

Most, if not all, of these characterise Russian modernity as well. Russian modernisation, like Latin American modernisation, has been characterised by the lack of civil society, political personalism, ideological traditionalism, authoritarianism and even relative depolitisation of society. Perhaps like Russia, “in many contemporary neoliberal positions in Latin America is implicit the idea that the application of appropriate economic policies is a sufficient condition for an accelerated development which will lead Latin America to modernity similar to that of Europe or North America” (Larrain 1999, 183; on neoliberalism in Russia see e.g. Gerner & Hedlund 1994).

Some scholars have discussed the parallels between the Latin American and Russian cases. Zemtsov (2000, 96) defined both of them (together with Iberian, Balkan, Turkish) as frontier or peripheral civilisations in comparison with Western Europe. For these civilisations an identity based on the mixture of archaic-traditional and modern elements and continuous search for identity is characteristic (ibid. 97; see also Shemyakin 2000). Khachaturov (1999, 15) has pointed out several historical similarities between Latin America and Russia, which include an authoritarian structure of power, intolerance of dissidence and problems with human rights and a newer one resulting from

the 'latin-americanisation' of Russia. In the spheres of market economy, state building and the formation of civil society Russia is trying to do what Latin America has already done. Krasilshchikov has pointed out that Russia is developing in the direction of Zaire or Mali rather than that of Argentina or Mexico and that the Latin American alternative represents the best possible way of development for Russia (Krasilshchikov 1997, 125). On the other hand, Kagarlitskii has pointed out that Russia can hardly learn anything from Latin American democratisation and market economy, but that the experience of Latin American authoritarianism may appear more natural for Russia (Kagarlitskii 1998, 43).

Even more general comparisons could be made with other peripheries as well. In peripheral societies, which have been latecomers to modernisation, the "process of modernization initially developed mostly under the impact of external forces, and only to a smaller degree through internal initiative and transformation of their broader groups and strata". In most of these countries, "a marked discrepancy tended to develop between the low level of mobilization and transformation in the economic and cultural fields, on the one hand, and the high level of mobilization in the ecological and political fields, on the other" (Eisenstadt 1966, 83-84).

Modernisation spread first to Central and Eastern Europe, where the social backgrounds were different although some features of common European tradition — landed nobility, commercial town centres — could also be found there. There were also crucial differences: the general level of social differentiation and of technological development was much lower than in Western Europe, the social pyramid was steeper, the broad base of peasantry was wider, the more autonomous urban, religious, professional, or rural groups were less numerous and weaker, the rulers more autocratic. (Eisenstadt 1966, 67).

A later comparison of modernisation in Bulgaria and Japan has indicated that in Bulgaria the interests of the elite prevail over the public interest, and the instability of institutions and absence of national integrity remain obstacles to effective reform, while in Japan the post-war modernisation was based on national integrity and national self-respect. The Japanese see change as a natural continuation of the past, whereas the Bulgarians associate reform with the rejection of the past (Keliyan 1998, 141).

Northern European experiences are also valuable. In Northern European countries in which modernisation started late and where the "starting conditions for delayed development" were not promising, the result of export-led development was industrial growth which brought these countries to the level of the most advanced industrial countries. The reasons behind this

development were both “the conditions of moderately unequal distribution of resources and incomes” and “considerable political control over domestic and external economic processes, in order to prevent export growth from making society more oligarchic and producing a sort of renter capitalism.” (Senghaas 1985, 93).

Therborn speaks about various historical trajectories of modernity, or different roads to modernity, the European road, modernisation of the New Worlds (the Americas, South as well as North), the Colonial Zone and those of “Externally induced Modernization” (Japan being the most successful example). The concrete historical experiences might include aspects of two or more routes like Russia which “contains features of the fourth road, as well as of Europe” (Therborn 1995, 7).

2.4. What was socialism? The peculiar modernisation of Russia

In the studies on Soviet society, the modernisation school got more support from the 1960s onwards and seemed to explain the development of Soviet society more clearly than the old totalitarianism school (for this discussion see e.g. Almond & Roselle 1993). Soviet society was seen as an example of modernising society which little by little would start to resemble the modern societies of the West more and more closely. A Bulgarian scholar argues that the Bulgarian post-war development can be understood in the framework of modernisation and that as “a by-product of modernization, the ascendant intellectual class exerted pressure for democracy, forcing the communist regime into democratic accommodation” (Vassilev 1999, 598).

Socialism has been “portrayed as perhaps the most extreme manifestation of modernity” although socialism was “oriented not only against the premises of traditional systems of authority but also against the modern institutional systems — political, economic, and ideological — which developed in the first phase of modern European society” (Eisenstadt 1987, 75, 85). Later Eisenstadt has specified that the Soviet and communist societies were “modern or modernizing societies, which, in seeking to catch up with the more developed, selected and totalized the Jacobin ideological and institutional elements of modernity” (Eisenstadt 1992, 33). Therefore the “revolutions” against “the totalitarian regime in Russia need to be seen as rebellions against certain types of modernity which neglected in practice other more pluralistic elements of modernity” and they were “rebellions or protests against a misrepresentation of modernity, a flawed interpretation of modernity” (ibid. 33). In interpreting the Soviet period, an apparent paradox arises: “what

appeared to some as rapid modernization and radical change was interpreted by others as cultural stasis and immobility” (Kandiyoti 1996, 535).

The transformation of the post-socialist societies has given a new impulse to the debates on modernisation and modernity. While others see the socialist period as a project of modernisation, others define it as “a failed revolt against modernity” (Arnason 2000, 61). Therefore it is worth paying attention to the peculiar modernisation of Russia.

Western economic modernisation was delayed in Russia until after the reforms of the 1860s and Russian modernisation “was authoritarian and imperial, creating and preserving the military and bureaucratic complexes” (Jakobson & Pursiainen 2001, 3). However, on the eve of the Great October Revolution Russia was a peripheral country of Europe. It was largely rural and traditional, but in cities the forms of modern societies, market relations and capitalism were developing. Russia was a part of European societies and before 1917 its development followed to a great extent the development of other peripheral countries of Europe. However, the problems of modernisation led to Bolshevism, which was “a social reaction against too rapid and uncontrolled economic modernisation” (Jakobson & Pursiainen 2001, 5).

On the other hand it is true that the project of the Bolsheviks was to modernise the country. In the words of Touraine (1995, 312), “Communism was the most ambitious and most destructive form of the revolutionary modernizing State”. The programme of the Bolsheviks was modern, even ultra-modern. Their aim was “to realise industrialisation, democratisation and modernisation better and faster than any other society” (Melin 1996, 39).

The rural areas and values linked to it were seen as backward and so even agriculture had to be industrialised (Susiluoto 1996, 46), but on the other hand the active hostility “of large segments of the population to the Bolsheviks and their program, undoubtedly heightened allegiance to old values and ways of life” (Inkeles 1968, 17). Indeed, the Soviet system was effective in destroying open manifestations of traditional lifestyle and culture, or at least some of them (such as open forms of religious behaviour, see e.g. Hakamies 2000).

The revolution also put an end to the Westernization development which had started at the end of the 19th century. The links with the Western world were broken and Marxism-Leninism took the place of the Orthodox Church as a state ideology (Gerner, Hedlund & Sundström 1995, 115).

The realisation of this modernisation project encountered several difficulties, which have been described as “the deformation of the Bolshevik project.” The realisation of the project led to unintentional consequences,

which created a special tension between the what the Bolsheviks held sacred and reality. According to Kivinen (2002, 183-184) the sacred aims of the Bolsheviks were science, progress, the development of the forces of production, city, proletariat and party, but in the reality the following negative or problematic shadows, taboos, developed instead of these aims: demonisation of reality, chaos, consumption, peasant way of life, *nomenklatura* and the new middle-class and NKVD.¹

When applied to the press, the sacred aim of the Bolsheviks was agitation, the dissemination of information and publishing of all opinions as opposed the capitalist profit-making media with limited access for the public, but the result was a ritualistic and formalistic journalism.

At the end of the 1960s the Soviet Union was a highly industrialised and urbanised society. Modernisation theorists like Inkeles pointed out that the society in fact had many of the features of a modern society. The Soviet individuals had elements, like increasing independence from traditional figures, strong interest and active participation in local politics, striving to keep up with news, openness to new experience, belief in the efficacy of science and medicine and avoidance of passivism and fatalism, which Inkeles (1976, 53-55; 1983, 300-302) recognised as modern. Similarly, some others argued that “by many of the multivariate measures of modernisation (GNP, per capita and disposable incomes, level and type of industrialisation, level of urbanisation, education and literacy rates, health care, ownership of consumer products, newspaper readership, doctors per person etc.) Soviet society by the early 1980s was a modernised one” (Hughes 2000, see also Lewin 1988, Lane 1992).

In the sphere of mass media this meant that “the modern man strives energetically to keep up with the news, and with this framework prefers news of national and international import to items dealing with sport, religion, or purely local affairs” and the Soviet Union was modern since “news and information concerning the process of national development and, to a lesser extent, news of foreign affairs have been the almost exclusive ingredients of Soviet mass media” (Inkeles 1976, 54).

The supporters of the modernisation paradigm paid attention mainly to the surface of Soviet society and interpreted the forms of Soviet society as signs of modernisation (like Inkeles 1983, 300-302, see also Rose 2001, 295) although in practice many of these were rituals which had only a slight effect on the daily lives of the people, or the traditional figures were replaced by new figures but the attitude towards them had not changed. Ritualistic

1 Russian acronym for People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (political police).

participation even eroded the modern features, e.g. the “voluntary” Saturday work (*subbotniks*) turned into carnivals (Kivinen 2002, 232).

According to the criticism originating from the supporters of totalitarianism theory the danger of modernisation theory was the neglect of the critical importance of “dictatorship” and the central power and that attention was paid to less important traits (Odom 1976, 545-546). Also according to later criticism by Malia (1994, 15) the Soviet Union was neither a developed nor a modern society. It was, rather, “a phenomenon qualitatively different from all other forms of despotism in this or in previous centuries.”

After the collapse of Soviet society, the discussion around totalitarianism, modernity and Soviet society gained new momentum and some kind of synthesis may have been forming. The recent views on the modern features of Soviet society are far more critical, but the supporters of the totalitarianism model have likewise gained no more ground.

Of the four Weberian conditions of modern society Soviet socialism obviously fulfilled the first one, the society was industrialised. Second, the state apparatus was certainly ‘bureaucratic’ but it was far from the Weberian sense of rational bureaucracy “its activity was not based on rational and abstract principles that would have been applied uniformly throughout the vast administrative apparatus” (Pirainen 1997, 17). The third condition for modernity, a developed civil society, was not met either and the fourth, the creation of an autonomous individual, was problematic too:

the integration of the Soviet society was based (...) to a large degree on the cohesive power of local and particular setting, on the *Gemeinschaft*. (...) The solidarities that developed in this particularized society were, in the first place, personal solidarities towards the members of primary group or a social network, and not abstract solidarities towards the social order in general. (Pirainen 1997, 18).

Soviet modernisation paid attention to industrialisation and technological progress and rejected other features of modernisation like the development of pluralist political culture, civil society and market. Market was replaced with political directions and control mechanisms (Blom, Melin & Nikula 1996, 9). Melin has called Russia another kind of modernity. Real socialism was one variant of an industrial society and according to a rough statistical picture rather similar to capitalism (Melin 1996, 45).

Despite the similarities on a rough statistical or material level, there were differences which made the Soviet society even more different. A large part of society could resist the modernising efforts of the state by developing the social networks which on the one hand were a prime necessity to the function of the system and on the other “the particular goals of this activity were thus

to a large extent contrary to the universal goals set in the official society” (Piiirainen 1997, 19).

On the surface Soviet society was modernised but in the private sphere, which was divorced from the public world, the traditional practices survived. This was perhaps even more visible in the peripheries of the Soviet state (e.g. Central Asia), where Soviet practices, e.g. collectivisation, “restored to its former strength the local community which had been weakened by colonial rule” of the Russian empire (Kandiyoti 1996, 537).

Some authors, mainly Eastern Europeans themselves, pointed out already in the 1980s and even before that Soviet society was something other than a well-developed modern society. This discussion increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union and it gained momentum from the difficulties in transition to a market economy especially in Russia and other core states of the Soviet bloc.

Among the first in this tradition were Hungarian scholars who called the Eastern European economies ‘dictatorships over needs’ (Fehér, Heller and Márkus 1983) or shortage economies (Kornai 1980). According to them, the Eastern European societies combined “economic dynamism with social conservatism, preserving, especially in everyday life and intercourse, many features of even a pre-capitalist past” and have therefore been described as pseudo-modern society. It was “a type of modern society, even if specifically apt to conserve many features that are in the historical sense traditional, i.e. even if it has a tendency to restrict the phenomena of modernization to definite spheres, especially that of economy” (Fehér, Heller and Márkus 1983, 42-43).

Hankiss defined the crises of the socialist system, which became visible from 1978 on, as both power and social crises. Power crisis refers to the gradual loss of political power and control over society by the ruling élite. In information policy and the public sphere the process of liberalisation and the increasing autonomy of various social actors limited, though not substantially the power of the élite.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the ruling élite had a more or less unchallenged power to determine the issues, which might be publicly discussed and might become parts of the public consciousness. In the 1970s and early 1980s they already had serious difficulties in this field. (Hankiss 1990, 115).

In the conditions of the second society a second system of communication and second public sphere were developing. It was this system of communication,

where genuine news circulated; where rumours and gossip were exchanged; where the infinitesimal information content of manipulated news was decoded; where the government's and party's policies were discussed and analysed; where (...) 'horizontal voice' was generated as opposed to the official 'vertical' voice. (Hankiss 1990, 95).

The social crises became evident mainly as a crisis of social values. The traditional value-system was destroyed, or at least its value-generation institutions (churches, communities, associations, social-movements) were dismantled and paralysed, but "the new regime was unable to build up a consistent and workable new value system; it was unable to resolve the inner contradictions of its value priorities or to bridge the gap between its principles (or rhetoric) and its everyday practice" (Hankiss 1990, 122). Although in the Soviet Union this process was certainly slower and it did not become visible before the starting of *perestroika*, the crisis development was going on even there.

The regime "was hampered by its rigid ideology, which became with the progress of time more and more conservative; it became less and less capable of self-renewal and of adopting itself and its values to a changing world" (ibid.).

In the West, too, the ideas of the contradictory nature of the Soviet modernisation were raised already in the 1970s. It was, for example, suggested that the Marxist system of values had found very little response in Poland, or in other words that "the 'Communist system' had a significant negative impact on modernizing attitudes" (Montias 1972, 424, based on *Preconditions for Success in Life in Poland and West Germany*, 1971). Inkeles (1976, 57) also pointed out that "issues relating to individual modernity may be a major problem for the system". However, methodological problems and difficulties in conducting surveys in socialist countries did not favour the development of this line of research.

Later, Berman writing about modernism in St. Petersburg, stated that

Petersburg traditions are modern in an unbalanced, bizarre way, springing from the imbalance and unreality of the Petrine scheme of modernization itself. In response to more than century of brutal but abortive modernization from above, Petersburg will engender and nourish, through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, a marvelous array of experiments in modernization from below. (Berman 1982, 285).

After the collapse of the Soviet system, this discussion got more attention. Srubar asked in his widely cited article of 1991 if real socialism was a modern society and came to the conclusion that real socialism was "system of mutually

beneficial personal networks, comparable to the nature of social relations in premodern societies, operated under the surface of a seemingly modern real socialist society.” (Srubar 1991, English translation by Lonkila 1999, 44). These redistribution networks were both necessary for the functioning of the socialist economy and

they also directed citizens’ attention from the dangerous sphere of politics to consumption. For these reasons they were tacitly accepted by the authorities. The long-term effects were, however, disastrous from the point of view of general social solidarity. The real socialist society was split up in the ‘archipelago of networks’, whose members were primarily loyal to their fellow network members and not to outsiders (Srubar 1991, cit. Lonkila 1999, 44).

Srubar’s fundamental question concerns the modern nature of real socialism. In his opinion many features of socialist countries — such as the increase in industrial production, the growth of white collar professions and a relative homogenization of income levels — entitles them to be described as modern though lagging behind western development. However, in terms of normative models for action orientation real socialism lacked both the achievement motivation mediated through money as well as the calculability of individual actions created through positive law. These two basic blocks of social integration of the western modern countries were replaced in socialism by ‘premodern’ network integration mechanism. (Srubar 1991, 428, English translation according to Lonkila 1999, 4).

Ledeneva has also pointed out the personalisation of the bureaucratic system which was, according to her, “related both to Russian culture and to Soviet-type conditions” and networks which were “quite fundamental to the day-to-day working of the Soviet social and economic order” (Ledeneva 1998, 83, 103). Both Srubar and Ledeneva emphasise the distinct, personalised nature of the ‘real socialist’ (Srubar) or ‘Soviet socialist’ (Ledeneva) type of social system, pointing out in particular the importance of informal exchange networks.

Other authors also paid attention to the privatisation and its effects on the society. According to Sztompka “the most fundamental and lasting cultural code organizing thought and action in the conditions of real socialism is the opposition between two spheres of life: private (personal) and public (official)”. The private sphere is the domain of the good — of virtue, dignity, pride; the public sphere is the domain of bad — of vice, disdain, shame.

Power centres are perceived as alien and hostile; the government is seen as the arena of conspiracy, deceit, cynicism, or at least stupidity and inefficiency. ‘Beating the system’, outwitting the authorities, evading public regulations,

rules, laws is a widely-recognized virtue, and successful rogues evoke admiration mixed with envy. Excessive egoism, attempts to appropriate common goods, 'grab-it-and-run' tactics to safeguard personal well-being are condoned, or at least excused. The state is held responsible for providing welfare and security, and blamed for all personal failures. On the other hand, private connections, networks, loyalties — in the workplace, among friends, at home — are overestimated and idealized. (Sztompka 1995, 244).

Shlapentokh (1989, 227) interpreted privatisation as “the combination of two processes: one which is connected with the radical decline in the authority of the state in Soviet society, the other with the creation of civil society based on the private activity of the Soviet people.”

One example of such activities was the esperantists, whose activity was not clearly prohibited although it was not promoted either and they could even organise a summer camp despite the official prohibition by the local authorities (see Bronstein 1992). The question of the existence or non-existence of civil society in the Soviet Union could be solved by stating that there was a civil society which was not autonomous from the state but separate from the state and that it could not in any constructive way influence the state.

The people, however, were far from questioning the fundamentals of the Soviet system but managed to adjust to the state by developing a mythological level in their thinking, which accepted most official dogmas and at the same time no way affected their material behaviour. Only at the end of the 1980s *glasnost* “destroyed this subtle balance between mythology and behavior, forcing people to reconsider many of their general views on the nature of their society” (Shlapentokh 1989, 229).

In information flow, the role of networks was also essential: the consumer's main worry generally was not how to get money to buy products. Instead, the main problems were, first, how to find information about the availability of goods, and second, how to gain access to them. Both problems, as well as numerous other daily problems, were solved with the help of one's social network. (Srubar, 1991, ref. Lonkila 1997).

Other kinds of information were also transmitted through networks. According to a study on public opinion and sources of information in the city of Taganrog in 1968-1970 it was found out that the official mass media were the most important source of information on general issues (economic reforms in the country, events and problems in the city in general), but when the issue was e.g. the increase in industrial production compared with the pre-war years or the number of citizens living in unsatisfactory apartments, the most important sources were personal experience and contacts. In issues

like the economic reforms in the city and the criminality in the city mass media, personal experience and contacts were equally important sources of information. (Massovaya informatsiya...1980, 352). The administrative system tried to control the information and channel it but it could not prevent rumours and leaks from becoming an important source of information. Access to information with special news bulletins also became one of the important privileges (Lendvai 1981, 129).

Several Russian scholars have also discussed on the modernisation of Russia in the 1990s and this discussion has, to a large extent, taken the place of historical materialism as a framework for explaining the historical development (Pursiainen 1998, 69). Russian scholars have defined Russian modernisation as “delayed” (*zapazdyvayushchaya*) (Aliezer in *Rossiiskaya modernizatsiya* 1993 and Popova & Kunyavskii 1997), “catching-up” (*dogonyayushchaya*) (e.g. Korovitsyna 2000), recidivist (e.g. Naumova 1999), conservative (Vyshnevskii 1998) or near-modernisation (*okolo modernizatsiya*) (Miletskii 1997, 15). Russia has also been described as a collapsing traditional society (Achkasov 2001).

Krasilshchikov (1993, 42) argues that capitalism is inseparable from modernisation, understood as “a process of transition to industrial society with developed market relations, political democracy, division of power etc.” According to him the modernisation in the countries of the second ‘echelon’ of capitalist development (Japan, Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, including Russia) was not caused by internal factors alone but also by influence from the centre, resulting a non-organic (catching-up) modernisation, in which some parts of society developed further while others lagged behind (*ibid.* 46).

The nature of Soviet society has been defined as “state monopolist feudalism” (Voslensky 1990, 660), “a peculiar hybrid of state monopolist capitalism and late feudalism” (Zaslavskaya 1993, 3) or “the degenerated state of the working class or bureaucratic state capitalism” (Butenko 1994, 96). According to Turuntsev “the definition of real socialism as a feudal society may be regarded as a simplification” but the definition of it as “state monopolist (or bureaucratic) capitalism may, by contrast, be regarded as justified” (Turuntsev 1995, 7).

Several cycles, ‘Petersburgian’, socialist and post-socialist, of modernisation has been defined. All of them have included elements of

1 Miletskii has borrowed this concept from Alain Touraine who has used it in a meaning of modernisation which includes the conservation of national elements and excludes obtrusion of western standards and Westernisation (Miletskii 1997, 15; see also Touraine 1995).

catching-up modernisation but also “elements of counter-modernisation and recidivist modernisation, and even modernisation without modernity (*modernizatsiya v obkhod moderniti*)¹” (Miletskii 1997, 118). Historically, a thrust toward modernisation has always been followed by a return to traditionalism (Iadov 2001, 77).

Other scholars see more continuity than different cycles. The Russian model of modernisation, starting from the reforms of Peter the Great, and preserved even in the Soviet period, was realised in narrow form, it contained many contradictions and anomalies (Khoros in *Rossiiskaya modernizatsiya* 1993, 15). Krasilshchikov (1999a 101-103) also supports the idea of the imperial model of modernisation, which started on the initiative of the imperial elite and continued in the Soviet period as well. As under the tsars, in Soviet society the subject of modernisation was the government.

Vyshnevskii summarises the results of conservative modernisation in Russia: economic modernisation changed the country from agrarian to industrial but did not create the social mechanisms needed for the development of this system, private property and market. Urban modernisation moved millions from the rural areas to the cities, but did not create carriers of specifically urban relations. Demographic modernisation changes the conditions for the reproduction of the people, but did not develop the freedom of individual choice for everything which is related to the private life of a person. Cultural modernisation provided an increase in education etc., but “gave birth to *Homo soveticus* — an intermediate type of personality which combined the elements of modernity and traditional collectivism (*sobornost*)” (Vyshnevskii 1998, 418).

The Soviet system was capable of producing social practices which looked modern, but inside these practices many premodern traits were preserved, for example the official declarations of the equality of both genders, the equality was not realised in everyday life and despite the large number of women in councils, their number remained small in those structures which had real power (Blom, Melin & Nikula 1996, 19). Similarly, the official planning mechanism looked modern, but in reality it was a command economy which had various degrees of independence and spontaneity. In this economy the market-oriented consumer was replaced by a networker who acquired and changed goods and services through personal contacts.

Communism in Eastern Europe “was never a complete, alternative version of modernity, but rather *sui generis* that was partially modern by incorporating some values of modernity at the same time as it was out-of-line with others.” It had many modern values but few modern forms. In this sense it represented

“only an imperfect, partial, and in many ways distorted and caricatured form of modernity” (Holmes 1993, 34, 41).

The result of modernisation ‘from above’ “could in many respects be regarded as a pseudo-modernization. (...) a peculiar co-existence of modern and archaic social forms and institutions, a lip service to the modern forms while the essence of social practices remained traditional (Piirainen 1997, 14). Communist states have been called an epitome of modernity: they were the quintessential modern formation, but at the same time “they were distinctly unmodern in some of the key factors of political organisation” (Holmes 1993, 31).

Sztompka calls this phenomenon ‘a fake modernity’ which is

the incoherent, disharmonious, internally contradictory combination of three components: (a) imposed modernity in some domains of social life (industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, technological advancement, educational progress etc.), (b) the vestiges of traditional, premodern society preserved in other domains (paternalism in politics, barter economy, nepotism, ascriptive and particularistic principles of status etc.), (c) the cultural effects of real socialism, blocking the way to modernity, and incapacitating the system from within, up to its ultimate destruction (Sztompka 1993a, 88).

Still another indicator of fake modernity was that the system could be criticised from antimodern points of view (e.g. in the name of the preservation of the national heritage), while the criticism of real socialism from a modernist position on the name of efficacy of the administration and economy, the rule of law, human rights and freedom of expression was possible only in the publications of the so-called dissidents (Lagerspetz 1998, 48).

Moreover, Soviet society has been defined even as an anti-modern society¹. It shared two attributes with modern Western societies: it was complex and, up to a point, effective. In other respects it was anti-modern. Neither votes nor prices were used to determine what people wanted, the system was not transparent, but translucent or opaque, the rule of law had limited practical utility, the bureaucratic system was not predictable and the output of the system was inefficient (Rose 2001, 294-295).

The post-Soviet discussion on the essence of Soviet society and the reasons for its collapse (and if the collapse could have been foreseen) has offered new impetus for modernisation theory (and its variation which is seeking to demonstrate the superiority of the West) and it has also been interpreted as the rehabilitation of totalitarianism. The situation has also highlighted the importance of comparative analysis (Burawoy 1995, 97).

¹ Krasilshchikov (1999, 102) has also spoken about antimodernisation in contemporary Russia.

Some authors see important parallels and symmetries in capitalist democracies and the state socialist societies, e.g. in the system-specific pathologies of their respective political public arenas:

In capitalist democracies you can say what you want, but nobody really listens and the political public domain is fragmented into innumerable different groupings round particular issues or forms of communication. The main problem is attracting attention for communications. In the former Comecon countries you were by no means able to say what you wanted, but this very fact meant that people certainly pricked up their ears (...) in a particular way. The art of carefully 'reading between the lines' of the official communiqués was pronounced in the state socialist societies. (Offe 1996, 5).

The great and perhaps historically decisive advantage of capitalism was that "it desists from making moral claims. Capitalism is a play that is successful even if the most of the roles are those of rogues" (ibid. 5).

In communication research, for example, similar views were offered by Sparks and Downing, who point out that "the difference between the media-power structure relation in authoritarian regimes and contemporary liberal democratic regimes is not of the order of night and day, (...) but rather night and twilight" (Downing 1996, xiii) or that "in both the communist and the capitalist versions, the media were and are run by people very remote from the lives of the masses, and over whom the masses have no control whatsoever" (Sparks 2000, 47).

It is also true that the competing modernisation and totalitarianism schools were perhaps not as widely different as the discussion of the 1970s might indicate. Both of them have serious shortcomings and were not free from political bias, but even those (mainly from the modernisation school) who tried "to analyse the USSR in as 'non-judgemental' a fashion as possible" failed because this "distracted them from the glaring inefficiencies of the Soviet system" (Rutland 1998, 38).

Nikula even described totalitarianism theory as a variant of modernisation theory, "where the central interest is to look after the development of central social institutions, their effects on society and explanations for their development: in the authoritarian state-theory the 'primus motor' of social development or change is ideology, in the modernization theory it is technology" (1997, 138).

Totalitarianism theory and one of its strands, the theory of civil society, has been accused of being self-contradictory, since from the beginning it sees the socialist societies before 1989 as extremely strong, when they suddenly collapsed under the pressure of social protests (Nikula 1997, 139).

Another view than that of totalitarianism school has been offered by a Polish scholar:

The Soviet state, far from being “total,” was incomplete, its structures having neither autonomy nor distinctiveness. As for the party, although its apparatus simulated certain traits of a stringent bureaucracy, it could hardly perform its typical integrative role, lacking as it did the bureaucratic ethos and reliability. Thus, the state’s weakness, rather than its omnipotence, stalled communist projects of modernization and, most notably, Gorbachev’s perestroika. Gorbachev’s failure only sealed a more general failure of communist regimes — *their inability to build a modern state*. (Suraska 1998, 133-134).

Soviet society was perhaps even more resistant to outside pressures than the totalitarianism theory expected, but, because of its inside plurality and civil activity, less resistant to reforms from inside. It seems clear that contradictions and the increasing ineffectiveness of Soviet modernisation were major factors behind the setting up of the policy of perestroika by Gorbachev (Hughes 2000, 23).

It is striking that the reformers of the Gorbachev era also called the Soviet system totalitarian and believed it was so. According to Bergman it prevented them from exploring the weaknesses of the system. Reformers believed that as the masters of totalitarian society, they had more or less total power and therefore their efforts could not fail:

by speculating that the Soviet system, which they considered totalitarian, could peacefully transform itself into something less malevolent, the reformers made it harder for themselves to comprehend what the dissidents seemed to understand intuitively: that once a regime like the Soviet Union begins to doubt itself, and to tamper with the ideology it uses to justify its monopoly of power, it runs the risk of destroying its very legitimacy... (Bergman 1998, 271).

The peaceful change of the system was a surprise to most Western scholars, but so was the development afterwards. The result seems not to be rapid transition to Western models but a development which both continues some elements of the Soviet legacy and seems to be beginning again from some earlier point of Western development. Therefore, it worth paying attention to the question of what comes next in the new Russia.

2.5. Post-Soviet Russia: continuity or new beginning

The Soviet system collapsed, if the explanation provided by modernisation theory is accepted (although not foreseen by most of its supporters), because

the centralised and authoritarian system was simply dysfunctional with regard to the requirements of an urban, educated and differentiated society. Forced modernisation may have been appropriate for the great leap of industrialisation, but not for the challenges of late modernity. It contained some inherent contradictions that limited its effectiveness. Moreover, it has been argued that the logic of modernisation itself should lead to the formation of civil society. With increasing complexity socialist development moved into a fundamental system crisis. (For the development of these ideas see White 2000, 261; Lantzov 1997, 21; Senghaas 1985, 200; Korovitsyna 2000, 120; Jakobson & Pursiainen 2001; Krasilshchikov 1999b).

This explanation, however, also raises many questions: the result of transition was not “kinds of competitive politics that were thought to be appropriate to a more complex and differentiated society” (White 2000, 261). However, this question can be answered with the idea of “fake modernity”: the society was not as modern as it appeared on the surface and the result was therefore also a partial return to the past, to a more traditional social system.

The fall of communism has offered evidence of the exhaustion of modernity, “grounded in a view that the Soviet system was the epitome of modernity. An alternative approach regards post-communism as opening new terrains of struggle *for* modernity. (...) This alternative view implies that Soviet systems were something other than ‘modern’” (Ray 1997, 543). Indeed, in core regions (including Russia) of post-socialism “socio-economic developments (...) run directly counter to the postmodernization thesis (...): elite has remained relatively entrenched, especially in the economy; plural democratization is uncertain and dogged by frequent, polarized conflicts among juridical, representative and executive branches of the state.” (Ray 1997, 551).

Stojanov has also defined the post-socialist development as a unique (re-)modernisation, which differs from modernisation elsewhere, because “the object of post-socialist transformation has already undergone one upheaval” and therefore “the process of its reform will differ in quality from the change of traditional societies” (Stojanov 1992, 212).

On the other hand, there are scholars who do not see the post-communist development of Russia in such an optimistic light. Müller argues that Russia and other Soviet-type societies “are not faced with the beginning of ‘modernisation thrust’. Rather, they are confronted with the collapse of a modernisation model conceived as an alternative to Western capitalism” (Müller 1992, 144). Yadov doubts that categories such as “modernization, the transitional period, and transitional society clearly do not express the essence of changes taking place in Russia, simply because the historical

vector of these changes is not a historical given; it is not predetermined” (Iadov 2001, 75).

Some have seen the new stage of development simply as “Westernization”. For example, Rukavishnikov finds that

in its political dimension Russian postcommunist modernization is Westernization steered by the elite, implemented in the interests of the elite, and, unfortunately, resembling to a considerable degree the modernization of Latin American states (Rukavishnikov 1996, 47).

Besides Latin America, the recent development in China may also offer some interesting parallels with Russia. In China the post-Communist modernisation started in the late 1970s, earlier than in Russia, in which it was only in the fairly late 1980s when concrete changes in the system took place. In practice, the transition towards new ownership structures and market conditions occurred much faster in China and, in the first place, from below, while in Russia both democratisation and privatisation were undertaken within a top-down model. Therefore “the underdeveloped character of Russian democracy presents the major obstacle to true Russian modernisation and integration to the European mainstream” (Jakobson & Pursiainen 2001, 31).

The discussion on the essence and collapse of the Soviet Union has been followed by the discussion on the nature of the processes which have followed the collapse. Less optimistic prognoses and discussion have followed the first supporters of a rapid transition to market economy and political democracy on the limits of transition.

If the recent and coming development of Russian society is called ‘transition’, some limitations should be taken into consideration: the Russian development is not and may well in the future not be a move from one well-defined model to another well-defined model but rather a process the outcome of which is not known and which may result in a new kind of social reality which differs significantly from the social systems of the West.

There was no similar turning point in Russia as was the case with the Eastern European countries. Many of the decisive changes had taken place already during the last few years of Soviet rule, and there have been strong elements of continuity, especially at the regional level (up to 80% of the local functionaries were the same as in the Soviet period). Many of those members of the elite who did not remain in power moved to private business and, indeed, the nature of Russian transition was

precisely that it allowed an elite whose position depended on their control of office, but who were now obliged to seek the support of an unpredictable

electorate, to 'convert' their political influence into the more enduring form of advantage that was provided by private property. (White 2000, 268).

Rose has even questioned the whole process of transition (or transformation) because Russia seems "have been going nowhere or altering only very slowly" (Rose 2001, 294). Also, according to Elo, there is no need for special transition studies, since "the old research tools seem quite sufficient for explaining the developments and for analysing possible outcomes" (Elo 2001, 208).

Therefore it would be better to speak about transformation than transition. Usually, transition has been used to refer to the change from an authoritarian system to a democratic system and therefore the term 'transition' implies that the essence of the new system is known. Transformation is a process the result of which is not necessarily known: it may be a democratic system, it may lead to a return to the old system or it may result in a new kind of system (Elo 2001, 208-212).

According to some analysts the transition has already ended and resulted in a relatively stable social system, which is not what was aimed at, nor the model which Russia will have in the future, but a system it will have in the near future (Sutela 1998, 292).

A problem with a strict understanding of transition is that it seems to exclude possible alternatives or if there are any alternatives these are without questioning defined as inferior, outdated or return to the (Soviet) past. The policy advice based on this kind of understanding of reality has led to policies based more on theoretical concepts than reality and has caused disastrous results for the majority of the population (Kapustin 2001, 16).

Offe has distinguished three basic theoretical approaches to the investigation of post-socialist transitional processes: theory of modernisation, genesis environment and path dependency. Theory of modernisation emphasis the similarity of development in various countries, while genesis environment approach "describes the situation in post-Communist countries as a state of perfect destructuration comparable to the situation when 'the earth was deserted and empty'" (Offe 1996, 137-138). The third, median position, emphasises not only similarities but also differences between countries: "This leads us to expect a constrained plurality of nationally specific transitional paths taken" determined by the economic, political and cultural created in individual countries over the last five hundred years (ibid. 138).

Kirkow, on the other hand, has defined two different theoretical explanations of the post-Soviet development: modernisation and postmodernist theories. First,

modernisation theories interpret the contemporary changes in post-communist countries as a new shift of modernisation, but this time, in contrast to the Soviet period, not in terms of the intention to develop higher productive forces and to 'catch-up' and to 'overtake' Western material rationality, but to modernise in terms of procedural rationality by introducing Western concepts of market and democracy as more complex and efficient modes of regulating human interaction. (Kirkow 1998, 8).

According to modernists, the profound essence of change "is the functional differentiation between politics and economics toward autonomous, self-regulating spheres." On the other hand, postmodernist theories, including the path dependency approach in Offe's listing, "accept the notion of functional differentiation but they also stress functional coordination, networks and synthesis." The question is about "complex reconfiguration of institutional elements rather than their immediate replacement", and the moves in new directions are constrained by the existing set of institutional resources. (Kirkow 1998, 9).

The post-Soviet development is clearly "a case of an epoch-making, historical change of great magnitude and complexity", and therefore it would be "well advised to refer to the theory of social change". All the approaches of the classical authors, Spencer, Marx, Morgan, Tönnies, Durkheim, and Weber,

are valid insofar as they grasp fragments of the overall transformation from traditional, pre-industrial to modern industrial society and they may also prove relevant to the current case of transformation from the 'fake modernity' of real socialism to the 'authentic modernity' of the developed democracy (Sztompka 1995, 237).

Sztompka has pointed out a specific cultural-civilizational approach, which refers to habits, symbols, frameworks, rituals and routines:

that what we are witnessing in the countries of Eastern-Central Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of communism is not merely the second birth of capitalist economy; nor is it merely the reconstruction of democratic polity; nor is it merely the restitution of some earlier social order - a 'return' to Europe, to the West, to 'normality', or whatever. Rather, it is the construction of a new social order out of a curious mixture of components of various historical origins. It involves the transformation of the most fundamental, deepest cultural-civilizational fabric. (Sztompka 1995, 238)

Sztompka has pointed out that besides grand theories some middle-range theories like the theory of globalisation and an older anthropological theory of cultural diffusion. "Economic interdependencies, political unification,

the cultural uniformization of the world are crucial factors in understanding the chances of transition, as well as the barriers against it" (Sztompka 1995, 245).

The post-Soviet development has also diminished the theoretical antagonisms in relation to the Soviet Union and Soviet society and increased the possibilities for a kind of synthesis. This could be based on modernisation theory with modification that the Russian "modernisation process was biased and did not lead to a society of truly modern individuals" (Hakamies 2001, 288-289) or even if modernity was strangely incomplete, missing some of its crucial political and economic components, the changes dubbed as modernisation produced fundamental shifts in people's values and behaviours "making them more 'modern' and therefore more open to democratic and market reforms" (Reisinger et al. 1994, 200-201, cited according to Sztompka 1996, 121).

Post-socialism can be seen as a new beginning for modernisation development or as a return to the traditional values and to the development which was under way before Soviet modernisation began. The rapid collapse of many Soviet practices and a more permanently on-going collapse of Soviet values have given place for traditional values, which were suppressed during the period of Soviet power. On the other hand the development of market relations has given new pace to modernisation but modernisation will come about in conditions which are in many respects different from those under which Western modernisation occurred.

Moreover, the collapse of economy has hindered the development of market relations and forced many people back to traditional exchange economy and self-sustainability which e.g. does not provide a good basis for the development of modern interest groups (e.g. trade unions). Moreover, the changes in Russian society since 1985 have had a forced nature and public opinion surveys indicate "a forced adaptation to change" (Levada 2000, 53).

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet system Russia is integrating with the world system but in a form of new periphery. Post-communist democracy is as 'undeveloped' and as 'backward' as is the local form of capitalism. Peripheral capitalism differs from the capitalism of the centre:

For the peripheric capitalism the preservation of the traditional connections is vitally important because they protect the workers from the market shock and the entrepreneurs from the frontal clash with the workers. On the other hand, these traditional corporative, patriarchal and corrupted structures are definitely an obstacle to the formation of a more dynamic class of entrepreneurs and block modernisation even in that sense, in which it is necessary for the international financial capital. The society is in *cul-de-sac* (Kagarlitskii 2000, 41-42)

As the result of the Soviet system “the gap between the periphery and the core has grown” and “the Eastern and Central European societies have landed deeper in the periphery than before” (Sztompka 1993a, 88).

Post-Socialism has also been defined as a return to the former social order, since some of the demands of the 1989/1991 revolutions can be interpreted as protests against modernisation (like those by the environmental movement and the concern for the increasing immigration of Russians to Estonia) (Lagerspetz 1998, 1999a). Therefore it has been stated that “the abandonment of socialism was, in many respects, an anti-modernist revolution”, or at least the participants of this process perceived it so (Lagerspetz 1999a, 380).

Kagarlitskii (2000, 10-11) also speaks about “the restoration in Russia”: Some parts of the older system were destroyed during the first half of the 1990s, but at the end of the 1990s the development reverted to a conservative and more authoritarian model, e.g. the role of the state in economy strengthened. As in Britain and France, the restoration will be followed by a series of renowned (*slavnye*) revolutions.

These two interpretations of post-communist development are not necessarily contradictory, but can be understood in the framework of different types of modernisation: the protests were directed against modernisation from above and they were possible especially because of the traditional contacts and absence of pressures from market forces.

Ray (1997, 556) also proposes that

expectations that the post-communist world will converge with a postmodernized world of stylish consumption cultures and globalized lifestyles are premature. For many in the post-communist world, the goal of transformation is a system with new boundaries between the public and private; differentiation between economy, civil society and the state; with regulated juridical ownership rights. These goals suggest a recapitulation of modernity rather than a leap into the postmodern.

Similarly, Miletskii (1997, 118-119) argues that only in the post-socialist cycle of modernisation “preconditions for carrying out purposeful (*tselenapravlennyi*) and organic modernisation have appeared” in Russia and that this modernisation does not bring the results of alien modernisation into Russia but is based on the indigenous social forms. Zarubina (1995, 50) has also argued for an original (*samobytnyi*) form of modernisation and the search for the forms of combining the cultural heritage and ‘the Russian idea’ with the idea of development.

Although the post-Soviet systems may also “be viewed as on the road to elsewhere” (Ray 1997) they can be analysed with the tools provided by the

modernisation paradigm. There are also scholars who have proposed that the post-Soviet reality might become a new formation not similar to any current or former societies (e.g. Misztal 1996).

However, after the collapse of socialism the question of alternative paths of development has a different sound, since the alternative proposed by the Communists and implemented in the countries of real socialism turned out to be untenable (Rukavishnikov 1996, 53).

Eastern European experience gives evidence that “the transformation process could have a different shape from that suggested by a globally applied theory of institutional modernization”:

the road ahead does not lead dead straight towards “civil society”: it also has many distracting forks and turn-offs, some of which may simply be detours, but other of which can surely prove to be wrong-turnings. (Srubar 1994, 217-218).

In contemporary Russia the establishment of democratic political institutions has preceded economic modernisation and reforms (Ester, Halman & Rukavishnikov 1997, 219). On the other hand the essence of Russian democracy has been questioned: the forms of democracy do not necessarily mean that these forms have been filled with democratic content. A Japanese analysis of the post-Soviet political system has used the concept of “government party regime” as a tool for analysing the post-communist Russian regional powers.

This kind of system is based on

the existence of a population dependent on mass patronage by the state, (2) the existence of political elites dependent on the results of democratic elections, and (3) the support of national elites securing an institutional environment favorable to this type of political regime. (Brie 1997, 64, ref. Matsuzato 2000, 146-147)

This helps us to understand the specific features of Russian politics in comparison with other post-communist countries. Only in Russia have elections become extremely important; the power of meso-governments (regions and districts) has risen, intra-bureaucratic patronage has survived or even strengthened in Russia. (Matsuzato 2000, 147-150). Government-party regime does not necessarily exclude political democracy as the Japanese experience has shown.

Market economy is “a necessary precondition for modernization but not a sufficient precondition. It represents the negative process of destroying the past but not the positive process of building a competitive economy” (Touraine 1995, 203).

Contemporary Russia has a market economy with special features. The important features of the Russian economic system include, first, the lack of outside ownership in enterprises, which is a result of insider privatisation. Insiders “rarely have the capital needed for investment”, and “may also regard the maintenance of jobs and social services as more important than maximising profits”. Second, Russia is a market economy but not a money economy. A large part of production is disposed of by barter. Third, political and economic decision-making are closely linked, and one of the results of it is the inability to draw the line between lawful and unlawful. The fourth peculiarity of Russian market economy is called virtual economy, the gap between objectives set and resources available (Sutela 1998, 292-299). These special features of Russian market economy are likely to lead to low productivity, economic growth and standard of living (Rautava & Sutela 2000, 262).

Economic inequality has become one of the important features of post-Soviet Russia. Some scholars argue that Russia has always been a deeply divided and unequal society, even during the Soviet period “Russian society remained highly stratified in political (access to power), social and ethnic terms. In the last decades of the Soviet rule, this stratification was extended to include the growing income inequality” (Tikhomirov 2000, 323). Others maintain that the Soviet Union appeared to be “a very egalitarian country compared with Western market economies, at least if social equality was measured with such standard measures as income distribution” (Piirainen 1998, 314, see also Melin 1996). It seems that according to some relatively unimportant factors, Soviet society was egalitarian, while according to some other factors it was rather unequal.

It seems universally accepted that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the internal divisions have grown rapidly. Moreover, the weakening of the central power and the increasing independence of the regions has increased the differences between the regions. Russian political life has also been characterised as fragmented and confrontational (Tikhomirov 2000, 294).

Modernisation is closely linked with the development of civil society. In traditional society and in the society of socialist modernisation the traditional links between people were functioning in a place which in modern societies is occupied by various civil organisations. While the society is modernising, the development of civil society becomes more essential and the traditional networks cushion the people against the pressure of the market forces during the transition period.

Civil society is a concept which has been used widely but seldom properly defined, or the distinct meanings of the concept have not been analysed.

Bernard defines civil society in terms of four critical components

- 1) a public space ... located between official public and private life, 2) populated by a range of ... autonomous organisations, 3) separated from the state by law, 4) guaranteeing actors within the public space 'personal and group liberties' enabling them to ... pursue their broadly conceived interests. (Bernard 1993, cited according to Bernard 1996, 309).

Sztompka is one of those who distinguish different meanings or levels of civil society. According to him the first meaning of civil society may be called a sociological concept according to which civil society is "a synonym for community ("*Gemeinschaft*", as opposed to "*Gesellschaft*")", or mezz-structures — the intermediate sphere" between family and nation-state. Second, civil society is an economic concept, which "refers to the autonomous sphere of economic activities and relationships, the 'mode of production' rooted in private ownership, moved by entrepreneurial initiative, pervaded by rational calculation, and aimed at individual profit." Third, civil society is a cultural concept, synonymous with axiological consensus and developed emotional community, bound by the tight network of interpersonal loyalties, commitments, solidarities, and trust. It means mature public opinion and a rich public life" (Sztompka 1996, 122-124).

Among the different definitions, the third, cultural civil society, represents a form which "communist regimes have never succeeded in fully destroying (...) but whatever remained of a civil society was nevertheless pushed underground" (Sztompka 1996, 124).

The existence or non-existence of a civil society in contemporary Russia has been debated by two Finnish scholars one of whom (Pursiainen) argued that there is a civil society in Russia while the other denied the existence of a civil society in Russia (Susiluoto). However, they did not define the concept although it seems that at least part of the dispute was based on different definitions of the concept.

There is general agreement that civil society played a key role in the overthrow of communist regimes in 1989 and there is now a widespread belief that civil society in post-communist countries is weak (Bernard 1996, 309). This is visible even at the level of political and social system:

Post-Soviet societies succeeded a standardised mass society without any relevant subcultures (in terms of classes, ethnic groups and other social groups), a requisite for making a system of group based parties, and as a result the political factions in power have developed into government parties, while the opposition movements can only be activist parties (Matsuzato 2000, 151).

This supports the idea of Kivinen (2002) of the weakness of classes in post-Soviet Russia and also raises a question about the possibilities of civil society. The weakness of classes and also other social groups has made it difficult to form civil organisations based on a social position (trade unions etc.). On the other hand e.g. environmental organisations have been more active because they have been based on concrete issues rather than any subculture. It is also important to note that despite the ethnically-based conflicts the ethnic groups have functioned as a basis for successful political parties only in the Baltic republics and even there the success of ethnic parties has been far from the share of the ethnic groups in question among the voters.¹

Kagarlitskii also takes a rather gloomy view of the development of Russian civil society: in contemporary Russia “irresponsible individualism is combined with authoritarian bureaucratic collectivism” which principally renders the formation of a civil society impossible (Kagarlitskii 2000, 370) although its development is essential for the further development of Russian society.

At the end of the 1990s Russia has been seen to be “very far from a liberal democracy, perhaps even further than in the last few years of the USSR” because the idea that power is divisible has still not sufficiently come into its own. According to Lukin, instead of “one-sided reliance on elections” Russia needs to

develop a legal consciousness, create an effective system of separation of powers, and ensure real guarantees of an independent judiciary. At the same time, state power should be strengthened at all levels, so that the decisions of the executive branch are acknowledged and fully implemented (Lukin 2000, 31).

Rose and Shin (2001, 353) suggest that people who have lived most of their lives “under a regime that is neither a modern state nor democratic”, may “prefer an incomplete democracy, whose infirmities assure a measure of freedom from the state”.

In spite of gloomy views there are also encouraging elements, for example, the values of Russians do not differ from the Western Europeans more than do the differences between individual Western European countries. The readiness for change is in Russia higher than in Western Europe and young Russians especially have rather similar values than Western Europeans of the

1 E.g. compared with the Swedish minority party in Finland which gets 75-80% of the votes of the Swedish-speaking population or with the poor success of non-religion based parties in Northern Ireland.

same age, while the old Russians differ both from young Russians and Western Europeans (Doktorov 1994, 19). The normative consciousness of Russians is situated today not at the beginning but roughly in the middle of the movement toward a modernist system of values, or is already on the second half of this path. (Lapin 1997, 29). On the other hand, studies on behaviour rather than attitudes and opinions have indicated the strong presence of anti-modern practices (Rose 2001).

As a result of post-Soviet changes Russia has, despite all shortcomings and problems, become closer to the other European countries. The transformation development, however, is not at the end but at the beginning, and it would be reasonable to suggest that the future development will be smoother and more predictable than what has occurred during the most recent two decades.

3. Newspaper and journalism in the historical and social context

Several researchers have paid attention recently to analysing the development of newspaper and journalism in their historical and social context. These studies have pointed out several development tendencies and factors behind these tendencies, which are useful also when the development of Russian newspaper and journalism is in focus. All these studies link the development of newspaper and journalism to the development of society and pay attention to the relations between newspaper institutions or the institution of journalism and the other institutions of society.

These studies have shed more light on the development of journalism as a new kind social phenomenon. Besides the traditional history of the press approach, a new look at the development of journalism has been given by American (Schudson, Barnhurst & Nerone), French/British (Jean Chalaby), Swedish (Jan Ekecrantz & Tom Olsson) and Finnish (Risto Kunelius) researchers during the 1990s. All of those approaches pay attention to the development of journalism as a field of its own and study the development of journalism apart from the development of the newspaper press, although recognising the links the development of journalism has with the development of the newspaper itself.

This chapter presents and analyses the approaches of these researchers separately in chronological order (not according to the year of publication but according to the period of time they have mainly analysed). The purpose of this analysis is to point out important features in the development of the press in Western Europe and Northern America and to point out the similarities and regularities of the development in different countries. The analytical concepts used by these researchers will be presented and some key points in the development highlighted. Finally, I present results from the research on journalism in other peripheries (e.g. Latin America, southern Europe and China) and some general approaches to media change and democratisation. The aim is to construct a general basis on which to explore the changes that happened in the Russian press in the 1980s and 1990s.

3.1. Historical development of the press

The traditional history of the development of the press praises the heroic struggle against state control, the key role of an independent Fourth Estate in

maintaining a mature democracy and the transformation of journalists “from venal hacks into socially responsible journalists committed to the ideas of objectivity, accuracy and truth” (Boyce, Curran & Wingate 1978, 17).

From the 1970s this view has been challenged by a substantial amount of recent research, which has pointed out problems with this traditional view and has added a more contextual approach to the history of the press.

In his dissertation Kauko Pietilä (1980) investigates the formation of the newspaper in the framework of historical materialism. He has searched “for the social laws in the formation of the modern press” mainly in continental Europe (Germany in particular) and states that each stage in the development of the form of newspaper was necessary in each stage of the development of the society.

Preliminary forms of newspaper (newsletter, bulletin of prices, news chronicle) were necessary for merchants who needed reliable information on affairs that had commercial importance, such as prices and political changes. Almost all these forms of communication were “made up of news, and particularly and almost exclusively, of news of occurrences in far-away places” (K. Pietilä 1980, 173-179).

The formation of the political newspaper was linked with the development of industrial capitalism, which needed a different form of communication. The successful operation of industrial capital presupposed civil society, in which the social relations were expressed “in the ideological forms of freedom and equality of contract, private ownership, pursuit of self-interest, individual well-being according to own achievement, industriousness, shrewdness etc.” (ibid. 206). Therefore, the earlier forms of mass communication were transformed into “means of social and political organisation of classes” (ibid. 208).

The age of bourgeois political revolutions was an important formative period for the press, the period of the political press. Political press essentially came to represent the interests of a party and a social class and “it does not function impartially for common good, but openly partially” (ibid. 215).

Politics needed the political press to organise itself. The new political press did not appeal to subjects of traditional authority, but to subjects fulfilling the duties of civil society, to citizens, to persons who are owners of commodities, to individual producers who all act by and for themselves. The first form of political newspaper was the general political newspaper which was “a necessary and sufficient form of communication for the articulation of civil society on the level of the general or public interest” (ibid. 288).

At the second stage the general political newspaper was transformed into a particularist-partisan press. However, the political press started to lose its

position soon after its formation. The large-scale industrial production of propaganda was relatively expensive for political parties and “this fact compelled newspapers to orient rather towards the market and effective demand at the expense of propagandist aims” (K. Pietilä 1980, 289-301).

Economic factors drove the party-press towards the capitalist mode of operation. Increased readership promoted advertisement, the revenue from advertisement very soon exceeded the revenue from readers in importance and the newspaper industry was transformed into capital (ibid. 302).

So that the press could have functioned with a maximum efficiency as capital, all the limitations should have been abolished. The bourgeoisie realised this with the slogan of the freedom of the press. The ‘free’ market was a more effective mechanism of control than direct state control: the expansion of the market enormously increased the capital needed to establish the plants and machinery for newspaper publishing. For the rise in costs and reduction in retail price resulted in British national papers “being sold at a net price (...) that was less than the cost of production”. Therefore, the fact that the newspapers “charging competitive prices were financially viable depended crucially upon the distribution of advertising patronage” (Curran 1978, 69). This caused severe difficulties for the alternative press: for example, the increase in the circulation of the left-wing *Daily Herald* at the beginning of the 1920s caused further losses and even doubling the cover price and private donations could not compensate for the chronic lack of advertising (ibid. 70).

The pressure of competition pushes newspapers towards a keener and keener consideration of the needs and wants of the readership. The number of newspapers declines; the publication of newspapers in one locality centralises (leaving only one newspaper for each locality); the circulation and frequency of issuing increases (daily issuing is the ideal minimum); and the new foundation of large papers becomes rare. The nameplate is turned into a neutral and rather insignificant trademark. Architecture has been used to make the paper more attractive and more marketable: the trend seems to be more and more away from the format of a book towards a format relying on a visual and pictorial impact. (K. Pietilä 1980, 328-331).

The result of such a development has been a universal and objective newspaper, which appears in two subdivisions: a universal culinary newspaper and universal analytical newspaper. Culinary newspapers form the bulk of the popular press and analytical newspapers are an unpopular ‘elaborated code’ for the so-called elite (ibid. 358).

In the early years of the universal newspaper the editing of the material is a merely technical operation but in later times “more attention is paid to

giving a preconsidered, balanced and selling form to the product". The text-form of the original universal newspaper was universal-narrative: "a neutral, objective, non-aligned, impartial blend of news and reportage. Competition, however, strongly favours selections of news-items that are made according to commercial criteria" (K. Pietilä 1980, 335-336).

In the era of the universal newspaper, reading has become "completely a matter of individual enjoyment and pleasure, and partly of orientation". Publishers are anonymous capitalists, who "merely have the relation of interest and profit to the newspaper." A universal newspaper makes a strong abstention from parties and partisanship. In it journalism is "a technical profession of publicity production and interaction mediation". Newspaper revenue comes overwhelmingly from advertisement, and the price is relatively low: readers provide only from a third to a fourth of the total revenue. Private owners have retained their importance and the newspaper capitals have intertwined with capitals operating on the other branches of production. (ibid. 339-340).

Pietilä has presented a general picture of the development of the modern newspaper. From the comparative point of view it is worth noting that the process of the development of the newspaper taken on various forms in different societies, but since the market logic is universal, there are universalities in the development of the market-based press.

3.2. Development of the newspaper form

Barnhurst and Nerone have studied the development of the form of news and newspaper in the USA from 1750 to 2000. They divide the development of mainstream newspapers into pre-modern and modern forms and within these categories into several subcategories. These distinctions were based initially on the newspaper form, "the persisting visible structure of the newspaper" and also on the factors behind the form and, to a minor degree, on the content of the newspaper articles themselves. Barnhurst and Nerone pay attention to typography, headings, ornamentation, illustrations, white space and topical segmentation in news.

Barnhurst and Nerone are also aware of the connections between the newspaper form and the society with which the form is linked. Each newspaper formation "combined a look with a system of newspaper production (or type) and a broader cultural configuration" (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 4).

The early newspaper formations included printerly, partisan and Victorian newspapers. The first newspapers were printer's papers. They were characterised by passive newsgathering, austerity and simplicity. "The

printerly newspaper combined a bookish appearance with craft production and the republican values of the American Revolution including a fantasy about the public sphere” (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 4-5).

Much of the content of these newspapers consisted of artefacts (e.g. speeches) without an interpreter: it was the reader’s job, not the newspaper’s to make sense of the world. Newspapers of the early republic (1780-1820) “operated under the master metaphor of the town meeting. Each newspaper supposedly provided a neutral, limpid mechanism for transmitting the information and opinion that its readers would use to govern themselves” (ibid. 49).

In the first half of the 19th century this initial form of newspaper was transformed into an editor’s paper. This period was characterised by partisan activism: “the newspaper was expected to take part in the process of continually generating legitimate authority and to help to sustain a sphere of rational public deliberation” (ibid. 16). The editor replaced the printer as the face and voice of the press, and the verbal duels and partisan materials made the newspaper a venue for an agonistic spectacle: the partisan newspaper formation “embraced the courtroom metaphor as its ideal” (ibid. 60).

In the early Victorian period (1860-1880) “the newspaper shifted away from party news organ toward mass-market commercial product”. This type of newspaper, the publisher’s paper, “was a commercial tool and a marketed good” (ibid. 16). The Victorian papers were characterised by intensive newsgathering, they grew in size (previously having only four pages) and density, advertising had come to occupy a large share of space, and the segmentation of news in the paper became more standardised (ibid. 73-105). The ideal metaphor of the newspaper became the marketplace: “newspapers depicted a world not as subject to the sense-making control of journalists but instead as witness to endless variation and diversity” (ibid. 83). Also the segmentation of the audience was no longer on the basis of political ideas but on the basis of separate categories of consumers. The newspapers aimed for the largest and most compliant readership but “advertisement matter would shepherd news matter into demographically coherent departments aimed at women, youth, sports fans, or businessmen” (ibid. 106).

By the 1880s, the representation of the abundance of the new age clashed with the rationalising spirit of the era of natural science and industrialisation and this led to the development of modernist newspaper forms. A key element in the move toward modernist forms was the development of illustration: photographs took the place of verbal techniques for presenting visual information and news analysis came to dominate the verbal report. Also changes in the practice of news gathering and styles of news presentation

marked the transition to modernism. The role and place of journalists changed as well.

Modern newspapers presumed a more autonomous reporting function, encouraging a stance of objectivity and expertise. Modern reporters, who as professionals, are neither gentlemen nor waged workers, took the task of authoritatively classifying and prioritizing events. (...) In both text and image, the emergent modern newspaper required the effacing of the persona of the journalist, who might have a name (registered in a byline), but who **did not have** a point of view, a set of values, or (usually) a style of writing. The modern journalist and photojournalist became experts, not authors.” (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 19, my emphasis)

Also the need and opportunity to assume professional responsibility could come into existence “only when newspapers could believably claim to present *the* news rather than to represent one view of the news (as was the case in partisan and competitive markets)” (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 22).

During the key years in the rise of modernism (1890-1940) the social position of the newspaper changed: it was no longer exclusively read by white men but started to appear “in the hands of ordinary folks, suggesting the spread of information from authoritative experts to the mass of readers” (ibid. 181).

Barnhurst and Nerone identify three types of newspapers that have existed during the 20th century. The industrial newspaper extended from the 1880s “until the First World War; the professional newspaper reached its height in the 1970s; and the corporate newspaper is still ongoing” (ibid. 20). These types, however, have coexisted for a long period but more newspapers have been moving from older designs into modern ones.

The formation of the professional newspaper was linked with the driving force of the social, industrial, and scientific logics of the modern world. The professional newspaper was a news establishment with elements of monopoly both at the level of content and market and of “the profession of reporting itself, with a unified standard of verifiability and a code of appropriate comportment prescribed for journalism” (ibid. 188).

In the Late Modern phase, the professional newspaper gave way to the corporate, or manager’s newspaper. Corporate managers overruled reporters’ interests when newspaper corporations developed the most elaborate mechanisms with the philosophy of maximising profits and minimising risk. In the corporate system of newspaper production newspapers “train their staff to manufacture a truly modular product in uniform doses at regular intervals” (ibid. 218).

Newspapers became more structured and their appearance more homogenous. Similar front pages, headlines, bylines, and stories “proposed to present an authoritative map of the day’s events. Moreover, the maps presented by different newspapers became strikingly similar” (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 217).

Barnhurst and Nerone have also examined the form of the newspaper in the international setting. Similar dimensions were found:

first, the existence of vernacular forms indigenous among journalists before the arrival of modern style; second, the phases of modern design from the Protomodern to the Late Modern; and third, the vocabulary of visual expression ranging from the most reserved to the most emphatic (ibid. 263).

The change towards modern forms had started “once newspaper conductors began to see vernacular designs as stodgy and conservative” and the result has been some type of modern newspaper design everywhere. However, the varieties of modernism “do not obey the chronology of phases of modernism that marked developments in the United States” but rather “what is called postmodernism is really incomplete modernization under conditions of global capitalism, various modern styles have moved from other countries and other industries to colonize the world’s newspapers. As a result, what was sequential in the United States is synchronic in the world” (ibid. 266). Newspapers also seem to follow national or regional schools of design.

For example, in Spain the transition from the closed society of Franco’s dictatorship meant that its newspapers revitalised in the last quarter of the twentieth century, at the same time as modernism reached its height. In Spain, modernism favoured the tabloid format and the newspapers still have a limited circulation, since they encourage a clash of ideology rather than the bland uniformity needed for mass circulation. In the 1980s, the Spanish newspapers also began to Americanise and the professionalisation of reporting and design in Spain followed the U.S. model (ibid. 278-280, see also Barnhurst et al. 1999).

Barnhurst and Nerone have argued that changes in news forms have occurred dialectically. Each of the forms generated a contradiction which led to a new formation. Similar dialectics have also constituted the phases of advertisement design, which in turn supplied the impulse toward changes in the news. (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 302-303).

The authors have used the concept of voice in order to understand the interaction between forms and publics. The printery newspaper gave voice to gentlemen-readers, the partisan newspaper spoke in the editor’s voice, the publisher’s newspaper “produced a de facto multivocality, with the editor’s

voice chanting alongside the staccato melodies of the marketplace” and this was continued by the industrial newspaper. The professional newspaper challenged multivocality:

The reporter’s soothing monotone overrode every other voice in the news, reducing all other speakers to sound bites and focusing attention on the unvoiced landscape behind everything else. Where voices could not be reduced, they were dumped into ghettos. (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, 303)

In the late modern period, the great public has bifurcated into passive (readers and viewers) and active (newsmakers and opinion leaders) parts and the reporters have aligned with newsmakers. This, however, marks neither an end to monovocality nor a return to multivocality. Rather, journalists “produce a pseudovocality that uses personal-sounding effects to speak from nowhere and everywhere.” (ibid. 304)

The analysis of voices has led Barnhurst and Nerone explore the ideal news form. They argue that multiple voices enhance democracy: “Multivocal forms invite readers to act as citizens in ways that monovocal forms, no matter how much mastery of facts or truth they promise, never can.” (ibid. 304). The historical record does not reveal an ideally multivocal form. The most optimistic of the formations examined, the printerly and the partisan newspapers, were a result of enlightenment and egalitarianism: Thereafter,

each succeeding formation has moved further away from the belief in the power and inherent goodness of the people. With the Late Modern phase, news arrived at its nadir, thoroughly pessimistic in regard to readers, whom it conceived as lacking knowledge, paying little attention to public affairs, and requiring constant visual cajoling (by marketing techniques) to show any response (ibid. 306).

Compared with Pietilä, Barnhurst and Nerone have described the changes in the formation of the newspaper more than the social forces behind these changes. While, compared with Pietilä, the surrounding social reality, as well as the newspaper content itself remain rather referential in Barnhurst and Nerone’s work, they succeed in finding something essential in the development of the newspaper form.

3.3. Discovering the news

Robert E. Park was among the first scholars who paid sociological attention to the development of the newspaper in the United States. He noticed that the history of the press is a history of surviving species. He connected the formation of the modern newspaper with city life; the newspaper was no

longer merely an organ of propaganda and opinion, but a form of popular literature. The press of opinion was aimed largely at business men, the so-called independent press added to its public the so-called artisan class, and the yellow press was created mainly to capture immigrants and women. (Park 1923, 273)

After the formation of news letters, the political press and the independent press, the formation of the yellow press was an important phase: "the newspaper men discovered that circulation could be greatly increased by making literature out of the news." The yellow press grew in the attempt "to write the news in such a way that it would appeal to the fundamental passions. The formula was: love and romance for the women; sport and politics for the men" (Park 1923, 286-287). The methods of yellow journalism were first completely worked out in the Sunday newspapers. Women read the Sunday paper before they read the dailies, and since women were the main buyers in the family, the department store is, in a sense, a creation of the Sunday paper. (ibid. 288)

Park, however, paid attention only to what he called "the natural history of the press" and he saw its development as rather natural, perhaps occurring mainly by trial and error, as a result of more suitable species surviving and others disappearing. As external conditions change, the only thing newspapers can do is to adapt or disappear.

A slightly different kind of approach is presented by Michael Schudson, who investigated the social history of the newspaper and asked, more precisely, why the standard of objectivity is so widespread in (contemporary American) journalism. Schudson argues that the revolution in American journalism was not caused just by technological innovations, rising literacy or natural development and survival of the fittest, but that behind these factors was conscious human activity: "constrained by social circumstances, people make their own history and, even unmake the conditions and conventions that guided them" (Schudson 1978, 42-43).

Schudson defines objectivity as a professional ideology of journalism as "the belief that one can and should separate facts from values". Objectivity is a faith in facts, distrust of values, and a commitment to their segregation. It means "that a person's statements about the world can be trusted if they are submitted to established rules deemed legitimate by a professional community. Facts here are not aspects of the world, but consensually validated statements about it" (Schudson 1978, 5-7).

He has noted that before the 1830s objectivity was not an issue. American newspapers were expected to present a partisan viewpoint, not a neutral one. He argues that there is little evidence for the support of a standard explanation,

that the news agencies created objectivity and that it later became the ideal of journalism in general (ibid. 3-4). Schudson, instead, links the development of modern journalism, which began with the penny press in the 1830s, with the emergence of a democratic market society. This society was characterised by mass democracy, the culture of the market, and modern social order in opposition to traditional community (ibid. 59).

Many of the journalistic practices were rather different than those of modern journalism. E.g. in the 1830s or the 1850s there were occasionally 'hoaxes' — stories of pure fiction presented as news, but 'making news' — promoting and producing events one could then legitimately claim to report as news was still unheard of. The most common and modest form of making news — interviewing a public figure — was a practice which did not make even its first tentative appearance in journalism until the 1860s (Schudson 1978, 66; on interviews see also Schudson 1994).

The reporter was a social invention of the 1880s and 1890s. His rising status was marked and promoted by a steadily rising income. Reporting was becoming a more reliable sort of employment and free-lance reporters working 'on space' rather than a monthly salary became extinct in the large New York newspapers by the end of the 19th century. The collegiality of reporters increased and they shared common ideas about how to conduct their work. The competing newspapers tried to be lively, colourful and entertaining on the one hand and factual on the other. (Schudson 1978, 69-71) Towards the end of the 19th century there was a growing emphasis on getting the facts, but the relationship to the facts was still that of empiricism (ibid. 77).

Also the relationship between newspapers and advertisers changed dramatically in the 1880s. The rise of retail trade accelerated the demand for advertisement space. As a result, the share of editorial matter decreased, and the share of advertisement revenue increased, which made circulation more firmly the measure of a newspaper's competitive standing: "Newspapers no longer could judge their advertisers from on high; they were themselves judged by the advertisers." (ibid. 93-94)

These changes were reflections of social change: the newspapers, that sought a wide and general readership responded to the changing experience, perceptions, and aspirations of urban dwellers. This was visible in the increasing entertainment function and the expansion of newspapers "as a compendium of tips for urban survival." As a result of increased reading on the bus, newspapers "reduced the size of the page, increased the size of headlines and the use of pictures, and developed the 'lead' paragraph" (ibid. 102-103).

In the 1890s the metropolitan newspapers were divided into two distinct groups, the papers of entertainment around the ideal of the 'story' and the papers of factuality around the ideal of 'information'. In the first group of papers the news served "primarily to create, for readers, satisfying aesthetic experiences which help them to interpret their own lives and to relate them to the nation, town, or class to which they belong", while the second model proposes that the "newspaper is uniquely defined as a genre of literature precisely to the extent that the facts it provides are unframed", understandable in itself, decontextualised and presented in an elaborate code in which all is spelled out, nothing is left to implicit or tacit understanding (Schudson 1978, 89-90).

These two forms of newspaper expressed different experiences of the urban population: the readers of factual journalism were those "whose position in the social structure gave them the most control over their own lives." They were relatively independent and participant, while the readers of story-based journalism "were relatively dependent and nonparticipant". (ibid. 119-120)

After World War I naïve empiricism was destroyed by an increasing distrust in facts and losing faith in the democratic market society. This was caused by both the development of public relations management and wartime propaganda (ibid. 122, 141). At that time, Park's recipe for improving the newspapers was the education of the people and the organisation of political information and intelligence: "But first of all we must learn to look at political and social life objectively and cease to think of it wholly in moral terms! In that we shall have less news, but better newspapers." (Park 1923, 289)

Later Schudson noted that the press and journalists responded to the apparent subjectivisation of the facts in a variety of ways. First, they might openly acknowledge subjectivity as a factor in reporting, which became visible, e.g., in the fact that the signed news story appeared more frequently. Second, specialisation could provide the reporter a greater capacity to be critical of his sources, and third, interpretative reporting developed. However, not everybody could apply these options and "daily reporters still needed a framework within which they could take their own work seriously and persuade their readers and their critics to take it seriously, too. This is what the notion of 'objectivity' (...) tried to provide." (Schudson 1978, 151)

By the mid-1930s, the term 'objectivity' "unknown in journalism before World War I, appears to have been common parlance". However, as was the case with naïve empiricism and the facts, objectivity was seen, even by the reporters committed to it, ultimately as a goal beyond reach (ibid. 154-156). Moreover, Schudson argues that objectivity became an ideal of journalism

“precisely when the impossibility of overcoming subjectivity in presenting the news was widely accepted and (...) precisely because subjectivity had come to be regarded as inevitable” (ibid. 157).

Schudson points out an important changes in society and in the newspaper economy which favoured the development of a certain kind of journalistic ideal. He has also pointed out that the development was far from simple and unidirectional, and, instead, rather conflictual and paradoxical. The changes that led to objectivity were closely linked with the modernisation of the society.

3.4. Journalism as an Anglo-American invention

According to Jean Chalaby, journalism as “a specialised and increasingly autonomous field of discursive production” is an invention of the 19th century, when

journalistic discourse became a distinctive class of texts: agents in the journalistic field developed their own *discursive norms and values*, such as objectivity and neutrality. The journalistic mode of writing became characterised by particular *discursive strategies and practices*, neither literary nor political in character. Journalistic texts began to possess distinctive philological characteristics, and the same *discursive phenomena* could be identified in the texts which formed the journalistic discourse. (Chalaby 1996a, 304)

The development which Chalaby calls “the Anglo-American journalistic revolution” started in the United States, and to a lesser degree in England. In these countries the discursive practices and strategies that characterise journalism were invented and in these countries the press industrialised faster than in others (e.g. France) and rapidly became an autonomous field of discursive production. (ibid.)

Before that there was a pre-journalistic press, which was characterised by publicist activity. Publicists represented a specific political group, they experienced their political convictions with great strength and intensity, were directly involved in politics, felt an immense sense of duty and wrote to get things changed. They had great faith in their influence on readers and in their ability to change the course of events (Chalaby 1998a, 16-17).

The inventions that were made in the 19th century in the Anglo-American press were: recent, factual and reliable news; the dissociation of facts and opinions; and discursive practices such as reporting and interviewing (Chalaby 1996a).

Among the factors that contributed to the formation of the journalistic field economic competition was the most important. In the second half of the 19th century in Britain the prices of newspapers decreased, the total number of newspapers grew and the average circulation increased. An immediate effect of this was the creation of a market of readers, as opposed to a public. The economic competition led to the industrialisation, concentration and capitalisation of the journalistic field (Chalaby 1998a 33-48).

In Britain, one of the major effects of industrialisation was that the working class lost the means of control over newspaper production. This has made journalism an essentially middle-class discourse and institution. According to Chalaby, journalism has favoured the emergence of social identities which are not hostile to the dominant social and political order, or at least to capitalism in general, and deconstruct social and political identities hostile to capitalism. Journalism is not only an invention of the market economy but it is “the narrative form capitalism took to become a historical force.” (Chalaby 1998a, 74-76)

The effects of the development of the journalistic field included depoliticization, the dominance of news, and news selection on the basis of readers’ interest and timeliness. While the publicists selected facts and events on the basis of their own moral, political and religious principles, “journalists detached themselves from publicists’ principles and dogmatic relation to reality” and paid attention to the audiences’ tastes and the performance of competing newspapers. The rivalry between newspapers made timeliness one of the most decisive criteria for news selection (ibid. 81-83).

While politics as a news topic lost prominence, the range of topics touched on by newspapers expanded enormously. Newspapers made an effort to cater to a great range of interests and please the disparate tastes of massive readerships. Newspapers took great pains to find news stories that would amuse and entertain, as opposed to being boring and tedious. Sports, society news, sensational news and human-interest stories became important. (ibid. 89-90).

Proper journalistic discursive practices were also invented and developed by American journalists. Chalaby (1996a, 310) has identified them as journalistic “because their use was determined by norms and values themselves conditioned by the regularities of the journalistic field.” These practices were fact-centred, like news reports and interviews. The news report, as developed by American journalists, first, implied the dissociation of facts and opinions and, second, was constructed ‘around facts’ and not around ‘ideas and chronologies’. Also the interview was invented by American

journalists in 1836 and it became a central activity of journalists by the turn of the century. (ibid. 310-312)

A news report implies not only the dissociation of facts and opinions but also the dissociation of facts and emotions. Chalaby concludes that the formation of the news report is

the outcome of a long process of the rationalization of a discursive practice whereby journalists have progressively learnt to refrain from expressing their opinions and emotions. This rationalized discursive practice produces an impersonal and distant account of reality and thus stands in sharp contrast with the opinion-oriented practices of publicists, and the personal narratives of literary authors. Through these practices journalists have gained credibility but have lost the freedom to fully express their opinions and emotions. (Chalaby 1998a, 130)

Objectivity as a discursive norm combines norms like neutrality, impartiality, balance and fairness, retreatism (journalists' reluctance to take sides in the political process), truthfulness, factuality, accuracy and completeness. Chalaby follows the reasoning of Michael Schudson in explaining the formation of objectivity. The main factors behind it were the financial independence of the press, competition for readers, the need for legitimacy among journalists and political stability (Chalaby 1998a, 130-140).

Chalaby deals also with the polarisation of the British press, which he argues originated in and was perpetuated by market forces. Market forces have divided the discourse of journalism into two main genres: quality press and popular journalism. The division became apparent at the end of the 19th century and has remained unchanged since then (ibid. 167-170).

This divide was a result of editors' and newspaper proprietors' endeavours to anticipate as much as possible the needs and desires of their readers and this rational calculation caused a trend towards standardisation within each class of newspaper. In Britain, the difference between high-class newspapers and the mass press came to be based on the quality of the discourse and the amount of information, rather than on the ideological orientation of these newspapers (ibid. 170-179). As a result, the media provides information for those who need it and entertain those who may not find themselves particularly advantaged in the present social and economic order (ibid. 182).

Chalaby has also compared the development of journalism in Britain and France. While in Britain market mechanisms had a much more determining influence, in France the press became widely corrupt. The French government used the press to protect its interests: according to one estimate, between 1871 and 1913 the French government spent one to two million francs a year

to bribe journalists (Bellanger 1972, cit. Chalaby 1996b, 145). Newspaper proprietors, editors and journalists accepted bribes from financiers and speculators for inducing the public to buy shares of companies in disastrous financial situations. Newspapers received money also from foreign governments for distorting and concealing information, most generously from Russia. “Until 1939, bribes and ‘subsidies’ must have accounted for a significant proportion of newspapers’ and journalists’ revenues” (Chalaby 1996b, 145).

While by 1937 British national newspapers received 53 per cent of their total revenue from advertisement, the

advertising revenue of the leading popular French newspapers must have accounted for at best one third to one half of this sum. (...) Furthermore, these French newspapers were four to six pages long, while the British norm was 16 to 20 pages (32 to 36 for *the Daily Mirror*). (Chalaby 1996b, 158)

Journalists in continental Europe imported and adapted the methods of Anglo-American journalism. In France, American journalistic practices began to be relatively widespread in the 1890s, but even then

these practices were still perceived as something foreign and nefarious. In 1888, Emile Zola, novelist and journalist, expressed his unease with the fact that ‘the uncontrolled flow of information pushed to the extreme ... has transformed journalism, killed the great articles of discussion, killed literary critique, and increasingly given more importance to news dispatches, trivial news, and to the articles of reporters and interviewers (the last two words in English in the original (Palmer 1983:92, my [=Jean Chalaby’s] translation). (Chalaby 1996a, 309)

The contrast between French and British press remained, even during the inter-war period. While the British press was commercially successful and had an average annual growth rate of approximately 5 per cent between 1920 and 1939, the French press stagnated. The reasons behind the success of the British press were mainly related to the most general factor — that market mechanisms had a much more determining influence on the British press. Economic competition was more intense, the pattern of newspaper ownership developed differently and both of these “forced the British journalists to develop journalistic practices and discursive strategies more commercially oriented than those of their French counterparts” (Chalaby 1996b, 143).

The most prominent French press companies decided to limit competition among them by forming a cartel. As a result, the circulation of these papers declined. In contrast, because of competition among the British newspapers,

“editors and journalists had to make the content of their newspapers as attractive as possible. They printed more pages, with more recent news, more illustrations, bolder headlines and gave their readers more sensational and emotional news.” (ibid. 148).

Several elements differentiated British tabloids from French ones. The layout of British tabloids was dominated by photographs and headlines and articles were laid out around these two journalistic devices. French newspapers published fewer pictures and headlines were not as prominent. British journalists developed different discursive strategies, one of which was depoliticisation. Depoliticisation refers to both the de-selection of politics as a journalistic topic and to the depoliticised treatment of politics. (Chalaby 1996b, 148-149)

British newspaper owners had to put their economic interests first and they knew that their newspapers could not survive with highly political content. From 1927 to 1937, the proportion of the total news space devoted to political, social and economic news declined from 10 to 6 per cent in *The Daily Mail*. In contrast, in 1937 sensational news occupied 9 per cent of the news pages in *The Daily Mail* and sports comprised 36 per cent (ibid. 151-155).

In this respect, it is worth referring to Park’s work from the 1920s (discussed above). He pointed out that the American newspaper (both in English and in immigrant languages) “with its local news, personal gossip, and its human interest anecdotes, is not the foreigner’s conception of journalism” (Park 1920/1967, 136).

This development had an impact also on the politically linked papers. *The Daily Herald* was losing heavily, its circulation in the 1920s being 330,000. In 1929 it was sold and turned into a tabloid, its circulation reaching 2 million copies in 1933. In France, the communist paper *L’Humanité* was able to prosper through the 1930s without being managed by an industrial conglomerate and being transformed into a tabloid. It achieved the fourth highest circulation of the country, with 350,000 copies. (Chalaby 1996b, 151-152).

There are also more recent influences of American journalism on the French press. Still, in 1970 the contrast between American and French journalistic styles was very much distinct, but by 2001 it was not quite so stark. Since the nineteenth century, among the influences of American journalism has been “the harnessing of news for commerce, the treatment of news as a commodity, the targeting toward a mass audience, the innovation of interviews and feature stories, the preoccupation with concisely presented

fact, and the standardization of news into the inverted pyramid and five Ws (what, who, when, where, and why)” (Napoli 2001, 106).

While some part of the French press has tried to be adversary towards the government, the French government “has had a large stock of options — fines, reduction in financial aid, censorship, seizures, and a range of formal and informal pressures — from which it could pick to silence newspapers” (Napoli 2001, 109; see also Freiberg 1981, 170).¹ Investigative reporting is discouraged by the government penchant for secrecy (Napoli 2001, 109).

According to Napoli, the French press also “retains respect for personal privacy that is lost in America”, “maintains a humane sense of balance and proportion in how it covers the news” and it has “a great tradition of taking ideas seriously and writing about them with grace, originality and purpose” (Napoli 2001, 110).

The importance of Chalaby’s work lies in the analysis of the factors that have contributed to the formation of the journalistic field. The process and the practice of journalism itself receive less attention in Chalaby’s work and from this perspective, his work was completed by Donald Matheson. Matheson argues that the “change in news writing is about more than the development of ‘fact-centered discursive practices’ in Anglo-American journalism.” Matheson distinguishes three major developments:

First, the wide range of styles in the Victorian newspaper all became subsumed under a single news style as a distinct and particular discourse of the news took shape. Second, the epistemological status of the news text changed from that of a collection of raw information to that of a form of knowledge in itself, not dependent on other discourses to be able to make statements about the world. Third, the news developed an independent social status, which did not need to have regard for the social conventions of public discourse. (Matheson 2000, 561)

Matheson dates the major change in the British press between 1890 and 1920. The essence of the change was that “reporters ceased simply to report the voices of those in public life, but framed them within the voice of journalism” (ibid. 564). By the 1920s, information from external texts started to be “severely edited, summarized and contextualized by the newspaper, and was thus translated into a single news style” (ibid. 565).

1 For example, during the Algerian war in the 1960s, the Communist paper *L’Humanité* was dragged into court 209 times for informational offences and twenty-seven editions were seized (Freiberg 1981, 177). For the control of the press during the Algerian war see also Keane 1991, 97; Knightley 1989, 362; Talbott 1981, 211).

Victorian news (news of the 1890s) “seems to have been able only to *represent* information, while the modern news story *was itself* a piece of information (Matheson 2000, 565). In the Victorian era, “the process of interpretation seems to have been understood to happen in the reader’s mind, not on the page” and therefore newspapers “could print contradictory reports side-by-side” and they “would also print information they explicitly marked as likely to be untrue” (Matheson 2000, 566).

Despite the formation of journalistic discourse, some traces of previous practices remained, e.g., in 1919, when: “important official statements are still quoted verbatim, prefaced with paragraphs giving details of who is speaking and when and where the statement was made” (ibid. 564).

Also Matheson looks for the reason for the formation of the journalistic discourse in the changing relationship between journalism and other discourse fields in society: the news story “was not born until a news discourse emerged allowing information to be reshaped and reinterpreted” (ibid. 568).

Similarly, as Chalaby referred to the criticism against newspapers filled with information in France, also Matheson (2000, 569) points out that the arrival of the modern news story “must have been a morally shocking event.” It implied “an egalitarian directness and a dismantling of social convention” and “the bald assertion of fact outside the conventions of public speech was a violation of good behaviour” (ibid.).

Matheson argues that the change in news discourse was possible because the news story

became recognised as a self-contained language event. It no longer had to refer outside itself to the source text to be able to assert a fact; the journalist’s role changed from a gatherer and recorder of news to a storyteller; and the news story could abandon the existing social conventions of its source texts or of formal social intercourse (Matheson 2000, 570).

Both Chalaby and Matheson paid attention only to Anglo-American (Chalaby to a lesser extent also to French) journalism. Therefore their findings contain both universal and particular elements. A closer look at other journalistic cultures is needed in order to find out what is universal and what is specifically British or Anglo-American.

The cultural diffusion of journalism has been reported also by other authors. In Sweden, Americanisation has been determined to have started in 1909. The layout of *Dagens Nyheter*, a major national daily, was re-formed: it used a smaller format, had more pages, new sections were introduced, and on the front page the advertisement was replaced with major news. The

headlines became bigger and the content more sensational. (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994, 113; see also Leth 1990, 110)

According to Napoli (2001, 104), American journalism is becoming the 'dominant paradigm' of journalism everywhere, although the imposition of the American model "will be guided by indigenous factors, such as the traditional relationship between state and media, the economic basis for the press, the legal environment, and, more broadly, the national culture" (ibid. 111). Nevertheless, "globalization still means Americanization, and the pressures on journalists to change remain unevenly distributed" (ibid.).

Still, another study by Chalaby offers an even more relevant comparative approach, especially where post-Soviet reality is concerned. Chalaby has compared "the nature of political communication in presidential regimes in non-consolidated democracies", namely the French Fifth Republic under de Gaulle in the 1960s and Ukraine in the early 1990s (Chalaby 1998b, 433).

Chalaby argues that the systems of political communication in presidential regimes in transition "possess features in common and that they have a flavour that is particular to those regimes" (ibid. 446). These features include, first, the fact that the state is a key player in the media field and continues to exert strong control over public communications. Second, television is a national institution and therefore it is conferred with a certain prestige, but has duties to present a positive image of the nation and foster national cohesion. Third, presidential regimes do not usually resort to overt or violent means of coercion against journalists and, fourth, they tolerate opposition papers, but presidents do exert personal control over television (Chalaby 1998b, 437, for television in Gaullist France see also Kuhn 1995). Unfortunately, this study does not pay attention to the actual practise of journalism.

3.5. Development of an edited society

Similarly with Chalaby, the Swedish researchers Jan Ekecrantz and Tom Olsson have investigated the development of journalism as a discursive field. They pay more attention to journalistic texts, which play a minor role in Chalaby's work. Several volumes of their research project (see Ekecrantz & Olsson 1993) have been published, mostly in Swedish (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1990, 1994; Ekecrantz, Olsson, Pollack & Sahlstrand 1994, Ekecrantz, Olsson & Widestedt 1995), although a summarising article (Ekecrantz 1997a) is available also in English (see also Ekecrantz 1997b and 2001).

The aim of their study is to identify strategies for the journalistic construction of reality, a discursive field which has been formed and events which result from it; to identify the social roles, relations, actors and categories

which are established in contemporary news journalism and to investigate how journalistic discursive order “has interacted with other institutional discourses in the selected years” (Ekecrantz 1997, 393-394).

Ekecrantz defines journalism as a specific discourse: a form of institutionally regulated social communication. Its main ideational product is the event. The concomitant social product is the reality effect: the acceptance of the givens of the news report. (Ekecrantz 1997, 393).

Ekecrantz and Olsson argue that the development of journalism is more linked with social changes at large than is usually thought. Journalistic texts reflect social structure and political culture, e.g. a special form of journalism, objective news journalism, corresponds with modern society. The ideological values of both are the same: impartiality and factuality (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994, 5).

In the main volume of the project, *Redigerade samhället* (The Editions of Society), they pay attention to the journalism reflected in four Swedish daily newspapers in each of the years 1910, 1935, 1960 and 1990. In 1910 Swedish journalism was characterised by uneditedness. The society in journalism was not yet edited, it was not organised into text by a relatively autonomous journalistic institution. Journalism did not create any information but only transmitted it. A necessary precondition for the publication of a story was that a message had arrived at the editorial office. A journalist was placed in the newsroom, where he received information and published it without any major editing. The journalist also visited public places and searched for news that was often published in the form of a reportage. The conflict of interest between the editorial office and the reporters has been a permanent feature of the history of journalism, but in 1910 the editorial office was dominating and the reporter was in a minor role. (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994, 129-130)

The journalism of 1935 represented a reported society. The newspapers had become more similar to each other. They had a common format and a common philosophy. On the first page, the political preferences were shown in the news selection rather than with open political rhetoric. Journalism aimed to act beside other institutions and it had an unexpressed but clear aim: to report about the plans and actions of the authorities. The speeches and written documents of the power institutions were summarised. Journalists gave the time, place and other conditions in which the actors appeared. Objective news journalism was dominating and it fit well together with the dominant ideology of the period, the building of the people's home (folkhemmet). Journalism tried more and more to search for news by itself. A journalist was above all a reporter who experienced and reported about his experiences. A difference with 1910 was also that the press aimed to strengthen

the consensus: the authorities, the market and the media were going in the same direction. (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994, 192-193)

In 1960 the society of journalism was characterised by conversation. The actions of the authorities were no longer described by an observing reporter but through a conversation between the reporter and the authority. The context of journalistic action, where and when something happens, had disappeared. Journalism was not, like in 1935, an outside observer and reporter, but a participant of the power process. The reported description of the meeting with the authority changed into an interview, which is taking place in the present tense. The present and future have displaced history. News transmission has been transformed into news production and the news is more concerned with the decision-making process. The reasons for the decisions have been analysed and their consequences estimated. The 1960 society of journalism is an ideal place: there are no confrontations between the authorities and the people, and if there are any problems they can be solved by administrative means. (ibid. 219-220)

The society of journalism in 1990 was called the edited society. The first pages of the newspapers had become more user friendly. They were colourful and also sports and other light material had found their way to the first page. The newspapers had rejected a common media philosophy, according to which the media comprised an independent observer of power which had received its assignment from the readers. They were no longer linked with an imagined community at the national level, but rather the local newspapers were aimed at local markets. They functioned on the basis of local identity and loyalty: everything local was newsworthy for them. The exercise of power had become more and more the use of information. The power of the political institutions had become more limited; they were simply institutions among the others. At the same time, newspapers had become more commercial and they were no longer a media with a comprehensive message. Advertisements had taken power over the front page and the readers had a greater role, as consumers but also as writers of letters to the editor and objects of journalistic description (ibid. 247-248).

Regarding power, the actors had become more unclear. Before the authorities were cited or interviewed, but in 1990 they had become sources in the reality described by journalism. The descriptive power of journalism had increased and only exceptionally did journalism recognise other special knowledge than its own. Journalism was interested in its own legitimacy and not in that of the party or political system (ibid. 248-249).

Ekecrantz has paid attention to the same changes also on the basis of the material from the years 1925, 1955 and 1987. One of his observations is that

the place of journalism in society has changed: in 1925 newspapers channelled class discourses but did not participate actively as organisers of public opinion. Some other social institutions seemed to constitute a problem for the rest of society, while the press itself appeared as a modern, enlightened and enlightening institution. In 1955, the press contributed to the organisation of discourses and the solving of social problems in collaboration with other institutions, while in 1987 this co-operation had disappeared and journalism functioned as “an initiator and organizer of the public dialogue”. It appointed the leading experts and the dominant discourses were incorporated into journalism (Ekecrantz 1997, 400-410).

There was no supreme editorial strategy in the 1920s to subordinate and incorporate autonomous voices into a newspaper monologue. Usually, a news item was more or less identical with a public speech, framed only by information about the location and time. The most elaborate form of voice organisation of this period formed a quasi-communication between representatives of different points of view. In 1955, the monologues and quasi-dialogues were replaced by substantive public communication. Represented and representing discourses were entangled with each other, but in most cases one could identify who the speaker was in the text. In 1987, the context of speaking tended to disappear and selected portions of the interviews were incorporated into the journalist’s own text (Ekecrantz 1997, 401-409 see also V. Pietilä 1982).

In 1925 many questions were asked, but few answers were given, in 1955 questions got answered, and the general atmosphere was that “there are (remaining) problems in Swedish society, (...) but solutions are close at hand” (Ekecrantz 1997, 406). By 1987, however, journalists did not

give priority to the questions and answers that people may have, but to answers they own — to questions they themselves have put on the agenda. In the modern world many problems are information problems (...). Unfortunately, the media, which cause many such problems, cannot solve them. They are not part of solution, but of the problem. (Ekecrantz 1997, 408).

In 1987 there was an increasing emphasis on timeliness. The present tense as well as the word ‘now’ appeared more often. ‘Now’ was a void between history and the future, and it was not filled with confidence in the near and distant future, but rather reflected negative trends leading to a worse situation. Another peculiarity was that the bases for the actualisation of the particular event were seldom disclosed (Ekecrantz 1997, 409).

In 1925 a typical journalistic event was a verbal event, a speech reported by the press. By 1955 it had been replaced by a symbolic event, including

various inaugurations, political and bureaucratic decision-making and social communication events. In 1955 society was characterised by consensus and social integration, while in 1987 society was “an abstract system, with negative and unforeseeable effects on (all) individuals”. The dominant type of journalistic event was a system event, which implied that social agents were “much more anonymous, and less identifiable as persons and organisations than they were in 1925 or 1955.” (Ekecrantz 1997, 400-407, see also Ekecrantz e.a. 1994)

On the whole, the development described by Ekecrantz and Olsson has made the position of journalism itself more central. Journalism has become more institutionalised, its descriptive power has started to have an impact on the practices of social power and on those relations linked with this power. Social life has become journalistic: the media uses other media as sources, their own criteria regulate the relevance and competence of the sources (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994, 253).

The result of this development has been the transformation of the traditional function of journalism. “Journalism does not any more organise communication between humans but between persons and objects. (...) People do not communicate. They do things to each other. Society is absent.” (Ekecrantz 1997, 409-410)

There is also evidence from the United States that the high modernism of journalism is passing due to the collapse of political consensus and the commercialisation of the news. The former is visible in that the old model of ‘objective journalism’ is giving way to a more active, mediated, journalist-centred form of reporting and in that the key political institutions have lost credibility and this vacuum has been filled by the expansion of the interpretative role of the journalist (Hallin 1992, 18-19). The commercialisation of news “has brought into question the notion of journalism as a public trust and the existence of the common public culture that news once provided” (ibid. 21).

The period of high modernism of the American press (from the 1950s to the 1970s) was characterised by a belief in progress, rationality and universal truths and standards, as well as a conviction that it was possible to be part of the ‘establishment’, with wealth, access and prestige, and simultaneously independent (Hallin 1996, 246). Owners had ceded the day-to-day control of news columns to journalists and the journalists “had accepted the bureaucratic hierarchy of the newsroom and the constraints of the professional norms of neutrality and ‘objectivity.’” Journalism has become less conflictual since journalists “have internalized the constraints of professionalism far more than the 1930s writers had done” (Hallin 1992, 15).


3.6. Formation of the journalistic news form

A Finnish researcher, Risto Kunelius, has paid attention to the discursive voices in journalism and to the development of the professional news form. Kunelius has analysed journalism both in its current form and in its historical development from the 1950s to the 1990s, e.g. changes in the news on environmental issues and reports on the New Year speeches of the Finnish president. His main emphasis is on journalistic texts, because “journalism only becomes socially meaningful through its texts” (Kunelius 1996, 375).

He has analysed the narrative structures in journalism on the basis of two dimensions. The first dimension attempts to describe the level of visibility of the narrative voice. The extreme ends of this dimension are, first, a completely faded, abstract and anonymous voice, which can be called a **transparent** narration. It could also be understood with the metaphor of a ‘window’. At the opposite end an **identifiable** narration can be found. It gives definite hints about the time, place and context of the act of narration. Kunelius has set the second dimension between narrative **independence** and **dependency**. Independent narration situates itself above the actors, it can quote things from its own memory and move in time and space. Complete narrative dependency would mean that “the narrative voice of journalism merely repeats the utterances of the sources” (Kunelius 1996, 126-127).

By combining these two dimension Kunelius has presented a narrative force field (Figure 3.1.), where four narrative situations can be distinguished.

Figure 3.1. Narrative force field according to Kunelius (1996, 130).



According to Kunelius, the first narrative situation, transparent and independent narration, “is perhaps the most paradigmatic and the one most commonly used in contemporary journalism.” This situation is applied, e.g., in factual stories, stories with facts and comments, and background stories. They are characterised by a journalistic narration that “builds a narrative level ‘above’ the events, issues and persons it narrates about” (Kunelius 1996, 131).

Also the second narrative situation is independent from the reality the journalism represents, but unlike in the first situation, the narrative voice becomes identifiable. This sort of narrative strategy “is currently often used in matters that are considered to be ultimately questions of opinion, matters of taste, and so on” (ibid. 132). These stories include editorials, columns, comment stories and critiques.

Kunelius explains that in contemporary journalism the move from the first narrative situation to the second is “a difficult move. It implies an alliance either with some parts of the audience (and their perspectives) or a visible alliance with some of the public actors” (Kunelius 1996, 134). The tension between identifiability (and involvement) and transparency

has also been a historical one. The commercialization of the press led first to a *distinction* between stories in terms of these generic modes of narration. Later on, it also led to a change in their respective ranking. The stories of ‘factuality’ undermined the stories of involvement and identifiability. (Kunelius 1996, 134)

In the last two narrative situations, the journalistic narration is dependent on reality. “The third extreme narrative situation is set by a voice that is both relatively dependent and identifiable.” In it “the narrator becomes an actor in its own narrative” (Kunelius 1996, 134). Examples of these kinds of stories are, e.g., interviews written in question — answer form.

The fourth situation is mobilised by narration that is both transparent and dependent. This is a case in which the news text is completely controlled by an outside voice. In this case journalism functions only as a channel through which an outside voice speaks to the audience. According to Kunelius, this sort of narrative structure “is quite unusual in contemporary journalism as the main narrative choice of the story, and to gain such a dominant role in a journalistic text an actor should have an exceptionally strong authority on some matter or an otherwise exceptional status” (ibid. 136). These include, e.g., documents and speeches published as such and not edited, as well as letters to the editor. The narration of a journalistic story can also move between different situations.

Kunelius has also argued that these four narrative situations imply different positions for the textual reader. Two principal roles suggested for the reader can be distinguished as the role of a 'spectator' and the role of a 'listener'. The role of 'spectator' is implied both in the first and third narrative situation. In the first narrative situation, "the transparent-independent narrative voice sets a stage for different actors" and "seems to suggest that the description of the dialogue is neutral and 'objective'." Also in the third narrative situation the audience is "set apart from dialogue between the performing narrator and the actor" (Kunelius 1996, 137).

In the second narrative situation the narrator "speaks thus more or less openly from its own point of view. The narration, then, is an utterance of a *particular* voice, directed to a certain *listening* audience." Similarly, in the fourth situation the actor's voice "is more or less trying to speak directly to the narrate" (ibid. 138). 'Listener' and 'spectator' modes suggest different positions for the reader. While 'watching', the audience is seeing things from a perspective claiming to be 'objective' or universal, but it is still difficult to point out whose facts the facts are. Listener modes acknowledge the readers as participants in communication. The 'listener' mode is a lot more demanding, time-consuming and difficult both for the producer of the text and for the audience, and perhaps that is why the news (Situation 1) with its detached narration has been popular among both journalists and readers. (ibid. 141)

Kunelius has used the narrative force field to analyse the historical development of news narration. One of the developments Kunelius has paid attention to is the reporting on the Finnish president's New Year speeches in the press. He argues that in the 1950s the journalistic involvement was minimal, the speech was published as such word by word in its full length. Little by little the leading paragraph, which presents the speech, started to become longer and to make small judgements. In the 1960s "the leading paragraph is gradually worked into an independent part of the story in which all the important parts of the address are covered", in the 1970s the leading part is divided into two, independently written parts, the first one of which can be found on the front page. (ibid. 176-178)

In the 1980s this development led to "the growing effort to interpret and contextualize the president's words." The news was ready to detect even things that the president did not say and to use other actors to comment on the president's words. The story was by now dominated by the news' 'own' voice (transparent and independent). (ibid. 182-183)

The reason behind this development is the changing power relations between politicians and journalism and the development of the society as a whole:

in the 1950s, society was still very much 'present'. People were far more coherently bound to their particular positions in society by various everyday practices than they are in today's society. Thus, in this sort of 'fixed' society, these positions gave people more stable contexts out of which to produce interpretations, any direct or indirect interpretation on the part of the news' 'own' voice would have been risking the factual credibility and legitimization (and thus its commercial potential) in the eyes of the desired large audience. (...)

In the 1990s, however, (...) the formal consensus on the division of labour between the discourses of politics and journalism has gone. Journalists no longer see it as their duty to provide a forum for the politicians. Instead, they see it as their duty to provide a critically mediated picture of the political reality for the public that they claim to be representing. (Kunelius 1996, 191)

Another development has been in environmental news stories from the 1950s to the 1980s. Kunelius argues that the professional, independent mode of news narration developed and gained ground in the 1960s and became the dominant news narrative in the 1970s:

In the 1970s the contribution of the news itself grows, but it remains implicit: it is produced by a professional consideration that tries to negotiate between the sources. Moving towards the 1980s, we meet a further developed professional mode of telling the news: it is the news that seems to be defining the nature of communication. (ibid. 246)

All the other major forms of news narration, the dependent and merged mode, dependent and distinctive mode and the rhetorical 'us'-mode have lost ground, although they had been common in the past. Only the monovocal mode of common sense in which news stories "mobilize a single, transparent and independent voice" has retained its position from the beginning to the end (ibid. 222).

According to Kunelius, the historical development of the coverage of politics has been from the suggested role of listener to the suggested role of spectator.

The readers of political journalism have – textually speaking – been repositioned: (1) from a position of listening to a position of observing, (2) from a position where the interpretations and criticism of politics was expected to grow from the reader's own, particular circumstances to a position where criticism towards politics is defined more from an abstract 'common' or 'general' point of view, (3) from a position of more direct confrontation of the utterances of political discourse to one with a more mediated and indirect position, and (4) from a position where the reader knew who it was that produced the utterance to a role where the identity of the speaking voice is no longer clear. (Kunelius 1996, 190)

This seems to be the case especially in the commercial, universal model of journalism, which exists mainly in countries with high media saturation. In other journalistic cultures, e.g. in Italy, the news treats the audience more as a participant in the political process, but the price is that the political news is a closed genre of the political parties. In comparison with its Italian counterpart, the American news seems to be more accessible to “the entire public albeit in a way that assigns the public a passive role in the construction of meaning” (Hallin & Mancini 1984, 847).

The repositioning of the reader of political journalism has changed the role and place of the public in its relationship with politics. Although Kunelius is careful to emphasise that he is not “speculating what the audience does”, but tries “to focus on what journalism does” (139), his results offer some considerations on the textual positions of the readers of political journalism:

as readers of the news genre, we are (1) less expected to consider ourselves as participants in politics, (2) less expected to find (or search) a context for political utterances from our own life, (3) less expected to compare our own thoughts and experiences to those presented in the news, and (4) less expected to experience politics as a dialogue, a practice with different possible solutions. (Kunelius 1996, 190)

This development is linked with the development of other social institutions: “the representational democracy – with its notion of representatives as active on our behalf – legitimizes the ‘spectator’ role as the proper role of an interested citizen. Historically speaking, the ‘great’ time of journalism history has to do with journalism representing those who are not represented in the political, representative apparatus” (ibid. 383).

The development noted by Kunelius has strong links with the development of modern society. According to his “positive interpretation of the ‘generic reader’” it is essential, for the sake of democracy and for the sake of society, “that individual human beings learn to forget — at least for a while and especially in certain issues — their own egoistic interests” (ibid. 292). Therefore

the growing importance of the news genre can be seen as the development of an everyday cultural mechanism for the true citizen to practice the proper democratic ways of thinking about the society. (Kunelius 1996, 293.)

On the other hand, Kunelius offers a critical reading of the qualities of the news genre as well: the qualities assumed of “the ‘generic reader’ stretch the distance between everyday experiences and the textual perspective too far; so far in fact that one can ask whether any kind of relevant connection between

them is probable or even possible any more.” In this case “the news becomes a ritual where ordinary people are expected to rehearse the issues, the viewpoints and the arguments demanded by the ‘general’ interest” (Kunelius 1996, 294-295).

These interpretations, especially the positive one, can well be understood in the frame of modernisation. A modern society is a mass society in which people need a common point of reference, a general interest. What newspapers have been doing in this process is that they have created “the public out of the publics” (Kunelius 1996, 296). Also the decline of the news can be linked with the decline of a modern society with a relatively homogenous population and unitary culture. As a result, journalism becomes something else, e.g. a talk show or tabloids (see also Kunelius 1996, Chapter VII).

Kunelius suggests also that “news journalism should try to break the conventions that reproduce the schizophrenia in its own texts, in journalistic practice at large and in culture more generally” but it is not possible to “challenge the conventions of journalism without challenging some of the key notions of our culture (ideology, representation, discourse, common sense, power, etc.) (Kunelius 1996, 389-390). I think this statement by Kunelius is very much valid in analysing the change of journalistic conventions in the Soviet Union. The challenging of the conventions of Soviet journalism occurred in connection with the challenging of Soviet ideology, power and the social system in general. Both of them were challenged and therefore collapsed or were transformed.

3.7. Peripheries, globalisation, democratisation and journalism

After presenting these studies on the development of journalism in some Western core countries (actually Finland and Sweden did not traditionally belong to the core, but they have been long enough influenced by the core and have become economically and culturally closer to the core countries) it is useful to address the development of journalism in some (more or less) peripheral countries, both in Europe and elsewhere. The Anglo-American ‘professional model of journalism’ based on neutrality, autonomy, and detachment from power has been exported especially since the Second World War. The process of Americanisation was motivated both by economic needs and political motives: there was the attempt to stop the propaganda machine of the communist regime and to prevent the return of the defeated Nazi and Fascist ideas (Mancini 2000, 268).

Despite the diffusion of the Anglo-American model, the national peculiarities of journalism that depend on the given political and economic situation have been preserved in many regions, but there is some evidence that these 'vernacular' forms of journalism have become more and more threatened and transformed to become closer to the originally American or British forms. Also McQuail has noticed that there has been a process of convergence among media systems and practices, diminishing national and regional differences (McQuail 1995, 28-29; McQuail 1994, 11-12). This development has been conceptualised in the framework of modernisation theory and, later, in that of globalisation.

While the Western paradigm of media studies has been criticised as being based on evidence from such "relatively unrepresentative nations as Britain and the United States" and therefore as being "both conceptually impoverishing and a peculiarly restricted version of even Eurocentrism" (Downing 1996, xi), the developments in the peripheral countries of Western Europe may offer useful material for comparison, especially when Russia is concerned.

The development of newspaper industries in various European countries has produced rather different media systems and different forms of journalism. In each of the cases special historical elements have contributed to these differences. For example, in Italy journalism has remained different from the Anglo-American tradition. The typical features of this system are that the media is under strong state control, the degree of mass media partisanship and the degree of integration of the media and political elites are strong and there is no consolidated and shared professional ethic among media professionals (Splichal 1994, 145-146; Mancini 1991).

In Italy, the features of "the professional model of journalism" did not develop, at least not completely. First, journalism never detached itself from its economic and ideological leanings. In the Italian public sphere "the means of communication are voices of organized groups" as is the case in many other Western European countries. Second, in Italian journalism the ideal has not been neutral and objective reporting but "advocate and interventionist journalism" and the task of the journalism has been to "transmit ideas, protect interests, and organize people who already share the same points of view". Third, in the Italian context "journalistic information generally, but not exclusively, performs a function of horizontal communication allowing the numerous social, political, and economic groups with which the news organizations are aligned to communicate among themselves" (Mancini 2000, 271-274).

Italian newspapers are directed toward a very limited public since they “aim at that segment of the public which is already socially conscious of the political problems and is integrated in one way or another in the political debate” (Mancini 2000, 275). In this kind of system daily newspapers have been running at a considerable loss, but every attempt at the closure of a newspaper “sees the mobilization of opposition from journalists and printers, and (...) compromise solutions are found to allow journalistic activity to continue on some new basis” (Bechelloni 1980, 229).

The Italian model of journalism has led to the strong presence of political themes and high degree of involvement of the citizens regarding political debate (see also Hallin & Mancini 1984). However, journalism has been changing even in Italy: the commercialization process has weakened the bonds of political affiliation (Ricolfi 1997, Mancini 1991), although

the traditional model of journalism has been transformed only partially; it has kept its attention focused strongly on political themes and its political links have not completely disappeared. Indeed, the major actor of the commercialization process, Berlusconi, strongly used, and still uses, his media empire to support his political activity (Mancini 2000, 275).

Mancini (2000) considers that the explanation behind the Italian model of journalism lies in the multi-party system and political participation. However, a similar multiparty system and high degree of political participation has produced a different journalistic and press model in northern Europe (mainly Sweden and Norway, in Finland the degree of participation is lower).

In northern Europe, the professional model of journalism developed earlier and has produced a high level of newspaper circulation, which has grown even after the introduction of the television and a local monopolisation of the newspapers. Monopolisation has been the most advanced in Finland, where practically all the regional newspapers are without serious competition in the core areas of their circulation, whereas in Sweden some competition has remained with the help of governmental support for the secondary newspapers.

Gustafsson has outlined several reasons for the high level of newspaper circulation in the Nordic countries: Historical reasons include the fact that the newspapers have enjoyed an almost unbroken development, they have not been hampered by political changes or the introduction of the competitive new media (radio and television were financed by license fees, not advertising). Ethnological explanations include both climate and mentality (religion) and economic reasons include the fact that Nordic newspapers are general newspapers, women are as heavy readers as men, the lack of news

magazines in the Nordic countries and that “the consumption of newspapers is high and even” (Gustafsson 1996, 17-18).

It seems reasonable that the reason behind the difference between the Italian and Nordic models is not at the level of political participation but at the level of technological development and the commercialisation of the press. In the Nordic countries the media technology has been the most advanced and the costs, which it has brought about, have made the newspapers search for the widest possible audience. Also the political development of the Nordic societies has contributed to that the trend: the role of politics in society has in general declined and a growing political consensus, with the depoliticisation of politics, has made the political controversies less present in society, and consequently in journalism.

In Greece journalism has moved from a politically-oriented to a commercial basis and this has accomplished a change in the role that journalism plays in the society; “although journalism appears to play a more active social role today in Greece, giving the impression that it sets the agenda and represents the citizen, in the final analysis it is influenced by the economic needs of the news organization” (Papathanassopoulos 2000, 400). As in Russia (and other peripheries of Eastern Europe) the development of journalism has been linked with modernisation: Greece was “late in ‘modernity’ and has neither a strong civil society nor a strong market” and because of the absence of a strong civil society “the media were used as vehicles for negotiating with and pressuring the government of the day, rather than representing the public discourse of society” (ibid. 401).

In Eastern Europe, where journalists have been accustomed to viewing themselves as politically influential, the “journalistic elite will continue to complain that the corrosive power of the marketplace is harming democracy, when it is their power and influence that is in fact being corroded”, and politicians continue to ignore the media (Johnson 1998, 120-121). This indicates clearly one of the problems which journalism is facing also in Russia: the former mechanisms for exercising power through publicity should be replaced with new mechanisms which are not so intimately linked with political power.

In another periphery, Latin America, the concept of news was originally understood as a current of opinion, but the growing dominance of Northern American news agencies in the 19th century led to changes and to “a concept of news which moved from the task of interpreting the events and presenting opinion to the daily process of selecting events deemed ‘newsworthy’ and commercially interesting” (Reyes Matta 1979, 164).

Periodical publications were consolidated as key players in the affairs of state and civil society, providing a continuous flow of information on current events and expressing a range of different views. This debate stimulated and informed mainly by the periodical press had a transforming impact on the institutional forms of Latin American modernity. (Marín 1999, 420)

However, in Latin America the public sphere was not 'bourgeois-liberal' as in Western Europe but 'oligarchic-liberal' and it was fragile because it was always at risk of either being subdued by state co-optation or becoming absorbed in politicised and polarised debates between the different political factions. This was visible in the development of the press,

which fluctuated most of the time between highly partisan, strategic and militant periodicals, which spoke not as impartial, or external commentators, but instead as representatives of their partisan community, and newspapers that were pro-government and pro-social order, which discussed topics of general interest but without compromising the government in power. (Marín 1999, 421)

Since the end of World War II, there has been a slow but growing trend in Latin America to develop less partisan newspapers. Recently, some newspapers and news magazines have gained attention as a 'new breed' of news media, not associated with partisan political views. (Salwen & Garrison 1991, 42-43)

Economic dependency keeps newspapers from reporting stories that might offend big business and therefore newspapers serve the interests of the relatively small number of economically prosperous readers. For example, in Mexico, "the central control of industries by the state and the fierce competition among newspapers (...) combine to give advertisers and the state a great deal of control over the media (Salwen & Garrison 1991, 36).

China offers an interesting point of comparison with Russia because of different roads chosen for reforming the society. In China, media reforms were carried out starting in the 1980s and were renewed after a short backlash in 1989-1990. Since 1992, the Chinese media has become more commercialised, the number of newspapers has been growing and the traditional partisan newspapers have lost in the competition both for audience and advertisement revenue. The Chinese media are increasing the variety and liveliness of cultural and entertainment forms and reducing explicitly propagandist content (Zhao 1998, 6; Ma 2000, 26-27). Moreover, advertisement decisions are made on the basis of knowledge, reasoned judgement, and free choice, rather than because of personal connections, indebtedness, and administrative intervention (Huailin & Zhongshi 1998, 91).

The number of Chinese newspapers grew significantly in the 1980s and in the 1990s (Li 1998, 308, Yu 1994, 24, see also Li 2000). The new newspapers are produced by existing publications, launched by various organisations and established by enterprises. They are mostly of a quasi-official nature, enjoy a high degree of editorial independence and their subjects are much less politically sensitive (Yu 1994, 25). The Party newspapers move toward greater reliance on political resources, whereas the mass-appeal tabloids cash in on circulation and advertising revenue. This has led to “rapidly enlarging revenue gaps between newspapers relying on political power and those relying on market popularity” (Guo 2001, 15).

At the end of the 1980s there was an emerging discourse on the democratisation of media communication, but this was stopped after the crushing of the pro-democracy movement in June 1989 the media reform was rolled back. In 1992, the media reforms turned into rapid commercialisation. After that, the Chinese media partly changed, partly remained the same; for example, in 1994-95 news reports were monolithic, positive, highly predictable and there was little variation within the media. However, the commodity nature of news has been widely accepted (Zhao 1998, 45-51).

In the Chinese press, developments are taking place mostly in peripheral fields. The Party organ has not shown much change in content and style and the front page of a paper is much less likely to show much change. The changes are more likely to happen in peripheral newspapers and in the entertainment or weekend sections (Pan 2000a, 274).

Commercialisation has led to the decline of national and provincial Party organs and the rise of metropolitan organs. It is also remarkable that the media is uncritically enthusiastic about almost all forms of commercialisation and actively promotes business interests (Zhao 1998, 70-71).

The drawbacks of commercialisation include the corruption of journalists, paid news, advertisement in the form of news stories, and sponsored columns and pages. The tradition of positive reporting is also linked with the easy acceptance of corruption, and therefore journalism is losing its credibility. In some successful newspapers anticorruption measures have been adopted, e.g. the separation of editorial departments from financial management and the separation of news-gathering and news-editing sections so that no individual can individually control the paper's coverage (Xu 1994, 33-35; Zhao 1998, 84-92; Huang 2000, 658-659).

On the other hand, commercialisation has led to the development of an elaborate media infrastructure, made some parts of the system more responsive to readers and audiences, modified the elitism of media professionals and given rise to populist sensibilities. Although private ownership of the media

is still suppressed, the importance of the audience is undermining the party-press ideology (Zhao 1998, 182-185; Zhang 2000, 633).

Commercialisation has enabled a degree of organisational autonomy and has helped to liberate the press from the state, but on the other hand it has institutionalised new control mechanisms in the form of advertising pressures, and has created a bias toward affluent consumers in the urban and coastal areas, a clientelist relationship with business and political sources, and a new regime of labour discipline in the newsrooms (Zhao 2000a, 21-22).

People demand things which are lighter, relevant to their lives or informative enough to help them adapt to changes in the reform era (Li 1998, 313). People want to know more, especially economic news and information relating to people's daily lives, work, safety and health. Tendencies that have been noticed include a sharp increase in prices, an increase in the material in newspapers, more social news, more entertainment, more information tied in with people's daily lives and more human-interest stories (Yu 1994, 29).

This development has led to a fragmented and de-centralised press structure. Since 1996 the Party has engineered a press-structuring campaign, which favoured business, lifestyle and mass appeal papers and institutionalised market principles in press regulations. The Party and government have also been active in building press conglomerates. The Party press managers fashion themselves after today's global media moguls, rather than yesterday's Western editors who fought for press freedom from the state (Zhao 2000a, 15-16).

Such changes are redefining the role of the press, reshaping its structure and bringing in a more pluralist and diversified information environment. On the other hand, political control remains and the changes have been more economic than professional (Xu 1994, 33-35). On the other hand, Chinese journalists have exploited the imperatives of market competition to dilute or dodge political control (Lee 2000, 36) and the Chinese tabloid newspapers have challenged the Party journalistic traditions. There is "good reason to suggest that the commercialisation of China's media (...) is a significant and positive development toward a free press" (Huang 2001, 447). The central Party leadership has even promoted a media watchdog role in order to reassess control over a dysfunctional bureaucracy without challenging the system as such (Zhao 2000b).

Chinese development has been conceptualised in the framework of modernisation. The Chinese popular newspapers represent popular journalism — the kind of journalism that results from modernity and is developing in the same direction as the Western popular press (Li 1998, 324).

Colin Sparks (2001, 28) forecasts the coming crisis of the regime in China, which may be marked both by a dual crisis of authority and by popular

mobilisations on a wider level than was the case in Eastern Europe since both political and market-based economic powers will, according to Sparks, fall together. Chinese researchers see a more stable process of internal evolution: the Chinese tradition of militancy, advocacy and partisanship could not be expected to change overnight, but popular journalism will continue to develop in China (Li, 1998, 326).

On the other hand, vested economic interest in journalists' news organisations, increased freedom in soft news and an officially sanctioned watchdog role may have made the fight for substantial press freedom less urgent for many journalists. Indeed, the issue of press freedom has not been on the agenda and the common interests among the party elite, the business elite, and China's rising middle class may make the business elite a silent partner of the Party in sustaining a marketised, party-dominated press (Zhao 2000a, 22, see also Pan 2000b). However, journalistic practices are changing and they are changing "the map of meaning" of journalism itself (Pan 2000b, 104).

Unlike in China, in Indonesia, contradictions and conflicts between the Suharto-era government and the press represented a contest between Western and Indonesian notions of the duty of the press. In Indonesia "the emergence of western writing strategies was enabled by an upwardly mobile, cosmopolitan middle class that constituted the primary audience for the news media and whose economic interests conflicted with those of the Suharto regime" (Manzella 2000, 324). In contrast, in China the economic interests of the middle class coincide with the policies of the government.

The South Korean transition to democracy may also offer some insights into China's future prospects. Economic development led Koreans to look beyond their economic freedom toward more political freedom. The press was also an active partner in this process; especially the alternative press was "critical in challenging the government-dictated news reporting of the establishment media" (Youm 1998, 188). Since democratisation, new kinds of problems have arisen and the "the exercise of press freedom has become more complex" (ibid. 189). The persistence of old control practices has continued during democratisation. The government has many resources and channels with and through which to exercise influence over press activities, particularly when media owners compete for regulatory favours leading to new business opportunities (Lee 1997, 145-146).

For example, the low level of professionalism has led to the acceptance of cash gifts because former social customs are still greatly irresistible (Youm 1994, 122). However, in a market economy that has moved from an authoritarian to a democratic regime the unethical and unprofessional

practices are seen more as embarrassing legacies from the preliberalization era (Youm 1998, 189) than as resulting from the liberalisation.

The South Korean experience also highlights the fact that there is a need to distinguish the professional freedom of reporters and editors from the freedom of publishers and owners. The freedom allowed media proprietors has improved during democratisation, but not the freedom and independence of reporters and editors. Moreover, fighting for editorial independence has become more difficult because one has to go against one's own editorial bureaucracy and management instead of the repressive government of the past (Lee 1997, 146). In that case, perhaps only the effective functioning of public pressure may provide shelter against the financial power of press conglomerates (ibid. 147-148).

After the historical and geographical reviews of the development of journalism, it is still worth paying attention to the role of the media in transition and democratisation. There is rather much literature about the role of the media in political transitions (Jakubowicz 1994, O'Neil 1998; Sparks 1998) and it is generally agreed that the "media can and often do play a central role in shaping the course of political transition", although there is not "a simple theory that universally explains the media's function in this area" (O'Neil 1998, 7).

Sparks (2001, 7) has pointed out that there are "surprising similarities of the outcome in the media democratisation process despite the differences in starting point." Usually the end of a repressive regime leads to a great flowering of popular self-expression and innovation, but after this stage the overall outcome has been

a commercial press and a sharp drop in newspaper readership. Often, these newspapers have some of the least democratic aspects of the western press, for example tabloidisation. Nowhere have readers gained any power over editorial policy or coverage, other than the purely negative sanction of non-purchase. (...) Power over the printed press has been passed from few hands to rather more hands, but not into the hands of the people. (Sparks 2001, 24).

Sparks concludes that usually during the regime decay a greater independence from the ruling party and opportunities for formerly oppositional voices are created, but soon, however, a combination of political interference and market pressures act to restrict those liberties (ibid. 27-28).

Rather similarly, Adam Jones, who has compared the press in transition in Nicaragua, Jordan, South Africa and Russia, concludes that "the proliferation of media institutions has been one of the most reliable indicators of transition's 'onset' phase". The first stage of transition is marked by an explosion of

independent and opposition media, which is nearly always followed by a winnowing — usually a rapid one. Newspapers and other media have been among the most sought-after prizes in competitions and conflicts among transitional actors. They have worked to unveil state and regime abuses, sometimes in ways that galvanised transitional forces, and have stood at the forefront of popular struggles that influence and help to define the liberalisation or transition. The media has been the first to push the boundaries of the new freedoms and has served as one of a few viable ways in which publics can articulate and communicate their concerns in times of transition and flux. It has also fulfilled an agenda-setting and educational function in transitional societies (Jones 1998).

Besides transition or transformation, also the diffusion of journalistic innovations has been used to explain the changes that have taken place in post-socialist countries. Høyer has reviewed the diffusion of the news paradigm and professional autonomy to Scandinavia and the Baltic states. He noticed that the news paradigm, generally known as aggressive ‘American journalism’ has raised outright resistance among many European newspapers and that this opposition was most extremely expressed in Lenin’s theory of the press (Høyer 2001, 24). Therefore it may not be a surprise that the most problematic changes in the press have taken place in post-socialist countries. In the Baltic countries the diffusion of Western models has been promoted by the foreign media moguls who took over a substantial part of the media system and also “provided many of the formats for content” (Høyer 2001, 24). Actually the change of journalistic practices in Estonian journalism has been many times greater in the 1990s than during the whole period from the 1920s to the 1980s (Harro 2001, chapter 6 and 8).

Høyer (2001, 4) presents three types of factors behind these changes in journalism: first, the material base of technology and economy of production; second, the cultural base of journalism; and third, the institutional power base of the media and the negotiations and interactions between the press and other institutional elites in its environment.

The development of technology has made mass audiences possible and more easily reachable, but on the other hand it has made market entry more difficult. The difference in style between the populist tabloids and more established broadsheets can be recognised in different countries and in many cases tabloids have been pioneers in news journalism. At the level of power, journalism has found its place in relation to other institutions, the most important of them being the political ones. As Høyer (2001, 24) states it “to the extent that journalists control and disseminate their image of political

reality by means of the news paradigm in an investigative manner, almost to the same extent, politicians loose control of their planned actions”.

Varieties of regional cultures have caused Høyer to doubt that there is one universal system of journalistic genres and ideas: “The news paradigm is not diffused systematically; rather it is adopted only when local conditions are ready for it” (Høyer 2001, 25). The history of the diffusion of journalistic culture, and the changes which have taken place in journalism, do not represent universal stages of linear development but could be referred to as “different kinds of autonomous epochs in the press”, “oppositions between competing paradigms” or a “collection of separate scenarios for the recreation of an originally Anglo-American idea of news journalism” (ibid. 25). Also Napoli has pointed out that the adaptation of the American model of journalism will, however, be guided by indigenous factors, such as the traditional relationship between the state and the media, the economic basis of the press, the legal environment, and the national culture (Napoli 2001, 111).

The democratisation or liberalisation of the media may not be a simple or conflict-free process. Control practices and attitudes continue to exist even in a changed environment and during the collapse of the authoritarian, non-market based system, the freedom of individual journalists may be greater than after the stabilisation of a commercial media system in which the freedom of the proprietors of the existing media may be greater.

3.9. Journalism: one or many?

All these researchers, Barnhurst and Nerone, Schudson, Chalaby, Ekecrantz and Kunelius, have explored journalism as a distinctive practice that was first born in the USA and Britain in the 19th century and later spread elsewhere. It is also a phenomenon that has developed in connection with other social institutions and received its current form as a result of development. The reasons or moving force behind this process of change have been modernisation (Kunelius, partly Ekecrantz); Americanisation and cultural diffusion (Chalaby, also others); and/or it has been formed as a result of struggles between journalism and other social institutions (Ekecrantz). Pietilä, on the other hand, has explored the newspaper as a specific production formed through a historical process. In general, all these analyses of the development of journalism can be understood in the framework of modernisation.

Many of these researchers see the history of journalism as decay: “Once there was a time in which some things were better than today”. In the process of change, something has been lost. The thing lost is either the freedom of an individual journalist to fully express his opinions and emotions, the true

political engagement of journalism or the role of journalism as an institution that co-operates with other institutions.

One could also argue, however, that in the exchange something has also been gained. According to Chalaby, journalism has gained more credibility; Ekecrantz sees that it has developed strong descriptive power; and Kunelius defines the gains as the development of a common perspective, which is essential for democracy to function properly. The coin has two sides: on the one hand, elements proper to a particular journalism (political etc.) have been lost and with them the individual power of the journalists has been reduced. On the other hand, the elements proper to universal journalism have been gained, and they increase the power of journalism in general (or journalists as a group).

These developments have a lot to do with modernity and modernisation. A modern society is based on universal principles, common perspectives. Those of these authors who have paid attention to international comparisons point to the strong influence and diffusion of journalistic ideas and practices from more advanced cultures to less-advanced (e.g. from Britain to France).

Therefore it seems reasonable to state that the development of the press and journalism has common elements and phases in many cultures. The newspaper was first born in continental Europe in the 16th century, it spread into neighbouring regions and to the whole world. The same happened with journalism as a specific cultural form. It was born first in English-speaking countries and then it spread in continental Europe and little by little to other countries. Various obstacles from censorship to the level of economic development restricted and delayed this development in countries like Germany and Italy, and the development took on national variations. The factors influencing the development of journalism and newspapers are many and the different combinations of them may result in very different forms of journalism.

There are other journalistic cultures than the American one, but as the researchers referred to above have shown, they are declining and the American form of journalism has increasingly become the standard. For example, in Sweden the 'inverted pyramid' was called 'American' in 1953, while in 1981 it was designated as either 'straight' or 'traditional' (Høyer 2001, 15). The cultural diffusion (and even conscious export) of the Anglo-American model has been felt in most journalistic cultures and the result has usually been an increasing move towards the standard that first developed in the USA and Britain. Why has this form of news received such broad popularity and how has the transformation happened?

As Høyer pointed out, there are perhaps no universal stages of development, but rather different kinds of autonomous epochs. It seems reasonable that changes in journalism are closely linked with the social structure and political culture of the country. Multiparty politics and coalition forms of government supported by a partisan media favour a different kind of journalism than bi-party systems with a market-based media. I suggest that the changes in journalism have also to do with different levels of modernisation: societies which are dominated by more traditional ways of life, vital personal networks and personalised human relations favour a different kind of journalism than societies based on modern forms of organisation in which personal networks are not as effective.

An important aspect of the process in which journalism changes is the interplay between the level of commercialisation and the level of political allegiance. It seems that in many cases these two factors have been interpreted as incompatible: political control or allegiance could only harm the commercial media and commercialisation itself decreases the importance of political connections. However, this need not necessarily be so. The Chinese development is especially interesting because the transformation of the press (and the society as a whole) is taking place under the control of the Party and the state, but the introduction of market elements is a driving force in this process. In Russia, on the other hand, the situation is interesting, since politics and business are closely linked and not easily distinguishable.

There are different journalismisms and the differences do not necessarily mean quantitatively different levels of freedom, quality or democratic communication. Rather they represent qualitatively different aspects of freedom, quality and communication. Partisan journalism may be an appropriate form in conditions with a great number of media channels, but it becomes suffocating when the number of media is limited. Commercial media may offer a wide variety of political views but it is likely to reduce the spectrum of expression to messages that do not harm business.

There are also common tendencies towards more market-based, less partisan and more detached media and journalism. In this process, the direct, outside influences become less visible (and possibly weaker) in journalism but also the freedom of individual journalists declines. On the other hand, the sense of freedom, strengthened by professional ideology and internalised practices, may increase. Although practical conditions and societies are different, the common elements and factors of change exist and I would argue that modernisation theory provides a map with which to analyse these changes.

4. Development of the press in the Soviet Union and Russia

4.1. Origins of the Russian and Soviet press

The first Russian newspaper was founded in 1702, but during the 18th and most of the 19th century the press developed slowly and was closely linked with the state and intellectuals (Istoriya mirovoi zhurnalistiki 2000, 85-87). Only the last decades of Tsarist Russia experienced a huge growth in the number of newspapers. Their number grew between 1883 and 1913 from 80 to 1,158 (874 of them in Russian).¹ In spite of this growth, the number of newspaper copies per capita remained low and most of the newspapers limited their circulation to the largest cities (Kenez 1985, 22). Increasing literacy contributed to the growth of the press. The number of literates grew from 20% in 1897 to 44% in 1914 (Luntinen 1986, 301). The reading of newspapers was low even among those who later immigrated to America. Robert E. Park cited an editor of the *Russkoye Slovo*, New York City, who told that of the 312 readers who replied to a survey by the newspaper, only 16 had regularly read newspapers in Russia and 10 others read them time to time. In America all of them were readers of Russian newspapers (Park 1923, 274).

Before the revolution Russia experienced a short period of relatively free press based on the new press law published in 1905, which remained in effect until the 1917 February Revolution. After the October revolution the Bolsheviks suppressed the non-Bolshevik press by nationalising the paper supply, machinery, and buildings of the bourgeois papers (Kenez 1985, 44; Zhirkov 1999b, 5-8). However, the shortage of newsprint resulted in falling circulation also for the Bolshevik press. The Bolshevik papers also had problems with the lack of trained personnel (both in printing and in journalism) and distribution, because the pre-Revolutionary distribution system had been destroyed (Brooks 1985, 154). The first years of the new Soviet state therefore saw a drop in newspaper circulation.

1 Soviet sources gave somewhat different figures. According to Yablokov (1971, 16) there were 859 newspapers in Russia in 1913, of which 775 were in Russian. Another source gives a figure of 1,055 newspapers in 1913 with a total circulation of 3.3 million copies (21 copies for 1,000 citizens). In 1918 there were 884 newspapers with a total circulation of 2.7 million copies (18 copies for 1,000 citizens). (Pechat SSSR za sorok let 1957, 31, 123). The lower figures are based on the period 1920-1939.

The new Soviet press was constructed and planned from the beginning and represented a major break with the pre-revolutionary press. The development of the press was based on the decisions of the Party, which had highly practical aims: to spread information and propaganda to all levels of Soviet society. Despite this, it has been estimated that the “common Russian read less in the decade after the revolution than they had in the decade before” (Brooks 1985, 165). When the newspapers were required to be economically self-sufficient in 1922, their number fell from 803 to 313 and their circulation from 2.5 million to one million. With the new subsidies, in 1923 the number of newspapers grew to 528 and the circulation to two million copies (Hopkins 1970, 81).

The shortage of newsprint was compensated by establishing wall newspapers. The purpose of wall newspapers was not to spread news and information, but “to draw the masses into political and social work.” The wall newspapers were closely supervised by the Party and were, according to Kenez, the most extraordinary examples of organised “spontaneity” (Kenez 1985, 238). The aim of reaching all the strata of the population led to the development of local newspapers and papers directed at the workers, the rural population and national minorities. The number of newspapers peaked already in 1934, when 10,668 newspapers were published and the pre-war peak in circulation was in 1940, when the newspapers were printed in 38.4 million copies (figures from Pechat SSSR za sorok let 1957, 123).

4.2. Origins and typical features of Soviet journalism

Besides the general reviews of the history and the development of the press in the Soviet Union, there are some works that pay more attention to the development of journalism itself in pre-Revolutionary Russia and in the early years of the Soviet Union. These include works on the mass-circulation press in Russia (McReynolds 1991), the development of the Soviet form of journalism in the 1920s and 1930s (Lenoe 1998) and the role of the media as social engineer (Ellis 1998). Also works with a somewhat different focus (Brooks 1989; Kenez 1985) have some information about the development of the Soviet form of journalism.

The first mass-circulation newspapers appeared in Russia in the 1860s and despite the limitation set by censorship, the mass-circulation press developed as a social institution. New, market-based journalism triumphed in Russia in the 1880s, much the same way as it did in the West. In Russia, however, those who lost their domination over print to the forces of commerce

were not political parties as in the West but the intelligentsia (McReynolds 1991, 121).

The factors behind the development of the mass-circulation press were the development of pluralism in the form of interest groups and variety in the press, which “evidenced the society’s growing ability to accommodate diversity” (McReynolds 1991, 135). The Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905 and the revolutions of 1905-1907, along with the formation of the Duma and the censorship reform of 1905, gave the development of the press a new pace. In 1908, the first kopeck newspaper, *Gazeta kopeika*, which was oriented towards the lower classes, was started. Like similar popular newspapers in the West, “*Kopeika*’s writers painted a picture of a modern world in that it encouraged readers to assume greater individual responsibility” and expressed ideals about mobility, both social and geographical (ibid. 234).

In the first decades of the 20th century the press market in Moscow and St. Petersburg varied from conservative to liberal and from popular to elite. Also *Pravda*, “the most potentially serious challenge to *Kopeika*”, started in 1912 but the government never let *Pravda* publish very long.

The mass-circulation press

established an institution between private individuals and the state in which the public opinion could take shape and find expression. In the West, commercial journalism developed only after the written constitutions and the formation of representative parliaments, and its political utility has traditionally been viewed from its relationship to the expanding electorate. Russians, however, had to depend more heavily upon commercial print communications to develop an opposition to the autocratic form of government. (McReynolds 1991, 282).

Similar to their Western counterparts, the Russian newspapers and reporters shared “a sense of professional obligation, and they believed that they had a duty to provide objective news as a public service” (McReynolds 1991, 284). However, the concept of objectivity was still characterised by naive empiricism, as was also the case in the Western press of that time.

At the beginning of the 20th century Russia had a developing commercial press, which was in many respects not far from its Western counterparts. The development of objective reporting had similar idealisations as was the case in the West. As McReynolds (1991, 284) puts it, “Russian paralleled Western journalism in many significant ways. The Russian newspaper played essentially the same role in modernisation as did its Western counterparts: it provided information, interpretations, and space for advertisers to grease the wheels of commerce.” Although the Russian press operated within an environment that differed in many basic respects from the Western ones, its development had started to follow the same lines.

Also Brooks (1989, 16) notes that “before the revolution, the print media had evolved along typically western lines, and publishers competed to identify and satisfy the tastes of different groups of readers”. Rantanen (1990, 172), who has studied the news agencies and foreign news in imperial Russia, states that “international news agencies had a unifying effect on the presentation of news in the Russian press” both in form and content.

The Bolshevik revolution turned the development of the press to another direction. Bolsheviks did not “permit the circulation of non-party press. They prevented newspapers from assuming their pre-Revolutionary capacity to institutionalize a space in which state and society could confront one another” (McReynolds 1991, 288). Soviet publishers ignored popular taste and produced materials unsuitable for the least-educated readers. “The seriousness and difficulty of the Soviet mass publications, as well as the message they conveyed, put them beyond the range of the common readers” (Brooks 1989, 16).

The Soviet attempts to use the daily press to reach the lower classes led to the founding of newspapers like *Bednota*, *Krestyanskaya gazeta*, *Rabochaya gazeta* and *Rabochaya Moskva*, which were aimed especially at workers and peasants. Despite such efforts, the language of these newspapers remained difficult to the audience and the content left a great deal to be desired in comparison with the pre-revolutionary papers. (Brooks 1985, 162-165)

Although the intention of the Bolshevik leaders was to create unified propaganda machinery, the early Bolshevik press “accommodated many voices and several distinct discourses, each linked with types of authors and targeted audiences”. These discourses varied from the explanatory commentary of the leaders, their surrogates and columns by reporters important enough to have by-lines to anonymous reporters as well as the wire services and interactive columns such as “Party life” and “Workers’ Life” (Brooks 1992, 1435; see also Vihavainen 1988, 234).

The major transformation of Soviet journalism happened between 1925 and 1933, although the development was not as radical a break as it may seem on the surface; underlying continuities also remained. According to Lenoe,

issues of *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* from the period of the New Economic Policy or NEP (1921-1927) contain journalistic genres familiar to the American reader: the wire service report written in an “objective” style, the editorial commentary, the economic analysis, the short satirical piece about everyday life. The shrill declamation, exhortation, and didacticism of the same newspapers in the early 1930s, on the other hand, seem alien and bizarre (Lenoe 1998, 1).

On the other hand, the layout of the newspapers came closer to the American ones and

editions of *Pravda* from 1933 resemble contemporary high-circulation American newspapers in the arrangement of text, headlines, and photographs. Issues from the NEP era are comparatively dull, with single typeface headlines above columns of text that roll unbroken from page top to page bottom. (Lenoe 1998, 1)

During the NEP period private newspapers existed (amounting in 1922 to about 20% of circulation), mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but they were gradually losing ground and were abolished in 1931 (Zhirkov 1999a). In the early years of the Soviet state, “the public realm gradually but drastically narrowed. The people could not become acquainted with the crucial issues facing their society by reading their newspapers” because “instead of genuine issues, the newspapers devoted columns more and more often to pseudo-issues.” The Soviet regime “succeeded in preventing the formation and articulation of alternative points of view. The Soviet people ultimately came not so much to believe the Bolsheviks’ world view as to take it for granted” (Kenez 1985, 253).

Throughout the 1920s Soviet newspapermen carried on an active discussion about how best to use the press to influence the masses and, e.g., reader studies were carried out. The Soviet editors knew that their newspapers were boring, but they were not supposed to resort to “sensationalism”. Therefore, they took their example from Western models of the mass press like Lord Northcliffe’s *The Daily Mail*. While Western papers “communicated effectively with the masses by explaining the problems of workers’ daily existence in terms of bourgeois ideology,” the task of Soviet journalism “was to help the masses understand their daily lives by providing *correct* explanations” (Lenoe 1998, 36).

Similarly, the early Soviet editors faced the task of defining what would constitute news under socialism. There were pressures from different sides. In the NEP era, many Soviet bureaucracies created public relations departments, while the Party leaders “urged journalists to cover the campaign *on the shop-floor* and give workers a channel for controlled criticism of management inefficiencies”. Newspapers started to interview managers and workers and to visit the factories and produced their own news, bypassing the public relations departments (Lenoe 1998, 57).

The formation of Soviet society and internal pressures within it had an influence also on journalism. Journalism needed to be liberated from the old habits of sensationalism and bourgeois elitism and to get a new kind of relationship with the masses. The development of mass journalism was a

collaborative process in which Party leaders provided overall guidance, but the newspapermen themselves created the specific solutions (Lenoe 1998, 78). The Soviet form of journalism was shaped in pressures between the bureaucratisation of Soviet society and the idea of making the masses part of the campaigns and in general a part of the journalistic production itself. The response to increasing bureaucratisation was a balanced position between bureaucratic control and the voice of the masses. The state and its bureaucracies were not a threat or a reason for suspicion in the Soviet system. On the other hand, the campaign character of the Soviet press gave a voice, although dependent on the system, “to the masses”.

The main innovations of the Soviet press were a network of worker-peasant correspondents (*rabselkor*), the publishing of official texts and the special features of the letters to the editor. Also the important role of wall newspapers (see, e.g., Kenez 1985) and later the role of the factory newspapers could be added to these, but since they fall outside the universal press they have been left out of further analysis.

The system of worker-peasant correspondents (*rabselkor*) was developed because the task of the newspaper was not to report the “news” but to participate in local economic affairs. The newspaper

must be both a technical guide and a forum for the exchange of experience about the economic life of the territory it serves. The party feels that it is clearly impossible for ordinary staff newspapermen to discuss such problems effectively, or to avoid being inaccurate or superficial. Effective writing on such problems, it holds, can be done only by the specialist actually participating in the economic activities involved. (Inkeles 1950, 179-180)

In 1921, the local press was encouraged to form networks of worker or peasant correspondents and their number grew from 100,000 in 1924 to 500,000 in 1928 (Hopkins 1970, 87). It was estimated that at the end of the 1930s there were over two million worker and peasant correspondents. A single district or city newspaper could have 300-500 correspondents (Inkeles 1950, 205). In 1960 “there were five million workers, farmers, and intellectuals, who actively took part in the work of the press, radio and television” (Buzek 1964, 227).

The number of staff journalists was limited and a common guideline was that half of the material should come from non-staff journalists (Inkeles 1950, 179). Even higher figures could be found. During three sample months, of all the stories published in *Taganrogskaya pravda*, 65% were written by non-staff authors (and only 18% by journalists, leaving 17% for official materials from TASS, etc.). The non-staff authors were mainly members of the intelligentsia, officials of enterprises or state administration and engineers. (Massovaya informatsiya... 1980, 390-391)

The editors were also proud that more than half the contents consisted of material contributed by readers and non-staff writers, because it was “considered to be a proof of the democratisation of the press” (Buzek 1964, 220-221). However, the newspapers preferred publishing the material of specialists and of people in positions of responsibility. A side effect of this ideal was also “the practice of extensive rewriting or even ghostwriting of what supposedly” were “the raw outpourings of the Soviet citizen.” (Hopkins 1970, 300).

It was also common that the texts of worker-correspondents were edited in the newsroom and parts of them were actually written by journalists, although this practice was criticised in a Soviet handbook for journalists (Bogdanov & Vyazemskii 1971, 59).

A negative attitude towards the worker and peasant correspondents was reflected among professional journalists and the Party had “to ‘encourage’ workers to take up functions of correspondents” and “to establish special commissions for ‘work with the press’” (Buzek 1964, 227). It has even been stated that “most of the journalist’s time is taken up with these contributions and with other duties which fall under the description of mass political work” (ibid., 210).

The second special phenomenon of Soviet journalism was the widespread publishing of official texts. Official texts have occasionally been printed in all political newspapers and when the texts themselves have been important enough, even in the commercial press (see Kunelius 1994 on the publishing of the New Year speeches of the Finnish president). In the Soviet press, however, the official texts took on a far more important character. Speeches of the Secretary General, the meeting reports of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and political bodies on other levels, and even statistical reports were published in the pages of the Soviet newspapers.

There was hardly an issue of any major Soviet newspaper that did not contain the text of some important Party or government decision. Official texts pushed the news away, so that

three fourths or more of an issue of even a national newspaper like *Izvestiya* may often be devoted to the publication of such laws and announcements. Almost an entire issue, for example, will be devoted to listing, column after column, the names of persons who have won particular awards or orders. (Inkeles 1950, 165)

On the other hand, only nine per cent of all items contained in the sampled media in March 1988 were “ofitsioz,” as these items were referred to by Soviet journalists (McNair 1991, 21), but their share of the newspaper space

may have been even higher, since many of these items were long. They included reports on meetings of the Politburo and sessions of the Central Committee, speeches by Party leaders, laws and documents. For example, in March 1988

the Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the Draft Law on Co-operatives, both lengthy documents of several thousand words, were printed in all of the newspapers sampled. Indeed, on the day of its publication the Draft Law took up so much space that *Pravda* had only one page remaining for 'news' as such, while *Zarya Vostoka*, with only four pages, had to dispense entirely with news coverage that day. (McNair 1991, 21)

A third innovation was the practice of using letters to the editor. In every country newspapers receive letters to the editor, but in the Soviet Union this system was developed in a direction and on a level that was very much unique. Soviet newspapers received huge numbers of letters, e.g. in 1967 *Izvestiya* got 487,000 letters and published one fourth of them and in *Pravda* 45 journalists worked in the letter department (Mickiewicz 1981, 68).

The publishing of the letters about abuses was used as a sanction and a tool for better action: journalists "did their best to push local authorities into action, sometimes writing several times in increasingly severe tones" (ibid. 162), but this tool was not effective. In mid-1935

there was about one chance in seven that the alleged abuser would be punished, about the same chance that the complaints would be discredited (and perhaps punished himself) and about five chances that nothing particular would happen. (Fitzpatrick 1997, 165)

The lower the level of the newspaper, the weaker the effect of its critical reports. In many cases criticism presented by the press was neither supported by Party organs nor the authorities in general; they tried to deny criticism and did not reply to critical reports (Buzek 1964, 230).

Also in the late Soviet press, the majority of the letters to the editor was concerned with practical matters or they were connected with various campaigns. From a fourth to a half of all letters received by Leningrad papers in the 1960s "were thank-yous for favours and services", another portion "were simple requests for information" and still another category "were literary contributions, news items, memoirs, and photographs submitted for publication" (Hopkins 1970, 304-305). Only 5% of the letters in *Izvestiya* and versus 34% in *Komsomolskaya pravda* were concerned with public events (Shlapentokh 1989, 102). The authors of the letters were much older than most of the readers; almost a third of them were industrial manual workers

and peasants, while scientists and scholars were severely underrepresented among the authors of letters (Mickiewicz 1981, 68).

According to a Soviet handbook, the publishing of a letter was based on two factors: first, how well it reflected the mood and the views of the received mail and second, how important the matter was, how objective the treatment of the topic was and the correctness (*vernost*) of the opinions and conclusions. The facts of the published letters should have been checked and a published letter could be edited with the assistance of the author (Zhanry... 1972, 417).

Often when letters were published the topic was related to the problems of everyday life or had a connection with various campaigns, or it was combined with a story on how the problem has been solved or what kind of action is expected from the authorities (Inkeles 1950, 210-211).

The approach to the letters to the editor was a part of the system of self-criticism, which was expected to serve as an instrument for controlling the activities of the Party and government bureaucracy, to function as a method of mass participation and to serve as a channel of communication between the Party and the people (Inkeles 1950, 215-216). This criticism fulfilled functions that were in many ways similar to those of the Western press. The press criticised localised, compartmentalised shortcomings related to the execution of policies and rarely addressed the policies themselves. Letters and direct contacts with the press also compensated for shortcomings in the political and juridical system and functioned as a substitute, however inadequate, for a system of free elections. However, the letters dealt more often with the interests of the readers as consumers rather than producers or participants in the political process (Hollander 1983, 121; Buzek 1964, 222; Inkeles 1950, 218; Remington 1988, 168).

One of the motives for allowing the critical letters to be printed was that they no doubt served to promote a certain feeling of being involved. Therefore, the citizens in fact regarded "the press as perhaps the most effective means they have available of promoting their interests and resolving their particular problems". The second motive was the actual information that was contained in the various letters. They served as an excellent way of eliciting information, without allowing autonomous articulation and the aggregation of interests. (Gerner & Hedlund 1989, 281, see also White 1983, 57; Fitzpatrick 1997, 149)

4.3. Structure and functions of the Soviet press after 1945

Although the foundation of the Soviet press had been established in the 1920s and 1930s, the major development of the Soviet press took place only

after 1945. By that time the Second World War had cut the circulation of the press further, although the Soviet Union had grown in territory.

During the war the circulation of newspapers fell dramatically and after the war the development was slow. The pre-war level in newspaper circulation was reached in 1951. The number of newspapers, however, started to decline starting in the 1960s. This was partly influenced by the administrative reform, which abolished a great number of districts, and with them the district papers. New papers were founded but the total number of papers remained below 9,000.

The major growth of the Soviet press occurred in the 1950s and the 1960s, when the annual growth rate of newspaper circulation was 6-7%. In the 1970s the growth rate decreased, but in the 1980s the number of printed copies per 1,000 citizens reached over 600. At the same time the share of national newspapers grew, so that they took a major part of the total circulation.

Table 4.1. Number of newspapers and share of newspapers on different levels in the Soviet Union.

	Number of newspapers	Nat. papers	Printed copies (1,000)	Copies/1,000 citizens	Share of national papers %	Share of republican papers ¹ %	Share of regional papers %	Share of city and district papers %	Share of other papers %
1928	1,197	-	9,400	60	-	-	-	-	-
1940	8,806	46	38,355	208	22.9	13.8	21.3	27.2	14.8
1946	7,039	23	29,600	178	23	13	19	28	16
1950	7,831	23	35,964	201	26.2	13.4	22.8	23.3	14.3
1960	9,544	25	68,561	323	34.3	19.2	19.1	17.8	9.6
1970	8,694	28	140,716	582	44.3	16.9	15.6	18.0	5.2
1980	8,088	31	176,225	666	45.5	14.9	16.6	19.7	3.4
1985	8,427	31	190,080	688	48.0	13.8	15.1	19.6	3.5
1989	8,811	34	230,474	807	49.7	13.9	13.2	19.6	3.7
1990 ²	8,434	43	225,064	781	49.2	13.7	13.1	19.3	4.7

1 Republican newspapers refer mainly to the newspapers of other Soviet republics than Russia; regional papers were papers of oblasts, krajs and autonomous republics. Other newspapers were published by factories, kolkhozes and various workplaces.

2 In 1990 the circulation information published in Soviet statistics was 225 million, but Uzbekistan, Estonia and Lithuania were not included in this figure. With these additions (data for Estonia and Lithuania from Høyer, Lauk & Vihalemm 1993; data for Uzbekistan estimated on the basis of the previous year), the circulation was approximately 240 million and the circulation per 1,000 citizens was approximately 840.

Most of the Soviet newspapers were small both in the number of pages and in circulation. The average circulation of the district papers was usually 5,000-6,000. Most of them came out three times a week and included four pages in tabloid format. District newspapers concentrated almost exclusively on their own communities, published little national or international information, relied on non-staff writers and were “community boosters in the most indiscriminating way” (Hopkins 1970, 224). The regional papers were printed in broadsheet format in four pages and their average circulation did not reach 80,000 even in the 1980s.

If only the papers that came out at least four times a week (Unesco’s definition for a daily newspaper) were to be counted, most of the district and lower-level newspapers would be excluded. For example, in 1960 slightly more than 50% of the circulation belonged to daily newspapers (coming out at least four times a week) and in 1980 this figure was 62%. The republican dailies increased their share together with the national newspapers (which were also mainly dailies). It is also important to notice that no newspapers were published seven days a week (usually Monday was left out).

In conclusion, the mass-circulation of the daily press was a relatively recent phenomenon in the Soviet Union. Only in the 1970s and the 1980s did the newspapers reach almost the whole population.

The function of the press in the Soviet Union was to agitate, propagate and organise. As an agitator, the newspaper published materials the aim of which was to influence its audience. The news itself played a minor role in the Soviet press but a lot of informative material, e.g. laws, decisions of the Party and government and various documents were published. Almost all the items contributed to the political agitation. The format of the stories was a standardised: “eulogy and glorification of the Soviet system and its products, the criticism of the inadequacies which still exist despite the great success so far achieved, and finally, the crucial exhortation for still greater effort and firmer support of the regime” (Inkeles 1950, 164-166, see also Tarchys 1979, 52-53 and Schramm 1956, 133-134).

Because the time-bound news had little importance, the pressure of time was not as intense as in the Western newspapers. Only in reporting foreign news did the newspapers retain freshness and timeliness. The newspapers worked according to strict plans; the greater part of the contents was fixed for several days ahead. (Buzek 1964, 210.)

The news of the Soviet press was often timeless, because it could be kept waiting for several days or even weeks until the newspaper’s pages were cleared of, for example, an especially lengthy Party or government decision. Therefore it was possible to make a detailed plan of the contents and layout

one month in advance, and to have 50 per cent of each current issue set in type and made up several days before the issue date. This was possible because journalists didn't need to have to wait for a social process to happen; it was going all the time, and the particular point at which they picked up the thread of events was secondary. The most important actors in the Soviet press were impersonal (the revolution, the Party, the coming elections, or a new plan). Also the persons in Soviet journalism had a different position. Persons figured in the news as social symbols and not as personalities (Inkeles 1950, 140-141).

An emphasis on the day-to-day problems of economic life was indeed one of the most characteristic and striking features of the Soviet press. The task of the press was to carry out mass campaigns and assist in solving problems such as low productivity and poor labour discipline (Inkeles 1950, 167-168). The main articles in *Pravda*, as in other Soviet newspapers, indicated what action was to be taken by those to whom the articles were addressed (Party agencies and members as well as organs within other hierarchies). They often clearly indicated who was to be mobilised and what was to be accomplished (Tarchys 1979, 51).

The press served also as a propagandist by publishing materials that served as guides for other propagandists. In its third role as organiser, the newspaper assisted various administrative organs by transmitting various instructions to the lower levels (Inkeles 1950, 171-173). Campaigns were often of short duration without long-term effects on the media content (Massovaya informatsiya... 1980, 192; Remington 1983).

Inkeles argued that the tasks set for the Soviet press meant that the newspaper more or less excluded "a large part of its audience from the reading of a significant portion of the total printed matter" (Inkeles 1950, 174). Both Inkeles and, even more clearly, Hopkins (1970, 29) stated that in terms of purpose and content, the Soviet newspaper came very close to the American corporate house organ and it also shared with the American religious or labour press the inclination to judge events from an ideological or class point of view. Also Gaunt (1987, 532) stated that the Soviet press resembles a corporate public relations department rather than U.S. media and even a Western public relations model might offer a better method for studying Soviet journalists than the stress on ideological differences.

Soviet newspapers did not write about many negative or disruptive issues in their own society and therefore they created a picture of society that is tranquil and stable; change tended to be controlled and manageable and social problems were seldom if ever beyond solution. Uncertainty, despair, and doubt were neither characteristic of the political leadership, nor of the

official national mood. According to Hopkins, this created a credibility gap: often what was written in the press did not correspond to reality as the audience understood it. The role of the mass media became dysfunctional when it so overwhelmingly concentrated on portraying success, progress, and accomplishment, thereby ignoring the evidence to the contrary (Hopkins 1970, 179-180).

In the Soviet Union the role of the press was seen as a social force, the main task of which was to facilitate attainment of the society's defined goals, which were determined by the Communist Party. This was visible also in the Soviet conception of press freedom: "the Soviet press would be (...) free of capital, careerism, and bourgeois anarchistic individualism. Nevertheless, it was to make no claim to independence but would be quite openly tied to the proletariat". (Inkeles 1950, 136)

The notion of objectivity was rejected, because "a man who sought to be completely 'objective' in explaining any set of facts (...) always ran the risk of acting as an apologist for the facts he was explaining." On the contrary, the interpretation of reality should "evaluate historical events from the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat" (ibid. 139, see also Hopkins 1970, 180).

The coverage of Western societies was dependent on the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union but the aim was also not to publish anything that might lead the readers to question the Soviet political order (Hurwitz 1976). In the coverage of Africa, the pro-Soviet countries received more coverage and it was overwhelmingly positive, while negative news was told about countries that were not pro-Soviet (Eribo 1993, 57).

Foreign news took up almost 40% of the content of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* in 1947-1948 and the interest was directed primarily to Western Europe, Eastern Europe and worldwide news events (Inkeles 1950, 163). The amount of foreign news decreased in *Pravda* during the following decades and the share of news about Eastern Europe grew at the cost of Western Europe. The interest in worldwide news events was a stable phenomenon (Roxburgh 1987, 277) and in 1988 *Izvestiya* devoted around 40% of its space to foreign news.

According to quantitative studies, Soviet media provided much fuller coverage of foreign affairs than the majority of Western media (Downing 1988, 6; see also Gerbner & Marvanyi 1977). Qualitative studies, however, indicated shortcomings: e.g. the coverage of the Soviet media on Afghanistan 1979-1986 was not better than the coverage on El Salvador in the mainstream U. S. media (Downing 1988, 28).

The control of the press and the regulations set for it were the most rigid in the 1930s and the 1940s but after the death of Stalin, the differentiation of

the press started. The variation was most visible in youth papers, evening newspapers and literary newspapers.

The control of the press was tighter during Brezhnev than during the Khrushchev era (Dzirkals, Gustafson & Johnson 1982, 87; Spechler 1982) because the press was characterised by the battle against dissidence (Ovsepyan 2000, 219). There was no return to a unified press as under Stalin, but the use of softer limitations, e.g. the state control over the paper and newsprint supply, was used to limit the diffusion of materials of which the authorities disapproved, “reducing the paper supply to media that challenged the status quo” (Downing 1996, 70). There were also limitations on subscription to some papers.

The Soviet press also applied various methods of news manipulation: “suppressing some news and delaying others until a more ‘suitable moment’ for publication; one-sided selection or deliberate omission of portions of otherwise comprehensive information, adapting, slanting and, in the last resort, outright falsification of inconvenient news.” Nevertheless, the falsification of embarrassing news was comparatively rare, since other methods usually proved adequate. (Buzek 1964, 173).

4.4. Developments in Soviet journalism

Soviet journalism was practiced in conditions of heavy control and settled guidelines. For example, the Central Committee guidelines from 1922 defined the structure of newspapers in a very detailed way (Resheniya partii... 1941, 37-39, 53; cit. Inkeles 1950, 162). According to Inkeles, this structure was followed even at the end of the 1940s in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (ibid. 162-163). In local and regional newspapers the unitary structure was strengthened by following *Pravda* and reprinting its main articles. The reason for this was the “fear of committing political errors, or of being found insufficiently enthusiastic in praising the party and Stalin” (Buzek 1964, 81).

After Stalin’s death the following remark was made by a Western scholar: “Soviet newspapers have become more lively and varied both in presentation and in content.” Editors were “no longer rigidly bound by outdated regulations as to how many lines or how much space must be given to specific material” and therefore out of a “uniform mass of dullness emerged several newspapers (...) distinguished by specialised contents, livelier and even bold layout, and greater use of photographs and drawings” (Buzek 1964, 85). According to Hopkins management of the press had been altered “less by legislation than by difference of political style, primarily in the Communist Party apparatus” (Hopkins 1970, 147).

Soviet authors also paid attention to the qualitative changes in journalism, although Soviet journalism was not liberated from its role as “weapon of the Party” or from its close connections with literature. The decade after the death of Stalin (1953-1963) was a period of qualitative changes in the Soviet press. The role of information had grown. There was a change in topics the newspapers wrote about. Still another new feature was the development of specifically publicistic genres, like articles, correspondence, reviews and satirical genres. The task of Soviet journalism, to take part in the development of society, was clearly visible in the development of these genres (Cherepakhov 1964, 32-36).

The development of Soviet journalism followed a different path when compared to Western journalism. While Western journalism developed towards increasing detachment, Soviet journalism preserved the tendency of involvement with the objects of its work. Soviet journalism was remarkably publicistic, social and political journalism.

Much has been written about the Soviet system of literary genres (*zhanr* in Russian) mainly by Russian authors (see e.g. *Zhanry sovetskoi gazety* 1972). The Soviet system of genres served as a model for journalists and it was highly institutionalised. Some of the Soviet journalistic genres did not have equivalents in Western journalism but some others certainly did. The *zametka* (a small news story), for example, was in its form very similar to its Western counterpart, although the purpose of the story was to tell about success or shortcomings (Zhanry... 1972, 24).

Both censorship and political control (including self-censorship) limited the possibilities for Soviet journalism to fulfil its tasks as part of the administration of the system. The role of official censorship was to guarantee that forbidden items were not mentioned, but according to an Estonian study, the censorship did much more, e.g. by keeping the interpretation of reality within the limits of the permissible (Lõhmus 2002, 69). The most important strategies used in the processing of texts were the addition and construction of myth (e.g. on the achievements of the system) and the elimination of discussions and commentaries (ibid. 141).

The habit of self-censorship was an even more important regulator. Media professionals operated according to long-ingrained procedures and the process of cultural production “was not a jerky, crisis-ridden, confrontational epic. It was simple, strong and smooth, because just as in corporate media, the rules of the game were very well understood, to the point of untroubled, ‘instinctive’ compliance” (Downing 1996, 67). On the other hand, the journalistic texts of the late Soviet period “could be understood as the textual battlefield or

frontier between different discourses”, since journalists challenged the limits of control and tended towards the widening of meaning (Löhmus 2002, 252).

Besides the controlled information, also elite sources of information were available but mostly the communication proceeded through the mass media, which the politically active persons could decode in an appropriate way. Some authors have also pointed out the importance of how the information was treated, not only the information itself. A comparative study on the coverage of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits indicated that “Soviet summit coverage was explicitly statist; the problem of peace was presented as one that the Soviet government would resolve; the citizen had no independent role or perspective” (Hallin & Mancini 1991, 261).

The question of professionalism among Soviet journalists has caused discussion among scholars, but the different opinions mainly depend on the definition of the concept ‘profession’ (see e.g. Školkey 1998). Soviet journalists had various professional skills, which were well developed — like the ability to read opinions between the lines, but as a group they were not autonomous from the state. An important difference compared to the Western press was that the role of the editor-in-chief was crucial in the making of the Soviet newspapers. He put the stamp of his personality on the entire editorial process and was far more important than the official censor (Dzirkals, Gustafson & Johnson 1982, 43-45; Spechler 1982, 243). Soviet journalists had some patterns of professionalism that were lacking in the West, e.g. peer review mechanisms in order to become a member of a professional union, while the idea of professional independence was a very weakly established norm (Remington 1985, 496). A later Estonian study emphasised that the majority of the Estonian journalists tried “to find ways of resisting the ruling system through journalism. Journalism was not a profession but it was a mission to a great extent” (Lauk 1996, 104).

Curry has pointed out that in Poland journalists had developed and retained the characteristics of true professionals, but their professionalism was “a product not of their autonomy but of the unpleasant push and pull of political forces” (Curry 1990, 207). In the Soviet Union the control was tighter, but even there some forms of professionalism developed. In Soviet Estonia, for example, the Communist Party looked “upon journalism as no more than an establishment of ideology” (Pärl-Löhmus 1997, 109): the framework of editing “became formally narrower, but at the same time the real content of the work was determined by the professionalism of journalists” (ibid. 118).

The idea of ‘public service’, which has formed the basis of the professional ideology of journalists in Western Europe and Northern America, was not

able to develop in Soviet society. Soviet journalists did serve public interests but these interests were defined by the Party apparatus. Their work was not oriented toward conceptions of administrative rationality and neutral expertise, but it may have been supposed to serve the public as a whole, since there was supposed to be unity between the Party and the people (for the definitions of Western professionalism see Hallin 1996, 245).

However, even besides the question of professionalism, the conditions of the work and requirements (both good and bad) were different for Soviet journalists than for their Western counterparts and therefore also the content of their work was different. Soviet editorial offices were usually overcrowded with journalists, a significant part of the salary was based on honorariums on the basis of published stories and a significant part of the work was not deadline-bound. Therefore, although there was perhaps no serious time pressure, there was pressure to get something published. Under such pressure for high quantitative output, the Soviet journalist turned to official sources for ideas and information and to standardised, clichéd techniques for writing (Remington 1988, 166). The practice became similar to that in the West, although the reasons were different.

4.5. Soviet media and audience

During the Soviet period, several audience studies were made and they have been reported, e.g., by Mickiewicz (1981) and Roxburgh (1987). One of the major surveys of the newspaper audience in the Soviet Union was done in the city of Taganrog (Rostov oblast) at the end of the 1960s.¹ According to this study, the readers of the city newspaper could be divided into different groups based on the amount of reading. The group that read over 80% of the content comprised 4% of the residents, 12% of the residents read 60-80% while the major part of the population (64%) belonged to the groups that read 20-60% and skimmed 20-80% of the content. One fifth (20%) did not read more than 20% of the content. (Massovaya... 1980, 263-264).

It should be kept in mind that a typical Soviet newspaper contained no more than four pages and to read a major part of the content was not a time-consuming task.² The most active groups consisted of intellectuals and

1 The results of this survey were reported in a book, *Massovaya informatsiya v Sovetskoy promyslennom gorode* (Mass Communication in the Soviet industrial city) and the major part of it was published in English in the journal *Soviet sociology*.

2 An average Finnish newspaper reader reads 15 to 20 stories and glance at the headlines of 32 stories (Miettinen 1980, 184-187, 200).

technical professionals. In the most non-active group, more than half were workers in the service sector. Most workers belonged to the average or non-active groups. The most active group was more highly educated but in the least active groups the majority had a secondary level of education. Over half of those who had only completed elementary education belonged to the groups that read more than average. (Massovaya... 1980, 268)

Also a survey of emigrants from the Soviet Union indicated that the reading of newspapers was on a high level, 86% read newspapers. Newspapers were the most important source of news; radio was second and the role of television was less important. Of those who had emigrated, 30% had read *samizdat* publications and 84% had listened to foreign radio broadcasts; especially those who were interested in politics had done so. (Zimmerman 1987, 339-342)

In the Soviet surveys it was found out, e.g., that *Pravda* claimed to have 39.5 million readers (with a circulation of 10 million), but only half of the readers had actually read the newspaper the day before. *Pravda* was almost compulsory reading for the members of the Communist Party and 90% of them read it. Only around one quarter of the readers were workers, 15% were pensioners and 2% students (Roxburgh 1987, 93, 278).

According to a study on the district press, in 1969-1971 the majority (60%) of the Soviet people read their local district newspaper; the regional newspaper was read by only 20% of the population, whereas national newspapers were read by 73% (among them the most popular was the countryside newspaper *Selskaya pravda*). Of all the readers of newspapers, 54% read more than two newspapers. The younger, more educated and working persons read newspapers more actively. Also men read them significantly more than women (96% vs. 63%) (Raionnaya gazeta... 1977, 61-63). Although the majority of the population read newspapers, only 40% read newspapers every day and 20% read them at least once a week (ibid., 67). One reason for this was that the district newspaper (the paper they read most) came out only three times a week.

Several surveys on newspaper reading were carried out in Estonia in 1979-1984 and according to them, 88% of Estonians read local newspapers. The youth newspaper in Estonian was read by 54% of (ethnic) Estonians and the Estonian national newspaper by 44% (Lauristin et al. 1987, 92-93). Another survey, done in 1989, indicated that the reading of Estonian newspapers increased at the end of the 1980s (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1990, 493-495).

The importance of television increased during the last few years of the Soviet Union. A survey among journalism students of Leningrad State

University in 1988 showed that 62% read newspapers daily, 18% at least once a week and the rest more seldom. Newspapers were the main source of news for only 36% of the students, although among all the sources they were second after television. (Eribo, Vaughn & Oshagan 1990, 197-198).

The major national newspapers were read more often by those with higher education, men, urban dwellers and white-collar employees. *Trud*, on the other hand, had more readers among industrial workers (Mickiewicz 1981, 54-55). Many Soviet newspapers suffered from the turnover in subscriptions, e.g. in Moscow more than a third of the subscribers to *Izvestiya* did not renew their subscriptions. Dissatisfaction with the content was the main reason for this and people wanted to see the newspapers improving human interest articles, articles on international events and critical articles as well as publishing more stories expressing "different points of view" (ibid. 67).

According to Mickiewicz, "the critical stance of the Russian reader and the unfulfilled demand for both broader and more sophisticated coverage of issues of crucial interest to the readership seem not to be paralleled on the American side." (ibid., 67). The consequences of this critical attitude became clear during the *glasnost* period when the circulations of pluralist newspapers were booming. It can also be interpreted as an indicator of an increasing gap between the official and private spheres of communication.

The most popular topic was the foreign news, which was followed by "morality and education" (according to Roxburgh its Western counterpart is loosely 'human interest') and "housing and social security" (Roxburgh 1987, 93). The occupation of the readers had an impact on the following topics: education interested teachers, economic news was read by administrators and Communist Party professionals, and crime stories were read by legal professionals (Mickiewicz 1981, 60).

Surveys of the readers of *Pravda* carried out in 1968 and 1977 showed that "about 90 percent of all readers more or less regularly read the articles on international issues, whereas only 70 percent on economic issues, 68 percent on moral and educational ones, and 60 percent on Marxist theory" (Chernakova 1979; Evdalov et al., 1969; see also Shlapentokh 1989, 143). Even readers of local newspapers "prefer international materials to all others; only 25 percent of Taganrog newspaper subscribers ignore foreign affairs articles, while articles on industry are ignored by 62 percent of all readers and on municipal bodies by 46 percent" (Shlapentokh 1989, 143).

The surveys indicated that the articles readers found most satisfying were those on international topics and on economics. Dissatisfaction was caused mostly by the human-interest stories, which in the Soviet press stressed "the ethical or moral choices and lessons to be learned from everyday life"

(Mickiewicz 1981, 62-64). A reader's level of education had an interesting effect on the level of dissatisfaction: "both the top of the status ladder and the bottom show the highest, though not identical, rates of dissatisfaction and criticism" (ibid. 134-135). The audience trusted the international news more than the stories about local events, which was explained by the lack of immediate experience (ibid. 136).

There was also a great discrepancy between perceived social problems and media coverage. It was found out that although *Taganrogskaya Pravda* reported widely on the plan for developing the economy of the city adopted by the City Council and the City Committee of the Party, only 10-13 per cent of the citizens knew the content of the plan, 26-27% had heard that the meeting of the City Council and the Party Committee had taken place but did not know what had been decided and the majority knew nothing about it. The low level of receiving information was explained by the lack of interest among the population and by the different interests of the public and the media. The newspapers paid little attention to the issues that were perceived as the most important problems (e.g. housing) (Massovaya ... 1980, 363-365).

On general topics the official mass media was the main source of information, but on more local and more delicate issues (the share of the citizens living in unsatisfactory apartments, the most common type of crime in the city) information was received more likely through personal networks (and by personal experience) or equally from the media and through networks. Also oral propaganda had only a minor role in the flow of information. The majority of the population did not receive information about official decisions at all. (ibid. 352)

In older studies, the reliance on private communications is mentioned frequently. It was found out "that word-of-mouth was one of the most important sources of information in the Soviet Union during the 1940s" (Inkeles & Bauer 1961, ref. Hollander 1972, 181). In the 1970s there were still certain kinds of information for which people relied on private conversation. This included "news about available goods, descriptive details on accidents and natural disasters, human interest stories, and, most important from the standpoint of political socialization, news about political events and intrigues" (Hollander 1972, 181).

Even in some post-Soviet studies the importance of personal contacts has been highlighted. In a survey done in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, it was found out that although television (81%) and the press (74%) were main sources of "information that is useful in daily life", half of the population (49%) received information also from neighbours and friends (Basow 1996).

Similarly in Kursk “everybody knew” when and where Aleksandr Rutskoi was having his campaign meeting although his candidacy was not mentioned either in official or opposition media (Shatikov & Nechasev 1997, 63). A comparative study on the exchange of important information between teachers in St. Petersburg and Helsinki indicated that in St. Petersburg the exchanged information related to everyday life, which was not present or was exceptional in the Finnish data (Lonkila 1997).

4.6. Media and the social crisis of the 1980s

The period of *perestroika* and *glasnost* changed the role of the media in Soviet society. This development has been reflected in many studies (e.g. McNair 1989, Paasilinna 1995) and the aim of this study is not to report them completely but to point out some developments.

The process of change became visible already at the beginning of the 1980s, mainly in Eastern European countries. In Poland the new role of information was visible already in 1980-1981 when the Solidarity movement was launched and then suppressed. Journalists were eager to open up the pages of their publications to information about the Solidarity union, explore previous taboo subjects, and initiate new forms of dialogue between the authorities and the public (Albright 1983, 129).

In the Soviet Union, the signals of change “were much more muted and delphic” before the accession of Gorbachev and the initiation of *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies. *Glasnost* was generally conspicuous in its rarity outside Moscow, Leningrad and the Baltic Republics and was a fairly rare commodity even in Moscow city localities (Downing 1996, 78-79).

Glasnost is a concept that had been used at least as far back as 1968 and the term was incorporated into the 1977 Soviet constitution. *Glasnost* initially meant the media’s participation in the campaign to highlight corrupt bureaucratic practices, but from 1986 onwards, protecting the population from disturbing news was considered a bad old habit and the openness of the public channels of communication increased to an unprecedented degree (Andrle 1994, 271).

At the beginning *glasnost* was not a goal in its own right, but a tool of democratisation and political reforms: a freed-up (but still controlled) press was in essence the only reliable ally Gorbachev possessed in his struggle with conservative forces in the Party apparatus (I. Zasurskii 2001, 8). It was seen as an aid to economic ‘acceleration’ and it looked like no more than another example of the ‘criticism and self-criticism’ of one of the regular campaigns. There had been *glasnost* campaigns even in the 1970s (McNair

1991, 42). During *glasnost* the leadership was not focussing primarily on the freedom of the press but “on the usefulness to the regime of an informed and involved citizenry” (Goban-Klas 1989, 247). Jakubowicz (1990, 51) even suggested several varieties of *glasnost*, since “while in China and the Soviet Union proposed changes amount to tinkering with the system, in Hungary and in Poland they entail the sweeping away of political, legal and administrative barriers to the exercise of the right to communicate”.

On the one hand, *glasnost* was intended to establish “a political culture of debate and difference, rather than uniformity and regimentation” (McNair 1993, 57). On the other hand, it was a tool for official policies, e.g., “when the Central Committee cancelled the projected diversion of the Ob river in Siberia to the Central Asian republics, there was a rush of media coverage of water pollution” (Downing 1996, 80). As an official policy *glasnost* has even been interpreted as a threat to the political position of the journalistic establishment and at the beginning the academic elite of journalism was seen to have resisted liberalisation (Remington 1988, 180). Also journalism education became a target of harsh criticism (Haddix 1990, 158).

In the second phase, from the end of 1986, *glasnost* was treated as a lever for the political reform of the Soviet system and, finally, by early 1990, the idea of ‘reform of the system’ “gave way to the widespread expression of openly anti-Communist views in the media” and “the concept of *glasnost* had to a large extent been equated with (...) the notion of free speech” (Benn 1987; Benn 1992, 12-13).

In the mass media *glasnost* did not eliminate the standard control mechanisms but made their usage more selective, while editors gradually secured greater discretion over content (Gibbs 1999, 88). The leadership considered liberal journalists its allies and a large section of the media responded with support for the leadership (Tolz 1992, 112). Although the first Western assessments of *glasnost* were rather suspicious, “*glasnost* will mean exactly what the leadership want it to mean: no more and no less” (Dejevsky 1989, 39), the liberation proved to be a process which could no longer be turned back and led to the collapse of the system and the state.

During the *glasnost* period the circulation of the press rose from 185 million copies in 1984 to 230 million in 1989. The circulations of reformist and liberal newspapers like *Izvestiya* and *Komsomolskaya pravda* rose while conservative ones like *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* stagnated. *Argumenty i fakty* increased from 1.4 million copies to 20.4 million, *Liternaturnaya gazeta* from 2.7 million to 6.2 million and *Ogonek* from 600,000 to over 3 million between 1985-1988 (Gibbs 1999, 86, Schillinger 1989).

In the multilingual weekly *Moscow News*, the *glasnost* era changes included the predominance of substantive, hard subjects over softer ones, the predilection for negative subjects and negative commentary, the growing passion for pluralism, and the new emphasis on timely and controversial topics (Schillinger & Porter 1991, 144). While in 1982 only 15 percent of items had timely relevance to actual events, their share was more than 92 percent in 1989 (ibid. 141). Mickiewicz (1988, 56) describes timeliness (*operativnost*) as a new value in Soviet journalism and compares its impact with that of *glasnost* itself. Similar changes were found already in the first years of the *glasnost* era in the analysis of English-language translations of *Pravda* (He 1988, 193).

Also the number of letters sent by the audience to the newspapers exploded (see e.g. Downing 1996, 71) and the worker correspondent movement was activated. "In 1986-87 almost every national newspaper and weekly magazine published letters to the editor containing views in direct and irreconcilable confrontation with one another" (Shlapentokh 1990, 154). Many papers started to print letters on the front page.

Glasnost brought problems and popular dissatisfaction to light: they were related to services, ecology, ethnic issues and the rise in prices. Soviet public opinion was more volatile and flexible than ever, which led also to the polarisation of views — a new phenomenon in Soviet society (Shlapentokh 1990). Also issues like anti-Semitism became public (Garrard 1991). The media started to reflect the opinions of the politically active segments of the population and public opinion became more important than before (Tolz 1993, 198-199).

Glasnost also increased listening to foreign radio broadcasts among youth. Moreover, the increase happened mainly in information programs. *Glasnost* also increased the distrust of and disagreement with the media among youth, which was even interpreted as a positive effect and a sign of democratisation developing (Manaev 1990, 200).

The dramatic rise of the non-traditional press began in 1987. A new wave of independent publications occurred in 1989, including also daily newspapers, along with the increasing commercialisation of the press and interest in the preparations for the 1990 elections. Many of these alternative publications became obsolete after 1991, and those who survived changed their content and character entirely (Krekola 2000, 77-88; Ovsepyan 1996, 172-174; on the alternative press, see also Manaev 1991 and on the formation of the independent press, Urban 1993).

Different periodisations of *glasnost* have been made, e.g. Paasilinna calls the years 1985-1987 'the phase of clearance' and the second phase (1987-

summer 1988) 'the period of difficulties' (Paasilinna 1990, 97; a similar periodisation is offered by Gibbs 1999, 89-90), while McNair distinguishes a 'top down' -phase up to 1990 and a 'bottom up' -phase from 1990 to 1991. In the second stage the concept of 'socialist pluralism' was replaced by 'liberal pluralism' and criticism started to arise with increasing spontaneity from below. The third phase after the collapse of the Soviet Union (August 1991-September 1993) changed the role of the media completely but also had elements of the decline of liberalism (McNair 1994, 116-122). Ivan Zassoursky (2001a, 86-87) outlines a difference between the *glasnost*-oriented propaganda machine model (1986-1990) and the 'fourth power', independent media model (1991-1995).

The most important turning point was the passing of the media law in 1990. This law banned censorship and also allowed individual citizens to found newspapers and other media channels, and after this point it was no longer possible to speak about *glasnost* as a concept based on Leninist ideology (see e.g. Gibbs 1999, 90).

Many Russian journalists regarded the years 1989-1992 as the golden age of the Russian press. At this time reporters had unprecedented access to a variety of sources, but this was also a period of great confusion and superficiality (Fossato 2001, 344). In this era the economy of the press was still largely secured by the state, which had lost most of its ability to control it (Hagström 2000, 205). The concept of the 'fourth estate' became increasingly popular among journalists, who did not see their task "as informing the public or coming up with a reliable picture of reality, but enlightenment, agitation and organisation in the name of true values and ideas" (I. Zasurskii 2001, 16).

Much has been written about the role of *glasnost* and the liberalisation of information in the collapse of the Soviet Union. A rarely referred citation from Stalin in 1948 proved to be true: "If our propaganda should ever be permitted to go lame (...) our entire state would inevitably collapse" (cited according to News from Russia 1952, 7). However, the lack of propaganda may not have been the main cause of the collapse of the Soviet state, but certainly "increased communications and information under *glasnost* contributed to the speedup of the collapse of the Soviet center" (Ganley 1996, 215).

Paasilinna (1995, 144) emphasise the importance of two features in Soviet television programmes: live broadcasts and social programmes on current affairs. For example, the televised debates from the first Congress of People's Deputies legitimised debate and went a long way toward banishing fear (Shane 1994, 151, see also Paasilinna 1995). Information undermined the

state by sowing doubt, eroding faith, exposing falsehood, and uniting dissidents (Shane 1994, 280; for the negative consequences of the press liberalisation in Poland in 1980-81, see also Albright 1983, 132).

Television was also criticised for lagging “behind the press in elucidating the crucial issues of *perestroika*”, which was linked to television’s role in a centralised command-administrative structure that left little space for alternatives and pluralism (Vartanov 1991, Muratov 1991). Soon after the beginning of *glasnost* the struggle for control over Soviet television became visible, e.g., in staff changes; this struggle took place on every level and between the center and republics as well (Androunas 1991, 190-199).

When Soviet ethnic conflicts became acute, the policy of the central television to ‘do nothing to make the situation worse’ led to a “general inability (...) to make the profusion of ethnically based incidents and local policies intelligible to a highly varied and very heterogeneous audience” (Mickiewicz 1991, 36). Non-Slavs, especially Central Asians, were underrepresented in the newscasts of the Soviet (national) television (Mickiewicz & Jamison 1991). Similar problems were visible in the coverage of Central Asia in the central press (Watters 1990).

Glasnost and *perestroika* did not succeed in the way that was intended, but they contributed to the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet state. People were no longer “the old impersonal and obedient mass for the Party. The *glasnost* medication failed; the patient overdosed and died” (Paasilinna 1995, 189).

4.7. Development of the press after the collapse of the Soviet Union

4.7.1. Changing press structure

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Soviet press found itself in a new situation. The economic reforms of 1992 led to increasing costs and the newspapers ran out of money (Matthews 1994, 37-39). As a result, the national newspapers lost much of their influence outside Moscow. The circulation of the most popular dailies dropped in 1992 and weeklies like *Argumenty i Fakty*, which survived better, lost the greatest part of their circulation (circulation figures for individual newspapers: Benn 1996).

The most complete data on the circulation of the press in Russia can be found in the annual press printing statistics published by the Russian Chamber of Book Publishers (RCBP) under the titles *Pechat Rossiiskoi Federatsii*

...*godu* (Printing in the Russian Federation in the year...), which contain data only concerning those newspapers that sent a free copy to the Chamber. It is likely that up to 1991 these figures were reliable enough, but since then some flaws have appeared¹. Another problem in using this data is also that the Russian definition of newspaper, *gazeta* in Russian, includes papers with very different kinds of periodicity and form, like weeklies, monthlies and nowadays also many free advertisement sheets.

Relying only on the overall figures, the decline in the circulation of the press is less dramatic than those mentioned in other studies. Actually, the total newspaper circulation is at the same level as it was at the beginning of the 1980s (see Pietiläinen 2001b). The drop happened between 1990 and 1994, but since then the figures have improved significantly. While the circulation of newspapers was 1,116 copies per 1,000 persons in 1990, it was 850 copies in 1998. In 1993 and 1994 this figure was 580 and 577.

While the overall figures for press publishing do not indicate a dramatic decline in newspaper circulation, a more significant drop, however, can be found upon closer look at these statistics. The figures change if only those newspapers coming out at least once a week, have been counted. In two years (1991-1993) the circulation of these newspapers was cut in half and the increase after 1994 has not been rapid. In this case also regionalisation is more visible.

On the other hand, there is also a growing tendency towards strengthening the position of the national newspapers among the daily press. Since 1997 national newspapers have increased their share of circulation, although the circulation of the national newspapers has remained unchanged (regional and local dailies have lost circulation).

The per capita circulation of weeklies and dailies dropped from 1,108 per 1,000 persons in 1990 to 463 in 1993 and 443 in 1994 and increased only to 580 in 1997, falling back to 460 in 2000. The circulation of daily newspapers (newspapers which came out at least four times a week) has also continued to decline even after 1994 and have dropped to the level of Italy, Spain and some Latin American countries. The circulation of national daily newspapers dropped from 80 million copies in 1990 to 5 million copies in 1998, while the circulation of local daily newspapers dropped 'only' from 24 million to 9 million. Among the national weeklies (1-3 times a week) the drop has been from 33 million to 14 million. Only the circulation of regional weeklies has increased from 27 to 48 million copies.

1 For example, the 1996 figures did not contain any newspaper in the Finnish or Karelian languages, although a newspaper in both of these languages was published regularly.

The World Association of Newspapers (WAN), which published the circulation figures for Russia for the first time in 1998, reports a higher figure for Russian daily newspaper circulation: 22.8 million. The discrepancy is insignificant among the national press (WAN: 5 million, Russian statistics: 5.2 million), but for the regional and local press WAN reports a circulation of 17.8 million while the Russian statistics give a figure of 9 million (WAN 1998, 159; Pechat 1998, 122). On the other hand, the figures for non-dailies and other papers are higher according to the Russian figures than according to WAN (83 million vs. 36 million). WAN's figures come from the Russian National Bureau of Circulation Audits.

The drop in the circulation of the newspapers is rooted in economic crises and the amount and share of income of the poorest. In 1991 one tenth of the population (11.4%) was in poverty, while in March 1992 already almost a quarter (23.4%) of the population was in poverty and the situation was same in June 1992 (McAuley 1995, 183). The major drop in the circulation of the press happened just at that time.

A major change has occurred in the periodicity of the newspapers. In 1990 the majority of the circulation belonged to the newspapers that came out six times a week, but already in 1993 the most of the circulation belonged to weeklies or to newspapers issued even more seldom. The growth of the newspapers published less than once a week or with non-regular periodicity is one the phenomena of the second half of the 1990s. Although there were almost 300 of this kind of newspaper in 1990, they were small (their standard circulation was around 1000 copies, although the mean circulation was around 7,000 because there were few national newspapers of this kind) and their share of circulation was only around one per cent. In 1997 there were over 1,400 such newspapers and their share of circulation was around one third.

Between March 1992 and March 1993 the share of those who read regularly at least one newspaper declined from 81% to 68% (Wyman 1997, 108). On the other hand, the estimated number of days on which an average male read newspapers fell from 200 days in 1990 to 109 in 1994, while the number of days on which an average woman read newspapers fell from 165 to 95 (*ibid.*, 49), which indicated the shift from dailies to weeklies. More recent figures reported by Resnyanskaya and Fomicheva (1999, 87-88) indicate a decrease in newspaper readership also after 1993. In 1993 newspapers were not read at all by 9% of Russians, while in 1997 this figure was 22%.

Also the number of national newspapers has increased and most them have been linked with political and economic groups that fight for power and influence. Hagström (2000, 218) calls this a segmented market, where some newspapers are oriented towards the general public and others towards

the different élite groups. The most successful national newspapers (*Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Izvestiya* and *Moskovskii komsomolets*, and among the weeklies, *Argumenty i fakty*) have been adapted to local circumstances by publishing local supplements (Vartanova 2001a, 29; Blinova 2001, 273; Trofimov 1999, 17).

Similar developments have occurred with magazines. One of the flagships of *glasnost*, the journal *Ogonek*, ran into difficulties because of rising prices and lost over 90% of its circulation between 1990 and 1993. It reoriented its content, extensive essays were replaced by short reviews and reports and some of the “magazine’s most trusted subscribers have reacted with horror to what they see as its vulgarisation”; the new market has largely been taken over by new journals (Lovell 1996, 1002-1003; on Russian journals also Kozlova 2000). Competition appeared also between news agencies, but in the first half of the 1990s the state-owned agencies ITAR-TASS and RIA still dominated (Rantanen & Vartanova 1995, 218).

By the end of the 1990s a four-level structure of the Russian media had formed: first, the all-Russian electronic mass media and the quality Moscow newspapers controlled by politicised capital; second, the commercial mass media both in the centre and the regions, which are usually not controlled by politicised capital but work in close co-operation with it; third, the regional electronic and print media, generally under the control of the local authorities; and fourth, the level of the Internet (I. Zasurskii 2001, 107-108).

Despite the arguments of some scholars (Izyumov 1993, McNair 1994, 131) and some individual cases, foreign ownership of Russian media has been rather limited in comparison with other Eastern European countries. Foreign ownership, in the form of Russian editions of foreign magazines, has mainly occurred in magazines but not in newspapers, except for a few like the English-language newspaper *The Moscow Times* and the Swedish-owned *Delovoi Peterburg*, (Business Petersburg) newspaper. In television, foreign ownership was even significantly limited by law (banning the foreign ownership of channels covering more than 50% of the Russian area or population) in August 2001 (RFE/RL Newsline 1.2.2002).

4.7.2. *Changing distribution channels*

The distribution channels of the press have also changed. While in 1992 67% of newspaper circulation was comprised of subscriptions distributed through the federal postal service, the percentage had declined to only 51% in 1994 and 41% in 1997. In 1994, 56% of central (national), 59% of regional, and 48% of city and district newspapers were subscribed to through the

postal service. The main drop in the postal distribution of the national press happened in 1995, when only 24% of copies were distributed through the postal service; in 1997 this figure was 22%. The regional press kept the postal distribution longer: in 1995 it comprised 40% and in 1997, 35%. By the end of the 1990s the lowest level of postal distribution belonged to the city and district newspapers: 24% in 1995 and 19% in 1997 (figures based on SMI Rossii 1998, 9 and Pechat RF of years in question).

The high level of inflation in Russia has made the postal distribution of newspapers a relatively insecure and unprofitable means of distribution because the subscriptions have been made and prepaid for a half-year period, twice a year, and newspapers with a high level of subscribed circulation were affected by the rapid growth rate of inflation in 1992 and 1993. The new newspapers have relied on retail selling and both new and old papers have also set up alternative distribution channels. Survey data on newspaper subscribing revealed that only 4.7% of the population subscribed to the Moscow-based newspapers for the second half of 1997 and 11.8% to local and regional newspapers (Pressa — nemnogo statistiki).

Several tendencies can be identified: in large cities the tendency toward buying newspapers instead of subscribing is more remarkable; the younger the reader is, the more likely he is to buy newspapers; the younger the newspaper, the larger its share of retail selling; the lower the regional level of the newspaper, the greater the share of subscriptions; and the smaller the locality, the greater the share of those readers who get their newspapers only by subscribing (Sistema SMI Rossii 2001, 37). Only in some remote regions have the national newspapers been distributed mainly by subscriptions, while in others retail sales prevail (Blinova 2001, 276). The level of vertical integration is generally very low in the Russian media sphere, and the newspapers do not own printing plants or distribution networks (Hagström 2000, 233).

4.7.3. Political control and market pressures

The independence, freedom and control of the press have become important issues in post-Soviet Russia. Television has become the most important medium and the battle over the media has concentrated on television and to a lesser extent on elite newspapers. The post-Soviet stage has been divided into different stages, the first one up to 1995, the second one during Eltsin's second period (1996-2000) and the third one after Vladimir Putin came to power (I. Zassoursky 2001a; Y. Zasurskii 2001; an earlier version Y. Zassoursky 1997).

Compared with the Soviet period, the level of the freedom of the press in Russia has increased significantly, but at the same public trust in the media has decreased from 70 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 1996 and further to 13 percent in 2000. On the other hand, the majority of Russians are pleased with the level of press freedom and a significant part are of the opinion that journalists are in general objective. Half of Russians think that the influence of the media is positive and only one in six has the opposite opinion. The media is among the most trusted institutions, together with the Orthodox church (RFE/RL Newline 12.7.2000, RFE/RL Newline 31.1.2001, Fond Obshchesvennoi mnenii, Opros naseleniya 16-17.6.2001, Fond Obshchesvennoi mnenii, Opros naseleniya 27-28.10.2001). Behind the decline in trust were “sensation mongering, hidden advertising and Western financiers”, which the public viewed as corrupt (Daniloff 1995, 36; for hidden advertising, known in Russian as *zakazukha* or “jeans” see also Pankin 1999).

At the beginning of the 1990s most of the major media outlets were privatised completely or partly (the main exception being some television channels and newly-founded official newspapers) and the state lacked the funds for supporting those who remained in its hands. The first private television channels were set up in 1993 (TV-6) and 1994 (NTV, Independent television). Because the state did not have the resources to finance even the state-owned channels, they had to finance themselves by advertising or with the help of sponsors (Mickiewicz 1995). At the beginning of the 1990s the media professionals saw their social place in terms of the ‘fourth power’ concept. According to this ideology, the press should be allowed to criticise the executive power even though the press received money from the state (after the 1992 liberalisation of prices) (I. Zassoursky 2001, 74).

The privatisation of media led to a strange symbiosis between the state and the rival political and business groups on the one hand, and between the state and the media on the other. The first media empires were formed in the middle of the 1990s, before the parliamentary elections of 1995 and presidential elections of 1996. The two most important media moguls were Vladimir Gusinskii and Boris Berezovskii, who both supported the incumbent Boris Eltsin in the 1996 presidential elections (for this development see Fossato & Kachkaeva 1997-2001; Fossato 2001, 345; Zasurskii 2001). The media moguls gained their position in close co-operation with the state and their co-operation with Eltsin was rewarded with transmission rights and the privatisation of television channels. The freedom of the press was further strengthened by the fact that the weak state “did not have the capacity to control the media” (Lipman & McFaul 2001, 117).

At that time the Russian media resembled the American press in the era of the political press with the dividing lines being not between political but business groups. According to one view, the real political parties were the TV stations (I. Zassoursky 2001b, 28). This phenomenon has also been called politicised capital, in which capital was invested in the media not primarily in order to obtain economic, but political profits (I. Zasurskii 2001). The real flows of finances and influence often remain unclear. It is, for example, questionable, to take “the very fact that a medium received a loan from a bank or that a financial structure owns a small percentage of its shares” as proof that the medium in question is within someone’s sphere of influence (Hagström 2000, 221).

Nonetheless political and other pressures have been visible, especially during the elections. According to the monitoring projects, the coverage of parliamentary elections in 1993 was rather positive, although there were shortcomings, including: “the passivity of journalists and the fundamental lack of analysis during the campaign” and “the practice of parties and candidates buying journalists, often with the knowledge of their editors” (Monitoring... 1993; Hughes 1994, 145; Skillen 1995, 121).

The parliamentary elections of 1995 were, perhaps, the most unbiasedly covered in the media. The European Institute for the Media concluded that the media had made progress in comparison with 1993, although “crucial issues — such as the economy, privatisation, Chechnya, future coalitions — were seldom discussed” and “journalists mixed news coverage with personal comment too regularly” (Monitoring... 1995, 88).

In contrast, the presidential elections of 1996 were a heyday of media empires and the coverage of the election was most heavily biased against the communist candidate (Zyuganov), in favour of the incumbent (Eltsin) and ignoring the others. The media marred the fairness of the electoral process and in comparison to former elections, “candidates were less free to get their views across and voters were given less information of a professional and objective nature” (Monitoring... 1996; Helvey, Oates & Vysotskaya 1998). Both Russian and Western observers have pointed out that the private media (and journalists) supported Eltsin in the belief that “they were protecting media freedom from the consequences of a Communist return to power” (Belin 2001, 323), but actually they may have been protecting the economic interests of the new business class. After the elections, the media returned to the opposition, which was visible, e.g., in the coverage of Chechen war.

Before the parliamentary elections of 1999, support for the different media outlets (based on the political preferences of their masters) was concentrated on two new parties: Unity and Fatherland-All Russia, while attention to

other significant parties and blocs was inevitably reduced (Monitoring... 1999). In the presidential elections of 2000 similar problems were noticed (Monitoring... 2000; Nivat 2000; Raskin 2001). In general, the monitoring missions have indicated that the commercial media tend to be more plural and that the newspapers in general have more varied content than national television.

The electoral campaign of 1996 has usually been mentioned as a watershed after which the Russian media became openly partisan and the tradition of brave dissident writing had gone (Gray 2000, 96; I. Zassoursky 2001a, 76). Some other scholars point out the problems with the freedom of the press already in the first Eltsin period (e.g. Androunas 1993), for example, in connection with the conflict between the parliament and the president in 1993.

The major change in comparison with the Soviet period has been that the previous unified agent of control has split into a number of competing actors (Koltsova 2001, 321) and the media has been used as an instrument of lobbying for the interests of mutually fighting elites (Dunaeva 2000, 15). Although the new pluralism may be tainted by pervasive corruption, the fact remains that alternative channels and alternative views of the news have become possible (Mickiewicz 1995, 173) and the variety of pressures compete with each other and promote "a structural variety previously unknown to Soviet media" (Vartanova 2001a, 72). Nevertheless the leading newspapers appear to be politically determined, perhaps even more than before, because today their way of operating is to follow "not an order from above, but the independent choice of the staff" (Korkonossenko 1997, 82).

The other side of the development of the Russian media system has been the low level but rapid increase in advertisements. Advertising rates increased significantly in leading Russian newspapers in 1991-1992 and advertisement revenue exceeded subscription revenues (Lee 1998, 67) and has continued to grow after that. The biggest newspapers got 60-70% of their revenue from advertisement in the middle of the 1990s (Richter 1995, 14). On the other hand, the level of advertisement has remained low, between two and 12 dollars per citizen compared with 200 dollars per citizen in the European Union or the USA (RussiaWatch 6/2001, 7; *Taloussanommat* 30.1.2002; SMI Rossii... 1998, 144).

Some authors (e.g. Lee 1998) argue that Russian newspapers gained financial independence in the middle of the 1990s, but the case is more complex and some others have even pointed out that the unprofitability of the Russian media seems to be both a cause and a consequence of external ownership, which is most often legitimised by journalists (Koltsova 2001, 323). The owners have restricted some aspects of media content but have

opened up new possibilities for the media as well. Therefore numerous

unprofitable Russian media, instead of merging into bigger entities and realizing economics of scale by shrinking their staff, prefer searching for additional funding from external owners. (Koltsova 2001, 323).

In general, Russian journalists are aware of political control and consider it inevitable. This seems to be due to the sudden collapse of old power relations, “while ‘new’ ones are still not routinized and thus have become highly visible to the actors” (Koltsova 2001, 333). According to Koltsova (2001) Russian journalists are more controlled than their Western colleagues but less dominated.

The quality, elite newspapers have provided for media empires and prominent companies a possibility to influence the political elite and tell their views. This has led to the founding of several formally national but in practice marginal (even in Moscow) newspapers. Only *Izvestiya* and the governmental organ *Rossiiskaya gazeta* have gained wider circulation. Other newspapers have been financed by businessmen and politicians who use them in order to get their political message told. Murray has argued that the Russian media (of 1996) was in many ways ‘free’ at the level of proprietorial (but not, as a consequence, editorial) independence. Yet they overwhelmingly hewed to the same ideology and, in so doing, failed to represent anything like a plurality of public opinion. What is offered is the pluralism of the positions of financial and business clans (Murray 1999, 28-29).

The same has been found at the regional level, where the number of media has been booming despite economic problems. For example, there are 289 printed media in the Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) region not because of the demand of the audience but “the demand of local politicians and businessmen, who desire to have their own mass media and are ready to maintain them” (Journalists and journalism... 1994, 13).

According to Alexei Pankin (1998, 32), the Russian media model is characterised by the following features: authorities’ unwillingness or inability to conduct radical reform, their unwillingness to either let media go completely on their own, or to fully subsidise them; early accumulation of national capital and an above average level of corruption. In this system, media do not live by the market, but a great amount of diversity can be found. “The net economic effect of a symbiosis of state, politics, private capital and the media is that the present unrealistically over-crowded media scene remains frozen with all the negative effects for the advertising market, the journalistic labor force, not to mention journalistic ethics” (ibid. 33). Among the Russian officials and politicians, the responsibility of the media

is generally understood as responsibility to the State rather than to citizens (Y. Zassoursky 2000, 54).

What is also an important, and largely positive, change is the rapid end to the Soviet practice of using the press as a tool in solving important social and even private problems. While in 1993 still 20% of the respondents placed their hopes in the media in solving social as well as private problems, in 1998 a mere 4% felt that the media is an effective tool in defending one's own interests (Zarodin, Burova & Syutkina 1999, 193). The media is free to criticise but the government is free to ignore these criticisms (Y. Zassoursky 1997, 220). Therefore it is not surprising that many Russians think that the possibilities to influence the government have declined in comparison with the Soviet period (White 2001, 15). The debate between the state and the public has been turning into a debate between writers of editorials and speech-writers of government officials (Y. Zassoursky 2001a, 184).

The media suffered from the August 1998 economic crisis (see e.g. Mickiewicz 1999, 27), but the recovery was also rapid: newspapers found themselves forced to adapt to the new economic environment and those newspapers which have been adaptive have gained, while their competitors have suffered (Coulloudon 1999, 32). Newspapers have also invented various means, including games and discounts, to get readers and subscribers (Gabelnikov 1998). The effect has been seen as positive, since the crisis has forced the owners to take a more pragmatic, economic attitude to their media and the balance of power has shifted away from the oligarchs (Lipman 1998, 10-11).

Russian president Vladimir Putin has been seen as a threat to the independent media and freedom of speech. Compared with the first period of Boris Eltsin, the differences are clear but the conclusions are not unanimous. According to some Western scholars, the independent media is under threat and Putin was even nominated as being among the ten worst enemies of the press in 2001 by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (Committee to Protect Journalists internet pages).

In 2000 and 2001 the Eltsin-era oligarchs (Gusinskii and Berezovskii) were largely destroyed and their television stations (ORT, NTV, TV-6) were put under the control of either the state or companies and businessmen with close relations to the state. There have been some attempts and plans to limit the freedom of the press and lawsuits against journalists (based both on libel and the publishing of classified information), but it is also important that the conflicts have remained in public; especially the Internet media has been important in this respect. On the other hand, the backlash by the authorities has been made easier because of the real economic difficulties of the media

and formally the closure of oligarchic television stations has happened legally (although the legal system is still rapidly changing and in discrepancy).

Privately owned newspapers are still in circulation, private radio stations are in business and a small number of private political Web sites are in operation (Lipman & McFaul 2001, 124). Moreover, the media can still be sharply critical of the government and of Putin personally (e.g. the media's reaction to the tragedy of the submarine Kursk in August 2000). On the other hand, "self-censorship is becoming a more prominent feature of the landscape" (Graham 2000, 6) and "the balance between state media and private media has become immensely skewed in favor of the state" (Lipman & McFaul 2001, 124). The pressure has been the most visible in television while newspapers are freer, because they are harder to suppress and they are thought to have less impact on public opinion (RussiaWatch 6/2001, 4).

The gloomiest picture was provided by Freedom House, which stated in its annual report in April 2002 that as a result of recent changes "the Russian public lost access to diverse news and opinions. In outlying regions, news media are mainly dependent on government subsidies and journalists face libel suits and physical harassment intended to intimidate critics" (Freedom House: Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002, 43).

Public opinion, which was, at the beginning of the 1990s, thought to be the 'main guarantor' of television independence (Benn 1996, 476), remained silent or turned away from defending television at the end of the decade. The Russian public is not especially in favour of oligarchs and has largely accepted the version of the state: only 4 percent of the public regarded the NTV take-over as a state attempt to limit media freedom (RFE/RL Newsline 23.3.2001; Fond obshchestvennoi mnenii 2001, see also Nations in Transit 2001, 320).

Alexei Pankin, one of the prominent media analysts of Moscow, has pointed out that the golden era of Russian television was based on political financing more than market needs, which has led to financial difficulties and made those channels highly vulnerable. The estimates of losses incurred and the amount of money owed by Russian television companies vary, but most (if any) of them are not financially profitable. The Eltsin era had resulted in a system in which the

press developed as a branch of the shadow economy and a tool of the information racket. (...) What people now remember as President Boris Yeltsin's remarkable tolerance was really nothing more than looking the other way. The result was a nasty little joke on the media, which was led to believe that lying and stealing under the president's patronage constituted normal relations between the press and the authorities. (Pankin in The Moscow Times 26.2.2002)

The pluralism of the press was based on a shaky foundation of official tolerance, not on the strength of the media enterprises. Putin “gave a push, but the system collapsed by itself because it was not viable” (Pankin 2001). Despite the often raised worries about the status of the press freedom in Russia, the freedom of expression and the press have been among the most important changes in Russia: there would be no political lie which one of the so-called quality newspapers of Moscow would not reveal (Sutela & Rautava 2000, 285). Also Brown (2001, 565) has concluded that enough freedom of expression has remained and enough diversity in the mass media still exists.

The government’s relative victory in the dissemination of political information may prove to be Pyrrhic. The attempts to impose controlled information on the public have led to public disinterest. The official propaganda is ineffective and potentially destructive, it is easily subverted by alternative channels available and, moreover, it breeds rumours, cynicism, and distrust of government (Foster 1996, 290). While a large part of the mainstream media has been characterised by strong persuasion and manipulation, the alternative media emphasise horizontal communication (I. Zassoursky 2001a, 84).

Some former Soviet scholars like Androunas (1993, 156-157) and Manaev (1995, 63-64) have emphasised the role of the emerging business class as the bearer and promoter of the freedom of speech and democracy. It is, however, not necessary that the business class automatically support the political democracy (or even the market economy); it may find a political alliance with the authoritative power more profitable. Actually, the result of the “campaign to silence critical media” has resulted only in pro-Eltsin oligarchs being replaced by pro-Putin oligarchs. There are clear similarities to other non-consolidated presidential democracies (see Chalaby 1998c). As Jakubowicz emphasises in support of Sparks (2000):

If the “Western model” was expected to bring an answer to the ills of the communist media model, then the problem was with the naiveté of those who held this view, and not with the Western media whose inner logic and true nature they failed to understand (Jakubowicz 2001, 76)

Actually, the poor development of the media infrastructure includes several factors which in fact support the diversity and openness of the media system, like the position of the state as one of the major proprietors, monopolist control of the state and municipal bodies over the printing and distribution sectors, the broadcasting system being operated by the state and a lack of free and fair competition in the media market (Vartanova 2000, 115). Therefore

growing commercialism and expansive politicisation have been seen as serious threats to openness and media diversity (ibid. 107).

In general, the development of the Russian media system has had close links with the political system, the economy and social reality. In the first half of the 1990s, Russian society was characterised by decentralisation and strong opposition, trade capitalism and industrial crisis, disintegration and chaos. Since 2000, however, the opposition has become weaker, the political system more centralised, the economy is growing and social reality is structured in a hierarchy of signs, supported by war, rituals and strong leader vs. different social realities (I. Zassoursky 2001a, 87-89). At the beginning of the new century Russia may be entering a paradoxical period when it is going to have a more independent media — just with less freedom of expression (Pankin 2001).

4.8. Transformation of Russian journalism

The practice of journalism has changed more rapidly in other Eastern European countries, where the desire to separate from the old practices of the former system has been greater and the new (foreign) owners have provided and demanded renovations (e.g. Jakubowicz 2001; on media in Central and Eastern European countries see Carey 1996; Gulyas 1998; Jakubowicz 1995; Kaplan 1996; Patterson 2000 and Sükösd 2000). In Russia, the path to Western journalism has been slower, e.g. because of economic difficulties and longer traditions of another kind of press model (and no immediate need to adopt a new journalistic culture). This transformation of journalism and journalistic practices has not been a popular topic among scholars, but there are some studies that highlight this development from different points of view.

The change in discourse was studied on the basis of a Soviet magazine (*Soviet Life*) and a Soviet newspaper (*Moscow News*) and published in English (Turpin 1995). While under Brezhnev, “*Moscow News* promoted the Soviet Union as an advanced, democratic nation in which Lenin’s dream of socialism proved to be the correct path to follow”. Under Gorbachev it developed into a venue of social criticism and promoted democratisation (Turpin 1995, 98, 123). The “manufacturing of dissent” was a tool of Gorbachev but later turned against him: “Gorbachev was ‘too successful’ at manufacturing dissent... the dissent took on a life of its own, moving beyond the narrow purposes for which it was created” (Turpin 1995, 131-132).

Although this statement is based only on the analysis of two English-language publications of the Soviet Union, it seems to get the point more accurately than those who pay attention mainly to freedom of information.

Actually it was not freedom of information that helped bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the freedom of opinions and public dissent that became possible during *glasnost*. The availability of information had a role in this process as a source for the formation of opinions but it was not the most important element.

Murray has studied the change of journalism in *Izvestiya* and other Moscow newspapers. He sees sensationalism, coverage of accidents and the change in foreign news as the most important changes. In the Soviet press sensationalism had been rejected and “the fear of causing sensation was the main reason for the reluctance of the pre-*glasnost*’ press to publish fresh news” (Murray 1994, 93). In the *glasnost* period, the first sensations included taboo topics (like prostitution and the drug problem) and the publishing of previously banned works of literature, and this led gradually to the Western understanding of sensationalism.

Another change was the coverage of accidents and natural disasters, which started with failure in the coverage of the Chernobyl accident (1986) but later improved, as seen in the immediate and extensive coverage of the 1988 Armenian earthquake. The freedom to report in a totally unencumbered manner came gradually with the emergence of an independent press and in the post-Soviet press accidents were “reported in the same way as in the West” (ibid. 100). The Chernobyl accident also facilitated and sped up the process of transforming *glasnost* from “a policy designed to spotlight bureaucratic ineptitude and obstructionism (...) into an invitation to engage in public debate over government policy and even over the form of government itself” (Young & Launer 1991, 122).

The coverage of foreign news, which had been dependent on the foreign policy objectives of the Party and the state (and which is to some degree also the case in the Western press), became more varied and pluralistic. Moreover, in the Eltsin period the liberal press began to lean very heavily on Western sources. “Since the August 1991 coup, for example, *Izvestiya* began to rely almost exclusively for its daily foreign news brief column on Western agency reports” and this is only one example of how “the Western way of treating news was imported into Russia after the disintegration of the old power structures” (Murray 1994, 114). The change was evident also in the geographic orientation of foreign news: after the ideological basis for the coverage was gone, Africa became increasingly marginalised and the result was a “stereotyped, one-sided and oversimplified presentation of African problems” (Adade 1995, 274). The image of Finland remained mostly positive but also of little interest (Salminen 2000, 77-87), while in Karelia the image of Finland has been very divided, from extremely positive (Finland as a model) to

extremely negative (war-time crimes and territorial disputes) (T. Laine 2000, 460).

The Western model of the press became the most attractive and the most prestigious for Soviet journalism. The Western model was the closest at hand following the discrediting of the Soviet model (Murray 1992, 111). The post-Soviet press, or at least part of it, was eager to adopt Western models and aspired to appear neutral and objective.

The political preference of a newspaper in the Yeltsin era is now more determined by editorial selection of what news to cover, rather than how it is covered. In other words, the methods of reporting have changed. In the highly politically polarized press of the Yeltsin era, however, much political news, while possessing some of the external attributes of the Western news story, is on closer examination quite crude propaganda for the political grouping which a particular newspaper supports. (Murray 1994, 144)

Western news agencies also played an important role in spreading Western news values, although Russian news agencies remained the most important (Rantanen 2000, 260-265). This was rather similar to the situation at the beginning of the 20th century (Palmer 1998). Also new private news agencies were forerunners in setting the standard of news writing (Rantanen 2000, 261).

According to Murray (1992, 1994), several typical genres of the Soviet press lost their *raison d'être* and became redundant. The short front-page news item, the *zametka*, appeared in 1987 with much less frequency and was usually published not on the first but on the second page. The *zametka* was replaced by a new type of article that was closer to the Western news story. The new Russian definition of *zametka* is practically the same as the definition of a small Western news story (Informatsionnye zhanry... 1995, 7).

The photo reportage (*fotoportazh*), which under Brezhnev consisted of a lead picture usually portraying a model worker, or group of workers, accompanied by a short text, also started to change. The people in them no longer represented an élite group, but “became more flesh-and-blood characters” and by the time of the August 1991 coup, the *fotoportazh* had been replaced by what Western journalists would call a ‘news picture’ (Murray 1994, 120).

The Russian newspapers of the Eltsin era showed a great variety in both language and content, including a Western liberal style (*Izvestiya*, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*), the old Soviet style (*Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*), a new, ultra-nationalist discourse (*Den*), and the language of the new, Western-inspired, pornographic press (*Mister Iks*) (ibid. 145).

Also the language of the Russian press has changed, and while some authors have interpreted this as a sign of unprofessionalism and deviation from the norms of Russian literary language (Grabelnikov 1996, 123), others see it as one consequence of the democratisation of literary norms (Mokienko 1999, 82). Murray (1994) points out that the language of the Russian news story at the beginning of the 1990s included at least two important removes away from the neutral news story. First, the language of the article served as a vehicle for the author's own opinions, not those of the politicians he derides nor even of others who might care to deride the politicians for the reporter. Second, (...) the personal observations of the reporter were reported by means of sarcasm.

Since Russian society was so highly politicised, it would be unreasonable to expect that the Russian press would have remained above politics, since also in Western democracies in times of political crisis the press becomes noticeably partisan in both the manner of actual coverage and the selection of items to be covered. The attempts by the liberal Western-looking Russian press to imitate the forms of the Western newspaper have been so often unsuccessful (Murray 1994, 156-157). On the other hand, the foreign news briefs have reflected "a Western perspective on news events, as well as a Western understanding of what constitutes news" (ibid. 158). This has been the case especially when Russia itself has not been a participant in the given news event. The United States is no longer seen as the enemy, nor the model (Becker 1999, 157) and the images of Russia and the United States in *Vremya* newscasts have become more complex than they had been during the Cold War (Washburn 1997).

Furthermore, the journalistic control over the newspaper material in Russia is remarkable, e.g. in Tatarstan over 60% and sometimes even 80% of the content has been written by journalists and the newspapers have started to prefer facts over analysis of these facts (Akhmetyanov 1999, 14). On the other hand, some features have remained longer, especially among older journalists, since the generation change did not happen overnight. In many cases ideological reorientation was easier than the change of practices and attitudes.

The professionalisation of Soviet and post-Soviet journalists has been discussed in several studies, mostly the idea being that during *glasnost* and after it would be possible to raise the level of professionalisation (Remington 1985, Haddix 1990, Jones 1992). However, the problem seems to be more complicated. Some authors have pointed out the lack of professionalism among post-socialist journalists (mainly in other Eastern European countries,

e.g. Vujevic 1998, 185; Školkey 1998; Kovats 1998; Oledski 1998; Sasinska-Klas 2001) while others have pointed out that “journalists’ understanding of ‘professionalism’ is unstable and ambivalent” (Davis, Hammond & Nizamova 1998, 83; also Juskevits 2001 and 2002, Belin 2001, 338).

Contemporary Russian journalists link professionalism to themes like “the importance of providing accurate factual information, an openness to new (often western) ideas and practices and a growing recognition of the audience” (Davis, Hammond & Nizamova 1998, 84), but many journalists “see ‘educating’ the public as a legitimate, even vital part of their jobs” (Belin 2001, 338). On the other hand, the position of journalists in their workplace has changed: at the end of the 1990s “journalists rarely formed and defended their own positions, but preferred to solidarise with the position of the owner of the publication”, in line with the Soviet spirit of corporatism (I. Zasurskii 2001, 93).

Authors who present the former role of the Russian journalist in negative terms, e.g. “as an anonymous cog in the vast propaganda machine” or as a “de-personalized obedient journalist” (Roventa-Furmusani 1999, 211) tend to emphasise the positive changes in the role of the journalist, while others (based e.g. on conceptions of journalists of the old school) see the change mainly in negative terms. Among the older journalists the “commitment to a serving role in the public interest and restriction to mere facts are regarded as a devaluation of their professional status” (Voltmer 2000, 478) and “for many journalists giving up the traditional Russian forms means a restriction of their newly gained freedom” (Geisslinger 1997, 411). Not surprisingly, a Russian survey of regional journalists revealed that they considered their prestige to be highest during *glasnost* (42%) or even before *glasnost* (26.5%), compared with the few (14.5%) who thought that the profession had the most prestige in 1994 (Journalists and journalism... 1995, 39).

“Another distinction between traditional Russian and Western journalism is the importance of timeliness. For Western journalists actuality is one of the most prominent news values (...); for Russian journalists it is only of marginal relevance.” (Voltmer 2000, 478). The same was noticed in a Finnish study on the concept of news in Russia: quantitatively Russian news criteria are close to Western ones but qualitatively the main difference is that the press does not construct a unified picture of the world and that the important items and elements vary between quality newspapers of Moscow (Käyhkö 1998, 99).

In the Soviet era, the subjective presentation of news was the first bold step in the direction of unbiased coverage and a challenge to the state-dominated message (Mickiewicz 2000, 107). During the *glasnost* era, “journalists adopted an egocentric view of themselves as missionaries, for

whom expressing whatever they had on their minds was by far more important than satisfying the information demands of the audience” (Pankin 2001) and even now “many journalists understand press freedom primarily as the freedom to express subjective convictions publicly” (Voltmer 2000, 479). The difficulty in adopting new practices was clearly indicated by the criticism by Kagarlitskii of the *Kommersant* newspaper in which the editors

believe that a newspaper should have a consistent editorial slant and a consistent style in each article. As a result, *Kommersant* keeps a team of special “rewriters” in order to unify the text, through whom all material must pass. Much of the text that passes through these people comes out unrecognizable. A significant number of the articles are even published without the authors’ approval. It isn’t surprising, therefore, that journalists who consider themselves creative quickly bail on *Kommersant* (Kagarlitsky 1998).

Kommersant tells in its Web pages that its model has become a norm for the Russian press. At the beginning of the 1990s *Kommersant* was almost like a foreign paper: stories were placed strictly in sections, they were constructed on the model of a revised pyramid, headlines told the most important news and “only facts were presented, not any kind of evaluations, moral statements and especially not a personal, author’s or citizen’s position” (Webpage of *Kommersant*, 2002).

On the other hand, it has been stated that the ideas the journalists transmit may have changed but the practices remain to a much greater extent the same. For example, in the presidential elections of 1996 the pro-Eltsin journalists

who saw themselves as fighters for democracy were still following the precepts of the Leninist school of journalism, except that they had become committed ‘builders of democracy’, rather than of communism (*sozidateli kommunizma*). The cause (*delo*) might now be different but not the mind-set (Murray 1999, 29).

In a comparative study on Russian and U.S. journalists at the beginning of the 1990s, the most striking difference was the ranking of the media’s role in setting the political agenda (53% of Russian journalists ranking it as extremely important compared with 2.5% of U.S. journalists), while U.S. journalists ranked the role of investigating government claims notably higher than the Russian journalists (Wu, Weaver & Johnson 1996, 538).

In 1992 it was still possible to see the traits of the role of agitator in Russian journalists. They believed “more in such active roles as setting the political agenda and developing the interest of the public, but not in

investigating government claims” (ibid. 544). This seems to indicate that “Russian journalists see themselves playing a role as creative, independent agents in the Russian political and social context”, as members of the intelligentsia (ibid. 544). Also a Finnish qualitative study on Karelian radio- and television journalists summarised the most important tasks of the Soviet and Russian journalists: to give information, to give the people mental strength (to support, to spread a positive mood) and to educate people (Remsu 2001, 39-41).

The change in values happened rather quickly, as least when judging it in terms of the responses in surveys. While in 1992 the journalists could be divided into three equal groups (authoritarian-technocratic, humanistic, informative-cognitive) on the basis of their professional ideologies, in 1995 over two thirds supported the informative-cognitive idea while the authoritarian-technocratic approach had lost its support almost completely, although “the practise indicates that it still has rather many supporters” (Dzhaloshinskii 1996, 156-157).

Although most of the Russian journalists reject the political role of journalists, they support the idea that a journalist is “an objective observer and analyst who is not supposed to take somebody’s side”. Nonetheless only seldom do they see journalism as a fourth estate or a producer of the commodity called information. (Journalists and journalism... 1995, 37-40). Also the role of investigative reporting is poorly developed in Russia: Most of the revelations on sins and crimes are based on leaks from competing organisations and institutions (Y. Zassoursky 2001b, 57).

In an analysis of the content of *Izvestiya* in 1988 and 1996, changes could be found in the selection of topics (a major increase in non-political themes, a decrease in economic and foreign news) and patterns of presentation (more dynamic and heterogeneous), while ‘old’ journalistic traditions still prevailed, e.g., in language that was “less ‘technical’ and standardized than in the West, using linguistic strategies like irony or ambiguous formulations” (Voltmer 1990, 485-494).

However, *Izvestiya* was more audience-oriented in 1988 than in 1996, since many economic articles addressed the problems of ordinary citizens, and the paper had become less readable as the language had become more compact and abstract and information had become “fragmented and decontextualized” (Voltmer 2000, 488-490). According to Obermayer (2000), local newspapers are virtually devoid of crime, business, or political coverage, while “news about roads, schools, art museums and industrial policy is considered insignificant and trivial”. The best-read feature is the TV schedule, the more comprehensive, the better, and horoscopes are another Russian

newspaper staple; some papers publish three of four different astrological features.

An important but usually neglected part of the transformation of Russian journalism is the increasing control of the newspaper text by journalists. This was pointed out with a slight lament by Grabelnikov, who noticed that democratic mass media publish mainly materials of staff members, and tell that they do not correspond with their readers. The audience “is seen mainly as an object of informational-propagandist action and as a potential buyer of information production (...) which can not and should not take part in production” (Grabelnikov 1996, 24). The development of relations between reporters and their sources can be characterised as mutual learning. Journalists are learning the skills of working with information in new conditions and information sources are learning new manipulative tactics (Koltsova 2001, 332). Conflict has become the main theme in the Russian media during the last decade while during the Soviet period public forms of conflict were impossible (Dunaeva 2000, 14).

While *perestroika*-era journalists were primarily interested in public relations and to some extent fulfilled the function of a civil society, the post-*perestroika* journalists are primarily concerned with the commercial sphere (Sosnovskaya 2000, 194). At the regional level (at least in St. Petersburg), the more Westernised journalistic style is referred to as the “Moscow style” and it is contrasted with the St. Petersburg school of journalism, which seems “weak and provincial” to younger journalists. Moscow journalism is directed at the larger public while St. Petersburg journalism “with its convoluted, unwieldy linguistic structures, is geared toward the intellectual elite (...) Themes in the St. Petersburg press are less concrete, sentences are longer, and the writing style is more literary” (Sosnovskaya 2000, 180). According to journalists of the older school, the public needs journalistic opinions and they also think that “opinion journalism demands greater literary mastery than does fact journalism”. The recent transformation of practices has led also to the invention of facts, since “verifying facts is very difficult, painstaking work, and often not worth the time” (Sosnovskaya 2000, 178-179). This points out also an unproblematic, naïve relationship to the facts.

Among the national minority journalists in Karelia, the main problems have been the lack of expressing one’s own opinions, an excessive respect for the interviewee, the copying of official texts, a lack of analysis, unbalanced and incomplete reporting of facts and making news on issues which are not news (Remsu 2001, 94). According to Remsu, however, they are more relics of the Soviet professional ideal than signs of unprofessionalism. On a more general level, it can be said that the discrepancies in professional performance

are first of all connected with the weak economic position of the media (Vartanova 2002, 16).

The coverage of the first Chechen war (1994-1996) was interpreted as a victory for independent journalism both in private and state owned channels (Mickiewicz 1997). Compared with the Soviet coverage of the Afghan war, the first Chechen war was reported in *Izvestiya* in a very different way. While the Soviet media presented a single, Communist Party-approved version of events during the Afghan war, the coverage of the first Chechen war “mirrored widespread public objection towards the Russian military intervention in Chechnya” (Malinkina & McLeod 2000, 46).

During the second war, the government dominated the media and “cleavages between the media concerning Chechnya looked really modest,” although NTV was the most critical (Koltsova 2000, 50). It has been shown that the Russian experience in controlling public opinion during the second war resembles the experience of many other countries, e.g. the USA, and it has been stated that the Russian government has learned from international experience. Neither in the USA (the case of Grenada and the Gulf wars) nor in Russia did the media manage to mobilise significant public support for its free access to information (ibid. 53).

The media played a major role in fostering the attitudes of Russians to support the war (Magnusson & Faurby 2000). On the other hand, the behaviour of the media during the first war was more abnormal than during the second. Only in a few cases has independent journalism been practiced during a conflict like that.

In general the changes in Russian journalism have brought it closer to Western European and North American journalism. The new press structure of Russia resembles the American model, in which there are few national newspapers; the dominant position of television and the division between the elite and the popular press brings the Russian model close to the British model; and the close relations among business, the media and politics bring the Russian model close to the Italian model. Actually the Russian model provides a rather unique combination of elements. (Dunn 2000)

4.9. Development of the regional press

4.9.1. Regional press in the Soviet Union

The Soviet press was organised in a pyramid-like way. The most important and the most widely distributed newspapers were published in Moscow; the republican and regional newspapers were secondary, followed by the local

newspapers. The least important were various factory and lower-level newspapers. In fact, the dominance of the national newspapers was possible only because they were printed simultaneously in different parts of the country. Already in 1970 *Pravda* was printed in 40 places, *Izvestiya* in 38, *Trud* in 35 and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in 21 places. Of the total number of printed copies of *Pravda*, only 26% were printed in Moscow; for *Izvestiya* and *Trud* this figure was even lower, 23% (Yablokov 1971, 22).

In non-Russian regions the position of the regional and local press was strengthened by the publishing of newspapers in local languages. Even in this the administrative structure played its role: those nationalities that had their own Soviet republics had more newspapers in their languages than those who had only autonomous republics or lower level administrative entities. Also the knowledge of Russian among the minority group influenced how many newspaper copies were published in that the minority language (Rogers 1986). Belorussia was the only Soviet republic where the share of newspapers in Russian exceeded clearly the share of the Russian-language population (for the reasons for this development, see Szporluk 1967).

In many cities and towns the national newspapers had a circulation equal to the local ones. For example, in 1973 in Taganrog (Rostov region) national newspapers accounted for 53% of the combined circulation, republic-wide papers 3%, the oblast paper 10% and the city paper 34% of combined circulation (Massovaya informatsiya... 1980, 130). In the city of Leningrad the national *Pravda* and local *Leningradskaya pravda* had almost equal audiences and the combined audience of the national newspapers was approximately as large as the combined audience of the local and regional newspapers (the estimation is based on figures presented by Firsov & Muzdybaev 1975).

In the countryside the share of national newspapers was strengthened by the agricultural newspaper *Selskaya zhizn* (Country Life), which accounted for almost half of the audience of national newspapers in a countryside district in the Ryazan region at the end of the 1960s. There the audience of national newspapers equalled the audience of the local and regional newspapers (Raionnaya gazeta... 1977, 61).

Relatively little information is available on the circulation and the structure of the local press in individual regions. This kind of information was not secret, but it was not customary to publish the printing figures of individual local newspapers. Some exceptions exist, e.g. an IOJ handbook on the media in CMEA countries presents the numbers of printed copies for the major newspapers of each region in the Soviet Union in (approximately) 1975 (Mass Media in C.M.E.A. Countries 1976). A handbook on the press in

Leningrad (Leningradskaya pressa 1984) also reveals the numbers of printed copies of all the newspapers in the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad oblast. Also Soviet encyclopedias gave the printing figures of the main newspapers. In general, there were a great number of newspapers in a single region but only a few were aimed at a wide audience.

4.9.2. Rise of the regional press in the 1990s

The rise of the regional press started when the centralised Soviet press system collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. The administrative and political obstacles to the development of the regional press were largely dissolved and the economic changes made the publishing of a nation-wide newspaper more difficult than the publishing of local newspapers. Some elements of the previous system have remained, like the difficulty for the newspapers to cross administrative borders: almost no competition has appeared in the border areas between regions and districts.

In 1990 a huge majority (77%) of the daily (5 or 6 times a week) newspaper circulation belonged to 15 national dailies and only a minor part to over 200 regional and city-level dailies. In 1997 the shares had been equalised and the national dailies counted for only 46% of the daily newspaper circulation.

Also the newspapers classified as “lower-level” (factory etc.) and “other” (perhaps freesheets or inter-regional campaign or partisan newspapers)¹ have increased their share in the newspaper market. In 1997 both of these categories stood for 9% of newspaper circulation compared with a total of 2% in 1991 (more data on newspaper circulation, see Pietiläinen 2001b).

It seems that the lower-level press has survived better than ordinary newspapers. Most of them have been published by factories and various organisations and have usually been financed by them. Also district and city newspapers have increased their circulation compared with the regional newspapers. This also demonstrates the appearance of free newspapers, which are usually city-based. In rural districts, however, the circulation of local newspapers has dropped to one half of its previous level.

If only those newspapers that come out at least once a week are counted, the drop in the national press is even more dramatic. Also among these the major part of the circulation belongs to the newspapers that come out only once a week (62% in 1995, 68% in 1998).

1 A new category of “other newspaper” was added to the statistical handbooks in 1994. They are ‘informal’ newspapers that do not fit into ordinary regional categories (Pechat 1994, 94) and most of these newspapers come out weekly or several times a month.

Although the single-copy circulation has dropped “only” from 164 to 76.6 million, the overall number of printed newspaper copies (only dailies and weeklies) has fallen from 38 billion to 7.5 billion, i.e., to one fifth of the previous total. This drop has affected most severely the national press (from 28 billion copies to 2.3 billion copies), while among the local and regional press the number of copies has dropped to one half (from 9.6 billion to 5.2 billion). The circulation of the daily press has decreased at all administrative levels. The national dailies have lost over 90% of their circulation, the regional ones around two thirds and the city-based daily newspapers approximately one half.

4.9.3. Different types of newspaper regions

The regionalisation of the press had been interpreted as having “the negative political consequence of increasing the influence of provincial authorities over the flow of information” (Nations in transit 2001, 319). There is a dearth of small and medium-sized businesses to support private media through advertising and regional leaders are often able to create a virtual ‘political monopoly’ over the media (Belin 2001, 340; Chernyakova 2001).

Already during Soviet rule regional differences in local newspaper circulation emerged. In 1959 the per capita circulation of the local press was highest in remote areas of Siberia and the Caucasus and lowest in central Russia around Moscow and in some regional centres, likely because of the competition from Moscow-based newspapers. In 1970 small, remote regions and ethnic republics were at the top of per capita local press circulation. These regions were often those in which the circulation had increased the most. The regions with the lowest level of local newspaper circulation were either in central Russia outside Moscow or regional centres elsewhere. In 1979 the top regions were similar regions (not necessarily the same individual regions) compared to those in 1970 and the bottom regions could be found in central Russia or in less urbanised peripheral areas.

In the late Soviet period (1985-1990) the per capita circulation of local newspapers was lowest in regions around Moscow and in some less urbanised areas (Checheno-Ingushetiya, Stavropol, Astrakhan, Saratov and Dagestan). The circulation of local newspapers was highest in areas in which the share of newspapers in non-Russian languages was high (Chuvass republic, Tuva, Yakutia, Tatarstan, Bashkiria) and in some areas of Siberia and the Urals (excluding the smallest ones).

Table 4.2. Correlations between per capita circulation of local and regional newspapers in Russian regions (excluding Moscow) in different years.

	1959	1970	1979 ¹
1970	.541**		
1979 ¹	.311**	.813**	
1989	.040	.660**	.755**

1 Kalmukiya is not included because of an apparent error in the newspaper publishing data.

The correlations between different years are strong, but they decline over time, so that the circulation figures of 1959 did not have any explanatory value in 1989. It also seems that in the 1960s the process of change in the local press was more dynamic than in the 1970s and 1980s.

The reasons for these figures might be that the circulation of newspapers in the Soviet Union was determined administratively rather than on the basis of competition. The declining circulation of local newspapers in some regions may indicate that the development of the local press was reduced when the availability of national newspapers became possible.

Other reasons include the presence of a non-Russian minority with a vivid publishing tradition in its own language (e.g. Tatars), economic possibilities, and a lower level of competition from national newspapers. The size of the population of the region had the greatest impact on circulation in 1959 (correlation -.533, smaller regions having the highest circulations) but the impact of population disappeared at the end of the Soviet period.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union the development of the different political regimes in the regions started and consequently different media models also developed. Economic development has progressed at a different pace in various regions and therefore the economic possibilities for newspaper publishing vary significantly. This has led to a differentiation among regions.

During the last few years of Soviet power, the circulation of the local press correlated relatively strongly with the average per capita income of the region and slightly with urbanisation (Table 4.3.). The transition has partly changed this picture, because the correlation between the local newspaper circulation and income has tended to decline. Especially in many northern areas the average income (also if compared with the cost of living) has remained relatively high while newspaper circulation has dropped. On the

other hand, many poor regions have high figures of local newspaper circulation.

According to a national study, in 1997 two thirds of Russians read newspapers regularly. Newspaper readership was highest in regions more distant from Moscow, such as the Central Black Earth region (82% read newspapers regularly) and the Far East (72%). It was lowest in the Northwest (52%, including St. Petersburg), the Volga region (58%) and Western Siberia (60%). In the other economic regions newspaper reading was on the average level. (Russian regional database).

An analysis by the Russian Union of Journalists suggests that three different models of media structure have emerged in different regions. First, the regions with a paternal model in which the state newspapers dominate and the society can mix with the editorial work, the main task of the press is to solve the problems that the society confronts, working together with the authorities (SMI Rossii... 1998, 20). Second, the regions with a liberal model of the press in which the independent newspapers dominate and the society cannot mix in the editorial work, the main task of the press is to provide objective and credible information, serving as an instrument for the social control of the authorities and therefore keeping distance from them (ibid. 20). There is also a third, the mixed model, which has elements of both the paternal and the liberal models (ibid. 24).

A survey conducted by the Public Expertise project specified seven different media models in Russian regions based on the openness of the local authorities towards the media, the freedom of the production of information, the freedom to distribute information, the saturation of the media in the region, the development of the media and advertising market, the level of conflicts between the authorities and the media, and the level and characteristics of the self-organisation of the media associations. (Obschestvennaya ekspertiza 2000, 107)

According to this analysis, the most widespread model is the transitional (prevailing in 33 regions, in which 33.5% of population live). In this type the most typical feature is that the local authorities cannot and will not command the media but some elements of Soviet practices have remained. (Obschestvennaya ekspertiza 2000, 116)

The second is the market model (in 11 regions, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, totalling 23.5% of the population) in which the transition has been completed and the media operates outside direct governmental control. The characteristics of this model are: a high level of media saturation, great advertisement revenue, the dominance of the private media and that the authorities see the media as an essential and relatively independent factor in

the politics and economics of the region. In the market model the media has become a business and this has transformed news into a commodity and changed the character of journalists and media managers. In these areas the number of media-related conflicts and the level of criminal violence against journalists are higher than in any other model. The market model is by its nature more inclined to conflicts than the Soviet model and it is not possible to hide any kind of conflict from the public. (ibid. 116-117). The third most common model (10 regions and 15.5% of the population) is the confrontational one, in which market relations prevail but the authorities have not lost their will to control, which has led to confrontation. These regions include Primore and Tula and other regions where the conflicts between the media and the authorities are frequent. (ibid.)

The fourth, fifth and sixth models are variations of the Soviet model. In the regions with the modernised variant of the Soviet media model (6 regions, 10.9 % of the population), both market-based and non-market media outlets exist and the share of advertisements is relatively high. The principal method of influencing the media applied by the regional authorities is not direct control but economic methods and a strong information and image policy. The amount of budget money used to subsidise the media is often significant; actually some of the regions with the most generous subsidies to the media belong to this group, which includes Tatarstan, Krasnodar, Yakutia-Sakha, Samara and Ulyanovsk. (ibid. 115)

In the fifth model, the paternalist variant of the Soviet model (7 regions, 9.5 % of the population), the authorities continue to control the media but not with extreme methods. These regions have a high level of media saturation, especially a high level of subscriptions to newspapers. The share of independent media is low and the authorities give significant subsidies to the media, e.g. in order to keep the subscription fees low. These regions include Bashkortostan, Belgorod, Volgograd, Orenburg, Penza and Orel. In these regions the media assist in preserving the present power elites and power relationships. (ibid. 112-113)

The sixth, the authoritarian variant of the Soviet model (9 regions, 4.4% of the population) is characterised by the lack of an advertising market and the high level of control over the media exercised by the authorities. Other characteristics of these regions are that the level of media saturation is low, the independent media are practically non-existent and the laws of the region include many regulations governing the media, including those that contradict the constitution of the Russian Federation. These regions include all the ethnic republics of the Northern Caucasus and some other republics. The

main purpose of journalism there is the reproduction of the ritual texts, prayers and eulogies of the regional leader. (ibid. 111-112)

The seventh model (11 small regions, 1.6% of the population) can be found in remote, sparsely populated areas of the North and Siberia where only a few media outlets exist. In these regions it is difficult to speak about the existence of a media or advertising market (ibid. 118).

Generally, in southern Russia the media model is either one of the variants of the Soviet model or the confrontational model and only the Stavropol *krai* and the Astrakhan *oblast* were classified as transitional regions. In contrast, the regions of Northern and Central Russia (except for Kostroma and Tula) belong either to the transitional or market models. Also in the Asian part of Russia the transitional and market models prevail.

Regionalisation of the media is also visible in the evolution of regional legislation. In many cases regional media laws contradict federal legislation and, in general, the restriction of the freedom of speech and the press is "more common the further you go from Moscow" (Richter 1999, 7).

4.9.4. Factors influencing the development of the regional press

Among the factors contributing to the successful development of the local press are broad economic possibilities, the uniqueness of the region, a high level of historically justified aspirations to the leading position in a larger area, closeness to the national borders, and distance from the centre (Sistema SMI Rossii... 2001, 69). Also the local newspaper publishing and reading traditions are important. Many areas that had a top per capita circulation at the end of the 1990s had a strong local press already in 1990.

The analysis of several factors (Table 4.3.) indicates that the most significant factors influencing the level of local press circulation are press publishing traditions, the strength of civil society¹ (positive correlation) and the number of subscribed copies (negative correlation). The average subscription price, even if adjusted for the average income and price level of the region, had no significant correlation with the circulation.

1 The strength of the civil society has been measured as a combination of the number of cultural institutions (theaters, cinemas, museums), the number of political alternatives, the number of employees in private small-scale companies, the number of university students and the existence of umbrella organisations for non-governmental organisations, and has been measured on a scale of 0-9 by Rurik Alhberg (1999).

Table 4.4. Pearson correlations between variances of several factors in regions of the Russian Federation (n= 70-76). (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Chechnya, Ingushetia and the autonomous districts, which belong to other subjects of the Federation, have not been included). Part of the data was not available for some of the regions.

Legend:

1. Per capita printing 1997-99
2. Per capita newspaper printing 1990
3. Per capita subscribed newspapers 1997
4. Freedom of the press 1999
5. Urban population
6. Per capita income 1990
7. Per capita income 1997
8. Relative income 1997
9. Share of poor 1998
10. Relative subscription price 1999
11. Strength of civil society

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2	.432**									
3	-.534**	-.250*								
4	.053	-.093	-.181							
5	.091	.287*	-.253*	.437**						
6	-.113	.373**	.011	-.041	.453**					
7	-.040	.357**	.114	.094	.471**	.850**				
8	.275*	.066	-.210	.273*	.435**	.260*	.500**			
9	-.232*	-.044	.212	-.368**	-.563**	-.205	-.378**	-.809**		
10	-.219	-.399**	.110	-.163	.100	-.315*	-.313*	-.337**	.155	
11	.426**	.062	-.409**	.301*	.309**	-.068	.083	.289*	-.386**	-.028

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Sources: Pechat 1990, Pechat 1997, Pechat 1998, Pechat 1999, Regiony Rossii 1997, Regiony Rossii 1998, Karta svobody pechaty 1999, SMI Rossii... 1998, Ahlberg 1999. Statistics on regional development published also by Statistics Finland in Suomen lähialueet 5/1999: Venäjän trendit 1989-1999.

The fact that the number of subscribed copies has a negative correlation with the total circulation requires more detailed explanation. It is likely that the development and formation of the new structures of the press have occurred at very different speeds in different regions. Therefore newspapers are sold in

retail outlets or alternative distribution channels have been developed mainly in regions with a more dynamic press structure. In more conservative regions the press relies on the state postal service and the circulation remains lower.

In 1990 the circulation of the newspapers correlated positively with the average regional income of the population, as was the case even in 1998 if the income figures are adjusted for the regional minimum cost of living. Income has at least some influence on the overall newspaper circulation. The share of the poor in the total area population correlates negatively with circulation.

On the other hand, the results of a study by Resnyanskaya and Fomicheva (1999, 67-69) indicate that on the individual level the reading of local newspapers is not heavily dependent on income. The share of those reading local newspapers varies between 63-72% in different income groups while the reading of national newspapers is more dependent on income, varying between 37-65%. Those earning more read national newspapers more frequently.

Interestingly, there is no correlation at the level of press freedom or the level of urbanisation and per capita circulation. One reason for that is that when the freedom of the press is considered most of the regions are in the middle and the differences among these regions are small (Karta svobody pechaty 1999, Obshchestvennaya ekspertiza 2000).

Despite the boom in the local press, there are some signs of the restoration of the national press in new conditions. The national newspapers have done better in the market of weeklies and rarely published newspapers while local newspapers have got the advantage in dailies. A survey done in the major cities of Russia and around them in 1997 revealed that 40% of all read copies of newspapers were national, 37% were local newspapers and the rest were freesheets. (Resnyanskaya & Fomicheva 1999, 60).

4.9.5. Press in individual regions

The development of the press in individual regions has been reflected in some Russian studies. Dissertations were written on the recent history of the press in Black Earth region (Efremova 1999) and on the development of the press and journalism in Tatarstan (Akhmetzyanov 1999; Lebedev 2000). The regional press was reflected even in other works, e.g., on the press of the indigenous nationalities of Siberia (Yakimov 2000), the press in Buryatiya (Dagbaev 1995) and in Mordoviya (Kirichek 1998) and in several regions (Journalists and journalism... 1994). The development of the regional press has been reflected also in the journals *Sreda* and *Zhurnalist*.

In the Black Earth region the press has been divided into the press of opinions for intellectuals and the mass press for the rest of the population, into the state-financed and the market-based press, into the administrative press which propagates the line of the local authorities, and the “independent press which represents the opinions of the publishers and journalists” (Efremova 1999, 9).

In Tatarstan the level governmental protectionism has been above average and clear signs of the capitalisation of the press are missing, e.g. there are no independent media empires, the business press and the independent press are weakly developed (Lebedev 2000, 21). Russian and Tatar language newspapers have been oriented towards different audiences, with Russian papers paying attention to economic and social reforms, commerce, social security and problems resulting from the non-payment of salaries, while the Tatar press gives more space to culture, the history of the Tatar people and language problems (Akhmetzyanov 1999, 14-18, see also Davis, Hammond & Nizamova 2000 and Yurev & Leonidov 1998; for similar development in Udmurtia, Shklyayev & Toulouze 2001). It has also been found out that Russian language newspapers are more independent from the local authorities, more independent in choosing editorial policy and more economically oriented (Lebedev 2000, 22).

In the Arkhangelsk region Arkhangelsk city subscribers “discard central media in favor of municipal newspapers, and provincial subscribers, in their turn, discard Arkhangelsk media in favor of local newspapers” (Journalists and journalism... 1994, 6). The situation was similar in most of the other provinces that were included in the study of regional journalists. In some of them, despite the impression of oversaturation, the amount of media is constantly increasing since local politicians and businessmen “desire to have their own mass media and are ready to maintain them” (ibid. 13).

In Ivanovo the traditional *Rabochii krai* and the city newspaper *Ivanovskaya gazeta* (founded in 1990) are mainly subscribed to and have lost the major part of their former circulation. In them the share of subsidies from the local administration is around 20% and the share of advertisements around 30-40%. The weekly *Khronometr*, founded only in 1998, is the most popular newspaper. At the end of 2001 its circulation was 65,000, while *Rabochii krai* was at 17,000 and *Ivanovskaya gazeta* at 27,000. *Khronometr* gets 80% of its income from retail sales and subscriptions and only 20% from advertisements. In the older newspapers of Ivanovo the salaries of the journalists are on the level of 1,000-2,000 roubles, while in *Khronometr* they get 6,000-7,500 roubles. Because of these good salaries, many journalists

would like to work in that paper but only a few understand what is required. (Kniivilä 2002, 12-13)

In Bryansk the number of newspapers has increased from two to 13, of which only two are dailies. *Bryanskii Rabochii* (circulation 21,000) became the paper of the local legislature and has a communist orientation. The regional administration launched and co-finances (40%) the daily *Bryanskie Izvestiya* (22,000). The new weekly, *Bryanskoe Vremya*, (circ. 30,000) remains the sole genuinely independent newspaper in the region, owned by an editorial collective and surviving without subsidies on its income from advertising and sales. (Lange 1996, 195) *Bryanskoe vremya* has promoted innovations in journalism as well by starting an opinions page as part of “the strategy of attempting to appeal to a broad audience by presenting balanced news coverage along with a plethora of viewpoints” (Drucker 1997).

In Chelyabinsk the former leading daily newspaper has succeeded economically by founding weekly advertisement newspapers, both a free one and a sold one, and can finance the publishing of the daily with this income (Obermayer 2000). Similar cases could be found also elsewhere.

In the Buryat republic the circulation of the former dominant newspaper, *Pravda Buryatii*, dropped from 134,000 copies in 1988 to only 50,000 in 1994, while a new newspaper, *Buryatiya*, increased from 15,000 in 1991 to 30,000 in 1993, but then dropped to 22,000 in 1994. The circulation of the Buryat language newspaper *Buryaad ünén* remained between six and nine thousand during the whole period (Dagbaev 1995, 65; Yakimov 2000, 135).

In the autonomous republics of Siberia the increase in national consciousness and the change in newspaper content attracted interest in the Yakut and Buryat newspapers, especially in cities (Yakimov 2000, 134-135). In the 1990s the number of subscriptions to Yakut newspapers survived better than subscriptions to Russian newspapers (Yakimov 2000, 164). The national awakening among smaller nationalities has also produced newspapers and supplements in languages that did not have them during the late Soviet period (Yakimov 1991, 37). There has also been a sharp decline in the number of ‘dubbed’ newspapers (in both Russian and the native languages) (Yakimov & Morrison 1995, 121).

In Mordovia the circulation of local newspapers dropped from 160,000 in 1992 to 145,000 in 1996 and the most popular newspaper in 1996, “Stolitsa S” did not even exist in 1992. The newspapers published by the parliament and government have suffered, while commercial newspapers, mainly weeklies, have been booming. In 1997 the press could be divided into three groups: 1) the newspapers published by governmental organs, with a total circulation of 140-150,000; 2) newspapers of political parties, social

movements and trade unions, with a total circulation of 20-30,000 copies; and 3) newspapers published by companies (including journalists themselves) with a total circulation of 110-120,000 (Kirichek 1998, 29-32).

In Chuvassia, for example, both the decreasing dependence of the new media outlets on the authorities and the process of establishing control over the media are taking place. Moscow-based papers of “yellow” and erotic content dominate in the newspaper and journal market of Chuvassia (Kiselev 1998, 37).

A study of media use in the Volga-Vyatka area in 1994 indicated that the local newspapers are the most popular in all the regions (Nizhnii Novgorod, Kirov, Mari-El, Chuvassia, Mordovia) and among the national newspapers the most popular were *Moskovskii komsomolets* (18% read it), *Argumenty i fakty* (13%) and *Komsomolskaya pravda* (10%) (Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya Volgo-Vyatskogo regiona 1996). Also a large survey of regional journalists indicated that in all the surveyed regions the local newspapers were the most popular (Zhurnal'ist i zhurnalistika... 1995, 39-40).

The changes in the regional press have common tendencies, the most important of which are pluralisation, commercialisation and division into different types of newspapers based on content, audience and financiers. Weekly newspapers are the most successful part of the press. In many regions the number of newspapers that actually compete for the attention of the audience has increased, in many cases even significantly. Similarly, in many regions (especially in those with a market or liberal press model) the new papers have taken over the dominant share of the local press circulation.

4.10. Conclusion: Modernisation and the Soviet background

At the beginning of the 20th century Russian journalism was quite comparable with journalism in many Western countries, but after the October revolution, the development of the press and journalism (as the development of the society in general) followed another path. The press and journalism took on forms that were in some respects similar to those of the Western press and journalism and in some respects were very different. Many functions of the Soviet press, its relations with other social institutions and textual practices were different.

Instead of the market or political civil society, the main outside influence on journalism came from the political and administrative levels of the society. Also the Western press has, in some cases, been promoted by the state, but in the Soviet Union the development happened without an open political power

struggle and without the influence of the market. Russian journalism was close to literature already before the revolution and Soviet journalism followed, and strengthened, this tradition. When the limitations on content were strict and difficult to overcome, the creative forces of Soviet journalists were directed to presentation. Soviet journalists were individuals who tried to develop their own styles and to maintain their own integrity. Soviet journalists were authors who were individually responsible for their materials (on an official level to the Party and on a practical level to the audience). Sometimes journalists had to fight to get their stories published without mitigation by the editors and the practice to edit the stories was seen as contrary to proper journalistic practises.

The increasing literacy and the ability to make individual judgements, the quest for facts through the popularisation of science, the fostered sense of autonomy and the search for democracy were important factors in the collapse of the Soviet system. As He Zhou has stated, these changes were driven by modernisation, which “makes it imperative for a social institution to provide a rapid flow of diversified, factual information” (He 1988, 207).

The collapse of the Soviet Union has created new conditions, the most important of which is the influence, although yet limited, of market forces on the media market. On the other hand, many old features have been preserved and, as a foreign scholar has stated, the change has been minimal:

The media before the fall of communism were large-scale, hierarchically organised, bureaucratic establishments in which there were elaborate procedures for ensuring acquiescence to the will of the directorate. The media after the fall of communism are large-scale, hierarchically organised, bureaucratic establishments in which there are elaborate procedures for ensuring acquiescence to the will of the directorate. (Sparks 2000, 45)

This view, however, is too general and too absolute. There have been important changes even if structures and outcomes on the whole have remained rather similar. The most important change has undoubtedly been the enormous increase of pluralism in the Russian media, especially in the press (if not counting the Internet). Although some authors have mentioned the threat of monopolisation of the media market (Gurevich 1999, 49), it is not a likely outcome, at least not in the newspaper market.

While the Western media models and practices were rapidly adopted in other Eastern European countries, especially in the Eastern part of Germany (see Kilborn 1993; Hagen 1997; Scherer, Schulz, Hagen, Zipfel & Berens 1997), they have not spread as rapidly to Russia itself. It is evidently true that Western-type media and social structures cannot be transplanted to Russia or

any other society, as de Smaele (1999, 181) has argued, but they can develop there as they have developed in the West. This development may happen more rapidly because models already exist. These models and structures, however, require some institutional preconditions without which they are not likely to emerge.

The development of an open society has been suggested as one such precondition factor, but it does not seem to be one of the best concepts for understanding post-Soviet Russia. A comparison between rigid and loose societies has been offered as an alternative, with the argument that Russia is a too loose society while the ideal remains somewhere in between (I. Zassoursky 1999, 166).

Marketisation, which is sometimes offered as a solution, may benefit only the capital holders and not the majority of citizens and some of the profit-oriented journalistic practices introduced by the market-driven media entrepreneurs “may in fact prove disruptive to the formation of a public sphere”. Furthermore, the flow of foreign capital and the development of commercial practices are likely to lead to escapism and light entertainment in media content (Chalaby 1998c). In these conditions the freedom of the media “remains ideological to the highest degree, i.e., it reinforces power” (Becker 1996, 9).

The Russian transition is part of the global processes of change. According to a comparative study on press transitions, the Russian transition was in many ways typical, perhaps the most important difference being the survival of an unusual, if not downright unrealistic, number of newspapers that “could endure only because the press itself engaged in a rollercoaster ride of shifting sponsorship” (Jones 2000, chapter 6). Many elements of the development of the press and journalism reviewed in Chapter Three have proved to exist in Russia as well.

The global trends of tabloidisation and the increasing role of television in comparison with the press can be observed in Russia as well. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the media has become the second estate (the first one being the economic system and political power only the third one) in Russia as has happened in the West (see Ramonet 2001, 52-53). In Russia the media is not exercising power over the political system but rather assisting the rulers or the opposition in political battle. The media has become more independent and influential, which is visible in the attempts to control its performance.

In the Soviet Union the press fulfilled some functions of civil society and in post-Soviet Russia the press continues to fulfil some functions of political parties and civil society: the aim of influence has been more visible than the

task to inform. In the Soviet press journalists had power or at least a feeling of power, while according to current opinion, the press has stopped being part of power. Many things can be published, but journalists do not have real power and they cannot solve the problems of individual citizens, which has also contributed to the low rating of journalists in contemporary Russia (Nikolai Svanidze in *Sreda* 8-9/2001).

The mistrust in journalism has been interpreted also as a motivation for the renewal of journalistic practices (Geisslinger 1997, 411). This offers an interesting, although hypothetical, comparison with the research done on Western news journalism. The generic forms of hard news, its contents, vocabulary, structure and narration, are the reasons why “one in general terms is likely to trust the news” although he “can have doubts about the ‘facts’ of an individual news report” (Kunelius 1996, 296). While a Western news reader has been learned to trust the news (Kunelius 1996) and even treated as an adolescent as a textual reader of a news story (Ridell 1998), a Soviet reader was trained to read between the lines and search for facts which were not visible at first glance (e.g. Mickiewicz 2000, 121). The legacy of this practice is a challenge for post-Soviet Russian journalism: what if the readers continue to read between lines even if there is nothing there to read?

At the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the new century Russian journalism and mass media seems to have a lot of common elements with Latin American or Southern European countries. Jörg Becker (1996) was one of the first to speak about the Latin Americanisation of the Mass Media in former socialist countries and it seems that the concept of clientelism can be used also in the Russian case. In Southern European and Latin American countries five major characteristics of clientelist media system have been outlined: a “low level of newspaper circulation, a tradition of advocacy reporting, instrumentalization of privately-owned media, politicization of public broadcasting and broadcasting regulation, and limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession” (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002, 176-177). These characteristics fit Russia as well as they do in Southern Europe or in Latin America, where “the press never developed as a cultural industry with a mass market sufficient to provide an independent economic base” (ibid. 183).

The Soviet legacy has provided a good basis for the development of clientelist relationships in Russia (Vorozheikina 1994), which have started to flourish with the introduction of market relationships (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002, 190). Clientelism has evolved as a correlate of modernity, providing mechanisms for social actors to gain access to resources as modernisation disrupted traditional institutions (ibid. 185; Günes-Ayata

1994, 24-25); this description can also be easily applied to Russia. However, such clientelist relationships have been eroding in Southern Europe and Latin America with the development of a media market and the diffusion of a global journalistic culture (ibid. 191) and this might likely be the case with Russia as well.

The period of transformation after the collapse of Soviet society is marked by a fragmentation of society and political, economic and social institutions are fluid and constantly changing together with the goal of great stability (Rogerson 1997, 349-350). According to one assessment, the press has fundamentally failed to function “as a force for societal consolidation and moderation during a period of profound national crisis” (Foster 1993, 742). In post-Soviet Russia freedom of expression has not been an essential mechanism for maintaining a balance between stability and change, but rather the Russian press

has played a destabilizing, not moderating role. Its debate of competing strategies and objectives has contributed to public dissention and disunity. Its unrelenting criticism and exposure of personal and systematic failings has eroded rather than fostered public confidence in the post-socialist Russian leadership and evolving norms, rules, institutions, and procedures. (Foster 1993, 742)

This has led Foster to ask if the conventional wisdom is correct — that press freedom is a precondition for a democratic, law-based state. Or is the democratic, law-based state a precondition for press freedom? (ibid. 743-744) The stability and economic recovery provided by the Putin administration have been important elements in the development of the Russian social system, but they have also led to fears of the end of press freedom and consequently to doubts about the usefulness of this stability.

The Russian experience has indicated that the relationship between free speech and democracy is not an easy one. The Russian experiment, to develop a framework of collective information rights, has been ultimately unsuccessful. The reason for this has been the idea of applying the right to information “as a collective right of citizenry rather than as a right of citizens individually” in both official and unofficial discourse. This has given the authorities the right to control information when acting in accordance with the majority of citizens. (Foster 1996, 290)

The experience has shown that the Western assumption that the media will help establish democracy is wrong (Gross 1998, 10); indeed the opposite might be true: democracy and civil society will help to establish independent, impartial and professional media. In a society that is fragmented and divided,

professional media, which often are also one-sided, serve the power elite and exclude alternative views, may not be the optimal type of media.

During recent years Russia has gained economic stability, a stable and universally respected legal framework is developing, constitutional confusion has been largely settled and a new generation of media professionals has emerged. Therefore, the conditions for the ideal role of the media as defined by McNair in 1994 are starting to be fulfilled. The list is, however, not complete. What is also needed is a developed and organised civil society and social structure in which the media and other institutions have a different role and place than has been the case in Russian history.

Russian experience has indicated that legal rights are neither necessary nor sufficient for the freedom of information to be realised. What are needed are a political culture-based institutional setting and legal traditions based on ensuring these rights not as privileges or collective rights but as individual rights (based mainly on Foster 1996). The abuse of the free press for the purposes of the ruling elite has discredited it and led to increasing voices for the control of political information. It would be possible to interpret this as a relic of the Soviet past, but a more positive interpretation might actually correspond better to the truth: the voters understand that they are manipulated and would like have control over this manipulation rather than limit the right to express alternative views.

Russians have not lost access to different views and opinions; there are plenty of them. However, the media system based on private ownership and support for the owner's views leaves a significant number of opinions outside the major media; there is also a lack of objective information and analysis. This is just a natural result of a media system based on a market economy and its particular forms originate from the peculiarities of the Russian market economy. It seems that, in fact, in a "broad socio-political national context Russian media are obviously lacking nothing" (Vartanova 2001b, 135), but the problem is more the underdevelopment of the Russian civil society.

The plurality of views and media outlets is important and increasing commercialisation may seriously reduce the number of media outlets and unify their content. Before this happens (and also as a necessary condition for this development) it would be necessary to ensure higher professional standards and objective criteria for reporting, as well as to strengthen the Russian civil society.

In concluding this chapter, it is worthwhile to give an assessment of the future of the press in Russia. According to an optimistic version presented by Yassen Zassoursky (Ya. Zasurskii 2001, 14-15), the reforms will create a civilised, socially oriented market and the media will get support both from

a solvent and educated audience and a more plural advertising market. The public sphere will receive a serious impetus. On the other hand, according to a pessimistic version, the role of the government will grow and the media will comprise a symbiosis between propaganda and public relations and will include plenty of boulevard publications. The public sphere will be narrowed. There is also a third scenario, which includes a stagnating economy and harsh economic conditions for the media, resulting in the fall of quality publications and the rise of boulevard ones. The public sphere will be compressed.

The most likely outcome will be the third one. The first scenario does not exist in practice anywhere; the second one, including the increasing role of the government, is not likely either, at least not in the newspaper market. The rise of the boulevard press is not necessarily a bad sign but attests to the potential of the popular news form. A likely prognosis for the next decades of the Russian press is that commercial competition and its inevitable outcome, the concentration of the press, will happen mainly among the popular press, while the elite press will compete mainly for political subsidies (excluding the business press). An independent elite press might develop either on the basis of some popular newspapers or on the basis of the business press. When the political subsidies become less important, most of the current politically engaged “quality” newspapers will go bankrupt.

5. Towards pluralism and competition: The development of the newspaper press in Karelia 1985-2001

5.1. Karelia as a region

5.1.1. Population and economy

The Republic of Karelia is one of the ethnic republics of Russia situated in northwest Russia, having a border with Finland. The population of Karelia is about 800,000, of which 280,000 live in the capital, Petrozavodsk. Almost 75% of the population is urban, although other towns than Petrozavodsk are small, with 5,000-40,000 inhabitants.

Approximately 75% of the population are Russians and the ethnic minorities consist of Karelians (10%), Finns (2%) and Veps (0.8%). Other major non-Russian minorities are Belorussians (7%) and Ukrainians (4%). The share of Russians steadily increased from 57% in 1926 to 63% in 1939 and to 73% by 1989 (Suni et al. 1998, Lallukka 1990, 1992 and 1998).

Most of the non-Russians of Karelia have been russified and approximately 90% of the population indicated Russian as their mother tongue in 1989¹. Karelian was spoken by 5.2% of the population (Census 1989). Of those who did not speak Russian as their mother tongue, over 95% indicated a fluent knowledge of Russian. In Karelia the level of russification is one of the highest among the ethnic republics of Russia. According to the micro census of 1994 Russian was spoken at home by 90.6% of Finns and by 82.5% of Karelians (Respublika Kareliya 1999, 58).

The Republic of Karelia includes also territories that belonged to Finland before 1940 (town of Sortavala, districts of Pitkäranta, Suojärvi and Lahdenpohja)² and which were after the War inhabited by immigrants from

1 Russian was the mother tongue of 58.5% of non-Russians as well, for example 48% of Karelians spoke Russian.

2 In this and the following chapters the place names in the former Finnish territory have been written according to Finnish orthography and not transliterated from Russian, e.g., Lahdenpohja instead of Lakhdenpokhya. In originally Russian and Karelian territory, the place names are usually in a Russian form and occasionally the Finnish or Karelian form has been given in brackets. Similarly, Finnish personal names have been preserved in their original form, even if they appeared originally in Russian form. If necessary, the transliterated Russian form has been provided in brackets.

Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia¹.

The Finnish population of Karelia was primarily established only after 1949, when the Finnish population of the Ingria region (around St. Petersburg) was allowed to move to Karelia. The Finns of Ingria were dispelled in the 1930s and 1940s to various parts of the Soviet Union (Matley 1979, Gelb 1996, Laine 2001). A smaller part of the Finnish population originates from the politically motivated immigrants from Finland and North America, who came in the 1920s and 1930s to Karelia (Sevander 1993; Gelb 1993; Lallukka 1998, 51). The Finns of Karelia are predominantly urban; most of them live nowadays in Petrozavodsk. Remigration to Finland has decreased the number of Finns since 1989. On the other hand, the redefinition of ethnic identity has kept the share of Finns stable (2.9% both in 1994 and 1997) (Respublika Kareliya 1999, 57).

Despite a short period at the end of 1930s, the Karelian language (Austin 1992) was not used in literature before the 1980s. Karelians used either Finnish (mainly in the northern part of the Republic) or Russian as literary languages. While the northern dialects of Karelian are very similar to Finnish, the southern dialects differ significantly (on linguistic processes among Karelians see Klementev 1971; Lallukka 1992 and Laine 2001).

Most of the Veps, the third Finno-Ugric minority group of Karelia, live in the Leningrad and Vologda oblasts, but 3,000 of them live in Karelia. The Veps national county (volost) was formed in 1994 but even there the Veps are a minority (42% of population) (Strogalschikova 1999, 52).

Traditionally the basis of the Karelian economy has been agriculture and forestry. The largest production units in the pulp and paper industry are in Kondopoga, Segezha, Pitkäranta and Läskelä, and in mechanical wood-processing in Petrozavodsk, Suojärvi, Lahdenpohja, Sortavala and Kem. Factories of other sectors are in Petrozavodsk (tractors, machinery for pulp and paper industries, electronic equipment, boats, wood-processing machinery) and Nadvoicy (aluminium). The most significant mining enterprise is at Kostomuksha, where a town has been built in order to excavate iron-ore reserves. In the lakes and the White Sea the fishing is important. The main form of agricultural production is cattle farming and the cultivation of animal fodder. The most important cultivated foodstuff is potatoes, of which three quarters were produced as a private activity in 1993. (Nemkovich, Druzhinin & Baibushinov 1994). According to one view, the Republic has an anaemic economy, dropping production, and increasing unemployment (Russian Regional Report 3:17, 30.4.1998). In the spring of 1997 the level of unemployment (according to the ILO criteria) was 11.9% (46,000 persons)

1 The original Finnish population was evacuated practically completely to Finland

(*Kareliya* 4.6.1997), although officially registered unemployment was only 6.2% (*Kareliya* 22.8.1997).

In 1998 the Karelian Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita was just 45% of its level in 1990. In Karelia the decline after 1994 has been greater than in Russia on average. According to preliminary estimates, the Karelian GRP grew by 13% in 1999. In 1991-99, the real incomes of Karelian people declined by almost 65%, which was in line with the national trend, but even the rapid economic growth of 1999 did not change this situation. The share of foodstuffs used for household consumption increased from 35% in 1990 to 54.5% in 1998. By 1998, unemployment had reached the level of 18.9%, which was significantly higher than the Russian average. (The Republic of Karelia in the 90's, December 2000).

5.1.2. Political development in Karelia

According to Butvilo (1998), the first new political organisation was the Popular front of Karelia, founded in November 1988; others like Democratic Russia, the Greens and Memorial organisation then followed. But none of the new political organisations could become a mass movement and have a serious influence on the affairs of state organs in Karelia during *perestroika*. Also the renewal of the work of the Communist Party organisation progressed with difficulties and in 1990 the crisis inside the Party accumulated: the outflow of Communists from the Party started as well as criticism towards central and regional Party organisations (Butvilo 1998, 13-16).

In 1989, when the first elections with a plurality of candidates were held, the incumbent first secretary of the Karelian regional committee of the CPSU, Vladimir Stepanov,¹ who ran in the Sortavala electoral district, was defeated by a young, reform-minded agronomist — A. Yudov, who got 76.5% of vote (compared with Stepanov's 19.7%). After that Vladimir Stepanov retired in November 1989 (Tsygankov 1998, 40-43).

The 1991 Russian presidential elections gave the victory in Karelia to Boris Eltsin, with 53.3% of the vote, which was a little less than the average in Russia. Among other candidates, the most popular were Nikolai Ryzhkov (18.0%), Aman Tuleev (9.2%) and Vladimir Zhirinovskii (8.9%) (Tsygankov 1998, 124).

1 Vladimir Sevastyanovich Stepanov. He should not be confused with Viktor Nikolaevich Stepanov, who also worked in the party committee and became in December 1989 the president of the Karelian parliament and later, after reorganisation, president of the government.

In parliamentary elections in December 1993, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR) of Vladimir Zhirinovskii became the most popular party in Karelia, with 20.3% of the vote, followed by Choice of Russia with 19.5%. Other popular parties were Women of Russia (12.1%), *Yabloko* (10.9%), *Pres* (8.6%) and the Communists (7.0%). The direct mandate seat for Karelia in the Russian parliament was won by Igor Chukhin of Choice of Russia. (Tsygankov 1998, 164-171).

The executive power of Karelia was reorganised in 1993, when most of the earlier functions of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet (president) and the prime minister was given to the Chairman of the Karelian Government (hereafter: Chairman) (Oksa & Varis 1994, 68-69). The new legislative assembly was elected in April 1994. At the same time, Viktor Stepanov was elected Chairman of the Government, with 68% of the vote. The major partisan groups in the Karelian parliament have been the Communists and their allies and the LDPR. The majority of parliamentarians, however, has been outside these factions.

In the parliamentary elections of 1995, the Communists were the most popular party in Karelia, although they got significantly fewer votes (15.4%) than in the country on average. The other most popular parties were the LDPR (13.6%); Our Home is Russia (10.9%); Women of Russia (7.7%); *Yabloko* (7.5%) and Democratic Choice of Russia (5.9%). The direct mandate seat was won by television journalist Larisa Zlobina, who got 28.7% of the vote.

In the presidential elections of 1996, Karelia supported Boris Eltsin, who got 43% in the first round of voting, compared with a mere 17% for Gennadii Zyuganov. In the second round Eltsin got 66.2% and Zyuganov 26.4%.

In the local elections of 1998, the main issue was the election of the chairman of the government (president) of Karelia. The main battle was between incumbent Viktor Stepanov and the mayor of Petrozavodsk, Sergei Katanandov. Katanandov won by a narrow majority (for the coverage of these election in the media, see Pietiläinen 2000).

In the parliamentary elections of 1999, the newly established "administrative party" *Edintsvo* (Unity) received 31% of the vote, which was significantly more than on average in Russia: 23.3%. Other popular parties were the Communists (13.7%), the Right Wing Alliance (10.3%), *Yabloko* (9.8%), Fatherland-Whole Russia (8.8%) and the Zhirinovskii bloc (8.5%). The chairman Katanandov was a candidate on the national list of Fatherland-Whole Russia. The direct mandate seat for Karelia was won by an independent candidate, the chairman of the Karelian parliament Valentina Pivnenko, who later joined the non-partisan group "Popular representative" (*Narodnyi*

deputat). Artur Mäki was elected to the Russian parliament from the national list of the Right Wing Alliance.

In the presidential elections of 2000, Vladimir Putin received a strong majority of the vote (64.3%) significantly more than in Russia on average. Gennadii Zyuganov got 17.0% and Grigorii Yavlinskii 7.4% of the vote.

In general, Karelia has supported the leading parties and presidential candidates in Russia and the communists have got fewer votes than on average. On the basis of recent parliamentary and presidential elections, it seems that the support for leading candidates has increased in comparison with the Russian average.

5.2. On the periodisation of the development and selection of the material

The development of the press in Karelia in the period 1985-1999 can be used as an example of the development of the press in a small, sparsely populated region of the Russian Federation with a small non-Russian minority. Such areas are few, perhaps the most similar cases would be the other regions of the Russian north. However, many factors (political control, economic crises, inflation) that influenced the development of the press are similar in various regions.

The following review of the development of the press in Karelia has been divided into five periods. This periodisation is more a tool for investigation than a division with clear boundaries and distinct differences. Up to 1988, the press remained in the frames of the old Soviet system, the years 1989-1991 were a period of rapid changes in the functioning and structure of the press. From 1992 onward, the press had to adapt to the market economy, e.g., with inflation and various problems. Between 1995 and 1998 a more stable development was noted and finally, with the local elections and economic crises of 1998, a new period with more intensive competition started and also a new struggle for an independent press was going on.

This research has focused on the general, socio-political newspapers, which have been oriented to a universal audience. The starting point has been the Russian use of the '*gazeta*' (newspaper), but the most specialised and less frequent ones has been left out.¹ Also the free advertisement newspapers have been left out. Most of those papers which have been left

1 For example, according to the Russian definition there were 60 newspapers in Karelia, 33 of them in Petrozavodsk, in spring 1999 (*Guberniya* 8.4.1999), of which only ten have been included in this study.

outside the analysis, are published less than once a week, but some of the less frequent papers with mainly political content have been included. The selection principles have thus been both the frequency (no less than once a week) and content (aiming at a wider audience), as well as the political role of the paper (partisan newspapers have been included). This kind of selection principle corresponds well with the Western definition of a newspaper, according to which a newspaper is regular, universal (intended for a unlimited number of people), commercial (openly for sale) and used for multiple purposes (for information, advertising, diversion, gossip) (McQuail 1987, 9).

On the other hand, the international definition of a daily newspaper as a periodical with at least four issues a week would have limited the material too much, because most of the post-Soviet newspapers of Karelia come out only twice or once a week. The main attention has been paid to the development of the press in Petrozavodsk, although district papers have been mentioned occasionally (for more on the district papers of Karelia, see Pietiläinen 1998).

5.3. Development of the press in Karelia before 1985

The development of the Soviet press has progressed in Karelia along the general Soviet trends. The first Soviet newspaper was founded in June 1917 when the first issue of *Izvestiya Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta Krestyanskikh, Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (The Communications of the Workers' and Peasants' Soviets of Olonets County) was founded. This newspaper was renamed several times: in the 1920s it was called *Krasnaya Kareliya* (Red Karelia), in the 1930s and 1940s *Leninskaya Znamya* (Leninist Banner) and finally in 1955 it was renamed *Leninskaya pravda* (Leninist Truth).

In the 1920s the circulation of the newspapers remained at a low level. In 1928 the circulation of *Krasnaya Kareliya* was only 6,000 copies and that of *Punainen Karjala* (Red Karelia) 3,000 copies (Kangaspuro 2000, 169). The circulation started to grow in the 1930s. In 1931 *Krasnaya Kareliya* was printed in 15,000 copies and *Punainen Karjala* in 7,500 copies and the combined number of copies for other newspapers (including district newspapers) was 25,000 (Kulturmoie stroitelstvo... 1986, 115). In 1940 there were already 47 newspapers (excluding factory newspapers) with a total single copy circulation of 147,000 and the annual volume of printed copies was 23 million. (Karelskaya ASSR... 1980, 112).

The literacy rate in Karelia was higher than in many other regions of Russia (Karelskaya ASSR... 1967, 121; Kangaspuro 2000, 160) but the literacy

rate of ethnic Karelians themselves was lower. Karelians were literate in Finnish especially in northern districts (Uhtua, Kiestinki, Rukajärvi), while southern Karelians could read mostly only in Russian (Afanaseva 1989, 50).

The history of the Finnish-language press in Karelia is closely linked with Soviet language policy and the position of the Finnish language. Also the strong position of immigrant Finnish Communists during the first decades of Soviet power shaped the development of the press in Finnish. The first Finnish-language newspaper was founded in Petrozavodsk in 1920 as *Karjalan kommuuni* (Karelian Commune) and in 1923 it was renamed *Punainen Karjala*. (For language policy see Kangaspuro 2000, Sarhimaa 1996).

In 1937-38, when the Finns came under severe purges and discrimination, there was an attempt to create a separate Karelian literary language in the Cyrillic alphabet (Austin 1992; on language planning in Karelia: Anttikoski 1998a and 1998b) and Finnish was banned. In 1940, when the status of Karelia was upgraded to the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Republic (the territories annexed from Finland were included), policy towards the Finnish language was shifted and new publishing started. The Finnish-language newspaper got the name *Totuus* (Truth).

At the beginning of the 1950s, *Totuus* was remarkable as a newspaper of the national minority. The cultural section of the paper published widely the works of Finnish and Karelian authors and “demanded the improvement of the cultural services of the national [=minority] population” (Hyytiä 1999, 167). *Totuus* was closed in July 1955 and in September 1955 *Leniniläinen totuus* (Leninist Truth) was launched as a translated version of Russian newspaper *Leninskaya pravda*. Among the Finnish population, the unification of the newspapers was seen as an attack on Finnish-language culture (see the memoir by Rudolf Sykiäinen in *Karjalan Sanomat* 7.6.2000).

The Finnish newspaper got its independence again in July 1957 with the title *Neuvosto-Karjala* (Soviet Karelia). In 1968, it became possible to subscribe to *Neuvosto-Karjala* in other parts of the Soviet Union outside Karelia and the newspaper took on a wider role as the newspaper of all the Finnish-speaking population of the Soviet Union (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 5.10.1990). *Neuvosto-Karjala* became popular also in Finnish left wing and Soviet friendship circles and the major part of the circulation went to Finland (for the history of *Neuvosto-Karjala*, see Launo 1976 and concerning its Finnish subscribers, see Ollikainen 1977).

The post-war development of the press in Russian was relatively stable and it reflected mainly administrative changes. In 1945, there were 27 newspapers (excluding factory newspapers), with a total circulation of 58,000

(only 40% of the pre-war level) (Karelskaya ASSR... 1980, 112). In 1954 there were 33 newspapers with a combined circulation of 115,000. In the 1950s and 1960s, the share of circulation divided between republican level and district-level newspapers remained stable; approximately 70% of the circulation belonged to the republican level papers. A more significant growth in regional newspaper circulation occurred in the 1960s, when the circulation increased from 139,000 to 201,000.

In 1960, the number of regional and local newspaper copies per 1,000 citizens was 213 and in 1970 it had grown to 282 copies. During the 1970s and 1980s, the growth rate decreased and this resulted in a newspaper circulation rate of 377 copies per 1,000 citizens in 1979 and 437 copies in 1989.

5.4. Period of the late Soviet press (1985-1989)

The press structure of Karelia in the middle of the 1980s was typical for a smaller autonomous republic. First, there was a combined organ of the Communist party and the government in Russian, *Leninskaya pravda* (Leninist Truth); a youth paper in Russian, *Komsomolets* (Komsomolian); and finally an organ of the Communist party and the government in a minority language, in this case Finnish: *Neuvosto-Karjala* (Soviet Karelia).

The circulation figures for individual newspapers were published in the Soviet sources only fragmentarily, but it is possible to conclude that the circulation of *Leninskaya pravda* was 100,000, while *Komsomolets* was printed in 30-40,000 copies and *Neuvosto-Karjala* in 12,000 copies. The total number of newspapers published in Karelia was 29 and, of the remaining 26, about half were district papers and the other half newspapers of various organisations and enterprises. Compared with the 1950s, the share of the three republican-level newspapers out of the total circulation had fallen to 50-55 per cent. The district newspapers had a combined circulation of over 100,000 copies, the remaining being left to other newspapers.

Leninskaya pravda came out six times a week, *Komsomolets*, *Neuvosto-Karjala* and most of the district papers three times a week and the other newspapers even more seldom, the rhythm varying from one weekly issue to one issue a month.

The combined circulation of local newspapers was in Karelia higher than on average in Russia. In 1985 the circulation of local newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants was 356 copies, in 1990 it was 441 copies and in 1991, 412 copies. Published statistics reveal that in 1987 the citizens of Karelia had

subscribed to 1.2 million newspapers and periodicals (compared with 0.54 million in 1966 and 0.92 million in 1976) (Maksimov 1987, 233). While the circulation of periodicals in the Soviet Union was in 1987 around half of the whole circulation of the printed press, it is possible to estimate that slightly less than one half (46%) of all newspapers subscribed to in Karelia were local and regional¹.

Some information was available even from the villages. For example, at the beginning of the 1970s, even in the remote village of Reboły (Repola) in the Muezero district, the Moscow-based newspapers were as popular as the local ones. The village got 700 subscriptions to national newspapers, 120 to *Leninskaya pravda*, 56 to *Neuvosto-Karjala* and 400 to the local newspaper *Avangard* (Vlasov 1974, 129).

Scattered information on the circulation of national newspapers is available for 1988, when *Pravda* had 21,000 subscribers. The circulation of national newspapers was declining, *Izvestiya* had lost 5,000 subscriptions and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* 8,000, although the total circulation of the newspapers had grown by 110,000. (*Leninskaya pravda* 22.12.1987).

Newspapers were mostly subscribed to, although the subscription fee was only slightly lower than the cost of retail copies. Subscription was a way to ensure receiving all issues, since the retail copies were often sold out.

5.4.1. *Leninskaya pravda*

Leninskaya pravda was the combined organ of the Karelian regional committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the Karelian ASSR. The editorial office of the paper had ten departments (according to the list published in the newspaper in 1985): propaganda, Party life, Soviet work and way of life, industry and transport, construction, agriculture and food industry, culture, information, and letters to the editor. In addition, the paper had correspondents in Kostomuksha, Segezha, Medvezhegorsk (Karhumäki) and Pitkäranta.

Before 1988 the number of printed copies was not published in the newspaper, but several sources mention that the circulation of *Leninskaya pravda* was 90,000 copies in the 1970s (Mass Media in C.M.E.A. Countries 1976; Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, vol. 14, 328).

1 When considered that the share divided between periodicals and newspapers was in Karelia the same as in the Soviet Union on average and that 85% of the newspaper circulation of local and regional newspapers was based on subscription.

The paper published preliminary information on the number of subscribed copies during the annual subscription campaign, but the final results were not published before the end of 1980s. For example, the preliminary results of the subscription campaign published on 20.10.1985 revealed that in 1984 the paper had got 41,700 subscription for the next year while in 1985 the result was already 53,773 subscriptions. The same report stated that as of 1.1.1985 the paper had 52,957 subscribers (*Leninskaya pravda* 22.10.1985).

When the 20,000th issue of the paper was published 4.10.1986, the paper reported that “this issue is printed in 109,000 copies” (*Leninskaya pravda* 4.10.1986). The preliminary result of the subscription campaign in 1986 revealed that on 20.10 the paper had over 73,000 subscriptions (*Leninskaya pravda* 28.10.1986).

The preliminary results for 1987 in the city of Petrozavodsk reported that 29,828 copies of *Leninskaya pravda*, 5,521 copies of *Pravda* and 2,843 copies of *Izvestiya* were subscribed to. In the whole of Karelia, *Leninskaya pravda* had got 55,159 subscribers (*Leninskaya pravda* 15.10.1987). This information gives evidence that a major part of the circulation was in Petrozavodsk.

More detailed information about circulation is available after 1988. At the beginning of 1988 *Leninskaya pravda* had 108,700 subscribers and in the middle of the year the number of printed copies reached 130,000 (LP 21.10.1988). The share of circulation by subscription was approximately 84%. The number of subscriptions was 4,000 copies more than in 1987 and the results reported increases also during the previous years. A reasonable estimation of the circulation of *Leninskaya pravda* in the middle of the 1980s is that it was around 100,000 copies and that it had increased slowly from 1975 to 1986 and more rapidly between 1986 and 1988.

The newspapers were subscribed to in post offices, but the most important role belonged to the voluntary subscription collectors. There were 5,000 collectors in Karelia. Every factory had its own collector and the Party groups should also activate the collection of subscriptions (*Leninskaya pravda* 5.11.1985).

Leninskaya pravda started publishing questionnaires targeting readers already in the Soviet period. The questions to the readers were published in the newspaper and the most active readers sent their answers. For example, the questionnaire published 2.10.1986 had very traditional Soviet-type questions such as “What kind of materials would you like to have about the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution?” but also more freely oriented questions, like which interesting person to interview or what kind of problems and shortcomings the paper could write about.

In autumn 1985 the paper got 551 answers, which give an opportunity to know something about the most active readers of the paper at that time. Of them, 85 per cent read all the issues of the newspaper, three out of four had read the paper over 10 years. One third read almost all the stories. The old readers had sent their answers more actively than the young ones: one third of the respondents were over 60 years old and only 20 per cent less than 30 years old. The number of young respondents had grown since the previous questionnaire. Over half (60%) of the respondents belonged either to the Komsomol or CPSU, which indicates that the most active readers had sent their answers. Also the citizens of Petrozavodsk were over-represented, with 64 per cent. (*Leninskaya pravda* 23.11.1985).

The most interesting topics of the newspaper related to the human factor in fulfilling the plans, e.g., the high moral level of Soviet man, his hard-working mood, patriotism, sense of the collective and willingness to help. Also the stories on the battle against everything which harms normal work and life were popular. Family life, education and services and satirical stories were popular. Four fifths of the respondents wrote that they read the newspaper in order to follow events, half of them looked for information that would be useful in work, studies, and in social and everyday life. One fifth of the readers "use our newspaper not only in order to form a right opinion on this or that issue but also in order to participate in discussion on the vital issues of society". (ibid.) This indicates that the often highlighted role of the press as a channel for participation was not supported even by the most active part of the audience.

The majority of the readers felt that the newspaper had improved during recent years, 13% felt that it had remained at a high level, 8% replied that it had remained similar and was not at a high level. Moreover, 18% did not have an answer to this question. The readers would like to have more local material and fewer stories that had already been published in national newspapers.

One reader would have liked to see the paper pay more attention to the failures. It should be a vanguard and not an echo. Another had the opinion that the paper should counter-attack rumours and publish factual information on, e.g., why there are problems with the delivery of gas and dairy products. (*Leninskaya pravda* 23.11.1985).

Only 40% of the respondents received the newspaper in the morning, 31% took it from the mailbox during the day, 25% read it in the evening and 4% received it the day after. The problems with the delivery of the newspaper were occasionally mentioned in the paper as well.

According to a questionnaire published in 1988, the most popular section (*rubrika*) was “The reader proposes, discuss, argues”. Also the sections like “verdict of *glasnost*”, “point of view”, “The issue of the day”, “Reporter on duty” and “In the crossfire of opinions” were popular. Most of them were those in which letters to the editor, or articles on the public discussion were published. The readers were particularly displeased with the stories on the anti-alcohol campaign.

The readers’ challenge to the newspaper was “not to smooth sharp corners”, to have “fewer general expressions, more concrete examples and facts” and that the paper “should with persistency strive for the truthfulness of the stories” (*Leninskaya pravda* 9.12.1988). “The reporter on duty” was a section, that was launched during *perestroika* in order to facilitate contacts between the newspaper and the readers. It was possible to phone the reporter during certain periods of time or to visit him in the newsroom.

On the 14th of September 1989, *Leninskaya pravda* reported on how the incomes of the paper were used. The income of the paper, budgeted according to the 133,000 printed copies, was 1,190,000 roubles. Of that total, 155,000 (13%) was spent on printing costs, 263,000 (22%) to the newsprint, 159,500 (13%) to salaries and 72,000 (6%) to honorariums. Various costs (travels, post, telephone, photograph equipment, repairs) took 101,000 (8.5%) and various funds (honorary, social, the development of production and primary repair funds) took 169,000 roubles (14%). In addition, 46,000 (4%) was used to cover the losses of the *Komsomolets*-newspaper and 205,000 (17%) to cover the losses of *Neuvosto-Karjala*. The Party received 127,000 roubles as profit (10.7%). (*Leninskaya pravda* 14.9.1989).

The total amount of the expenditures was 103,000 roubles greater than the income of 1,190,000 roubles. There might be a printing error in one of the figures. It should be noted that the costs of the paper did not include the distribution costs (the postal service distributed the papers without charge). Combining these figures reveals that the technical production of the newspaper took approximately 35% and the editing and administration (including the funds) about 40% of the expenditures.

The income from subscriptions and retail sales was a bit over one million roubles, or approximately 85% of the income. During the period 1985-1989 the subscription fee for *Leninskaya pravda* was 7.80 roubles a year and the retail price was 3 kopecks per issue (9 roubles a year).

The salary of the journalists (altogether 16 journalists) was 150-200 roubles in month each. The editor-in-chief received 360 roubles, the deputy editor 290, managing editor 270 and the heads of the departments (10 altogether) 220 roubles. In addition, 72,000 roubles or 230 roubles per issue were paid as

honorariums, of which 60% was paid to staff journalists and 40% to outside authors¹ (*Leninskaya pravda* 14.9.1989). Based on these figures, the estimated share of honorariums in journalists' incomes was around one third.

The wages of journalists working for *Leninskaya pravda* were on an average Soviet level. In 1985 the average salary of the Soviet journalists was 201 roubles and in 1990 already 297 roubles. In comparison, the average wage in the service sector was 189 roubles in 1988 and 208 roubles in 1989 (Boutenko & Razlogov 1997, 110-111). According to the official exchange rate, the salaries of the journalists were 1,000-1,500 Finnish marks and that of the editor-in-chief 2,500 marks.

5.4.2. *Komsomolets*

Komsomolets (Komsomolian) was the other republican newspaper in Russian. Its circulation was at the end of the 1980s around 35,000 - 40,000 copies. *Komsomolets* started to publish its printing figures only in 1989 and there are not even approximate figures available for previous periods.

Komsomolets was published by the regional committee of Komsomol (the Soviet Youth Organisation) in Karelia. It came out three times a week: Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. Tuesdays and Thursdays *Komsomolets* had four broadsheet pages and on Saturdays eight tabloid pages. In 1987 all the issues started to appear in tabloid format and all the issues started to have eight pages. The subscription price of *Komsomolets* was 4.08 roubles and the retail price for a single copy three kopecks. In 1988 the retail price was raised to five kopecks without a rise in subscription price. The editor-in-chief was at that time A. Faturin and the deputy editor A. Tsygankov.

Komsomolets covered a wider range of topics than a Western youth paper. It had articles on education, the work of the teachers and questions concerning the upbringing of children. There were more articles on sports than in *Leninskaya pravda* and the disco club of the paper published music notes and lyrics and replied to questions on youth music. There were more pictures and caricatures than in *Leninskaya pravda*. Every issue had a crossword and the layout was livelier. *Komsomolets* published also speeches by Gorbachev and campaign stories. Even the list of sections revealed that it was a political youth paper: working youth, countryside youth, propaganda, information (news), culture and daily life, Komsomol, studying youth and sports.

1 According to Soviet practices, however, 60% of the newspaper space should be used for the materials of outside authors and 40% for materials of staff journalists (see, e.g., Gurevich 1986, 46).

Komsomolets could renew its policy faster than *Leninskaya pravda* and it used the opportunity offered by *perestroika* and *glasnost* by publishing stories, e.g., on new social movements. For example, already in spring 1986 the paper published news about young people committing crimes.

5.4.3. *Neuvosto-Karjala*

Neuvosto-Karjala (Soviet Karelia) was a typical example of a minority-language newspaper in an autonomous republic. It, however, differed from a typical newspaper of its kind, because the majority of its readers lived abroad, mainly in Finland. For example, in 1990, approximately 80 per cent of subscribers lived in Finland (*Leninskaya pravda* 5.10.1990). Despite this fact, it was “clearly aimed at Soviet readers in Karelia” and in format, appearance and news it was unmistakably Soviet (Austin 1981, 173).

In the 1980s the circulation of *Neuvosto-Karjala* grew to 13,000 copies, of which over 9,000 were subscribed to in Finland. The paper “made a revolution in the developing of friendly relations with the neighbouring country Finland” (*Karjalan Sanomat* 4.10.1995). The subscription price to Finland was extremely low, 65 marks, compared with the Finnish newspapers of similar volume. A three-year subscription was only 130 marks. The propaganda for the Soviet way of life was one of the most important tasks and the paper received letters to the editor not only from Finland but even from Finnish-Americans (Styf 1981).

The paper also had a local role: it worked “as a faithful and reliable partner of the Regional Committee of the party in the fight for the realisation of the immortal ideology of Marxism-Leninism, in actively propagating the Leninist nationalities policy, the Soviet way of life, in strengthening the international friendship of the peoples” (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 4.10.1985).

The editorial office of *Neuvosto-Karjala* had six sections: Party life, economic life, culture, news and letters, and finally translations. The editor-in-chief was Juho Laitinen and the deputy-editor Walter Styf. From November 1985 to October 1986 the paper had only a deputy editor, but on 5 October 1986 Aleksei Mironov started as the editor (Sundelin 2000, 56). According to a later criticism, the character of the paper remained in the beginning of 1980s “traditional and the principle of its articles was to defend the non-existing and deny the existing” (Elli Aalto in *Neuvosto-Karjala* 5.10.1990).

The language of *Neuvosto-Karjala* revealed very few Russianisms and it was “ultraconservative compared to its Finnish counterpart. While there is clearly the influence of Russian journalist style, there is virtually no influence of Russian itself” (Austin 1981, 175).

Because of its foreign circulation, the paper had many stories about the successes of Soviet technology and science. It is also likely that the range of social problems that could be reported in the paper was more limited than in Russian papers. Also the number of letters to the editor remained low. *Neuvosto-Karjala* got annually only several hundred letters (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 4.5.1986).

5.5. Press in transformation (1989-1991)

The years 1989-1991 were a period when the press abolished the old Soviet models. It was first visible in the appearance of the new independent newspapers and secondly, in the breakdown of the old newspapers along with their publishers. The third new phenomenon was new non-political newspapers, like the city newspaper *Petrozavodsk* and the new Karelian newspaper *Oma mua*.

5.5.1. New independent newspapers

The first new newspaper was *Novosti dlya vsekh* (News for All). The first issue was published in July 1989. The newspaper was published by the Council of Karelian co-operatives and it was edited by Yu. S. Ivakin. A single copy was sold at 10 kopecks. The publishing of this newspaper started gradually: the second issue came out in September 1989 and only in the beginning of October did the paper start to come out regularly: twice a month in 15,000 copies. Its masthead included the slogan of the paper: "The construction of civilised co-operatives is also the construction of socialism". The paper announced that it is an "Information and advertisement publication of the Council of Karelian co-operatives"

In its first issue, *Novosti dlya vsekh* defined its aims as "a publication that reflects the interests of all the healthy forces in the co-operative movement, which gives a word to everybody who has something to say about this topic" (*Novosti dlya vsekh*, nr 1, July 1989). At the same time, the editorial staff reserved its right to express its own views in every issue.

From the beginning of January 1990, the paper started to come out weekly, on Saturdays. The layout was changed into a tabloid and the paper got a new editor, A.I. Sokolov. At the same time, the single-issue price was dropped to five kopecks. Of its four pages, one was filled with advertisement in the Autumn 1990.

In October 1990 the paper announced that the Council of Ministers of the Karelian ASSR had officially registered it as an independent newspaper. At

the time the paper got a new editor N. Shabiev. The publisher of the newspaper was the “Scientific project co-operative Tsentr”. The editor announced that from the beginning of 1991 the paper would come out twice a week and the paper told about its aims:

As before the centre of the attention among the journalists will be our everyday life with its plusses and minuses, the fight for social justice. We will help you to orient in the difficult political situation in the republic and the country. As before the paper will look for “burning” facts. Despite this, “Novosti” will of course change. Because every journalist has his own style, his own view on affairs.

Lastly, we will with all means try to avoid repetition, that you would read in “Novosti” affairs about which you have already heard. The name has its obligations. (*Novosti dlya vsekh*, 14.10.1990)

The paper would not be afraid of the competition a new independent newspaper brings with it, because *Novosti* was a “genuinely people’s newspaper, which is mainly made of letters to the editor” (*Novosti dlya vsekh*, 14.10. 1990).

The new newspaper, to which the editor of *Novosti* alluded, was *Nabat Severo-Zapada* (North-Western alarm bell), the first issue of which was published on 12.10.1990. All the journalists of the new paper were previous journalists of *Novosti dlya vsekh*, even the editor-in-chief was the previous editor of *Novosti*, Aleksandr Sokolov. In its first issue, the editor stated that *Novosti* was then being published by the journalists of the *Stroitel* (Constructor) newspaper. The founders of *Nabat Severo-Zapada* were the editor; an MP of the USSR, S. Belozertsev; an MP of the Russian Federation, I. Tshukhin; and an MP of Karelia, A. Isakov. The publisher of the newspaper was also the editor, Sokolov. The first issue was printed in 15,000 copies and its single-issue price was 30 kopecks.

The editor defined the policy of the new paper as follows:

The aim of the independent popular newspaper “Nabat” is to spread information on current affairs in our country, in its Northwestern region and concretely in the Karelian ASSR. As an independent organ, the people’s newspaper will give an equal right to use the pages of the newspaper to all the registered and unregistered parties and organisations, informal movements, and citizens, who struggle for the construction of a free and just society in our country, for their complete political and artistic self-expression, for the guaranteed social security of all the stratum of society, for the defence of civil rights and liberties for all the citizens of the RSFSR. The paper reserves for itself the right to publish alternative views on all socio-political issues and to give the authors freedom of artistic self-expression. (*Nabat Severo-Zapada*, 12.10.1990)

The only limitation was that the paper was anti-Communist, although it was ready to give its “pages to everybody — even to monarchists and constitutional democrats”. In the first issue, Social Democratic and Small Peasant Party documents were published of. *Nabat Severo-Zapada* was published in autumn 1990 and spring 1991 in eight pages in tabloid format. Advertisements and classifieds took approximately one page in every issue. There were a lot of classifieds, e.g., on the exchanging of apartments and private employment offers. In July 1991 *Nabat* came out twice a week but returned soon to the weekly schedule.

The third new paper, *Namedni* (Recently), started to come out 14.2.1991. The paper was published in Pryazha, in which it was also printed. The editor-in-chief was A.A. Shcherbakov and the paper was published by a small enterprise *Namedni*. The political line of *Namedni* was nationalistic. The editor himself was a jurist and a member of the Russian Christian-democratic movement (RHDD). In its election campaign issue of 1994, the paper supported the candidates of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskii and other nationalist candidates (*Namedni* 48, 1/1994).

5.5.2. Transformation of the traditional newspapers

Competition from the new papers was yet not visible in the circulation of the traditional newspapers. The number of printed copies of *Leninskaya pravda* grew up to 1989. The number of subscriptions taken for 1989 grew by 2,000 copies, but for 1990 the number of subscriptions was 112,412, which was 3,488 less than in 1989 (*Leninskaya pravda* 21.11.1989).

The regional committee of the Party started to lose its grip on the paper, which was apparent, e.g., when the editor was changed, as was told by the new editor Aleksei Osipov in his newspaper four years later.

In a regional congress of the Party in the final days of 1988, one of the authoritative delegates proposed that the editor of *Leninskaya pravda* should not be nominated for the regional committee of the Party. Many factions of the meeting took advantage of this and the editor was dropped from the committee. So the paper remained without an editor. Osipov, who had been editor of *Komsomolets* up to 1982 and worked later in the propaganda department of the Party, was proposed as the new editor in January 1989. Traditionally the election of the editor should have been confirmed in Moscow, but Osipov was told that he would be the last editor whose election was confirmed: everything should be decided in the regions. Also the journalists of the paper had nothing against the new editor (*Severnyi Kurier* 12.1.1993.)

In 1988 the dismissal of the editor was not commented on with a single word in *Leninskaya pravda*. The list of the elected members of the regional committee was published in the paper on 25.12.1988. In this issue the name of the responsible editor was instead of the editor Shtykov, the deputy editor A.A. Kolosov. The paper reported also that A.V. Mironov was confirmed as the editor of *Neuvosto-Karjala* (he was elected to the regional committee). Shtykov's name was published as the responsible editor again on 27.12. but on 28.12. Kolosov was responsible again and on 30.12. Kolosov was mentioned as temporary editor-in-chief.

In *Komsomolets* the deputy editor Anatolii Tsygankov discussed the possible reasons for the dropping of the editor: "The working style of the editor or the journalists is not liked? This is very possible. The policy of LP is not liked? This is not excluded. The discontent with the whole press was transferred to one newspaper? Even this may be true. There is not a single answer." According to Tsygankov, one of the main reasons was the dissatisfaction toward the whole press. (*Komsomolets* 29.12.1988).

In January 1989 the Sunday issue of *Leninskaya pravda* started to be published in tabloid format. The journalists argued that they would like to make the Sunday issue "solemn, but also sharp, interesting, entertaining and activating". In connection with this, the price of the Sunday issue was raised according to the decision of planning organs to five kopecks (*Leninskaya pravda* 15.1.1989). The everyday issues remained at three kopecks. The tabloid-formatted Sunday issue remained a short experiment: at the end of May 1989 the Sunday issue returned to the broadsheet format. In the beginning of February 1989 *Leninskaya pravda* was printed in 133,000 copies (on Sundays in 130,000 copies).

In February 1989 the new editor defined the task of the paper rather traditionally, but with additions about *perestroika*:

Nowadays it is especially important to give in the pages of the paper a truthful and objective picture of the course of Perestroika in all areas of life — in social, economic, cultural and intellectual — in the republic. The people — the main subject of Perestroika should be given priority. They have to be given the chance to speak out more often. Because it is just he — worker, agricultural worker, engineer, teacher, doctor, student, housewife, pensioner, writer, a member of some other profession or stratum — who should speak openly about his difficulties, shortcomings and delights, on all that which concerns him. The paper covers topics of upbringing of children, relations among family members, the atmosphere in the workplace, the lack of products and also problems with the lack of goodness, humanity and spirituality. In a single word, the problems of every-day life in their all forms and plurality. (*Leninskaya pravda* 28.2.1989.)

For example, the word “news” is not mentioned in the manifesto of the new editor. A month later the editor asked, “what kind of criticism should be published in the newspaper?” According to him all the more often it is asked what right the paper has to publish criticism and the editor has been criticised when the paper has published criticism. The editor noted that the right to criticism had been given by the Party, which had started *perestroika*. The paper also expects that after the criticism has been published, the enterprise takes measures to correct the problems. The intimidation and criticism towards journalists does not remove the causes of the problems and the need to discuss them openly:

We would greatly like to help and we will help all who hopefully write to the paper. But does it make sense to write about one single problem year after year? The journalists give a simple answer: it makes sense! As before we will continue to be irreconcilable towards that what disturbs us. The paper intends to go on with its readers in an honest and open discussion of the problems of our everyday life, on the perfection of *perestroika*, on the widening of democratisation and *glasnost*. And we would like to hope that our voice will be heard. (*Leninskaya pravda* 30.3.1989)

At the beginning of the subscription campaign, the paper stated that it will depend on the readers what the paper will be in the next year:

We try to cover the whole sphere of public opinion, to continue discussion with different groups of readers, including the representatives of informal groups and societies. Respecting the opinions of the readers, we do not aim to have the position of an institution of the final truth, but we consider that our paper cannot become any kind of apolitical weathervane or “reflect” whatever opinions or views. Appealing to the public opinion, to the fundamental documents of the Party and to the resurrected councils [soviets], we have presented and will present our clear and principled evaluation on those phenomena and forces that, according to our opinion, lead to the destabilisation of the situation, complicate the socio-political atmosphere and disturb the cause of *perestroika*. (*Leninskaya pravda* 26.9.1989.)

The paper set its task as “finding the way to every reader, paying attention to his social position, age, experiences, interests and hobbies; to speak with him openly, honestly, benevolently and with principles; to be his interesting and useful discussion partner and assistant in our everyday life.” (*Leninskaya pravda* 26.9.1989).

The interest in the problems of national minorities and the aim of supporting them became so visible in *Leninskaya pravda* that the paper published its whole last page in Karelian (with Latin alphabet) in 28

September 1989. The page contained material prepared by the Society of Karelian culture and it invited people to the founding meeting of the society, which was held on the same day. An introduction in Russian told that every nationality has the right to its own language and instead of quarrels and words there has to be actions. The paper asked also for the comments of the readers about the page and it received plenty of them:

The page looked unusual and odd, so that the reaction was unexpected. On the day the page was published, the telephones rang constantly. The readers were embarrassed, angry, they thanked us for it, their emotions were stirred up, they were anxious, they asked us to explain what was going on, why one page was printed in a language other than Russian. (*Leninskaya pravda* 3.10.1989)

The reaction describes clearly how the changes in the newspaper were connected with social and political changes. In this case there were fears of the increasing position of the Karelian language.

The role of the newspaper as a source of authentic information was visible, e.g., in December 1989, when the editor-in-chief answered the readers who asked if all the materials of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the CPSU had been published in the newspaper. According to the editor, the paper had not received complete information, and the published documents were all that were available. He also criticised that “not for the first time all the information has not been given to the public” despite the talk that *glasnost* should be the leading principle. (*Leninskaya pravda* 19.12.1989)

In 1989-1990 *Leninskaya pravda* received 1,200-1,400 letters from its readers every month, which was more than ever before. According to the editor, the paper could not

stay a simple mediator of those ideas which have been worked out in the Central Committee or Regional Committee. The five years of *perestroika* has signified that the readers would not like to be consumers of the officially confirmed ideology, they would also like to participate in developing it. (...) An independent search for truth is going on (*Leninskaya pravda* 5.5.1990).

The paper participated in the social discussion by giving voice to others. According to the editor, it was justified because there was only one daily newspaper. It was not justified to equal every published letter, article by a journalist or a published official document with the official policy of the paper. “Despite all the plurality of opinions reflected in the pages of the paper, the paper itself remains faithfully a supporter of democratic principles.” According to the editor, the journalists can express their free, independent and personal opinion in their own stories. When publishing letters, the paper

should function as a social forum and respect the equality of the parties. (*Leninskaya pravda* 15.5.1990).

Also *Neuvosto-Karjala* profited from *perestroika*. The paper started to publish stories about the fate of the Finns in the Soviet Union. In connection with the subscription campaign in the autumn 1989, *Neuvosto-Karjala* defined its policy as follows:

In the spirit of openness it provides materials on very different topics, e.g., the language problem, social justice, the victims of Stalinism, the life and hopes of contemporary people. The scale of topics is wide and plural. The paper uses plain language about party life and the development of the economy of the republic, about the solution of the foodstuffs and housing problems. (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 15.9.1989)

But when the conservation of nature was the topic, the policy of the paper became “formal and cold”; for example, the paper wrote little about the planning of the nuclear power plant, the planned Paanajärvi national park, and the Nuorunen project¹ and did not pay attention to the damage the town of Kostomuksha has caused to nature. (Author Pekka Perttu in *Neuvosto-Karjala* 5.10.1990).

In 1990, when *Neuvosto-Karjala* had its 70th anniversary, the paper mentioned that its mission had changed: the paper

should illuminate all that is going on under the conditions of *perestroika* in the economic, social and political life in our country. (...)

As another main direction of its activities, *Neuvosto-Karjala* will deal with the nationalities question — it will continue to tell about the life and destiny of Karelians, Veps and Finns, e.g., to continue investigations on the fate of the Finns who came from America and Finland and the Ingrian Finns, about which the paper has recently told a lot. (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 5.10.1990)

5.5.3. *Fight for Komsomolets*

In 1990 there was a conflict over the ownership of the youth newspaper *Komsomolets* between the publisher, the Komsomol organisation of Karelia, and the journalists of the paper. The conflict arose because the journalists wanted to have a more independent position in producing the paper and wanted to become the publisher. The changes began in January 1990 when the paper changed the masthead information: it was no longer the “Organ of the Karelian regional committee of Komsomol” but the “Organ of the

1 The Nuorunen project was a plan of Finnish businessmen to build a winter sports centre on Nuorunen Mountain near the Finnish-Soviet border.

Komsomol organisation of Karelia". In *Leninskaya pravda* this change was welcomed as a sign that the papers should not be the organs of party leaders but the organs of organisations. The journalists of *Komsomolets* felt that they had the support of the readers, because, "while Komsomol has lost members during recent years, *Komsomolets* has got new subscribers. And only because of limited access to newsprint, the paper could not raise the number of printed copies to over 53,500. (*Komsomolets* 2.10.1990).

The editorial staff of *Komsomolets* registered the paper in Moscow on 4 October 1990 and indicated the staff as the publisher. From the same day onward, the paper no longer published information about its organ role, but had replaced it with the phrase "*Molodezhnaya gazeta*" (Youth paper). The registration in Moscow was possible because the paper aimed to be interregional, so it was planned to cover not only Karelia. (*Leninskaya pravda* 19.10.1990).

The regional committee of Komsomol decided, however, on 6 October 1990 that *Komsomolets* had no right to come out as a "Youth paper" and the staff could not be the publisher. The committee took the case to court. The paper appealed for the support of the readers.

According to the president of the Karelian Union of Journalists, Konstantin Gnetnev, there was permanent conflict between the regional committee of Komsomol and the paper: "Using the language of the Press law, behind it was the fact that the staff challenged continuously the boundaries that the publisher, the regional committee of the Komsomol, had set." (*Leninskaya pravda* 19.10. 1990). The result was one of the most interesting papers in northwestern Russia.

Because the both sides remained firm, there were opinions that in 1991 there would be two papers with the name *Komsomolets*, although the journalists assured that there would be only one paper (*Leninskaya pravda* 28.10.1990). The position of the journalists became more difficult when the government of Karelia decided that the subscription fees, the property and the newsprint reserve belonged to the Komsomol. The journalists demonstrated outside the governmental building and collected signatures for their support. (*Leninskaya pravda* 1.11.1990).

Also the committee for regulations, parliamentary ethics and *glasnost* of the Supreme Council of the Karelian ASSR discussed the situation and after that the journalists of *Komsomolets* concluded that no social institution supported the idea of publishing an independent youth paper (*Komsomolets* 24.11.1990). The Union of Karelian journalists called the situation around the paper "an infringement of *glasnost*" (*Komsomolets* 8.12.1990).

Despite, or because of the conflict, the collection of subscriptions succeeded well. At the end of October *Komsomolets* had received 28,500 subscriptions, while *Leninskaya pravda* had 51,000. *Komsomolets* was leading in the Prionezhskii, Pryazha, Suojärvi and Olonets districts and in Petrozavodsk. (*Komsomolets* 11.11.1990). The final number of subscriptions was 48,949, which was much more than for 1990 (39,000) (*Komsomolets* 22.11.1990). However, at the beginning of December (11.12.) the staff of the paper explained what to do if someone would like to cancel his subscription to *Komsomolets* and instructed the subscribers who did not like to receive a paper of the Komsomol leadership to do so. Some supporters of the paper also sent back their Komsomol membership tickets and quit the Komsomol. The regional committee of the Komsomol won the case on the ownership of the *Komsomolets* newspaper on 25 December 1990 and the old staff announced that the paper would be published with new staff and the old staff would start a new paper, *Komanda* (*Komsomolets* 28.12.1990). The journalists hoped that one of the banks would give support to start the new paper. There was also a problem with printing because the Anokhin printing plant would not be ready to print the new paper due to the lack of capacity. (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 16.12.1990.)

At the 12 January 1991 meeting of Karelian journalists it was decided to collect support for the new paper (*Komsomolets* 12.1.1991). *Leninskaya pravda* reported that the activists were looking for possibilities to publish a new paper, but it was not a project of one week or month (*Leninskaya pravda* 15.1.1991). The new paper might have been published during some period of time but, e.g., the library collections in Petrozavodsk do not include a paper called *Komanda*. The journalists which left *Komsomolets* ended up working in other newspapers.

At the beginning of 1991 V. Berezhnyak became the editor of *Komsomolets* and the paper took, in addition to the name “*Komsomolets*”, a secondary title “*Molodezhnaya gazeta Karelii*” (Karelian youth paper). The circulation of the paper reached a record of 58,000 in January, but it fell to 54,000 in May and 47,000 in July. In autumn the number of printed copies grew again to 51,000.

5.5.4. *Independence from the Party*

In *Leninskaya pravda* increasing independence among the journalists was easier. *Leninskaya pravda* was registered according to the new press law in November 1990 and it had four publishers (founders): The council of deputies of the Karelian ASSR, the council of ministers of the Karelian ASSR, the

republican organisation of the CPSU and the staff of the paper. (*Leninskaya pravda* 7.11.1990). On 7 November 1990 the masthead of the paper still included the words “The organ of the regional committee of the CPSU, the supreme council of the Karelian ASSR and the council of ministers” but on 8 November the paper announced that it was “The paper of the Councils of Deputies of the Karelian ASSR and the republican organisation of the CPSU”.

It is justified to conclude that at this point the official role of *Leninskaya pravda* as an organ of the Party leadership was ended. However, the paper still continued to publish the traditional slogan “Proletariat of the world unite!” and the awards the paper had received. The paper announced that it would be dependent mainly on the subscribers and on the truths of life. The journalists would do all in their power to “make the paper a tribune of reconciliation, so that it would serve the stability of society, to analyse all sides of the social, economic, political and spiritual processes in the republic, throw light on the pace of reforms in all the fields of life” (*Leninskaya pravda* 8.11.1990.)

At the same time the process towards the change of the name of the paper started. Already on 11 November 1990 the paper asked the opinion of its readers on the new masthead in which the main element would have been the capital letters “LP” beside “The socio-political newspaper of the Karelian ASSR.” The masthead would also include all the previous names of the paper. (*Leninskaya pravda* 11.11.1990). The proposal was not implemented and the paper continued with the old masthead. The front-page column of the minor news, however, listed, besides the old title “Events — facts — comments”, a new one; “*Severnyi Kurier*” (Northern Courier) at the beginning of December 1990. In January 1991 “*Severnyi Kurier*” became an independent element in the upper left corner of the front page, as part of the masthead.

At the beginning of 1991 *Leninskaya pravda* had 23 journalists, of which three were the editor, deputy editor and managing editor (including also the photographer and the artist of the paper) (*Leninskaya pravda* 1.1.1991). The new conditions had an impact also on the section division of the paper. The “Party life” and “propaganda” sections had been replaced with sections on “socio-political life” and “the work of the council of deputies.” The economic sections had been combined so that only two remained: “economic life” and “agricultural-industrial”. The paper had correspondents in Kostomuksha, Medvezhegorsk and Lahdenpohja. In spring 1991 the correspondent was moved from Lahdenpohja to Pitkäranta.

From the beginning of 1991 *Leninskaya pravda* started to come out five times a week. The change was based on the change in the working time of the

postmen. At the same time the retail price was raised to 10 kopecks. The circulation was still in 100,000, of which 74,000 were subscribers.

After *Leninskaya pravda* had lost its organ role, the communists of Karelia founded a new organ, *Nashe slovo* (Our word). The first issue was published 4 January 1991. *Nashe slovo* was published weekly on Fridays and it had 8 pages in tabloid format. The editor of the paper was Arkadii Reutov. The price of a single issue was 10 kopecks and the subscription fee 40 kopecks a month. The founder of the paper was the City Organisation of Communists in Petrozavodsk and the founding of the new paper was motivated by the fact that the journalists of the newspapers had moved to liberal ideological positions and published views of the parties which opposed the CPSU. There should be a paper in which the communists could express their views, Ivan Shurupov, the first secretary of the CPSU City Committee, stated.

The distribution problems of the new paper became crucial. A reader asked why the paper runs out in kiosks and received an answer that the first issue sold badly and the distribution company decided to ask sellers how many copies should be delivered to each of them. For example, only 1,400 copies of the first issue were delivered to kiosks. The paper stated also that the kiosk company receives 20-26% of the cover price and the selling of 2,000 copies of *Nashe slovo* would profit the company only 52 roubles, thus concluding that it is not profitable to sell a newspaper like *Nashe slovo* instead of more expensive newspapers and periodicals.

The paper published in its first issue a questionnaire which was returned by 80 readers. The majority of them were men, middle-aged or older and highly educated. The readers would have liked the paper to write first of all about Party work and its results and events in political and economic life. A majority wanted to read views of different parties and movements and analytical articles on anti-Communism. Actually the paper resembled the other political newspapers (*Nabat*, *Novosti dlya vsekh*) more than a partisan Communist organ, although the views and statements of the Communist organisation received a lot of space.

Nashe slovo published also advertisements and in some issues the whole last page was full of them. The main advertisers were restaurants, shops and especially the new co-operatives, which advertised their products and services. The paper had a lot of letters to the editor and discussion pieces as well as news and pictures. It published even political analyses by Anatolii Tsygankov.

Nashe slovo planned to move to a three times a week rhythm at the beginning of 1992. The planned subscription fee was 15.60 per year, but the retail sale fee was planned to be raised to 20 kopecks (*Nashe slovo* 2.8.1991).

Neuvosto-Karjala also asked its readers in autumn 1990 if the name of the paper should be changed. The published answers supported the old name, e.g., on the basis that “we would like to be at peace with all the people and be citizens of the Soviet Union” and “if the name is changed the paper will lose its image.” Those supporting the change motivated it, e.g., because the word Soviet (*Neuvosto*) “is too worn-out and standard, and I am not sure if we have functioning *soviets* (councils)” (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 28.12.1990.)

Neuvosto-Karjala left its organ role behind at the beginning of 1991 when it defined itself as a “National public newspaper”. At the same time it started to move away from its old name by publishing the word “Karjala” with much bigger letters than the word “Neuvosto” from 26 January 1991 onward. The paper stated that “the outlook needs to be modernised and improved”.

Also the publisher of *Neuvosto-Karjala* was changed. On 1 July 1991 the Karelian State Committee on Publishing founded a publishing house, Periodika, which started to publish *Neuvosto-Karjala* and *Oma maa* and later also other newspapers in minority languages.

5.5.5. *More new newspapers: Oma maa and Petrozavodsk*

The founding of new newspapers continued in 1990-1991, when the first newspapers of a mainly non-political character were founded. These included the first newspaper in the Karelian language and a new kind of city newspaper.

The first newspaper in the Karelian language (since the 1940s), “*Oma maa*” (Own Country) was founded in 1990. The decision to found the paper was made in the Council of Ministers of the Karelian ASSR and in the Karelian regional committee of the CPSU (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 8.6.1990). The first issue was published on 8 June 1990. In 1990 only three preliminary issues came out and the regular publishing started from the beginning of 1991. In the 1990 issues it is stated that it is a “paper of the Karelian regional committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the Karelian ASSR. The founders of the newspaper were the Supreme Council of Karelia, the Council of Ministers and the Society of Karelian Culture. Starting in the beginning of 1991 the paper announced that it is a “paper of the Karelian people.”

In the first issue the journalists of the paper appeal to the readers: “We expect your help in making the paper. Write about your life, your worries and thoughts. If you can, write also something else, we will together learn to make the organ of the Karelian people.” (*Oma maa* 8.6.1990)

The aim was to publish stories in all the three main dialects of Karelian: Ludic, Olonets and Proper (northern) Karelian. The editor-in-chief was Vladimir Kettunen and besides him there were two journalists and a photographer. *Oma mua* had only four tabloid-sized pages. The preliminary issues were published in 5,000 copies and from the beginning of 1991 the circulation was 3,000.

Oma mua started to publish a lot of cultural materials, poems and short stories and articles about the history of Karelia. Many stories were written by readers. The majority of the stories were written in the Olonets dialect. The use of various dialects was discussed in the paper and the journalists responded to the request that they “write in the language which our grandmothers talked” and only rarely published articles in Finnish. (*Oma mua* 15.2.1992).

While *Neuvosto-Karjala* was traditionally the organ of the authorities, *Oma mua* could, as a new paper, stay away from the organ role and become more an organ of Karelian culture. There were very few official documents published in the paper and also activists of the Karelian movement published their texts in the paper.

The subscription price of *Oma mua* was lower than that of other newspapers, e.g., for 1992 only 2.64 roubles. Despite this, there were fears that the number of subscribers was decreasing (*Oma mua* 19.10.1991), but for 1992 *Oma mua* was subscribed to by 2,370 persons (of them only 305 were in Petrozavodsk).

Another new paper, the city newspaper *Petrozavodsk*, was founded in January 1991. City newspapers had long traditions in the Soviet Union. They were often afternoon papers and their content was more popular and entertaining than that of the other newspapers. They aimed for more timely news coverage and closer contact with the audience.

Petrozavodsk was founded by the city council of Petrozavodsk and the company Petropress. At the beginning it was printed in two colours and according to its masthead it was “The evening paper of the city”. At the beginning it came out once every two weeks, but from the beginning of April it came out weekly. At the same time the word “evening paper” was removed, the printing started to be in one colour only and the quality of the paper weakened. The paper had eight pages in tabloid format. At the beginning it had seven journalists and it was printed in 10,000 copies (the first issue in 15,000). *Petrozavodsk* paid attention to the events of the city, the work of the city council, crime and culture news. It published also the prices of food in Petrozavodsk market places.

At the beginning it was possible to subscribe to *Petrozavodsk* only in the suburb of Kukkovka, because the paper did not want to engage the postal

distribution, instead having its own network of delivery. At that time a new cable television network (the Nikacompany) was established in Kukkovka and *Petrozavodsk* published the programme information of this network. In April it became possible to subscribe to the paper in the suburb of Drevlyanka and in May in the whole city. In May the number of printed copies was raised to 15,000 and by June the paper had 600 subscribers and was printed in 16,000 copies.

While other newspapers decreased their number of printed copies, *Petrozavodsk* got a new audience. The low level of subscriptions made *Petrozavodsk* more adaptable in coping with rising costs. In January 1991 the retail price of *Petrozavodsk* was 20 kopecks, then it was raised to 28 and 30 and in December to 40 kopecks. For example, *Leninskaya pravda* was sold for 10 kopecks up until August and then the price was raised to 15 kopecks and 20 kopecks in December.

Petrozavodsk looked for new solutions also in its journalism. Besides the different sphere of topics, the journalists used both first names and surnames in their stories instead of traditional initial and surname form, to name one example. An example of the continuation of old practices was that the reports on the meetings of city council were usually written by deputies themselves and not by journalists.

5.5.6. August 1991 and the new names of the papers

The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow (19.-21.8.) had its impact on the Karelian press as well. The traditional papers published the communiqués of the state of emergency committee as they had published official materials from Moscow before. The new papers were more rapid in protesting the coup and also the local cable television had an important role.

Leninskaya pravda and *Neuvosto-Karjala* published the communiqués of the emergency committee on 20 August (a decree by the vice-president of the USSR; the declaration by the Soviet leadership; The decision NR. 1 of the State of Emergency Committee of the USSR; the Appeal to the Soviet peoples; the Appeal to the heads of states and governments and to the Secretary General of the UN) and did not comment on them with a single word. The next day the papers reported on demonstrations against the coup that took place in Petrozavodsk, published the decree by Russian President Boris Eltsin and the decision of the presidium of the Petrozavodsk city council and its appeal to the citizens of Petrozavodsk.

A group of democratic deputies of the city council tried to prevent the publication of the emergency committee documents in *Leninskaya pravda*.

The militia was called, but it did not take action against the deputies, who were not, however, able to prevent the publication of *Leninskaya pravda*. (*Komsomolets* 24.8.1991).

Also *Komsomolets* published the communiqué of the emergency committee and did not comment on it on 20 August. On 22 August *Komsomolets* reported the demonstration in Petrozavodsk and published on the first page a text with black margins with information on the first victims of the coup.

Nabat Severo-Zapada published decrees by Eltsin already on 20 August, even before the members of the government of Karelia had received them. The paper had got the decrees by fax from the Ministry of the Press of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation using the fax machine of the Petrozavodsk group of the Russian Social-Democratic Party. (*Nabat Severo-Zapada* 27.8.1991).

Novosti dlya vsekh also published a decree by Eltsin and a communiqué by Eltsin, Rutshkoi and Khasbulatov to the citizens of Russia on its front page on 21 August. At the end of August the issues of *Novosti* were printed in 20-21,000 copies instead of the usual 17-18,000.

On 23 August *Nashe slovo*, the organ of the Petrozavodsk communists, reported the reactions of the communists during the coup under the headline "Dictatorship did not overcome". According to the paper, the local communists lacked information on what had happened in Moscow, but the communists condemned the anti-constitutional actions and stated that "strikes and demonstrations are not useful for the country" (*Nashe slovo* 23.8.1991). However, this issue remained the last one since the paper (as were all the communist organisations) was closed.

The issue of *Petrozavodsk* that came out on 24 August reported on the preparation of the issue:

We were preparing the next issue with ordinary topics: the holiday of September 1st, ecology, family, daily life... Black Monday changed all this. Someone already predicted in the streets that our paper would be closed. This issue is unusual for us, almost completely about politics, which we have usually written little about. The issue tells about it what was going on in the country, in the city and in the editorial office on 19, 20 and 21 August. (*Petrozavodsk* 24.8.1991.)

Aleksei Mironov, the editor-in-chief of *Neuvosto-Karjala*, reported that he had quit the CPSU on 27.8.1991 because of the coup.

On 28 August, after the coup was suppressed, the Union of Karelian Journalists analysed the activities of the press and journalists during the coup. The initiative for that was taken by the working collective of *Leninskaya pravda*. The meeting concluded that only one of the papers in Karelia (the

district paper *Vpered* in Medvezhegorsk) called for supporting the emergency committee on 20 August.

The republican papers and the papers of several districts and cities and factory papers published the materials of the emergency committee, which they had received through the official channels of TASS on 20 August. Karelian television could already on the evening of 19 August present objective information given by the television company Nika. (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 31.8.1991).

The meeting of the committee of the Union of Journalists made a decision according to which

Every medium should be assessed professionally: the information and the attitude toward the information should not be mixed. The publishing of the materials of the emergency committee should not be treated as support for this committee. We are convinced that the duty of all the media is to give operative information about important events to readers. In particular, on the basis of the official documents, the people can by themselves evaluate the real aims of the conspirators and the means to achieve them.
(...)

At the same time we have to recognise that the journalists of many newspapers and the committee of the Union of Karelian journalists did not find the courage and resolution to tell their opinion publicly already on 20 August. (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 31.8.1991).

However, the communiqué of the Union condemned those district newspapers that published the materials of the emergency committee on 22 August. Despite this, the emphasis on the official materials indicated very clearly what kind of relation the Soviet journalists and journalism had both to the official materials and to their readers. The official materials were treated as direct facts and their interpretation was left to the readers themselves and they should not even be interpreted by the journalists. Also another task of Soviet journalism was visible: to tell their own “correct” opinion (but which was not done because of the lack of courage).

A consequence of the coup was also the change of the names of the papers. *Leninskaya pravda* started to come out with the name *Severnii Kurier* on 5 September 1991. The masthead of the paper included also all the previous names of the paper, indicating that the name had been changed even before. At the same time the paper dropped its role as a paper of the CPSU and became only “The paper of the Council of Deputies of the Karelian ASSR”. In the following daily “the Karelian ASSR” was replaced with “Karelia.” During the following weeks the paper published the opinion of the readers,

in which a majority approved of the change, but many also held the opposite opinion.

Komsomolets, which had previously been published with the name “*Komsomolets — Molodezhnaya gazeta Karelii*” changed the order of the names on 19 October 1991. The paper was reregistered as a new newspaper on 17 October 1991, with new founders: the industrial company *Kondopogabumprom* (The paper mill of Kondopoda), the journalists of the paper and the regional committee of Komsomol. “Komsomol has been registered as a founder only temporarily up to the middle of November, when the last conference of the Komsomol organisation will start its work.” (*Molodezhnaya gazeta Karelii* 19.10.1991.)

The paper had arranged a competition among the readers for the new name and the journalists had voted on it but were not unanimous. The regional committee of Komsomol was removed from the list of founders in November together with the abolition of the name *Komsomolets*. *Neuvosto-Karjala* changed its name at the turn of the year 1991-1992 to *Karjalan Sanomat* (The News of Karelia) without much discussion in the the paper.

While *Nashe slovo* was closed, its printing capacity was available for other newspapers. This was given to the *Petrozavodsk* newspaper, which started to come out twice a week, on Sundays as before (the paper was distributed already on Saturday evenings), and on Fridays with the title *Petrozavodsk-plus*. The number of journalists increased to nine. Also other newspapers like *Nabat Severo-Zapada*, *Komanda* and *Golos* (the paper of the Karelian trade unions) had asked for the possibility of printing two issues a week, but for some reason (proximity to the administration?), *Petrozavodsk* was given this privilege.

In autumn 1991 *Petrozavodsk* was printed on Fridays in 12,500 copies and on Sundays in 19,000 copies. With increasing circulation, the paper started to have advertisements, which together filled one page out of the total eight pages of the paper. The circulation continued to grow, so that in November 13,000 copies of the Friday issue were printed and 28,000 copies of the Sunday issue. In December 13,400 - 15,000 copies of the Friday issue and 33,000 - 40,000 copies of the Sunday issue were printed.

Petrozavodsk did well also in subscriptions for the year 1992. In the city of Petrozavodsk *Severnyi Kurier* had 49,564 subscriptions¹, *Petrozavodsk* 17,568 and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* 7 376. *Namedni* had 1,904 subscriptions, *Novosti dlya vsekh* 1,089 and *Nabat Severo-Zapada* 447. *Karjalan Sanomat* had 884 and *Oma mua* 305 subscriptions in the city. Most popular national

1 The number of subscriptions published in *Petrozavodsk* was slightly different from that published in *Severnyi Kurier*.

paper was the weekly *Argumenty i Fakty*, with 30,000 subscriptions. *Komsomolskaya pravda* had 13,340, *Trud* 8,514 and *Izvestiya* 2,484 subscriptions in the city. The subscriptions to other newspapers remained on a much lower level: *Sovetskaya Rossiya* had 1,101, *Pravda* 803, *Kommersant* 532 and *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 97 subscriptions. (*Petrozavodsk* 22.12.1991.)

In the whole of Karelia *Severnyi Kurier* had increased its subscriptions from 76,635 (1991) to 88,438 (1992). Of the subscriptions to *Severnyi Kurier*, 53,717 (60.7%) were in Petrozavodsk. In Petrozavodsk the number of subscriptions per 1,000 citizens was 193, in the Prionezhskii district (the countryside around Petrozavodsk) 180 and in the Pryazha district 165. In the Pudozh district the number of subscription per 1,000 citizens was 107 and in all other districts below 100. In Kostomuksha, where the circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* was lowest, there were only 21 subscriptions per 1,000 citizens.

These figures indicate that the golden period of the newspapers was more a period of subscription to many newspapers (including many weekly newspapers like *Argumenty i fakty*) than a period of universal penetration of the major newspapers. It can be estimated that the share of households which subscribed to *Severnyi Kurier* was in all of Karelia only around 25-30% and even in Petrozavodsk no more than 50%¹, a very low level if compared, e.g., with many Nordic regional newspapers. The share of *Argumenty i Fakty* was in Petrozavodsk around 25-30% and *Petrozavodsk* was subscribed to by every sixth household.

Molodezhnaya gazeta (Komsomolets) got only 25,959 subscriptions for 1992, only half of the previous amount. The conflict in the newspaper and the change of journalists might have had a negative influence on the subscriptions. *Nabat Severo-Zapada* got 735 and *Novosti dlya vsekh* 2,129 subscriptions.

The major part of the subscriptions to *Neuvosto-Karjala / Karjalan Sanomat* were in Finland; in Karelia it had only 1,681 subscriptions in 1990 (*Leninskaya pravda* 21.11.1989) and 1,876 in 1991 (*Leninskaya pravda* 22.11.1990). In 1992 *Karjalan Sanomat* had 2,557 subscriptions in Karelia (*Novosti Kalevaly* 19.12.1991). The paper had subscriptions also in other parts of the Soviet Union. During *perestroika* the number of subscriptions to *Neuvosto-Karjala* was declining in Finland and increasing in Karelia.

1 Petrozavodsk had 280,000 inhabitants and the average household of the Karelian ASSR had 2.5 persons (according to the census there were 217,111 families with an average 3.2 persons. This leaves approximately 105,000 persons for one-member households in all of Karelia. By adapting these figures, the number of households in Petrozavodsk was around 112,000.

5.6. Press encounters the market economy (1992-1994)

The major change in the press structure of Karelia happened in 1992, although signs of it had been developing also during 1991. The main reasons for the difficulties that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union were the liberalisation of prices and subsequent hyperinflation, which increased the printing and material costs at the same time as the postal service started to charge for the distribution of the papers.

5.6.1. Decline of the major papers

In Karelia the traditional major paper, *Severnyi Kurier*, was most seriously hit by the rising prices. At the beginning of 1992 it had 89,000 subscriptions and was printed in 100,000 copies. The paper had difficulties already at the beginning of the year: "the paper is lacking over three million roubles, but we hope that SK will not die." (*Severnyi Kurier* 1.1.1992). The missing sum was huge, because the whole amount of money that was collected during the subscription campaign in autumn 1991 was only 2.5 million roubles.

While a year before the greater number of subscriptions automatically led to greater profits, it started in 1992 to lead to greater losses. The subscription price of 28.20 roubles was 11 kopecks per issue, but already in February the mailing cost of one issue was 27 kopecks, the printing took 4 kopecks, the newsprint 18 kopecks and the share of the subscription collectors were three kopecks. So, the costs for a single issue were already over 60 kopecks and there was no guarantee that the prices would not have continued to rise. (*Severnyi Kurier* 4.2.1992). The paper asked for governmental support and demanded that the mailing fees should not be raised again.

The supreme council of Karelia decided not to give subsidies to *Severnyi Kurier*, despite the appeals of the paper (*Severnyi Kurier* 3.4.1992). The paper raised the subscription fee for new subscribers to 7 roubles per month, but because the number of new subscriptions was insignificant, it did not help a lot.

Because of the economic problems, *Severnyi Kurier* was not published on 8 April and 22 April 1992 (*Severnyi Kurier* 7.4.1992). The paper reported the displeasure of the people because the paper had not been published in those days in order to bring pressure on the government. (*Severnyi Kurier* 9.4.1992).

The paper also increased its retail price. In December 1991 it had been 20 kopecks, in January 1992 already 40 kopecks, in March 60 kopecks and in

April one rouble. After that the price was no longer published in the paper but was contractual.

An average issue had approximately one page of advertisements, mostly by banks and Finnish companies. There was also clear publishing of concealed advertisement (stories which looked like journalistic texts, but were likely paid by the companies which were presented in the stories).

The paper published the opinions of the readers, which defended the governmental support for the newspapers, but had to admit in April that there would be no money to continue publishing. In April the costs for the production of a single issue were already over 1.5 roubles. The paper announced that it had to collect new subscription fees for the second half of the year. The new fee was 20 roubles per month. (*Severnyi Kurier* 21.4.1992). After the decision the paper published comments of the readers in which especially pensioners stated that they would not have money to subscribe to the paper with the new prices, but many of them also declared that they would continue subscribing. (*Severnyi Kurier* 24.4.1992).

In order to compensate for the difficulties the higher prices had caused the readers, *Severnyi Kurier* emphasised the importance of receiving information and the close connection the paper had with its readers: according to the paper the readers regard it as “their advisor, an old and faithful friend” (*Severnyi Kurier* 14.4.1992) and it stated that “SK defends and will defend human rights against the measures of the authorities. We intend also in the future to inform the readers on everything that is going on in the republic, fully and objectively, independent of the political cycles.” (*Severnyi Kurier* 27.5.1992).

Nevertheless, in the beginning of July, when the new period of subscriptions started, the circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* dropped from 95,000 to 36,700. For the second half of the year the paper had got 34,000 subscriptions, which was less than 40% of the number during the first half of the year (*Severnyi Kurier* 8.7.1992). In the autumn the circulation rose to 40,000.

The number of the letters to the editor decreased if compared with the *perestroika* period. In 1992 *Severnyi Kurier* received 6,600 letters, of which over 1,000 was published. Over 600 of the letters were various petitions, mostly for the free subscription. Criticism was addressed mainly towards the postal service and transport, while the interest in the problems of shops and canteens was decreasing. This topic was present in 500 letters in 1991, but only in 200 letters in 1992. Also the letters dealing with the flats and repairs were less frequent. The problems might not have disappeared, but the readers had lost their faith in solving them. Also politics was a less frequent topic in

1992 compared with 1991. The majority of letters (80%) came from Petrozavodsk. (*Severnyi Kurier* 27.1.1993.)

In the beginning of 1993 *Severnyi Kurier* was still a leader of subscribed circulation in Petrozavodsk, where it had 16,878 subscribers. The *Petrozavodsk* newspaper had 7,529 and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* 7,394 subscriptions in Petrozavodsk (*Severnyi Kurier* 5.2.1993). In the whole of Karelia *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was the leader, with 37,142 subscriptions (according to the preliminary figures), *Severnyi Kurier* had 26,056, *TVR* 16,459 and *Petrozavodsk* 6,812 (*Petrozavodsk* 22.11.1992). As before, over 60% (64.8%) of the circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* was in Petrozavodsk.

In February 1993 the Consortium of Russian Newspapers was founded in order to support the regional newspapers. In Petrozavodsk the only member of the consortium was *Severnyi Kurier*. The stories from this consortium, mainly large reportages, started to appear in the paper soon after that.

The price of the paper rose continuously. In February 1993 *Severnyi Kurier* announced the new price for those who would like to subscribe to the paper during the first half of the year: 159 roubles, of which 90 roubles went towards the costs of the newspaper itself and 69 for the postal delivery (*Severnyi Kurier* 8.2.1993). In April the new price for the second half of the year was announced: 255 roubles, of which 168 roubles were for the newspaper and 87 roubles for the postal delivery. The postal service had given a discount for all the local newspapers; without it the price would have been 342 roubles instead of 255 roubles. (*Severnyi Kurier* 20.5.1993).

In spite of everything, the readers wrote and called to the newspaper and said that they would continue subscribing: “SK — it is half a kilo of sausage, a kilo of butter, a can of instant coffee” (*Severnyi Kurier* 30.3.1993). The readers wanted to have less politics, more economic news, and more analytical information. According to the editor-in-chief of the *Petrozavodsk* newspaper, “SK has become more operative, but as before there are too many big and boring stories. Is it possible that some part of your readers likes them?” (*Severnyi Kurier* 19.5.1993).

The policy of the paper also caused some criticism. Readers criticised the paper because it did not publish the views of the communists and that the letters were often commented on by a journalist, who criticised the opinions presented in them. Journalist V. Alekseev replied to this criticism by stating that “the newspaper does not bring the opinions of the readers artificially to its pages. This is the socio-political situation in the republic.” However, “SK is not even slightly interested in blaming someone for his opinions” but the journalists “would like to tell our views, strengthen the common sense, the full freedom of speech, defend the rights and freedoms of our readers.” Despite

this, “the paper does not serve parties, movements or power structures.” (*Severnyi Kurier* 3.6.1993).

For the second half of 1993 *Severnyi Kurier* was subscribed to by 23,548 persons, while *Petrozavodsk* got 6,070 and *TVR* 18,656 subscriptions. Of the subscriptions to *Severnyi Kurier*, part was paid by sponsors (Tekobank 200 copies and pension foundation 150 copies). (*Severnyi Kurier* 29.6.1993).

In the power conflict between the Russian parliament and President Eltsin in fall 1993 *Severnyi Kurier* supported the president. The paper published 23.9.1993 the appeal of President Eltsin to the people of Russia and the decree on constitutional reform. It also reported that the editorial staff had sent Eltsin a telegram stating its support. The same issue of the paper also contained news from Moscow that was remarkably non-partisan, and appeals and statements by different institutions (the Karelian government and parliament, the Karelian group of the Democratic Russia movement, the city council and the mayor of Petrozavodsk). (*Severnyi Kurier* 23.9.1993).

In order to show the popular support for its policy, the paper published an opinion poll based on interviews of 1,000 citizens of Petrozavodsk on what they thought about the conflict in Moscow. According to the paper, 623 of them supported Eltsin and 171 did not. Moreover, 937 considered Eltsin their president, while only 56 supported Rutskoi and 72% trusted Eltsin (*Severnyi Kurier* 24.9.1993).

On 5.10.1993 *Severnyi Kurier* headlined its main news story: “Sunday of Blood. Tragic events took place in Moscow. In Karelia everything was peaceful”. The same issue included the telegram of the journalists to Eltsin: “In this moment, decisive to the fate of Russia, the journalists of the *Severnyi Kurier* newspaper of the Republic of Karelia are with you. We will support the most resolute actions in suppressing the anti-national rebellion.” The journalists also pointed out that Viktor Stepanov (the chairman of the Republic of Karelia) is not the whole Karelia and that the opinion polls indicate that the majority of the Karelian citizens support Eltsin. (*Severnyi Kurier* 5.10.1993.)

The paper lost some subscriptions because of its hard line, which was reported, e.g., in an editorial commentary on 8.12.1993. According to the story, the paper occasionally received phone calls and letters in which readers said that they were canceling their subscriptions, because of its editorial line. The response of the paper is that it is a pity if someone refuses the paper because of politics, but “no less displeasure is caused by the fact that the journalists have been, almost with a form of an ultimatum, told to write as someone else desires.” According to the paper there is no alternative to support for democracy. (*Severnyi Kurier* 8.12.1993).

As in the Soviet period, the paper had its own political view, of which it tried to convince its readers. Despite its own view, the paper published letters to the editor on both sides. They were often on the first page with the title "Discussion forum on the situation in the republic and the country" and with the common headline "For and against."

The paper emphasised also its informative role and its commitment to its role in advocating the interests of the public: "As before the paper is for its readers the final institution to which they can turn with requests and get a reasonable answer, an explanation" (*Severnyi Kurier* 25.11.1993).

Severnyi Kurier also published interviews and letters in which the readers told why they subscribe to the paper. For example, the correspondent of the *ITAR-TASS* news agency in Karelia, Vladimir Zlobin, appreciated the fact that *Severnyi Kurier* reflected different opinions objectively and former journalist M. Fishman stated positively that SK "does not incite national and political ambitions. In its pages the discussion is being performed correctly, with dignity. The paper does not degrade itself to insulting, rumours, indecent quarrels or flattering" (*Severnyi Kurier* 19.10.1993).

For the first half of 1994 *Severnyi Kurier* got 20,490 subscriptions, which was 3,000 less than the year before, while *TVR* increased from 18,656 to 19,537 and the *Petrozavodsk* newspaper from 6,070 to 8,089 (*Severnyi Kurier* 22.12.1993). Besides the political line of *Severnyi Kurier*, also the rising price contributed to the decline. The price rose significantly compared with the average salary (see table 6.5.).

The daily newspapers, even more than the others, suffered due to the declining service of the post. The postmaster of the village of Ogorelysh (Medvezhegorsk district) said that in the 1960s the village had 700 subscriptions to various newspapers, but currently only 200. Before the papers were distributed three times a week but currently only on Mondays and on Fridays. The situation was similar in the villages of Tolvuya and Kuzarandy, in which the papers have been distributed on Tuesdays and Thursdays. (*Severnyi Kurier* 30.9.1994).

The competition with the weeklies made *Severnyi Kurier* look for new methods of distribution. Starting with the second half of 1994 it became possible to subscribe to the Saturday issue of *Severnyi Kurier* separately. The Saturday issue was published every second week with eight pages instead of the usual four pages. In August 1994 the Saturday issue also recapitulated the main news of the week with the headline "About what did SK write this week?" This practise, apparently harmful for the circulation of the daily, was soon cancelled.

The paper tried to revive the subscription campaign also with discounts. For example, the collection of the subscriptions for the first half of 1995 started with a discount price during the first week of the campaign (15-19.9.1994). There were also competitions for subscribers. *Severnõi Kurier* continued to emphasise its role as public organ and forum, e.g., on 20.5.1994 the paper published an issue, which was comprised completely of letters to the editor.

Severnõi Kurier stated its aims in this way: to offer

objective, complete, operative information on all spheres of life in the republic, to guarantee the social security of the citizens of Karelia, to strengthen humanism, freedom of speech and other universal values and to safeguard political stability. (...)

Often those in power express their dissatisfaction with the stories of the newspaper. Despite this, the journalists base their work on the principle that the authorities have to serve the people and not otherwise. The editorial staff will reject the aspirations of any forces to use journalists as their assistants and to use the paper for limited political aims, to dictate and impose their own will. (*Severnõi Kurier* 3.9.1994)

“The freedom of speech remains empty words if the media consciously and voluntarily reject it: for SK this problem is definite and the readers appreciate the principled position of the paper properly” (*Severnõi Kurier* 24.9.1994.)

Moreover, the paper answered the reader who complained that the paper contains too much propaganda like this:

“No one is interested in personal opinions” is said strongly. When important events are going on the majority of the readers demand that the paper defines its own position, and the journalists tell their own opinion on the problem about which the society is worried. Personal opinion on that which is going on in the world is characteristic of the Russian journalistic tradition and the dispassionate presentation is equated with hard-heartedness... (*Severnõi Kurier* 29.9.1994)

It seems that *Severnõi Kurier* had replaced communist ideals with “democratic” ones, but was not ready to accept the independent, dispassionate and increasingly non-political ways of doing journalism. Indeed, it felt no immediate compulsion to do so, despite declining circulation.

The other traditional Russian newspaper of Karelia, *Molodezhnaya gazeta Karelii* “MG” (former *Komsomolets*), was saved from the 1992 crisis by the sponsor of the paper, *Kondopogabumprom* company (The Paper Mill of Kondopoga). In January 1992 the paper had a circulation of 40,000, of which 26,000 were subscriptions. In the second half of 1992 the circulation of *MG* remained at 36,000. The paper was one of the cheapest in Karelia, which was

visible also in its circulation figures. The subscription price for the first half of 1993 was 156 roubles, while, for example, the price of the *Severnyi Kurier* was 477 roubles. The previous subscribers could continue their subscription with the even lower price of 126 roubles.

For 1993 *MG* got 37,142 subscriptions, which made it the leading paper in subscriptions. While the total number of subscriptions for republic-level papers dropped by 43% (for Moscow-based newspapers the drop was 60%) compared with 1992, *MG* could increase its subscriptions by 50%. (*Molodezhnaya gazeta Karelii* 24.11.1992).

According to a view presented in *Karjalan Sanomat*, the *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was marked by an anti-governmental policy and a low level of articles. "According to many, the success of *Molodezhnaya gazeta* depends more on the low price than on the level of its journalists. The flourishing of the paper has been promoted by its main sponsor: the Karelian industrial giant The Paper and Pulp Company of Kondopoga" (*Karjalan Sanomat* 13.10.1992).

At the beginning of 1993 *MG* was printed on average in 45,000 copies. Although the subscription price had been low, the retail price grew rapidly: in January it was 4 roubles, in February five, in March six, in April eight, in July ten and at the end of the year 25 roubles. Also the subscription price was rising in the second half of the year, when it reached 720 roubles for a half a year. Therefore the circulation dropped to around 30,000.

From the beginning of 1994 the founder¹ of the paper became Kondopoga Inc. (newly organised former founder) and the publisher was "MGK". For 1994, *MG* got only 18,277 subscriptions, which was less than for the previous period. The wealthy sponsor did not help the *MG* with the decline in circulation. In 1994 the number of printed copies decreased from 22-27,000 in the first months to 20,000 in the summer and fall. For the beginning of 1995 the subscription price was 14,100 roubles, of which the postal fee took almost two thirds. For those who collected the paper in the editorial office, the price was only 3,960 roubles.

Molodezhnaya gazeta survived better with the help of a sponsor, but despite that fact, it could not escape difficulties. It is even possible that the cheap subscription price shifted the audience of the paper from youth to older generations, and it may have had an impact on the content of the paper as well. The rapid increase in costs and decline in income or support of the sponsor, led to the increasing price and declining circulation of the youth paper.

1 Actually meaning the main backer or owner. The Russian terminology which separates founder and publisher is applied. For rights and duties see Law of the Russian Federation on the Mass Media (December 27, 1991). Published in English in Russian Media Challenge.

5.6.2. *End of political newspapers*

The liberalisation of the market also led to the demise of the new political newspapers. In January 1992 *Novosti dlya vsekh* came out in 17,000 copies. The retail price was 30 kopecks. In March the price was increased to 60 kopecks and in July to one rouble. Some of the copies was sold in contractual price. From the beginning of September the price was increased to 3 roubles. With the increasing price, the circulation went down: in March it was 13,500, in April 12,000, in June 10,000, in September 9,000 and in November 8,000. The paper sought other sources of income, e.g., promising a reward for those who would find advertisement for the paper.

Within the new press, the concept of independence started to become more and more vague. For example, the article by V. Nazarov in *Novosti dlya vsekh* revealed that Karelia had few enterprises which supported an independent press. Co-operative Keramik supported the *Nabat Severo-Zapada* newspaper, Romashka supported *Novosti* and Karelpotrebsoyuz supported the *Namedni* newspaper. Nazarov maintained that a new paper could not survive in the market without sponsors, because the monopoly of *Severnyi Kurier* had been preserved. (*Novosti dlya vsekh* 29.4.1992.)

In December the paper announced that in January it would come out only in retail sales. The paper appealed to the readers as the final supporter of the paper. "The Romashka Company has paid the costs of the paper. But its possibilities are not endless" (*Novosti dlya vsekh*, 9.12.1992).

Novosti dlya vsekh continued to come out in 1993 despite difficulties. N. Shabiev was replaced on 27 January by V. Nemtshininov. He appealed to the members of parliament in order to get support for the paper. The paper had to change its office already three times and this time it was given shelter by the Mashinostroitel cultural club, which gave a small office without a telephone line (*Novosti dlya vsekh* 10.-16.2.1993).

In the following issue of 17 February the paper stated that it was a mistake not to collect subscriptions for 1993, but at the same time noticed that the losses of the paper were already hundreds of thousands of roubles and expressed doubts as to how long the support of the company would last. The paper declared that its final lifeline was the connection with the readers: "You need us, we you. Without this the editorial work loses its meaning." (*Novosti dlya vsekh* 17.-23.2.1993.)

The clear signals forebode the end of *Novosti*: on 24.2.1993 the paper stopped the publication of the weekly television programme, at the beginning of April the number of printed copies dropped to 5,000. During its final period *Novosti* was a discussion forum for its readers. For example, the members

of the city council wrote their articles, the journalists commented on them, and they were replied to. However, there was no longer a place for a political discussion newspaper. The final issue came out on 2 June 1993.

At the beginning of 1992 *Nabat Severo-Zapada* came out twice a week, on Tuesdays and Fridays, in 15,000 copies. It had either four or eight pages and the retail price was 20 or 30 kopecks. The subscription price for 1992 was 26 roubles. In 1992 *Nabat* paid a lot of attention to the fate of the Ingrian Finns, independent trade unions and Memorial organisation, and was praised even by the leader of the Karelian Congress (the most extremist Karelian organisation) A. Grigoryev. The paper was praised because it gave space even to its political opponents (*Nabat Severo-Zapada* 10.10.1992).

On 21 August the newspaper announced that it had been decided to discontinue the publication for the time being and the journalists had been given a one month break without salary: “*Nabat* has had economic problems for a long time, but thanks to the sponsor, the labour collective of the Keramik company, we have been able, with heavy difficulties, to solve the material problems.” (*Nabat Severo-Zapada* 21.8.1992).

Behind the difficulties of *Nabat* may have lain also the change of the political climate. The editor-in-chief Eduard Hämäläinen stated in August 1992 that *Nabat* was no longer an opposition newspaper: “There are even claims that we are now a governmental newspaper. That is not right either. We are independent, we speak sometimes out against the government as well. First of all we are for the democratic forces more than for or against the government.” (*Karjalan Sanomat* 4.8.1992).

The paper appeared again on 3 October. The number of copies was as previously, 15,000, as was the number of pages, eight, but the price had increased to three roubles. The paper was published on Saturdays and the amount of advertisement totalled approximately one page.

In 1993 *Nabat* continued with 10,000 copies and the previous three rouble price. The paper had a lot of advertisements and political texts from social democrats, Mensheviks, Communists as well as nationalists. The paper reported, e.g., the visit of the journalist from the extremist-nationalist *Den* newspaper in Petrozavodsk.

The period of Eduard Hämäläinen as the editor-in-chief ended at the end of March and the new acting editor was Galina Lazovskaya. Most of the managers of *Nabat* moved to Finland. According to *Severnyi Kurier*, both the previous editor and publisher, Aleksandr Sokolov, and the editor Eduard Hämäläinen as well as the managerial editor Galina Lazovskaya had moved to Finland (*Severnyi Kurier* 15.4.1993). Lazovskaya, however, was acting editor and wrote in the newspaper, so the information of *Severnyi Kurier*

might not be completely correct. The paper looked also for new journalists with an announcement published in several issues from March to May.

In the issue of 12.6. the paper asks forgiveness from all who tried to buy a copy the week before. "The issue was prepared, even type-set, but because of a lack of paper it could not be printed" (*Nabat Severo-Zapada* 12.-18.6.1993). In summer the news from the ImaPress agency disappeared and the paper started to publish news from Interfaks. There were also some pieces from the RIA news agency and from other newspapers.

Aleksandr Sokolov came back to *Nabat* on 10.7.1993: He published his salute in the first page:

No more rumours are needed, there are a lot of them. Yes, I have returned, yes, I am the editor again. This has happened. Why I travelled to Finland, why I came back? That is personal. We do not talk about it. What I am planning to do? To work! (*Nabat Severo-Zapada* 10-16.7.1993.)

Sokolov returned to the editorial post. At the same time the news distributed by ImaPress came back. The decline of the paper, however, continued: on 7.8. the retail price was raised to six roubles and on 14.8. the number of copies had dropped to 4,000. The news from news agencies as well as the classified announcements started to disappear. The number of stories reprinted from other newspapers increased. On 11.9. the paper was again printed in 10,000 copies, but the end seems to have come on 16.10.1993 when *Nabat* had its third anniversary.

The publishing of *Namedni* seems to have stopped in spring 1994, when an issue was published for the Karelian parliamentary elections (in March 1994). In the beginning of 1993 five issues had come out and at the end of the year only one issue. The issues of 1993 were printed in 1,100-1,300 copies and the election issue of 1994 in 6,000 copies.

While the new political weeklies of "democratic", anti-Soviet orientation were in difficulties, a new political, communist newspaper was founded in August 1993. The founding of the newspaper coincided with the revival of communist activity in Karelia. The new paper was named *Leninskaya pravda* following the example of the old communist organ. In its first issue the new paper included the awards that the old *Leninskaya pravda* had had in its masthead and stated that the newspaper had been founded in 1917. *Severnii Kurier* protested and the new paper left the awards out and stated 1993 as its new founding year.

The new *Leninskaya pravda* came out once a month in tabloid format in 4,000 copies. During electoral campaigns it was printed in greater numbers, up to 10,000 copies. The founder and publisher of the paper was the Union of

Karelian Communists. The communists also financed the paper and published the names of contributors in its pages. In 1995 the paper published the names of the editorial collective: Yu. V. Berestennikov, Yu. P. Vlasov, Yu. S. Ivakin, N. Ya. Kopev and S. D. Ulitin, but from 1996 onward the paper stated only that it had a “responsible editorial council.” The paper had no editorial office but only a post office box address and it published two telephone numbers “for inquiries”.

The content of *Leninskaya pravda* was highly political: even its letters to the editor dealt mainly with political issues.

5.6.3. *New weeklies took the market*

Characteristically, in such conditions of economic crisis, new, successful newspapers were born and started to grow. The *Petrozavodsk* newspaper was founded already in 1991 and it showed itself to be a success from the beginning. For 1992 the paper was subscribed to by over 17,000 residents of Petrozavodsk and its printed figures were 27-30,000 on Fridays and 34-38,000 on Sundays.

The paper defined itself as an organ of the “information party” a name in which the term party was not a political concept but meant “those on the same side, with the same opinions.” According to the *Petrozavodsk* newspaper “the task of the local paper is not to highlight the political or even social preferences of the public but its deeply personal problems.” The local paper should take care that “the ‘interest of the people’ will be visible in journalism” (*Petrozavodsk* 5.1.1992).

The economic crisis was visible even in *Petrozavodsk*. The retail price was 80 kopecks in January, one rouble in February and two roubles in May. Despite this, *Petrozavodsk* published extra issues on those days when *Severnyi Kurier* was not published. The extra issues of 15 and 22 April were sold only retail (*Karjalan Sanomat* 21.4.1992).

In May 1992 the paper announced that the publishing of two weekly issues would be stopped and the paper would become a weekly again, but the number of pages would be increased to 16. At the same time the paper announced that it would cancel all subscriptions and would be sold only retail. The 300,000 roubles, which were received as subscription fees, had run out: “the publishing house Petropress and the editorial staff have no money. At current prices, producing the newspaper costs 214,000 roubles per month.” (*Petrozavodsk* 17.5.1992).

The paper had not received support from the city during January-April. On 12 May the City council decided to give 300,000 roubles to cover the

expenses of the newspaper during the second quarter of the year and on 5 May the mayor gave 136,000 roubles to cover the expenses of the first quarter of the year (*Petrozavodsk* 17.5.1992). However, it seems that the paper did not receive anything but the 136,000 roubles from the mayor, because the paper stated that it “did not require support from the funds of the city during the second quarter of the year (despite the 136,000 roubles given by the mayor).” (*Petrozavodsk* 26.7.1992).

The economic problems had their effect also on the number of printed copies. In May 1992 the number of printed copies dropped to 21-23,000 and in June to 20-22,000. Also the retail price increased: on 24.5. it was three roubles and on 19.7. four roubles. The subscription price for August-December was 28 roubles a month. In September the retail price was raised to five and in December 1992 to six roubles. The retail price thus grew 7.5-fold during 1992.

The circulation of *Petrozavodsk* started to increase again in the autumn. In August it was printed in 26,000 copies, at the end of September in 30,000, in November 31-36,000 and in December 34-36,000 copies. The appearance of another new weekly reduced the growth of *Petrozavodsk*.

Petrozavodsk celebrated its second anniversary on 10.1.1993 and thanked the readers for advice and that the paper had learned from its readers' optimism. (*Petrozavodsk* 10.1.1993). In January 1993 *Petrozavodsk* started to come out on Fridays instead of Sundays. At the same time the paper got a new section, “Friday”, which told about events in Petrozavodsk during the weekend.

The rising price was a reality in 1993 as well. In January the retail price was 7 roubles, in February 10, at the end of March 12 and in May 15 roubles. In July the price was raised to 20, in August to 25 and in September to 30 and 40 roubles. In October the price was 60 roubles. In 1993 the retail price thus grew 8.5-fold. Despite this, the circulation remained at a high level: in January it was 34,000-45,000 and stabilised during the spring at 40,000. In autumn 1993 the number of printed copies of *Petrozavodsk* was between 41,000 and 47,000.

Also the subscription price, which had been 840 roubles for six months at the end of 1993, was raised to 3,642 roubles for the first half of 1994. Nevertheless the number of subscriptions increased from 6,812 at the first half of 1993 to 7,521 at the first half of 1994. However, the proportion of subscriptions in the total circulation remained low (15-20%), because a city newspaper was easily distributed in retail sales.

Petrozavodsk defined its role as being a paper for the whole family, which told all the news of the city; told about the past, present and future of the city; and published personal stories on citizens, information of the city council

and city administration, programmes of all the television channels, crosswords, horoscopes and classifieds. (*Petrozavodsk* 20.5.1994).

In May 1992 a new paper *TVR* (Television, Radio, Advertisement) was founded. At the beginning it published only the television programme and advertisements, but gradually more and more stories. The paper was founded on the basis of the programme sheet of the Karelian Television and Radio Company (Programmy televideniya i radio). Behind it was also the running out of money from the subscription fees. Because the subscription money had run out, the company decided to cancel the programme sheet, but founded instead of it a newspaper *TVR* together with the Petropress company.

The four-page programme sheet became a newspaper with eight pages and it published, besides television programmes, presentations of the most interesting programmes, advertisements and classifieds, useful advice, advice of a lawyer, and hints to cottage owners (*TVR* 15.5.1992). The subscription price for the second half of 1992 was eight roubles.

TVR got rapidly a great circulation because the old papers were in crisis. The first issue was printed in 38,000 copies, while the programme sheet had been printed in 32,000 copies. In June the circulation was 16,000, but in July already 25,500, of which 10 838 went to the subscribers and the rest was sold retail. The retail price was in July one rouble in Petrozavodsk and two roubles in the rest of Karelia. In the autumn the circulation continued to grow to 30,000 in September and 40,000 in November.

Similar to *Petrozavodsk*, also *TVR* defined itself as a paper for the whole family, which published “interesting domestic and foreign news” and “sensations from the life of the stars”. It was the “kaleidoscope of the cottage-owner”, it had a “column for the house builder”, horoscopes, crosswords, “free advice for any situation in life”, classifieds such as personals and exchanges of apartments, advertisements, “but not politics of any kind”. Moreover, *TVR* defined itself as a “completely independent publication. We do not ask and do not receive any kind of support” (*TVR* 9.10.1992).

For the first half of 1993 the subscription price of *TVR* was 22 roubles per month, of which 15 roubles went to the publishing house and 7 rouble for postal fees. *TVR* got 16,459 subscriptions for 1993 and already in February it was printed in 50,000 copies. During 1993 the retail price of *TVR* rose from four roubles in January to 30 roubles in December (in Petrozavodsk; in other regions of Karelia the price was higher, e.g., in December — 40 roubles) or almost eight-fold.

The paper stated that all the costs had increased, e.g., the price for newsprint was 400 times higher than in 1991 and the transport price to the districts of Karelia was in September over 10 roubles and in October closer to

20 roubles (*TVR* 8.10.1993). The price continued to rise in 1994 as well, at a slower pace, from 40 roubles to 150 roubles in Petrozavodsk and from 50 to 180 roubles elsewhere.

TVR resembled *Petrozavodsk* a lot, but the main difference was its non-political line. While *Petrozavodsk* published articles by the members of the city council, *TVR* remained outside politics. *TVR* was read in the whole of Karelia, while *Petrozavodsk* concentrated on the city and its surroundings. Interestingly, both of the most popular newspapers were published by the same company, Petropress.

In November 1992 still another new newspaper was founded. It was the governmental organ *Kareliya*. There was a need to found a new paper because *Severnyi Kurier* refused to publish the official documents of the government because the authorities did not support the paper financially (*Karjalan Sanomat* 28.4.1992).

The first issue of *Kareliya* came out 4.11.1992 and it described the aims of the newspaper in this way:

The paper is official, it does not have commercial aims. Its aim is to be politically non-partisan, in the most possible way useful and a desirable source of information for all the citizens of the republic, for the members of parliament, workers of the local councils and administrative organs, and for the entrepreneurs.

Even *Kareliya* was at the beginning published by the Petropress company. The paper defined itself as “The newspaper of the Council of the Deputies”. It came out once a week, with four pages in broadsheet format. The content was mainly various documents, laws, decrees and official texts.

The first issue was published in 10,000 copies, but soon the stable number of printed copies was 5,000. The subscription price for the beginning of 1993 was 35 roubles a month.

Kareliya tried to get a wider readership and described its contents like this:

Kareliya is a newspaper for all, including

- special theme reviews and communications: politics, customs regulations, privatisation, arbitration court, express information from the statistical committee of the Republic of Karelia,
- decisions of the Supreme Council and Government of Karelia: Laws, decrees, instructions
- opinions: discussions, reviews of letters to the editor, interviews
- social problems, way of life and traditions, chronicles of events
- national archive
- information calendar
- ecclesiastical chronicle
- new books: new pieces of literature

- religious poetry
- world of the press
- press review: selected pieces from various newspapers
- various advertisements. (*Kareliya* 2.2.1994)

Despite advertising the manifold content, the laws and decrees usually took even over one half of the content. In March 1994 *Kareliya* started to come out twice a week, on Wednesdays and Saturdays. The number of printed copies rose to 5,500-6,500. The subscription price for *Kareliya* was significantly lower than that of many other new newspapers. For the first half of 1994 it was 195 roubles a month, while that of *Petrozavodsk* was 607 and that of *TVR* 325 roubles. For enterprises and organisations the subscription price was higher: 762 roubles in month. In retail prices the differences were smaller. *Kareliya* was sold at 30 roubles, *Petrozavodsk* 60 roubles and *Severnyi Kurier* at 40 roubles.

Kareliya gave lot of space for Russian nationalists and Orthodox movements, but covered also the Conference of Karelians and gave space for Ingrian Finns and Veps. However, compared with other newspapers, *Kareliya* was more an organ of the Russians of Karelia. This was reflected, e.g., in *Oma mua*, which published a letter to the editor that asked *Kareliya* to change its name and argued that the Karelian government and the Council of Deputies should refuse to be publishers of the newspaper. The reader argued that:

from the beginning the paper started to publish and support the chauvinist ideas of such organisations as *Russkoe soglasie* (Russian agreement), the Society of Russian Culture, *Dvizhenie za edinenie* (Movement for Unity) and the Russian liberation movement. The articles by A. Tsygankov, V. Badanov, Yu. Paltsev and V. Sudakov emphasise the historical task of the Russian nation – to be supreme and enslave other nations, the supremacy of Russian – in other words, raising the national-chauvinist feelings, which they call patriotic, of the Russian people. (*Oma mua* 20.8.1994)

The author stated also that *Kareliya* was the only newspaper in Karelia which followed this line and could be compared with the extreme nationalist Russian newspaper *Den* (Day).

5.6.4. *Minority newspapers in difficulties*

Karjalan Sanomat started to lose its journalists, who emigrated to Finland. Already in 1991 the paper lost 18 journalists of the total 25. According to the new editor-in-chief, Robert Manner, the paper should have obtained money

and it should have commercialised its activities and published more advertisements (*Severnyi Kurier* 22.11.1991).

The minority newspapers were confronted not only by the lack of journalists but also by administrative interference. The importance of *Karjalan Sanomat* was based mainly on its audience in Finland and on the effect it may have had when the Finnish newspapers cited it. One of the examples of administrative interference appeared when *Karjalan Sanomat* published 5.3.1992 the statement of the co-ordination council of the Karelian movement "On the state of Karelians in the republic of Karelia" in which the movement proposed that Karelia should be united with Finland. After that the Council of Ministers (government) of Karelia published a statement, that despite the fact that the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Council are the founders of the newspaper, the published view "does not represent the opinion of the government and the newspaper does not have that kind of position on questions of international justice." The Council of Ministers thought that:

the opinion of the small group of leaders of the Karelian movement does not reflect the interests of the majority of the population in the republic; the movement escalates nationalist passions, sharpens the situation in the republic, does not contribute to the strengthening of the friendly relations between the nationalities living in the territory of Karelia and does not promote the development of co-operation and mutual understanding between the Russian Federation and Finland. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 10.3.1992)

The tradition of connecting the stories published in the newspapers with the official policy of the newspaper and its publisher remained perhaps even more firmly in the administration than among the journalists.

The journalism of *Karjalan Sanomat* gained a lot from the co-operation with Finnish journalists. The first Finnish journalist, Pirkko Jyv akorpi, worked in *Karjalan Sanomat* in June 1992 (*Karjalan Sanomat* 6.6.1992). The Finnish journalist "has brought a fresh wind to the work of the newspaper and has encouraged us to take up the topics with courage. -- Now there is a new time in journalism. The story should be reported when the topic is in the air, and not after it has been decided." (*Karjalan Sanomat* 14.7.1992). Jyv akorpi was followed by two other Finnish journalists in 1992-1993. The first students of the University of Tampere came to *Karjalan Sanomat* for internships in autumn 1992. After that the students have been working there regularly.

The economic crisis of 1992 did not have a direct impact on the number of printed copies of *Karjalan Sanomat*. The number of printed copies was stable at 9,000 and increased in the end of 1992 to almost 10,000. The

decline in the circulation, especially in Finland, happened in the beginning of 1993, when the number fell suddenly from 9,800 to 3,000. *Karjalan Sanomat* lost a major part of subscriptions in Finland because of its changed editorial policy. Finnish readers were irritated, e.g., because of discussion on the unification of the Karelia with Finland and the interview with the activist of the Peace of Tartu movement, Seppo Lehto. The readers expressed their discontent in letters, which were published in the paper.

Besides the changed policy, also the price had an impact. In 1990 the subscription price of *Karjalan Sanomat* had been 80 marks for a year and in 1991 it was 95 marks. For 1993 the subscription price was raised to 295 marks. At the same time the only subscription agent mentioned in the newspaper was Suomalainen Kirjakauppa (book store) and the traditional left-wing oriented agents (SN-kirjat, Vastavoima) were left out.

The distribution of the newspaper had its problems also in Karelia. In Petrozavodsk the minority newspapers were not accepted at the kiosks because they were not sold. According to *Karjalan Sanomat*, the reason was conscious discrimination. When a client had asked for *Karjalan Sanomat*, the saleswoman had to open an unopened stack and only few kiosks had put the papers on view. Moreover, the paper was not found in those kiosks in which Finnish tourists might have asked for it (in hotels and in the bus station). (*Karjalan Sanomat* 28.11.1992).

The readers of *Karjalan Sanomat* belonged mainly to the older generations. According to the readership questionnaire, over half were over 50 years of age. The main interests of the readers were the nationality question, culture, the environment and co-operation with Finland. Also economic, social and political stories were popular while only a few were interested in science, art and religion. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 23.10.1993.)

The economic difficulties of *Karjalan Sanomat* were increased by the policy of the Periodika publishing house, which kept the income from the Finnish subscriptions (100,000 marks). The journalists received a small salary and the publisher was not interested in developing newspapers. Editorial technology was donated from Finland, even the pencils and notebooks. According to the editor-in-chief, the journalists were mainly pensioners because the younger ones were not interested in working for a small salary and being dependent on the publisher. (*Severnyi Kurier* 1.3.1994).

The Periodika publishing house was set up as the publisher of minority newspapers after the Regional Committee of the Party was abolished.

In 1992 there was an attempt to set up another newspaper in Finnish. The publisher of *Petroskoin Sanomat* (News of Petrozavodsk) was the Petropress publishing house. Two issues were published in autumn 1992, but after that

the publisher had a conflict with the journalists, who all left the newspaper. The editor-in-chief Lilja Lamberg wrote that:

the leadership of the publishing house refused to include the journalists as one of the founders of the newspaper and guarantee them 30% of the profit. The leadership of the publishing house is satisfied with the current situation in which the salaries of the journalists are small and the journalists have no rights in defining the editorial policy of the newspaper. The final end of the conflict happened when the manager of the Petropress publishing house removed the editorial article of the editor and placed his own article instead without telling the editor. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 17.10.1992).

However, new journalists were recruited and nine issues of *Petroskoin Sanomat* were published up to June 1993, of which eight were printed in Finland. The paper had 16 pages and the number of printed copies was 5,000. Then, however, the paper was suspended “temporarily” because the costs had increased and the income from the advertisement did not cover them. The paper had expected financial support from the authorities but it was not received. Also the economic crisis in Finland had had a negative impact on the possibilities of the new paper and there were hopes that the publishing could be continued when the economic situation got better in Finland. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 16.10.1993).

Oma mua found rapidly its role as the newspaper of Karelian culture: “the paper contains stories on the past and present life of Karelian villages, poems, anthropological stories, sermons and proverbs. There are opinions of the people on various topics” (Pekka Zaikov, The president of the Union of Karelian People, *Oma mua* 5.11.1992). *Oma mua* published even religious material, e.g., texts from the Bible translated into Karelian and a series on the life of Jesus. There were also political discussions and materials from different organisations. Also the language question remained among the frequent topics.

Oma mua had got in summer 1992 over 2,700 subscriptions, although in many villages the paper remained unknown. Only when journalists visited some villages did the people get to know about the newspaper. The paper appealed to the readers to tell about the paper and say that “it is the newspaper of the Karelian people in Karelian language” (*Oma mua* 12.6.1992).

The problem for *Oma mua* was the differences among Karelian dialects and the lack of journalists who could write in Karelian. The majority of the contributors were old, because the young ones were not literate in Karelian. The staff included the editor Vladimir Kettunen, who took care of texts in the northern dialect and journalists Vera Hämäläinen and Lyubov Arefevna, who

knew the southern dialect. All of them had graduated from the Department of Finnish language of Petrozavodsk State University (*Karjalan Sanomat* 13.10.1992). In January 1992 the paper started to publish a course in the Karelian language.

The paper was criticised even because of the fact that the third dialect of Karelian, Ludic, was not given space. There was no journalist who knew the Ludic dialect. The problem was also that many Karelians did not know the Latin alphabet and the paper could have had more readers if it had been printed both in Latin and in Cyrillic scripts (*Karjalan Sanomat* 25.8.1992).

The editor, Vladimir Kettunen, announced his resignation at the beginning of September 1992, and did not want to comment on the reasons for it (*Karjalan Sanomat* 30.7.1992). However, in the autumn Kettunen was mentioned as the editor of the newspaper.

Also the circulation of *Oma mua* dropped because of rising prices. In 1992 it had been between 3,000 and 3,300, but in 1992 it dropped first to 1,100 and after that to 900. The number of subscriptions fell, even as the subscription price for the first half of 1993 was only 9 roubles a month. Of this, the postal fee took seven roubles and two roubles were left to the newspaper. This covered only one tenth of the costs and the rest was covered by a state subsidy. (*Oma mua* 13.8.1992.)

For the second half of 1993 the price was 84 roubles for half a year. For organisations like schools the price was 225 roubles. The postal fee for one issue was four roubles so that the entire subscription price was used for postal fees. (*Oma mua* 1.4.1993).

The falling number of subscriptions also had an impact on the connection with the readers. The number of letters and contributions from the readers fell. The paper had more and more stories in Finnish, e.g., a novel by Ivan Sergeev — “Plot of the Generals” — translated from Russian. The novel told about the plan to expel the Karelians to Siberia in the 1940s and how it was rejected.

For the first half of 1994 the subscription price was already 564 roubles. The journalists were worried about the rising price and appealed to the readers not to cancel subscriptions. For those who picked up the paper in the editorial office, the price was 150 roubles. In 1994 the number of printed copies of *Oma mua* rose again to over 1,000.

Also a bilingual Russian-Veps monthly newspaper, *Kodima* (Homeland), was founded in 1993 but it is too small and too infrequent to fall within the scope of this study. *Kodima* comes out in 990 copies and therefore escaped the registration formalities and because of this does not appear in official

printing statistics either (officially *Kodima* is an appendix to the newspaper *Oma mua*).

5.6.5. A new kind of press market in the making

As a result of the developments in 1991-1994, the press market in Karelia had changed completely. For the first half of 1994, altogether 70,000 copies of Petrozavodsk-based newspapers were subscribed to, compared with around 140,000 in 1991-1992. While *Severnyi Kurier* had been the leader with over 60% of the total amount in 1992, in 1994 the leading papers had a more equal positions. *Severnyi Kurier* was subscribed to by 20,490, *TVR* by 19,538, *Molodezhnaya gazeta* by 18,277, *Petrozavodsk* by 8,089 and *Kareliya* by 944 people (*TVR* 24.12.1993).

When the number of subscriptions is compared with the number of printed copies (circulation) of these newspapers in January 1994, it is evident that for *Severnyi Kurier* the share of subscriptions was highest, 87% (in January the circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* was only 23,400 copies, in February it rose to 29,000, if the number of subscriptions had remained unchanged their share would have been 70%). For *Molodezhnaya gazeta* the share of subscriptions was 80%, for *TVR* 40%, *Petrozavodsk* 17% and *Kareliya* 20%. On average the share of subscriptions was around 40%, while it had been over 70% in 1992.

The comparison of the information collected from the newspapers themselves with the figures published in press publishing statistics reveals that there are serious flaws in official statistics, caused likely by the incomplete receiving of the free sample copies of all the newspapers.

The old newspapers, especially the daily *Severnyi Kurier*, were more dependent on subscribing and therefore with a more stable readership; on the other hand, they were more vulnerable to rising costs. The difference between *TVR* and *Petrozavodsk* is explained by the fact that a major part of the circulation of *TVR* was in the countryside, while the readership of *Petrozavodsk* was concentrated in the city itself, where retail distribution was easier.

The newspapers differed not only in their methods of distribution, but also in their strategies towards their audiences. While *Severnyi Kurier* emphasised its role as a political forum and source of information (however contradictory these might be with each other), the new non-political newspapers emphasised their role as a service provider and advisor outside politics.

5.7. The new kind of press stabilises (1995-1997)

A more stable period of press development started in 1995 when inflation decreased and the conditions for the functioning of the press became more predictable. The drop in circulation was stopped. The founding of new newspapers continued, but old ones were no longer closed down. The quality of the printing of the newspapers increased a lot with the use of the new printing machine in the Anokhin printing house and because of the use of computerised setting and layout.

The new newspapers stabilised their leading position and the traditional press fell more deeply into difficulties. Also the differentiation of the press between more expensive, quality publications and the cheaper, mass-oriented popular press became apparent. The subscription prices continued to rise compared with average salaries, but this did not lead to decline of the overall circulation of the press.

5.7.1. *A traditional newspaper in search of a new role*

The circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* continued to decrease. For the first half of 1995 *Severnyi Kurier* got 23,954 subscriptions and the Saturday-issue got separately 2,462 subscriptions. *TVR* got 21,860, *MG* 10,482 and *Kareliya* 1,173. (*Severnyi Kurier* 24.12.1994.) During the first half of 1995 *Severnyi Kurier* was printed weekdays in 30,000 copies and on Saturdays in 33,000 copies. For the second half of 1995 *Severnyi Kurier* got around 20,000 subscriptions and the circulation totalled 25,000, on Saturdays 28,000.

The subscription campaigns continued longer and longer into the autumn. In 1995 the subscriptions were accepted up to 20 December and at the end of the campaign the postal service announced that it would support *Severnyi Kurier* by discounting its transportation fee. So the subscription price fell from the previously announced 69,600 roubles to 34,800 roubles (for half a year). (*Severnyi Kurier* 9.12.1995). Despite the discount, the circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* remained at the previous level.

For the year 1996 subscriptions were again accepted for the whole year, which gives evidence of declining inflation and improved faith in the future. The share of the subscription price allotted to postal fees remained huge, e.g., for the first half of 1997 the subscription price of *Severnyi Kurier* was 15,000 roubles per month, but if the paper was collected at the editorial office the price was only 6,000 roubles.

The problems with the postal service were perhaps the most harmful for the daily newspapers. For example in Shuya, which is situated just outside

Petrozavodsk, the papers arrived one day late and the situation was not expected to get better due to of the poor economic state of the postal service (*Severnõi Kurier* 13.9.1996). In summer 1996 the timetable of the mail delivery in Petrozavodsk was changed, so that *Severnõi Kurier* started to be distributed already “early in the morning”, between 6-8 o’clock (*Severnõi Kurier* 12.6.1996).

High postal fees provided opportunities also for individual distributors, who sold subscriptions in certain suburbs and distributed the newspapers themselves. For example, a retired postal worker, Viktoriya Mylleri, sold subscriptions to *Severnõi Kurier* in the suburb of Drevlyanka totalling 54,000 roubles (for the first half of 1997), while the ordinary postal price was 90,000 roubles. (*Severnõi Kurier* 3.12.1996).

Reductions were offered to the early subscribers, e.g., in September 1996 it was possible to subscribe to *Severnõi Kurier* by paying only the postal delivery fee. (*Severnõi Kurier* 5.9.1996).

A good example of the attitudes towards the newspaper among journalists was offered by the reaction towards the plan to buy *Severnõi Kurier* in August 1995. V. Popov, the director of the retail trade company Lentorg, made an offer to the journalists to buy their shares in the SK Joint Stock Company. The paper took a negative attitude towards it and labelled it as a threat to the freedom of speech:

V. Popov, without a trace of suspicion, thinks: it is just like any other commercial transaction, a newspaper is merchandise that can be bought and sold. Such concepts as honour, conscience and professional pride are for him, presumably, only a hallucination, empty words. (*Severnõi Kurier* 18.8.1995)

The paper published Popov’s rejoinder on 25.8. In his letter Popov referred to the media law, which obliged the paper to publish the rejoinder (the paper published also this part of Popov’s letter). Popov stated that the freedom of the press and the freedom of the enterprise are different sides of the same coin. He added that the Lentorg company was engaged also in construction, the clothing industry, tourism and operating restaurants and was interested in investing in the newspaper. The paper was interesting especially because of its commercial potential. (*Severnõi Kurier* 25.8.1995.)

The paper also published the statement of a (social-democratic, liberal) Republic-level organisation, which condemned the plan to buy a newspaper: “We need an independent press — only if it commands the respect of the readers, only if it has the possibility to repulse the discretion by the authorities. Journalists should not become an obedient weapon in the hands of those with money and power.” (*Severnõi Kurier* 25.8.1995.)

Severnii Kurier tried to function in the role of a political, participating newspaper (without being partisan or an organ of anyone). The aim of the newspaper was to have an influence: “the defence of the interests of pensioners, veterans of war and labour, invalids, and large families has an important place in the newspaper” (*Severnii Kurier* 30.12.1995).

The relations with authorities had been normalised. Among the authorities there were discussions on the stories of the newspaper, but there was no pressure. Everybody takes care of his own business. “After all, the aims of the press and the authorities are the same — that life in Karelia would get better” (ibid.).

The paper defined its positions as “socio-political. It means that *Severnii Kurier* publishes stories on topics which interest all population groups. Political life in Karelia, economy, culture, social problems and sports are continuously monitored by the journalists of the paper.” The paper received its information from the districts of Karelia from its own correspondents, who lived permanently in Medvezhegorsk, Kem and Sortavala. In addition, “SK” published information on life in Russia, in the near and far abroad, which the paper received from the news agencies Interfax, SPb-TASS (TASS in St. Petersburg) and Globus. (*Severnii Kurier* 20.3.1997.)

The political orientation of *Severnii Kurier* was “democratic.” The paper supported those forces which opposed communists and nationalists. During the presidential elections of June/July 1996, *Severnii Kurier* strongly supported Eltsin. The paper published also letters to the editor in which the authors opposed Eltsin, but in editorial texts Eltsin was favoured. The paper covered the elections mainly by letters to the editor and news from the campaign itself or analysis of the aims of the candidates remained relatively absent.

During the election campaign the circulation of *Severnii Kurier* grew to 29,000 but after the elections it dropped to 21,000 during the work week and to 24,000 on Saturdays.

The paper published the opinions of the readers on the newspaper during the subscription campaigns. Readers were pleased with the letters column, in which a “wide spectrum of opinions” was present and with the timeliness of the newspaper, although “the rhythm of creative work, the lack of time, sometimes have its impact on how deeply the topics are analysed. Many of the stories are superficial, and sometimes even troublesome mistakes occur.” (*Severnii Kurier* 15.3.1997)

The columns of the editor told about changes in the social role of the newspaper. Changes in society had had an impact on the role of the paper, perhaps more than the editor himself would have liked:

On the contrary, now, criticise, or not, even so, the response is... silence. The readers ask no more what kinds of measures have been taken after this or that critical story. We have witnessed whatever disclosures in the press both in Moscow and in Karelia! But consequences — none. (*Severnyi Kurier* 8.2.1997)

The practice of publishing letters to the editor continued and the paper received no fewer letters than in the first year after *perestroika*. For example, in 1997 *Severnyi Kurier* received over 6,000 letters (compared with 6,600 in 1992). According to the paper, the incoming mail was “like litmus paper which shows life as unvarnished. It is a rich source of topics for journalists and a sticking nagger for the majority of the state officials” (*Severnyi Kurier* 10.1.1998).

Also *Molodezhnaya gazeta* lost its circulation continuously. At the beginning of 1995 its circulation was 15,000, occasionally even 16,000 copies, in July 1995 the number dropped to 8,200, and increased in the autumn only to 9,000. Following the example of other newspapers, even *Molodezhnaya gazeta* started to give discounts for veterans, invalids from childhood and for those who lived in Leningrad during the siege. These kinds of discounts, however, were not useful for young subscribers.

Molodezhnaya gazeta fell in to economic crisis in spring 1996. The 30 workers of the newspaper, of which 14 were journalists, were not paid their salaries from January to June 1996. In June the paper owed 250 million roubles (app. 250,000 FIM) to its workers and to the tax authorities. The reason for this was the economic problems of the main financier of the paper, Kondopoga, Inc. “We would not like to believe this and all the workers have continued to work as usual. We await the help of the Karelian government, wrote the editor-in-chief, Svetlana Lysenko. (*Severnyi Kurier* 22.6.1996.)

In June 1996 the workers of the paper took the conflict over the salary to the court, but because there was no money, the distrainer listed the property of the newspaper so that it could be sold in order to cover the debts (*ibid.*). In July the paper asked for help from the Karelian government and sent an open letter to the chairman Viktor Stepanov. One journalist started a hunger strike. (*Molodezhnaya gazeta* 13.7.1996.)

Finally the paper was saved by enlarging the group of its financiers. Among the founders of the paper were included the journalists of the paper and the Committee of Families, Youth and Children of the Republic of Karelia. At the same time, the name of the publishing company was changed from MGK to MG.

Although the survival of the newspaper was ensured, it could not get the readers back. The number of printed copies remained at 5,000. The problem was too serious and outdated content, which did not interest the young

audience. In autumn 1996 the paper published, e.g., a picture and a story on the occasion of the “Senior Citizens’ Day”. Moreover, the youth paper started to publish a Karelian edition of the Moscow-based *Novaya gazeta* (New paper) as a supplement (four pages in the middle of the paper).

At the end of 1996 *Molodezhnaya gazeta* came out only twice a week, but it returned to a thrice weekly schedule at the beginning of 1997. This did not last a long; in April the paper had to announce that “the worsening economic situation does not allow for *MG* to appear in three issues per week. In the future the paper has to cut back on costs for publishing and distributing the newspaper. From 1 July on, *MG* (*MG* plus *Novaya gazeta*) will come out once a week but not with eight, rather with 16 or 24 pages.” (*MG* 24.4.1997). In practise the number of pages remained 16, while before the paper had had three issues of eight pages a week. The content became a bit youthful but the serious and slightly paternal tone remained.

Behind the difficulties of *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was also the increased competition for the young readership. Besides *MG*, papers oriented towards young readers included: *Litsei* (Lyceum), published by the Ministries of Education and Culture of Karelia; *Tineydzher* (Teenager), published by the Rits company (the publisher of *Guberniya*; later it became a section in *Guberniya* itself); and also *Petrozavodskii universitet*, the newspaper of Petrozavodsk University. *Molodezhnaya gazeta* looked outdated and paternalistic, while *Tineydzher* was oriented towards youth culture and personal relationships and *Litsei* towards culture and education.

5.7.2. *More intense competition among the weeklies*

The leading position of the weeklies continued to strengthen while *Severnii Kurier* lost some of its circulation. The competition among the weeklies was hard and increasing, although the founding of *Guberniya* in 1996 did not lead to a loss of circulation among the other weeklies.

Petrozavodsk did not increase its circulation after 1995 and its circulation even dropped a bit. *Petrozavodsk* has been the most expensive of the weeklies and the appearance of new competitors cut its circulation from 51,000 to below 40,000. Considering that an overwhelming part of its circulation was in the city of Petrozavodsk, the circulation was 125-130 copies per 1,000 citizens or approximately one third of households. This was still a lower level than what *Severnii Kurier* had in the 1980s.

The use of the new printing machine in the Anokhin printing house at the beginning of 1995 improved the image of *Petrozavodsk* the most. The paper started to publish four-colour appendices (mainly advertisements) already in

1995 and at the end of August 1996 the paper started to permanently use fourcolours in its first and last page. Also other newspapers published four-colour pages and covers occasionally.

Petrozavodsk described itself in its website in the following way:

The city newspaper *Petrozavodsk* had during many years a leading position among the media of Petrozavodsk. This not by chance. The urban news, analytical articles, reviews, interviews with the mayor, really functioning advertisements, and high-level printing gives to the Petropress publishing house the right to ensure that our newspaper deserves your attention.

The paper has been popular among citizens because one can get news from it about practically everything that is going on in the city. And the advertisers have noticed the effectiveness and high profitability of the advertisements published in *Petrozavodsk* newspaper.

In the sections "City mosaic", "The column of the Petrozavodsk City Council", "Business Friday", "Round Table," "Paradise Place," "Call on Friday" and "Changing Petrozavodsk", the journalists and our other authors and our readers tell about themselves, about what makes them worry, what makes them nervous and glad in our town and among our citizens.

We love our Petrozavodsk – cosy, green, our own beautiful city. And we would like to make the newspaper wise, useful and close to every citizen. (Website of *Petrozavodsk*, March 1998)

The composition of the editorial council of the *Petrozavodsk* newspaper revealed the close relationship of the paper with the local authorities of business, culture and education: in autumn 1997 the members of the council included the director of the Petropress company, the rector of Petrozavodsk State University, the vice-director of the Avangard factory, the minister of education of Karelia, the president of the union of theatre workers, the director of the Karelian investment company, the director of the Karelstroimekhanisatsiya company, one member of the Petrozavodsk City Council, the president of the Karelian Union of Writers, the director of the Karelian research institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the head of the Petrozavodsk militia.

While *Petrozavodsk* was the leading newspaper in the city, *TVR* was the leading newspaper in the countryside. *TVR* came out already on Thursdays, so that it would reach even the most remote places before Monday, the first day of its weekly television programme. In *TVR*'s Internet pages, the newspaper was described in the following way:

Our newspaper is a weekly of Karelia for the whole family. And this means that it should be interesting for all – from the from kids to grownups. Therefore the regular columns of our paper, if it can be put like this, have a relation to the

family, they are useful. "Housebuilder" tells how to make one's home more comfortable, "The calendar of the cottage-owner" helps our gardeners in the high-risk zone of agriculture to grow and ensure their harvests and it has also useful advice and recipes. "Telekitchen" helps to orient readers to the world of television, it tells about the most interesting programmes and films. Our newspaper has information on what is going on in the republic: "The world of Karelia" tells our readers what is going on in the republic and the very name of the section "Details" tells what it is on. Project "20th Century. Karelia. Names for posterity" tells about people of whom the republic can be proud – artists, performers, poets. And the section "Children's Island" is full of stories, puzzles, poems and riddles for children, which have been intended for common reading among children and parents. (Internet pages of *TVR*, March 1998)

TVR changed its name on 29 August 1996 to *TVR-Panorama* and tried to emphasise that it is more than just a television programme magazine. At the same time, the number of pages in the magazine was increased regularly to 16 (previously the issues alternated between 8 and 16 pages). Actually the share of television and radio programme news in it was only five pages (out of 16) in autumn 1996.

Kareliya extended the number of its owners (founders) in 1995, when besides the Legislative Assembly (previous Supreme Council) of Karelia, also the government of the Republic of Karelia, the Karelian fishing fleet, Inc. and the journalists of the newspaper became founders. The publisher continued to be the Petropress publishing house.

The layout of *Kareliya* was changed with the shift to the new printing technology. The previous broadsheet newspaper with four pages took on a tabloid format with eight pages.

In 1996 the publishing of *Kareliya* was moved from the hands of Petropress to the journalists of the newspaper. The founders were the same as before. The circulation of *Kareliya* remained small even though its subscription price was a bit lower than that of most of the other new papers. *Kareliya* also moved to a weekly rhythm in September 1996. This was done because a weekly newspaper became cheaper for the publishers and also because it happened that the issues with eight pages were sometimes two-thirds full of laws and decrees and "it was a real danger that instead of being a socio-political newspaper, '*Kareliya*' would become a bulletin for the publishing of laws and government decrees" (*Kareliya* 4.9.1998).

A new paper, *Ves Petrozavodsk* (All of Petrozavodsk) or *Večerka* (Evening paper) was launched when part of the journalists of the newspaper *Petrozavodsk* quitted and decided to found a new paper in November 1995. Behind this were the quarrels between the publisher and the journalists. The

first issue of the new paper came out on 23.11.1995. The journalists which quitted did not do so for the first time. Many of them were those who had left *Leninskaya pravda* in December 1990 and founded *Petrozavodsk*. The aim of the journalists was to publish a daily, but there was no financial support available for that. In November and December 23 issues were published in total, but from the beginning of 1996 to the beginning of June 1996 *Ves Petrozavodsk* came out once a week, totalling 46 issues in that period (*Ves Petrozavodsk* 6-12.6.1996).

The journalists of *Ves Petrozavodsk* continued to publish a new newspaper *Guberniya* (Province) in June 1996. *Guberniya* was founded and published by the Rits company. *Guberniya* became the clearest example of a popular newspaper in Petrozavodsk. It published scandal news and reportages, an erotic section "Only for adults", sport news, minor political news and a motoring page. *Guberniya* became popular and its circulation grew from 10,000 for the first issue to 40,000 in 1997. *Guberniya* competed with other weeklies also with its number of pages: with its 24 pages it was thicker than *Petrozavodsk* with 20 and *TVR-Panorama* with 16 pages. Approximately one fifth of its contents comprised advertisements.

In April 1996 another new newspaper was founded. It was called *Nablyudatel* (Observer) and it defined itself as the "Socio-Political weekly of Karelia." *Nablyudatel* became a clear example of a quality newspaper, e.g., at the beginning it did not publish television programmes at all. Its six broadsheet pages contained business news, analyses of the business climate, political news and analyses, presentation of new persons and reviews of new laws. The founder and publisher of *Nablyudatel* was the publishing group Abzats and its editor was Maksim Tikhonov, who had previously worked in *Komsomolets* (up to 1990) and after that in *Severnyi Kurier*. In *Nablyudatel* the share of advertisements was around one sixth. The number of printed copies of *Nablyudatel* remained small, only 3,000 during 1996 and 1997. At the beginning *Nablyudatel* did not even publish a television programme and therefore was clearly a newspaper for the elite and for those who get the television programme from another newspaper.

5.7.3. *Minority newspapers still in trouble*

Karjalan Sanomat could more or less stabilise its circulation in Finland after the autumn of 1993 and its number of printed copies remained at 2,000. Of these copies, a little less than 800 were subscribed to in Finland (*Karjalan Sanomat* 4.10.1995). This was only 10% of the previous figure.

At the beginning of 1995 *Karjalan Sanomat* moved to a computerised layout and offset printing. At the same time, the format of the paper was changed from broadsheet to tabloid and the number of weekly issues dropped from three to two. At the beginning only the Saturday issue was printed with the new technology, but in the beginning of February 1995 the Wednesday issue was as well. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 7.1.1995).

In 1995 the staff of *Karjalan Sanomat* included four journalists, the managerial editor, the style editor, a photographer, two translators, two typists, a proof reader, two artists and interns from the Universities of both Petrozavodsk and Tampere. The editorial personnel totalled over 15 persons. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 4.10.1995).

One of the most well known lawsuits against journalists in the region was filed against *Karjalan Sanomat* and the journalist Apu Sundelin in 1996, provoked by the story: "Wild capitalism rages in Karelian forests" published 24.2.1996. The story was based on a press conference given by members of the Karelian parliament. The Forest Company of Suojärvi made a compensation claim because it felt that the story had harmed its reputation among Finnish business partners. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 27.7.1996, see also *Helsingin Sanomat* 25.7.1996). In the event, however, the paper won the case in court.

Karjalan Sanomat and *Oma mua* continued to receive financial support from the budget of the Republic, but the sums were not sufficient. In addition to the insufficient budget support, only 60-70% of the promised funds was actually paid because of a lack of money. The paper had outstanding bills accumulated over three or four months, owed to the printing house, post, telephone company, tax administration and to its own workers, so that in autumn 1996 both minority papers and the governmental *Kareliya* were under the threat of closure. (*Severnyi Kurier* 20.12.1996.)

Because of such economic problems, *Karjalan Sanomat* was not published 5.2.1997; the paper owed 67 million roubles (60,000 FIM) to the printing house. The publishers (founders) of the paper, government and the Legislative Assembly of Karelia knew the situation but had not been able to correct it. At the end of 1996 the Chairman of the Government, Viktor Stepanov, ordered that the debts of the paper should be paid, but it was not done. The journalists had not received their salaries after October 1996 and it was predicted that they would receive their October salary only in March 1997. (*Severnyi Kurier* 6.2.1997.)

The problem of *Oma mua* was the lack of journalists. The editor Vladimir Kettunen was often on sick leave and the deputy editors in charge were Lyubov Arefevna, Natalya Yakovleva and Olga Pokornaya. In January 1995

it was stated in the paper that two journalists were in hospital and only a typist and a photographer were working in the editorial office. Help from the readers was needed in order to produce the paper. (*Oma mua* 7.1.1995).

The paper contained much other than current journalistic materials, e.g., the poems of Kalevala in the Olonets dialect and the gospel of Mark in the Northern Karelian dialect. In order to receive subscriptions, the paper arranged a competition for selling the most subscriptions, the prize being a trip to Finland. *Oma mua* could stabilise its number of printed copies to around 1,000.

The policy of *Oma mua* was to write about Karelian culture and history. The paper reported only a little on some current affairs like the presidential elections of 1996. Between the two rounds of the elections they were not mentioned at all in the paper. The function of *Oma mua* was different: “to remind the Karelians on their own language, traditions, antiquity, to tell about the history and everyday life of the home region” (*Oma mua* 28.1.1995).

According to thematic interviews (mainly on the listening and watching of Finnish and Karelian radio and television programmes) made by Finnish students in 1995, the Finnish and Karelian newspapers tried not to push their opinion on the people as much as the Russian ones do, e.g. by concluding that ‘this case would be a good example for all the others’ (Skön & Torkkola 1997, 148).

Oma mua and *Karjalan Sanomat* did not reach a wide audience. One reason was that the subscription fees, while low, were still too high in the economic situation of Karelia at that time. Other reasons were the insufficient knowledge of the language, youth were not interested in reading and the Latin alphabet caused difficulties (Pyöli 1996, 149-150).

According to a Finnish dissertation on the current status of the Karelian language, the importance of the media as a relatively new and effective tool for the preservation and development of the language as well as a tool for changing attitudes was incontestable in the Karelian community, but the operations were hindered by the lack of a common literary language, dialect differences and the lack of financial resources for publishing activities (Pyöli 1996, 87).

Oma mua received assistance from Finland, e.g., in 1995 the Union of Karelian People paid subscriptions to 260 copies of *Oma mua* for Karelians in Petrozavodsk and in villages with the help of assistance it received from Finland (*Oma mua* 28.1.1995).

5.7.4. Newspapers and the Internet

Most of the newspapers established their Internet services in the second half of the 1990s. First was *Guberniya* which started its pages on the Internet on 5.9.1996. *Guberniya* had first its pages on the private Onego server but in the first half of 1997 it moved to the Karelia server of Petrozavodsk State University. *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* followed in August 1997. *Severnii Kurier* opened its pages in February 1998.

Petrozavodsk and *TVR-Panorama* published only part of their material and they stopped doing so in 1998 when they moved to another server. In June 1998 *TVR-Panorama* stopped publishing its materials on the University of Petrozavodsk (karelia.ru) server. *Petrozavodsk* followed in November 1998. These newspapers moved to a new server, Onego, on which the publishing house Petropress opened its site. A major change was also that these newspapers did not publish any of their stories on this server but offered only information about the newspaper and advertising prices. *TVR-Panorama* published there some issues in the summer of 1998 but stopped doing so in August. In 2000 Petropress moved to still a another new server, Sampo, on which *TVR-Panorama* started to have its website in October 2000. *Petrozavodsk*, however, did not provide its material there.

Also *Guberniya* stopped providing its material on homepages in 2000, when only three issues (6.1., 20.4., 27.4.) were made available on the Internet. After the printed version of *Reporter* had been closed, the paper continued in an online version which *Guberniya* advertised as its web address.

Nablyudatel was published on the private Onego server from the beginning. It opened its pages in June 1997. *Nablyudatel* published all the articles of the paper on the Internet, but the updating of the material on the server stopped in February 2000. *Kareliya* has its Internet pages on the governmental server and it also published all the material of the newspaper there. *Kareliya* started its Internet pages in October 1998.

Oma mua also had experience with the Internet, but it remained short-lived. One of the problems was the encoding of the Karelian alphabet, which did not produce the right Karelian letters in most of the computers. Some texts of the paper were published, however, from December 1997 to March 1998. *Karjalan Sanomat* started its web pages in May 1997, but several times the service was interrupted because of technical problems.

Even *Molodezhnaya gazeta* has its own page, but as of April 2001, the best stories from the paper were only from the issues of 1999. On the other hand, the pages of *Molodezhnaya gazeta* include other materials, the date of which is not recognisable.

Strange enough, most of the papers do not provide advertisements their Internet pages (some of them have practically no advertisements in printed versions either) and it seems that the Internet is for them more an experiment than an extension of the printed paper. It is possible to send e-mail to the paper, but Internet pages does not have any extra services.

The statistics on the users of the Internet versions (see *Statistika poseshenii*) indicate that the majority of them were local or at least Russians, followed by Finns. *Karjalan Sanomat* and *Oma mua* were read mostly by Finns.

Karelian newspapers have been active in setting up their websites but they have not maintained their pages regularly, perhaps because of technological problems or because the electronic versions have been seen as a threat to the printed papers. *TVR-Panorama* and *Petrozavodsk* seem to have abandoned Internet publishing, at least for a while.

As of March 2001 the only regular Internet pages with stories from print versions were those of *Severnii Kurier*, *Kareliya*, *Online Reporter* and *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii*. *Severnii Kurier* and *Kareliya* published all their articles on the Internet, while the other two had a regularly updated selection of news there.

The most popular newspapers have left the Internet and those which remain are mainly newspapers for smaller audiences. The Internet provides them with a possibility to reach readers outside Karelia and to provide an archive of materials (as advertised by *Kareliya*), but it is not seen as a competitor for the printed paper. The more popular papers might have had a different experience, since they have removed their material from the Internet.

5.8. Increasing competition and a new struggle for an independent press (1998-2001)

5.8.1. Local elections of 1998 and the press

In Karelia the political consequences of the national elections of 1995 and 1996 for the press were small. The press supported mainly Boris Eltsin, although also Zyuganov got reasonable coverage (especially in *Severnii Kurier*) in letters to the editor. Even the popular weeklies, which used to pay little attention to politics, published some editorials and commentaries in which they appealed to the readers to support Eltsin. The more important consequences occurred with the local elections of 1998 and the national elections of 1999 and 2000.

The local elections of 1998 had more impact on the Karelian press than any other election before or after. In the 1998 elections both the Chairman of the Government (President) of Karelia and the regional parliament were elected. The main candidates were the incumbent Viktor Stepanov, supported by communists and directors of large enterprises, and the mayor of Petrozavodsk, Sergei Katanandov, supported by the Our Home Is Russia movement, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov (RFE/RL Newslines 27.4.1998). The elections took place on the 26th of April and the runoff on 17th of May 1998.

Already well before the elections special campaign newspapers were established. For example, *Narodnyi Advokat* (People's Advocate) the main aim of which was to support the incumbent Viktor Stepanov, was founded in December 1997 and closed after the elections. The first editor of *Narodnyi Advokat* was the political commentator Anatolii Tsygankov, who worked also for the governmental newspaper *Kareliya*. In February a few issues of *Narodnyi Advokat* were published without the name of the editor and after that Natalya Kazberovich was appointed editor. The campaign papers were distributed freely and they got significant circulation; nevertheless they did not have a significant influence on the circulation of the ordinary newspapers.

The change of the editor of the newspaper *Petrozavodsk* in autumn 1997 was also linked with the elections. The editor Rudolf Ershov was replaced by deputy editor Rostislav Gladkikh in October 1997 and on 12.12.1997 the paper stated that "From the 9th December the editor of the *Petrozavodsk* newspaper is Khevsurishvili, Vera Sergeevna". There was no mention of who had nominated her. *Narodnyi Advokat* stated that the editor of *Petrozavodsk* was dismissed during a trip abroad and the paper speculated that before the elections a purge was carried out in newspapers because the candidates wanted to be confident about the loyalty of the personnel of the print media. The new editor, Vera Khevsurishvili, had worked as the editor of the *Stroitel* (Constructor) newspaper and former colleagues of Khevsurishvili joked that "she can easily find a common language with Katanandov because both he and she are involved in construction" (*Narodnyi Advokat* 16.12.1997). After that, *Petrozavodsk* published a comment on that statement: "We announce that in accordance with the order by 'Publishing House Petropress Ltd' R. A. Ershov has been removed from the duty of editor-in-chief on 1 December 1997" (*Petrozavodsk* 26.12.1997).

The coverage of the elections in the press (see Pietiläinen 2000a) was concentrated on the two main candidates, Stepanov and Katanandov. For the other four candidates, the coverage was far from comprehensive. It was even difficult to find out who the other candidates were, not to mention their aims.

They appeared most often only when all the candidates were mentioned (and such items were few). There were no articles presenting the differences between the candidates or giving basic information about them. In *Severnii Kurier* the other candidates got eight percent of the coverage and in other newspapers their share was even smaller. Katanandov was clearly favoured in the Russian-language media, but Stepanov got more coverage in *Karjalan Sanomat* before the first round.

Severnii Kurier offered the greatest amount of material about the candidates. The elections were clearly the main news and the paper even twice published a special section (23.4. and 14.5.) with letters and other material about the elections. *Severnii Kurier* offered coverage of both the main candidates but the coverage on Stepanov was mainly critical and the coverage on Katanandov was mainly favourable.

Guberniya and *Petrozavodsk* used much less space for electoral coverage. In *Guberniya* the amount of coverage was relatively small. There was more coverage for Katanandov, but the difference was caused by the letters published (possibly paid advertisement). The only sign of bias was the item in which Katanandov answered the questions of the electors (*Guberniya* 15.5.1998). In *Guberniya* the elections were not among the main news. *Petrozavodsk* gave major coverage to the elections only in issues just before the poll. On 15th May, for example, *Petrozavodsk* published several letters in which people from different professions praised Katanandov's work and his election platform.

Karjalan Sanomat offered the most balanced coverage before the first round, but after that the coverage swung from the incumbent towards the likely winner. The major part of coverage for Katanandov was from original sources: his platform and letters. *Karjalan Sanomat* also published a letter by Stepanov.

An interesting thing in the coverage of these elections was that the news was not the main part of the coverage because only about one fourth of the coverage could be classified as news or a feature story (i.e., items written by journalists containing no comments by the author). Around 10% of the coverage was from original sources: press releases, platforms and letters written by the candidates. One third of the coverage comprised letters to the editor (their role was especially important in *Severnii Kurier*). Editorials took over 10% of the coverage and interviews and opinion polls around one sixth.

The media agenda in the Karelian elections was biased in two ways: first, the coverage concentrated on two main candidates. Second, there was a qualitative discrepancy in the coverage of the main candidates. Stepanov was mostly criticised, Katanandov praised. Supporters of Katanandov were

allowed to reply to criticism, while neither Stepanov nor his supporters got a similar opportunity. One reason for the qualitative bias was the structure of the coverage. The coverage was fairer in the news than in letters or commentaries. However, the prominence of other material than news made the overall coverage clearly biased.

5.8.2. New pressures from authorities

After the elections of 1998 the newspapers, which opposed the new chairman Sergei Katanandov, pointed out pressures towards them. *Nablyudatel* pointed out that the first actions of the new leader indicated that he would pursue a completely different information policy than his predecessor did. Katanandov dedicated almost one third of his first speech after the elections to the district press and after that an informal meeting with the editors took place. According to the paper already on the day after Katanandov had been sworn in, a case was brought to court between him and the newspaper *Narodnyi Advokat* (*Nablyudatel* 9.6.1998). *Narodnyi Advokat* (20.4.1998) in which he blamed Katanandov for mistakes and violation of laws.

Also the election of the new editor of the newspaper *Kareliya* can be seen as proof of the policy of Katanandov. The period of the former editor Konstantin Gnetnev had ended and he refused to continue in the leadership role, which was temporarily taken by the deputy editor Anatolii Tsygankov. According to *Nablyudatel* there was four candidates for the post: Tsygankov, E. Dobrynina (press secretary of Vedlozero national park), A. Zhilinskii (a former member of Karelian parliament) and R. Ershov (a former editor of the newspaper *Petrozavodsk*) (*Nablyudatel* 26.5.1998).

As was later told by a member of the Karelian parliament, Aleksei Mosunov, the journalists of the newspaper had supported Aleksandr Tsygankov in becoming editor, but the assistant to the chairman of the government, Tamara Kolesova, got Pavel Suzi elected (Aleksei Mosunov in *Reporter* 3.6.1999). Pavel Suzi started as editor on 11 September 1998.

The last issue edited by Tsygankov included a one-page article by him on the relationship between politicians and the press with the title "PRESSuyut" (They are PRESSing). It had been attempted to take the article out of the paper, therefore causing a small scandal, but the article could anyhow be published because the control was not yet complete (*Guberniya* 10.9.1998).

Tsygankov concluded that the government was increasing its control over the media. Among the influential newspapers only *Guberniya* will remain in opposition, but *Guberniya* is also controlled by the mayor of the Olonets

district, Vasilii Popov (the businessman who tried to buy *Severnii Kurier* earlier), who may oppose Katanandov. Also *Nablyudatel* stays in critical polemics with the government, although the government is capable of influencing the publisher and in a critical moment could control the paper. According to Tsygankov, the change of the editor of the *Severnii Kurier* “did not occur according to the plan made in the governmental cabinets. Another person should have become the editor instead of Sergei Kulikaev: the assistant to the Chairman of the Government of the Republic of Karelia, Tamara Kolesova, who had been not long ago deputy editor of SK” (*Kareliya* 4.9.1998).

According to Tsygankov, the *Severnii Kurier* tries to be objective. It does not risk taking part in political conflicts, but tries to give facts and to describe life accurately, although this kind of “impartiality could become not less exposing, and consequently, undesirable for the government” (ibid.).

Tsygankov states that three camps of the press can be found: “1) *Guberniya* + *Petrozavodsk/TVR*, 2) *SK*, 3) *Kareliya* + *MG* + *Nablyudatel* (the last two we have included in the pro-governmental list because their publishers depend on governmental structures” (ibid.).

Tamara Kolesova, the manager of the information service of the Chairman of the Government, replied to the criticism of Tsygankov with a comment that the article “was written with the style typical of the author of ‘Fantasy on the given topic’”. Kolesova stated that the press is needed for the administration “in order to tell the electorate about their actions, to explain them, to hear opinions, advice and critical remarks from the citizens.”

Commenting on the materials is the task of media staff themselves. Not a single journalist of the republic has the basis to declare that the government is ‘pressing’ him, to compel him to write down from dictation. ‘War’ in the information camp exists only in the conscience of the author.

Kolesova also emphasised that Tsygankov is interpreting the natural change of power in *Severnii Kurier* as a fight played out by the government.

It is difficult to believe that he does not know the facts known to journalists: not a single of the candidates for the editorial post can be called even in a bold fantasy protégés of S. Katanandov. Furthermore, A. Tsygankov well knows that the winning candidate participated actively in the work of the newspaper *Narodnyi Advokat*, which supported V. Stepanov. (*Kareliya* 25.9.1998).

Kolesova stated that with the new editor S. Kulikaev, the government have normal business relations and that Kulikaev has made *Severnii Kurier* more

informative than analytical, which he has right to do. Tsygankov continued to write in *Kareliya* even after this episode.

At the same time, yet another controversy was related to the ownership and control of the press. In August 1998 the Karelian Ministry of State Property bought 37.99% of the shares of the company "Publishing House Petropress", the nominal value of which was 94,975 roubles (equivalent to 82,000 FIM before the collapse of the exchange rates in August 1998). The funds for that purpose were taken from the investment programme of the republic for 1998. The Ministry of Finance of Karelia also agreed to pay the debt of Petropress to the Development and Reconstruction Fund of the Republic of Karelia, the sum of which was 877,736 roubles (over 750,000 FIM before the August 1998 crisis) (*Kareliya* 26.8.1998). According to *Guberniya* (10.9.1998) the government got the opportunity to influence the editorial policy of the newspapers of that company.

Katanandov rejected this criticism, arguing that the government would give journalists a free hand in expressing their views: "there has not been and will not be censorship" (e.g. *Oma mua* 1.1.1999). Also the director of the press service for the chairman of the government, Sergei Pyanov, stated in *Nablyudatel* that the task of the press service is to provide favourable working conditions for journalists and that "Sergei Katanandov expects for the journalists above all objective assessment of the work of the government" and that a "'pocket' press is not necessary" for him. On the other hand, he also emphasised preserving "normal, objective journalism" instead of "wild journalism" (*Nablyudatel* 29.12.1998).

An analysis by a commentator of *Nablyudatel* for the first year of Katanandov's tenure referred to the new style of working with regular meetings with the electorate and the press, which makes a clear difference between him and his predecessor. While electronic media are completely loyal to the executive power, in the print media the whole spectrum of opinions prevails. Although Katanandov tries to avoid journalists being afraid of criticising him, "the recent tendency of light toadying could not go unnoticed, since it has been tried in order to praise the executive power both when appropriate and inappropriate" (*Nablyudatel* 1.6.1999).

Anatolii Tsygankov commented in *Kareliya* (29.4.1999) that "the first victim of the encounter was *Kareliya* and it was followed by the publications of Petropress" and that the election campaign for the Russian parliament has made these processes more rapid.

Newspapers suffered also from more ordinary problems. In March 1999 the editors in chief of all newspapers in the republic from *Guberniya* to *Kareliya* and from *Karjalan Sanomat* to *TVR-Panorama*, sent an open letter

to Katanandov, chairman of the parliament V. N. Pivnenko and members of the Karelian parliament. In the letter the editors complained about the raising prices and asked the members of the parliament to abolish the sales tax on newspapers, because it caused the prices of the newspapers to become too high for many citizens. (*TVR-Panorama* 31.3.1999, *Nablyudatel* 9.3.1999). Karelia was among the few regions of Russia which had adopted a sales tax on newspapers.

The election of the new editor of *Kareliya* in spring 1999 caused another conflict. Already on 9 April 1999 *Severnyi Kurier* reported that *Kareliya* had a new editor, Oleg Tarakanov, and that the former editor, Pavel Suzi, had been dismissed while on business trip in Moscow. However, the situation was not resolved easily. *Nablyudatel* stated at the same time that Pavel Suzi lost his post as the editor because he had a reputation of being a supporter of Our Home is Russia (NDR), while Katanandov supported the *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) Party. Suzi was also seen as a protégé of the director of the press service Tamara Kolesova, while Tarakanov was preferred by the new director Sergei Pyanov (*Nablyudatel* 13.4.1999). Anatolii Tsygankov stated in *Kareliya* 29.4.1999 that no formal changes had been made yet, although there was a will to make them, and that the editor did not need to read about his fate in the newspapers.

It became clear that three of the founders of the paper (the parliament, the government and the Fishing Fleet of Karelia) had nominated Oleg Tarakanov as the editor-in-chief, while the journalists of the newspaper (the fourth founder) supported Anatolii Tsygankov for editor (*Reporter* 29.5.1999). As a result, the Fishing Fleet of Karelia voluntarily withdrew from the newspaper and also journalists were excluded from the newly nationalised newspaper (*Reporter* 3.6.1999). The rules of the company were changed: while before the council of founders had elected the editor, now he was nominated by the government with the approval of the chairman of the parliament (*Nablyudatel* 13.4.1999). *Kareliya* was also registered again (*Severnyi Kurier* 28.5.1999).

The formal change of the editor happened at the beginning of June when the first issue with the name of the new editor came out. The new editor, Oleg Tarakanov, had previously worked in different military newspapers and had become a journalist in *Kareliya* in 1998 (*Reporter* 29.5.1999). He was at the beginning nominated for a half-year trial period (*Severnyi Kurier* 28.5.1999).

Tsygankov was dismissed from *Kareliya* in June 1999. Actually all the journalists were dismissed and had to apply for their posts again, but Tsygankov was unofficially told that he will not be elected (*Guberniya* 22.7.1999). Tsygankov continued to publish his analyses in *Nablyudatel*, *Reporter* and *Guberniya*. He also interviewed Katanandov for *Severnyi Kurier*

(4.8.1999) and in that interview Katanandov stated that the press is uncontrollable and it is in the hands of journalists themselves.

Kareliya continued to experience financial insecurity because it depended on budget subsidies. In previous years no more than half of the costs had been paid from the budget and the journalists had been active in raising money for the newspaper (*Kareliya* 8.4.1999). Only during the few months from June to October 1999 was the paper given subsidies, totalling 340,000 roubles (*Guberniya* 7.10.1999).

Despite this subsidy, the financing of *Kareliya* was highly dependent on political developments. In the budget for 2001 the total amount of press subsidies was decreased by 4 million roubles and it caused problems for all the state-financed papers, especially for *Kareliya*, which faced a shortfall of 47%. The problem was solved temporarily by transferring money earmarked for the publishing of the paper at the end of the year to the first quarter of the year. (*Gorod* 2.3.2001)

In summer 1999 Katanandov brought a court case against pensioner Yuri Savkin and the newspapers *Reporter* and *Guberniya*, which had published an interview with Savkin (*Reporter* 1.7.1999). In the interview it was stated that on the occasion of the first anniversary of Katanandov being in power, a party was held in the restaurant “Severnyi” and that Katanandov did not pay the bill, 55,000 roubles (12,000 FIM), by himself. Instead it was paid by an unnamed person. As was pointed out by the journalist, no law had been violated but it may have morally wrong.

Journalists at the *Reporter* could not confirm the fact because the source (not Savkin himself) was afraid to testify. Katanandov filed a lawsuit because he felt that his honour and dignity was damaged. He evaluated these papers as “biased (tendentsioznye) and purposefully aiming at the destabilisation of the social life in the republic” (*Nablyudatel* 20.7.1999). The case was interpreted as a sharper form of the reciprocal dislike between Katanandov and *Guberniya*.

A *Reporter* journalist saw the case differently: in the original story it was indicated what was a direct quote from the interviewee and what were the words of the journalist and a journalist had good reason to believe the interviewee. The journalist added: “and this depends on two premises: First, the level of trust in the source of information, and second, correspondence with the previously accumulated conception on this or that phenomenon, of its plausibility”. The journalist believed the information about the party because general knowledge of the life of the political elite did not give any evidence of personal modesty. (*Reporter* 7.8.1999).

Although this may be similar to the Soviet-type reference to the true essence of reality despite individual facts, it also resembles the ideology of Western journalists to justify their action with plausibility, leaving responsibility to the source and criticising the authorities on that basis.

Katanandov won the case in court and the newspapers had to pay him a symbolic one-ruble compensation (*Guberniya* 5.8.1999).

The financial status of *Guberniya* was controlled by tax authorities in July 1999 and this was interpreted as another action against the opposition press. The company “Newspaper Guberniya Inc.” was registered in the Olonets district in summer 1998 and in April 1999 the local tax authorities controlled the accounts of the company and found them to be satisfactory, but the republican authorities wanted to check the accounts again without presenting good reasons for that (as required by law) (*Guberniya* 15.7.1999).

Guberniya and *Reporter* journalists were also not invited to the press briefings of the government (*Guberniya* 15.7.1999) and the press service of the Karelian Ministry of Interior denied the journalists of the *Reporter* the access to incident reports (e.g., of accidents) (*Reporter* 21.9.1999).

Guberniya (15.7.1999) started to write about *Katanandovshchina* (the era of Katanandov’s supremacy; in a strongly negative sense). All the actions of the government were seen as part of a policy to get the press under the control of the government.

Only a few months after the conflict over the editor of *Kareliya*, a new conflict broke out in the publishing house Petropress between the two founders, the city of Petrozavodsk and the government of Karelia. The administration of the city defended its right to nominate the editor of *Petrozavodsk*. It was planned that a person working in the press service of the mayor of Petrozavodsk would become the editor. Behind the wish to change the editor were also economic reasons and therefore the position of the editor of *TVR-Panorama* was stable because the paper developed successfully and gained more readers. Also the director of the Petropress company had been changed (*Reporter* 3.8.1999).

Starting in September 1999 the editorial post of *Petrozavodsk* was held temporarily by Andrei Vorobyev, who replaced Vera Khevsurishvili, who had quitted but remained deputy editor. On 17 September 1999 *Petrozavodsk* reported that the directors (*direktsiya*) of the Petropress publishing house had nominated Andrei Borisovich Vorobyev, who had previously edited the newspaper “*Voennyi vestnik Severo-Zapada*” (Military Communications of the Northwest) as the editor-in-chief of *Petrozavodsk*. In that issue the name of Vorobyev was mentioned as the editor but after the next issue he was mentioned only as “I.o. red.” (Substitute Editor). It is likely that the

nomination was not confirmed because of the conflict over the right to nominate the editor. According to *Guberniya* (16.9.1999), Vorobyev was presented to the journalists of *Petrozavodsk* on 13 September by Sergei Pryanov, the director of Katanandov's press service.

Guberniya has criticised also the governmental newspaper *Kareliya* that it is has nothing to do with legislators (although its founders are both the legislative assembly and the government) but it is a classic example of a case in which "the authorities realise their private (in this case ideological) interests with public funds" (*Guberniya* 7.10.1999).

The parliamentary elections of 1999 weakened the possibilities of the opposition to get into the media. For example, Petropress refused to sign an agreement on paid advertisement services with the Karelian organisation of the *Yabloko* party and Karelian television unilaterally cancelled the agreement on television and radio transmissions already paid for by *Yabloko* (*Nablyudatel* 20.7.1999).

In December 2000 the editor of *Kareliya* was changed again, this time with fewer conflicts. The paper announced that it had new leadership; Lyudmila Elagina, the former editor of *Molodezhnaya gazeta*, had been nominated as director of the organisation "Redaktsiya gazeta Kareliya" (Editorial collective of the newspaper Karelia) and the new editor-in-chief was Anna Kuznetsova, who had worked in the 1970s and 1980s in *Komsomolets* and after that in Karelian radio. Oleg Tarakanov continued as a journalist in the newspaper (*Kareliya* 2.12.2000).

Still further proof of the problems in relations between the government and some newspapers is the list of the Karelian newspapers on the Internet on the governmental web server (www.gov.karelia.ru), which does not include *Guberniya*, *Reporter* nor *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii* in its page on "The Mass Media of Karelia" (January 2001). In contrast, *Guberniya* can be found on a similar page of the Petrozavodsk State University server (www.karelia.ru). Strangely enough, information and a link to *Guberniya* (with the old address and telephone number) can be found on the list of the most important enterprises on the same governmental server.

While Katanandov had won his case against *Guberniya*, the libel action against *Guberniya* by Valentina Pivnenko, the president of the Karelian parliament (in December 1999 she was elected to Russian parliament), was rejected by the court. *Guberniya* had stated in autumn 1999 that Pivnenko had built a cottage next to the presidential summer residence in Shuiskaya Chupa and the paper had pointed out that a member of a legislative body may be losing her independence as a controller of the executive power by having a cottage on governmental land. (*Guberniya* 27.1.2000).

Pivnenko explained in *Kareliya* (17.11.1999) Pivnenko that the whole case was not planned: a building site happened to become available there after she had been looking for a site for two years, the land was not governmental but belonged to the Prionezhskii district and her family had bought the land for a cottage.

Guberniya stated after the decision of the court that there was not a single fact in the story which did not correspond to reality. The only reason for the case was a single phrase: “the chairman of the Chamber of representatives is building a house on state land”. *Guberniya* emphasised the trust of the readers in the paper, which is all that the paper needs. (*Guberniya* 27.1.2000)

It is also striking that the governmental newspaper *Kareliya* has published several times stories in which it corrected what according to its view was “false information” reported by *Guberniya* (e.g. *Kareliya* 10.6.2000, 5.8.2000, 7.10.2000). Actually, most of the references to *Guberniya* in *Kareliya* were of this kind.

One more conflict between the authorities and the press happened in summer 2000. On the 30th of June, 2000. Aleksandr Chekshin, the director of the company “*Komsomolskaya pravda in Petrozavodsk*” was told to dismiss the editor of the regional edition of the paper, Natalya Ermolina. The paper had published an article, “Anniversary covered itself with an ‘umbrella (awning)’” in which the celebration of the Day of the Republic was described with a humorous, informal tone. After that someone among the authorities of the republic told the administration of the paper and after that the editorial staff to dismiss the author of the article within two weeks and to appoint a new editor. (*Anatomiya svobody slova* 2000, 191).

The story about the celebration was published in the issue of 16 June and it paid attention, e.g., to the use of six million roubles for the celebration and a separate article *Nash postrel vezde pospel* (Our little rascal made his way to every place) paid attention to the timetable of Katanandov during the day and concluded that the experience had shown that “quantity only seldom compensates for quality” (*Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii* 16.6.2000). The tone of the article might well fulfil the criteria for libel, but Katanandov did not take the case to court. Later the republican authorities complained to the Moscow headquarters of *Komsomolskaya pravda*:

the Moscow management of *Komsomolskaya pravda*, apparently not wanting to spoil its relations with Petrozavodsk, ordered its Karelian branch to seek a replacement for Yermolina. Obeying orders from the capital city, the Karelian branch hired one Olga Mimmieva, who until recently had worked for the pro-administration newspaper *Karelia* and at some time or other reportedly studied with none other than Karelian Prime Minister Sergei Katanandov. (RFE/RL Russian Federation Report 9.8.2000)

According to *Guberniya*, the Karelian leadership of *Komsomolskaya pravda* had received a phone call from Moscow already on the day the story was published. The Moscow editors of *KP* refused to comment on the case to *Guberniya* (*Guberniya* 29.6.2000).

The Public Expertise project reported this as a typical example of a media conflict in Karelia. In total the data of the project included five conflicts in Karelia during 1999-2000. One dealt with the violation of the professional independence of the editorial staff and interference in their activities (the *Komsomolskaya pravda* case) and another included criminal violence and three violations of the intellectual property rights of physical and judicial persons. (*Anatomiya svobody slova* 2000, 191).

The first issue of *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii* with the new editor came out on 7 July and the paper did not refer to it with a single word. On the other hand, Boris Matveev, a former editor of *Reporter* continued as the deputy editor of *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii*. Other journalists of the paper included Aleksei Smirnov, Anna Romanova and Mariya Kuznetsova. Ermolina got a new job in *Stolitsa* in which she became deputy editor.

Despite such pressures, the relationship between the media and the authorities remained relatively peaceful. The authorities exercised control over the governmental organ *Kareliya* (more than during the previous leadership), but the independent press was largely outside its reach, although the will to suppress the negative coverage of the authorities remained.

A sign of the new kind of politicisation of the press is that even *TVR-Panorama* started political co-operation in January 2001 by publishing a page on the Edinstvo party every month. This could be considered either the pure selling of advertising space or as the political engagement of the previously non-political newspaper. It is doubtful whether the paper had made a similar arrangement with the communists or the LDPR. It is worth noting that the Karelian organisation of Edinstvo was headed by Valerii Tolskii, who was the director of the Karelian television and radio company, which was one of the publishers of *TVR-Panorama*. Tolskii was also the president of the Union of Karelian Journalists.

By 2001 the conflicts between the administration and the media had disappeared from publicity. *Guberniya* continued to publish critical material on Katanandov, while in other papers this kind of material decreased and positive interviews with Katanandov have increased. Also, according to the interviews published in *Guberniya*, the readers value the independent line of the paper, e.g., a member of parliament from LDPR stated that “*Guberniya* is the only paper of the republic which is not afraid to tell everything about Katanandov that it feels is important” (*Guberniya* 15.6.2000).

It is difficult to say if the increased amount of coverage of Katanandov reflects the subordination of the press or if it happened because of the settling of conflicts and comprising on the part of the administration. The interviews attest also to the better accessibility of Katanandov to the press. One example of the attitudes of the press is that *Kareliya* even pointed out that Katanandov had not written enough stories for the paper by himself.

Katanandov's attitude towards the press is visible in his interviews and especially in his articles and notes on the topic. In his article in *Kareliya* on the occasion of the Day of the Russian Press, Katanandov expressed his opinion that for him the most important thing is that

the media would have a positive aim: to correct shortcomings, to try to make life better. Unfortunately, some newspapers make their policy according to the principle "the worse, the better" and are completely dependent on the political views of their masters. (*Kareliya* 13.1.2001)

He stated as well that he think that the most independent newspapers are the state-owned papers, because the government will not dictate its view or exercise political censorship. He also thought that "the relationship of the governmental press service to the media is an example of how the government on the basis of partnership suggests to the media its ideology and makes corrections in its work, showing regard for their wishes and the opinions of the population" (ibid).

It seems that Katanandov had an opinion that criticism is possible only as a positive pointing out of shortcomings, since he stated that

recently in many media can be noticed the strengthening of 'denigration' — only negative materials are published. In order to tell about positive changes in the socio-economic development of Karelia, the work of labour collectives, and the faiths of the people, the government has declared a journalistic competition 'The Revival of Karelia' (ibid.)

Even before, Katanandov had stated that the press and the administration have the same goal, to make life better.

The attitude of Katanandov towards the press leaves something to doubt, since he, as do Russian officials in general, sees the press as a tool which can serve the interests of the administration. Even if the role of constructive criticism is allowed, the role which results from that is much the same as was the case according to the Soviet ideal (not real) function of the press. The idea that the governmental media would be the most independent could be interpreted as support for some kind of public service function, but the way in which Katanandov defined this role does not support that view. The public

service function was fulfilled by *Kareliya* when independent analysis and criticism against the government could be expressed in it (e.g., by Tsygankov) but not after the critical voices had been dismissed and the paper had been transformed into the voice of the government.

Also on private television channels the influence of the authorities has been remarkable. For example, a journalist, Aleksandr Tikhii, was dismissed from the private cable television company *Nika* after he had discussed with Anatolii Tsygankov “the nature of the formation of such social organisations as ‘Soglasie’ and ‘Otechestvo’ in the republic”. These organisation had close relationship with the republican leadership. (*Nablyudatel* 2.2.1999, *Karjalan Sanomat* 3.2.1999). Later, at the 10th anniversary celebration of the company, the director said that the support for Katanandov is company’s own choice: “And when it comes to the criticism of his actions or the actions of his subordinates, we criticise when there is reason for that” (*Gorod* 16.2.2001).

The criticism towards the government is a trademark of *Guberniya* and *Reporter* and for them any kind of conflicts are welcome. On the other hand, they have been able to publish and their distribution has not suffered difficulties (if to conclude on the basis of high circulation) and as a Ukrainian editor commented in *Reporter* (14.9.1999): “If we had written like this, we would have been closed down the next day”.

5.8.3. *New Conflict over Severnyi Kurier*

Severnyi Kurier got a new editor in July 1998. The meeting of the shareholders chose by a majority Sergei Kulikaev as the editor (*Severnyi Kurier* 11.7.1998). According to an interview, Kulikaev was a “native” of the SK-LP: he started to work there in 1981 and has occupied almost all of the positions in the paper. He stated as his aims to renew the staff, to recruit additional younger ones and to balance the budget. He aimed not to write editorials but to work administratively. “The trust of the reader has to be restored. The paper should be as sober-minded as *Izvestiya*, naughty as *Komsomolskaya pravda*, and responsible vis à vis the readers” (*TVR-Panorama* 29.7.1998).

The paper started to publish a whole page on sports news in its Saturday issue. It also got correspondents in Joensuu (Finland) and Winnipeg (Canada) in autumn 1998, but their articles were not very frequent in the paper. On the other hand, the number of correspondents (mentioned in the paper) in the Karelian districts decreased. In spring 1998 it had correspondents in Medvezhegorsk, Kem and Sortavala, while in autumn 1999 there were correspondents only in Medvezhegorsk and Olonets.

The circulation of *Severnii Kurier* stopped decreasing in 1998 and started to increase. This was due to an upturn in economic development and also the subscription price in proportion to the average salary started to decrease (see Table 6.5. in Chapter 6). The number of subscriptions started to increase in 1999 when the number of printed copies grew to 14,000. *Severnii Kurier* got more subscriptions for the first half of 1999, especially in more remote districts (increasing from 15% to 46%), while in Petrozavodsk the number of subscriptions increased moderately (7%) (*Severnii Kurier* 4.12.1998). Also for the first half of 2000 the number of subscriptions increased in all the districts, to the greatest degree in remoter districts (from 11% to 47%) (*Severnii Kurier* 3.12.1999).

Also the number of pages started to increase. The Saturday issue had 8 pages occasionally already in autumn 1994 and regularly in 1995 and at the beginning of 1998 the *Delovoi vtornik* (Business Tuesday) appendix in the Tuesday issue increased its total number of pages to eight as well. The Wednesday issue also started to be published with eight pages in October 1998 and before the parliamentary elections of 1999 the Saturday issue had occasionally 12 pages. Also the Friday issue had occasionally eight pages.

At the beginning of January 1999 *Severnii Kurier* tried to start a Sunday edition after a nine year- break. The new Sunday edition was printed in tabloid format in 16 pages and sold retail only. The first issue was printed in 1,000 copies but soon the number of copies grew to 2,000 (normal issues were printed in 15,000 copies) and its price was the same as the price for the Saturday issue (2.00 roubles; the price on other days was 1.50). The Sunday edition lasted only until May and despite the plans, it was not started again in the autumn.

In June 1999 *Severnii Kurier* changed the look of its first page. The largest element in the headline became the two letters SK and the name of the paper, *Severnii Kurier*, was printed with smaller letters. At the same time the first-page definition of the paper was changed from "Independent Socio-Political Newspaper" to "Daily Newspaper of Karelia". According to critics this was done by the decision of the editor-in-chief alone (*Karjalan Sanomat* 25.8.1999) and he was criticised for that. The change was interpreted as a threat to the independent policy of the newspaper (*Zhurnalist* 11/1999, 33).

A new conflict over the ownership of *Severnii Kurier* occurred in 1999. In summer 1998 the editor-in-chief Aleksei Osipov retired because of age (according to other information, he moved to work in the government of Karelia) and the deputy editor Tamara Kolesova moved to work in the press service of the Karelian government. Two journalists of the paper, Boris Matveev and Sergei Kulikaev, applied for the post of editor. According to the

opinion of several journalists (presented in *Zhurnalists*, the magazine of the Russian Union of Journalists). Matveev was “honest and more popular among journalists”, but the majority of the shareholders of the paper (those working in the paper when it was privatised in 1991) elected Kulikaev as the editor (*Zhurnalists* 11/1999, 32). The rules of the company required that the editor should be one of the shareholders of the company, which limited the number of possible candidates.

According to the same criticism, Kulikaev transformed the paper into his family business and his wife worked as the main accountant. Experienced journalists left the paper because they did not like to work with the new editor and a friend of Kulikaev’s wife and a daughter of another friend got their jobs (*Zhurnalists* 11/1999, 32-33). Another source stated that nine journalists had left the paper during one year because of continuous quarrels with the editor and the journalists had not been paid salaries regularly (*Karjalan Sanomat* 25.8.1999).

The fight for the ownership of *Severnii Kurier* started in June 1999. On 29 June the Ministry of Justice of Karelia was given the documents for the registration of the statute of the company, which had been approved in the meeting of the founders on 17 June. On the following day (30 June), new registration documents were submitted by Kulikaev, but the first version was registered (*Reporter* 27.8.1999). The company changed also the form and the journalistic collective of the paper lost its position as one of the founders (and a collective voting right in the shareholders meeting).

On 1 July *Severnii Kurier* reported that the paper was in a state of emergency. On 30 June Petrozavodsk businessmen D. Alikhanov and A. Bydanov (Badanov) came with militiamen to the editorial office and threatened the editor. They said that if the editor did not agree to make a compromise they would arrange a meeting and elect a new editor (*Severnii Kurier* 1.7.1999).

The paper told its version of the case a week later: the businessmen wanted to become co-founders of the paper and when the editor did not agree, they bought shares of the company, offering 10,000 roubles (2,500 FIM) for one vote (and an additional 10,000 after the final purchase of the shares). The paper defended the rights of the working journalists and not those shareholders who had gone to the other newspapers, moved to other professions or retired. The situation was similar to that in 1995 when there were attempts to buy the paper. The only difference was that in 1999 the “former communists Osipov and Kolesova” were on the side that tried to buy the votes of the shareholders. (*Severnii Kurier* 7.7.1999)

The party of Kulikaev blamed the previous leadership also for mismanagement because the company had to “pay a fine of 345 million roubles (one year’s profit) because of neglecting the bookkeeping account register” (*Severnyi Kurier* 7.7.1999). The annual profit mentioned equals 86,000 Finnish marks. The paper also faced decreasing circulation and debts totalling 500,000 roubles (125,000 FIM).

On 16 August the new meeting of the shareholders decided to release Kulikaev from his duties (20 votes for, 13 against) and chose Viktor Timofeev as the new editor. Three shareholders (Osipov, Kolesova, Volkova), who were working in the Karelian government, supported the businessman Badanov (*Reporter* 18.8.1999, *Zhurnalists* 11/1999, 33).

In 1999 there were 35 journalists working in the newspaper, the majority of which did not have right to vote in the meeting of the shareholders. Of those who worked in the paper only seven were against the editor. One journalist described the situation like this:

Behind the closed doors strange people will decide who will become my editor-in-chief. We can only nervously smoke in the corridor waiting for the verdict (Irina Smirnova in *Severnyi Kurier* 17.8.1999).

According to *Severnyi Kurier* (representing Kulikaev’s position) the meeting of the shareholders was illegal because the Petrozavodsk city court had ordered not to arrange any meetings of the company (*Severnyi Kurier* 19.8.1999).

Kulikaev did not let Timofeev into the editorial office and the case went to court. The court was to decide if the journalistic collective of the paper was removed from among the founders legally (*Guberniya* 2.9.1999).

A collective *Redkollegiya* (Editorial collective) started to appear instead of the name of the editor in the publishing information in the paper at the beginning of September 1999. The issue of 1 September did not appear “because of a number of reasons” (*Severnyi Kurier* 3.9.1999), likely because of the conflict in the paper.

The position of the businessmen was focused on in the *Reporter*. Alikhanov stated that he had lived in Karelia already for 20 years, he was not indifferent to what was going on in Karelia and that he wanted order and prosperity in the republic. He added that “through the newspaper we could explain to the politicians, what should be done to achieve that” (*Reporter* 27.8.1999). He also wanted to make the newspaper independent from political parties and interesting to the people and that the journalists could tell their views freely. “And now the one who pays for the newspaper — his songs it

will sing. How can the newspaper be independent if it can not pay salaries?" (ibid.).

The accusation concerning the non-payment of salaries was rejected in *Severnyi Kurier* in an article that also offers useful information about the salaries and the ways of their being paid. This is how one case was commented on:

Her average monthly salary from the beginning of the year was 1,874.42 roubles. Sokhnova has received her entire salary, including that of August. In addition to this, this co-worker of the paper received 3,180 roubles from the editorial fund to pay the dental bills of her adult daughter. Sokhnova used the services of the sanatorium Kivats (750 roubles) at the expense of the paper, the services of medical enterprise 'Lotsiya' and received extra salary in the form of foodstuffs. (*Severnyi Kurier* 27.8.1999)

The events around *Severnyi Kurier* got a lot of space in other newspapers. In *Kareliya* (25.8.1999) the journalist Lyudmila Mishina pointed out that the selling and buying of the shares is normal and the journalists had freedom to work or not to work in a private paper.

Also the shareholders opposing Kulikaev stated that the property conflict is an internal affair of the company and only Kulikaev had tried to politicise it. They wrote that while a real master is lacking, the practical manager is the editor, who has even strengthened his position by buying shares from the others (*Zhurnalists* 11/1999, 33).

The case was interpreted as another example of getting an independent newspaper under the control of government (*Guberniya* 15.7.1999), mainly because the businessmen were supported by the shareholders working in the company. *Guberniya* also had doubts that *Severnyi Kurier* was bought because of the election campaign so that it would support the candidate of the new owners. Because the Our Home is Russia party had supported the businessmen, the candidate might have been from that party (*Guberniya* 2.9.1999).

Nabat published comments (by Viktor Timofeev) about the case in a March 2000 article, according to which the journalists had complained because of internal censorship in the newspaper: "There has been unclear prohibitions on publishing critical remarks concerning some local politicians". Around ten journalists had left the paper during the previous two years, some them because of not wanting to work under Kulikaev. (*Nabat* 14.3.2000)

The situation calmed down in the autumn. Already on 10 September the paper stated that the situation was normalising and both parties were looking

for a compromise. (*Severnyi Kurier* 10.9.1999). On 6 November 1999 Kulikaev's name replaced again the collective "Redkollegiya" as the editor-in-chief. On 10 November 1999 Kulikaev reported that in August the journalists worked in war-like conditions because "the efforts to change the publishers of the paper started with a psychological attack on the journalists and continued with threats."

One interpretation of the conflict could be that there was a struggle between old and new journalism. It is even likely that these kinds of conflicts arise because of the increasing marketisation of the press, which mainly affects creative journalists who were appreciated in the Soviet press. Those who can not find their place in a marketised press, complain about all the changes and see the aspirations of the businessmen only as negative. Also the right of the journalists to have an influence on the election of the editor, which sounds absurd in the conditions of a market economy, has had very strong support among Russian journalists.

Usually privatised Russian companies in general have been under the supervision of the managers, although the companies have been owned mainly by the workers themselves. This has made, e.g., necessary cuts in personnel difficult and has had a negative impact on restructuring, efficiency and growth (Rautava & Sutela 2000, 210-211). In *Severnyi Kurier* the situation was a bit different because many journalists had left the paper, but the problems were mostly the same.

As a result of the conflict, the publisher and founder of *Severnyi Kurier* were changed in August 2000. Before the founder had been the "Working collective of Severnyi Kurier" and the publisher OOO "SK" (Severnyi Kurier Inc.) but after 22.8. both functions were taken by the "Publishing House Severnyi Kurier Inc." This action was not commented on in the paper with a single word. At the same time, the paper started to publish also the name of the deputy editor (Valentina Akulenko) and the names of the members of the editorial collegium in each issue (including also Viktor Timofeev, the candidate backed by the opponents of Kulikaev). This indicates also that the paper finally got a deputy editor, the lack of which was criticised by opponents of Kulikaev. One of the members was even one of those who had signed a protest article published in *Zhurnal'ist* in November 1999. Akulenko had supported Kulikaev in her articles.

The circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* remained stable at 14,500. Still the majority of the circulation was in the form of subscriptions (according to preliminary figures it got 7,327 subscriptions for the first half of 2000) (*Severnyi Kurier* 11.11.1999). In 2000 the paper started to publish more regularly special pages like *Territoriya zakona* (Territory of Law), which

were prepared together with the source organisations. Also the number of pages continued to increase. In November 2000 the Saturday issue had already reached 10 pages.

In June 2001 all the additional pages (except Business Tuesday) were moved to the Thursday issue, which got 12 pages and could compete in size with most of the weeklies. Thursday was also a better day for publishing the weekly television programme, because this way all of the readers got it before Monday when the programme period started. The Thursday issue replaced the Saturday issue as the weekly issue (with separate subscriptions).

The registration of the paper with a new publisher led to a court case which some journalists of the paper brought against the editor Kulikaev (*Nabat* 27.10.2000). The registration of the paper with the new publisher was based on a meeting of working journalists of the paper. At the beginning of the process the court declared the new registration of the paper invalid, which meant that the paper came out illegally under the new publisher (*Nabat* 10.11.2000).

The conflict over the ownership of *Severnõi Kurier* was resolved finally at the end of June 2001, when the paper was registered again and formally became another newspaper, although its look, content and journalists remained the same. Everything happened smoothly and stepwise so that many readers might not even have noticed it. The first sign was in May when the announcement about the new subscriptions did not mention the name *Severnõi Kurier* but “*SK - Kurier Karelii*” (Karelian Courier) and the subscription catalogue number of the paper had changed. In May also the subline of the masthead became *Severnõi Kurier Karelii* (Northern Courier of Karelia). In June the word *Severnõi* was removed from the nameplate and on the inner pages “*Severnõi Kurier*” was replaced with “*Kurier*” only. Finally on 21.6. the index number and on 22.6. the registration number of the paper were changed. The 23 June issue was the first one under the new numeration: before the paper had had running numeration from the beginning of the paper in 1917 but on 23 June the numeration started again, not from one but from 16. In the inner pages the masthead text was changed to “*Kurier Karelii*”. The paper also cut ties with the paper founded in 1917 and only stated in its masthead that “the first issue of ‘*Olonetskie gubernskie vedomosti*’ was published in 1838”. Also the Tuesday appendix *Delovoi Vtornik* started to publish the name “*Kurier Karelii*” in its list of regional host newspapers instead of “*Severnõi Kurier*”.

Thus the operation actually changed *Severnõi Kurier* into a new paper, *Kurier Karelii* (Karelian Kurier). Also the slogan of the paper was changed from “Daily Newspaper of Karelia” to “Independent Daily Newspaper”.

However strange it may seem, neither the paper itself nor any other newspaper of Petrozavodsk told about the changes in the appearance of *Severnii Kurier*. It seems that this was a case of moving property from one company to another (perhaps done already in 2000) and this was secured with the change of the name and registration of the paper as well. It is likely that the journalists of the paper under the direction of the editor, Sergei Kulikaev, were behind this move.

In April 2001 *Severnii Kurier* published opinions of the readers and they said, e.g., that the paper had become less politicised, which was good, but the paper praised Katanandov and severely criticised Demin (the mayor of Petrozavodsk). Many of the readers wrote that they had read and subscribed to the paper for decades. (*Severnii Kurier* 7.4.2001).

5.8.4. *New competition among the daily press*

A new daily newspaper, *Reporter*, was launched in April 1999 by the publishing house of the *Guberniya* weekly. The new paper was first distributed for free in the kiosks of Petrozavodsk and elsewhere and after the first week it started to come out as a normal daily newspaper. In Petrozavodsk the paper established its own distribution system, although it was also included in the postal catalogue of subscribed newspapers (*Guberniya* 8.4.1999).

Reporter, compared with *Severnii Kurier*, pays more attention to popular issues and even its size is tabloid. The print run of *Reporter* dropped after the beginning to 2,000, but it started to grow to 4,400 in the autumn. The paper tried to become known through various campaigns, e.g., by distributing the new paper to the readers of various district newspapers.

The journalists of *Reporter* were young, the average age being 35, but only two of the nine journalists presented in the 100th issue of the paper were women (*Reporter* 25.8.1999). The editor-in-chief Boris Matveev stated that the aim of the paper was to “collect information on every event going on in Karelia which is in the slightest degree interesting” and “to give useful information with maximum speed to the reader”. He wrote that the paper would also try to interpret information. The position of the paper would be “to defend the weak” and it would not “defend the interests of individual political and economic groups”. Moreover, the editor wrote that “any newspaper which illuminates events in socio-political, economic and cultural life, has the duty to remain objective” (*Guberniya* 8.4.1999).

The discounted subscription fee for *Reporter* for the second half of 1999 was 45 roubles, which was almost half of the subscription fee for *Severnii Kurier* (84 roubles), although the “normal” fee (at the end of the subscription

collection period) was higher than that of *Severnii Kurier* (134.70 roubles compared with 124.74 roubles). The start of the new daily paper did not, however, have a negative impact on the circulation of *Severnii Kurier*. For the first time the print run of *Severnii Kurier* did not decline in 1999, despite the open conflict among the journalists.

For the first half of the year 2000 the subscription fee for *Reporter* was 130.62 roubles, which was only slightly lower than the fee for *Severnii Kurier* (146.40). A comparison of the content between the *Reporter* and *Severnii Kurier* indicates that they paid attention to different topics and news items and there was no major competition on news.

Reporter started its web pages already soon after it began and provided an archive of news, materials from press services, weather reports, currency rates and political reviews by Anatolii Tsygankov. According to the web pages, they were established with support from the Open Society Foundation of George Soros.

A new competitor from the national press appeared in March 2000 when *Komsomolskaya pravda* started to publish its regional version in Karelia. Earlier similar regional editions of *Komsomolskaya pravda* had been published already in 51 other cities of Russia.

Before that the daily *Komsomolskaya pravda* had 1,200 subscribers in Karelia and the weekend issue had an additional 2,000-2,500 readers. The aim was to increase the circulation to 12,000 copies (*Karjalan Sanomat* 23.2.2000).

The local edition of *Komsomolskaya pravda* has consisted mainly of the material of the national edition of the paper but it also has locally made pages. In April 2000 *Komsomolskaya pravda* was printed in Petrozavodsk in 3,000 copies and the weekend issue with television programmes in 7,000 copies. Natalya Ermolina, who had previously worked in *Guberniya*, became the local editor-in-chief and Aleksandr Chekshin, a former journalist from Karelian television, became director of the company. Besides the editor, the paper hired only one other journalist specialising in cultural issues. The rest of the work was done by freelancers (*Karjalan Sanomat* 23.2.2000).

In an interview Chekshin said that "*Komsomolka*" was the only paper which "does not depend on the pockets and ambitions of local oligarchs and politicians" and that the paper would "support the tone of constructive criticism and if someone would like to advertise himself — for that purpose there is a commercial section" (*Reporter* 23.3.2000).

Soon the circulation of the weekend issue of *Komsomolskaya pravda* grew to 10,000. At the beginning of July 2000 the localised version of the

paper, *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii* (*Komsomolskaya pravda* in Karelia), started to come out three times a week.

Concerning local content, only a few pages (3-5) and the television programme section (7 pages) were done in Karelia; the other pages (24, and in the weekend issue 32, pages in total) were reprinted from the national *Komsomolskaya pravda*. Karelian *KP* came out on Tuesdays, Fridays and Saturdays. On two days (Wednesday and Thursday) the normal issue was printed in Petrozavodsk without local content. The Friday issue was a weekly with a television programme section and it was printed in 10,000 copies and the Tuesday and Saturday issues in 3,000 copies. At the end of July it was printed in Karelia also on Thursdays, but soon the localised Saturday issue was left out. The local and television programme pages included also local advertisementa.

In the autumn of 2000 the local edition of *Komsomolskaya pravda* was published on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. In the autumn the number of printed copies in Karelia grew to 5,000 on Tuesdays and Thursdays and to 15,000 on Fridays. In February 2001 the number of printed copies was again increased to 7,000 and 17,000. Also *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii* started its Internet-pages soon after establishing the regional edition. *Komsomolskaya pravda* was clearly more expensive than any of the regional newspapers: for the first half of 2001 its price was 306.18 roubles (183% of the price of *Severnyi Kurier*), which evidently made it inaccessible for many readers.

The last printed issue of *Reporter* came out on 13 May 2000. The last issue did not tell anything about the end of the paper. *Nabat*, on the other hand, published some explanations of the reasons: because of the lack of funds for publishing *Reporter*, due to “a tough decision by a local oligarch or because *Reporter* had not fulfilled the tasks which had been given it.” The decision, however, was a surprise not only to readers but also to the postal workers, because the subscriptions for the second half of the year had been collected. (*Nabat* 9.6.2000).

It seems that there was not enough of a market for two daily newspapers. *Reporter*, however, continued to be published in the Internet and *Guberniya* gave in its pages only the webaddress of *Reporter* (www.rep.ru). *Reporter* became a kind of an electronic version of *Guberniya*.

5.8.5. *Booming popular weeklies*

The weeklies have continued to hold their dominant position in the press market in Karelia. *TVR-Panorama* has dominated the market, especially outside Petrozavodsk. In January 1999 *TVR-Panorama* had 21,592

subscriptions and in February 22,656. On average 20,000 copies were sold through the postal service (ostensibly in the countryside) and 26,000 in Petrozavodsk (*TVR-Panorama* 10.2.1999). In total these figures are 68,000, slightly less than the number of printed copies (71,500 in January). Around 35-40% of circulation was in Petrozavodsk (approximately the same share as the city has among the population of Karelia).

Guberniya was mentioned as the most popular newspaper in Petrozavodsk (see Chapter 6) but its circulation has remained smaller than that of *TVR-Panorama*. The newspaper *Petrozavodsk*, on the other hand, has continued to lose its circulation and has dropped to less than half of the top level.

The weeklies have emphasised their dependence on the readers. *Guberniya* called readers the only support the paper has and the main master of the paper. *Guberniya* increased its number of pages from 24 to 32 in August 1999 and so became the thickest Karelian newspaper. The youth newspaper *Tineidzher* (Teenager) of the company became a four-page supplement appearing every second week. In parallel weeks a special supplement, *Kontrolnaya zakupka* (Controlled purchase), started to come out, which published advice that helped readers to orient themselves in the world of goods and services. (*Reporter* 17.8.1999).

TVR-Panorama was among the first newspapers to develop a non-political editorial column. In 1999 it started to appear irregularly on the second page of the paper and was titled "View". The editorial dealt with current events and it often included a reference to a story in the same issue of the newspaper.

TVR-Panorama has been successful especially in the countryside and in small towns. Information on the town of Segezha told that 3,300 copies of the district newspaper had been subscribed to compared with 1,000 copies of *TVR-Panorama*. In addition, 2,800-3,000 copies of *TVR-Panorama* had been sold retail, which made it the leader. (*TVR-Panorama* 11.11.1998).

TVR-Panorama had two pages of letters to the editor, titled "Dialogue" and "Children's Island" (mainly letters by children). Also *Petrozavodsk* pays attention to the young readers with its *Moya gazeta* (My newspaper) pages once a month.

While *TVR-Panorama* and *Petrozavodsk* remained connected with local and republican authorities, *Guberniya* tried to emphasise its independence. *Guberniya* had had Vasilii Popov, chairman of the Olonets district and member of the Karelian parliament, give his duties to the director of the *Guberniya* publishing house, Svetlana Chechil. In addition, Lyudmila Sojunen, the vice mayor on economic issues of the city of Petrozavodsk, left the publishing house, so that according to the editor-in-chief of *Guberniya* no one connected

with politics remained (*Severnyi Kurier* 17.11.1998). According to some sources Popov even owns 35% of shares of *Guberniya* (*Nabat* 1.12.2000).

Guberniya has been experiencing most seriously investigative journalism. The paper has a section of investigative journalism, the chairman of which, Dmitrii Makov, is also a member of a governmental anticorruption commission. In an interview in *Reporter* he stated that before it was easier to get information, but now it has been more difficult because the republican authorities have stopped giving information which may harm their image and recently also the city administration has started to do the same (*Reporter* 15.3.2000). Information has been available only by written request (according to the law a reply to these kind of requests should be given within 30 days; see Richter 2001, 134). *Guberniya*, however, was not free from political alliances either: on the same page (sic!) of *Reporter* in which an interview with Makov was published, a candidate for the Petrozavodsk City Council published his advertisement (marked as a political advertisement) in which he wrote that he had met with Dmitrii Makov and that they had agreed to work together.

At the beginning of 1998 the publishing house Real became the founder and publisher of *Nablyudatel*, but it seems that this was only a reorganization of the publisher. A change that was perhaps more significant happened in May 1998 when the publisher and founder *Stroiinvestles* took over the paper. This was not reflected in the paper other than by changing the publishing information. Neither the content nor the look of the paper changed.

Little by little, however, changes started to appear. *Nablyudatel* changed its serious and even a bit dry image and tone in summer and autumn 1998 when it started to publish also the television programme. The number of pages increased from six to ten, of which two pages consisted of the television programme. In order to advertise the paper, *Stroiinvestles* paid for the free distribution of 60,000 copies of a special issue of the paper in July 1998.

In October 1998 *Nablyudatel* increased the number of television programme pages to four and named the new section in the center of the paper *Telenablyudatel* (Tele-observer). The paper also dropped the business news pages under the headline *Delo* (Business) and started a new, more popular section *Nablyudatel bez galstuka* (Observer without a tie) with feature stories and more photographs. While part of the content became more tabloidised, part remained as before, informative and serious.

Nablyudatel could advertise itself as “the most competent and reliable source of information on political and economic life in Karelia, offering also crimine news, reading for entertainment (*zanimatelnoe chtivo*), competitions and crosswords for adults and children, and a complete television

programme". At the end of 1998 the number of printed copies increased first to 8,000, then to 9,000. In 1999 the number of printed copies grew from 9,000 to 12,500 in February and to 15,000 in March, but in the autumn the circulation fell back to 9,000. In December 1999 it increased again to 14,000.

In June 1999 *Severnii Kurier* stated that *Nablyudatel* had been financed by the Kostamuksha mining company, and *Guberniya* and *Reporter* by the mayor of Olonets, which left *Severnii Kurier* as the only newspaper financed by the readers (*Severnii Kurier* 19.6.1999).

At the beginning of 2000 the printing of *Nablyudatel* was moved to Finland (Joensuu), which was the first Finnish participation in the Karelian press market. The paper became more colourful, with colour photographs on practically every page, and at the same time its content became more entertaining, although the special section names *Telenablyudatel* and *Nablyudatel bez galstuka* were removed.

Also the look of the paper changed in September 2000 when the printing of the paper was moved from Joensuu to Savonlinna. The former broadsheet format was replaced by a tabloid format and the number of pages was increased correspondingly: 12 broadsheet pages became 16 tabloid pages. The first and last pages and the middle pages with the television programme were printed on glossy paper.

In February 2001 *Nablyudatel* started to appear not on Tuesdays as before but on Wednesdays. In March 2001 the paper got new co-founders: the company "Karelnrud" and a private person, A. V. Nelidov. Maksim Tikhonov remained editor despite other changes; also some journalists frequently writing for the paper remained the same, while some others left and new names appeared. Perhaps not coincidentally the new editorial office of *Nablyudatel* was located in the building of BashKreditBank (later renamed as UralSib Bank), where also the office of the travel agency Arsik, one of the major advertisers in *Nablyudatel*, had its office.

Molodezhnaya gazeta was the only weekly which had difficulties in finding its place in the market. On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the paper the editor-in-chief Lyudmila Elagina told that the aim of the paper "is to give multifaceted information on the economic and political life of the republic and the interests and problems of its youth. The paper is aimed at the whole family. Both children and their parents can find interesting articles in it" (*Karjalan Sanomat* 1.4.2000).

In a book published on the occasion of the 80th anniversary the editor wrote that without the support of the Kondopoga company (the new name of Kondopogabumprom) *Molodezhnaya gazeta* would have closed down, as many other youth papers had done in Russia (Stroka dlinoyu.. 2000, 75).

The content of *MG* has become more interesting to the youth, e.g., telling about common-law marriage, school reform and other things which may interest young people, but the problem might be more the question of money available for buying newspapers among the young people and the willingness to choose *MG* from among the papers. The problem is also that it is difficult to make a paper that would be interesting for both “children and their parents” and for youth of different ages.

A new paper *Gorod* (City) was founded on 8.9.1999 and first it was published as a free newspaper, therefore falling outside this study. In July 2000 *Gorod* was registered again and it became a paper sold retail. While the freely distributed *Gorod* had been printed in 40,000 copies, the sold version was printed only in 12,000 copies. The number of copies had been kept high because it was possible to subscribe to the paper for free for two months. In October the number of copies fell to 3,750, but it started to increase and was over 5,000 in November. Several issues of the paper had a questionnaire for the readers about their wishes for the development of the paper.

The first founder of *Gorod* was KROPO “Respublika” and first the publisher was first the company “Karpovan sizarekset” and later the company “Truent”, but when the paper was registered again ANO “Agenstvo razvitiya g. Petrozavodsk” (Agency for the development of the city of Petrozavodsk) became its founder and publisher. In September 2000 Grigorii Voevodin became the new editor of *Gorod*. As a free newspaper *Gorod* had 16 pages but as a sold one the number of pages was increased to 24 and in 2001 to 32.

Gorod was printed in Kondopoga, perhaps because the capacity of the Anokhin printing house was not sufficient or because of price. In 2001 the printing was moved to Petrozavodsk. In March 2001 the number of printed copies of *Gorod* grew to 8,000.

The content of *Gorod* was mainly comprised of news about the city administration and other local news. In spring 2001 the front page of *Gorod* was made up usually of answers of several people to one question posed on the street, but later it was developed into a more informative front page with a big photo and several news stories.

After the mayor Andrei Demin lost elections in May 2002, *Gorod* was closed and the new mayor Viktor Maslyakov started a new paper, *Gorožhanin*.

Still another new weekly paper, *Stolitsa Karelii* (Karelian capital), or *Stolitsa for short*, was founded in October 2000. Its publisher and founder was Lenkom-Press Inc., a company from St. Petersburg. According to the publication data of the paper “the idea and the concept of the paper” belonged to Tsentri Len.com and the paper was registered and printed in St. Petersburg. Shortly, the idea of *Stolitsa* was to publish an interesting newspaper with a

low work intensity (e.g., interviews on the street). It was also reported that *Stolitsa* was still another media project of the group of Vasilii Popov (*Gorod* 9.11.2000).

Unlike *Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Stolitsa* is entirely a local newspaper. It has 24 pages, four of which contain the television programme. Andrei Arkhipov became its editor-in-chief and Natalya Ermolina, who was sacked from *Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii*, became its deputy editor.

The emphasis of *Stolitsa* is on short stories, lot of photographs and graphic elements, personalised stories and interviews. The sections of the newspaper indicate also its content: *Stolichnyi telegraf* (Telegraph of the capital, short news), *Govorit Petrozavodsk* (Petrozavodsk is speaking, short answers to a question on the street with photographs of the interviewed persons), *Dezhurnyi po gorodu* (On the duty in the city), *Politklub* (Political club, political news and commentaries) and *Kult lichnosti* (Personality cult, a long interview with many photographs). Many stories have been published without the name of the author, which is very exceptional for a Russian newspaper. *Stolitsa* also publishes letters to the editor. On 8.2.2001 Aleksei Mosunov, a member of the Petrozavodsk city council and Karelian parliament, started as a political commentator.

Printing in St. Petersburg hindered *Stolitsa's* ability to compete with local newspapers. The paper was set for printing at 13.00 two days before the publishing date. The local papers were printed at 17.00 (*Petrozavodsk*) or at 19.00 (*Guberniya*) the day before. In comparison, *Nablyudatel*, which was printed in Finland, was ready for printing at 18.00 on the day before its publishing date.

Stolitsa was also sold not only in kiosks, in which new papers have difficulties in getting attention, but also in other shops in which it had a separate stand from which the paper could be bought. After *Stolitsa* has started this practice, also other newspapers started to be sold elsewhere than traditional kiosks and many newspapers sought private distributors of the newspaper. It should be noted that there are no tables of contents in the newspapers and it is not possible to leaf through a paper before buying it.

In February 2001 the price of *Stolitsa* was raised to 4 roubles. Similarly the prices of *Petrozavodsk* and *Guberniya* were raised to four roubles, while *Severnnyi Kurier* was sold at 3 roubles and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was the cheapest of the more popular newspapers at 2 roubles (*Leninskaya pravda* was sold at one rouble, while the price of *Karjalan Sanomat* was 1.20).

Following the example of *Stolitsa* a new paper, *Vesti Karelii* (News of Karelia), was founded in March 2001. *Vesti* was founded by a company "Tsentri Delovoi Informatsii" (Centre for Business Information) and is published by a

working collective of journalists. *Vesti* is also printed in St. Petersburg and its style and layout resembles *Stolitsa* a lot. The first issue of *Vesti* was distributed free in 50,000 copies but after that it started to come out as a sold newspaper in 15,000 copies. Dmitrii Makov (an investigative journalist from *Guberniya*) became the editor of *Vesti Karelii* and Leonard Khozin became the deputy editor.

Vesti is published weekly (on Thursdays) in 24 pages, of which the television programme takes seven pages. *Vesti* has not only Karelian news but also some Russian (Chechnya, politics) and foreign stories (mainly feature and sports). Also *Vesti* has four-colour photographs in most of its pages.

Despite increasing competition in the press market, also some forms of co-operation appeared: newspapers started to advertise themselves in other newspapers in pairs: *Guberniya* and *Stolitsa* on the one hand (perhaps indicating the close ownership ties between these papers), and *Nablyudatel* and *Vesti Karelii* on the other, started to publish advertisements in each other's papers in spring 2001.

5.8.6. Political newspapers with limited possibilities

Nabat Severo-Zapada, which was closed in autumn 1993, continued to be published in September 1999. Aleksandr Sokolov, who had been the last editor before the closing of *Nabat* in 1993, became the editor-in-chief. He said in an interview that he does not like the reputation of being the editor of a scandalous newspaper. He added that the paper is "popular" (*narodnaya*), which means that everybody has the right to present his views in the paper. Only fascists and politicians with foolish ideas have no place in it. (*Petrozavodsk* 10.3.2000).

The publisher and founder of *Nabat* was *OOO Gazeta Nabat* (Newspaper Nabat Inc.) and the price was 1.50 (less than for many other newspapers). *Nabat* was printed in 2,000 copies but in March, before the elections, the number of copies grew to 7,700. The content of *Nabat* was mainly letters to the editor and stories from different points of view. The articles supported different candidates, even Zyuganov.

In April *Nabat* started to come out on Fridays. After the elections it was printed again in 2,000 copies and occasionally even in 1,500 copies. In September, when by-elections to the Petrozavodsk city council took place in some parts of the city, it was again printed in 3,600-4,900 copies.

According to an assessment published in *Gorod* newspaper, *Nabat* used a tendentious (biased) style in presenting information. Everything that was published attested to the support for Karelian Barkashovites (Russian

neofascists). “The paper would have been dead again, but it is very useful for the republican government. During different election battles *Nabat* is used as a kind of ‘litter bin’ (...). It is not important that afterwards it has to publish a refutation of the decision of the court: every lie has its black effect” (*Gorod* 9.11.2000).

Nabat was closed again at the end of 2000. It seems either that *Nabat* was also a pre-election paper, although it did not support directly any candidate (rather publishing materials of several candidates to the Karelian parliament and Petrozavodsk city council) or its new launch did not prove to be successful.

Leninskaya pravda has remained the only partisan political newspaper that has been able to survive. Before the elections of 1999 and 2000 it was printed in 6,000 copies, but after the elections its print run was dropped back to 3,000. Before the elections the paper also came out weekly but after the elections it returned to a twice a month rhythm.

The content of *Leninskaya pravda* is strongly partisan. The four pages of the paper are filled with political statements, letters, occasionally interviews (e.g., with Gennadii Zyuganov, reprinted from *Pravda*) and political documents. There is no television programme and no news other than some related to party politics.

5.8.7. *Surviving minority papers*

Oma mua and *Karjalan Sanomat* could survive with governmental subsidiaries, although this caused another problem, e.g., salaries were often paid several months late (see, e.g., *Karjalan Sanomat* 3.4.1999). *Oma mua* stated at the beginning of 1998 that some of the honorariums from 1996 were still not paid and that while before the journalists had the power to decide about finances, now everything is decided by the Periodika company (*Oma mua* 10.1.1998). In December 1998 the paper reported that the salaries for July had been paid (*Oma mua* 3.12.1998).

For *Karjalan Sanomat* the subscriptions from Finland were also important, comprising almost one half of the circulation of the paper (*Karjalan Sanomat* 11.10.2000). In spite this, *Karjalan Sanomat* has remained mainly a newspaper for the Finnish-speaking population in Karelia. In issues which caused disagreement between Finnish and Russian public opinion (e.g., the discussion about the actions of Soviet partisans during the war) *Karjalan Sanomat* represents clearly the Russian point of view.

Nationality issues had an increasingly important role in *Karjalan Sanomat*: the paper wrote about the declining official status of Finnish, the

problems of language teaching and marked the 50th anniversary of the arrival of Ingrian Finns to Karelia (in March 1999). To reach young readers, a youth page, *Koulun pöllö* (School Owl), started to appear at the end of 2000 and has continued to do so approximately once a month.

Oma mua has had only a few subscriptions in Finland and it has become a real Karelian minority newspaper. The literary Karelian language has developed, the number of Russianisms has decreased and the paper has played an important role in developing new vocabulary. Even the obligation to publish political materials for free before the elections had a positive impact, since it helped to develop political terminology in Karelian. In January 2000 the paper started to publish regularly a list of Russian words and the proposed Karelian equivalents and asked for comments from readers.

A separate paper in the northern Karelian dialect, *Vienan Karjala* (Viena Karelia), was founded in November 1999 in order to separate the different dialects into different papers. *Oma mua* continued with the Olonets dialect. The first issue of *Vienan Karjala* stated that on the occasion of the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the complete edition of the Kalevala, “the president of the government of the Republic of Karelia commissioned the Periodika publishing house to publish a paper with the name *Vienan Karjala* as an appendix to the newspaper *Oma mua*” (*Vienan Karjala* 17.11.1999). Actually the decision was made in the meeting of the publishers of *Oma mua* on 29 October 1999 (Klementjev 2001, 142). *Vienan Karjala* started as an independent newspaper in the beginning of 2000 with 500 copies twice a month. Raisa Remsujeva became the editor of the paper. In March the number of copies was raised to 700. While *Oma mua* continued with 700 copies, a clear discrepancy between the number of published copies appeared because a minority (25-30%) of Karelians spoke the northern dialects. An explanation is likely that in the north Karelians had used Finnish as their literary language and were more used to a Latin alphabet. *Oma mua* did not have much popularity in northern Karelia, e.g., in the Belomorsk district it had only four subscribers in 1996 and two in 1998 (*Vienan Karjala* 8.2.2000). In comparison, *Oma mua* had only 150 subscriptions in all of Karelia at the beginning of 1998, 34 of them in Petrozavodsk and 30 in Olonets (Aunus).

In June 2000 *Oma mua* celebrated its 10th anniversary and also the 500th issue of the newspaper was published. On the occasion of the celebration the paper introduced the journalists who had worked for the paper during the ten-year period. In 2000 the journalists were mainly young and had graduated from Petrozavodsk State University with Karelian language as their major. A total of ten persons worked both in *Oma mua* and *Vienan Karjala*. (*Oma mua* 8.6.2000).

Oma mua has become an organ of the Karelian population. It publishes letters by Karelians (mainly on memories or stories on everyday affairs), short articles by children who are learning Karelian in schools, reports on Karelian villages and folklore materials. Also the number of political and factual articles has increased.

After the paragraph on the official status of the Karelian language was not approved in the renewed Constitution of Karelia in December 2000, both papers paid much attention to the negative attitude of many Russian politicians towards the Karelian language and also to the development of the language despite this backlash. New legislation on regional minority languages started to be prepared instead.

Karjalan Sanomat and other minority language newspapers were dependent on governmental subsidiaries, which covered 85% of the costs of the Periodika publishing house (which publishes all the minority newspapers). In the years 1996-1998 the share of the funding from the budget was cut to 70%, but the years 1999-2000 were better (*Karjalan Sanomat* 11.10.2000). In 2000 the publishing house got the budgeted subsidiaries almost completely (*Kareliya* 4.1.2001). According to the vice-director of the publishing house, it was possible to reduce the share of state subsidies from 85% in 1998 to 70% in 2000 because of the income from book publishing: 56% of the income of the Periodika publishing house came from book publishing in 2000 (Talja 2001, 115).

Cuts in governmental subsidies in 2001 caused also more trouble for the minority newspapers. So far the support, both moral and material, from Finland has been important for all the minority newspapers. Also various saving plans have been discussed between Finnish partners and minority language journalists, e.g., based on possibly available funding from EU, but no permanent solutions have been found.

In summer 2001 *Karjalan Sanomat* asked for its readers' opinions about the paper and got a result that the same topics interest readers both in Russia and in Finland, but from different points of view: for example, Finns would like to get background information about ownership etc., while Karelian readers would like to have facts e.g. on prices. Readers in general would like to have more criticism and background information and the Finnish readers stories on former Finnish territories. (*Karjalan Sanomat* 29.8.2001).

5.9. Karelian development as an example

Is Karelia a typical region of Russia when the development of the newspaper press is considered? With the reservation that also Karelia has its own

peculiarities (e.g. its proximity to a foreign country), it can be said that Karelia does not differ greatly from the other regions of Russia. In the Public Expertise project Karelia was classified as a transitional region, which was the most common type in the country; over one third of Russians lived in a transitional region in year 2000 (see Chapter 4.10.3.).

Karelia is one of the ethnic republics of Russia, which causes some differences compared to the ordinary regions, but among the ethnic republics Karelia is the most Russified and therefore is similar to many other regions of Russia. Politically Karelia has been a pro-Eltsin and pro-Putin region, but it has also provided a relatively high level of support for opposition parties of different types (e.g. the Karelian parliament has had a fraction of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskii). The chairman of the government (president) was a communist, Viktor Stepanov, up to 1998 but he was not a hard-liner. In 1998 a “democratic” candidate, Sergei Katanandov, won by a narrow margin.

The political pressures and economic limitations differ somewhat among the regions of Russia. In terms of political pressure and press freedom, Karelia is an average case. Economically Karelia is perhaps better equipped than most of the smaller regions of Russia. One of the aspects which should be taken into consideration is that Karelia produces a major part of Russian newsprint and the lack of newsprint has not been a problem for Karelian newspapers. Close contacts with the main producer, the Kondopoga paper mill, have also guaranteed the Karelian press more favourable conditions. For example, in 1999, Kondopoga director Vitalii Federmesser announced that the company would give newsprint for free to the district newspapers, minority language newspapers and to the governmental newspapers *Kareliya* and *Litsej*. The company guaranteed other newspapers a stable and favourable price for the first quarter of the year. (*TVR-Panorama* 3.2.1999).

Among the Russian regions, Karelia is on the average level in the number of subscribed newspapers per capita. In autumn 1997 the number of subscribed copies per 1,000 citizens was 179, with which Karelia ranked 47th among the 82 regions for which the data was available (of all 89 regions of Russia). In the whole of Russia the average number of subscribed newspapers per 1,000 persons is 207. (SMI Rossii.. 1998, 12-13). In Karelia the subscription prices of the newspapers are lower than the average prices of newspapers in Russia. Among the 67 regions from which the Public Expertise project collected information on subscription prices, Karelia is 42nd, well in the middle among the regions.

In the analysis of the freedom of the press, Karelia received a total score of 35.6% (100% represing the ideal case) which indicated that there are both

favourable and unfavourable conditions for the freedom of the press. The general level of freedom was better in 37 regions and worse in 43 regions (Anatomiya svobody slova 2000).

Freedom of access to information was defined both by test requests to authorities and by analysis of regulations. Karelia made out rather well on this definition of freedom (with a score of 59.0%). Only 20 of the 81 regions of Russia had a better score than Karelia. On the other hand, only three of the 12 authorities responded completely and within the required time to test requests; among those who did not answer were, e.g., Sergei Katanandov and chairman of the parliament, Valentina Pivnenko. The conditions for the accreditation of journalists to the Karelian parliament included only four violations of the law, fewer than in many other regions. (ibid. 192-194).

Freedom of production of information was in Karelia on an average level (score 36.8%). Half of the regions had a better score than Karelia. This freedom was violated by the degree to which the state allows support only for newspapers, the founders (or one of the founders) of which are local elected bodies or which were financed from a state budget (therefore discriminating against private media). Karelia received a low score also because of the lack of non-state printing houses. (ibid. 194-195).

Karelia made out worse with the freedom to distribute information (score 11.0%). Of 81 regions, 50 had a better score than Karelia. According to the project, this freedom was harmed in Karelia by the lack of some privileges for newsstands that were available elsewhere. Also the 5% sales tax for newspapers lowered the score. On the other hand, permissions from only five instances were needed in order to set up a newsstand (compared, e.g., with 29 in Moscow). (ibid. 195-196).

It seems that different methodology and different weighting of various factors would have improved Karelia's score. Many of the negative aspects of the Karelian situation are not serious threats to the freedom and plurality of the press (e.g. the sales tax on newspapers, lack of privileges) and it is also questionable whether, for example, private printing houses are automatically better than state-owned.

According to the monitoring of the Glasnost Defence Foundation (2001), Karelia was in 2000 among the regions of Russia with a low level of conflicts between the authorities and the media (together with many other areas), being similar to a few mainly small and northern regions.

Local financial empires have their role in the press market of Karelia and also the participation of the local authorities is significant (also in formally independent papers, like the Petropress company). This development is very much similar in many other Russian regions.

In Karelia the position of the minority language newspapers has been different than in regions with more numerous non-Russian minorities. For example, in Tatarstan and Yakutia-Sakha the local nationalities have a significant share of political power and the position of minority languages and their newspapers is stronger. In Karelia the situation resembles more the case of the small nationalities of Siberia. The minority press is not political but cultural and its main task is to develop the language and to strengthen national identity. However, in Karelia the obligation to publish election campaign material (translated from Russian) has had a positive effect: it helped to develop political language and terminology in Karelian.

The minority papers have generally been even more independent from politics (or outside it) than the Russian language press, because among the authorities (and the public) only few people can read these newspapers. These newspapers may nonetheless have any impact which can often come through Finland (as the lawsuit against *Karjalan Sanomat* indicated).

6. Contemporary press and audience structure in the Republic of Karelia

6.1. Structure of the press

6.1.1. Circulation of the press in light of various statistics

The circulation of newspapers in Karelia grew up to 1990, when it stabilised and started to decline. A major drop occurred in 1992 when many papers had to cancel subscriptions in May and collect new ones with increased prices for the second half of the year.

When the weekly page volume has been counted, the rapid collapse of the Soviet press system and stable development after that becomes visible. The page volume of the proper newspapers of Petrozavodsk dropped rapidly to almost one half in 1991 and 1992, and remained between 40 and 50% of the late Soviet level up to 1999. The growth in volume happened in 1999-2001 mainly because of growth in the number of pages per issue and, partly, because of a more frequent rhythm of newspaper publishing. Neither the localised national newspaper, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, nor other national newspapers, have been included in these figures.

Also the number of issues per week has remained relatively stable. The number has only occasionally (spring 1994) fallen below the level it was in 1990 but it did not grow to over 17 before the launch of *Reporter* in 1999. After that, the number of weekly newspaper issues has grown to over twenty, which is double the level of the late Soviet period. Even the closure of *Reporter* was compensated for by the launch of new newspapers, so that the drop in the number of weekly issues did not have a similar impact on the weekly volume.

Table 6.1. The combined number of printed copies of Petrozavodsk newspapers according to the figures published in the newspapers (b = beginning of the year, e = end of the year), excluding the Karelian edition of *Komsomolskaya pravda*.

Year	Number of news-papers	Number of copies	Issues per week	Total weekly page volume (approx.) ¹	Relative volume (1989=100)
1989	3	189	12	3,876	100
1990	5	219	14	3,810	98
1991	8	214	17	3,256	84
1992 b	7	204	17	3,202	83
1992 e	8	192	17	2,006	52
1993 b	8	197	17	1,880	49
1993 e	8	184	16	1,668	43
1994 b	7	180	13	1,710	44
1994 e	8	172	15	1,658	43
1995 b	8	171	16	1,752	45
1995 e	8	151	16	1,494	39
1996 b	9	161	17	1,662	43
1996 e	10	157	15	1,648	43
1997 b	10	182	16	1,954	50
1997 e	10	174	15	1,820	47
1998 b	10	181	15	1,872	48
1998 e	10	167	15	2,026	52
1999 b	10	182	22	2,656	69
1999 e	11	174	22	2,450	63
2000 b	13	182	23	2,586	67
2000 e	14	168	20	2,706	70
2001 b	14	217	21	2,913	75
2001 e	14	197	21	2,709	70

1 Volume = number of printed copies x number of pages (broadsheet) x number of weekly issues

The data on the circulation of individual papers is available after 1988, when the papers started to publish them (this was required also in the press law).

Table 6.2. Circulation of individual newspapers 1988-2000. The figures have been rounded to full thousands. The figure for the beginning of the year refers to the average circulation in March/April and that for the end of the year to the average circulation in September/October.

Newspaper	1988	1989	1990	1991	-92 b	-92 e	-93 b	-93 e
Leninskaya pravda/ Severnyi Kurier	130	133	126	95	95	40	35	31
Komsomolets/ Molodezhnaya gazeta Karelii	40 ?	48	54	54	35	38	45	32
Neuvosto-Karjala/ Karjalan Sanomat	9	9	11	9	9	10	3	3
Novosti dlya vsekh	—	—	15	17	12	9	8/5	—
Nabat Severo- Zapada	—	—	15	15	15	15	10	10/—
Oma mua	—	—	—/5	3	3	3	1	1
Petrozavodsk	—	—	—	18	35	32	40	45
Nashe slovo	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
Kareliya	—	—	—	—	—	5	5	5
TVR	—	—	—	—	—	40	50	52
Leninskaya pravda (new)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5

Newspaper	-94 b	-94 e	-95 b	-95 e	-96 b	-96 e	-97 b	-97 e
Severnyi Kurier	28	30	30	25	25	21	21	16
Molodezhnaya gazeta	27	20	15	9	8	6	5	5
Karjalan Sanomat	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Petrozavodsk	51	51	48	42	39	34	40	38
Kareliya	6	5	5	5	5	6	7	6
TVR	60	58	65	62	62	56	70	65
Leninskaya pravda (new)	5	5	5	5	8	5	5	5
Oma mua	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ves Petrozavodsk	—	—	—	—/5	11	—	—	—
Guberniya	—	—	—	—	—/20	23	28	33
Nablyudatel	—	—	—	—	—/3	3	3	3

Newspaper	1998b	1998e	1999b	1999e	2000b	2000e	2001b	2001e
Severnyi Kurier	14	12	15	14	14	14	15	14
Molodezhnaya gazeta	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6
Karjalan Sanomat	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Nabat Severo-Zapada	—	—	—	2	2	2	—	—
Petrozavodsk	36	27	27	21	20	20	20	20
Kareliya	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	5
TVR	74	70	74	74	70	64	64	62
Leninskaya pravda (new)	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Oma mua	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Guberniya	39	33	33	35	40	41	41	35
Nablyudatel	3	8	13	9	16	16	16	10
Reporter	—	—	—/2	2	2	—	—	—
Vienan Karjala	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	1
Gorod	—	—	—	—	(40) ¹	12/5	7	8
Komsomolskaya pravda v Karelii	—	—	—	—	—/7	6	10 ²	—
Stolitsa	—	—	—	—	—	—/20	20	20
Vesti Karelii	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	10

1 Distributed freely.

2 Average figure. Twice a week circulation was 7,000 and once 17,000.

A rather different picture is provided by the official printing statistics, which also indicates the problems with them (see also Chapter 3). The differences between individual years, especially 1996-1999, suggest that there have been either serious shortcomings in the compilation of the statistical data or major fluctuations in newspaper publishing. Actually both might be true. The local elections in 1998 increased the number and circulation of freely distributed campaign newspapers, which were then closed after the elections. On the other hand, there have also been clear problems in data collecting, e.g. the data for 1996 is clearly underrepresentative, while the data for 1998 and 1999 corresponds more closely with the data available on the circulation of individual newspapers.

The problems in collecting and reporting official figures become even more visible by looking at the more detailed information, e.g., on the publishing of the newspapers in Finnish and Karelian. For example, in 1996 there was no mention of these newspapers, although they were published regularly. The official statistics seem to present a kind of minimum data on newspaper publishing — at least those newspapers and freesheets that were published.

Table 6.3. The official printing statistics figures for newspaper publishing in Karelia

year	News-papers	Printed copies (1,000)	Annual printed copies (1,000)	Proper news-papers ¹	Printed copies (1,000)	Annual printed copies (1,000)
1991	35	329	54,290	25	313	53,156
1992	38	335	46,845	27	311	45,859
1993	37	235	26,982	26	210	25,824
1994	32	173	17,240	24	154	16,672
1995	34	211	19,354	24	175	18,233
1996	29	153	15,692	18	125	14,522
1997	45	448	22,404	25	161	13,898
1998	53	905	45,916	28	280	16,783
1999	37	375	17,243
2000	17	165	7,238

1 The proper newspapers category includes only those newspapers which come out at least once a week and are not factory or other newspapers. Even this kind of reduction leaves some problems, e.g., included are the city-level freesheets, which come out once a week, and campaign newspapers, which have been registered as republican-level newspapers. On the other hand, the figures may even exclude *TVR-Panorama*, which could have been classified as “other” (as a TV and Radio program sheet). The reduction in the publication of the certain tables makes it impossible to count these figures for 1999 and 2000.

Source: Pechat 1991, 138-139; Pechat 1992, 142; Pechat 1993, 142; Pechat 1994, 142-143; Pechat 1995, 169; Pechat 1996, 189; Pechat 1997, 180; Pechat 1998, 195; Pechat 1999, 155; Pechat 2000, 156.

Still another set of statistical data on the publication of the newspapers is provided by the postal service, which indicates the number of distributed copies of newspapers and journals. While it had been 73.9 million in 1988 (47.2 million in 1970 and 58.8 million in 1980) (Karelskaya ASSR... 1989, 68), it dropped to 40.3 million in 1992, 25.6 million in 1993, 21.1 million in 1994, 19.1 million in 1995, 16.5 million in 1996 and 16.4 million in 1997 (Respublika Kareliya v tsifrakh 1998, 221). The drop parallels closely the drop in the annual number of printed copies. Although the number of printed copies started to increase in 1996, the number of publications distributed through the post did not, which indicates that the alternative distribution channels started to gain some popularity.

6.1.2. Structure of the press and competition between newspapers

The Soviet newspaper structure was based on administrative boundaries. There was only a little competition between newspapers of the same level. The competition existed mainly between the newspapers of different levels. In Petrozavodsk and in districts around it, the position of the old *Leninskaya pravda* was stronger than in more remote areas. *Komsomolets* was more clearly a secondary paper. The position of district papers was stronger, especially in more remote districts, which had larger towns (see also Pietiläinen 1998). In the 1990s, the new weeklies changed the traditional press structure. The position of Petrozavodsk newspapers has strengthened at the cost of the district papers, with which weeklies can compete more effectively than dailies. Weeklies, for example, tolerate the problems of the postal service better and can accept even delays of one or two days in delivery.

The choice of retail sales as the main channel of delivery has helped the weeklies. The traditional subscription system according to which the subscriptions were collected in the autumn (in September and October) for the whole calendar year made the newspapers vulnerable to rising costs. The high share of subscriptions led to increasing losses and forced the papers to search for new sources of income. The papers which were sold in retail outlets could raise the income together with the costs.

Also the price of the newspapers has an impact. The subscription price for the dailies *Severnyi Kurier* and *Reporter*, is twice the price of the weeklies (see Table 6.4.). Among the weeklies, the most expensive is *Petrozavodsk* and the cheapest has usually been *TVR-Panorama*. Occasionally *Kareliya* has been the cheapest, since it has been supported by the government. The higher price of *Petrozavodsk* may indicate the orientation towards a wealthier

audience but more likely it is a matter of a conscious policy not to encourage subscriptions but to sell the paper mainly retail. The weekend issue of *Severnii Kurier* has been on the level of cheap weeklies, but having fewer pages, it has not been able to challenge them seriously. The price of the weekend issue of *Severnii Kurier* has, however, increased more rapidly than that of other newspapers and it reached the level of most of the others at the end of the 1990s.

The new papers, *Guberniya*, *Reporter* and *Nablyudatel*, seem to have challenged the established papers with slightly cheaper subscription prices. It is also noteworthy that *TVR-Panorama* and *Petrozavodsk* give a discount to those who subscribe for the whole half-year period (traditionally the annual or half-year subscriptions were not cheaper per month than separate monthly subscriptions). Many papers also give a discount to previous subscribers who continued their subscriptions.

The prices of *Karjalan Sanomat* and *Oma mua* have been lower than those of the other newspapers. In the spring of 2000, the price for *Oma mua* was only 32.52 roubles (22% of that of *Severnii Kurier*) and for *Karjalan Sanomat* 49.74 roubles (34%). Also *Leninskaya pravda* was a low-price newspaper: for the first half of 2001 its subscription fee was only 25 roubles (14% of that of *Severnii Kurier*). Despite their low prices, the number of subscriptions to these newspapers is low.

For 2001, the price of *Severnii Kurier* increased less than that of other newspapers and perhaps because of this, *Severnii Kurier* could improve its circulation slightly (from 14,000 to 14,500).

The postal fees, which were not charged in the Soviet Union, are significant in contemporary Russia. For the first half of 2001, the share of the postal fee in the final price of a newspaper varied from 37% to 63%. Among the weeklies, the partly state-sponsored *Kareliya* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* had the highest share of postal fee (61-62%), while for the commercial newspapers the share of the postal fee was lower (*Guberniya* 47%, *Petrozavodsk* 38%, *TVR-Panorama* 37%). *Severnii Kurier* was an exception, as a daily with 63%. Clearly, the external funding for *Kareliya* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* gives them an advantage which can be seen also in the share of the postal fee of the price. The higher share of the price covering distribution costs among the dailies offers a further explanation for the success of the weeklies.

Table 6.4. Comparative subscription prices of Petrozavodsk newspapers, % of the price of *Severnyi Kurier* (from 1993 onwards the data refers to the subscription price for the first half of the year).¹

Newspaper	1991	-92	-93	-94	-95	-96	-97	-98	-99	2000	2001
Severnyi Kurier	100	100	100	100	100	100 ²	100	100	100	100	100
Weekend issue of Severnyi Kurier	—	—	—	—	21	23	29	33	36	40	38
Molodezhnaya gazeta	61	71	33	50	46	47	46	31	31	31	39
Petrozavodsk	109 ³	64	58	47	48	43	43	49	49	55	68
Kareliya	—	—	44	15	41	52	35	26	28	34	46
TVR-Panorama	—	—	28	25	22	27	30	33	35	39	59
Guberniya	—	—	—	—	—	—	39	41	35	33	54
Nablyudatel	—	—	—	—	—	—	35	32	24	32	52
Reporter	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	89	—
Stolitsa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	44

- 1 The prices have been taken both from the newspapers themselves and from the postal catalogue of newspapers and journals. For some years, the prices published by the newspapers differ slightly from what is listed in the postal catalogue.
- 2 For 1996 the price of *Severnyi Kurier* was later cut in half.
- 3 The price for the second half of the year compared with the price of *Severnyi Kurier* for a halfyear.

For the subscription price of *Karjalan Sanomat* to Finland, 70% (FIM 246 of the subscription price of FIM 349) was used for postal fees in 1999 (Sundelin 2000, 57). In Karelia, the share of the postal fee for *Karjalan Sanomat* was around 20%.

The development of retail prices has had different phases. *Kareliya* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* have been the cheapest newspapers also in retail sales. In April 1995 the price for *Kareliya* was 150 roubles, while *Severnyi Kurier* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* cost 200 roubles, *TVR* 300 and *Petrozavodsk* 400 roubles. In October 1997 the prices were almost equal, since the price for *Severnyi Kurier*, *Petrozavodsk*, *Guberniya* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was 1,000 roubles while *TVR-Panorama* and *Kareliya* cost 800 roubles.

In recent years (2000-2001) the retail prices started to differ again. In April 2000 *Severnyi Kurier* cost 2.10 roubles, *Guberniya* 2.50 and

Petrozavodsk 2.80, while the price for *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was 1.20 and for both *Kareliya* and *Reporter* 1.50. In March 2001 three different prices were applied: *Molodezhnaya gazeta* and *Kareliya* were the cheapest at a price of two roubles, *Severnyi Kurier*, *Nablyudatel*, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Gorod* and *Vesti Karelii* were sold at three roubles, and *Petrozavodsk*, *TVR-Panorama*, *Guberniya* and *Stolitsa* cost four roubles (of them, *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* did not print the price in the paper but were actually sold at that price). Clearly, the most popular papers (and *Stolitsa*) had the highest prices.

6.2. Press economy in perspective

The high prices of newspapers have often been mentioned as a reason for a fall in circulation. Table 6.5 reflects the development of the subscription and retail prices of one newspaper. The data on the prices has been collected from both newspapers and the catalogues of the Karelian branch of the Russian Postal Service. The price used in this analysis includes also the costs of the delivery to the home address without any discounts. From 1991 onwards the prices for the first and second half of the year have been given separately.

Table 6.5. The price of *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier*, 1989-1998.

Year (and the half year)	1989	1990	199 I	1991II	1992I	1992II	1993I	1993II
Subscription price (roubles)	7.80	7.80	16.56	16.56	28.20	360 ¹	954	3,060
Retail price (roubles)	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.20	0.40
Subscription price, % of average monthly salary ²	4	3	5	3	2	7	6	6
Subscription price in FIM ³	55			1	1	6	11	30
Retail price in FIM	0.21			0.01	0.02

- 1 From 1992 II onwards the subscription prices are based on prices for half-year subscriptions, but they have been multiplied by two in order to facilitate comparison.
- 2 Based on the average salary in the period in which the subscriptions were made (September-October for the first half of the year and April-May for the second half).
- 3 According to the exchange rate published in the newspapers.

Year	1994I	1994II	1995I	1995II	1996I	1996II	1997I	1997II
Subscription price	15,600	18,852	61,404	96,000	139,200	168,000	180,000	208,800
Retail price	40	120	200	300	300	500	700	1,000
Subscr. price % of salary	11	9	20	20	22	21	20	21
Subscr. price FIM	78	43	61	90	130	141	160	188
Retail price FIM	0.17	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.9


Year	1998 I	-98 II	-99 I	-99 II	2000I	2000II	2001I	2001II	2002I
Subscr. price	216.12	216	217	249	293	296	357.6	424.2	519.1
Retail price	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.0	3.0	3.0	...
Subscr. price % of salary	20	21	20	17	17	15	16	15	15
Subscr. price FIM	207	67	49	55	73	65	83	106	115
Retail price FIM	1.1	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.44	0.7	0.75	...

The subscription price refers to the price of the newspaper subscription for the period in question; the retail price refers to the price in effect in the middle of the period. The comparison with the average salary has been done using the Russian average salary for the period in which the subscriptions were usually made (for the first half, the salary in September-October of the previous year and for the second half, the salary of March-April). The reality might be somewhat different since significant discounts have been offered.

Compared with the average monthly salary, the subscription price increased five-fold within the decade. At the same time, the standard of living has decreased and a greater and greater share of income is used for food and housing. The price has increased not only in local currency, but even in foreign currency. During the economic transformation, the price in Finnish marks was at an extremely low level. The fall of the rouble in the autumn of 1998, however, dropped the foreign currency price to the same level as it was in Soviet times, but soon after that the price in foreign currency started to increase again. Compared with the prices of Finnish newspapers, the prices of the Soviet newspapers were low. Only since 1995 have the newspaper

subscription prices in Karelia taken approximately the same share of the average monthly salary as Finnish regional newspapers usually take.

The subscription price of Severnyi Kurier: % of average monthly salary



Interestingly, the drop in circulation happened at the time when the subscription price increased from the traditional 3-5% level to the level of 10%, but the further increase from 10% to 20% has not had a major impact on circulation. The increase in price had a negative impact precisely when new alternatives became available in the press market. The relative price started to decrease in 2000, but the circulation increased only slightly.

The relationship between the subscription and retail prices has varied significantly, but in the long run it has developed in favour of the subscription price. In 1989, the retail price of all the annual copies was only 20% higher than the subscription price; at the beginning of 1992 the retail price was almost 300% higher, but in 1994 it was just 60% higher. At the beginning of 1995, the average subscription price was over 20% higher than the average retail price, but at the end of 1997 the retail price was again 60% higher. In 1999, the average retail price was almost double (84% higher) the average subscription price and in 2001 it was more than double (110% higher). The newspapers gave discounts for special groups (veterans etc.) and at the beginning of the subscription campaign it was possible to subscribe to the paper at a discounted price.

The published data on the subscription and retail prices, the advertisement prices and the amount of advertising reveal some information about the income sources of the newspapers. For the newspaper *Petrozavodsk*, the price

for advertising in 1997 was 195,000 roubles for one block (a tabloid page was divided into 50 blocks, one block measuring ca. 15 cm²); in other words, the price of one page of advertising was 9,750,000 roubles (about FIM 10,000) (Internet pages of *Petrozavodsk*).

The average amount of advertising in *Petrozavodsk* was three pages, so it is possible to estimate that the weekly income from advertisements was 30 million roubles. At the same time, the income from subscriptions and retail sales could be estimated to be no more than 40 million roubles a week. On the basis of this calculation, the share of income from advertising was around 40% and the share of income from subscriptions and retail sales was around 60%. The advertising revenue had increased due to a monthly four-colour advertisement supplement published in both *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama*.

In *Severnnyi Kurier* the price for advertisements was lower than in *Petrozavodsk*. The price for one square centimetre was 11,000 roubles in 1997 (the price for similar space in *Petrozavodsk* was 13,000 roubles). In the autumn 1997 *Severnnyi Kurier* had had only around one half a page for advertisements, totalling approximately 800 cm². The weekly income of *Severnnyi Kurier* from advertising was around 40-45 million roubles. Moreover, its advertisement revenue was increased due to the weekly advertisement supplement *Karelskaya nedelya*, which gave an additional weekly income of approximately 20 million roubles (classifieds not included).

The income from the readers could be estimated to be around 8 million roubles per issue¹ (after the postal fee had been reduced) or 40 million roubles a week (FIM 70,000). With the addition of *Karelskaya nedelya*, the share of advertisement revenue was around 60%², which was clearly more than in *Petrozavodsk* without the supplement. Also the number of pages was higher than in the regular issue of *Petrozavodsk*; with *Karelskaya nedelya*, *Severnnyi Kurier* had 24 broadsheet pages and 8 tabloid pages, or three times the number of pages of *Petrozavodsk* (24).

In 2000 the advertising prices started to differentiate on the basis of circulation. The price of an advertisement in *Kareliya* was around ten roubles per cm² and *Nablyudatel* charged similar prices. In more popular newspapers the prices were higher. In *Severnnyi Kurier* the standard price was 16 roubles per cm². On the first page and in the section with the television programme

1 It has been estimated that 75% of the circulation were subscriptions and 25% were sold in retail outlets and that 90% of the printed copies were sold).

2 *Karelskaya nedelya* could be bought separately and its circulation was higher (19,000) than that of *Severnnyi Kurier*, so it contributed to the revenue from the readers as well. The retail price in *Petrozavodsk* was 700 roubles (if bought separately).

the price was double. *Severnyi Kurier* could also utilise its position as the only daily in the region. The advertisements in the Tuesday and Saturday issues cost 30% more than on other days. On Tuesdays and Saturdays the competition with other newspapers was lowest, because on Saturdays no other newspapers were published and on Tuesdays only *Nablyudatel* and *Severnyi Kurier* came out. (Atlas 2000)

In *Petrozavodsk* larger (one page) advertisements cost 20 roubles per cm², while smaller ones were up to 30 roubles per cm²; in *TVR-Panorama* larger advertisements cost 22 roubles per cm² and smaller ones up to 36 roubles per cm². In the free paper *Medved*, the price per cm² of advertising was 26 roubles (Atlas 2000). In *Guberniya* the price was from 19 to 22 roubles per cm² and in *Reporter* it was approximately seven roubles. (Internet pages of *Guberniya*).

Nablyudatel, *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* offered a special price for advertisement articles that was lower than the price for ordinary advertisements. All the newspapers offered a discount on repeated advertisements (Atlas 2000).

In 2000 the first page of *Petrozavodsk* was usually full of advertisements and they covered also one to two pages inside the paper. There were also up to half a page of classifieds. The weekly advertisement revenue totalled no more than 65-70,000 roubles while the retail sale of the paper (the price was 2.80 in April 2000) likely brought in no more than 50,000 roubles a week.

For *Guberniya* the weekly revenue from advertisements (on average six pages of advertisements per issue) was around 100,000 roubles, while the revenue from retail sales could reach (at a single copy price 2.50 roubles) a maximum of 100,000 roubles.

In *Severnyi Kurier* advertisements filled around three broadsheet pages a week and, in addition, the paper had one page of classifieds. The classified ads were placed usually on the third page and they were more frequent in the Wednesday issue. The weekly revenue from advertising was above 100,000 roubles, perhaps even as much as 130,000 roubles. The subscription and retail sale revenue (70% subscriptions, 30% retail) was only around 20,000 roubles a week, of which a major part (8,000-9,000 roubles) was used for postal fees. Therefore, *Severnyi Kurier* got over 80% of its revenue (over 90% if postal fees were not counted) from advertisements.

The income structure of the main papers remained rather stable at the end of the 1990s. *Petrozavodsk* and *Severnyi Kurier* had been able to increase the share of income from advertising by the end of the 1990s and in 2000 they got over half of their income from advertising (60% and over 80% respectively), while other newspapers received only 50 per cent of income from advertising. It should be kept in mind that these figures are only estimates,

because information about the number of actually sold copies was not available and it is difficult to estimate the real price of advertising because of various discounts, etc.

Possible other income cannot be detected with this kind of method and information about them is not easy to get. Nonetheless, even the relative shares of income from advertising versus retail/subscription sales tells something about the financial situation of the press. According to Andrei Demin, the mayor of Petrozavodsk, it is generally argued that a paper should have a circulation of 30,000 in order to be profitable (Demin, interview 20.8.2001). Such papers include only *TVR-Panorama* and *Guberniya*, although *Petrozavodsk* (especially when considering the higher price and revenue from advertising) comes close as well. All the other newspapers have a lower circulation and thus need some kind of extra financing.

6.3. Diversity, competition and concentration in the Karelian press

International studies on media diversity and competition point out that the competition and diversity of the press were the highest in the period when the newspaper press was founded, before the commercialisation of the press. Concentration has been explained by different theories, of which the most important are the theory of industrial organisation and the theory of the ecological niche.

According to the theory of industrial production, the high fixed costs (mainly printing plants, the distribution network and the salaries of the journalists) have led to concentration because the most effective and large-scale newspapers have received more income and have been able to develop their content, which has led to even larger circulation and increasing income. The other papers have lost some of their income and therefore have been forced to cut costs, which has led to providing weaker content and decreasing circulation (see Jyrkiäinen 1994; for the economy of American newspapers see e.g. Udell 1978).

In Petrozavodsk the high costs of the printing plant have been avoided, since all or most of the newspapers have used the same printing plant. Also the distribution network has been common for most of the newspapers, although some of them have experience with their own networks. Furthermore, the salaries of journalists have been relatively low, and therefore the pressure of the fixed costs has been lower. On the other hand, only recently have the papers received enough income to develop their service, e.g. increase the

number of pages. This kind of organisation of the production has clearly favoured the launch of the new papers.

According to the theory of the ecological niche, every species (newspaper) has its own niche, which may be either general or specialised and in various degrees overlapping with the niches of other species. Newspapers compete not only with each other but also with television, radio, freesheets and other forms of advertisement. In this study this aspect, however, has been set aside, since there is a lot of competition even within newspaper industry itself.

The newspapers of Petrozavodsk can be divided into two main groups on the basis of their content and audience. First, *Severnii Kurier* and *Nablyudatel* have been oriented towards an audience that is interested in political and economic news. *Nablyudatel* pays more attention to economics and business and less to the problems of the lower strata of the population. *Nablyudatel* is also less partisan than *Severnii Kurier* and it presents the views of opposition parties and movements. However, the recent reorientation of *Nablyudatel* has made it closer to the popular newspapers.

Second, *Petrozavodsk*, *TVR-Panorama*, *Guberniya*, *Vesti Karelii*, *Stolitsa* and the former *Reporter* have been oriented towards an audience that is not interested in partisan politics. *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* provide practical advice, entertainment news, local news and television programmes; *Guberniya* and *Reporter* are more distinctly popular newspapers which do not limit their coverage according to topics, but rather cover them in a scandalous, popular style. *Guberniya* has, e.g., a page of erotic stories and a section on investigative journalism. *Stolitsa* and *Vesti Karelii* are still looking for their niche, but both of them seem to be a mixture of *Guberniya* and *Petrozavodsk* with some new elements: they are scandalous (as in *Guberniya*), colourful (as in *Petrozavodsk* and also recently *Nablyudatel*) and full of small pieces of news about everything. The stories of *Vesti Karelii* and *Stolitsa* are also shorter and less analytical than those of any other Karelian newspaper.

Kareliya is a mixture of official, popular and quality newspaper styles. The paper has many supplements, which gives it a special character: the "Civil society" supplement reports on political development, "Our heritage" is dedicated to the region's popular folklore traditions, "Mariya" is a supplement for women and "Vse – Svoi" is oriented toward youth. After the victory of Katanandov, the direction of the paper has been brought under stricter control, e.g. the supplement "Civil society" has lost a lot of its quality.

It seems that different papers have chosen different strategies. The new weeklies emphasise retail sales and colourful advertisements. *Severnii Kurier* places subscriptions and serious journalism first (and has the resources to do so because of revenue from advertising). In this respect, *Nablyudatel* has

started to compete with it and has rapidly surpassed *Severnyi Kurier* in circulation. The problem for *Severnyi Kurier* is political partisanship and its orientation towards the lower strata of the population, which might have alienated from it those readers who otherwise would have been a potential audience for a quality newspaper. *Vesti Karelii* and *Stolitsa* have started to compete primarily with new weeklies but their potential remain to be seen.

The weekly publishing rhythm has proved to be successful, but nevertheless, there have been attempts by some newspapers to move to a more frequent rhythm. *Molodezhnaya gazeta* came out three times a week up to 1996-1997, when it finally adopted weekly rhythm. *Petrozavodsk* tried the twice-a-week rhythm in 1991-1992, *Kareliya* came out twice a week in 1994 and three times a week in 1995-1996, *Karjalan Sanomat* dropped one of its three weekly issues in 1995 but has managed to continue with two weekly issues since then.

In 1996-1997 all the other newspapers except *Severnyi Kurier* and *Karjalan Sanomat* changed to a weekly rhythm. But in 1999 when a new daily, *Reporter*, was launched, *Kareliya* also started to come out twice a week and at the beginning of 2001 three times a week. The higher costs, which the more frequent rhythm caused, seem to be a reasonable price for more rapid news coverage. It is likely that with the increasing economic capacity of the population and the improvements in distribution service, the more frequent rhythm will gain more ground.

A Swedish study has pointed out that the amount of local news, the number of permanently hired journalists, new printing technology, periodicity and price are important factors in competing for readers (Severinsson 1994, 215). In the Karelian case, many of these factors have not yet started to have an effect. This is still another indication that the press in Karelia is not primarily market-based.

The increase in the number of newspapers has led to the fragmentation of the audience, which should usually lead to the spiral effect of declining content investment. According to a model applied usually to the electronic media, the smaller audience for each of the media generates lower income, which requires less expensive content (Picard 2000, 186-187). Since the salaries of the Karelian journalists are relatively low, the pressure for lowering the costs of content investments is not as high as in developed press markets.

The total circulation of local and regional newspapers in Karelia (including the district newspapers, the circulation of which was around 45-50,000 in 1999 and 70,000 in 2001) was about 230,000 copies in 1999 and almost 300,000 copies in 2001, which totalled approximately 290 copies per 1,000 citizens in 1999 and 380 in 2001 (around 700 copies per 1,000

households in 1999 and over 900 in 2001). These figures are not especially high (when taking into consideration the low level of circulation of national newspapers) but are not low either. The district newspapers had serious difficulties after the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Pietiläinen 1998) but recently their position has started to strengthen again. Compared with the late Soviet period, the drop in overall circulation has been only minor, but the circulation at the end of the 1990s was divided among a greater number of newspapers, which came out less frequently.

The development of subscribed or bought newspapers has been hampered also by the rapid growth of freesheets. In Petrozavodsk, several freesheets containing only advertisements and classifieds have been published, which is likely to have a negative impact on the advertising revenue of the ordinary newspapers and, if they start to publish television programmes, might pose a threat to ordinary newspapers.

The diversity of the newspaper market has been measured with the so-called Lorenz curve, on the basis of which a Gini-coefficient can be counted (Jyrkiäinen 1994, Nixon & Hahn 1971). It, however, has been used mainly for measuring the concentration of the national newspaper market and not the local one. I suggest that one possibility for measuring media diversity and the level of competition is to analyse the difference among the circulation rates of the main newspapers, e.g. to pay attention to the circulation of those newspapers which are above the average. There is little real competition if there is one dominant newspaper and two-three others with a minor circulation, while a situation with only two equally large newspapers represents a case with higher competition (even independent of the number of small papers). In terms of the diversity of channels, an ideal situation would be a case in which there are many newspapers of which no one holds a dominant position.

Table 6.6. Indexes of competition in the Karelian press (from 1992 the figures for the first half of the year have been used).

- 1 the number of newspapers
- 2 the number of newspapers above average (% of the total amount of newspapers),
- 3 the share of the most popular newspaper(%),
- 4 the share of the three most popular newspapers (%),
- 5 the share of the most popular newspaper among the total circulation of the newspapers with above average circulation (%)
- 6 the differences (% of the total newspaper circulation) between the two biggest newspapers.
- 7 Gini-coefficient (min. 0, max. 1) of competition

	1989	-90	-91	-92	-93	-94	-95	-96	-97	-98	-99	2000	-01
1	3	5	8	7	9	8	8	9	10	10	10	13	14
2	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	3	4	3	3	4	5
3	70	57	44	47	35	33	38	39	38	40	41	38	29
4	100	88	78	81	69	77	84	78	76	81	75	72	58
5	100	70	64	58	29	36	45	49	44	50	55	48	40
6	37	33	19	29	3	5	10	14	16	19	23	17	11
7	.438	.484	.540	.499	.473	.517	.555	.551	.580	.604	.548	.587	.540

The first two figures in Table 6.6. indicate how large a share the most popular newspaper and the three most popular newspapers have. These figures express how dominant the position of the major newspapers is. The bigger the figure, the greater the dominance of the major newspapers.

On the fourth line, the share of the newspapers with above average circulation is also interesting. The existence of many small newspapers decreases the average, but only the newspapers that are big enough can surpass the average and compete for the dominant position. The number of these newspapers (line 2) has remained rather stable: some have dropped from the list and some new papers have been able to reach it.

Line five shows the level of dominance of the largest newspaper among the newspapers with above average circulation and describes competition among the major newspapers only.

Perhaps the most interesting and representative of them is on line six, which reveals the intensity of the competition between the two most popular (and most well equipped for the competition) newspapers. The smaller the figure, the more intense the competition is between the most popular newspapers. The existence of many small newspapers in a market in which

only one newspaper dominates does not necessarily increase competition, but neither can a situation in which two newspapers compete equally and where there are no other newspapers be defined as ideal.

The Gini-coefficient (line 7) measures the competition between all the newspapers equally, therefore it increases (indicating that the competition is decreasing) when new small papers appear. The Gini-coefficient does not count the qualitative difference between large and small papers: the large papers compete for a universal audience, while the smaller ones aim for specialised audiences and compete only in order to reach their special segments of the population. Therefore the value of the Gini-coefficient is a relatively weak tool for analysing the competition between qualitatively different newspapers. This was, however, not noticed by Nixon & Hahn (1971) although they pointed out some other problems with using it.

The competition between newspapers in Karelia is intense and so far not a single newspaper has been able to reach the dominant position that the leading newspaper still had in the spring of 1992. In 1999, *TVR-Panorama* was close to that status, but the appearance and popularity of *Guberniya* has increased competition. The share of the three dominant newspapers has remained almost the same, although the newspapers have changed dramatically: e.g. in 1991 they included *Leninskaya pravda*, *Komsomolets* and *Petrozavodsk*, but in 1997 *TVR* and *Guberniya* had replaced the two traditional newspapers on this list. In 2001, the new paper *Stolitsa* had started to challenge the position of the smallest of the three big newspapers (*Petrozavodsk*).

On the other hand, the marketisation of the press has not really happened, because the drop in circulation and economic difficulties (e.g. non-payment of salaries) has not led to the closure of newspapers other than *Reporter* and political newspapers. The number of newspapers has been increasing all the time. In any case, it will be only a question of time as to when the marketisation will be completed and the fight for survival will start. Another aspect of competition is the formation of newspaper chains: two of the most popular newspapers, *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama*, are both owned by the Petropress company and *Reporter* was founded by the company which also published *Guberniya*. This process has also only just started.

Although the free sheets remain outside this study, the problems they may cause for real newspapers should be noted. Free sheets have been a successful part of the newspaper market of Petrozavodsk since the beginning of the 1990s and the leading freesheet, *Medved* (Bear), has been printed in 85,000 copies. The pre-election freesheets have been printed in even more copies (up to 200,000), but they have not attracted advertisers. There is also

a newspaper comprised entirely of advertisements, which is sold in retail. It seems that the freesheets have not had a major impact on the circulation of real newspapers, since they do not, for example, publish the television programme, which is one of the assets of real newspapers.

So far the newspapers' share of revenue from advertisements has not been large in most of the Russian provincial cities. The city of Petrozavodsk was not included in the analysis of Russian regional advertising markets by Internews, but in the cities with the most similar number of inhabitants (e.g. Kurgan, Kaluga, Tambov, Tver) the newspapers' share of all media advertising has been estimated to be around 35% (Issledovanie regionalnykh reklamnykh rynkov 2000, 12-13).

The Karelian media market is highly differentiated, but the line between market-oriented and politically-oriented newspapers is not clear. Clearly *Leninskaya pravda* and *Nabat* belong to the politically financed newspapers, while *Petrozavodsk*, *TVR-Panorama*, and *Guberniya* rely on advertising (as did the closed *Reporter*). In between are *Severnyi Kurier*, *Nablyudatel* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta*, of which *Severnyi Kurier* is close to the market-oriented newspapers and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* receives most of its financing from sponsorship. For *Kareliya* and *Gorod*, the situation is mixed, with support from governmental funding and private sponsors that finance newspapers on the basis of political preferences or other vaguely defined reasons. *Stolitsa* and *Vesti Karelii* are so new that nothing can be said about the sources of their success, but they seem to be oriented towards the market. With the launch of *Gorod* and *Stolitsa* as newspapers seeking an audience in the city of Petrozavodsk, it seems that political aspirations, which are certainly behind the founding of these new papers, are concentrating on the capital city of Karelia before the local elections of 2002.

Most of the papers have tried to find their ecological niche and the most successful ones are those whose niche is large enough and those who can dominate their niche most completely. Some others have failed to find their niche or have not succeeded in occupying it and have therefore lost circulation.

6.4. Newspaper audience in Karelia in the 1990s

Several newspaper and media audience surveys have been conducted in Karelia or parts of it since the 1990s, but they have been reported in public only fragmentarily. Therefore a separate survey was collected for this research in February 2000.

Some data about the readership of Karelian newspapers was provided as part of research on inter-ethnic relations in 1994. A survey carried out by Russian researchers in December 1993 and January 1994 included a sample of 500 residents of Petrozavodsk¹. It was found out that *Severnii Kurier* was read by 50%, and *Petrozavodsk* by 64%, of those questioned. The other newspapers had smaller audiences: *Molodezhnaya gazeta* 12%, *Karjalan sanomat* 4%, *Oma mua* 3%, *Kareliya* 3%, *Leninskaya pravda* 2%, and *Nabat Severo-Zapada* 1%. Also some Moscow-based newspapers had readers in Petrozavodsk: *Argumenty i fakty* 20%, *Komsomolskaya pravda* 5%, *Trud* 2%, *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 2%, *Izvestiya*, *Moskovskie novosti* and *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 1%. In addition to these papers, 19% of the respondents said that they read other newspapers; perhaps this group also includes those who do not read newspapers at all. (Ivanov, Kotov & Ladodo 1994, 31)

Some information on newspaper audiences in post-Soviet Karelia has been published also in local newspapers. In the spring of 1996 a survey of newspaper readership in Karelia was performed by the Doka-M agency². According to this survey, the most popular newspaper was *Severnii Kurier* (rating 29.6%). The free advertisement newspaper *Medved* was second in popularity (26.7%), *TVR-Panorama* was third (23.5%) and *Petrozavodsk* was fourth (22.5%). Less popular were the advertisement supplement of *Severnii Kurier*, *Karelskaya nedelya* (12.8%), *Molodezhnaya gazeta* (9.4%), *Kareliya* (8.2%) and *Ves Petrozavodsk* (6.3%). These percentages are the average of three figures: 1) regular readers, 2) irregular readers and 3) those who had read the latest issue (*Severnii Kurier* 24.5.1996).

The popularity of the newspapers differed significantly between Petrozavodsk and the countryside. In Petrozavodsk, *Medved* was the most popular newspaper (47%), *Petrozavodsk* was second (34%) and *Severnii Kurier* was third (32%). *TVR-Panorama* was only in fourth place, with a readership of a mere 20%. In other parts of Karelia, *Severnii Kurier* was the most popular (36.4%), followed by *TVR-Panorama* (35.5%), *Petrozavodsk* (21.8%), *Medved* (17.4%) and *Karelskaya nedelya* (15.5%). When the readers were asked to choose one newspaper among the nine named ones, 34.5% chose *Severnii Kurier* and 22.7% *Petrozavodsk*. *Molodezhnaya gazeta* followed with 8.0% and *TVR-Panorama* with 7.9%. The rating of

- 1 In this sample the middle-aged groups (from 30 to 49 years) were over-represented, as were Karelians and Finns, while Ukrainians and Belorussians were practically not included at all.
- 2 The 1996 survey was based on interviews of 609 persons in seven towns and settlements. Petrozavodsk (44% of respondents) and small towns around it (Chalna, Derevlyannoe, Shuya; 25% of respondents) were over-represented, which may have favoured *Petrozavodsk*, *Medved* and *Severnii Kurier*.

TVR-Panorama was surprisingly low in comparison with its high circulation and wide readership. (ibid.)

According to the results reported by the paper itself, the readers of *Severnii Kurier* could be found more frequently among the middle-aged population and even more often among senior citizens. They could be found almost equally in almost all income groups; only in the poorest group (those earning less than 200,000 roubles) was *Severnii Kurier* read less frequently. The readers of *Severnii Kurier* thought that their economic situation was good or satisfactory more often than the average population (ibid.).

It was also found out that the attitudes towards advertising varied greatly among the readers of different newspapers. Among those who opposed advertising, *Severnii Kurier* was overwhelmingly the most popular newspaper, while among the supporters of advertising, the most popular was *Petrozavodsk* (ibid.). It is surprising that despite their good or satisfactory economic situation, many readers of *Severnii Kurier* had a negative attitude towards advertising. The explanatory factor is likely age.

According to a survey done at the beginning of 1998, the most popular newspaper in Karelia was *Guberniya*, which was read by 35% of the population. The district newspapers were in second place with 25%. *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* were third and fourth, both with 25%, and *Severnii Kurier* was fifth with 22%. The electoral campaign newspaper *Narodnyi Advokat* was read by 15% of the population and *Kareliya* by 11%. (*Karjalan sanomat* 28.3.1998, *Guberniya* 26.3.1998).

The district newspapers were trusted by 10% of respondents, whereas *Guberniya* and *Petrozavodsk* were each trusted by 7%; *Severnii Kurier* and *TVR-Panorama* were each trusted by 5%. *Narodnyi Advokat* was trusted by only 2% of respondents. According to 19%, boulevard newspapers should not be trusted, 11% had no trust in any newspaper, 7% had no trust in commercial and political newspapers and 6% had no trust in communist newspapers. The survey was based on interviews of 1,245 persons. (*Guberniya* 26.3.1998).

In addition, Gallup Media conducted a readership survey in Petrozavodsk in September-October 2001. According to the survey, the most popular newspaper in Karelia (average audience of one issue) is the free newspaper *Medved* (45.9%), followed by *Guberniya* (39.3%), *TVR-Panorama* (28.3%), the free newspaper *Region* (22.8%), *Petrozavodsk* (22.3%), the advertisement newspaper *Vse* (21.8%), *Gorod* (16.9%) and *Nablyudatel* (8.3%). The daily *Severnii Kurier* was read on average by 4.9% and its weekly issue by 3.9% of the population 16 years and older. *Kareliya* was read by 4.2% and *Molodezhnaya gazeta* by 3.1% (Gallup media 2001).

6.5. The February 2000 Survey. Aims, method and sample

A survey of mass media use and attitudes was carried out among the citizens of Petrozavodsk for this study in February 2000. The main purpose of the survey was to trace differences in the audiences for various media and the factors influencing them, to find out the various media diets of the population and to investigate attitudes towards the media. In total 92 questions were asked, but only part of the answers has been reported in this dissertation.

The survey was carried out under the supervision of Evgeni Klementev and Aleksandr Kozhanov (Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences), who also provided an elementary review of the results in Russian. The further elaboration of the results and conclusions were done by the author. The survey included 508 respondents in the city of Petrozavodsk.¹ Older strata of the population were slightly over-represented and the middle-aged under-represented, but the nationality composition of the sample corresponded relatively well with the nationality structure of Petrozavodsk.² Family size in the sample differed somewhat from family size according to the census of 1989, e.g. singles were under-represented. However, it seems certain that the sample represents the active population (those capable of following media, e.g. excluding persons in hospitals, armed service, prisons etc.) relatively well. Finally, the fact that the survey was only about the media may have biased the sample towards those who actually use media.

1 The data was collected as a quota sample that was adjusted on the basis of age and gender, corresponding with the population in Petrozavodsk (according to the Karelian Statistics Committee in 1998). The respondents were interviewed in their homes in six different districts of Petrozavodsk (Drevlyanka–Perevalka, Klyuchevaya, Kukkovka, Golikovka–Zareka, Centre, Oktyabrskii – 5th poselok). In each district around 84-86 persons were interviewed and the sample in each of these districts was adjusted on the basis of age group and gender. In all the districts the inhabitants of 4-6 streets (6-15 blocks of flats) were interviewed. The interviews were conducted from the 4th to the 28th of February 2000.

2 The sample included 224 men (44.8%) and 276 women (55.2%). Of them, 105 (20.7%) were between 19-29 years old (young), 185 (31.4%) were between 30-49 years (middle-aged) and 218 (42.9%) were over 50 (older). At the beginning of 1997 the census percentages for the same age categories were 20%, 46% and 34%, respectively (Respublika Kareliya v tsifrakh 1998). In the sample, 79.9% were Russians (according to the 1989 census they comprised 81.1% of the Karelian population), 7.7% were Karelians (census: 5.3%), 5.9% were Belorussians (census: 3.6%), 2.2% were Ukrainians (census: 3.0%) and 2.2% were Finns (census: 3.5%). Members of other nationalities totalled 1.9 % (census: 3.5%).

The discrete questions on electoral participation and choice of candidate corresponded well with the results of the elections. Support for the different presidential candidates (based on the provided list of seven names, of which two did not actually register as candidates) corresponded rather well with the outcome of the elections. Supporters of the communist candidates Zyuganov and Tuleev were under-represented, while supporters of Yavlinskii were over-represented.

In the sample, 40% of the respondents reported that had completed or partly completed higher education (likely understood as high school), 34% had middle, specialised education (perhaps meaning vocational school), 17% middle, general education and 8% had not completed middle education. The characterisation of education is based on the Russian classification. According to the census, only 12% of urban population of Karelia 15-years and older had completed or partly completed higher education (*Kratkaya sotsialno-demograficheskaya... 1991, 138-139*). It seems that the level of education has been understood differently in the sample and in the census or the sample was biased towards those with higher education.

According to their positions at work, 30% of the respondents were specialists, 17% workers, 3% officials but non-specialists, 7% managers of various levels and 2% entrepreneurs. Pensioners comprised 25% of the respondents; 7% were students and 6% were unemployed.

Almost half of the sample earned less than 750 roubles per household member and only 5% earned more than 2,000 roubles per person per month. The majority of those who earned less than 1,000 roubles per person defined their economic situation as non-satisfactory or catastrophic, while the majority of those who earned more than 1,000 roubles thought of their situation as satisfactory. Persons who defined their economic situation as good could be found rather equally in all income levels.

Some problems were caused by the form of the questions. Media use was measured with questions on reading individual newspapers, watching specific television channels or listening to particular radio stations. The respondents might choose to answer that they follow each of the media outlets regularly, irregularly or not at all. The difference between regular and irregular reading or watching is naturally subjective and it is different to read a daily newspaper versus a weekly newspaper regularly. On the other hand, the problem is not a major one, because the purpose was not to measure exactly the size of the audience of individual media but to find out characteristics of these audiences and to explore the factors influencing their media choices.

6.6. Newspapers and their audiences

6.6.1. General media consumption

The way in which people get their newspapers in Karelia (as well as in other parts of Russia) today differs dramatically from the Soviet era. In the Soviet Union, the people subscribed to newspapers and buying was only a complementary method of acquiring them. In post-Soviet Petrozavodsk, the newspaper audience mainly bought newspapers; 77% did so. Only 13% subscribed to newspapers; 22% read them at the homes of relatives and friends; 11% at work; a mere 7% read newspapers on bulletin boards, “stands” in Russian, which still exist in various parts of the city; and only 3% read them in the library.

Table 6.7. Ways to get local newspapers

Method	%	Average number of regularly read newspapers	Average number of irregularly read newspapers
Only buying	51.0	1.3	2.3
Buying and reading at friends	7.3	1.4	3.0
Only reading at friends	5.5	1.1	2.6
Buying and subscribing	4.5	1.8	3.4
Only subscribing	4.5	1.3	1.4
Buying and reading at work	3.7	1.7	2.1
Only reading at work	2.4	1.3	4.0
Other multiple ways	12.6	1.8	3.5
Other single ways	1.4	2.0	2.4
Not reading / other	7.1	0.2	0.6

For half of the population (51%), retail buying was the only way to get newspapers (receiving the newspapers for free was excluded), but the combined use of different ways to get newspapers was also rather frequent — 28% did not rely on one way only. The most frequent combinations were buying and reading at the homes of friends, buying and subscribing, and buying and reading in the workplace. Only 5% acquired their newspaper solely by subscribing and 6% read them only at work.

Those who used multiple ways of getting newspapers used more newspapers than others, and those who read newspapers at work or in the library (not shown in the table) made the widest choice of newspapers. Those who got their newspapers only by subscribing read the smallest number of various newspapers.

Compared with other countries, the reading of newspapers at work in Russia is much lower than, e.g., in Sweden (in 1998 almost half, 48%, of Swedes read newspapers at work or school) (MediaSverige 1999, 159). Those who read newspapers at work in Petrozavodsk were mainly middle-aged and were women (2/3) more often than men. They were more frequent among workers in administration and workers in commerce, services and communications. Among managers and specialists, reading at work was more common than among workers.

Despite the fall in circulation of the newspapers, the major part of the citizens of Petrozavodsk read them regularly and the practice of reading several newspapers has continued. Television, however, has become the most important media both due to the reach of its audience and as a source of information.

Over 70% of the Petrozavodsk audience read regularly at least one newspaper. Moreover, 25% read at least one newspaper irregularly, many of them actually read several newspapers. Only 5% of the population did not read newspapers at all. Among the newspaper reading, the local newspapers were clearly the leaders. Only 17% read national newspapers regularly and 49% irregularly. Over one third, 34%, did not read national newspapers. There were almost no persons who read national newspapers but do not read the local ones. On the other hand, only 70% of the readers of local newspapers read national newspapers, of them 75% irregularly.

Television was clearly the most popular media: 91% watched at least one of the television channels regularly and 7% irregularly (actually this group likely included persons who watched television regularly, but did not follow any particular channel regularly). Only 1.6% did not watch television. Listening to radio was less frequent: 67% listened to one of the radio channels regularly, 22% irregularly and 11% did not listen to radio.

Despite the smaller audience of radio and national newspapers, over half of the population followed them all, at least irregularly. Over 90% used at least three different media. In total, the use of many media channels had remained on a high level. The citizens of Petrozavodsk used regularly on average six different media channels and irregularly seven different media channels.

Table 6.8. Combined use of different media

Television, local and national newspapers, radio	58.7%
Television, local newspapers, radio	25.4%
Television, local and national newspapers	6.5%
Television, local newspapers	3.5%
Television, radio	3.1%
Only television	0.6%
Other combinations	1.8%
No media at all	0.4%

6.6.2. Preferred newspaper choice

When the readers were asked to choose one of the newspapers, the majority (60%) chose one of the popular newspapers, most often *Guberniya*. Around 20% chose one the quality newspapers and around 20% did not want to choose any newspaper, chose another newspaper (mainly one of the free sheets) or could not answer. Compared with a similar question (with a slightly different sample of newspapers based on the newspapers existing then) in the spring 1996, a major change in the popularity of newspapers had occurred (Table 6.9.). In 1996, the sample included also other towns and settlements (44% of the sample was in Petrozavodsk, 25% in settlements around it and 30% elsewhere in Karelia).

Severnyi Kurier, the clear leader among the readers' choices in 1996, had lost its position and fallen to third place after *Guberniya* and *Petrozavodsk*. Interestingly, the launch of *Guberniya* had not changed the ratings of *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama*, but received its gain mainly from *Severnyi Kurier* and partly from other newspapers.

Guberniya was not only the most read newspaper and the newspaper that the largest group would choose, but it was more successful among its own regular readers than any other newspaper. Of those who read *Guberniya* regularly, 53% would choose it as their newspaper, while of the regular readers of *Severnyi Kurier*, 50% and of the regular readers of *Petrozavodsk*, 40% would choose the newspaper in question. *TVR-Panorama* was the favourite for only 28% of those who read it regularly. *Nablyudatel*, despite its small number of regular readers (6% of the total sample), had many devoted readers: it was the main choice of 28% of its regular readers.

Table 6.9. The preferred newspaper when asked to choose only one (%)

Newspaper	1996	2000	development (per cent unit)
Severnyi Kurier	34.5	14.0	- 20.5
Petrozavodsk	22.7	21.3	- 1.4
Molodezhnaya gazeta	8.0	1.6	- 6.4
TVR-Panorama	7.9	10.8	+ 2.9
Guberniya	—	27.0	+ 27.0
Ves Petrozavodsk	0.8	—	-0.8
Nablyudatel	—	3.6	+ 3.6
Kareliya	1.5	1.6	+ 0.1
other (freesheets etc.)	8.5	4.6	- 3.9
no one of them	16.1	5.9	- 0.8
difficult to answer		9.4	

Comparison between pairs indicated that *Guberniya* was more popular than the other newspaper in the pair in all cases. Of those who read both *Guberniya* and *Severnyi Kurier* (n = 173), 29% chose *Guberniya* and 18% *Severnyi Kurier*. Of those who read *Guberniya*, *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* (n=206), one third (33%) chose *Guberniya*, 23% chose *Petrozavodsk* and 13% chose *TVR-Panorama*. It seems clear that *Guberniya* was the most popular newspaper not only among the population as a whole, but also among those who read more than one newspaper and had the possibility to compare them.

Among the readers of both *Nablyudatel* and *Severnyi Kurier* (N=99), one fourth (24%) preferred *Severnyi Kurier* and only 8% chose *Nablyudatel*. There were also some persons (8% of the sample) who would have wanted to choose a newspaper that they did not read at all. Most of them chose either *Severnyi Kurier* or *Petrozavodsk*. It is likely that this group of readers did not have the economic means to get the newspaper they would like to read (*Severnyi Kurier* and *Petrozavodsk* being the most expensive newspapers).

Those who did not want to choose one of the papers or who could not answer read fewer newspapers than others; the majority of them read regularly not a single newspaper and irregularly on average only two newspapers. In this group, the most popular newspapers were those newspapers that were popular in general (*Guberniya*, *Petrozavodsk*, *TVR-Panorama*); these people only read them less often than others. In general this group was less interested

in newspapers. Among the non-choosers were many specialists and usually highly educated persons. Those who did not choose any of these newspapers were usually old.

6.6.3. Audiences of individual newspapers

It is possible to distinguish different levels of audiences for each newspaper. First, those who read the paper regularly and chose it as their preferred newspaper (the core audience); second, others who read the paper regularly; and, third, those who read it irregularly. The core audiences of each paper differed most and the irregular readers were usually more like the population on average.

As would be expected for the most popular newspaper, the **audience of *Guberniya*** resembled the population in general. Only among the elderly was the reading of *Guberniya* less frequent. The core of *Guberniya*'s audience (those who selected *Guberniya* as their preferred newspaper and read it regularly), included 19% of all the respondents. They were almost equally men and women and were younger than the population in general. There were more industrial workers and fewer pensioners than among the population in general.

The other regular readers of *Guberniya* (18% of the total sample) were overwhelmingly women and equally distributed among age groups. It seems that a significant part of women and the older population read *Guberniya* regularly, but did not prefer it as their first choice. In this group, those who preferred another newspaper as their first choice usually chose *Petrozavodsk* (33% of them), *TVR-Panorama* (20%) or *Severnyi Kurier* (17%).

The irregular readers of *Guberniya* (34% of the sample) did not differ from the average population significantly on the basis of gender, age, education, employment status, workplace or income. In this group the most preferred newspaper was *Petrozavodsk* (26%), followed by *Guberniya* (19%), and *Severnyi Kurier* (11%).

Petrozavodsk was the second most popular newspaper in *Petrozavodsk*. The core of *Petrozavodsk*'s audience included 12% of all the respondents. In this group, lower levels of education were more frequent than on average (only 29% had higher education), and this group included fewer students and specialists. The majority (62%) were women, but the number of persons older than 50 was below average. *Petrozavodsk* was also preferred by persons with large families (almost half had four or more family members). Other regular readers of *Petrozavodsk* were close to the average population. In this

group, the most preferred newspaper was *Guberniya* (40%) and *Severnyi Kurier* was second (19%).

Also the irregular readers of *Petrozavodsk* resembled the average population. Of the irregular readers of *Petrozavodsk*, one sixth preferred it as their main newspaper choice, but the most often preferred choice was *Guberniya* (31%). After *Petrozavodsk* came both *Severnyi Kurier* and *TVR-Panorama*.

The average readers of *Petrozavodsk* did not differ from the audience of *Guberniya* much according to any socio-demographic variable (although the core audiences have differences). It would be difficult to find differences, because the majority of the population read both of these newspapers, but there were also no significant differences even between the parts of the population that read only either *Guberniya* or *Petrozavodsk* (around 15% of the sample in each group). The most important difference seemed to be that the active readers of *Guberniya* read *Severnyi Kurier* less actively than active readers of *Petrozavodsk*.

TVR-Panorama was remarkably a newspaper read mainly by women. The core audience of *TVR-Panorama* (7% of the sample) was comprised overwhelmingly of women (75%) and more middle-aged than young or old readers. According to other variables, it resembled the population as a whole. Also the other regular readers of *TVR-Panorama* (18% of the population) were mainly women (58%) but according to age they resembled the population as a whole. In this group the readers preferred usually *Guberniya* or *Petrozavodsk*.

Irregular readers of *TVR-Panorama* (32% of the population) were also mainly women (58%), but otherwise were close to the population as a whole. Many irregular readers of *TVR-Panorama* also read other newspapers (mainly *Guberniya* and *Petrozavodsk*) irregularly. Of the irregular readers of *TVR-Panorama*, only 9% chose it as their preferred newspaper (in fourth place after *Guberniya*, *Petrozavodsk* and *Severnyi Kurier*), while of the regular readers, 28% did so (even this figure was low in comparison with the regular readers of other newspapers).

The **audience of *Severnyi Kurier***, the most popular daily newspaper in Karelia, differed from the readers of the three weekly newspapers more than the audiences of the weekly newspapers differed from each other. The majority of the readers of *Severnyi Kurier* were older than 50 (few young people read it) and their education was higher than average.

Those who read *Severnyi Kurier* and named it as their first choice totalled 7% of all respondents. They were mostly elderly (73% over 50 years old), included equally women and men and, if working, were specialists who worked

mostly in culture, media or education. The majority of them subscribed to newspapers. The higher price of *Severnnyi Kurier* excluded a greater part (15%) of those who would like to choose the newspaper but who did not read it. Other regular readers of *Severnnyi Kurier* were also old (56% over 50), were mostly women, were very highly educated (62% had at least incomplete higher education), and were specialists and managers. They preferred mostly *Petrozavodsk* and *Guberniya*, but there were also many who do not prefer any newspaper.

Irregular readers of *Severnnyi Kurier* were also older than the population in general (50% over 50 years old), were highly educated, and were more evenly distributed according to class position and type of workplace, although among them were more specialists, managers and workers. They read popular newspapers more frequently than regular readers but *Kareliya* less frequently.

Nablyudatel was read less frequently than the four most popular newspapers and only around 20% of the readers of *Nablyudatel* read it regularly. Readers of *Nablyudatel* differed from the population in general on the basis of age, gender, professional status and workplace but they were more educated than the population in general. The readers of *Nablyudatel* were more eager readers of all the other newspapers than the people in general.

The regular readers of *Nablyudatel* were so few (32 persons, 6%) in the sample that it was difficult to make any generalisations, but they were more frequently women (72%), were older than the population in general and were even more educated than other readers of *Nablyudatel*. They were almost exclusively specialists, managers or pensioners and were often working in administration. One-third of them lived in the centre of Petrozavodsk. Among the regular readers of *Nablyudatel*, it was the most often preferred newspaper choice (28%), while only 6% of irregular readers preferred it.

Irregular readers of *Nablyudatel* (25% of the population) were also more educated than the population on average but were otherwise close to the average population. They preferred most often *Guberniya*, *Petrozavodsk* and *Severnnyi Kurier*.

As a governmental newspaper, *Kareliya* was regularly read by specialists and managers but also by pensioners. Readers of *Kareliya* were also older and more educated than the population on average. Workers in administration were more frequent readers of *Kareliya*, as were workers in science, culture, education and the media. Many of the regular readers (over 20%) read the paper at work. Regular readers of *Kareliya* had a higher income than the population on average (73% over 750 roubles per month) and felt better about the economic position of their families. Only few readers preferred *Kareliya* as their first choice, rather choosing *Severnnyi Kurier* (24%),

Guberniya (15%) or *Petrozavodsk* (12%) instead. Regular readers of *Kareliya* were very heterogeneous in their newspaper preferences.

Irregular readers of *Kareliya* resembled the population in general more than regular readers. They were also almost as old as the regular readers and even more educated, but their incomes were on an average level. Interestingly, the readers of *Kareliya* were more frequent supporters of opposition candidates (34%) than Putin (33%).

The audience of the other daily newspaper, *Reporter*, differed rather much from the audience of *Severnii Kurier*. Only 37% of the readers of *Severnii Kurier* read *Reporter*, while *Severnii Kurier* was read by 63% of the readers of *Reporter*. There were more women and more young and middle-aged respondents reading *Reporter* regularly than among the population in general. Readers of *Reporter* were also more educated than the population in general (53% had higher education). *Reporter* was read more often by specialists and less frequently by workers. These readers worked slightly more frequently in science, education and culture, and in medical fields than the population in general. Their income and economic situation were close to the average.

Compared with the readers of *Severnii Kurier*, *Reporter* was read more frequently by women (of readers of *Severnii Kurier* 53% were women, compared with 58% of the readers of *Reporter*) and young people. Compared with the other newspaper of the same company, *Guberniya*, *Reporter* was read more by women (*Reporter* 58%; *Guberniya* 55%) and its readers were more educated.

It is perhaps not surprising that the readers of *Reporter* preferred *Severnii Kurier* more often than other readers (many of them being readers of *Severnii Kurier* as well), but perhaps surprisingly *Guberniya* was slightly less popular among *Reporter* readers than among the population as a whole. Also *TVR-Panorama* was more popular as the first newspaper choice among them than *Reporter* itself. *Reporter* itself was a preferred choice only for three respondents. It seems that the ecological niche of *Reporter* was small and occupied by many other newspapers as well and that these other newspapers could cover this niche better. No wonder that *Reporter* was closed in May 2000.

Molodezhnaya gazeta has had serious difficulties in finding an audience in the new press market. *MG*, as it is also called, was read only by one fourth of those under 30 and almost exclusively irregularly. The few regular readers (10) surveyed were mostly old women. Moreover, only one third of the readers of *MG* were below 30 years old. The audience was relatively heterogeneous

for such a small newspaper and there was not a single group in which *MG* was among the most popular newspapers.

Among the young, *Molodezhnaya gazeta* reached best those with the lowest education (perhaps the youngest) and students better than those already working. The survey did not include readers less than 19 years old, among which *MG* might have had more readers. Also those young people who were interested in youth issues and music read *MG* more often (38% of those who read about youth issues regularly) than others (25% of those who read about youth issues sometimes and 4% of those who were not interested in these issues).

For those who read *MG*, the most popular newspaper choice was *Petrozavodsk*, followed by *Guberniya* and *TVR-Panorama*. Among the young readers of *MG*, *Guberniya* was, however, clearly the most popular choice, as was the case among all the young. *Molodezhnaya gazeta* itself was the preferred choice for only eight respondents and only five of them actually read *MG*.

In all the age groups, the readers of *MG* read on average more newspapers than others (among the young, two newspapers or more, among the middle-aged and old, three newspapers or more). *Molodezhnaya gazeta* was clearly a secondary newspaper for those who are interested in youth issues.

Nabat Severo-Zapada was read by a small part of population (3% regularly, 15% irregularly). The readers of *Nabat Severo-Zapada* were older than average (48% over 50 years old), were more highly educated, and were often pensioners (36%) or unemployed (12%). Their incomes were lower and families smaller than average.

Nabat Severo-Zapada was the only newspaper that was read more often by the unemployed and those with a low income than by other social groups. One of the reasons may be that *Nabat* was distributed for free in some parts of Petrozavodsk. This was indicated also by the fact that almost 40% of the readers (and 85% of regular readers) lived in the Kukkovka suburb (no other newspaper had such a high proportion of readers in one part of the city). On the other hand, among the regular readers of *Nabat* were many who read newspapers (in general) while visiting friends.

In the small audience of ***Leninskaya pravda*** (regular readers 3%, irregular readers 6% of the sample), the majority was male (57%), and two thirds of the readers were over 50 years old. The readers of *Leninskaya pravda* were well educated, mostly pensioners and, if working, were more likely working in cultural and educational fields.

They preferred the scandalous newspapers (e.g. *Guberniya*) less frequently than people on average but there were no major differences in their preferences

for other local newspapers. On the other hand, the choice of the preferred national newspaper distinguished them more: one third chose either *Sovetskaya Rossiya* or *Pravda*. Zyuganov was clearly the favourite of the readers of *Leninskaya pravda* (43%, versus 19% for Putin).

The audiences of *Oma mua* and *Karjalan Sanomat* were very small, but anyhow they could be found in a survey like this. Among the respondents, *Oma mua* was read irregularly by five persons and *Karjalan Sanomat* was read irregularly by four persons. One respondent read regularly both of these newspapers. Of the ethnic Karelians in the sample (39 persons), either *Oma mua* or *Karjalan Sanomat* were read by 10% (4 persons). These newspapers were also read by some Belorussians and Russians. Of the Finns in the sample (11 persons), no one mentioned the reading of *Karjalan Sanomat* or *Oma mua*.

It is likely that also in 1993-1994 the readers of *Oma mua* and *Karjalan Sanomat* were mainly Karelians and Finns and therefore it is possible to estimate that around 20% them read *Karjalan Sanomat* and 15% *Oma mua* (it is likely that the readership of these newspapers overlapped heavily). On the basis of this calculation, the reading of *Karjalan Sanomat* and *Oma mua* among the Karelians and Finns of Petrozavodsk decreased between 1993 and 2000. This is not surprising, since many of those who knew Karelian or Finnish in 1993 may have either died or emigrated to Finland.

6.6.4. Various newspaper diets of the population

The reading of newspapers overlapped heavily, since the majority of the population reads many newspapers. The overlapping reading of newspapers is visible in Table 6.10. The reading of some (usually unpopular) newspapers was concentrated on those who read many newspapers. On the other hand, the readers of the most popular newspapers were close to the average population also on the basis of their newspaper choices.

Those reading unpopular newspapers were active newspaper readers in general. On average, the highest number of newspapers was read by the readers of *Zavtra*; they were followed by the readers of *Pravda*, *Kommersant-Daily* and *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. Among the readers of local newspapers, the most active were the readers of *Leninskaya pravda* and *Molodezhnaya gazeta*. When the newspaper sample of a reader included these newspapers, the reader was likely to be very active in searching for different newspapers and reading almost all the newspapers more actively than other readers. Only some differences appeared: the readers of *Zavtra* were not interested in *Guberniya* or *Reporter* more than the population on average. The readers of *Kommersant-*

Daily tended to avoid communist newspapers like *Pravda* and *Leninskaya pravda*, the nationalist papers *Zavtra* and *Nabat* and for some reason the local daily newspapers.

Readers of *TVR-Panorama* were among the most passive and were closest to the average readers of newspapers: they read the smallest number of newspapers in general and did not select other newspapers (other than *Petrozavodsk*) more frequently than the population in general.

Table 6.9. Overlapping newspaper reading. Per cent of those reading another newspaper among the (regular and irregular) readers of the mentioned newspapers (e.g. 83% of the readers of *Kareliya* read also *Guberniya*).

Figures in bold = difference is statistically significant at 0.05 and at least 10%-points above the average level.

Newspaper	Total sample	Gub. (359)	Karel. (125)	Len. pr (47)	Mol. g (72)	Nabat (91)	Nabl. (161)	Petroz. (362)	Sev. k (227)	Rep. (149)	TVR (291)
Guberniya	71	100	83	81	76	63	83	79	76	85	80
Kareliya	25	29	100	55	39	33	44	29	41	38	30
Len. pravda	9	11	21	100	14	32	14	11	15	15	12
Molod. gazeta	14	15	22	21	100	19	23	19	12	28	18
Nabat	18	16	24	40	24	100	26	17	21	29	18
Nablyudatel	32	37	57	49	51	45	100	39	44	56	41
Petrozavodsk	71	80	84	87	93	68	87	100	78	84	82
Severnyi Kurier	45	48	74	70	61	59	62	49	100	63	46
Reporter	29	35	46	47	57	58	52	35	41	100	36
TVR-Panorama	57	65	70	77	71	58	74	66	59	71	100
Argumenty i f.	58	66	68	64	69	62	76	65	67	71	66
Komsom. pr.	24	27	38	40	42	28	40	29	32	36	30
Mosk. komsom.	11	12	19	11	24	10	18	12	15	17	13
Nezavisim. gaz.	8	10	16	15	25	13	15	10	11	16	11
Sov. Rossiya	8	9	17	40	15	14	16	10	12	13	10
Izvestiya	5	6	11	6	10	9	11	6	9	9	6
Trud	5	6	10	21	11	7	8	7	9	8	7
Pravda	5	6	14	36	6	8	10	6	8	7	6
Kommersant-D	5	6	9	2	14	6	10	6	5	9	6
Zavtra	3	3	7	15	6	7	4	3	4	3	3
Regul. newsp. (average)	1.6	1.8	2.5	2.8	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.8	2.1	2.1	1.6
Irregul. newsp. (average)	3.5	4.1	5.5	6.0	5.9	5.0	5.6	4.2	4.6	5.5	3.1

Table 6.10. (cont.)

Newspaper	Total sample	A i F (295)	Kom pr (123)	Mosk. K. (58)	Nezav. g. (41)	Sov. R (42)	Izvest (27)	Trud (26)	Pravda (24)	Komm. D.(24)	Zavtra (13)
Guberniya	71	80	79	74	83	79	74	81	83	92	69
Kareliya	25	29	39	41	49	50	52	47	75	46	69
Len. pravda	9	10	15	9	17	46	11	38	71	4	54
Molod. gazeta	14	17	24	29	44	26	26	31	17	42	31
Nabat	18	19	20	15	29	31	30	23	29	21	46
Nablyudatel	32	41	52	50	59	60	67	47	67	67	54
Petrozavodsk	71	80	85	78	85	83	82	92	88	96	92
Severnyi Kurier	45	51	59	60	59	64	74	81	75	50	77
Reporter	29	36	43	43	59	46	48	47	46	54	31
TVR-Panorama	57	65	70	67	76	71	63	77	75	67	77
Argumenty i f.	58	100	87	78	83	64	63	77	67	88	62
Komsom. pr.	24	36	100	59	49	43	48	81	50	58	54
Mosk. komsom.	11	17	28	100	39	10	30	31	21	46	23
Nezavisim. g.	8	13	16	28	100	26	30	15	17	63	39
Sovet. Rossiya	8	9	15	7	27	100	19	27	63	25	62
Izvestiya	5	9	11	14	20	12	100	19	21	29	15
Trud	5	7	15	14	10	17	19	100	21	13	23
Pravda	5	6	10	9	10	36	19	19	100	13	54
Kommersant	5	7	11	19	37	14	26	12	13	100	15
Zavtra	3	3	6	5	12	19	7	12	29	8	100
Regul. newsp. (average)	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.6	3.8
Irreg. newsp. (average)	3.5	4.5	5.5	5.9	6.9	6.2	6.5	4.7	7.2	7.3	6.7

Table 6.11. indicates that the reading of the most popular newspapers (*Guberniya*, *Petrozavodsk*) did not increase the reading of other newspapers significantly compared with the population in general, while the reading of those newspapers which were not read by the majority of the population was concentrated heavily among some individuals who usually read other unpopular newspapers as well.

The readers of *Severnyi Kurier* read *Kareliya*, *Nablyudatel* and *Reporter* more often than people in general and the readers of *Kareliya* followed actively many regional newspapers, but as readers of national newspapers, they were only slightly above average. Only *Argumenty i fakty* and *Komsomolskaya*

pravda were those national newspapers that the readers of *Kareliya* read significantly more actively than the population in general.

The statistical analysis methods may give some further evidence as to the principles according to which the readers chose their local newspapers. First, factor analysis of all the local newspapers produced four factors. These factors explained together 53.6% of the variance. The first of these factors consisted mainly of quality or elite newspapers, *Severnyi Kurier* being the prime example. Also some other newspapers with a small audience (e.g. *Molodezhnaya gazeta*) received a high value on this factor. This factor explained 21.0% of the variance.

The second factor was comprised of *Karjalan Sanomat* and *Oma mua*. This factor clearly represented the reading of minority language newspapers (or mainly not reading them). It explained 13.1% of the variance. One may ask why a factor which received high values for two minor newspapers explained that much of the variance and the reason can be found in the non-reading of newspapers in general. This factor represented not only the readers of *Karjalan Sanomat* and *Oma mua* but also those who read very few newspapers in general.


The third factor received high scores on popular newspapers, *TVR-Panorama*, *Petrozavodsk* and *Guberniya*. It explained 10.9% of the variance. The fourth factor received high values only for two political newspapers, *Leninskaya pravda* and *Nabat Severo-Zapada*. This factor explained 8.5% of the variance.

Table 6.11. Dimensions of content categories of four factors (decimal points have been omitted). Varimax rotation.

Newspaper	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Severnyi Kurier	73	06	-15	06
Kareliya	65	09	06	19
Nablyudatel	53	11	37	10
Guberniya	19	-03	56	-24
Reporter	56	00	26	07
Molodezhnaya gazeta	49	08	13	-06
Petrozavodsk	24	-07	61	-09
TVR-Panorama	-01	12	71	27
Nabat Severo-Zapada	13	-00	-22	70
Leninskaya pravda	10	-00	17	76
Karjalan sanomat	01	92	00	-03
Oma mua	14	91	02	03

When political newspapers and minority language newspapers have been excluded from the analysis, only two factors, elite newspapers and popular newspapers, remain. Now the first one of them explained 28.4% of the variance and the second one 14.4%. Newspapers can be placed in a two-dimensional figure according to these factors. In Figure 6.1 below, the newspapers can be found on an almost direct diagonal, running from the top-left to the bottom-right corner, in other words, from the most popular or trivial to the most elite or serious newspaper.

Figure 6.1. Positions of the main newspapers on the basis of two factors.



When the factors for the reading of other than political and minority newspapers were counted separately for each of six groups based on age and gender, some differences appeared. For the young, the factors could be called 1. popular and serious (*Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama*); 2. oppositional, scandalous (*Guberniya* and *Reporter*); 3. youth-oriented paper (*Molodezhnaya gazeta*); and 4. quality newspapers (*Severnyi Kurier* and *Kareliya*).

For the middle-aged, the factors were: 1. quality newspapers (*Severnyi Kurier*, *Kareliya*, *Reporter*); 2. popular and conservative (*TVR*); 3. popular and scandalous (*Guberniya*). For the elderly, only two factors arose: quality (*Severnyi Kurier*, *Kareliya*, *Nablyudatel*) and popular (*Guberniya*, *Petrozavodsk*).


On the basis of these findings, it seems that there were three newspapers — *Guberniya*, *Severnyi Kurier* and *TVR-Panorama* — which divided the audience. Among the young, *Reporter* was linked with *Guberniya*, while the others linked it with *Severnyi Kurier*. Among the young, *Petrozavodsk* was in

the same group with *TVR-Panorama*, while the elderly linked it with *Guberniya*. *Kareliya* was always linked with *Severnyi Kurier*. *Nablyudatel* was linked with different papers in each age group: the young linked it with *Molodezhnaya gazeta*, the middle-aged with *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* and the old with quality newspapers. A similar picture remained when, besides age, also gender was included in the analysis.

It seems that different gender and age groups selected their newspapers somewhat differently but the basic choice was usually made among three newspapers of different character and the differences were mainly based on the reading (or not reading) of other newspapers.

Another method, multidimensional scaling¹ of proximities and distances between newspapers on the basis of the readers' newspaper choices, gave the following picture. The two dimensions on the basis of which the readers seemed to choose their newspapers could be called audience size and newspaper content. Clearly, the first dimension (degree of popularity) distinguished between newspapers geared to large versus small audiences. The readers of smaller newspapers tended to read also other newspapers for small audiences, while the readers of the most popular newspapers read on average fewer newspapers.

Figure 6.2. Two-dimensional scaling of newspapers on the basis on readers' choices at the beginning of 2000.



1 Performed with the Proxscal function of the SPSS 10.0 programme.

The second dimension (degree of scandalismness) distinguished between newspapers like *Guberniya* and *Reporter* (highlighting various scandals etc. and being lively and dynamic in their layout, and having a great number of common readers) and newspapers like *Severnyi Kurier* and *Kareliya* (which were rather conservative in their content and layout).


The newspapers with a small audience were rather close to each other, mostly on the basis of non-reading. Most of the population did not read any of these newspapers. The three popular newspapers were relatively far from each other just because of greater variance in the reading of them, although the majority of the population read at least two of them (and 40% all of them).

Even correlations between newspapers revealed that there were different interests and tastes that divided the audience. First, almost all the correlations (Pearsons correlation) were positive (a negative correlation could be found only between *Nabat* and each of *Guberniya*, *TVR-Panorama*, *Petrozavodsk* and *Karjalan Sanomat*, and between *Oma mua* and *Petrozavodsk*). Second, most of the correlations were relatively weak. The highest correlations were between *Oma mua* and *Karjalan Sanomat* (.704), *Severnyi Kurier* and *Kareliya* (.358), *Reporter* and *Nablyudatel* (.314) and *Kareliya* and *Nablyudatel* (.279). The lowest correlations were between *Guberniya* and rarely read newspapers, but also between *Guberniya* and *Severnyi Kurier* (.040) and *Severnyi Kurier* and *TVR-Panorama* (.016). Also correlations indicated the large differences among three newspapers: *Guberniya*, *Severnyi Kurier* and *TVR-Panorama*.

Still another method, hierarchical cluster analysis, was used in order to define proximities between newspapers on the basis of readers' choices. This analysis produced the following dendrogram (Figure 6.3.), which shows the proximities between newspapers.

Hierarchical cluster analysis is only one-dimensional and therefore provides information which is somewhere between factor analysis and multidimensional scaling. The divisions were based mainly on the size of the audience. The most clear division was between popular and elite newspapers. Among the popular newspapers, *Guberniya* and *Petrozavodsk* were closer to each other and *TVR-Panorama* a bit farther away from them. The distances between popular newspapers were still quite large if compared with the distances between the elite (small audience) newspapers.

Figure 6.3. Dendrogram using average linkage (between groups)



Among the elite newspapers, the clearest division was between *Severnyi Kurier* and the others. *Kareliya*, *Nablyudatel* and *Reporter* were quite close to each other. *Karjalan Sanomat* and *Oma mua* as minority newspapers were very close to each other and, on the basis of lower readership, *Molodezhnaya gazeta* came close to them. Actually, half of the readers (four out of eight) of either *Oma mua* or *Karjalan Sanomat* also read *Molodezhnaya gazeta* irregularly and therefore the closeness of these papers was highly justified.

Cluster analysis (K-Means Cluster) can be used also in order to define groups of the population on the basis of their newspaper diets. In order to increase the scale, the core audiences (those reading a newspaper regularly and preferring it as their first choice) were defined in addition to the regular and irregular reading. Therefore a four-dimensional scale was formed: not reading, reading irregularly, reading regularly, reading regularly as the first choice. The minority language newspapers, the readers of which form their own cluster, were excluded in order to get relatively equal clusters.

The k-means cluster analysis with six clusters produced the following groups. First, those who read newspapers a little or mainly irregularly. This group comprised 31% of the population. According to socio-demographic variables, this group was close to the population as a whole. The clearest difference was that this group includes a higher share of those (21%) who saw

their living conditions as catastrophic. In this group, the reading of newspapers was mainly irregular.

Second was a group that was reading *Guberniya* (20%). The members of this group were younger, more proletarian (29% workers) and it had a male majority. Interestingly, the *Guberniya* cluster was composed of population groups that were not among the most populous, but the cluster was large because it was compiled from several of these kinds of groups.

The third group, which was reading *Petrozavodsk* regularly (15%), was the most middle-aged and the least educated and there were rather many workers in it (26%). The fourth group was characterised by reading of a lot of newspapers (14%). It was the most highly educated, rather old (54% over 50), and had the lowest proportion of those seeing their living conditions as catastrophic. Many of the members of this group lived in the city centre. The fifth group was made up of the readers of *TVR-Panorama* (12%), which were mostly women (70%) and were often working as specialists (43%). Finally, the readers of *Severnyi Kurier* (8%) were the oldest of all the groups (71% over 50), were rather highly educated, and if working, were usually specialists. The distances between these groups are shown in Table 6.12.

Table 6.12. Distances between clusters and average distance from cluster centres in each cluster.

Cluster	1	2	3	4	5	6	average distance from cluster centre
1 Irregular readers		2.3	2.1	2.8	2.2	2.4	1.36
2 Guberniya readers	2.3		2.7	2.4	2.8	3.3	1.55
3 Petroz. readers	2.1	2.7		2.2	2.6	3.0	1.64
4 Intensive readers	2.8	2.4	2.2		2.6	2.6	2.12
5 TVR readers	2.2	2.8	2.6	2.6		3.1	1.66
6 Sev. Kurier readers	2.4	3.3	3.0	2.6	3.1		1.80

The distances were the biggest between groups 2 and 6, 5 and 6 and 3 and 6 and are the smallest between groups 1 and 3, 1 and 5 and 3 and 4. Group 6, comprised of the readers of *Severnyi Kurier*, differed mostly from those who preferred one of the popular newspapers. On the other hand, those preferring either *Petrozavodsk* or *TVR-Panorama* were close to those who read newspapers only occasionally or not at all, and the readers of *Petrozavodsk* were also close to those reading a lot of newspapers. This is no wonder, since *Petrozavodsk* was the most often read newspaper both among those reading

few newspapers and among those reading many of them. The cluster of active reading was internally the most heterogeneous, while the cluster of occasional reading was internally the most homogenous.

As can be seen from Table 6.13., the clusters which had been formed around four popular newspapers, irregular reading and extensive reading differ very much on the basis of newspaper diets. The high distance between *Severnnyi Kurier* and *Guberniya* was clear. In the sixth group the reading of *Guberniya* was on the lowest level and in the second group *Severnnyi Kurier* had the least popularity. The *Guberniya* cluster was the only one in which *Reporter* was more popular than *Severnnyi Kurier*, although in the fourth cluster *Reporter* competed rather well for the place of the most popular daily.

As could be expected, the preferred newspaper of the majority was 'the cluster newspaper' in all the four clusters formed around one newspaper. The clearest preference was in the clusters of *Severnnyi Kurier* and *Guberniya* (over 70% chose the cluster newspaper). In the cluster of extensive reading, the most popular newspaper choices were *Guberniya* (30%) and *Petrozavodsk* (28%), followed by *Nablyudatel* (12%) and *Severnnyi Kurier* (10%); in the cluster of occasional reading, there were many not choosing any of the papers (30%), followed by *Petrozavodsk*, *Guberniya* and *Severnnyi Kurier* (each of them chosen by 13-19%).

Table 6.13. Newspaper reading (first figure: regular reading; second figure: irregular reading; % in each cluster). The most popular newspaper in each cluster in bold, second most popular underlined, third in italics¹.

Cluster	Cluster size	Gubern.	Petroz.	TVR-P.	Sev. Kurier	Nablyud	Kareliya	Report	Len. pravda
1 Irregular readers	31%	- 50	- 56	- <i>41</i>	- 33	2 17	1 15	1 18	1 4
2 Guberniya readers	20%	100 -	16 45	<i>13 31</i>	3 25	- 22	5 9	6 23	1 4
3 Petroz. readers	15%	24 42	100 -	<i>19 31</i>	3 31	1 24	6 10	1 17	4 5
4 Intensive readers	14%	65 33	65 35	<i>39 52</i>	30 59	35 52	23 41	22 49	7 17
5 TVR readers	12%	22 43	<i>16 48</i>	100 -	- 29	5 22	3 16	5 14	6 2
6 Sev. Kurier readers	8%	14 33	17 45	<i>24 19</i>	100 -	2 29	7 31	2 33	5 7
All	100%	36 34	31 41	25 32	13 31	6 25	6 18	6 24	3 6

1 In the sixth cluster *Guberniya* had more readers than *TVR-Panorama*, but *TVR-Panorama* had more regular readers than *Guberniya*.

Petrozavodsk as “the newspaper in the middle” had rather many readers in all the clusters. Moreover, *Petrozavodsk* was read by 60% of the population outside its own cluster and the cluster of extensive reading. This was the highest share of audience outside these two groups, compared with *Guberniya* with 50%, *TVR-Panorama* with 44% and *Severnyi Kurier* with 30%. The majority of the regular readers of *Nablyudatel*, *Reporter* and *Kareliya* belonged to the cluster of active readers.

Those who read newspapers irregularly followed on average only 2.7 newspapers, while those clustered around the four most popular newspapers on average read regularly 1.5-1.7 newspapers and irregularly 1.8-2.3 newspapers. The members of the most active group on average read regularly 3.0 and irregularly 4.0 local newspapers and they were also the most active readers of national newspapers.

One problem in using cluster analysis to define groups of readers is that the formation of clusters is at least partly haphazard: the structure of groups changes a little if the order of cases (and the order of variables in the cluster analysis) in the data matrix changes. Although these changes moved only 10-15% of the cases to another cluster if the number of clusters remained constant, it makes the replication of the analysis difficult and the results (even the characterisation of clusters) may differ according to haphazard reasons. On the other hand, the cases which changed a group were on the edge of the cluster and therefore could be easily placed in another cluster.

On the basis of cluster analysis five groups of readers could be identified: three groups based on the regular reading of each of the most popular newspapers, one group based on extensive reading of many newspapers and still one group based on the irregular reading of newspapers generally. The irregular group was rather large and therefore it did not differ much from the population on average. This group may serve as a potential market for new newspapers or as a battleground of the old newspapers for new readers. On the other hand, the less popular newspapers found readers mostly in the group that read many newspapers and therefore may have difficulties in establishing their own clusters.

6.6.5. Factors influencing the newspaper choice

There did not seem to be major differences based on class, income or education in reading newspapers. A more significant factor was age (Table 6.14.); part of the older population continued to read mainly the traditional newspapers and was less interested in new ones, while among the young the new newspapers were clearly more popular.

Although the differences were small, it seems that regular reading increased a bit with age, while irregular reading was more frequent among the young. A significant part of the older audience rejected the new popular papers. *TVR-Panorama*, *Nablyudatel* and *Reporter* were almost equally read in all the age groups, while *Severnyi Kurier* was clearly a paper of the older generation and *Kareliya* and *Nabat* had slightly more readers among the older generation than among the younger one. Among the young, the share of those reading not a single ordinary newspaper was greatest and among the middle-aged population the lowest.

Table 6.14. The impact of age and gender on reading various newspapers. % reading either irregularly or regularly

newspaper	men			women		
	-29 n=48	30-49 n=87	50- n=91	-29 n=57	30-49 n=97	50- n=125
Guberniya	75	71	67	75	72	69
Petrozavodsk	77	72	63	77	71	71
TVR-Panorama	50	56	46	65	59	65
Severnyi Kurier	29	40	62	26	41	53
Nablyudatel	27	32	30	32	33	33
Reporter	23	35	23	39	28	30
Kareliya	10	22	36	16	21	30
Nabat	13	17	22	11	21	19
Mol. gazeta	23	13	7	25	11	14
Len. pravda	4	9	19	0	5	12
Not any of these papers	8	3	4	5	4	5
Average number of regularly read papers	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.5
Average number of irregularly read papers	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.5

Age caused difference also in the ways in which the people got their newspapers. Among the older generation subscribing was three times more common than among the young. The older were also more frequent readers of newspapers bought at stands.

Gender had some effect on newspaper choices. Especially *TVR-Panorama* and also *Petrozavodsk, Reporter* and *Nablyudatel* were read more actively by women, while *Severnyi Kurier* and *Kareliya* had more readers among men. The differences caused by gender are minor.

Social grouping caused significant differences in the reading of newspapers (Table 6.15.). Newspaper reading increased with social position, but some newspapers were read almost with the same frequency in all social groups. It is important to notice that two groups, pensioners and students, are highly age-bound.

Table 6.15. Readers of various newspapers according to social group (% both regular and irregular reading).

newspaper	workers	officials	specialists	managers, pens. unemp. students	entrepren.		
Guberniya	71	77	72	79	66	61	72
Petrozavodsk	74	88	73	75	67	58	78
TVR-Panorama	57	58	63	60	55	45	50
Severnyi Kurier	28	41	49	53	55	42	25
Nablyudatel	24	18	35	36	33	26	33
Reporter	21	24	36	34	28	26	26
Kareliya	7	29	26	38	28	23	6
Nabat	13	24	15	9	25	35	8
Mol. gazeta	11	6	14	21	10	10	31
Len. pravda	5	—	7	13	18	3	6
Not any of these papers	7	6	5	3	4	3	6
Average number of regularly read papers	1.2	1.0	1.3	2.1	1.5	0.8	1.0
Average number of irregularly read papers	2.0	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.3

While there were no newspapers overwhelmingly read by workers, there were newspapers which the workers did not read. These included *Kareliya* and *Severnyi Kurier*, but also *Nablyudatel* and *Leninskaya pravda* were read less frequently by workers.

Also education had a small impact. All the papers were read more actively by those with higher education, while some of the papers (the most popular ones) were read even by those with a lower level of education.

It seems that the choice of different newspapers has to do with the cultural capital of the readers. The groups with higher cultural capital read more newspapers and they also read elite newspapers more often. This cultural capital, however, is not formed by education (only) but mainly by their positions at work.

Also political preferences (Table 6.16.) caused some differences in newspaper choice. Supporters of Zyuganov read *Leninskaya pravda* significantly more often than supporters of other candidates. *Severnyi Kurier* was also read slightly more often by supporters of Zyuganov, but in this case the explaining factor was age: both those voting for Zyuganov and the readers of *Severnyi Kurier* were older than the population on average. The supporters of Yavlinskii read *Severnyi Kurier* and *Kareliya* less and chose more often *Nablyudatel*, *Guberniya* and *Reporter*.

Table 6.16. Readers of some newspapers (both regular and irregular) among supporters of various presidential candidates

Newspaper	Putin (197)	Yavlinskii (58)	Zyuganov (48)	Other candidate (38)	Against all, will not vote (164)
Guberniya	68	78	63	71	74
Petrozavodsk	69	78	71	60	75
TVR-Panorama	55	62	67	45	59
Severnyi Kurier	45	36	52	47	46
Kareliya	21	26	35	29	25
Nablyudatel	26	48	31	18	36
Reporter	28	41	29	26	27
Leninskaya pravda	5	3	42	13	7
Nabat Severo-Zapada	18	12	25	26	16

The fact that Putin was an overwhelmingly popular candidate and that support for other candidates was a more conscious act was visible also in newspaper selection. The less popular newspapers were more popular among the supporters of the minor candidates (depending also on the political alignment of the newspaper): supporters of Yavlinskii were looking for alternative information in *Nablyudatel* and *Reporter*, while supporters of Zyuganov did so with *Leninskaya pravda*. *Leninskaya pravda* was the only newspaper the reading of which was defined primarily by political preferences:

of its readers who told their candidate choice, almost 60% supported Zyuganov (75% of regular readers) and over 40% of the supporters of Zyuganov read it, at least occasionally. Among those who do not read *Leninskaya pravda*, only 10% (of those who told their candidate) supported Zyuganov. *Nabat Severo-Zapada* did not reflect a similar difference between candidates. Only among those (n=8) who would like to vote for another candidate (not on the list), *Nabat* was significantly more popular (the majority of them read *Nabat*).

6.6.6. Factors influencing the preferred newspaper choice

Although the reading of popular newspapers differed on the basis of age and gender, the differences were even more remarkable when the preferred newspaper choice was analysed. Table 6.17. reveals that old men were the most conservative in their newspaper choices, while both young men and women were the most eager to choose new and scandalous newspapers. Age was a more important factor than gender.

Table 6.17. Preferred newspaper by gender and age (%)

	Men			Women		
	young	middle-aged	old	young	middle-aged	old
Guberniya	40	28	26	37	24	20
Petrozavodsk	21	20	14	14	28	25
Severnyi Kurier	2	16	26	4	7	18
TVR-Panorama	4	9	1	14	16	17
Nablyudatel	8	5	3	2	3	3
Other choices	8	9	10	12	4	6
No answer	17	14	19	18	19	10

Moreover, the differences between age groups were stronger among men than women. The difference was smallest between young men and women and gender had the greatest influence among the old. Old men preferred more frequently traditional newspapers like *Severnyi Kurier* (and also *Leninskaya pravda*, included among the other choices), while old women read more mass-oriented, but less scandalous newspapers like *TVR-Panorama* and *Petrozavodsk*. *Severnyi Kurier* was the most often preferred newspaper among those who subscribed to newspapers (one third of them chose it).

Also social class had an important impact on newspaper preferences (Table 6.17). *Guberniya* was popular especially among the lower class and students,

while *Petrozavodsk* and *TVR-Panorama* were more popular among the middle class than among workers. The age factor caused *Severnii Kurier* to be the most popular newspaper among pensioners. Interestingly, *Severnii Kurier* was not apparently popular among managers and entrepreneurs, although they read it actively. *Petrozavodsk* was the second most popular newspaper in all the groups.

Table 6.18. Preferred newspaper by social status

newspaper	workers	officials	specialists	managers,	pens.	unemp.	students
Guberniya	39	41	26	28	16	13	43
Petrozavodsk	25	18	21	26	19	26	11
TVR-Panorama	6	12	14	9	11	16	9
Severnii Kurier	10	6	12	6	27	10	3
Nablyudatel	2	6	5	4	4	—	3
Other choices	11	6	5	9	9	6	9
No one of them, difficult to answer	6	12	17	19	13	29	23

Education caused no major differences: only *TVR-Panorama* got more popularity when education increases. Also political preference was less visible, although the supporters of Zyuganov preferred *Guberniya* less. On the other hand, there was no major difference in preferences between the supporters of Putin and Yavlinskii.

6.6.7. Audiences of the national newspapers

The regional newspapers were followed by almost everybody surveyed, at least irregularly. The audience of the national newspapers was more selective. One third of the population in Karelia did not read national newspapers at all and only less than one fifth (17%) read them regularly. The national newspapers have clearly lost part of their audience. While a large overlap existed in the reading of regional newspapers, only around one half of those who read national newspapers followed more than one national newspaper (and only 8% did that regularly).

The more highly educated and more affluent read national newspapers more often than those with lower education and income. The influence of income did not function only through the lack of resources, because a

significant part of the readers of national newspapers (37% of all readers of national newspapers) read them at the homes of relatives and friends.

Interestingly, the influence of age was a smaller factor in national newspaper reading, whereas the opposite was the case with the regional newspapers (Table 6.19). Those national newspapers in which major differences based on age can be found (*Argumenty i fakty*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Kommersant-Daily*), were more often read by the young.

Although differences were small, it seems that the most conservative national newspapers (*Zavtra*, *Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*) were read more frequently by the old, but they also had more readers among the young than among the middle-aged.

Table 6.19. Age and reading of national newspapers, % reading either regularly or irregularly.

Newspaper	-29	30-49	50-
<i>Argumenty i fakty</i>	65	65	49
<i>Komsomolskaya pravda</i>	22	29	22
<i>Moskovskii komsomolets</i>	15	14	8
<i>Sovetskaya Rossiya</i>	9	4	12
<i>Nezavisimaya gazeta</i>	10	9	6
<i>Trud</i>	5	5	5
<i>Izvestiya</i>	7	4	6
<i>Pravda</i>	4	3	7
<i>Zavtra</i>	2	1	5
<i>Kommersant-Daily</i>	11	4	2
Not any of these papers	31	27	40
Average number of regularly read national papers	0.2	0.2	0.3
Average number of irregularly read national papers	1.3	1.1	0.9

The most popular national newspaper was *Argumenty i fakty*, which was read regularly by 12.4% and irregularly by 45.7% of the sample. With this result, *AiF* was in fourth or fifth place in popularity of all newspapers together with *Severnyi Kurier*. All the other national newspapers were read by smaller segments of the population: *Komsomolskaya pravda* (read regularly by 4.7%

and irregularly by 19.5%), *Moskovskii komsomolets* (1.0% and 10.4%), *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (1.8% and 6.5%) and *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (0.8% and 7.3%) were the most popular. *Trud*, *Izvestiya*, *Pravda*, *Zavtra* and *Kommersant-Daily* were read only by less than 6% of the population. Irregular reading was typical for audiences of all the national newspapers.

The reading of national newspapers had a strong relationship with the social position of the individual. Workers, pensioners and the unemployed read only *Argumenty i fakty* if anything, while the readers of *Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Moskovskii komsomolets* and especially *Nezavisimaya gazeta* and *Pravda* were mainly managers (see Table 6.20.).

Table 6.20. Reading of national newspapers according to social class. % reading either regularly or irregularly

Newspaper	Workers	Officials	Specialists	Managers	Pensioners	Unempl.	Students
Argumenty i fakty	51	76	73	69	41	52	67
Komsomolskaya pravda	20	29	30	46	18	10	31
Moskovskii komsomolets	8	6	12	40	4	10	19
Sovetskaya Rossiya	5	—	8	11	11	7	6
Nezavisimaya gazeta	5	6	10	23	5	10	6
Trud	5	—	6	20	2	3	6
Izvestiya	2	—	8	11	5	7	6
Pravda	—	—	5	14	7	—	6
Zavtra	1	—	1	12	5	—	3
Kommersant-Daily	3	—	6	14	—	7	11
Not any of these papers	41	18	22	11	48	45	29
Average number of regularly read national papers	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
Average number of irregularly read national papers	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.9	0.7	1.0	1.4

The reading of regional and national newspapers were partly interdependent. *Argumenty i fakty* and *Komsomolskaya pravda* were more often read by those who read either local quality newspapers (*Kareliya*, *Nablyudatel*) or less frequently read local popular newspapers (*Reporter*) and also by those (a small group) who read *Molodezhnaya gazeta*.

Pravda, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Zavtra* were read more often by those who read the local communist newspaper *Leninskaya pravda* or the local nationalistic newspaper *Nabat*. *Pravda* was read by 36% of those who read *Leninskaya pravda*. This group of the population was, however, a tiny one, only 3-4% of the total population. Readers of *Zavtra* were more active in reading *Nabat* and *Leninskaya pravda* (approximately half of the 13 respondents who read *Zavtra*) and the majority of them read also *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. *Zavtra* was read overwhelmingly by the old (77% of the readers over 50).

Another, even less clear, group were those who read *Izvestiya*, *Kommersant-Daily* and *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. The readers of *Izvestiya* were rather heterogeneous in their other newspapers choices. Although the majority of them read newspapers like *Severnyi Kurier*, *Nablyudatel* and *Kareliya*, the readers of *Izvestiya* were also reading more actively newspapers like *Nabat*, *Trud*, *Pravda* and *Kommersant-Daily*.

As was the case with the regional newspapers, most of the readers of national newspapers got their newspapers by buying them (45% of the population, 62% of the readers of national newspapers). Only 3.5% of the population (5% of those who read national newspapers) received national newspapers through subscriptions; 24% of the population (34% of the readers) read national newspapers at the homes of friends and relatives; 8% of the population (11% of readers) read them at work.

Only around 20% of those who subscribed to local newspapers also subscribed to national newspapers and there were even a few of those who subscribed only to national newspapers. Those who subscribed to national newspapers were mostly old, almost exclusively highly educated, and if working were either managers or specialists. Even the majority of them read only one national newspaper, usually *Argumenty i fakty* (over 80%).

The reading of national newspapers at the homes of friends was more common than the reading of local newspapers. Around 60% of those who read local newspapers at the homes of friends also read national newspapers there, while more than half of those who read national newspapers at the homes of friends read local newspapers there. Reading at work was rather similar. Of those who read newspapers at work, around one third read only

national newspapers there, one third read both national and local newspapers and the final third only local newspapers.

It is also able to analyse the reading of national newspapers with statistical analysis methods. First, factor analysis produced three factors, which could be called 1) communist and nationalistic newspapers, 2) popular national newspapers and 3) business-oriented newspapers. *Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Zavtra* received the highest value for the first factor, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Argumenty i fakty*, *Moskovskii komsomolets* and *Trud* for the second and *Kommersant*, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* and *Izvestiya* for the third factor. The three factors explain together 53% of the variance.

Table 6.21. Dimensions of content categories of three factors (decimal points have been omitted).

	factor 1	factor 2	factor 3
Komsomolskaya pravda	09	74	14
Argumenty i fakty	-08	59	21
Moskovskii komsomolets	-05	49	41
Trud	23	66	-15
Izvestiya	09	34	43
Sovetskaya Rossiya	81	05	08
Nezavisimaya gazeta	17	01	79
Pravda	83	14	01
Zavtra	71	-01	16
Kommersant	06	13	75
Explains	26.2%	16.1%	11.0%

Also hierarchical cluster analysis indicated the closeness of *Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Zavtra* on the one hand and *Izvestiya* and *Kommersant* on the other. However, all these newspapers were rather close to each other and also close to *Nezavisimaya gazeta* and *Trud* in comparison with the more popular national newspapers (*Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Argumenty i fakty*, *Moskovskii komsomolets*).

It seems that the reading of national newspapers was less structured than the reading of local newspapers. Using cluster analysis, four clusters could be identified: first, the cluster of non-reading or occasional reading of only *Argumenty i fakty* but not *Komsomolskaya pravda* (74%); a cluster around

Komsomolskaya pravda (22%); a cluster of communist newspapers (3%); and a cluster of active reading of many national newspapers (1%).

6.7. Peculiarities and universalities: the Karelian media audience in international perspective

Media use differs among countries significantly. If any general basic models can be defined, they could be defined as British, American, Nordic and South European. In Britain, the differentiation of the press has been extremely clear between quality (elite) and popular (mass) newspapers. The American situation is different because the universal newspapers have been on the decline, newspapers are mostly local and television is the only national media.

In Northern Europe, the use of newspapers is on a high level and the main type of newspaper is a local, universal, (often monopolist) daily. In Sweden the reading of the daily morning newspapers does not differ much on the basis of age, gender or even education (the elderly and those with higher education, however, do read morning newspaper more frequently). In Norway the umbrella model of the press includes even more different levels (local, regional, national) and has led to a very high level of newspaper readership. In Denmark the press situation is closer to the Central European model (and has the peculiarity of many freesheets).

In Southern Europe the use of newspapers is on a much lower level and the major newspapers are often national ones. In some countries (Italy), the politicisation of the media has divided the audiences among the different media and has had an impact on the treatment of political materials in the newspapers.

Also the ways of getting newspapers vary among countries. For example, 72% of the population subscribed to newspapers in Sweden; 42% read them in the workplace or at school only 14% bought them in retail; 14% read them at the homes of friends and 5% in the library (adapted from MediaSverige 1999/2000, 159). The reading in the workplace was much more frequent in Sweden than in Petrozavodsk (13%), while reading at the homes of friends was much more common in Petrozavodsk (33%). Interestingly, the retail buying of morning newspapers decreased in Sweden from 40% to 14% between 1987 and 1998. In Britain the retail buying of newspapers is much more common than subscribing, as is the case in many southern European countries.

Development of the media in the Baltic states offers some interesting comparisons. At the end of the 1990s, subscribing was the main delivery channel for many main newspapers in Estonia, while in Latvia and Lithuania

buying at news stands had become more frequent. Reading at work was more common in Estonia (Baltic Media Facts 1998, 78; Baltic Media Facts 2000, 68). Estonia was closer to the Nordic model and Latvia and Lithuania to the Russian model. In Lithuania, buying at news stands increased between 1997 and 1999, while there was no clear change among major Estonian and Latvian newspapers. (Baltic Media Facts 1998, 78; Baltic Media Facts 2000, 68).

The Russian press model seems to resemble more the Central European one than the British or the Southern European ones. There are universal newspapers, which are read without great differences by all groups in the population, and specialised newspapers, which are read by managers, those with higher income and higher education. On the other hand, Karelia (and Russia in general) differs from all the other models of press structure mainly because of the great variety of media channels on the regional level.

A particularly Russian phenomenon is, perhaps, the great differences based on age (cohort). A similar fact was found also in a Czech study (Pácl 1998), so it may be possible to speak about a post-socialist or transitional press model. If the age factor is actually a cohort factor, the differences between age groups are likely to decrease when the Soviet generation is replaced by those who have been socialised into a post-Soviet society.

The impact of age has been found even in some other countries in particular cases. In Sweden the reading of evening newspapers (tabloids) has been more frequent among the young and middle-aged population, but the differences decreased from the 1980s to 1998, because the reading of evening newspapers decreased among the young and middle-aged and remained at the same level among the old. (MediaSverige 1999/2000, 162).

Compared with newspaper reading in the Soviet Union, the first major difference is the differentiation of audiences on the basis of their newspaper choices. This has been made possible primarily by the huge growth in the number of available newspapers, but it also reflects rapidly changing social realities. Some newspapers are preferred because they represent new lifestyles and opportunities better while part of the audience prefers the old ones.

In many other countries, the percent of the population reading more than one newspaper is low and, in some cases, declining. In the USA the two-paper-a-day readership dropped from 26% to 14% of the total population between 1970 and 1979 (Bogart 1981, 55). In Sweden the reading of more than one morning (daily) newspaper has been stable at around 10% of the population, while around 25% read both a morning paper and an evening paper (these groups are partly overlapping) (Anshelm 1989, 17, 25). In Finland the reading of two or more newspapers (national, regional and local, including less frequent papers) increased in the 1970s and at the end of the 1970s the

majority of the audience read two or more newspapers (Miettinen 1980, 23-24). Current figures on readership in Finland indicate that the reading of many newspapers has remained at a high level.

In Norway the number of newspapers has grown from 1.6 newspapers per household in 1972 to 1.8 newspapers in 1987 (Høst 1999, 108), which indicates that most of the households receive more than one newspaper (the Norwegian figures include also non-daily papers). Even in Estonia the average number of newspapers read was declining in the 1990s, although Estonians still read regularly on average 3.6 newspapers and irregularly 2.7 newspapers (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1998, 32-34). The non-Estonians of Estonia read much fewer newspapers.

In Karelia, the increase in the number of newspapers is connected to the major shift from subscribing to newspapers to retail buying, with several consequences. First, retail buying has intensified the daily (or weekly) competition between newspapers for their audience, and second, it is easier for a new newspaper to gain a foothold in a retail sales-based market than in a subscription-based market. Other factors behind the changes include rapid inflation in some years and the collapse of the former subscription-collecting network, which was organised on the basis of Party structures and the slow development of the new subscription-selling network.

A major change has occurred in the frequency of the most popular newspapers. Although the number of dailies is as large as it was at the beginning of the 1990s, the most popular newspapers are weeklies. The combined use of both national and local newspapers has been replaced by an overwhelming domination by the local newspapers. National newspapers have preserved some audience as secondary sources of information (and entertainment) for those actively seeking alternative information.

The results on the audiences of national newspapers are similar to those received by Resnyanskaya and Fomicheva, who found out that income has a strong influence on the reading of national newspapers. Also the most popular newspapers were the same in the Petrozavodsk survey and the survey by Resnyanskaya and Fomicheva.

Foreign news does not interest a major part of the Karelian population, while in Soviet-era studies it was found to be the most interesting topic. It is also possible (although this was not directly asked in the 2000 survey) that differences in attitudes towards advertisements have decreased.

The interest of the media users has changed from foreign news and human interest to local news and national politics. Although the local affairs are those that have been rated as the most interesting issues, a greater share of the population does not have any deeper interest in receiving information on

local affairs than on the national affairs. The differences in interest based on gender were rather similar to those found in other countries. For example, almost the same topics were read much more often by men (sports, business) and by women (fashion, food & home) in the USA (Bogart 1981, 229-230), in Sweden (Weibull 1983, 311) and in Karelia. On the other hand, the differences based on age were greater in Karelia than in the USA.

A Finnish study (Hujanen 2000, 56-57) on newspaper non-subscribers has indicated that some part of the group not subscribing to a regional newspaper does not subscribe to any newspapers at all, while another part relies on national or local newspapers. Some also read the regional newspaper in other places. The most important media among non-subscribers were the main television channels and in some cases also local newspapers. Finnish non-subscribers were close to those in Petrozavodsk who did not read newspapers at all or read them irregularly.

6.8. Future of the press in Karelia

Although the societies are different, research on the factors behind newspaper success in Germany may give some ideas for the understanding of newspaper success in Karelia as well. In Germany (Schönbach 2000, 93-94) it was found that characteristics of the geographical market are often as important for success as all the measures taken by newspapers themselves. In areas where people have a choice among several local dailies, a more dynamic layout and design, a greater variety of both sections and topics and a stronger local news orientation were among the factors for success. “Infotainment” — the use of entertainment, human-interest topics, etc. outside entertainment sections of the newspaper proved not to be a good idea. In Germany local newspapers are supposed to be interesting; those who want to be entertained watch television instead or read magazines.

In contrast, the media market situation in Karelia is far from clear. The weekly newspapers mix elements of magazines and real newspapers and they might perform functions that belong to the magazines in another kind of media structure. This study did not include magazines but they seem to be less developed in Russia. Although there are some both factual and entertaining magazines, this kind of media has remained relatively undeveloped (with a rather low circulation) in Russia. Most of the magazines are localised editions of major foreign magazines and may not be congruent with the contemporary Russian reality.

The newspaper market of Karelia is saturated with many different newspapers. Purely economically it seems impossible that over ten weekly

newspapers can survive in a market with rather limited economic possibilities. An increasing interest in more frequent publishing can be interpreted as a sign of the formation of daily newspapers, one of which may get a dominant position some time in future.

Paradoxically, the experience of other countries seems to suggest that a large number of newspapers can survive in rather poor economic circumstances, but when the income from advertising and the costs of newspaper publishing and distribution increase, the weakest ones will lose out and will be closed. In the Russian case, an important factor is also non-commercial financing from outside, which on the one hand may harm the market-oriented newspapers but on the other hand keeps the number of newspapers higher, since this kind of financing is not based on purely economic considerations.

The current economic growth may change the situation already in the near future. The weakest newspapers, which now survive on the support of sponsors, are likely to go bankrupt when a more business-oriented policy is implemented. It is possible that the newspaper market will differentiate even more when new papers enter the market and some older newspapers disappear. It seems that a big trial-and-error process is going on, as the case with *Reporter* indicated.

On the basis of some foreign studies, it has been argued that “the more choices that became available, the more selective people were in their attention, guided by differences of interest or need” and that “these natural tendencies were accentuated by the efforts of media to appeal to different social groups” (McQuail 1997, 55). In Karelia, the situation is not as clear: people are selective but the selections do not (yet?) follow clearly distinctions among social groups.

The fragmentation and break-up audiences have been found mainly in the analyses of television audiences in other countries. This idea is well adaptable to the Karelian press. The core, the former universally read newspaper, is broken and “the audience is distributed over many different channels in no fixed pattern” (McQuail 1997, 137-138). On the other hand, there is still a good deal of overlap of audiences, especially with the three popular newspapers (40% of the audience reading them all, at least occasionally). More than fragmentation on the basis of media, a more serious issue is the lack of universal news criteria and a great discrepancy in the content of various newspapers. As McQuail (*ibid.* 138) states, “media change is not enough on its own to disrupt established patterns of shared culture” but Russia seems to be in a situation in which the shared culture is, at least partly, disrupted and this is reflected also in the development of the media.

This offers challenges for the main newspapers for the future. Each of the major newspapers has its problems and possibilities. The problem of *Severnii Kurier* is the ageing of readers who became accustomed to reading the newspaper in the Soviet era. On the other hand, *Severnii Kurier* has some younger readers, who are mainly those with higher education and income and those who subscribe to newspapers. This may offer for *Severnii Kurier* better possibilities with the increasing standard of living but, on the other hand, few of those young persons who read *Severnii Kurier* prefer it as their first choice.

Petrozavodsk as “the newspaper in the middle” holds a paradoxical position: it may succeed in becoming a really universal newspaper representing all the population groups and being the most popular secondary newspaper for readers of many different newspapers or it may be crushed between other newspapers which have more specialised ecological niches.

Guberniya as the most popular newspaper has its clearest ecological niche among youth, workers and men. However, none of these groups belong to the largest population groups (old, specialists, women). Popularity among the youth provides good prospects for the future. For *TVR-Panorama* and *Severnii Kurier*, the prospects may not be as favourable. These newspapers have small core audiences and for *TVR-Panorama* the popularity of other newspapers (*Guberniya* and *Petrozavodsk*) in its niche is a problem, while for *Severnii Kurier* the problem is low popularity among the young. All the other newspapers are relatively popular only among those who read a lot and (partly) among those who prefer *Severnii Kurier*.

Overlapping reading may cause problems mainly for the less popular newspapers, since they are read mainly by those who have the largest choice of newspapers at their disposal. On the other hand, those populations (newspapers) whose niches are currently broad are better equipped to retain viability in the uncertain future (Dimmick & Rothenbuhler 1984, 117).

It is not always the case that an increase in television (e.g. cable) programming has a negative effect on newspaper reading, but “once cable came into the home, the newspaper was not regarded as indispensable as before” and over time newspaper reading may drop as a “consequence of the change in assessment of the medium’s importance” (Schoenbach & Becker 1989, 357).

In *Petrozavodsk* the increase in television programming has occurred together with: 1) an increase in the price of newspapers (while television programming remained free); and 2) an overall decrease in income and standard of living. These trends, together with the changing social role of the newspaper and also because of the slower adjustment of newspapers to the needs of the

population, led to a drop in newspaper reading and to a change in newspaper structure: in the new conditions, the weekly popular newspapers appeared to be the most successful form. In spite of this, newspaper reading in Karelia is at a high level (at least when irregular reading and weeklies have been counted) and newspapers reach not much less of the population than they did in the Soviet Union. Television has become the most important media but newspapers have preserved their role as well. Differences between newspapers have produced differences between their audiences but the process is very much in the making. Age and social class and to a smaller extent gender, working place and interest have strong influence on the reading of different newspapers, especially on which of the newspapers is the most important. The readerships of different newspapers are also greatly overlapping each other.

7. Changes in the main newspapers in Karelia 1985-1999

7.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the changes that took place in the appearance and content of two traditional newspapers in Petrozavodsk, the Russian *Leninskaya pravda*, later *Severnyi Kurier*, and the Finnish *Neuvosto-Karjala*, later *Karjalan Sanomat*. These two newspapers have been selected because they existed during the whole period studied, which makes the analysis of changes easier, and have had a dominant position in the definers of journalism during most of this period. *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier* has been the only daily newspaper (excluding a short period in 1999-2000) and *Neuvosto-Karjala* / *Karjalan Sanomat* can be used as an example of the diffusion of cultural influences from Finland and their application in Russia.

The character of this chapter is descriptive. The aim is to describe and partly also quantify what kind of world has been described in these newspapers in the years in question. The sample has been taken from every second year (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999) and for each year two sample weeks have been selected, the first one in April and the second one in September. The aim was to select weeks from periods without any major political or other upheavals in each of the years. This has, however, not succeeded completely. In 1991 the September sample week was quite close to the August 1991 coup attempt, which was still visible in the papers during the sample week, and in April 1999 Orthodox Easter fell on the sample week, causing perhaps an unintentionally large amount of religious materials.

Rather few scholars have paid attention to changes in newspaper content and editing over time. Besides the authors mentioned in Chapter 3 (Ekecrantz & Olsson and Kunelius as the most important), also some others have analysed newspaper texts, but these analyses have seldom been extensive.

In Estonia the strong influence of Scandinavian media companies and media culture has been noticed. The desire has been “to make newspapers more modern”, i.e. more Western-like. Since 1995 the second biggest daily in Estonia has changed its design, layout and content three times. The post-Soviet development of Estonian newspapers can be divided into three phases: 1) the Soviet remnants phase; 2) the phase of confusion and search — ignoring Soviet ways of newspaper making and searching for specific Estonian ways of editing; and 3) the phase of stabilisation, which is characterised by

increasing concentration, economic growth, the appearance of foreign owners and the stabilisation of circulation (Saks 2002, 187, 205; also Saks 2001).

In the history of Estonian newspapers the post-Soviet period, however short, has been full of rapid changes. Actually, Estonian newspapers changed more during the last decade of the 20th century than between 1920 and 1990 altogether. The Soviet period, indeed, was based on the earlier development of journalism and in many respect the journalism of 1971 or 1981 was similar to that of the 1920s and 1930s, while both of these latter periods differed significantly from the end of the 1990s (my conclusion is based on findings by Harro 2001). The Stalinist period of the Soviet era had been an almost complete opposite to the journalism of the end of the 1990s, but the 1930s and the late Soviet period were quite close: both of them were characterised by a middle level of journalistic activity and a high level of political control, while the end of the 1990s represents an extremely low level of political control and a high level of journalistic activity (Harro 2001, 255).

A study on the construction of social problems in Estonian media has revealed important changes: in the late Soviet period there was “a tendency to present the problems as being caused by individual factors or by the inability of the officials responsible”. In contrast, during *perestroika* the institutional level (e.g. the bureaucracy) was given more attention and in independent Estonia legislation was seen as a means of overcoming social problems (Lagerspetz 1996, 98).

7.2. On method

The analysis of Soviet and Russian newspaper texts presented here is based on social constructivism and discourse analysis (Berger & Luckmann 1971; van Dijk 1988a and 1988b). On the highest level, the outward appearance of the newspaper has been analysed and on the lowest level (Chapter 8), individual news stories have been analysed. The relationship of journalism to developments in society has been taken into consideration, but mainly the analysis remains on the level of newspapers and texts. They can, however, provide information on this relationship as well, since the discourse produced by the journalistic institution “is largely a function of the mode of communication established by the news media, in turn related to the position of journalism in society, including its relations to other institutions” (Ekecrantz 1997, 395).

How news events are constructed (if they are constructed at all) is important, as is what is taken for granted, what is included and what remains outside journalistic discourse. Norman Fairclough (1995, 5) has presented

three sets of questions about media output which are relevant also in my analysis: 1) How is the world (events, relationships, etc.) represented? 2) What identities are set up for those involved in the programme or story (reporters, audiences, 'third parties' referred to or interviewed)? 3) What relationships are set up between those involved (e.g. reporter-audience, expert-audience or politician-audience relationships)?

According to Fairclough, the focus should be on how wider changes in society and culture are manifest in changing media discourse practices and the research should include detailed attention to the language and 'texture' of media texts, should be complemented by analysis of practices of text production and text consumption, should be mapped onto analysis of the institutional and wider social and cultural context of media practices, including relations of power and ideologies (Fairclough 1995, 33).

From the constructivist point of view, the starting point has been that the newspaper does not simply represent reality as such. The process of news reporting "does not constitute a neutral reflection of 'the world out there'. Rather it works to reaffirm a hegemonic network of conventionalized rules by which social life is to be interpreted" (Allan 1999, 87).

When the culture of news production, or of journalistic production in general, is changing, it is especially interesting to look for the ways in which it happens. The researchers who have critically examined processes of constructing meanings have often not paid attention to the changes that are more or less constantly going on in this constructing process.

In my own analysis, the newspaper stories were coded on the basis on 24 variables. In the original coding scheme, there were a few more variables, but because of coding difficulties, some were left out of the final coding. Some of the variables were based on the works of Ekecrantz and Kunelius, while others were developed specially for this study. In addition to the quantitative analysis, some typical or characteristic stories have been translated and analysed qualitatively.

The outward appearance of the newspapers is also included in the analysis. Mervola (1995, 416-417) has pointed out that in Finnish newspapers the outward appearance of the papers has changed whenever the amount of newspaper content has increased threefold. The reason for this is that the volume of the content exceeds the tolerance level of the outward appearance of the previous stage. Behind the expansion of content lie environmental changes, e.g. sharpened competition among the media. However, the amount of content in Russian newspapers did not increase threefold during the analysed period, but the outward appearance of the two dailies changed significantly.

This analysis also has some limitations. Russian newspaper language is full of references to other cultural products (films, literature) as well as to other media texts. Lacking knowledge of these references makes it difficult to analyse them and therefore this aspect has been set aside because it is not essential for analysing the development of journalistic forms, although its decrease could be interpreted as a sign of modernisation and a distancing from literary models.

In addition, a major part of the analysis of newspaper language has been set aside because the aim of my analysis is not linguistic and because it goes beyond my knowledge of Russian. The transformation of Russian has been described elsewhere, e.g. John Dunn (1999) speaks about “the transformation of Russian from a language of the Soviet type to a language of the Western type”.

According to Dunn, the transformation of Russian includes de-Sovietisation and Westernisation, the latter of which includes both new topics and stylistic liberalisation. New vocabulary needed in describing the modern capitalist economy, a multi-party and parliamentary political system and themes like sex and violence have been borrowed from English. Also stylistic changes have made the Russian of the mass media resemble more closely Western languages, e.g. the use of ‘low’ language, archaic forms and forms that have religious connotations, the use of various forms of word play and the emphasis on political correctness, especially in connection with the nationalities question (Dunn 1999, 4-19).

My analysis looks at Russian journalism through Western eyes. This is an inevitable fact and can be used as a resource as well. A foreigner may notice something that is too taken-for-granted for a local scholar and may also contrast his/her findings with the reality of his/her own culture.

In translations from Soviet and Russian journalistic texts, I have attempted to preserve the original tone, e.g. abbreviations and figurative forms have been taken into the translation as well (with clarifying footnotes).

The journalistic terminology is based on the Finnish-English journalism dictionary by Mary McDonald-Rissanen and Kaarina Melakoski, which is published by the Finnish journalism portal (Journalismiportaali 2001), and on the English-Russian Dictionary published by Mass Media (Moscow 1993).

7.3. Newspaper and journalism in 1985

In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen Secretary General of the CPSU, which was followed by the beginning of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. In journalism the first signs of more open criticism could be found, but on the

whole journalism remained rooted in Soviet practices. Similar campaigns of openness and criticism had been arranged even before Gorbachev without long-lasting results.

Journalists, as with other groups of intellectuals, had already formed a theoretical basis for supporting drastic changes in the Soviet political system and they were ready to respond to the new challenges and to take advantage of the new opportunities they were offered (Tolz 1992, 122). But Soviet journalism in 1985 did not significantly differ from that in 1983 or 1981.

Journalism was still functioning as a collective agitator, presenting the experience of the best working practices and criticising those lagging behind. Various official texts had a lot of importance and visibility, although their number was not as large.

7.3.1. Typical events and headline news

The second week of April 1985 (8-14.4.1985) was an ordinary spring week. The main stories on the front pages of *Leninskaya pravda* reported on: Gorbachev's discussion with the personnel of the newspaper *Pravda*; a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU; a campaign to increase the efficiency of the agricultural-industrial complex; a discussion between Gorbachev and the speaker of the House of Representatives of the USA; preparations for the 27th congress of the CPSU and for the "red Saturday", which took place on 20 April and presented the slogans of the CC of the CPSU for the May 1st parades.

The inner pages included more variation. *Leninskaya pravda* told about: the "vicious circle" of the appearance of outdated goods; the preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Second World War victory in the East German "twin-city" of Neubrandenburg; Party life in the White Sea fishing company; and the campaigns Earth-90 and House-Warming-85. There was also a story by a reader who commented on an article about the problems of house repairs, which, according to his own experience as a former worker in the renovation company (*Karelnemstroj*), do exist and should be corrected. The stories about the Second World War were prominent also in the inner pages.

The last or the second last page of the paper was often dedicated to a special topic: on 9 April there was a "page of Petrozavodsk" and on 10 April there was material on traffic safety with information about changes in traffic regulations. On 11 April the second last page was dedicated to the section "I am serving the Soviet Union", which told about service in the army and also included stories by veterans about the Second World War.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the major part of the content was “official materials” that were also published in *Leninskaya pravda*. The paper published an interview of Gorbachev with the editor of *Pravda*, Gorbachev’s discussion with the US Speaker of the House and a speech by Gorbachev on “Initiative, good organisation, efficiency”. It also published articles by TASS about the preparations for the 40th anniversary of victory (in the Second World War), reports about the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a report about the plenary of the Petrozavodsk city committee of the CPSU and the slogans of the CPSU Central Committee for the 1st of May. These materials took up about one third of the pages of *Neuvosto-Karjala*. Because also some foreign and local news items and also the television and radio programme information were the same as in *Leninskaya pravda*, almost 40% of the content of *Neuvosto-Karjala* could be found also in *Leninskaya pravda*.

Neuvosto-Karjala also had its own news items. Among them were an interview with the Moscow correspondent of the Swedish communist newspaper *Norrskensflamman*, who visited Karelia, a review of the Kalevala-based plays by the Karelian playwright Pekka Pöllä, a historical article on the situation in Finland during the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 and an article about the 80th Anniversary of the birth of the Karelian writer Nikolai Jaakkola.

In the second week of September, the attention of *Leninskaya pravda* was paid mainly to harvesting and the fulfilment of the five-year plan (the five-year period ending at the end of 1985). Harvesting was the main topic in every issue of *Leninskaya pravda* during this week. The paper also reported on the intensification of production in the Kondopoga wood-processing plant, which uses waste in order to produce fuel, reported on the experiences of the Petrozavodsk construction trust in saving electricity, and urged the agricultural sector to prepare for the winter and to end the five-year plan “strikingly”. Attention was paid also to the Stakhanovite campaign among sawmill workers and the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

On 14 September the front page editorial column “The topic of the day” was devoted to reports and elections in the Party organisation. Another story on the first page reported on the high quality of the work by I. I. Nazarenko, a worker in the Petrozavodsk sawmill and furniture *kombinat*. The main stories in the inner pages dealt with propaganda lectures and technical progress and the question of the return of war-time trophy art to the GDR. On 15 September the main theme was the Day of the Forest Workers, which took up one half of the first page and almost the whole second page. The Sunday

issue also had more popular material: human interest stories from abroad, a satirical column, jokes and a poem by a reader.

The main stories of *Neuvosto-Karjala* told about the socialist commitments of the workers of the Kostomuksha concentrating plant and it published a report on the meeting of Gorbachev with the vice-president of the German Social Democratic Party, Johannes Rau. On 13 September the main emphasis was given to the speech by Gorbachev on agricultural production. In addition, the paper published a report on harvesting, told about the Moscow book fair and printed a story on the 80th anniversary of the revolution of 1905-1907. On 15 September *Neuvosto-Karjala* devoted most of its space to the meeting of the Politburo and to the Day of the Forest Workers, the latter by reporting the experiences of the Pyaozero (Pääjärvi) forest industrial district.

The September week allowed more variation between the two newspapers. Only about 15% of the material of *Neuvosto-Karjala* was published also in *Leninskaya pravda*. Common texts for both newspapers included mainly the major political materials: the speech by Gorbachev, the meeting between Gorbachev and Rau and a report from the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Also some national and foreign news items were the same (e.g. a story about the diamond dedicated to the memory of Samantha Smith, an American school girl who had fought for peace and better relations between the USA and the Soviet Union) and who had died accidentally.

The same topics were also given different coverage. The Day of the Forest Workers was marked in *Leninskaya pravda* by an article by the secretary of the Party district committee, while *Neuvosto-Karjala* published an article by the director of production at the Karelian forest company and a reportage from Pyaozero (Pääjärvi) by a different author than in *Leninskaya pravda*. Also the 1000th Anniversary of the city of Bryansk and the visit of the English writer Stan Barstow to Petrozavodsk were given different coverage.

7.3.2. *The structure and the sources of the newspapers*

The first page of *Leninskaya pravda* was usually devoted to the politically most important materials. These included the speeches of the Secretary General, ideological stories, reports about harvesting and workplaces and sometimes it included also some foreign news.

The second page included stories with political importance, like campaign reports or stories about Party life. The page had usually many stories written by outside authors. The third page had usually a section of foreign news and stories about culture and everyday life, like (in September) a serial story

“The people and the products of the year 2000” and occasionally political articles. Sometimes the stories that began on the first page were continued either on the second or on the third page. Occasionally the third page was devoted to a single topic, like the army. The Sunday issue had a more popular-style third page, with poems by readers, anecdotes, human-interest stories and a satirical column “There is a question” (*Est vopros*). The foreign news, usually from half a page to almost one page long, could be found either on the third page or on the back page.

The back page was usually given over to the more popular stories on everyday life, culture and sport. Also the television programme, the programmes of theatres and cinemas, classified advertisements and the weather report were placed on the back page. The back page had sometimes also stories about crimes and problems and a column “The Reader and the Newspaper”, which was based on letters to the editor. Sometimes the back page was dedicated to one topic, like “The Page of Petrozavodsk” or traffic. On Saturday the back page had the weekly television programme and on Sunday a crossword. Also the few advertisements as well as obituary notices and necrologies were as a rule placed on the back page.

Similarly, the first page of *Neuvosto-Karjala* was reserved for major political stories, but it occasionally also had smaller stories by the TASS or APN news agencies on current events and the successes of Soviet science. Sometimes there was also some foreign news. The second page of *Neuvosto-Karjala* continued the stories from the first page or published news on economics and politics, letters to the editor (although significantly fewer than *Leninskaya pravda*), local news and reportages. The third page had mainly foreign news and the television programme and also some smaller pieces of news, e.g. on sports. The back page of the paper contained mainly news about culture, history and sport. There was also local news of Karelia under the headline “In the different parts of Karelia”. Sometimes the back page was reserved for a special section, which included women and youth.

Many of the stories did not contain “news” in the way in which it is understood in current North-European mainstream journalism. For example, a story could report that a meeting has happened but nothing about its results or the purpose of the story could be to remind readers about the start of the newspaper subscription campaign.

The division of newspaper space among texts from different sources indicated the importance of different sources and the balance of power in newspaper space (Table 7.1.). A large number of stories were written by authors outside the newsroom staff. This was a typical phenomenon for Soviet journalism, which emphasised the participation of “the people” in the making

of journalism. According to Soviet doctrine, only those personally involved in production could report objectively on the real state of affairs in one or another field of economy. The classification has been done on the basis of what can be concluded from the newspaper itself. For example, because of the high value of “from the public” materials it may happen that a story actually written by journalists was published in the name of an outside author. Similarly, “the letter to the editor” -label has been given only to those stories which were clearly letters about everyday problems or speech acts in public discussion. The other stories prepared on the basis of letters, which were common in Soviet journalism, have been classified as journalistic stories.

There were also a number of stories without a signature or an indication of the source, e.g. some meeting reports and replies to the problems presented in previous issues. The meeting reports have been classified as official texts, because they likely originated from the press services of the institutions in question and could not be edited on the newspaper level. The others of these have been classified either as journalistic or as outside writers’ texts depending on what can be judged from the text itself. If there are signs of editing, like citations etc. they have been included as journalistic texts.

Table 7.1. The division of space among various sources and types of text in *Leninskaya pravda* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* during the sample weeks in 1985 (column cms and per cents).

	Leninskaya pravda		Neuvosto-Karjala	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	19,968	100	9,984	100
- Name plate, publication data	960	4.8	401	4.0
- General headlines, residual space	416	2.1	154	1.5
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre	478	2.4	111	1.1
- Advertisements	475	2.4	27	0.3
- Television programmes	607	3.0	454	4.5
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	2,583	12.9	2,140	21.4
- Letters to the editor	311	1.6	—	—
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	4,424	22.2	2,204	22.1
- Written by outside authors	3,699	18.5	1,423	14.3
- Written by journalists	6,079	30.4	3,004	30.1

Editorial articles like those under the title “The Topic of the Day” have been classified as journalistic. Materials that had a personal name only as the by-line were also classified as journalistic (either staff or free-lance), if the page context or the text itself did not indicate that the text was in fact a letter to the editor. When a story by an outside author or an official text was indicated as transmitted by TASS or APN, it has nonetheless been counted as a text by an outside author or an official text, rather than being identified as from one of the agencies. News agency materials include those stories which clearly indicate that they have been received from news agencies or taken from other newspapers, and also those which could easily be judged to be such (e.g. foreign news).

The share of text written by outside authors (stated as such by giving the workplace or professional title) versus journalists (also the authors which were presented only by name) was an important indicator of the “true mass character” of the Soviet press. During the sample weeks, the texts written by outside authors and the letters to the editor covered around 20% of the space. In addition, material from news agencies and different official sources (speeches, etc.) covered a third of the page space, and only less than one third was left to the journalists.

The letters to the editor as such were relatively rare in the pages of Soviet newspapers. Letters were usually used as material for journalistic stories, they were published together with an answer to the problem indicated in the letter, or were reported in the journalistic review of the letters. Public discussion with conflicting opinions and replies to the other person’s letter(s) was not present in Soviet newspapers (at least not in these newspapers during the two sample weeks).

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the number of outside writers was lower, perhaps mainly because of the lack of available writers. Even so, many of the stories by outside writers were apparently translated from Russian. *Neuvosto-Karjala* had to use more space for official materials, because of its smaller page space. Although it sometimes could leave some of these materials out or shorten them, this option was not always possible. The share of news agency materials was practically the same in both newspapers.

Contrary to what is usually believed, Soviet newspapers also contained advertisements. Many of them were announcements by public organisations with information about cultural events, courses, educational possibilities and changes in bus timetables, but there were also more commercially oriented ads about new goods available and work possibilities.

Usually the advertisements contained only text and seldom a logo of the enterprise, like the ad for the department store “Kareliya”. A typical

advertisement looked like this:

Attention
enterprises, organisations,
establishments, specialists,
all book lovers

The Karelian bookstore is about to start the reception of orders for the literature in all branches of knowledge for the year 1986.

The bookshops of the republic have received the the publishing plans of "Politizdat" "Khimiya", "Finansy i statistika", "Nedra", "Muzyka".

(*Leninskaya pravda* 12.4.1985).

The only advertisements published in *Neuvosto-Karjala* were requests to subscribe to *Neuvosto-Karjala*. There were also announcements about theatre and cinema presentations and some death obituaries, which were included in the category of "classifieds". Both newspapers published also cinema and theatre programmes.

In *Leninskaya pravda* the stories were signed usually with the first initial and the complete surname according to the Soviet practice. In *Neuvosto-Karjala*, however, the Finnish practice to use both first and last names was mixed with the Russian practice. This concerned both the stories written by authors with Finnish names and the stories evidently translated from Russian (like TASS and APN stories). In translated stories the Russian-Soviet practice was dominant, while most of the Finnish authors used both names.

Leninskaya pravda published during the two sample weeks 85 photographs, on average seven per issue. Photographs were mostly accompanied by a caption or a short story. Over two thirds of the photographs were published in stories in which the share of the space used for photographs was over half. These stories were either reportages with a lot of photographs or they were so-called *fotoreportazh* (see Murray 1992, 101), with a large photograph and short text telling what the picture portrayed. Most of these 'lead pictures' (the English term by John Murray) portrayed a model worker or a group of workers. Almost all of them were local. There were also pictures called "*fotokorrespondentsiya*", photo-correspondent materials, received from TASS or APN and picturing life in other parts of the Soviet Union or abroad.

Photographs were placed rather equally in all the pages, but the most likely page for photographs was the third page and the most unlikely, the first page. The paper also published nine drawings, which were mainly cartoons related to everyday life. The cartoons were only on the third and

fourth pages. On the fourth page, the photographs presented less serious topics: there were photos of animals, nature and everyday life. Some, perhaps even most, of these were contributions from readers (some of them indicated that they had participated in a photo competition organised by *Leninskaya pravda*).

Neuvosto-Karjala published 50 photographs, of which around two thirds were in stories in which the photographs had the major role. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the photographs were placed mainly on the fourth page (half of the photographs) or on the first page. *Neuvosto-Karjala* also had some non-local photographs, picturing e.g. short news items from Afghanistan, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic or France.

7.4. Newspaper and journalism in 1987

By 1987 the period of Gorbachev had lasted two years and the new policy started by him had begun to produce the first results. This was the period of *glasnost*; the limits of public discussion had become wider and debates about socialist pluralism had come to the had arisen. The first violent ethnic clashes had taken place in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, in December 1986 and the year 1987 became the turning point in the development of inter-ethnic relations. Baltics republics were important in this, although there the development did not led to violent clashes. The development of the economy was still positive, unemployment remained minimal and inflation low. The anti-alcohol campaign, started already in 1985, was still going on and it had cut the tax revenue. (Iivonen 1992, McNair 1991).

The Central Committee meeting in January 1987 had started the third phase of *perestroika* in which it was expanded from economic issues and public discussion to political issues, the status of the Party and democratisation. At this stage democratisation was understood by Gorbachev as the shifting of power from executive to decision-making organs and from the centre to the regions. Socialism and the existing political system were not questioned yet. This expansion of *perestroika*, however, was turned back in November 1987, after the period analysed here. (Iivonen 1992, 12-13)

Some elements of the new policy were visible also in newspapers. There was more discussion of shortcomings and more letters to the editor. In Karelia *perestroika* had been visible mainly in the activation of the national intelligentsia and in the question being raised publicly of the revival of the Karelian and Veps languages and nationalities and of the administrative status of Karelia (Butvilo 1998, 16-17). Besides cultural associations, also discussion clubs and independent youth associations were founded. Political

topics were legitimised by citing Gorbachev's programme of *perestroika*, and in this sense discussion clubs "represented more a kind of political sub-culture than political counter-culture" (Liikanen 2002, 188).

7.4.1. *Typical events and headline news*

During the April sample week (8-14.4.1987), the first pages of *Leninskaya pravda* were filled with news about the preparations for the elections of the local councils (21st of June), with appeals and promises to carry out the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU and with preparations for the red Saturday *subbotnik*. Socialist competition, intensification of the production and the activities of Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev were in focus as well. During that week Gorbachev visited Czechoslovakia. Among the smaller but regular news items was a Soviet space flight.

An important aspect of the preparations for the elections was that for the first time in Soviet history, experimental elections with more candidates than seats took place. This was, in accordance with the Soviet practice not to highlight news issues, reported as the last question in an interview about the new things in the electoral campaign. Democracy as a term was in focus frequently (although it had not been absent in 1985 either) and it was used in contrast to the previous period. There were headlines like "In the conditions of democratisation," "Democracy in action" and "Learning and teaching democracy". Other new phenomena included self-financing, co-operatives and various reforms. There was also discussion around the draft legislation "On state enterprises".

The anti-alcohol campaign was also visible in *Leninskaya pravda*. The review of the readers' letters was dedicated to this topic. Compared with 1985, there were more letters to the editor and once they took up a whole page.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the main news on the first pages was the visit of Gorbachev to Czechoslovakia. On Friday, 10 April the paper published the same story as *Leninskaya pravda* and on Sunday, 12 April most of the first page was devoted to Gorbachev and his speech, which was continued on page three as well (taking almost the whole page; only at the bottom of the page was the daily radio and television programme listed). Other stories on the first page were about preparation for the elections and the presentation of the cultural activities of the Kalevala and Loukhi districts (the northern part of Karelia) in Petrozavodsk.

Common items on the other pages of *Neuvosto-Karjala* were about the quality of the work, the development of democracy and culture. The paper

reported also the 50th anniversary of the Union of Karelian composers and the congress of Komsomol, which started 15 April in Moscow. Reforms which should, e.g., abolish corruption, the robbery of state property and the system of favours were implemented. Changes in the system were required in order to encourage new leaders to work in a new way.

During the September sample week the first pages of *Leninskaya pravda* paid attention to socialist competition, the upcoming *Subbotnik*, democratisation and the 70th Anniversary of the October revolution. Harvesting was one of the most prominent topics. It was one of the major front page stories every day of the week under the headline “All that has grown we will gather and preserve!” (*Vse vyrashchennoe — uberem i sokhranim*). The prominence and the style of the coverage indicated that the harvesting was going on less smoothly than two years earlier or that the problem could be published more easily.

The main stories on the other pages told about the work of the Control Committee of the Party, about the implementation of the health programme, extraordinary Party cell meetings and various aspects of *perestroika*. There were also a lot of materials about the self-financing system, discipline in the work and the quality of the work. Many stories were about history: the development of the Karelian economy after the revolution, the war; or were on applying Lenin’s teachings to current life.

Leninskaya pravda published also a questionnaire for the readers, asking, e.g., their “opinion on the **constructive character** of criticism presented in the paper”; the “**objectivity of the evaluation** of the phenomena or events”; and “how **concrete and personified** the critical stories were” (*Leninskaya pravda* 10.9.1987, my emphasis). In several questions the scale of possible answers was only from positive to neutral.

On the first pages of *Neuvosto-Karjala* the main stories told about the preparation for the winter in forestry, economic reform, the harvesting of potatoes and socialist competition. On other pages common topics were intensification, *perestroika*, Party life and Karelian culture. Longer stories were published on the reforms in Party organisations and the 40th anniversary of the department of Finnish language of Petrozavodsk State University.

Both newspapers published reports about the visit of a delegation from Neubrandenburg (German Democratic Republic) and a delegation of Finnish journalists in Karelia. In *Leninskaya pravda* these were short protocol stories but in *Neuvosto-Karjala* the story was made up mainly of interviews with Finnish journalists.

Besides the new elements, the old ones remained: there were stories about “Common Political Day”, reports from the local Party committee and the

detailed results of the haulage of timber in various forestry districts. Saturday voluntary work campaigns, which were partly linked with the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, were more prominently present than in 1985. Also problem stories under headlines such as “Severe Warning” (*Ostryi signal*) and solution stories like “Action has been taken” (*Mery prinyati*) or “The newspaper paid took notice. What has been done?” were more frequent than in 1985. In general there were many more questions in the headlines than in 1985.

In many stories the search for new solutions was present. There were problems, which awaited solutions, and new ways of solving them were in the air. *Perestroika* and other reforms were key issues and there was a lot of faith in the reforms. For example, the stories in which the Baltic republics were mentioned emphasised internationalism and the need to learn from the experience of the others.

7.4.2. The structure and the sources of the newspapers

The structure of both newspapers followed very much that of 1985. The first page of *Leninskaya pravda* was filled with the most ideologically important stories. There were news items on the visits of the Secretary General of the CPSU, photographs of the most praiseworthy workers, preparations for the elections (21 May) and for the 70th anniversary of the October revolution.

The second page was usually used for important topics with more specific emphasis. There were stories about Party life, economics and campaigns. Sometimes there were also letters to the editor. Often the stories on the second page were written by outside specialists.

The most common topic on the third page was foreign news, which usually covered around one third or one half of the page. Sometimes stories that had started on the first page were continued on the third page (sometimes taking up the whole page). There were also ideological materials, and sometimes letters to the editor or sport news. On Sundays the third page was filled with more popular historical stories and feuilletons.

The fourth page had usually news on culture and sport, television programmes and programmes of cinemas and theatres. Sometimes a special page, like the Petrozavodsk page, or a page about health was published. Sometimes when the third page was filled with other stories, the foreign news was placed on the fourth page. Then there was usually less foreign news than usual. In the Sunday issue, both the third and the last page had more light and entertaining content.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the first page was devoted to the most important events (visits and speeches of Gorbachev, reports on the meetings of the Politburo, preparations for the elections, harvesting); there was also news about the economy and politics and the most important cultural events.

On the second page were, as in *Leninskaya pravda*, stories and articles about Party life, economic problems and democracy. Sometimes there was the continuation of the stories that began on the first page. The third page of *Neuvosto-Karjala* was almost exclusively devoted to foreign news and television programmes. Sometimes (once during the sample weeks) a story from the first page was continued on the third page, if in that issue there was no foreign news at all. Sometimes there was also space for some other news items like sports.

The last page of *Neuvosto-Karjala* was usually covered with various cultural stories and small local news and sometimes sport news. Once there was a youth page (on the preparations for the Komsomol congress). Perhaps the most important change was evident on the fourth page, which had much more cultural content than in 1985, especially many stories making reference to Karelian and Finnish culture.

The sources of the materials were largely the same as in 1985. The only important redaction was made with speeches and official materials, but this might indicate only that there were no such speeches to be reported on during the sample weeks.

The number of letters to the editor had increased, but their share was still small. On 10 April, *Leninskaya pravda* published a whole page of letters. The page was titled "The reader proposes, discuss, debates". The letters themselves told about problems in forestry, the work of the ticket-control service of the local bus company, the lack of products in shops of Petrozavodsk and supported the fight against drinking. All of them commented on articles previously published in the newspaper, mainly supporting the ideas presented in them, but also criticising, correcting mistakes and moving the discussion ahead. The paper itself justified the publishing of letters in this way:

"Full clarity on all the vitally important questions is needed" as was underlined in the January (1987) Plenary of the CC of the CPSU.

One of the ways to achieve this clarity is the exchange of opinions in the pages of the newspaper. It is no accident that we call the newspaper the tribune of the people.

Glasnost, openness implies not only one's own ability and the will of our fellow man to speak out, but also the capability to listen to other opinions, not to be afraid of them, and this means not interrupting the opponent. This was said recently in the Congress of the Union of Journalists of the USSR.

(*Leninskaya pravda* 10.4.1987, 3rd page)

The paper called the discussion “a good lesson in democracy” and considered its aim to be to “decide together the problems which arise in our life”. Letters were published also in other issues of the paper. On Saturday, 11 April, page 2 had a small section under the headline “From the mail” and on Tuesday, 14 April, a traditional review of letters was published on the topic: “Against drinking in the whole world”.

The strong position of outside authors was visible, e.g., in such stories as authoritative accounts in the first page sections like “The Topic of the Day”, which were written by an engineer, or “The Column of the Worker”, written by a simple worker.

Table 7.2. The division of space among different sources and types of text in *Leninskaya pravda* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* in 1987.

	Leninskaya pravda		Neuvosto-Karjala	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	19,968	100	9,984	100
- Name plate, publication data	800	4.8	403	4.0
- General headlines, residual space	598	3.0	285	2.9
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre, horoscope	608	3.0	89	0.9
- Advertisements	744	3.7	49	0.5
- Television programmes	610	3.1	389	3.9
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	1,715	8.6	1,078	10.8
- Letters to the editor	620	3.1	70	0.7
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	3,289	19.8	2,420	24.2
- Written by outside authors	4,460	22.3	1,620	16.2
- Written by journalists	6,493	32.5	3,581	35.9

Compared with 1985, *Leninskaya pravda* had more short news stories under the section headline “Economic news”. This news was about the work and successes of local enterprises, and was usually written by journalists and occasionally by workers or factory directors.

Both of the newspapers published during the two sample weeks special pages presenting material from other newspapers. On 12 September 1987, *Leninskaya pravda* reprinted material from the magazine *Sovetskaya zhenshchina* (Soviet Woman). The likely aim of the stories and the intro

presenting them was to increase the circulation of the magazine. The lead story urged the readers to subscribe to the magazine if they would like “to become familiar with the latest fashions or to receive competent advice on how to raise children”. It also gave information on how to subscribe to the magazine and stated that “an unlimited number of subscriptions to *Sovetskaya zhenshchina* was allowed”.

On 10 April 1987, *Neuvosto-Karjala* published a page of stories from the newspaper *Yugyd tui* of the Komi ASSR. The aim of these stories was certainly not to attract new readers for *Yugyd tui* (Karelian and Finnish differ significantly from Komi), but to strengthen the friendship between the Soviet nationalities. The Komi republic was often mentioned in the press as a comparable partner of Karelia (e.g. in ‘socialist competition’). The stories published by *Neuvosto-Karjala* included a review by the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU in the Komi republic on the 70 Soviet years of the Komi people, some economic reports and some culturally related stories, like the 65th anniversary of the teachers’ college in Komi and the 60th anniversary of the literary review in the Komi language.

Also the practice of publishing serial literary stories continued. In April *Leninskaya pravda* published every day a part of the book “*Vash psevdonim ‘Bruk’*” (Your pseudonym is ‘Bruk’), by Anatoli Mikhaev. It is a fact-based novel about wartime partisan battles. In September *Leninskaya pravda* published every day a part of the book “*Kaissa v Zazerkale*” (Kaissa in the Mirror Room) by Aleksei Samoïlov and Mikhail Tal. The book told about the chess match between Garri Kasparov and Anatoli Karpov. *Neuvosto-Karjala* had no serial story in April but during the September sample week it published the novel *Näin tehtiin historiaa* (in English published under the title: *History in the making: memoirs of World War II diplomacy*) by Valentin Berezhkov as a serial.

The use of both first and last names had become the rule in *Neuvosto-Karjala*. Only the stories that were translated from the newspaper *Jugyd tui* were signed with with an initial of the first name and the whole last name. In *Leninskaya pravda* the old Soviet style of using only the initial of the first name and the whole surname remained.

In *Leninskaya pravda* the number of photographs had increased to 103, of which almost two thirds were in stories where the photographs were the main element. There were also quite many (historical) stories that included archive photos, but only a few stories in which news or another story had been accompanied with a recent photograph.

The greatest number of pictures in one story (covering a whole page) was eight (in a story about the history of Karelia), while usually there were only

one or two pictures in a story. Many pictures (one third) presented two or more persons. Pictures without people were more frequent than purely individual pictures.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* there were 54 photographs, of which over 70% were in stories in which they were the only or the major element. The number of stories with pictures was 33, which means that every sixth (exactly the same figure as in 1985) story had a picture, usually only one. There was only one story that had five pictures and two stories with four pictures. Pictures presenting a place with or without people were more frequent than in *Leninskaya pravda*.

7.5. Newspaper and journalism in 1989

In 1989 the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* had been going on for four years and more signs of change were visible. The economic situation had become more problematic. The difference in prices between the free market and the state shops had increased, the shortage of daily household goods had become more acute and the Communist Party had given up its role as leader in formulating economic policy in 1988. Ethnic relations had become more conflict-ridden. An acute conflict with human casualties had taken place in Azerbaijan already in 1988 and in 1989 conflicts broke out in Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. In the Baltic republics the popular fronts had become active. (Iivonen 1992)

In Karelia, the Ingrian National Revival Movement, the Society for Vepsian Culture and the Society for Karelian Culture were established in 1989 (Heikkinen 2002, 206). The Popular Front of Karelia was founded in November 1988 and political discussion clubs had taken on a more critical role (Liikanen 2002, 189). The civil movements challenged the Party and declared themselves to be political opposition aspiring to take power (Tsygankov 2002, 253).

The reform of the political system had taken its first steps and the first elections to the Supreme Council of the USSR with a plurality of candidates had been held in March 1989. The elections had resulted in the unexpected failure of incumbents to be re-elected and the rejection of all the candidates in some constituencies and new elections took place in May.

In 1989 the circulation of the newspapers peaked and the social discussion was at its liveliest. The newspapers resembled the traditional Soviet ones a lot but there was more discussion. However, journalism functioned inside the limits of Soviet doctrine, although this doctrine was interpreted more liberally.

7.5.1. *Typical events and headline news*

In the April week of 1989, the main stories were often not news in the strict sense of the word but told about processes which were going in social life, e.g. about economic changes and the work of the enterprises, preparations for the repeated elections on 14 May, various aspects of *perestroika* and the shortage of goods.

Leninskaya pravda told about the visit of Gorbachev to Great Britain, the celebration of “the day of space exploration” with a picture of Yuri Gagarin, the problem of members resigning from the Party because of too heavy duties and the preparations for the repeated elections on 14 May. On the other pages discussion around the status of the elected bodies and new laws (e.g. on their quality) was going on and the paper paid attention to the work and tasks of the trade unions, problems in agriculture and forestry, and the “black spots” of history.

The main items in *Neuvosto-Karjala* were the visit of Gorbachev to Great Britain, the preparations for the repeated elections and the review of the fourth year of the five-year plan. The first page included also some “real news” on the ethnic clashes in Georgia, labelled “anti-Soviet mass meetings”. On other pages the prominent stories included a polemic essay by a Karelian national writer, Jaakko Rugojev, on the revival of Karelian villages, a tourist’s report on travel to Cuba, an opinion article on the revival of the Karelian language and an essay on the new policy towards religion.

During the September sample week, the main topics dealt with the shortage of goods, social discussions and ethnic relations. First-page stories told about the problems of everyday day life: there is a shortage of milk as well as sugar and the harvest will be smaller than was planned. The paper also published a report on the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU, an interview with the president of the Karelian trade unions, who had participated in the plenary of the central council of the Soviet trade unions and investigated the details behind the highest allowed amount of nitrates in vegetables and fruits and asked why producers were not required to provide information on the amount of nitrates.

Neuvosto-Karjala reported on the repair work on the shore street of Omega lake, the prospects of the Karelian economy and the visit of the delegation of Karelia to the United States. The other pages of *Neuvosto-Karjala* told about the visit of the president of Iceland to the Soviet Union as a tourist, the translation of Kalevala into Vietnamese, and the harvesting of potatoes.

Both newspapers naturally paid attention to the visit of Gorbachev to Britain, his television speech and central committee meetings and reported

also on the conference on the economic development of Karelia, the Nuorunen project (a plan to build a winter sport centre in Karelia near the Finnish border) and the autumn fair in Leipzig (Germany) in which Karelia took part for the first time.

Also some differences between the newspapers had become clearer. For example, co-operation with Finland, and ethnic and cultural issues (especially in *Neuvosto-Karjala*) were more prominent topics than before. While a lively discussion on political and economic topics was going on in *Leninskaya pravda*, *Neuvosto-Karjala* had only a few letters to the editor.

The striving towards more entertaining content was visible also in the selection of topics, especially in the foreign news sections: *Leninskaya pravda* published pieces from the Guinness book of world records, a story by APN, "Is there a snow man?" (bigfoot / yeti) and *Neuvosto-Karjala* told about the biggest crocodile in the world.

An interesting relationship to news was visible in both newspapers concerning two sensitive, current news items. Both the conflict in Tbilisi and an accident in a submarine in the Sea of Norway were reported with the help of official communiqués from the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. One example of such stories is the following:

From the Central Committee of the CPSU,
the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR
and the Council of Ministers of the USSR

In a nuclear-powered torpedo submarine situated in the Sea of Norway outside the territorial waters of the country, a fire broke out on the 7th of April. The crew could not extinguish it. The submarine sank. There are human casualties.

The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR express their deep condolence to the families, relatives and friends of those killed.

The Central Committee The Presidium of The Council of
of the CPSU the Supreme Council of the USSR Ministers of the USSR
(*Neuvosto-Karjala* 9.4.1989, *Leninskaya pravda* 9.4.1989)

Only in the following issue of *Leninskaya pravda*, two days later (11.4.1989), was a news story published with more detailed information about the event. While the official communiqué was on the first page, the news story was placed on the third page. *Neuvosto-Karjala* did not publish this news story at all. On the other hand, *Neuvosto-Karjala* reported the disturbance in Tbilisi both in a communiqué (condolences by the supreme organs) and in a news

story, while *Leninskaya pravda* published only the communiqué. The coverage of the events was certainly not ideal, but compared with the previous silencing of these kinds of events, it was a major step towards publicity and even towards timely reporting.

7.5.2. *The structure and the sources of the newspapers*

There was a lively discussion going on and even the speeches of the secretary general became livelier, but in general the paper looked like before. There were more stories on the first page (11 on average in *Leninskaya pravda*), but the first page had, as previously, mainly the most important ideological stories. The practice continued of publishing *fotoreportazh*, a photograph of a model worker and a short text about him/her. They were published under the label “Moving forward” on the first page. In 1989 these model workers were also from non-traditional branches of industry: a driver, milkmaids, a worker in a radio factory; in many pictures the workers were photographed at work. The column of the editor-in-chief was published once during both sample weeks.

The second page differed a lot between the April and September sample weeks. In April it was filled with various stories, often on the topic of the economy, e.g. on the People’s control in enterprises. There were also “measures taken” –stories, a report on the meeting of the regional Party committee, discussions on proposed legislation and some letters to the editor. In September the second page was usually filled with letters to the editor and materials aimed at public discussion. In September the page was titled “Discussion forum of *Leninskaya pravda*” or “The reader — the newspaper”.

In April the letters to the editor were mainly on the third page, of which they sometimes filled over half. There were also foreign news, meeting reports, laws and cultural stories. In September the third page was a place for broad reportages, which sometimes extended to other pages as well, foreign news (on only one day) and the column of “reporter on duty” (*dezurnyi reporter*). Once it was set up as a special page for elderly people. On some days there were also some letters to the editor.

The fourth page included foreign news, sport news, cultural news and stories, television programmes and some classifieds and advertisements. There were also a column of the reporter on duty, a crime and accident column under the headline “The services 01-02-03 inform” (the numbers referred to the phone numbers of emergency and police services) and occasionally also the end of a story that had begun on the third page.

In April, the Sunday issue had eight pages in tabloid format. On the first page were the most important news and a picture of working life. They were

followed by current reportages, letters to the editor, stories about everyday life and culture, the reporter on duty column; at the end were the weekly television programme and crossword, a chess puzzle and human-interest stories. The tabloid-formatted Sunday issue looked less serious than the ordinary issues.

It seems that a significant change happened between the sample weeks in 1989, when the letters to the editor received more space and pushed away “secondary” materials like foreign news.

The first page of *Neuvosto-Karjala* included the most ideologically important news stories: the visits and speeches of Gorbachev, preparations for the elections, campaigns, but also current news stories, reportages and opinions. Especially stories and views related to relations between nationalities and other Soviet republics were published on the first page.

The second page included mainly opinions, commentaries and letters to the editor, e.g. on economic reforms, social issues and proposed legislation. They were mainly written by outside specialists and commentators. On the third page space was given to foreign news, some sport news and often also television programmes. On the fourth page were mainly various small news items, interviews, and articles on cultural issues, education, and co-operation with Finland under the section heading “From the diary of co-operation”. In September, the paper ran a serial story by Roy Medvedev on Molotov titled “One of the long-lived citizens of Moscow”.

In *Leninskaya pravda* the share of the stories written by the paper’s own journalists had increased with the decline of the official materials and news agency stories. The main change was, however, in the amount of material written by individual citizens (letters to the editor). During the sample weeks there were 113 letters in *Leninskaya pravda* (on average 9.4 in one issue) compared with a mere 27 in 1987. The letters to the editor took 15% of the space and every fourth story was a letter. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* there were only nine stories written by individual readers, but these stories were quite long, covering over six per cent of the space. *Neuvosto-Karjala* clearly did not function as a public forum for discussion in the same way *Leninskaya pravda* did.

Some advertisements were published in *Leninskaya pravda* during the sample weeks. For example, one of the advertisements urged readers to subscribe to *Leninskaya pravda*, and another described the services provided by the *Invatekhnika* co-operative of invalids. There were also some announcements about the programmes of cultural halls, job openings and courses. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the only advertisements urged readers to

subscribe to the newspaper and there were also some classifieds of Finns searching for a pen pal in Karelia.

Neuvosto-Karjala continued to have foreign news and materials from news agencies and it published even in absolute numbers more official texts than *Leninskaya pravda*. A partial explanation for this is that a report on the visit of Gorbachev to Great Britain (with speeches there) was published as a whole in *Neuvosto-Karjala* during the sample period, while parts of it had been published in *Leninskaya pravda* already earlier. *Neuvosto-Karjala* had the same number of foreign news stories as in 1985 and 1987 and also many stories on ethnic relations and economic reforms that had been transmitted by Tass. A sign of change was that *Neuvosto-Karjala* published also some pieces of news from a Finnish newspaper, *Warkauden lehti* (published in Varkaus, the Finnish twin city of Petrozavodsk).

Table 7.3. The division of space among various sources and types of text in *Leninskaya pravda* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* in 1989.

	Leninskaya pravda		Neuvosto-Karjala	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	19,784	100	9,984	100
- Name plate, publication data	930	4.7	432	4.3
- General headlines, residual space	498	2.5	194	1.9
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre	630	3.2	99	1.0
- Advertisements	452	2.3	25	0.3
- Television programmes	639	3.2	404	4.0
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	806	4.1	1,061	10.6
- Letters to the editor	2,962	15.0	633	6.3
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	1,908	9.6	2,590	25.9
- Written by outside authors	2,956	14.9	1,216	12.2
- Written by journalists	8,003	40.5	3,330	33.4

Leninskaya pravda gave a lot of space to the letters to the editor. They were published three times in a large separate section during the April sample week and there were letters printed also elsewhere. There was also a separate column for letters related to one article (related to *perestroika* in the schools, the original article having been published already on 14 February) and another presenting the mail to the agricultural section of the paper. Twice the letter

section was completely filled by reactions to the open letter of the cultural intelligentsia of Karelia published on the 5th of April in *Leninskaya pravda*. The cultural workers were worried about the failure of all the ethnic Karelian candidates in the elections. Printing the letters on this topic, the paper emphasised its role as a social forum:

The newspaper is a social platform. (...) It is the paper that gives to the conflicting sides a possibility to express different opinions on the topic under discussion. Let's remember: no one has a monopoly on the truth, but there should not be a monopoly on *glasnost* either. It is hardly right that the editorial staff takes on the role of arbitrator in the discussion of an acute, difficult and many-sided question of particular importance. For us another thing is important — not to allow individual claims to the social platform. (*Leninskaya pravda* 11.4.1989)

This example shows clearly how journalism saw its role in mediating the public discussion. The role was minor: to cut off individual claims but not to arbitrate the discussion. However, the tone of the letters was not conflictual and both sides presented various opinions.

In September the columns “Letters fight”, “In the crossfire of opinions” and “The reader — the newspaper” had become even more frequent. In four issues a whole page was dedicated to the discussions and the page was titled “The discussion forum of *Leninskaya pravda*”. The previous unanimity was gone and many stories dealt with different conflicting issues like nature conservation or ethnic issues.

Different views were presented also in other stories by outside authors. Discussion was carried out e.g., under headlines like “A forestry village: What should it look like?”, “We discuss the draft action programme of the CPSU” (On the nationality question), “We prepare for elections” and “A Fight for the trade unions”.

Also the paper itself participated in the discussion. The editor in chief Anatoli Osipov told his opinions in the “Column of the editor”. This column was published once during both sample weeks. In April it dealt with the state of *perestroika* in Karelia and the role of the press in the progressing of the reforms. In September the column emphasised the role of the readers as necessary assistants of the journalists. Moreover, the paper published a letter to a member of the Soviet parliament, S. V. Belozertsev, who had told journalists that an ecologically dangerous pharmaceutical plant was being planned to be built in the town of Medvedzhogorsk, although a decision that the plant would not be built had already been made. According to the newspaper, he misled the journalists and they in turn misled the readers and the public opinion of the republic, and therefore the paper expressed in public its disapproval for this kind of unethical behaviour.

In *Leninskaya pravda*, there were fewer pictures (78) than in 1987 but the pictures had become less static and only a few (8) of them presented places without people, and even fewer (5) were personal photos. Most of the photographs presented a person in surroundings or a place with people. The pictures had action and some of them were linked to longer stories in the paper. The decrease had happened mainly in the number of photographs received from Tass (28-29 in 1985 and 1987, but only 15 in 1989). Only every eighth story had a picture and of them almost 75% were such in which the pictures took up over one half of the space.

The increasing striving for timeliness and orientation towards news was indicated also by the fact that on several occasions the photographs were published in *Leninskaya pravda* a day later than the news story related to them. For example, the picture of the delegation of Neubrandenburg (twin city of Petrozavodsk in East Germany) was published only on 15.9, while the news about the arrival of the delegation was published on 13.9 and an interview with the guests was published on 14.9. Similarly a story about the visit of the representatives of a West German foundation was published a day before the pictures. It is likely that the production of the photographs took more time, but the story was not left unpublished for one day in order to wait for the pictures.

Neuvosto-Karjala had 49 pictures, of which one fourth did not present people, while only every sixth picture was a personal picture. Usually the photo showed a person or persons in a surrounding or a place with people. In *Neuvosto-Karjala*, two thirds of the pictures were in picture-dominated stories (as in 1987 and 1985) and every seventh story had a picture.

7.6. Newspaper and journalism in 1991

The year 1991 was the last year of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet system was already clearly visible. *Leninskaya pravda* had competitors, but its position as the main newspaper of Karelia had not yet been challenged. The paper had also distanced itself from the previous publishers (Party and local government). *Neuvosto-Karjala* had still many subscribers in Finland and its role as an organ of the Finnish-speaking population of Karelia was increasing.

In August 1990 the Supreme Council of the Karelian ASSR had approved a declaration of the sovereignty of Karelia in the structure of Russia and the Soviet Union, while in the referendum on the future of the Soviet Union (21.3.1991), a majority of Karelians (76%) had supported the conservation of the Soviet Union (Butvilo 1998, 18). During 1991 trade unions, ethnic

movements and newly established political party units were the most active forms of voluntary association. The old regime, however, managed to keep its position and “in the case of the Karelian Republic it is evident that Soviet power structures did not collapse because of broad mass mobilization and contentious collective action” (Liikanen 2002, 193).

The failed *coup d'état* in August 1991 led to the change of the name of *Leninskaya pravda* to *Severnyi Kurier*, but this was only the end of a process that had started earlier (see Chapter 4). *Neuvosto-Karjala* changed its name at the beginning of 1992. The economic problems of the newspapers had not yet started and this period has been described as the “golden era of Soviet journalism”, when the previous controlling apparatus had collapsed but a new one in the form of a market had not been formed yet.

In *Severnyi Kurier* the changes were visible even in the structure of the sections in the editorial office. Already in April the previous section on party life had been replaced by a section on the work of the councils of people's deputies and the section on “industry and transportation” had become a section on the economy. Also a new section on social policy had been launched, while sections on Soviet work and life and culture had been abolished. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* most of the previous sections, including Party life, remained, but the section on social affairs had replaced the section comprised of letters.

7.6.1. Typical events and headline news

The second week of April 1991 had no continuing prominent events, but the first page news was new every day. The main items on the first page of *Leninskaya pravda* included a report with several photos of the Pudozh childrens' home, which had its 70th anniversary, the export of tractors made by the Onezhkii tractor factory to Indonesian jungles, and Cosmonautics Day (marking the 30th Anniversary of the first space flight), with photos of Yuri Gagarin. There was also a photo reportage on Finnish tourists, who had visited Kostamus and the Kalevala district, an “Timely interview” on the plans of a sovkhos in Pitkäranta to improve its production, a story about the Pudozh vocational school, which educates workers for the countryside and the views of a prosecutor on the housing problem.

On the other pages the prominent stories told, e.g., about the right to business, survey research on people's attitudes toward Lenin and his theories, the transition to a market economy, visits of foreign businessmen and venereal diseases.

Neuvosto-Karjala headlined the first page of its issue of 9 April with “the Soviet Union Today” and told about the training of cosmonauts from Germany, referendums in Georgia, the situation in Southern Ossetia, the preparations for fieldwork by geologists and the model city project in Segezha. On 11 April, the first page paid tribute to the 30th anniversary of the first space flight with three photographs and the “topic of the day” article told about progress and problems in Karelian forestry, while on 13 April, the first page news told about the lack of foreign currency in Petrobank, an action day organised by independent trade unions and the rise in prices for domestic flight tickets.

On other pages, the paper reported about the economic problems in constructing the new diagnostic centre in Petrozavodsk, a review of the situation of the Finnish theatre of Petrozavodsk, life in the Olonets district with emphasis on agriculture and Karelian culture, the Finnish composer Erkki Salmenhaara, who visited Petrozavodsk, preparations for the sowing period, the development of the multiparty system in the Soviet Union and a conference on sport education in schools.

The second week of September 1991 was the second week after the change of the name of *Leninskaya pravda* to *Severnyi Kurier*. This was visible even in the paper itself, which no longer included information about its role as an organ of the CPSU regional organisation, but printed in its nameplate all the other former names of the paper. The new name has also been the subject of some of the first page news items during the week.

On 10 September *Severnyi Kurier* started with a photo reportage on the Petrozavodsk radio factory. Another main item on the first page was an article by the editor in chief, “In the captivity of pluralism” in which he comments on the criticism towards *Severnyi Kurier* presented in other newspapers. On 11 September the main place on the first page was given to the letters to the editor, while on 12 September the main items included a *photoreportazh* on the Onega tractor factory, a decree (*ukaz*) of the Karelian Supreme Soviet on the composition of the Karelian parliament and the point of view of a lawyer on the change of the name of the newspaper. On 13 September the topic of the day was preparation for winter, but the most visible story on the first page was a photo reportage on the shortage of food in state shops and the abundance in the markets. On 14 September the paper reported about harvesting with the headline “There should not be hunger...” and published a decree of the president of the Russian Federation “On Efforts for the defence of the free press”.

On the other pages important stories told, e.g., about an investigation of the “black spots” of history, the new phenomenon of goods-exchange bourses and what had happened during the August coup. There was also an interview

with a philosopher on recent changes in society, an interview with the director in chief of the Russian Drama Theatre of Petrozavodsk and a reportage on a colony for juvenile delinquents.

The most prominent first page stories of *Neuvosto-Karjala* included the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, a “topic of the day” -article about shortcomings in the preparations for winter, a report about the conference of the CSCE on the human dimension, the results of the potato harvest and a report about the meeting of Finnish and Russian veterans of war in the old battlefields.

On the other pages *Neuvosto-Karjala* told about a family which takes care of orphan children in Kotkatjärvi, the planned economic reforms in the Soviet Union, the pollution in the Gulf of Finland, the visit of Russian journalists from Estonia to Petrozavodsk, unemployment among previous Party officials who lost their work and the co-operation of Austrian and Karelian enterprises in preparing a rapid paper machine. The paper published also a story (by a Karelian author, Jaakko Rugojev) on the occasion of the 110th birthday of Edvard Gylling¹.

Human rights seemed to be one of the permanent topics in both papers. A declaration of Human rights and liberties was published in both newspapers in September and there were also other stories on human rights. There were new social problems like AIDS, bankruptcies, protests, hunger strikes, rising black market prices, thefts even at city hall, the lack of apartments and the rising prices of them, but also new positive things like the education of managers, assistance from abroad and the development of the market.

Neuvosto-Karjala paid more and more attention to questions of national culture. For example, the situation of the national (Finnish) theatre in Petrozavodsk was analysed in a long story in which the future of the theatre was said to be threatened because of “the change of actor generations, financial problems, many arts policy problems and the loss of the audience” (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 9.4.1991). It published also lessons in the Finnish language and not only Finnish and Karelian issues were reflected but also a cultural revival of other nationalities. *Neuvosto-Karjala* told even about the celebration of the Jewish New Year in Petrozavodsk (14.9.1991).

7.6.2. *The structure and the sources of the newspapers*

The image of *Severnyi Kurier* had become less reader-friendly. The leads of the short news stories on the first page were printed in block letters, which

1 A Finnish socialist activist who became the first chairman of Soviet Karelia in the 1920s and 1930s and was executed in 1938.

made them difficult to read, and in some cases small news leads could make up over half of the story.

Compared with the previous years, *Severnyi Kurier* placed greater emphasis on news. On the first page one of the main elements was a column of local and regional news stories, which was published in April under the column headline “Northern Courier. Events, facts, comments” and in September when the name of the paper had been changed, this element was naturally removed. The paper published also the telephone numbers (three) of the news section on the first page with a text “Waiting for your messages”. Occasionally the column headline “Northern Courier. Events, facts, comments” could be found also on other pages, e.g. on the fourth page. In six issues of the April week it was published there three times. In September it was published on the fourth page in reduced form as “Events, facts, comments”.

On the other hand, the concept of news was not as something that should dominate the structure of the first page, but the main item of the page was often a “fotoreportazh,” a pictured feature story on some current event or situation. News items could be found on the first page but it was the reader’s task to search for them. It was difficult to find out which of the stories was the most important, at least without starting to read them.

Besides news, the first page of *Severnyi Kurier* contained some longer current affairs stories or interviews. The first page was prepared mainly by staff journalists; only a few official texts, Tass news stories and articles by non-staff authors (specialists) remained. On the second page the paper published shorter and longer articles and interviews, mainly by staff journalists and also some official texts and many letters to the editor. There were significantly fewer items on the second page than on the first one. On the third page were also longer articles on various topics both by staff journalists and outside authors. There were also occasional thematic sections like “Nature and us” and, in one issue, a crossword puzzle.

More than half of the last page of *Severnyi Kurier* was often filled with advertisements, television and radio programme information, crossword puzzles and chess problems. There were also some small news items, usually about sport, history and crime, but sometimes also politics (e.g. a column by the deputy editor). On the last page were also the satirical column, “*Estvopros*”, and the column “Reporter on duty”.

Neuvosto-Karjala had better preserved the traditional form of a Soviet newspaper. On the first page were the most important news stories and politically important texts. The page became more news-oriented and political

texts like the article “topic of the day” were published only occasionally and there was mainly news about the economy and not about politics or ideological work. Many news items on the first page were about other parts of Russia or the Soviet Union, and there was also some foreign news.

The second page was predominantly an economic news page. Sometimes the stories dealt with one overall topic but usually there was no connection among them. There were also some political stories and columns. The emphasis of these stories was mainly local or regional. On the third page *Neuvosto-Karjala* published usually foreign news, the television programme and occasionally laws and decrees. The foreign news had become more human interest-oriented. *Neuvosto-Karjala* reported, e.g., on a new perfume called Egoist by Chanel, the most popular first names in the USA and a Slovakian border crossing point in a cave, but it had also a place for the problems of the capitalist world. It informed the readers, e.g., about the social and economic problems in the eastern part of Germany after reunification.

The fourth page was given over mainly to cultural, historical, ethnic and local issues like co-operation between Karelia and Finland, local nature, literature, history and sports. On the fourth page were also weekly lessons in the Finnish language (in the Saturday issue).

In *Severnõi Kurier*, the share of journalists among the sources of the newspaper content had increased but not as significantly as in the earlier period and this had happened mainly due to the fact that letters to the editor had decreased significantly.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the share of text contributed by journalists but also by news agencies increased, in contrast to texts by non-staff authors and official texts. *Neuvosto-Karjala* still filled over one fourth of its space with material from TASS and a significant part also from APN and other newspapers (including the Finnish newspaper *Warkauden lehti*). It also continued the tradition of a serial story by publishing a novel by Roy Medvedev, “The Political Career of Nikita Khrushchev” in September.

Furthermore, in *Severnõi Kurier* more stories were reprinted from other (mainly Moscow-based) newspapers (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, *Moskovskaya pravda*) than in 1989. Many of these stories had a general character, e.g., concerning national issues, which went beyond the competence of the local journalists at that time. There was also an effort by the newspaper staff themselves to respond to the apparent demand for such material, e.g. an interview with a philosopher from Petrozavodsk State University, but usually local journalists did not cover national issues (as was not done in the Soviet time either).

Table 7.4. The division of space among various sources and types of text in *Leninskaya pravda/Severnyi Kurier* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* in 1991.

	Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier		Neuvosto-Karjala	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	16,640	100	9,984	100
- Name plate, publication data	800	4.8	384	3.8
- General headlines, residual space	518	3.1	233	2.3
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre	697	4.2	12	0.1
- Advertisements	1,309	7.9	59	0.6
- Television programmes	558	3.4	557	5.6
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	939	5.6	330	3.3
- Letters to the editor	731	4.4	125	1.3
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	1,629	9.8	3,139	31.4
- Written by outside authors	2,265	13.6	524	5.2
- Written by journalists	7,194	43.2	4,621	46.3

In *Severnyi Kurier* the share of letters to the editor had dropped to one fourth of the amount of 1989 (in absolute terms), while some other types of sources had decreased only slightly. The share of letters would have been even lower but during the September sample week the discussion for and against the name of *Severnyi Kurier* was going on actively. Compared with the April sample week (3.8%), the share of letters was higher in September (5.0%). Letters were published mainly in a separate section but there were also individual letters in other places, e.g. on the first page.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* a single letter was published during the September sample week, although it was not clearly marked as an opinion but looked more like a specialist's article. In it a machine entrepreneur from Ilomantsi (Finland) told about Finnish forest harvesting methods, which were different from the Soviet ones (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 12.9.1991).

The amount of advertising had more than tripled, but the amount was still rather small. In *Leninskaya pravda/ Severnyi Kurier* the advertisements were placed exclusively on the last page, where they covered usually no more than one third of the space. Once an advertisement began on the first page and was continued on the last page (covering almost the whole page). It was a list of available goods on the commodity exchange company "Alisa" in

Petrozavodsk, ranging from summer cottages and cars to telefax paper and tinned vegetables. Also other advertisements often related to various goods exchanges or retail sales, and also to services and courses like “American aerobics”, foreign languages (English) and management.

Even *Neuvosto-Karjala* published one advertisement during the sample period. A Finnish company, which produced packages for berries, was looking for a Karelian partner. The paper even had an office in Helsinki, which accepted advertisements for it.

In *Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier* most of the stories were signed with the initial of the first name and the whole surname. In some cases the signature was only “Our correspondent” (*Nash korr.*) or “Our own correspondent” (*Nash sob. korr.*). In some cases some other information like the location of the story, the profession and working place of the author or the name of the news agency was given.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the stories were signed overwhelmingly by both the first and surname according to the Finnish practice. There were few stories in which only the initial of the first name was given and these were either stories from Tass or other news agencies or by Russian authors (likely translated from Russian) and were perhaps the first name was not even known to the newspaper.

The number of photographs had decreased in *Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier* to 67, while *Neuvosto-Karjala* had 71 photographs (more than in 1989). Actually the number of photographs per issue was in *Severnyi Kurier* practically the same as in 1989, but the number of stories with photographs had decreased; only every tenth story (34 stories) had one or more photographs. There were many photo reportages with several photos (15 of the stories had more than one picture). The paper published 19 photographs from TASS during the sample weeks (actually more than in 1989), but there were not photographs picturing life abroad and only a few showed named places in the Soviet Union. Many photographs from TASS were related to human-interest topics.

Neuvosto-Karjala continued to publish photographs from TASS (29, around 40% of all photographs) and it also had some reportages with three or four photographs (mainly taken by the paper’s own photographers, Mikko Ollikainen or Valeri JärviPelto). The photographs from TASS did not usually have any story with them, rather only pictures of the world out there (one third of them coming from outside the Soviet Union and most of the others from the other regions of Russia). There were photograph stories like “Iran in focus”, “Women in the contemporary world” and “High-quality cameras”. The only photograph from TASS related to current news was from Stavropol,

in which a hunger strike was organised as a protest against the conservative local leadership.

7.7. Newspaper and journalism in 1993

In 1993 two years had passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and around a year since the economic crisis that caused troubles for the newspapers. After the end of the *perestroika* and *glasnost* era, a pessimistic view on the fate of civil society started to spread among the intelligentsia in the Karelian republic. According to this view, the arena for free discussion and diverse opinions was destroyed by the logic of political conflict, which demanded ideological homogeneity. On the other hand, the number of voluntary associations continued to grow (Liikanen 2002, 194-195).

A Referendum on trust in President Eltsin and on the need to organise early elections for the Russian presidency and parliament took place on 25 April. In Karelia the population supported president Eltsin with a clear majority and opposed new elections (Tsygankov 1998, 137-138).

In Moscow the political crisis was going on and it ended with the violent attack on the parliament by the armed forces supporting the president in October 1993. After that president Boris Eltsin passed a decree on the reform of the local and regional government, which was followed by a new referendum in which a new constitution was adopted and a new structure of government was defined in December 1993 (Varis 1994, 66).

The circulation of the traditional newspapers had dropped and besides traditional papers, new ones had appeared. *Severnyi Kurier* had lost its leading position in the market but on the other hand it had become an independent newspaper, the founder of which was the journalistic collective of the paper. *Severnyi Kurier* had also reduced its number of weekly issues by a day and started coming out five times a week, from Tuesday to Saturday.

Karjalan Sanomat, the former *Neuvosto-Karjala*, came out three times a week as of 1991 but its circulation had dropped in Karelia as well as in Finland. The contacts of *Karjalan Sanomat* with Finland had increased significantly. Finnish journalists brought with them new methods of working and writing stories. During the September sample week the paper published stories by the Finnish journalists Marjatta Pöllänen and Pirjo Nironen.

7.7.1. Typical events and headline news

During the April sample week the main issues on the pages of *Severnyi Kurier* were the preparations for the 25 April referendum, local politics (like the

session of the Karelian parliament on economic policy and forestry legislation), and conferences, like the one about local administration held in Moscow with Karelian representatives.

On the other pages the main stories included a story about current life in the Karelian countryside, the orphanage in Pitkäranta in which the Capitalist Day was arranged, a seminar about energy production, discussions about the new general plan of Petrozavodsk and articles about the housing problem (mainly the privatisation of apartments and the new rents). The paper published also the new anthem of the Karelian republic.

In September the main topics in *Severnyi Kurier* were a seminar, "Problems in founding a municipal bank", held in Petrozavodsk, the chamber theatre festival and, again, the harvesting of potatoes, which was reported in four issues, but only in five stories with a total column space of 207 cm. The paper told also about trends in traffic accidents in Petrozavodsk, the quarrels between journalists and the Karelian television and radio company, the experiences of a Petrozavodsk journalist who travelled with a frigate in the Baltic Sea and the speculation caused by the European currency system in the stock exchanges of Western Europe. The paper told also how to lose weight and remain thin. It also interviewed the manager of the White Sea-Ladoga shipping company, the director of the Olonets sovkhoz, a pop singer visiting Petrozavodsk, a colonel of Ministry of Interior forces who was also a football player and trainer.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the most important news items were various visits: the archbishop of the Finnish Orthodox Church, Johannes (John), was visiting Karelia and the representatives of the national congress of Karelians, Finns and Veps had been in Finland. The paper also covered conferences (on municipal banks, foreign business among privatised enterprises, geology). *Karjalan Sanomat* published reportages, e.g., on the decline of the birth rate in Karelia, the Finnish veterans of war visiting Petrozavodsk and how to get a visa to Finland. The paper interviewed, e.g., a Veps poet, a Karelian who had success in the Russian national milking competition, and a retired journalist. *Karjalan Sanomat* did not publish anything about harvesting during the sample week.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* many stories dealt with the culture of the national minorities of Karelia. The paper told, e.g., about the Veps poet and journalist Nikolai Abramov and a premiere in the national theatre. Both newspapers interviewed a Japanese professor of Finnish who visited Karelia.

The annual celebrations reported on were only "the international day of aviation and cosmonautics" (*Severnyi Kurier* 10.4.1993), which was covered by a small news article, and also Lutheran Easter (*Severnyi Kurier* 10.4.1993,

13.4.1993). Moreover, the international day of the elderly (1 October) was the subject of an advance story on 11 September. *Severnnyi Kurier* also published a picture and story on the 208th anniversary of the town of Kem, while *Karjalan Sanomat* published a story in the occasion of the 66th anniversary of the Loukhi district and the 89th birthday of chess master Vladimir Makogonov. The coverage of anniversaries other than the round ones seems to be strange and may reflect the lack of celebrations or the lack of stories in the newspapers. The special days of various professions were not covered to any great extent.

The papers had quite many common items. For example, all the conferences, the Veps poet, the journey of the Karelian delegation to Finland, the return of the remains of Finnish soldiers to their homes, the book fair in Moscow, a cemetery founded by the Memorial organisation and a Finnish-Russian rescue exercise were reported on in both newspapers. In many cases one of the papers had a smaller story than the other, often even the author was the same person, so the story was translated for one of the papers. A typical feature for 1993 was that there was also a lot of questions: "What is going on?", "Will the barrier be opened?" (for the export of timber), "How to stop the fall of the economy?" and "Is the newspaper '*Izvestiya*' in the right?".

7.7.2. *Changes in outward appearance and contents*

The main differences in the outward appearance of the papers was in their advertisements. Of the total space in *Severnnyi Kurier*, almost 20% was comprised of advertisements (real advertising totalled 18.4% and there were also some classifieds). While the television programme, the weather report, announcements of theatre performances and concerts, horoscopes and publication information took up over 10% of the space, only 65% was left for journalistic materials. The change was a big one, since in 1989 only 16% and in 1991 23% of the space was filled with other than journalistic materials.

The most important advertisers in *Severnnyi Kurier* were the shopping centre TOM, the private money lending office Zalog, the Lotos company, which sold clothes and loaned money, the housing exchange office Nolmar, the computer sales company Getco Russia, the car shop STK Servis and a car shop from Moscow, Rosavto. There were also a lot of classifieds from the readers.

Karjalan Sanomat, on the other hand, had very few advertisements but even there the number had increased. In April *Karjalan Sanomat* had, e.g., advertisements of Finnish businessmen looking for partners in Karelia, Karelians looking for work in Finland, and private persons selling a bearskin

or offering translation services. In September the sewing factory MP Raita was looking for “a partner, who can propose an economically profitable activity in our production facilities”, work was offered for a free church or Pentecostal-person with knowledge of Finnish and Russian, the Finnish cultural magazine of Karelia, *Carelia*, promoted itself to subscribers and *Karjalan Sanomat* told about the possibility of advertising in the Russian newspapers. The advertisements took only 2-3 % (including the paper’s own advertisements on subscriptions and placing an advertisement in the paper) of the space but even that was much more than before or after that.

The reorganisation of the newspapers was indicated also by the fact that the previous section division in *Severnyi Kurier* had been abolished. The paper published only telephone numbers of four sections, which were socio-political (three phone numbers), economic (one number), news (two numbers) and letters (two numbers). If the department telephone numbers tell anything about the number of workers or the importance of the section, it is worth noticing, e.g., the strong position of the letters department in comparison with the news section. The letters section had two phone numbers also in 1989 and 1985.

The departments of *Karjalan Sanomat* were: economic, culture, news, social affairs and translations. Besides journalistic departments, both newspapers had also advertising departments, which they did not have in 1991.

In textual material, the share coming from different sources had not changed significantly between 1991 and 1993. There were only five stories written by outside authors in *Karjalan Sanomat*. *Severnyi Kurier* published more stories by outside authors but even in it the amount had decreased. These stories were often those in which special knowledge or authority was required. Also stories in the section “The newspaper continues the discussion” were written by outside authors, e.g., a story on problems in the electrification of the countryside. Another discussion story was based on a letter by the Union of Karelian artists, which protested the murders of artists.

The share of the newspaper’s own journalists has increased in comparison with outside authors and news agency texts, but the total amount of text written by journalists has decreased because the huge increase in advertisements and classifieds has taken space from them. The share of news agencies has remained on the same level as in 1991. In *Severnyi Kurier* the share of letters to the editor has increased a little, while in *Karjalan Sanomat* they remain almost extinct.

The increased share of text by the paper’s own journalists shows not only that more stories have been published, but also a change in the identification

of the authors. For example, the stories written by novelists and poets had been marked before as stories written by outsiders, but in 1993 the writer had become a journalist. Before an outside author had had stronger authority than a journalist but in 1993 this was changing.

Table 7.5. The division of space among various sources and types of text in *Severnyi Kurier* and *Karjalan Sanomat* in 1993.

	Severnyi Kurier		Karjalan Sanomat	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	16,640	100	9,984	100
- Name plate, publication data	800	4.8	462	4.7
- General headlines, residual space	278	1.7	77	0.8
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre, horoscope	945	5.7	142	1.4
- Advertisements	3,062	18.4	210	2.1
- Television programmes	772	4.6	794	8.0
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	134	0.8	88	0.9
- Letters to the editor	917	5.5	96	0.7
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	1,919	11.5	2,743	27.5
- Written by outside authors	1,836	11.0	296	3.0
- Written by journalists	5,985	36.0	5,076	50.8

A few of the bigger stories in *Severnyi Kurier* were taken from the “Consortium of the Press” and these stories told, e.g., about prostitution in Moscow and Stalin’s summerhouse in Kuntsevo. *Severnyi Kurier* also reprinted some stories from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* and some short news stories from RIA, mainly on national and international issues. They were usually placed in a separate section on the second page, but could be found also on the first page.

Karjalan Sanomat had more stories and longer ones from other newspapers and news agencies (mainly RIA), apparently because of the lack of the paper’s own journalists. It had also many other articles, which were apparently translated from Russian, and published also four articles from Finnish newspapers (*Helsingin Sanomat*, *Kuhmolainen*, *Elintae*), e.g., on the visit of the Karelian ethnic organisations to Finland and a report on a brewery in Sortavala.

The first page of *Severnyi Kurier* was more news-oriented than before. Most of the page was filled by a section of small news items, *Tele-taip "SK"*, in which stories both by the paper's own journalists and from news agencies were printed. Although the headline of the section seems to refer to news from a long distance, this section included also some local news from Petrozavodsk. In addition, the first page had also some longer news stories and reportages by journalists. There were also some small advertisements on the first page.

The second page also contained news: two columns were filled with news from RIA from abroad (mainly the CIS) and other parts of Russia. However, the main part of the second page was filled by reportages, interviews and less time-bound news stories, e.g., on sports and culture. In the Saturday issue the second page contained letters to the editor.

The third page of *Severnyi Kurier* often had bigger stories, e.g. reportages on a ship journey on the Baltic Sea, on Petrozavodsk through the eyes of a visitor (by a student of Moscow university), articles, e.g., on the economy of Finland and a conference of geologists, book reviews and also some discussion materials. There was occasionally (in April) also national news in the section *Tele-taip "SK"*. Two columns were usually given over to advertisements. The last page was completely filled with advertisements, the television programme and the weather forecast. On Saturdays the fourth page also had horoscopes.

The first page of *Karjalan Sanomat* included both small and big news stories and also commentaries. The topics of the first page stories varied a lot, from culture to politics and from nationality issues to foreign news. On the first page there was also local news, which was translated and reprinted from the newspaper *Petrozavodsk*.

On the second page the stories were mainly similar to those on the first page, but a greater part of the second page-stories were reportages rather than news. The stories were also longer than those on the first page. On the third page, *Karjalan Sanomat* published almost entirely foreign news and in the Saturday issue, most of the third page was taken up by the weekly television and radio programme. The last page of *Karjalan Sanomat* had cultural reportages, interviews and personal commentaries.

In April the letters still functioned as a channel for discussing current political topics, such as the referendum on 25 April, about which *Severnyi Kurier* published 15 letters during the sample week. The policy of Eltsin was both criticised and supported. Other topics related to everyday life in a transitional society.

In September the share of letters to the editor took up merely three per cent of the space. Also the topics of the letters were different in September. *Severnyi Kurier* published letters in the Saturday issue under the headlines “From this week’s mail” and “Our contemporary life”. The readers wrote about their memories of wartime and post-war reconstruction, about a family who cultivated tomatoes in a glasshouse and about the indecent language of the school children. One reader complained that his prize journey to Germany failed because of the delay in receiving his passport and that the travel agency had treated him improperly. A more general topic was the new draft of the Karelian constitution, which was discussed under the headline “The Choice of the Constitution — the Choice for the Future”. The letters section included also stories, which previously would have been published as ordinary news stories from outside authors.

There were also many stories that were based on letters to the editor. For example, stories about the new law on guns, Kukkovka water problems, an internal conflict in Karelian television and new population registration requirements were based on requests from the readers.

Karjalan Sanomat published only two letters during the sample weeks. In April an associate professor of Finnish at the Petrozavodsk State University wrote a rejoinder correcting the mistakes in her interview published in the paper. She wrote that her ideas had been presented incorrectly. In September Niilo Päätaalo from Kuusamo (Finland) wrote about his journey to Karelia.

The number of photographs had continued to fall and *Severnyi Kurier* even had issues without photographs at all. During the two sample weeks the number of photographs was only 37 (21 in April, 16 in September) and there were also seven drawings. Only less than nine per cent of the stories had a picture. One of reasons was also the increasing share of advertisements that did not include pictures but likely also the lack of funds for processing the photos. The paper no longer published photographs from Tass (as it had stopped subscribing to the news service of Tass as well), and most of the photographs were taken by the paper’s own photographers.

Karjalan Sanomat had better preserved its traditional appearance also concerning pictures. It published 60 photographs and two drawings during the two sample weeks (24 in April, 36 in September) and every fourth story had a picture. There were also 12 pictures from Itar-Tass, but most of them were taken by staff photographers or the authors. The comparison with *Severnyi Kurier* is striking.

The pictures in *Karjalan Sanomat* presented mainly several persons (one third) or were without people (20%). There was even one “*fotokorrespondentsiya*”-style picture of a model worker under the headline

“Vladimir Haukka is driving a concrete-delivery truck”. Although the worker was young and he had been photographed next to his truck, it was a clear element of the past.

7.8. Newspaper and journalism in 1995

In 1995 already four years had passed since the collapse of the Soviet system and the political situation had stabilised after the turbulence and power struggles of the beginning of 1990s. The country was preparing for the parliamentary elections, which took place in December 1995, and the presidential elections of 1996. In these elections the communists gained more support, while the Liberal-Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovski lost and the party of power, Our Home Is Russia, obtained poor results. In 1996 president Boris Eltsin was re-elected in the second round.

In Karelia, the economy was still falling due to the collapse of the Soviet system. Inflation was 131% and unemployment reached eight per cent at the end of the year, but the decline of the economy started to slow down: in 1995 GNP declined only 4.2% compared with 12.6% a year earlier.

The circulation of *Severnii Kurier* was approximately on the same level as in 1993. It had remained one of the major papers but it now had to compete for readers with several other newspapers. *Karjalan Sanomat* had dropped one issue a week and came out only on Wednesdays and Saturdays. The paper had taken on a tabloid format and had eight pages. The total space was only around 60% of that in 1993 and before that. Compared with the year 1993, major progress had occurred in the outward appearance and content of both newspapers.

7.8.1. Typical events and headline news

In 1995 the most frequent news stories in *Severnii Kurier* dealt with various seminars, visits and meetings, everyday problems and crimes. During the April sample week the main news stories were linked with the 50th anniversary of victory in the Second World War and economic crisis in different forms. The main items on the first page were the scandal around MMM inc., a so-called pyramid company, which collapsed, the reasons behind the high increase in rents for flats in the town of Medvezhegorsk and the trade union action day were topics for the longer reportages on the first page. A lot of attention was also paid to the newspaper subscription campaign that began during that week. *Severnii Kurier* published already on 13 April the results

of the first days, which indicated that it was the most popular newspaper among subscribers.

The short news stories on the first page told about the visit of a Karelian delegation to Georgia, the common day of action of the Russian trade unions to protest against rising prices and declining living standards, the traditional cleaning campaign in the city, compensations for families with children and a programme for fighting criminality in the city of Petrozavodsk and the lack of money to implement it.

Longer reportages on the other pages paid attention to war-time memoirs, the energy and electricity prices of the monopoly company Karelenergo and highlighted the fact that Petrozavodsk may run out of free places in the cemeteries already within the year. Lighter stories in the Saturday issue, presented, e.g., a new book on Lev Trotsky and reviewed the recommendations of a magazine from the year 1915 for women. There were also cultural issues like news about the publication of a Karelian dictionary and the *kantele* (traditional Karelian instrument) festival.

News from other parts of Russia and the CIS included, e.g., information that a tiger killed a hunter in the Far East, that six journalists were killed in the CIS in March, that the causes of the sinking of the passenger ship Estonia had been investigated, that a swindler who had presented himself as a tax policeman had been arrested in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Karjalan Sanomat introduced the newly launched Student newspaper of Karelia made by students both in the Finnish city of Joensuu and Petrozavodsk, reported on a conference on the wartime concentration camps in Karelia and about the work of the constitutional court of Karelia. It published also stories on the University of Joensuu (Finland) and the life of Russian immigrants in Finland. *Karjalan Sanomat* paid a lot of attention to culture by reviewing concerts, interviewing a Russian poet of Karelia and a Finnish actor working in the Finnish theatre of Petrozavodsk and reporting on the congress of the Ingrian Finns of Russia.

Both newspapers paid attention to the launch of the Student newspaper of Karelia and the conference on the wartime concentration camps in Karelia, but in general the number of common news items was rather small. *Karjalan Sanomat* was more oriented towards culture and nationality issues, while *Severnyi Kurier* paid more attention to social problems, the economy and politics. On Saturday the 8th of April, *Karjalan Sanomat* included many news stories that had been reported in *Severnyi Kurier* already earlier.

During the September sample week the main events reported by *Severnyi Kurier* were various seminars and visits of delegations, everyday problems (the increasing price of meat, queues for bread, the lack of medical resources

in hospitals) and political conflicts. The major first page news stories reported on the secret building of a summer cottage for the Russian president, Boris Eltsin, in Shuiskaya Chupa near Petrozavodsk by 80 Macedonian workers who had a higher salary than the local builders, the preparations for the December 1995 parliamentary elections, the violent conflict in the Russian parliament (MP Vladimir Zhirinovski attacked another MP) and on what Finns buy in Karelia (alcohol, Finnish sugar and milk but at cheaper prices than at home) and how the border had changed in four years. There were also many stories on the subscription campaign of the paper.

On the other pages *Severnii Kurier* reported on the conference of the Our Home is Russia Party in Moscow, preparations for the elections, the life in small villages and the economic prospects of the forestry sector and the Nadvoitsa aluminium factory.

News from other parts of Russia and the CIS paid attention to the preparations for the parliamentary elections, accidents (the crash of an MiG-29 aircraft near Moscow and another MiG-31 near Arkhangelsk, cases of cholera in Belorussia, fire on a ship in Sakhalin) and crimes (the number of crimes in Russia during the first eight months of 1995, the number of journalists killed in the CIS, the theft of caviar in Sakhalin). The stories taken from other newspapers discussed, for example, capital punishment in Russia and preparation for the winter in Murmansk.

In September the major stories in *Karjalan Sanomat* dealt with the forthcoming parliamentary elections, the bankruptcy of Tekobank, Karelian governmental efforts to support small businesses, the day of the forest workers and the 30th anniversary of the twin city relations between Petrozavodsk and the Finnish town of Varkaus. In September also culture had a prominent place. The paper published a reportage on an exhibition of the works of the Karelian artist Sulo Juntunen in Petrozavodsk and on an exhibition of Ilya Repin's paintings in Finland, a conference on the popular culture of Northern Russia and an interview with a jewellery artist. Also co-operation with Finland had a prominent place in *Karjalan Sanomat*, which reported on co-operation between schools, journalists and scouts.

Both newspapers paid attention to the visit of a Karelian delegation to the Nordic countries and the visit of a Finnish parliamentary delegation to Karelia. Both newspapers published the story of the Karelian government press service about the visit. There were also differences: *Severnii Kurier* published a small story on the situation around Tekobank while *Karjalan Sanomat* used the whole first page for the story.

In general, the newspapers of 1995 were full of news and larger reportages on important issues. There was even an effort to cover the important national

news by using staff journalists and to look for news. On the other hand, *Severnyi Kurier* was favouring the Our Home is Russia Party by giving it major coverage in comparison with other parties.

7.8.2. *The structure and the sources of the newspapers*

The most striking difference in the first page of *Severnyi Kurier* is the prominence of short news stories even in comparison with 1993. A regular column headline such as “News” is placed on the left side of the first page of *Severnyi Kurier* and occasionally a column of Karelian news under the title “All of Karelia” (in the Russian, Karelian, Finnish and Veps languages) can be found in the upper middle part of the page. The right side of the first page was a place for a commentary column under the titles “In the corridors of power” and “Occasional notes” (*Zametki po povodu*) or for an editorial article (*Kolonka redaktora*). The average number of stories on the first page was increased to 16.2, which was 40% of all the stories.

In the inner pages the most remarkable change was the appearance of the weekly television programme in the Saturday issues of both newspapers. The television programme took up two pages in both newspapers. *Karjalan Sanomat* had ceased to publish television programmes elsewhere at all, while *Severnyi Kurier* continued to publish the daily programme on the last page.

On the second page the main element was “News — the correspondents of SK, RIA and Interfax inform”, a section that was divided into three parts: Karelia, Russia and the World. The world, however, meant mostly the CIS countries, because the news services used had little news from outside the former Soviet Union. The news came mainly from Interfax and partly also from RIA. Other stories on the second page were longer, mostly local stories on politics and the economy.

On the third page were larger human interest stories and larger stories on culture, politics, the economy and sports. There was also some advertising (mainly in April) and occasionally a crossword puzzle and its solution. On the fourth page were only advertisements, classifieds and the daily television programme.

In the Saturday issue *Severnyi Kurier* had eight pages, of which one or two were filled with advertisements. The Saturday issue had lighter stories on culture, lifestyles, history and human-interest issues.

Karjalan Sanomat had changed its format at the beginning of 1995 and it was published in tabloid format with eight pages. The first page of *Karjalan Sanomat* included usually one major story and an index of the most prominent stories (one column on the right hand side of the page). The second and third

pages had news of politics, the economy and other topics. There were also currency rates, a list of forthcoming events and publication data. In the Saturday issue the fourth and fifth pages were the location of the weekly television programme, while in the Wednesday issue they had news stories and longer reportages. The second half of the paper had many longer stories on culture and current events. On the last page were a crossword puzzle and horoscopes (in the Saturday issue) and the solution to the crossword (Wednesday).

In *Severnyi Kurier* the number of advertisements remained on the same level as in 1993. The whole fourth page, except for a small column for the day's television programme, weather report and cinema announcements, was used for advertisements and they were also on the third page. On the first page the only piece of advertising was a regular one of the "Russkii dom Selenga" during the April sample week. A major drop in the amount of advertising occurred from April to September: in April the share of advertising had been 24%, while it was only 13% in September. The drop was compensated for by an increase in journalistic material.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the only advertisements were the ones published by a travel agency and Russian-Finnish transport agency. There was also an advertisement that encouraged readers to subscribe to *Karjalan Sanomat*.

Karjalan Sanomat had significantly decreased the use of news agency materials and translated stories from other newspapers. There were some foreign news items from RIA and a story from the Finnish newspaper *Karjalainen* on foreign language teaching in Finnish schools. *Karjalan Sanomat* did not have many official texts nor letters to the editor. But although the share of stories written by journalists themselves had increased, the total amount of journalist text had in fact decreased because of the reduced number of issues and the change of format.

The number of photographs had increased to 68 in *Severnyi Kurier* and in addition to this there were also 12 drawings. The paper published photographs mainly in connection with larger reportages or, to a lesser degree, in order to show a person interviewed or mentioned in the story. The text was primary and only in a few cases did the photographs linked to the story take up more space than the text. The number of stories with photographs was only 28, so those stories that had a photograph had usually many of them. In comparison with the Soviet period, the photographs had become smaller (the usual size was below 50 cm²) and there were no longer stories comprised of a single photograph with a short text. Photographs were not of a standard size and they often broke text columns. This was perhaps done in order to give the page a more lively look but it also caused an effect of obscurity.

Table 7.6. The division of space among various sources and types of text in Severnyi Kurier and Karjalan Sanomat in 1995.

	Severnyi Kurier		Karjalan Sanomat	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	19,200	100.0	6,080	100.0
- Name plate, publication data	822	4.3	208	3.5
- General headlines, residual space	540	2.8	147	2.4
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre, horoscope	1,018	5.3	305	5.1
- Advertisements	3,591	18.7	45	0.8
- Television programmes	2,189	11.4	760	12.5
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	291	1.5	185	3.1
- Letters to the editor	617	3.2	16	0.3
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	2,241	11.7	274	4.6
- Written by outside authors	1,144	6.0	299	5.0
- Written by journalists	6,805	35.4	3,841	63.2

In *Karjalan Sanomat*, despite the decrease in the number of issues and space, the number of photographs had increased to 64. There were pictures on the first page in each of the four sample issues, but generally the pictures were in the second half of the paper, usually in connection with larger stories on culture. On pages two to four there were only a few pictures (mainly showing persons).

7.9. Newspaper and journalism in 1997

The decline of the Russian economy continued in the second half of the 1990s but the drop was less severe than earlier. For example, inflation was at its lowest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first local elections in the Karelian Republic in 1996 had kept Vladimir Stepanov in power, and the former members of the ruling elite preserved their positions. The institutions of democratic power were strengthened and “social, political and economic life was developing without serious trouble” and “no counter-elite appeared which aspired to power, aiming at a qualitative change of the society’s political structure” before summer-autumn 1997 (Tsygankov 2001, 266).

Although a pessimistic view of the development of civil society is very common among the intelligentsia in the Karelian Republic, the activity in civil society has not been declining since the early 1990s, but on the contrary has broadened every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Liikanen 2002, 194-195).

In 1997 a new kind of press structure was stabilised. Two new weekly newspapers were founded and the circulation of newspapers, especially the new ones, had increased. Consequently, the old newspapers were in trouble: their circulations were declining, they did not appeal to the public as they had done before. *Severnyi Kurier* was still the only daily and *Karjalan Sanomat* was, at the moment, the only newspaper that came out twice a week. All the other papers were weeklies. *Severnyi Kurier* had lost its circulation further and in 1997 it was around 12 000 copies (less than half of the circulation of 1995).

7.9.1. *Typical events and headline news*

In general the new conditions caused by the transition to the market economy and various problems and power conflicts were regular issues in the newspapers of 1997. Lot of things happened “in the corridors of power” and in “press conferences” or dealt with “money”, “zigzags of the market” and “social security”, as the regular catchlines indicated.

In April the main events were different meetings and visits. There was a meeting of the governors of northwest Russia in Petrozavodsk, a visit by the Swedish Consul-General to Petrozavodsk, a visit by members of the German parliament to the forests of Karelia and the week of European movies. There were also some topics dealing with social problems and crimes like a theft in the republican veterans’ hospital and rising prices of alcoholic drinks, and political events like the problems with the local budget. Many first-page news items, including major ones, dealt with the subscription campaign: the paper interviewed those who had subscribed to *Severnyi Kurier*.

On other pages *Severnyi Kurier* told, e.g., about the economics of health care, problems in the plywood factory of Lahdenpohja and problems with budget transfers from Moscow, reported on criticism against the local authorities for not serving the interests of the citizens and plans to open new mines in the Pudozh district. It also published a translated article from the Finnish newspaper *Savon sanomat* on problems on the Russian-Finnish border.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the main news items dealt with co-operation between the regions of northwest Russia, the construction of a nursing home for the

ethnically Finnish elderly in Petrozavodsk, aid transportation by the Red Cross from Finland and plans of the trade unions to organise a protest demonstration on May 1st. *Karjalan Sanomat* also paid a lot of attention to various cultural issues (also Russian-language culture) which remained uncovered in *Severnyi Kurier*.

In September 1997 the harvesting of potatoes was not one of the main topics of first page news, as it had been still in 1993 and 1995. There was only one news story about harvesting in *Severnyi Kurier*. Instead of harvesting, preparations for the heating of apartments and the purchase of fuel for the winter had become new seasonal problems. The coverage reflects the social change: harvesting had become a problem of privatised companies and it was no longer a general issue, while the heating which did not cause any major problem before (at least not one to be solved with common effort) was in 1997 a problem that affected everybody and that was on the agenda of the local authorities.

Other news topics on the front page were, e.g., the inauguration of an exhibition on the blockade of Leningrad, the difficult telephone situation in the Muezero district, reactions to the denomination of the rouble and a report about the work of the fireman. On the other pages the paper told about the Swedish joint venture plan for the Segezha pulp and paper mill, customs regulations, housing reform and published an interview with the manager of the Petrozavodsk liqueur factory. It also published extensive reports on the situation on the fish market of Karelia and the work on the Baltic-White Sea canal.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the first page news issues were positive developments in the Segezha pulp and paper mill and a reportage on the village Sergievo in the Medvezhegorsk district. On the other pages the main stories told about the anti-crisis programme of the Karelian government, the state of Karelian roads, the participation by Karelian teachers in a media education conference in Finland and a scientific conference at Petrozavodsk State University. The paper also published a report on a tourist trip to London, articles about rock concerts both in Petrozavodsk and in Finland and an interview with the chairwoman of the Union of Karelian Business Women. Cultural stories included, for example, the visit of an Australian playwright to Petrozavodsk, a music video festival in the Finnish city of Oulu and the opening of the season at the puppet theatre of Petrozavodsk.

The papers also had common news items, which included the Segezha pulp and paper mill, the blockade of Leningrad and a press conference of the Federal Security Service on the protection of classified information. *Severnyi*

Kurier did not mention many cultural items covered by *Karjalan Sanomat* while *Karjalan Sanomat* did not cover the heating problem.

Local, Karelian issues were prominent in both newspapers. As in 1995, *Severnnyi Kurier* published a lot of news from the districts of Karelia. It had its own correspondents in Medvezhegorsk, Kem and Sortavala and stringers provided news from Olonets, Pitkäranta, Belomorsk and Loukhi. Also *Karjalan Sanomat* published news from Kostomuksha, Chupa, Segezha and Sortavala. The paper also obtained news items from stringers, district newspapers and the news agency Ima-Press.

7.9.2. *The structure and the sources of the newspapers*

Severnnyi Kurier had renewed its nameplate and the layout of the first page. On the upper-left hand side was a column for small news items under the section headline “Our correspondents communicate” and the main headline: “Karelia: yesterday, today, tomorrow”. Besides this there was also a contour map of Karelia. On the top of the first page were several teaser headlines on the content of the paper. The first page also had some major news stories and occasionally a kind of editorial column under the headline “Editors column” or “Occasional notes”.

On the second page, two columns were reserved for “The news of the issue” which came from Interfax and the rest of the paper was filled with larger stories on current local affairs. There were sometimes also letters to the editor and some advertisements. The topics related usually to politics and economics. There were also some textual advertisement stories.

On the third page *Severnnyi Kurier* published longer local articles, letters to the editor, advertisements and a crossword puzzle was regularly placed on that page. The topics of the third page stories related usually to culture, crimes, nature and people. On the last page the most important items were the television programme and advertisements (over one half of the page). Also included on the page were the solution to the crossword puzzle (from the previous issue), the weather forecast, and currency rates (which previously had been on the first page). There were also some stories, mostly on various human interest and entertainment topics.

The Saturday issue had eight pages, of which two were used for the weekly television programme. The Saturday issue was more entertaining and human interest-oriented, including short human-interest news items from abroad, astrological predictions, religious articles, caricatures and chess problems.

Karjalan Sanomat had mostly a similar structure to the one it had in 1995. The first page had the most important stories, an index of the most

important stories on other pages and some advertisements (one advertisement by Finnair). On the inner pages the most important stories on economics and politics were usually on pages two to four, in the middle of the paper some wider reportages were published and at the end were stories on culture. In the Saturday issue the third page was titled "What, where, when" and it included some stories and a list of ongoing events in the city.

Karjalan Sanomat published crossword puzzle only in the Saturday issue, while *Severnyi Kurier* had a crossword in every issue. Instead of horoscope, *Severnyi Kurier* published a weekly prognosis by an astrologist in the Saturday issue, while *Karjalan Sanomat* had a traditional horoscope.

There were no major changes in the distribution of the space among various text sources. The material from news agencies and other newspapers had continued to decrease in *Severnyi Kurier*, but the shares of text from other sources had remained practically the same.

With the decline in circulation, the share of advertisements in *Severnyi Kurier* had fallen to 11%. The most important advertisers were stores for electrical equipment, car shops, internet-service providers and companies interesting in buying shares. There was little advertising for household goods. The paper published also several of its own advertisements in order to get subscriptions and advertising. There were also several advertisement stories (marked with text "na pravakh reklamy" which could be translated as "entitled as an advertisement") which presented medical products, a construction company and a candidate for the Karelian parliament and told about the support provided by the American "Evraziya" foundation for the small businesses of Karelia. These articles were partly without the author's name but partly signed by journalists who had written also other articles in the paper.

The advertisements were rare in *Karjalan Sanomat*: some of their own advertisements urged readers to subscribe to the paper, some advertisements related to cultural events and the search for friends in Finland and Karelia and there were also advertisements by the Finnish aviation company Finnair. They took up only less than two per cent of the space.

The section division of *Severnyi Kurier* reveals a change in the importance of topics: In 1997 the sections were "family, children and youth", "economy, juridical issues", "culture", "agriculture", "organs of power and administration", "city economy" and "everyday life, education". There were more sections than in 1995 and most of them dealt with everyday life and social issues. It is worth noticing that the separate section of news was abolished. The section division given in the list of phone numbers was, however, not visible in the content of the paper. The different sections did

not have separate pages or columns and the names were not visible in logos or labels either.

Table 7.7. The division of space among various sources and types of text in *Severnii Kurier* and *Karjalan Sanomat* in 1997.

	Severnii Kurier		Karjalan Sanomat	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	19,200	100	6,080	100
- Name plate, publication data	1,080	5.6	204	3.4
- General headlines, residual space	1,136	5.9	267	4.4
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre, horoscope	1,261	6.6	294	4.8
- Advertisements	2,122	11.1	78	1.3
- Television programmes	2,573	13.4	760	12.5
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	317	1.7	62	1.1
- Letters to the editor	843	4.4	98	1.6
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	1,488	7.8	489	8.0
- Written by outside authors	1,145	6.0	185	3.0
- Written by journalists	7,235	37.7	3,643	59.9

The television programme received as much space as in 1995. There were eleven different television channels (in 1993 the number was five and in 1995 nine). *Karjalan Sanomat* published only the weekly television programme on two pages in the Saturday issue, while *Severnii Kurier* used two pages for it in the Saturday issue and published also the daily programme information on the last page.

The longer stories of *Severnii Kurier* were published with both the first and surnames of the journalists, while for shorter stories only the surname and an initial was included. There were also stories, even major ones, without a signature at all. *Karjalan Sanomat* continued to publish both first and surnames in most of the stories (as it had done even in the Soviet era).

The share of material from news agencies and other newspapers had continued to decline. *Severnii Kurier* used mainly the agency Interfax for news outside Karelia. This limited significantly the amount of foreign news, because Interfax only occasionally offered news outside the CIS. The paper published also stories from the press syndicate Globus and stories from *Komsomolskaya pravda* and *Moskovskie novosti*.

The news stories of Interfax told about the destruction of the home of migrants from the Northern Caucasus by local citizens in Sakhalin, a strike by metro drivers in Ekaterinburg, an attempt to smuggle over a million US dollars from Moscow to Tajikistan by a passenger, investigations around the case of the wiretapping of the telephone discussions of the vice-premier Boris Nemtsov, Yurii Baturin's training for a space flight and about the poll results on the value of education among Russian parents. The news from Interfax was published on the left side of the second page in each issue. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the major news agency sources were RIA Novosti and IMA Press.

Severnii Kurier published letters to the editor section in almost every issue of the paper (one issue in the April sample week and two issues in the September week did not have letters), although one issue had only a few of them. The letters dealt mainly with everyday problems and issues, e.g., the closing of a shop in one district of Petrozavodsk, the non-payment of salaries for aviation personnel, demands of the citizens of Segezha to the Russian president that the salary arrears be paid, and a housing problem of a veteran of war and invalid. Besides these, there were also letters on more general issues, presenting, e.g., criticism of foreign words in the names of companies, the use of foreign-made cars by members of the Russian parliament, the denomination of the Russian rouble (which was, according to the author, serving only the interests of the politicians and the West) and discussing the status of the republic of Karelia (proposing to change it to a region (oblast)) and the status of the Karelian language. Many letters commented on articles published in the paper and there were also a poem (about the Karelian language) and a travel report (by a group of invalids to Finland). *Karjalan Sanomat* had only three letters, dealing with issues of ethnic culture and co-operation with Finland.

The number of photographs had remained practically at the same level as in 1995. There were 72 photographs and 8 drawings in *Severnii Kurier* (not including photographs with advertisements) and 70 photographs in *Karjalan Sanomat*. In *Severnii Kurier* the photographs were placed on all the (textual) pages, but most often they were on the first page (over one third of all photographs) and there was a photograph on almost every first page during the sample week. The first page was favoured as a place for photographs: even if the major part of a larger story was on the second page, the photographs of the story were on the first page.

In *Severnii Kurier* one fourth of the photographs had no people and many of them presented either two or more persons, or places with persons. One third of the pictures had one person either as the only item in the

photograph or a person in a place. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the number of pictures with only one person was lower, as was the number of pictures without people.

If a story had a photograph, there was often also another one. Of the 43 stories with photographs, over half had at least two photographs in *Severnyi Kurier*, while in *Karjalan Sanomat* most of the 45 stories with photographs had only one photograph.

7.10. Newspaper and journalism in 1999

An open competition for power appeared between the mayor of Petrozavodsk, Sergei Katanandov, and the chairman of the government, Viktor Stepanov, at the end of the 1990s and this led to an unavoidable split of the elite. The struggle peaked in April-May 1999 when Katanandov beat Stepanov in a close election for the post of chairman (Tsygankov 2001, 267). During the election campaign most of the established press supported Katanandov and criticised Stepanov (see Pietiläinen 2000).

In 1999 the number of pages of the main newspapers had started to increase, including *Severnyi Kurier*. It had started to publish a national newspaper, *Delovoi Vtornik* (Business Tuesday) as an appendix to the Tuesday issue and also the Saturday issue had eight pages. In the Saturday issue two pages were used for the weekly television programme.

The editor in chief of *Severnyi Kurier* had changed in 1998, which had some influence on the content and style of the paper as well. The economic crisis of 1998 had harmed the press somewhat but the recovery had been rapid. The crisis had made the papers orient themselves more toward their audiences and in 1999 enough time had passed that some permanent development in the journalism can be noticed.

Severnyi Kurier had got a new competitor in the market of the daily newspapers when *Reporter* was launched, but it happened to be a short-lived phenomenon. The circulation of *Severnyi Kurier* had not fallen any more and had stabilised at its former level, at 12,000 copies, one tenth of the late Soviet level. *Karjalan Sanomat* continued as before, having a small number of readers both in Karelia and in Finland.

7.10.1. Typical events and headline news

Two main news stories during the second week of April in 1999 were the Karelia Days in Moscow and the situation around the sawmill of Ilinskii (Alavoinen), which were almost the only issues mentioned in both of the newspapers. *Severnyi Kurier* paid attention also to Orthodox Easter, which

occurred during the sample week. The preparations were mentioned in the issues of 8 and 9 April and on 10 April the paper published part of the greeting of the bishop of Karelia. Finally, the first page of the Sunday issue of *Severnnyi Kurier* on 11 April was dedicated to Easter, “the most solemn of all the Christian celebrations”. The largest part of the page was a photograph of an Easter worship service. The story itself told about Easter traditions and their origins in Russian culture.

Other first-page topics included the preparations for the farming season and some visits, like that of an American honorary doctor of Moscow State University, a professor from Minnesota state university, in Karelia. There were also many smaller news stories on various accidents under headlines such as “Tragedy”, “ChP” (an abbreviation for crisis situation), “Under the signal SOS” and “01” (the fire alarm telephone number).

On the other pages the most prominent stories reported about the difficulties around the repair of the swimming pool of Petrozavodsk, reportage on a Finnish forest worker (in northern Finland) who became an entrepreneur, an interview with a director of the forest fire brigade and a story related to the 200th anniversary of the birth of the Russian author Aleksandr Pushkin. On the other pages the Sunday issue presented something other than Easter celebrations: the Anthology of the Karelian Estrade told about the pop group ‘Variant’, ski excursions and the arrival of migrant birds in April. There was also a story about Sofia Loren, instructions how to make a roof for a summer cottage and a story about the ancient military history of Karelia (in the 17th Century).

Karjalan Sanomat reported also on the fate of the sawmill in Ilinskii (Alavoinen) and the days of Karelia in Moscow on its first pages. On the other pages the most important stories told about problems with the orphanage in Pryazha, Paanajärvi national park, the forthcoming amnesty for prisoners, the teaching of Finnish literature at Petrozavodsk State University and a concert of Karelian artists in Moscow.

During the September sample week the most important topics were related to international co-operation, crimes and accidents, social security and economic problems. The paper told also about the terrorist attacks in Moscow and in Dagestan, housing reform and the budget plan for 2000. The prominent first page stories included also a report on a seminar on rehabilitation technology for the handicapped, reportages on the village Kolezhma in northern Karelia, on the woodworking factory in Kem and on the Belomorsk sawmill and woodworking company. A photographer from the paper had visited the towns and villages on the White Sea coast and the results were published in several issues.

On the other pages the most important stories included an interview about the development of new information technology at Petrozavodsk State university, a reportage on the village of Ersnevo, articles about housing reform, traffic accidents and regulations concerning market sales.

Karjalan Sanomat paid more attention to cultural issues and local politics. The first page stories included a report on the visit of chairman Sergei Katanandov to the Veps district and an interview with the president of the republican energy commission on preparations for the winter. The other major news stories reported that economic thinking was starting to develop in the districts, the children's activity centre would host the international congress of policemen, the teachers of Karelia received an antidrugs guidebook and that the Karelian philharmonic orchestra would start its 25th anniversary with a visit to Sweden. There were also large reportages on an exhibition of British computer art in Petrozavodsk, on the revival of villages in Äänisniemi and on the 100th anniversary of the founder of the local Kantele ensemble.

7.10.2. The structure and the sources of the newspapers

The number of pages of *Severnõi Kurier* had increased significantly. In the April sample week, the Tuesday, Wednesday and Saturday issues had eight pages (in the Tuesday issue four pages were made up of *Delovoi Vtornik*, Business Tuesday, the appendix) and the Sunday tabloid-formatted issue was almost as large as an ordinary issue. Only the Thursday and Friday issues had four pages. In September the Sunday issue was omitted but the Friday issue started to come out with eight pages.

Severnõi Kurier changed its first page, especially the nameplate, between the sample weeks. In April the biggest text in the nameplate was *Severnõi Kurier* and the text below it told that the paper is an "Independent socio-political newspaper of Karelia". In September the biggest element of the nameplate was the letters SK and only below them was the name "Severnõi Kurier"; the paper described itself as the "Daily newspaper of Karelia". Moreover, the nameplate had regularly a headline referring to the stories on the second or third page. The first page included also the most important news stories, both small and large ones. Often only the beginning of a larger story was on the first page and the largest part of the story was on the second or third page. Compared with 1997, there was no longer a separate column for local short news items, but rather just a general news column, usually on the right side of the page.

The average number of stories on the first page had decreased to nine from 12.5 in 1997 and over 16 in 1995. The first page also had advertisements;

often (in April) the most important of them advertised the paper itself, which was explained by the fact that the discounted period for subscriptions ended just after the sample week.

The second page of *Severnyi Kurier* had changed even more. There was no longer a news section, but rather longer stories on economic, political, cultural, criminal and other topics, often written by non-staff authors. There were occasionally also some smaller news stories. On the other pages there was not a clear division between thematic sections, but the stories were put together loosely with similar ones. If there were more stories on culture or sport, they were usually on pages five or six (in issues with eight pages), while stories about economics and politics were placed closer to the beginning. Human interest and everyday life stories were usually after politics and economics, but before sport and culture.

In the Wednesday issue the last five pages were made up of advertisements; in the Saturday issue the weekly television programme took up two pages. The last page was always used for advertisements and the television programme. Astrological prognoses and crosswords could be found on the second to last page. There was a crossword in every issue. In general the orientation towards news had decreased in *Severnyi Kurier*. Instead of short news, the paper had larger reportages and columns. As a consequence, the headlines had become wider; 60% of the stories had one or two column wide headlines, while almost ten percent of the stories had at least five column wide headlines. In 1995, 80% of the stories had one or two column wide headlines and five column wide headlines were extremely rare.

Karjalan Sanomat had preserved its former format. The first page of the tabloid-formatted newspaper of eight pages had one major story and the index of the stories on the other pages. There was as a rule one large photograph or several photographs, so that they covered usually over half of the page. The second and third pages included shorter and longer news stories by the paper's own journalists and also from the IMA-press news agency. Some of the stories were continued from the first page. In the Saturday issue pages four and five had the weekly television programme, while in the Wednesday issue these pages were made up of larger reportages and columns (one or two per page) and some smaller news stories. At the end of the paper were mainly stories on culture and education. There was (on page six) also a news from Finland column and, in the Saturday issue, horoscopes and a crossword.

In *Severnyi Kurier* the amount of material written by journalists had almost doubled, while the amount of textual material from other sources had remained at the same level. Most of the increase was due to the appendix, Business Tuesday, which had practically only materials written by journalists

(approximately 3,000 column cms), which totalled around 20% of the material written by journalists in *Severnyi Kurier*. Even without the appendix, the amount of material written by journalists had increased from 7,000 to 11,000 column cms. Partly this was caused by a more spacious layout, but there was also a real increase. On the other hand, the number of stories had not increased at the same pace. In 1997 journalists had written 180 stories, while in 1999 they had written 255, of which 49 were in Business Tuesday. *Severnyi Kurier* also had its own correspondent (stringer) in the eastern Finnish city of Joensuu and correspondents in Olonets, Kem and Medvezhegorsk.

While the signing of stories with both first and surnames (instead of an initial and surname) had not been very frequent in 1997, in 1999 over 90% of the stories in *Severnyi Kurier* written by journalists were signed with both the first and surname. Also the share of stories without a signature at all had increased to 25% (from 19% in 1997). The use of both names had become more frequent also in the letters to the editor, although there the old practice of using the first initial still prevailed. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the use of both names was a universal rule, but over 40% of stories were not signed at all.

The outside authors had written mainly stories that required special knowledge — the authors included a member of the geographic society, a specialist of the mathematics division of the Academy of Sciences, a director of the energy company, but also a member of parliament (a former journalist). There were also some stories by press secretaries, e.g., of the Petrozavodsk liqueur factory. Official texts included stories mainly by the press service of the chairman of the republic, but they were short and covered less than one percent of the newspaper space.

Karjalan Sanomat had changed its number of columns per page from five to six and therefore the amount of text seems to have increased, although the paper produced the same number of pages in the same format as in 1997 and 1995.

In *Severnyi Kurier* the share of television programmes had decreased because of the increasing number of pages, but the absolute amount of space for them had increased slightly. The weekly television programme took up two pages in the Saturday issue, and besides it the paper published a daily television and radio programme on the last page of each issue. *Severnyi Kurier* offered programme information for 12 television channels while *Karjalan Sanomat* offered only three (the first and second channels and the cultural channel). Besides the local state radio channel, *Severnyi Kurier* published also the programme of *Russkoe radio*.

Table 7.8. The division of space among various sources and types of text in *Severnyi Kurier* and *Karjalan Sanomat* in 1999.

	Severnyi Kurier		Karjalan Sanomat	
	cm	%	cm	%
Total space	28,876	100	7,296	100
- Name plate, publication data	1,005	3.5	168	2.3
- General headlines, residual space	944	3.3	346	4.7
- Classifieds, weather, cinema, theatre, horoscope	1,963	6.8	397	5.4
- Advertisements	4,192	14.5	45	0.6
- Television programmes	2,895	10.0	912	12.5
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	187	0.6	31	0.4
- Letters to the editor	687	2.4	—	—
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	1,653	5.7	424	5.8
- Written by outside authors	1,303	4.5	101	1.4
- Written by journalists	14,047	48.6	4,872	66.8

The material from other newspapers and news agencies came to *Severnyi Kurier* mainly from the newspaper *Argumenty i fakty* (the stories for the human interest column 'Mozaika') and the Itar-Tass news agency. There were only a few news stories from the SeverInform news agency and the Globus company and from several other newspapers and agencies. *Karjalan Sanomat* used mainly the IMA-Press news agency.

The number of letters to the editor had dropped from 41 to 28. *Severnyi Kurier* published them only in the Wednesday issue, in which they were printed on the second page. *Karjalan Sanomat* had no letters at all during the sample weeks. The letters dealt with everyday life and problems. There were many expressions of gratitude and many letters that reported about current events (the constructing of a new musical school, dance courses in a village school).

The share of advertisements had increased again in *Severnyi Kurier*, although the circulation of the paper remained on a rather low level. It, however, had not dropped significantly from 1997. In absolute terms the number of advertisements had almost doubled and there were also many classifieds, e.g., selling flats, cars and other things, searching for and offering jobs and funeral announcements. There were also many 'looking for a friend'

classifieds. Most of the advertisers were small companies selling working and repair tools, furniture, cars and accessories or buying metal. Among the larger companies were the shipbuilding company *Avangard* (Avantgarde), which was selling furniture, the *Vozrozhdenie* (Revival) bank and the cable television company *Petronet*, which both advertised programmes and searched for new customers. There were also announcements about the meetings of the shareholders and announcements on the willingness to buy shares in some companies. There was only one story-like advertisement that presented the restaurant “Fregat”.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the number of advertisement remained low; even Finnair (which had cancelled the route from Finland to Petrozavodsk) was not advertising anymore. There were only advertisements urging readers to subscribe to the paper (and to other Finnish and Karelian language papers).

The number of photographs in *Severnyi Kurier* had increased with the increase in the number of pages to 172 (without photographs in advertisements). The increase was not only due to the increase in volume but the photographs had also become more frequent in stories: almost 30% of the stories had a photograph compared with 15% in 1997. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the number of photographs was slightly smaller (63) than in 1997. A new feature was also the reduced number of photographs per story: two thirds of the stories with photographs had only one photo.

In *Severnyi Kurier* the photographs were most often on the first page (25% of all photographs). The number of photographs with one person and those without people had increased most (every fourth photograph was without people), while photographs presenting places with people or a crowd had become less frequent. Often photographs were placed one over another and often headlines were partly placed in photographs. Photographs also were not column-sized, but often broke columns. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the use of photographs as a rule adjusted with the columns and in general *Karjalan Sanomat* looked more reader-friendly and Western-like.

7.11. Trends and directions

Several changes in the layout and content of *Severnyi Kurier* and *Karjalan Sanomat* occurred during the 1990s. For *Karjalan Sanomat*, a major renovation of the paper occurred in 1995 when it changed its format. For *Severnyi Kurier*, the changes have been less dramatic, but nonetheless there have been many of them. Several stages and trends can be seen. For *Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier*, the years 1985-1989 were a period of reformation of Soviet practices, the years 1991 and 1993 represented the decline of these

practices, 1995 and 1997 included experiments with new kinds of journalism, while 1999 represents a kind of synthesis of new and old practices.

As in the Estonian case, the decline of Soviet practices was followed by a period of confusion and searching. During this period new ways of making newspapers were adapted mainly from the West, although these practices were adapted to the post-Soviet conditions. An important aspect was the economic decline of the society, which reduced the possibilities for new experiments. Unlike in Estonia, Western ownership has not been remarkable in the Russian press and therefore the Western impact has remained less intense. Somehow it could be said that the foreign influence could not take root completely in the Russian reality.

The change in the sources of the material in the newspapers (especially in *Severnyi Kurier*) led to the decline of journalistic content, which was pushed away by advertisements and television programmes. The major decline happened at the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, the official texts played a kind of role as advertisements in the Soviet press and when they were substituted by commercial advertisements, the ordinary reader did not lose that much. Only in 1999 was the reader of *Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier* receiving approximately the same amount of text as had been the case during the last years of the Soviet period. However, the material written by journalists themselves did not collapse at the same pace, but remained almost at the same level, because journalists were increasing their share on the pages of the paper. In 1999 readers got more than double the amount of texts written by journalists than they had in 1985 or 1987.

Table 7.9. Share of journalistic content among various authors in *Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier* (%).

	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	15.1	10.3	4.8	7.4	1.2	2.6	2.9	1.0
- Letters to the editor	1.8	3.7	17.8	5.7	8.5	5.6	7.6	3.8
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	25.9	19.8	11.5	12.8	17.8	20.2	13.5	9.2
- Written by outside authors	21.6	26.9	17.8	17.8	17.0	10.4	10.4	7.3
- Written by journalists	35.6	39.2	48.1	56.4	55.5	61.3	65.6	78.6

The sources of journalistic texts changed a lot. When only journalistic texts have been analysed, the following summary was produced. The disintegration of the former Soviet structure in the distribution of texts happened quickly, as did the *glasnost* era emphasis on material written by ordinary readers (letters to the editor). Although the year 1999 represents in some respects a return to the former practices, in the sources of the newspaper texts it marks a clear break from the past toward more Western-like practices.

Journalists have clearly taken over the formal control of the newspaper space. This, however, does not mean that the textual form of the material has changed as radically, as will be shown in the next chapter. Such formal control, however, offers the possibility that structures inside the news stories will be more controlled by journalists. A text written by an outside author remains a completely foreign, unedited voice.

In *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier* this change happened gradually, the greatest changes being between 1987-1989, 1993-1995 and 1997-1999. Together with the increase in the material written by journalists, an increase in the number of stories written by women also occurred. In 1985 and 1987 only 15% of the stories with a signature were written by women, while in 1995-1999 it varied between 25 and 40%. Of stories written by journalists, only 10-20% were written by women in the Soviet era, but at the end of the 1990s this figure had increased to 30%.

On the basis of material sources, the analysed period can be divided into three different phases: one representing Soviet journalism, another representing *perestroika* journalism and the third representing post-Soviet journalism. The first period included the years 1985 and 1987, when the share of journalists' own stories was still rather low and a lot of space was given to outside authors and news agency materials.

"Transitional journalism", one could call it; another option might be *perestroika* journalism, which was characterised by an increased share of text by journalists themselves, an increased share of letters to the editor, and a decline in the material from news agencies. The foreign news was the first to suffer from the increase in local material.

Post-Soviet journalism is based mostly on stories written by journalists themselves. Outside authors, private readers and, increasingly, news agencies are losing their share. The official sources contribute only slightly to journalism without editing.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* / *Karjalan Sanomat*, changes happened (after a slow beginning) even more thoroughly. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the clear reform happened only in 1995, when the layout of the paper had become tabloid and the amount of content was adapted to the capacity of the staff. In 1991

and 1993 the former format had been preserved, while there were not enough journalists to fill the pages and the material from other sources was used instead. Also the change of the editor in 1991 may have had some impact.

The directed influences from Finland and Finnish journalism have been among the key factors, but also factors like the lack of material by outside authors have contributed to this. Rapid changes in the work force have also helped in this process, although there is a danger of deprofessionalisation (which might even be a good step in the development of journalism toward a more Western and professional model).

Table 7.10. Share of journalistic content among various authors in *Neuvosto-Karjala / Karjalan Sanomat*, %.

	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
- Speeches, official documents, official reports	24.4	12.3	13.0	3.9	1.1	4.0	1.4	0.6
- Letters to the editor	—	0.8	8.7	1.5	1.2	0.3	2.2	—
- Material from news agencies and other newspapers	25.1	27.6	29.3	33.2	33.1	5.9	10.9	10.9
- Written by outside authors	16.2	18.5	13.8	6.3	3.6	6.5	4.1	1.8
- Written by journalists	35.4	40.8	35.2	55.1	61.2	83.2	81.4	86.7

While the conservation of the Russian tradition may be a reason for the preservation of some practices in *Severnyi Kurier*, it does not play a major role for *Karjalan Sanomat*, which already in the Soviet period did not follow the Soviet tradition fully, but adapted it to Finnish ways, despite being under ideological limitations.

Changes in *Karjalan Sanomat* happened in two stages: first in 1989-1991, the share of official texts and texts by outside authors fell; and second, in 1993-1995, with the change of the format the share of texts from news agencies and other newspapers fell. In both cases the increase was in the stories written by journalists. The total amount of text in *Karjalan Sanomat* had fallen from almost 9,000 cm to 4,000 cm (if the column width is standardised), but the amount of text written by journalists had nevertheless increased. The share of stories written by women was originally higher in *Neuvosto-Karjala* than in *Leninskaya pravda* (around 20%) and it increased to over one half in 1995-1999.

8. Changing journalism in focus

8.1. Number and size of stories

In both newspapers the total number of stories decreased in the 1990s in comparison with the Soviet era, mainly because of the decrease in short foreign news stories. In *Severnyi Kurier* the highest number of stories was in 1995, when the paper had a strong emphasis on short news stories. In 1999, despite the major increase in the number of pages, the number of stories remained rather low. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the change of format to tabloid in 1995 reduced the number of stories. The number of pages increased, but in terms of space the new format was only 60% of the former.

The size of stories was measured by the length in column centimetres. Also the size of headlines was measured. The stories with an unusual column size were counted on the basis of a normal column width and measures of the weekend and other exceptional issues using other column sizes were standardised. Table 8.1. indicates the average length and standard deviation for each year in both newspapers.

The average length of the stories was relatively stable up to 1993. In *Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier* the average length was 38 cm and in *Neuvosto-Karjala* 41-45 cm (except in 1985 it was 51.5 cm). In 1995 the stories were the shortest in *Severnyi Kurier*, while in 1995 and 1997 they were almost equal in *Karjalan Sanomat*. After 1995-1997 the length started to increase again and it received the highest level of all in *Severnyi Kurier* in 1999. In *Karjalan Sanomat* the changes have been smaller and the most recent increase in length was due to the change in the number of columns per page from five to six.

The standard deviation in the length of stories decreased between 1985 and 1997 and it indicates that the length of the stories became less varied. Also the number of short stories (in the Soviet press especially foreign news items which were published without a headline) has decreased, but in 1995 there were many short news stories, while longer stories were completely lacking. The standard deviation for 1999 increased again and received its highest level in *Severnyi Kurier*.

Table 8.1. Number of stories, length and headline size in different years.

- (1) Number of stories during two sample weeks
- (2) Total number of pages during two sample weeks
- (3) Average length (column cm)
- (4) Average size of headline (columns)
- (5) Stories without own headline (%)
- (6) Stories with wide headline (3 columns or more) (%)

year	Leninskaya pravda / Severnyi Kurier						Neuvosto-Karjala / Karjalan Sanomat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1985	445	48	38.4	1.88	19.8	32.1	175	24	51.5	2.21	9.7	40.0
1987	438	48	37.9	1.82	15.8	25.1	205	24	42.9	1.99	10.2	36.6
1989	447	40	37.2	1.79	21.7	26.0	215	24	41.1	2.02	13.5	34.4
1991	343	40	37.2	2.15	13.4	18.3	202	24	43.3	2.19	6.4	36.1
1993	300	48	36.1	2.30	5.0	18.8	186	24	44.6	2.48	5.4	40.9
1995	422	48	26.3	2.11	0.9	19.9	121	32	38.1	2.39	0	44.6
1997	341	48	32.3	2.37	2.9	30.2	119	32	39.0	2.23	0.8	37.8
1999	384	72 ¹	46.6	2.53	0.3	39.1	125	32	44.9 ²	2.38	0	38.4

1 Of them, 12 in tabloid size. If adjusted as broadsheet pages, the figure would be 65.4 pages.

2 The column width had changed (six columns per page instead of the former five). If adjusted to the former size, the average length would have been 37.4 cm and the average size 1.98 columns.

The revised development in 1999 can be explained by several factors. First, the layout started to include more empty space, which also increased the length, although the number of words may not have increased. On the other hand, there was also a tendency towards longer, more analytical and reportage stories than short news stories, which were characteristic of the year 1995.

Second, in the Soviet press there were some very long stories (the ten longest stories took over 11% of the total space of the paper in 1985 and 1987) and all the stories (four) over 400 column centimetres were published in *Severnyi Kurier* either in 1985 or in 1987. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* longer stories appeared even in 1991. Between 1993 and 1997 there were no such long stories, but in 1999 longer stories appeared again in both newspapers. In the Soviet press the longer stories were almost all various speeches or official materials, while in the post-Soviet press they were written by journalists. Of the ten longest articles written by journalists, five were published in 1999. Also the increasing number of photographs had an impact on the length of the stories in 1999.

In Soviet journalism many stories were published without a headline. These were mainly short foreign news stories and letters to the editor, but occasionally also others. These stories were much more common in *Leninskaya pravda* than in *Neuvosto-Karjala*. This practice was abolished very soon after the collapse of Soviet journalism: in 1993 these stories were rare (in *Neuvosto-Karjala* already in 1991) and after 1995 they became practically non-existent. On the other hand, the share and the number of long stories increased in 1999.

The correlation between the length and the headline size has increased from 0.56 (in 1985) to 0.75 (in 1997; in 1999 it was 0.70) in *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier*, which indicates that the more prominent stories have received also more prominent headlines and there are fewer smaller stories with wide headlines. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* / *Karjalan Sanomat* the development has not been linear but the correlation between the headline size and length has increased as well.

8.2. Topics and events

8.2.1 General change in topics

The two most important topics of the story have been coded according to a list of 26 topics. For one half of the stories, only one topic is coded. Some of the topics (campaigns, ethnic issues) are such that they appear mainly as secondary topics and therefore the topics have been presented in combined figures in Tables 8.2. and 8.3.

Soviet journalism paid much attention to economy and work, which covered 40% of the space. National politics and Party affairs were among the next most important ones. Also culture, everyday life and, perhaps interestingly, history were among the important topics.

With the collapse of the Soviet system, major changes took place in the frequency of different topics. First to lose their Soviet positions were Party life and foreign policy issues, which started to disappear already during the last Soviet years. Only later did the traditionally most important topic, 'economy and work' lose its dominant position, but it remained the most important topic even after that. This kind of coding does not reveal the changes within the range of topics: at the end of the 1990s there were many more stories about economic policy, while at the end of the 1980s the stories on working life and on the problems of production certainly dominated.

Table 8.2. Space given to various topics in *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier* (%) (since up to two topics have been coded for each story, the total number is over 100)

	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
economy, work	44.5	39.6	30.9	31.9	26.2	28.0	25.1	23.8
national politics	14.8	7.1	8.2	16.8	14.0	13.8	5.9	9.1
local politics	1.9	8.3	9.1	22.1	14.0	10.9	16.4	9.4
foreign policy	9.4	7.0	2.7	3.9	3.0	1.9	0.9	3.1
party	10.5	14.9	8.3	2.2	1.9	2.4	0.1	2.9
military issues, war	5.9	5.9	0.6	1.3	2.7	7.1	2.5	2.6
culture, media	11.1	10.0	15.0	14.9	17.9	18.3	20.1	16.3
education	8.9	5.8	4.3	6.9	5.5	3.3	6.9	7.9
history	9.6	10.2	5.5	6.1	12.5	9.4	7.2	10.3
sports	3.4	5.8	4.5	1.2	2.0	1.4	3.2	4.8
social policy	4.6	8.0	16.2	9.0	13.4	15.2	12.9	7.1
human interest, entertainment	1.8	2.5	3.6	3.5	5.8	11.8	11.3	13.4
everyday life	10.9	9.5	12.8	18.1	15.4	14.7	11.2	20.0
crime, legislation	1.4	4.4	3.9	7.3	9.2	7.2	11.2	7.7
accidents, catastrophes	1.1	0.6	1.4	0.5	2.8	2.3	3.4	2.6
environment, nature	2.9	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.9	2.8	2.2	7.9
religion	—	—	—	1.3	1.2	0.8	2.0	3.9
traffic, energy	2.1	2.7	2.0	1.6	7.0	2.9	7.2	4.6
campaigns	6.5	6.8	4.2	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2
civil organisations	0.7	1.4	1.3	2.1	1.1	3.8	2.0	0.7
ethnic issues	—	—	4.9	1.2	2.5	0.5	0.4	0.9

With the collapse of the Soviet system, *Severnyi Kurier* started to pay more attention to national politics, but this trend was reversed at the end of the 1990s. In 1999 the share of national politics was higher mainly because of the Business Tuesday appendix.

Other topics with increasing importance were social policy, human-interest topics and, during the glasnost era, the previously silenced ethnic issues. In addition, the share of space devoted to previously important culture and everyday life issues increased. The change between 1997 and 1999 mainly increased the attention devoted to light topics of everyday life and human interest, while the amount of attention on politics decreased. The increase in the coverage of national politics was mainly due to the Business Tuesday

appendix. Of the total space in Business Tuesday, 38% was on the economy and 19% on national politics, but there were also stories on social policy, human interest topics and everyday life.

In general the trend has been away from hard topics (politics, the economy, foreign relations) and towards softer topics (social policy, culture, crime, everyday life), but some other softer topics like sport has remained on a low level all the time. The number of disruptive topics like crimes and catastrophes has increased but rather moderately and has not become predominant.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the share of various topics has followed the same lines as in *Severnyi Kurier*. The differences among the topics became greater at the end of the 1990s.

Table 8.3. Space given to various topics in *Neuvosto-Karjala / Karjalan Sanomat* (%) (since up to two topics have been coded for each story, the total number is over 100)

	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
economy, work	39.6	37.3	36.7	30.3	30.9	18.0	26.9	25.0
national politics	22.8	8.7	8.3	16.9	8.4	6.6	6.1	12.3
local politics	2.1	7.3	16.5	14.5	6.1	16.9	13.8	32.8
foreign policy	13.1	18.6	12.5	8.1	5.1	5.1	5.3	7.7
party	7.0	19.2	4.6	5.1	0.2	0.3	—	3.4
military issues, war	6.1	1.4	2.5	3.4	3.8	1.7	1.4	2.9
culture, media	15.0	23.8	11.1	14.6	20.8	36.9	29.4	21.2
education	9.6	3.0	5.8	4.7	10.1	17.2	9.9	5.8
history	15.7	11.8	6.6	16.5	9.0	13.7	9.2	1.9
sports	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.4	2.1	3.3
social policy	2.8	1.2	5.1	6.1	9.9	10.9	13.6	9.8
human interest,								
entertainment	2.2	1.7	2.8	4.9	8.6	4.0	4.0	3.5
everyday life	12.4	8.4	4.9	8.7	7.6	3.3	10.7	16.6
crime, legislation	0.2	1.7	1.6	0.5	4.1	4.1	2.6	3.2
accidents, catastrophes	—	—	1.9	0.6	0.9	—	—	—
environment, nature	4.1	1.8	6.7	2.8	3.7	0.3	1.8	3.7
religion	1.4	0.2	1.8	1.0	1.9	0.2	1.4	—
traffic, energy	0.6	0.8	0.1	2.1	3.9	—	3.0	5.8
campaigns	5.1	5.7	7.0	1.9	0.1	0.5	—	—
civil organisations	1.6	2.3	3.0	2.9	2.1	9.8	8.1	3.2
ethnic issues	—	0.5	11.7	7.4	13.0	4.3	9.8	2.0

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the shift has been away from economy and work, as was the case with *Severnõi Kurier*, but in *Karjalan Sanomat* the increase has occurred mainly in culture, media and ethnic issues, and, more recently, in local politics and everyday life. Many more issues than before deal with local politics and the increase in these stories does not necessarily mean an increased interest in politics, but that issues like culture and the economy are also politically defined, and increasingly defined by local politics.

The major change in topics occurred also in connection with the reform of the newspaper format in 1995, but some steps in this direction were taken already in 1993 (e.g. an increase in cultural stories). *Karjalan Sanomat* clearly concentrated on cultural issues and partly on social policy, everyday life and local politics, while the share of economic news declined.

8.2.2. *Soviet-era cyclic stories*

A typical event in Soviet journalism was cyclic. Various anniversaries, seasonal campaigns and events, five-year plans and preparations for Party conferences gave cycles for Soviet journalism to follow. Because of campaigns and cyclic events, a great deal of the newspaper content could be planned beforehand.

In April 1985 the main cyclic events were the preparations for the *subbotnik* (the Saturday voluntary work effort) and the upcoming 40th anniversary of the Great Victory. Also Lenin's birthday got some mention in the stories. The preparations for the first of May festivities could be noted with the publication of the slogans of the CPSU Central Committee for the parades. Also the specific Party campaigns received coverage. In 1985 they included an apartment building campaign "House-warming-85", the results of which were reported, and "Earth-90" (for the improvement of farm lands). In September 1985 the campaigns included also the final year of the five-year plan, harvesting, and the campaign for newspaper subscriptions.

Campaign stories reported on successes and failures and encouraged better achievements. Usually campaign stories were written by outside authors, Party functionaries, managers of factories and companies or even workers themselves. A typical example of a campaign story is a report by V. Pichugin, a staff correspondent for *Leninskaya pravda* (13 September 1985, first page):

To the last potato!

An extensive harvesting of potatoes is taking place on the farms of the Lahdenpohja district, as in the whole Ladoga area. Agricultural workers receive help from urban dwellers, students and school children. It is worth pointing out

that this year the managers of sovkhoses have been prepared somewhat better to host the helpers. In the Sovkhoses Druzhba, Zarya and Zastava, the dormitories were renovated earlier and the minimum level of comfort has been provided for the people. For example, in the village of Ihala (sovkhos Druzhba) everything was ready for the students to arrive already at the end of August. But in the village of Välimäki (sovkhos Zarya), not all the problems had been solved until very recently: there was no drying-room for clothes, there was no bathroom, firewood had not been provided for the kitchen...

The students of the Petrozavodsk construction college were taken into the work immediately and they were placed in the brigade of Lippola (sovkhos Zastava). They arrived in the morning of the 3rd of September and left for the fields already after lunch. In two and a half days they already finished the harvesting in nine of the 66 hectares that they are responsible for. Not a bad start! There are 115 people working here. They have been divided into five groups, each of which has been given a concrete task. Inside the groups the lads have been divided into team pairs. Between the pairs and the groups there is a competition for cutting the breaks shorter and for the improvement of the quality of the harvest.

However, in the second group of the college students (77 persons), which has been placed at the sovkhos centre, in the village of Hiitola, the work is not going well yet. On the first day the uplifted mood of the lads was spoilt because of a standstill: in the morning there were no buckets for potatoes. Then problems started, sometimes with the sacks, which were not received in the fields at the right moment, and sometimes with the transportation of the potatoes.

— These kinds of problems disorganise the lads and dampen their enthusiasm, teacher A. S. Pirogov laments. — After the compulsory idleness, it is not so simple to start to organise the work again. And here there is also a mess with the lunch. The managers of the sovkhos have not been able to decide whether to bring the lunch to the fields or to bring the lads to the village for lunch. For this reason one group of students was in the fields up until evening without eating.

And the sovkhos professionals have claims also on the potato pickers. They are concerned mainly about the quality of the work. After the rains, a lot of potatoes were found in certain sectors in the fields that had already been harvested. It means that the work of the students has not been monitored well enough to ensure that they pick the potatoes not only quickly but also maintain high quality. In addition, the teachers of the college have to control the harvesting more strictly. The work has to be organised in a way that not a single potato plant remains.

These and other similar problems and reciprocal claims have to be jointly eradicated quickly. Examples of good work, and of understanding of its importance, exist literally next door. The students of the Medical Faculty of PSU¹ working in the fields of the Druzhba sovkhos, have taken on the duty to

1 Petrozavodsk State University

perform the harvesting work quickly and with high quality, to finish the potato harvesting by 25 September and after that to help in the harvesting of fodder root plants as well.

In this way, doing one's best, everyone should work.

V. Pichugin (Staff correspondent)

The presentation of good and bad practices, which was typical of Soviet journalism, is clear. The criticism of bad performance and the praise for success were both necessary parts of the story. At the end of the story, the author presents his (a journalist's or, more correctly, a political worker's) own authoritative opinion (conclusion) on what the story can teach others. Examples of good practices and criticism of shortcomings could be found frequently in the Soviet press.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the number of problem stories was clearly smaller. This can be explained at least partly by the fact that the paper was directed not only to Soviet citizens but also to Finland. Instead of problem stories, *Neuvosto-Karjala* contained articles from TASS and APN on the achievements of Soviet society. Another explanation might be that as a small, minority-language paper, *Neuvosto-Karjala* did not have the same political significance in influencing the masses and playing a role in solving societal problems.

With the decline of Soviet society, the cyclical topics started to lose their importance. In 1985 the harvesting was reported on in *Leninskaya pravda* in 14 stories, which totalled 607 column centimetres, and in 1987 in 13 stories, which totalled 648 column centimetres and which were published regularly on the first page. In 1989 harvesting was a topic in 12 stories, covering only 331 column centimetres and in 1991 in nine stories totalling 234 cm. In *Neuvosto-Karjala*, harvesting was covered in 1985 in four stories totalling 233 column centimetres, but in 1987 it was covered in three stories comprising 166 cm. In 1989 there were three stories on harvesting which covered 144 column centimetres and in 1991 two stories totalling 174 cm.

Also the coverage of harvesting changed. The coverage in 1985 was a traditional Soviet combination of positive and negative elements in a campaign atmosphere and in 1987 coverage had a rather similar campaigning style, with perhaps a little more emphasis on drawbacks and problems ("All the forces are needed in order to save the harvest"). By 1989, however, the number of positive examples decreased and the problems, shortcomings and failures in the fulfilling of the plans and agreements were dominant, although some positive examples were also present. In 1989 *Leninskaya pravda* reported that the harvest would be smaller than planned and that on the fields of Lahdenpohja "helpers were not visible" because, instead of the expected 120-130 students from Petrozavodsk, only 46 had arrived.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala*, journalist Irja Raita demanded in an editorial-type “Topic of the Day” story titled “Better less, but better”, better organisation in the harvesting of potatoes. The problem was that the potatoes were stored in conditions in which they would not be preserved: “Now I think it is time to demand of the farm directors, that the potatoes be of high quality” (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 13.9.1989). Previously, commentaries of this kind would have been prepared in the name of the Party or the paper itself (or “I” would have been substituted for by using passive forms or “we”), but in 1989 even a journalist could speak in her own name.

By 1991 the stories on harvesting were mainly news items and the campaign atmosphere was almost non-existent. *Severnõi Kurier* reported on the progress of the work in some sovkhoses, published official figures on the progress and about the conservation of the harvest for the winter. It told also that a buying organisation had not fulfilled its plan to buy the potatoes, although they had been harvested. There was also an article by a director of a sovkhos and member of the Karelian parliament in which he discusses the fact that a good yield causes problems in harvesting, since it is difficult to get workers to the fields and the sovkhoses have no funds to pay for this work. He points out that it is often said that such problems have been solved in the West but emphasises that “no one besides we ourselves will help us” (*Severnõi Kurier* 13.9.1991)

Neuvosto-Karjala published a photo reportage on harvesting in Viitana and a “topic of the day” column, which was dedicated to the autumn delivery pressures on consumer co-operatives. The story was based on (and presented as) an interview with the vice-president of the Association of Karelian Consumer Co-operatives. The lead of the story told that there were problems in getting enough potatoes for the winter but in the interviews these kinds of worries were denied. (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 12.9.1991).

8.2.3. *Post-Soviet change in cyclic topics*

After the collapse of Soviet society, the previous cyclic events decreased in frequency and many former anniversaries and other pre-planned media events either disappeared or were reduced in importance. Also coverage of them continued to change along the same lines as during the last few years of the Soviet Union.

In 1993, the harvesting of potatoes (and other products) was presented in the form of “news”. In *Severnõi Kurier*, harvesting was reported in five stories covering 205 column centimetres. In *Karjalan Sanomat*, harvesting was not mentioned at all. Also in *Severnõi Kurier* the former campaign atmosphere

was gone and there were mainly problems present: prices are too high, the harvest is not selling well. There were reportages from the fields and interviews, but the main emphasis was on news. As a rule these stories told about failures and problems. A typical example is the following:

Pogrom in Velikaya Guba

The students leave reluctantly “for potatoes”. And not only because of this, the work in the cold autumn drizzle does not awaken enthusiasm among them. The potato picking is even paid for. They are worried about something else, the “wars” with the local youth, which vary in severity and length. Only seldom does the work of the students in the sovkhozes of the republic go without conflicts with the local youth.

In the night from 6 to 7 September, a group of villagers from Velikaya Guba attacked the dormitory in which students of the Petrozavodsk medical school were accommodated and caused a riot. The extremely short police information item tells only that two “burglars” — a forty-year-old teacher at the middle school, S. Cherepov, and a 19-year-old unemployed man, I. Savut — have been arrested.

— This year our two hundred students (they are all second year students) work in four villages of the Progress sovkhoz. The receiving partner has committed itself to strengthen the forces of the militia in all the settlements in which the girls who assist in the harvesting are located — tells the vice director of the Medical School, G. Vainblat. — In order to avoid conflicts with the local population, we have not taken male students with us, we could find work for them in Petrozavodsk. But this did not help. The director of the school is currently in Velikaya Guba. It is likely that a decision will be made that the continuation of the presence of girls in “Progress” is impossible.

T. Smirnova
(*Severnii Kurier* 10.9.1993)

On the next day, *Severnii Kurier* published a story in which the head of the department of personnel of the Karelian Ministry of Agriculture told about the state of harvesting. According to him, there were over a thousand students in the fields:

Concerning the exceptional situation in “Progress”, it is the first case of this kind. Unfortunately there are conflicts between the local population and the youth who travel for the harvesting every year.

Although the fights between students and local youth had been common already in the Soviet period, only in 1993 were they mentioned in public as one of the main aspects of the harvesting theme.

In 1995 harvesting was mentioned in *Severnyi Kurier* in three stories, which together took up 120 column cm; it was mentioned in only one 12 cm story in *Karjalan Sanomat*. By 1995 the coverage of the harvesting season had changed completely. There were no stories about success in the fields, rather an ironic report about the “Work-army members of the year 95” (*obraztsa 95*), which paid attention to the students working in the field and to the problems they faced: “it is impossible to create ideal conditions in Esoila, but much could have been done before” was a conclusion of one of the teachers (13.9.1995, third page). There was also a commentary article with the headline “Master, do you need potatoes?” (14.9.1995, first page), which told about persons who are going from door to door selling potatoes that, according to the author, are almost certainly stolen. The tone of the article was, however, sympathetic, since this may be the only way for a vagrant to survive. The third story reported about harvesting in Kazakstan. The story in *Karjalan Sanomat* told that the harvesting of potatoes was halfway finished and that the harvest was very modest.

In 1997 harvesting was mentioned in two stories in *Severnyi Kurier*, which covered 30 column cm. One of them told that “D., an inhabitant of the village of Salmi” had been collecting potatoes in his own garden and found a mine; the other reported on the help provided by students to a certain farm. In *Karjalan Sanomat* harvesting was referred to only briefly in a reportage on the village of Sergievo and it was not the main topic of any story. The decline of the harvesting topic during one sample week of September does not necessarily tell anything about other weeks and the coverage of the topic in general, but the decline certainly points out the direction in which journalism is going. Another seasonal topic was the preparation for winter, which had been on the agenda already during Soviet times, but which got more attention in the new market conditions. In 1997 the stories on the preparation for winter were not, as in Soviet times, campaign-type stories but were rather informative. For example, one of the stories was based on a meeting arranged by the mayor of Petrozavodsk and the main message was that the administration was preparing for the winter, although there were still some problems to be solved.

In 1999 harvesting was reported in one story in *Severnyi Kurier* and in one story in *Karjalan Sanomat*. *Severnyi Kurier* published a small news story on a visit by experts from the ministries of finance and economics to the Teplichnyi sovkhos in order to improve the financial state of the company. The story in *Karjalan Sanomat* told about harvesting on a state farm in the predominantly Karelian village of Mäkrä (Megrega).

The harvesting has started in Mäkrä

The state farm of Mäkrä is is full of activity. Tractors are buzzing and over 600 harvesters are bustling in the fields. Among them 290 students are struggling. A lot of hard work is done. Before the rains come, potatoes should be collected from 80 hectares, the cabbage from 43 hectares, carrots from five, beetroots from six and black radishes from two. The harvesting is going on in the sugar beet fields as well.

Lyubov Makarova, having been a director of the farm for over one year, is pleased with this year's harvest.

— There were many more vegetables growing in the fields than last year. The prospects for the harvest are good. If only the weather would be favourable and there would be enough fuel. Now we have a supply of diesel for one day only, Makarova says.

Makarova is sure that there will be buyers for the vegetables of Mäkrä. She is only worried about how to protect the unharvested fields from thieves. The stealing of vegetables is common in Karelia and in Mäkrä the situation is aggravated because of its closeness to the St.Petersburg-Murmansk highway. Beside the highway, dozens of tramps sell vegetables to the passing drivers. According to Makarova, the sacks include also stolen carrots, potatoes and beetroots. As on other farms, also in Mäkrä guarding is organised for day and night but it does not always help.

Holding onto the jobs with tooth and nail

The state farm of Mäkrä offers work to 350 persons. According to Makarova, they are all holding onto their jobs with tooth and nail. It is difficult to get work in the countryside. The average wage on the state farm of Mäkrä is 800 roubles and in fodder provision the salary has risen to over five thousand roubles. But to receive the salary in cash is still very rare. In August the workers of the state farm received only 100 roubles in cash. The rest of the salary was paid in the form of food parcels. It is also possible to borrow a tractor or lorry for private purposes from the farm in lieu of the salary.

Aleksandr Ivanchenko

(*Karjalan Sanomat* 11.9.1999, 8th page).

This story was placed on the last page of the paper and it had no signs of a campaign atmosphere. It was just an ordinary seasonal story with information on the conditions on one farm. The story was possibly translated from Russian, because the name of the author was more likely Ukrainian than Karelian. Nonetheless, this could have just as well been published in a Western local newspaper. The non-payment of salaries, which would have been a major topic in other conditions or in another kind of society, was taken as a minor detail of the current Russian reality.

8.3. From the General Secretary to the Chairman of the Government: unedited materials

8.3.1. The General Secretary is speaking

In 1985 a lot of space was provided for the speeches and interviews of CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Both *Leninskaya pravda* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* published the discussion of the General Secretary with the Editor of *Pravda*. The questions treated mainly the international situation and Soviet-American relations. The interview was published in question-and-answer form. The name of the editor who made this interview was not even mentioned, which indicates the unimportance of the journalist in comparison with the General Secretary. On the following day, the foreign echo of the interview was reported in the foreign news section with the headline “The Good Will of the USSR”.

Both newspapers also published a discussion between Gorbachev and the speaker of the House of Representatives of the US. Congress, Tip O’Neill, and published Gorbachev’s speech in the Central Committee of the CPSU. The discussion with the American political leader was reported in indirect speech and most of the story presented the views of Gorbachev himself. Only at the end of the story could the American visitors have a word: “Speaker O’Neill and other American congressmen spoke out for the improvement of US.-Soviet relations and for the success of the Geneva negotiations. They expressed great satisfaction with the discussion, appreciating it as having been open and useful.” (*Leninskaya pravda* 12.4.1985, *Neuvosto-Karjala* 12.4.1985)

During the September sample week both of the papers published the speech by Gorbachev on agriculture held in Tselinograd, Kazakhstan, 7 September 1985. *Leninskaya pravda* published the speech on Wednesday, 11 September, while *Neuvosto-Karjala* could do it only on Friday, 13 September, likely because of time needed for translation. Both newspapers also published a report on a meeting of Gorbachev with the vice-president of the German SDP, Johannes Rau.

In his speech in Tselinograd Gorbachev spoke in the name of the Party. He used expressions like “Our country” (not the Soviet Union), “It depends on how successfully we decide these questions” and “In our meeting...” and passive forms like “It would be nice to hear” (*khotelos by uslyshat*). On a few occasions he spoke also in his own name, which was unusual in Soviet practices. He said, e.g., “I would like pay attention to...” and “I would even

say that the question of quality has to be given priority". At the beginning of the speech and occasionally in the text it is pointed out that it is Gorbachev who is speaking. Quotation marks were not necessary; the reader should know that the words come from Gorbachev himself.

The practice to give the newspaper space directly to the General Secretary resembles the practice in Finnish journalism of the 1950s to publish the New Year speech of the President as such without commentary (see Kunelius 1996, 176). The words of the General Secretary had value of their own and the position of journalism in relation to the General Secretary was not such that the narrative voice of the story could comment on or contextualise his words.

In 1987 the practice of publishing the speeches of the General Secretary was continued. The visit of General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev to Czechoslovakia was reported as a news story on Friday, 10 April. The story reported the departure of Gorbachev from Moscow (mentioning the members of the Politburo who saw him off at the airport) and his arrival in Prague, with a very exact description of the arrival ceremonies and Gorbachev's visits during the first day. *Neuvosto-Karjala* published an even longer version of the story including, e.g., what Gorbachev wrote in the guest book at the memorial exhibition of the Soviet Army.

On 11 April *Leninskaya pravda* published a speech by Gorbachev in Czechoslovakia starting on the first page (over one third of the page) and continuing on the third page (the whole page). The story started like this:

A Demonstration of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship

Prague, 10 April (Spec. corr. of TASS). Today, here in the Palace of Culture, a Manifestation of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship took place.

First a speech was made by the Secretary General of the CC of the CPC, President of the CSSR, G. Husak.

This was followed by a speech made by Secretary General of the CC of the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev.

Dear comrade Husak!

Dear comrades and friends!

Most of all I would like to thank you for your cordiality and hospitality.

I appreciate a lot the possibility you have given me to speak to you — Party and governmental leaders, representing all the strata of the Czech and Soviet peoples.

In his speech, Gorbachev spoke mostly in the name of the Party and the Soviet Union, using passive and plural forms. Occasionally, as for example in the beginning, when he spoke about himself, he used also the form "I". Other uses of "I" were "In connection with this, let me say something about

the role of Europe...” and “I can announce that the Soviet Union has cancelled the production of chemical arms.” The use of “I” indicated, perhaps, the strong personal role and involvement of Gorbachev. The norm was still the use of the traditional “we”, like “Every success of yours sincerely delights us”, “We agree with Czechoslovak comrades, that...” and “We think that...”

The visit was covered also in news reports. One of the reports told about the discussion of Gorbachev with workers and the concluding meeting between Gorbachev and Husak. Another reported on the arrival of Gorbachev in Moscow. In that story the most important was, perhaps, the list of politburo members who met Gorbachev in the airport.

Neuvosto-Karjala published the speech of Gorbachev on 12 April with two news stories, one on the meeting of Gorbachev and Husak and another on the meeting of Gorbachev with workers and a discussion in Bratislava.

During the September sample week, Gorbachev’s speeches or other actions did not appear in the newspapers. There were, however, other official materials. Both *Leninskaya pravda* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* published a story: “Bolshevik of the Leninist Guards” dedicated to the 110th Anniversary of the birth of Feliks Dzerzhinski, the founder of the Soviet army. Besides Dzerzhinski himself and his life, the story paid attention also to current political problems. The anti-socialist policy of the West was condemned; glasnost was praised as a means to limit the possibilities for bourgeois propaganda to speculate about shortcomings and unresolved problems; and Soviet leadership was praised as showing humaneness by given amnesty to a group of people sentenced for anti-Soviet activity. Moreover, Soviet internationalism was praised as one of the supreme achievements of socialism, with information that part of the Soviet people was infected with the virus of nationalism—in Alma-Ata (a group of extremists among Crimean Tatars) and in the capitals of the Baltic republics. Actually, the story provided much information on current affairs, although at first glance it looked like a formal political article. In *Neuvosto-Karjala*, however, this story was shortened and it did not include as much information.

Also in 1989 Gorbachev remained in the headlines during both sample weeks. He visited Great Britain 5-7 April and the sample week started with the last few days of the visit. On 8 April *Leninskaya pravda* published two pieces of news on the visit on the first page. The first news item, “Meeting with the leaders of Labour”, reported on the meeting of Gorbachev with Neil Kinnock and the second news item, “The completion of the visit of M.S.Gorbachev in Great Britain”, summarised events during the last day of the visit and the departure ceremonies. Again, as when covering Gorbachev’s visit to Czechoslovakia in 1987, the ceremonies were reported in very detail,

e.g., on the solemn ceremony at the airport before his departure:

A guard of honour of the officers of the RAF was reviewed, the Soviet national anthem was played.

Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher made short statements.

Departing with M.S. Gorbachev, were: CC of CPSU politburo member and minister for foreign affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, CC of the CPSU politburo member and secretary, A.N. Yakovlev, and vice-president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, V.M. Kamentsev.

Leninskaya pravda also published a short piece of news on the return of Gorbachev to Moscow. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* a wider report on the whole visit was published on 9 September. The report was collected from different items of TASS and it covered one third of the first page and one half of the third page.

In the September 1989 sample week a television speech by Gorbachev was published verbatim without mentioning when the speech was shown on television. His speech dealt with current and unresolved problems “tight markets for consumer goods, conflicts in the field of nationality relations and difficult, sometimes even pathological processes in the collective consciousness which are related to overcoming the distortions of socialism and to its renewal.”

Gorbachev, who had sometimes used “I” (the first person singular) in 1985 and 1987, spoke more clearly in his own name in 1989: “I would not like my words to be understood as saying that the plurality of opinions would now cause trouble...” or “Comrades, this is all very serious. I have found it necessary to tell my opinion about it” or “I think that the people do quite the right thing when they...”

There were also traditional “we” forms (first person plural) and speaking in the name of the Party in Gorbachev’s speech, but when addressing the topics on which there was no unanimity among the leadership, he told his own opinion. Occasionally, he referred to common sense: “Isn’t it self-evident that this contradicts the policy of perestroika...”

This change in Soviet journalism was not an independent development but rather it indicated a broader change in the social use of language in general. The previous General Secretaries had been heads of the unanimous (at least on the surface) collective leadership and could not state their own opinions that differed from the view of the majority, but in 1989 this unity was broken and divisions inside the leadership became visible.

While in the late Soviet period the official texts were mainly comprised of speeches by the Secretary-General, laws and slogans, in 1991 they had

become a more heterogeneous category. The increasing autonomy of the Karelian republic was visible in the number of local laws published in the newspaper and the national laws and resolutions were those of the Russian Federation instead of the Soviet Union (like the decrees of President Boris Eltsin).

Leninskaya pravda published, for example, a Resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian SFSR On the social and political situation in Russia and on measures to escape the crisis (signed by B. N. Eltsin), and a report on a meeting of the Bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU. There was also a law of the Karelian ASSR: "On Property in the Karelian ASSR", a Soviet Declaration on human rights and liberties and a Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures for the defence of the freedom of the press".

Neuvosto-Karjala published even more official materials, which included the Declaration on human rights and liberties, the Declaration of the Plenary of the Central Committee of Komsomol of the Russian SFSR, a Law of the USSR "On organs of the state and administration during the transitional period", and a Decree of the President of the Russian SFSR "On implementing the Temporary decree on the representatives of the Russian SFSR in the republics" and the Temporary decree itself.

8.3.2. *Unedited texts in the 1990s: official and specialised*

By 1993 the amount of official text had decreased significantly. Neither speeches nor laws were published any longer (the Karelian government had set up its own newspaper, *Kareliya*, which published laws because *Severnõi Kurier* had refused to do so. Those official texts which still remained *Severnõi Kurier* were a few short announcements by the Karelian government and a press release by the Ministry of Interior of Karelia (militia) on crimes. *Karjalan Sanomat* published some official texts, like the decree of the Karelian government on preparations for the Russian referendum.

In 1995 the official texts published in *Severnõi Kurier* included mainly press releases of the Karelian parliament and texts like the appeal of the Karelian parliament to the Russian president and other officials for support of the veterans of war. The press releases included one on changes in election legislation and another on the visit of members of the Finnish parliament to Karelia, which were published also by *Karjalan Sanomat*. It also published greetings from the chairman of the Karelian government to the forest workers on the occasion of their annual celebration day.

In the last sampling years of the analysed period, the share of official materials was still in decline. The outside authors wrote about topics which were in some ways “official” or, on the other hand, especially private. For example, the criminal news of the paper was often written by employees of the militia and juridical system. Despite being by an outside author, these stories were written in a news format, often in chronological consequence and the voice of the text itself was rather invisible.

The use of unedited material written by outsiders or the printing of official materials indicates that the newspaper did not see itself as an independent, self-reliant actor in relation to the authorities. It did not edit or frame the stories other than by indicating that they were comprised of official information which was distributed by a press service. It is likely that journalists did not see any major problems in publishing this kind of material and the press service materials had also become more informative and news-like.

Close to this group were also the articles that were published as advertisements (na pravakh reklamy). Also these stories bear signs of the fact that they have not passed the ordinary journalistic consideration and criticism but rather represent someone else’s view. While the readers having little trust in advertisements may well have doubts about these stories, such non-trust does not seem to affect the stories or else the originators of these stories do not care about it. Indeed, when journalism itself enjoys a rather low level of public trust, the publishing of press service materials is not a problem from the point of view of the originator of the message: if the story had been written by a journalist, the surplus value would have been minimal or even negative.

8.4. Geography of the news

The geographic orientation of the news in Karelia remained relatively stable during the whole period 1985-1999. In 1985, the geographical orientation of the stories was mainly local (54% of the space) but there was also a strong emphasis on national and international events. National events and events in other regions of the Soviet Union took up less than 20% of the space and international events less than 20%. Only 10% of the space was devoted to stories which mixed geographical categories, mainly Karelia and Russia.

Karelian news maintained a strong position during the whole period, but in 1999 the share of news about Karelia dropped to its lowest level, mainly because the appendix Business Tuesday included mainly Russian and foreign economic and political news items, affecting the overall balance.

The most interesting feature of this period is an increase in combined categories from a mere 10% in 1985 to 23% in 1999. This indicates both an increase in activities which mix local and national aspects, like various conferences and political disputes between the regions and the centre, and increasing contact with foreign countries.

Table 8.4. Geographical orientation of stories in *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier* (% of space). For 1999 the first figures are for both *Severnyi Kurier* and *Delovoi Vtornik* together the second ones are based only on *Severnyi Kurier* itself.

	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999	1999 SK only
Karelia or part of it	51.0	57.2	67.2	63.0	51.0	46.9	57.3	44.0	52.8
Karelia + Russia	4.3	6.0	5.1	7.4	11.9	12.0	11.4	8.0	9.6
Russia /Soviet Union	18.8	11.5	12.5	14.0	14.3	19.0	10.8	15.9	12.6
Other parts of Russia / USSR	4.0	5.5	4.4	5.2	6.9	5.0	4.5	10.1	6.0
Foreign	11.4	8.8	2.4	1.2	4.3	2.2	4.0	3.9	3.1
Foreign + Russia	5.4	8.2	2.5	1.9	2.8	5.5	1.8	10.0	6.2
Foreign + Karelia	0.7	2.1	3.9	6.1	7.6	6.5	9.1	5.0	6.0
other / not applicable	4.5	0.9	2.0	1.3	1.2	2.9	1.1	3.0	3.7

The share of Karelian news increased during perestroika but returned to its former level in 1993. While foreign news as such has not regained its previous position, the stories that have a mixture of references to foreign and Karelian or foreign and Russian issues have gained more prominence. This indicates both increasing connections between Karelia and foreign countries and the importance of these connections as news items.

In 1999 the shift away from Karelian news to Russian news and news including both Russia and foreign countries happened mainly because of the introduction of the Business Tuesday appendix. All the stories in the appendix told about general Russian or mixed Russian and foreign issues. If counted without *Business Tuesday*, the geographical orientation in 1999 was close to what it was in 1997 or 1995.

Neuvosto-Karjala / *Karjalan Sanomat*, on the other hand, was less local in the Soviet era (even if possible bias caused by some longer articles /

speeches on generally Soviet issues were to be taken into account) but became as local as *Severnii Kurier* in the post-Soviet era. In *Karjalan Sanomat* also the foreign (mainly Finnish) contacts with Karelia became more prominent than in *Severnii Kurier*. The radical reform in the format of the paper in 1995 was visible mainly in the strong decline of the categories of Russia, foreign and foreign + Russia.

Table 8.5. Geographical orientation of stories in *Neuvosto-Karjala / Karjalan Sanomat* (% of space).

	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
Karelia or part of it	34.2	46.7	44.7	37.0	35.2	39.8	48.5	53.9
Karelia + Russia	4.6	4.4	5.4	8.5	8.1	19.1	5.3	18.8
Russia /Soviet Union	28.2	4.8	10.1	12.2	9.0	0.6	10.8	4.3
Other parts of Russia / Soviet Union	3.6	8.0	7.5	6.5	7.6	1.2	0.5	0.8
Foreign	11.2	14.9	11.7	15.7	15.5	5.0	6.4	2.6
Foreign + Russia	13.7	18.8	12.5	9.6	5.4	8.9	1.3	2.3
Foreign + Karelia	2.0	2.1	8.1	9.1	19.2	23.9	27.1	16.7
other / not applicable	2.6	0.3	—	1.3	—	—	0.2	—

8.4.1. National news: from official texts to news

In the Soviet era, the largest part of the national news belonged to the category of “ofitsioz”, such as speeches of the General Secretary or laws and decrees. In 1985 their share among the stories addressing all-Soviet issues was around 60%, while by 1987 it had dropped to around 25%. There were few news stories on national issues. The national news of the late Soviet period dealt mainly with various plans and national issues like elections, economic planning or, increasingly, with new legislation.

During the sample weeks of 1989, *Leninskaya pravda* ran 38 national stories, of which almost one third were letters to the editor, one fourth came from news agencies, one fifth was written by non-staff authors and the rest were mostly official texts. Besides traditional speeches, meeting reports and anniversaries, the national stories also included articles on the economic reform in the Soviet Union, the possible reform of the governmental structure of the state and Soviet history. Letters to the editor commented on topics like the nationality question and the anti-alcohol campaign.

In 1991 the national news was increasingly written by staff journalists or came from news agencies and other newspapers, while there were fewer texts from outside authors and fewer letters to the editor. National stories were only occasionally “news”; rather, most of the stories were comprised of essays and articles on the future of the Soviet Union, current problems and, in the September sample week, the echo from the August putsch.

In 1993 the amount of short national news and news from other regions of Russia had increased, although longer stories on national topics had become less frequent. In *Severnyi Kurier* the topics of these stories varied from national politics and economics to various human interest and criminality issues. News stories covered topics such as the congress of Russian nationalities in Moscow, the price of gasoline in Moscow, the strike plan of the health care workers, the 540,000 persons in the prisons of Russia, and that the Ministry of Security could listen in on 2,500 telephones in Russia at one time. News from the other parts of Russia reported on a bear that had killed two persons in the Khabarovsk region, the popularity of Russian politicians in Tatarstan, whaling by native peoples in the Russian Far East, a militia operation in Vladivostok and the denial of a request to register a Cossack organisation in Khabarovsk. The national news came mainly from the RIA news agency.

Karjalan Sanomat reported concerning the other regions of Russia on the idea of autonomy for the German minority of Russia, the flower festival in St. Petersburg, the Lenin museum in Ulyanovsk, and the fate of cancer patients because of the lack of funds. There was also a story about woodcarvers in the Moscow region with their address and phone number, also stating their wish to earn more income by selling their products. The story was apparently paid for.

In 1995 the aim of providing to the reader of *Severnyi Kurier* reasonable coverage of national news was fulfilled rather well. National news stories were usually placed on the second page and were related to national politics, economics, crimes and accidents. More concretely, they told, e.g., that the Party of Beer Lovers had been registered, the price of petrol had increased in Moscow, criminality had increased five per cent during the first eight months of 1995 in comparison with the year before and that one of the directors of Alfa-bank had been killed. The news came mainly from the Interfax news agency.

Some national news could be found also on the first page, e.g., about the fight in the State Duma between Vladimir Zhirinovski and other parliamentarians and a report about the meeting of the Our Home is Russia Party. These stories were written by a staff correspondent of the paper.

There were also many news items from other parts of Russia, e.g., on the damage caused by a cyclone in Sakhalin and an oil-field fire in the Tyumen region, that an MiG aeroplane was crushed in Arkhangelsk and that a bank director was arrested in Altai because of misuse of his official position.

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the only national news told about the rating of Russian commercial banks, the increased discrepancy in incomes in the country and the defeat of Russian tank troops in Chechnya. There was also some news from the CIS, e.g., that an international murderer had been arrested in Ukraine. These news stories were received from RIA.

In 1997 the aim of providing comprehensive coverage of the national news decreased in prominence, but the national news preserved its position in the news section. *Severnõi Kurier* reported on the competition to plan a graphic symbol for the rouble, the plan to give amnesty to 40,000 prisoners, the plan to send civilian Yuri Baturin into space and the fact that Microsoft has done well in the Russian market.

Karjalan Sanomat reprinted a story from *Argumenty i fakty* on poverty in Russia, a story from *Izvestiya* on the Russian budget and a story from *RIA Novosti* on the development of Russian cities. There were also some small news stories telling, e.g., that Chechnya wanted to change to daylight savings time and on the plan to open a border crossing point between Russia and Norway.

In 1999 there were somewhat fewer national news stories than in 1993 or 1995 but more than in the Soviet period. Around 20% of all the national news was in the Business Tuesday appendix, without which the number of national news items would have been as low as in the late Soviet period. Also stories from other parts of Russia were mainly published in Business Tuesday.

The national news stories were more frequently written by staff journalists or were without indication of the source. Rather many were also taken from other newspapers (mainly *Argumenty i fakty*) or from the syndicated news agency Globus. These stories were either short human-interest stories or larger reportages. The news stories about national issues were less frequent than in 1997 or 1995.

The national news stories addressed mainly politics and economics but increasingly also human-interest issues and crimes. National news topics included corruption and elections, Easter traditions in Russia, the results of the Russian football league and a bomb explosion by terrorists in Moscow. There were also cultural stories related to the 200th anniversary of Pushkin's birth and to national television programmes. Stories from other parts of Russia told about an armed attack on the Russian museum in St. Petersburg, problems in the election of the mayor of Vladivostok and that the world championship

in ice hockey would be arranged in St. Petersburg in the year 2000. There were few national news stories in *Karjalan Sanomat* in 1999.

8.4.2. *Foreign news: from political to human interest topics*

In 1985 the foreign news got a lot of attention during both sample weeks. A special section of foreign news was published regularly in *Leninskaya pravda* with a common headline "From all continents, International information" and in *Neuvosto-Karjala* the common headline was "News of the World". Smaller pieces of foreign news were published in telegram style without individual headlines under the heading "Teletype band". Occasionally, some foreign news stories were also published also on the first page with the headline "During the last hour". During two sample weeks, *Leninskaya pravda* published 108 foreign news pieces and *Neuvosto-Karjala* 32.

The foreign news came mostly from TASS and APN and their world-view represented the general line of Soviet foreign policy. Geographically, the foreign news was mainly from Asia and the Middle East (one third of the news items) and Western Europe (around 20% of the items). The main difference between *Neuvosto-Karjala* and *Leninskaya pravda* was that *Neuvosto-Karjala* told more about international relations and less about North America. Only less than 25% of the news items in *Neuvosto-Karjala* could be found also in *Leninskaya pravda*. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* most of the foreign news came from APN and they were in general longer than in *Leninskaya pravda*.

Staff journalists and other writers visited occasionally foreign countries and reported on their experiences. During the sample weeks, one example of this kind of story was a report by an individual who had visited Japan as part of a tourist group, and who told his views in the paper.

In *Leninskaya pravda* regular topics included protests against the military policy of the Reagan administration in the USA and Western Europe, the situation in Sudan, the conflict between Israel and the "Patriotic forces of Lebanon" in Southern Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War, which was reported on from both sides of the front line. Many US-related stories addressed the US-Soviet relationship and the foreign policy of the USA.

Important elements of the foreign news included also co-operation among socialist and friendly countries, peace and détente. The news from Eastern Europe often told about technological innovations and progress and co-operation with the Soviet Union. A crack in this view was evident in a story from Yugoslavia on a traffic accident between a bus and a lorry. The main message on capitalist countries was that they were full of social problems,

the “law of the jungle” ruled and there was no place for the weak. The stories told, e.g., about a suicide epidemic in Japan, unemployment in England, the new proletariat in Italy and economic problems in Spain. Both *Leninskaya pravda* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* told their readers that the USA was a country of illiterates. *Leninskaya pravda* reported also about a lawsuit against peace activists in Chicago and protests of “the American public against the anti-national domestic and military foreign policy of Reagan.” There were also non-political stories from the West, like the public discussion around the renovation of the Louvre in Paris, Swedish parliamentary elections and labour legislation in Portugal. *Neuvosto-Karjala* even had curiosity stories, e.g., about a tribe in Papua New Guinea that uses leg rings in order to count the population.

In addition to the foreign news proper, also some other stories related to foreign countries. They were mainly on visits of foreigners to the Soviet Union, which happened mainly on the national level. Local contacts with foreigners were rare. Both newspapers reported about the visit of an English writer in Petrozavodsk and *Neuvosto-Karjala* published a protocol news report about the visit of Finnish communists to Kostomuksha. Also some sport news stories were reported from abroad, mainly when Soviet sportsmen were involved.

In 1987 the number of proper foreign news stories had decreased to 83 in *Leninskaya pravda*, but had increased to 51 in *Neuvosto-Karjala*. While in *Leninskaya pravda* foreign news took up only 8% of the newspaper space, in *Neuvosto-Karjala* it covered 17%.

In *Leninskaya pravda* the foreign news stories reported on topics similar to those of 1985: problems in the capitalist world, conflicts in the Third World, and co-operation and progress in the socialist countries. Also the actions and declarations of Western communist parties were given a lot of attention. One of the most important international issues was the placement of missiles in Western Europe and related protests. *Leninskaya pravda* published the Soviet view on the Soviet SS-24 missiles, which were placed in Eastern Europe. The geographic orientation of the foreign news had shifted to Western Europe (one third of the stories), while the Third World was receiving less coverage. There were also human-interest stories taken from the Guinness Book of Records.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the foreign news items were increasingly from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe (one third), while the attention to the Third World had decreased (but still 40% of foreign news stories were related to Asia, Africa and Latin America). The topics of the news had moved towards

human interest: there were stories about a robbery done in Austria with the help of hypnosis and a story about communication between elephants.

In 1989 the decline of foreign news was even more remarkable. The increase of the domestic issues and discussions did not leave any more space for foreign news, which was treated as secondary by the journalists and editors. In *Leninskaya pravda* foreign news was still published as a separate section in five of the issues during the April week but in only two issues during the September sample week (of them one included only two stories). The total amount of foreign news from TASS was less than 300 column cm, which was less than 2% of the paper.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the position of the foreign news was better preserved. The total amount of foreign news was over 1,300 column cm, or 15% of the total textual space. *Neuvosto-Karjala*, which was free from the flood of letters to the editor, preserved the Soviet practice of giving a defined amount of space to foreign news longer than *Leninskaya pravda* did.

Even in foreign news, alternative sources were found besides the news from TASS. In *Leninskaya pravda* some foreign stories were translated from an American newspaper, *Duluth-News-Tribune*, published in the American twin city of Petrozavodsk. The stories selected from it included, e.g., a marathon for older people, the super-high incomes of some Americans, the new kangaroos in the Duluth zoo and the plan to develop the city centre.

In *Neuvosto-Karjala* a similar source was *Warkauden lehti*, which was published in the Finnish twin city of Varkaus. Items reprinted from *Warkauden lehti* told about the plan to import timber from Karelia for a planned pulp plant in Finland, a poll on what Russians know about Finland, the plan to organise a sled dog caravan from Varkaus to Petrozavodsk and the fact that five Finnish municipalities had started to promote tourism in the Ladoga region. *Neuvosto-Karjala* also published a travel report by an engineer from Petrozavodsk who had visited Cuba.¹

Furthermore, some local events had a foreign connection. Both of the papers reported on the visit of the Karelian delegation to the USA and covered the Leipzig fair in which a Karelian barking machine with two engines won a gold medal. Also the visit of a delegation of Finnish journalists to Karelia was reported in both newspapers.

The amount of foreign news continued to decline, or, it may be more accurate to say, it started to disappear by 1991. During the two sample weeks,

1 Interestingly this article had mentioned the following, which could well be interpreted as praise for the USA in comparison with the Soviet Union: "In the streets it is possible to see our 'Lada's, Japanese cars and huge American cars of the 1950s which are still usable". This is one example of the possibilities for counter-readings.

Leninskaya pravda/ Severnyi Kurier published only four foreign news stories. Only once did *Severnyi Kurier* publish news from Tass, under the heading “Teletaip”, which told about the acceptance of a record number of refugees into the USA and the decrease in the price of gold in Western Europe. There was also a news story on the use of alternative sources of energy in Finland (related to the Karelian discussion on the building of a nuclear power plant) and a story from the IAN news agency (former APN) on the history and current status of Interpol.

Neuvosto-Karjala had preserved the share of foreign news in its coverage better than *Severnyi Kurier* in 1991. The paper published foreign news almost daily during both sample weeks. There were 50 news items, which covered over 1,700 column centimetres, or almost 20% of the textual space. Geographically, the foreign news dealt mainly with Western Europe, Eastern Europe and North America (around 25% each), while Latin America and Africa were mentioned in a few stories.

Foreign news articles appearing in *Neuvosto-Karjala* told, e.g., about economic reform in Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, the situation in Cambodia, relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, and interest in studying the Russian language in Japan. There was also a photo reportage: “From Liberated Kuwait”. Also the “traditional” negative stories from the capitalist world were still present, although less prominent than before. *Neuvosto-Karjala* told that the American unemployment benefit system was in crisis, social problems were increasing in the eastern part of Germany after reunification and reported on the strike of civil servants in Canada. Negative news came also from the former socialist countries. *Neuvosto-Karjala* reported, for example, that communists had been persecuted in Poland and about environmental problems in Romania. In many foreign stories, the human-interest aspect was also present. The paper told about the most popular names in the USA, a unique border crossing point through a cave on the Slovakian-Hungarian border, the popularity of football star Diego Maradona and a new French cologne for men called ‘Egoist’.

In addition, the news from Finland had a more central place than before. *Neuvosto-Karjala* told about the opinions of the Finns on the impact of the Soviet political evolution on Finland, the danger of pollution threatening the Gulf of Finland (mainly because of the pollution from Leningrad) and that criminality was spreading to Finland from the Soviet Union. *Neuvosto-Karjala* reported also on the possibility that whites may become a minority in the United States and the official status of the Sámi language in Finland.

There were also many more foreign-related local stories that told about the co-operation and contacts between Karelia and Finland. In *Neuvosto-Karjala* the section "From the diary of co-operation" appeared more frequently. Among the visitors mentioned in articles were Finnish foreign minister Paavo Väyrynen, veterans of war, biologists from the University of Jyväskylä, athletes from Taivalkoski and a delegation from the central fish-breeding plant of eastern Finland. Visitors also came from countries other than Finland, for example schoolchildren from the German town of Tübingen and the mayor of La Rochelle (France) visited Petrozavodsk. Also Karelians visited abroad; *Severnyni Kurier* reported, e.g., on the Petrozavodsk firemen who extinguished forest fires in Greece.

In 1993 the low level of foreign news continued. During the sample weeks *Severnyni Kurier* published 15 foreign news stories, which the paper received from RIA. The paper also published a review of the economy of Finland, which it had received from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other larger stories on the advice of a German nutritionist and on the European currency system. The share of foreign news of the total space of the paper was only less than 3%. The foreign news items informed readers that in Romania the bronze from the statues of Lenin and Stalin would be used to build a monument to the Romanian revolution, that support for the Lenin museum in Finland was being cut, that the Indian prime minister made a visit to China, that the Finnish president Mauno Koivisto would like to meet Boris Eltsin and told about the processing of an aid package for Russia in the U.S. Congress.

In *Karjalan Sanomat*, in contrast, the position of the foreign news had been preserved. During the sample weeks of 1993, it published 45 foreign news stories from news agencies (mainly RIA) and these news items covered 16% of the journalistic space. The topics included relations between Russia and GATT, the new president of Eurobank, the first sommelier in Norway, the breeding of ostriches in Belgium, a border agreement between China and India and that South Korea would not permit a visit by Michael Jackson. Only a few topics, like the cut in public funding for the Lenin museum in Tampere (Finland) were mentioned in both newspapers.

Karjalan Sanomat also reprinted some news taken from the Finnish newspapers *Kuhmolainen* and *Helsingin Sanomat*. There were also many news stories on the former Soviet republics, mainly from the Baltic states and Ukraine. These stories told about the relations between the city of Narva and the Estonian government, that Russia is the main trading partner of Lithuania and asked "Why is God punishing Ukraine?"

In 1995 the number of foreign news items had declined even further in *Severnyi Kurier*. The foreign news stories were often related to Russia (or Karelia), but there were also a few others, received from RIA, e.g., on wine legislation in the Czech republic and reasons for the *Estonia* accident. Most of the foreign coverage was related to human-interest stories, e.g., on the changed image of Michael Jackson “on the basis of materials from the American press”, or to sports. There were short sport reports on Formula-1, tennis and ice hockey. *Karjalan Sanomat* published three foreign news stories from RIA (about tourism in Germany and the wine legislation in the Czech republic) and its own articles about the teaching of foreign languages in Finland and a plan to launch a Russian school in the Finnish city of Joensuu.

In 1997 and 1999 foreign coverage addressed mainly Karelian relations with foreign countries. For example, in 1997 the Norwegian Secretary General of the Barents council, a representative of the Finnish Red Cross and researchers from several countries visited Karelia and a film festival of European countries was also organised in Karelia. In 1999 Italians searched for granite in Pudozh, a delegation of the Swedish Consulate General visited Sortavala and an American honorary doctor of Moscow State University visited Petrozavodsk.

Staff journalists wrote reports on tourism and travels. Among these was a story about an artist, Eila Timonen, who had visited Sweden. There were also human-interest stories “from the world of entertainment” which reported, e.g., about the car purchase of Arnold Schwarzenegger, the new marriage of Woody Allen’s former wife Mia Farrow and the 60th birthday celebration of Robert Redford.

In 1999 *Severnyi Kurier* published rather many foreign news stories, received either from news agencies or taken from other newspapers (mostly from *Argumenty i fakty*). Some of them were received from the French news agency AFP. The foreign news stories covered increasingly human-interest topics, like the fact that Monica Lewinsky had become a millionaire due to the sales of her book, the auction of lost and found objects in the Finnish city of Joensuu, sexual relations and attitudes in Sweden, suicide by jumping off the Eiffel tower and that donated medicine from the USA often does not fulfil the requirements of that country and might be outdated. There were also sport news stories written by journalists on the basis of materials from news agencies and other newspapers.

Karjalan Sanomat did not publish a single foreign news story transmitted by a news agency in the sample weeks of 1997 or 1999. Other stories dealt with foreign issues, mainly in relation to Karelia, e.g. the visit of the mayor of Sortavala to Sweden, the forthcoming congress of the youth association of

the Finno-Ugric peoples and the visit of a Lithuanian delegation to Karelia. Close connections with Finland were also visible in the paper, which told, e.g., about the visit of Karelian teachers to Finland and about a music festival in Finland. Also a journalist working for *Karjalan Sanomat* had visited London as a tourist and reported on her trip. In the full-page story the journalist told about her personal experiences and contrasted foreign issues with the Russian reality. The *Karjalan Sanomat* story mentioned many names of enterprises and it is not out of the question that the trip had been sponsored by a travel agency.

8.5. Social problems

8.5.1 Soviet type: Problem to be solved

One of the tasks of the Soviet press was to assist in solving social problems and therefore the articles about social problems and their solutions were an important part of the Soviet newspaper. This was true especially in *Leninskaya pravda*, since almost every issue of it had an article with the catchline “Critical signal”. There were also stories about social problems without this title. Some of the problem stories were based on readers’ letters, in which catchline like “Waiting for a reply” or “On the basis of a reader’s letter”.

Letters to the editor were one of the channels through which a Soviet citizen could bring everyday problems into the public discussion. As a rule, those who were criticised should reply within one month. Although this was not fully implemented, the paper published answers that had been prepared on the basis of complaints.

Judging according to the texts, little journalistic effort was made in order to get information or to uncover social problems. The problems became public only after someone brought up the idea in the newspaper either by sending a letter or contacting the newsroom in another way.

When a social problem was taken up in a Soviet newspaper, the level of the problem was usually low, e.g., a problem in one enterprise or workplace. The treatment of problems was usually formal: a problem was identified, often a relevant Party document addressing the problem was mentioned and the solution was expected to be found if this Party decision were to be implemented. The reason for the problem was defined as shortcomings in the implementation of Party policy or poor management at the lower levels. Usually the names of those responsible were mentioned. A good example of a Soviet problem story is the following:

Critical signal

Without an answer

The CPSU Central Committee decision “On measures for the improvement of the utilisation of the club locales and sport buildings”, published in June, points out that “a significant part of sport buildings are in dissatisfactory condition”. Alas, this has also to do with us. For many months we were not able to get the Building Management Administration Nr. 1 and the Housing Repair Company of the Lenin district of Petrozavodsk to help us the necessary conditions for training in the sport hall of the Dynamo club.

The primary repairs that are being done have not thus far prevented the athletes from taking part in the training. The problem is that water that cannot get out through the sewer well accumulates below the floor. We have been forced to carry the water out by hand with a dozen buckets — and nevertheless without results.

In the cloakroom one wall is constantly wet, so because of humidity and stuffy air, the training sessions cannot be conducted normally. In the corridor to the weightlifting gym, the water pipes remained after the repairs without water-resistant insulators and water is constantly dropping onto the floor.

We communicated these facts orally immediately to the Building Management Administration Nr. 1 and the Housing Repair Company. In addition to the face-to-face communications and telephone calls, a letter was sent to the Building Management Administration, to A. Ya. Menshova, and to the Company, to S. I. Kostin, on the 16th August. There was no answer.

It is necessary that the Dynamo hall will be with joint efforts set up to provide normal conditions for training.

N. Belov

The Director of the Sport Hall of Dynamo of the Karelia Sport Club
(*Leninskaya pravda* 11.9.1985, back page)

A similar example of a problem story is a report about problems with bus traffic (see pages 427-428). On the basis of these examples, it can be concluded that the problem stories follow a standard structure. The problem has been defined, a Party decision has been presented and those responsible have been urged to implement the Party decisions. It may be that the true significance of the CPSU decisions was to put tools into the hands of individuals and organisations of different levels in order to plead for their causes.

It is impossible to say if the public attention to the problems led to any improvements. It is likely that at least the problem mentioned was given special treatment and that action against those responsible was taken.

Social problems were presented as affairs that affect “us all”. Journalism was a participant in solving these problems and it looked for explanations

and encouraged better performance. A typical problem story began with a description of the situation and the problem, then the responsible person was asked the reason for the shortcomings and finally the story referred to a Party decision, which urges solving the problem or taking some action. A lack of discipline and irresponsibility were mentioned as the main reasons.

The cause of the problems was not looked for on the structural level, but the guilty were always individuals or groups which were usually named: the bus depot did not provide enough buses or the construction unit did not repair a sport hall. If only the Party decisions were fulfilled and if everybody would have worked in a responsible way, there would not have been problems. This kind of “individualisation” of problems did not encourage searching for solutions on the structural level. In this way the social system itself was saved from criticism but it may have also strengthened the problems and demoralising on a structural level: the responsible ones knew the real problems in implementing Party policy, although it could not have been said in public.

The newspapers also published replies to complaints made in letters to the editor (although unpublished) or to complaints in the newspaper articles themselves. Also in this aspect *Leninskaya pravda* was more prominent. A typical example of a reply is the following:

Measures have been taken

The carelessness towards a passenger has been punished

A citizen of Borovoi village, Kalevala district, V. N. Fokina left for a trade union vacation trip for medical treatment in Truskavets. But the health resort trip turned out to be the cause of unexpected hardship and trouble for her. She tried to reserve a ticket with a direct seat reservation in the Borovoi Station in good time, but this was not successful, and because of this a delay occurred.

V. N. Fokina told about her spoilt trip in a letter to *Leninskaya pravda*. At our request, the passenger’s complaint was reviewed in the Petrozavodsk office of the railway company.

As the vice-director of the office V. F. Bogatikov reported, an official from the technological control group conducted an investigation at the Borovoi Station on the basis of V.N. Fokina’s statement.

It was found out that the cashier T. R. Shagzhieva acted incorrectly, when she did not sell a ticket with the direct connection via Leningrad. For not fulfilling a priority order, she has been punished materially, warned and repeatedly advised how to proceed with orders of this kind.

(Leninskaya pravda 9.4.1985, 2nd page)

This story, as did the previous problem story, dealt with everyday troubles that harmed an individual but which could be discussed and solved without

challenging the system. In this case, the newspaper compensated for the lack of an official complaints system and proved to be successful. Both the newspaper and the administration could show that “measures have been taken”. Interestingly, the coverage of events is one-sided: the version of the punished cashier was not published.

8.5.2. Crisis time: a problem cannot be solved

The social problems that were reported in the newspapers in 1989, were different than in 1985 or 1987. In many problem stories, the writer himself was a participant, e.g., a director of the dairy factory who told why there is not enough milk, or a citizen who had suffered because of the problem. This had been the case even before, but in 1989 the solutions were not as easy as before.

The guilty person was often not a private person who had neglected his duty, but structures on which no one seemed to be able to exert influence or which could not be changed easily. Also journalists themselves wrote about problems and took the side of the readers (citizens, consumers) against the authorities. The following is an example of a problem story by a journalist:

Will we solve the “sweet” problem?

How long will we still have to go like mad rushing around in the city so that we can buy sugar with rationing cards?! The readers ask.

They no longer think about the beauty of the style – it has become painful! Here is one of the dozens of letters and phone calls: “I read a short story, ‘In the Ministry of Commerce of the KASSR’ in the paper on 2 September and I got angry. There are rationing cards, but where to exchange them for goods? I run like an animal around the city looking for sugar. Why are these cards necessary?” (S. Luzgin, Petrozavodsk)

Indeed, why?

— We fulfil 100 per cent of the orders of the “Prodtovarov” company for sugar delivery to the shops. Another issue is that the sugar we bring to the shops of Petrozavodsk, and to the other towns and districts of the republic, at the rate of one day’s supply only, because the sugar “goes from the wheels” [it is sold directly off the truck], there is not enough of it in the whole country. If we would give, let’s say to Petrozavodsk, on a certain day over 20 tons, it would be taken away from the share owed to other citizens of Karelia, answered the director of “Rosoptprodorg” A. Sidorenko.

The “sweet” problem of the inhabitants of Karelia cannot be solved if we ourselves do not start to grow sugar beets in the fields of the sovkhozes. But what can be done already now, to facilitate improving the difficult situation that has arisen?

— We have thought about this already; last Friday, 2 September, the representatives of the companies “Prodtovarov” and “Rosoptprodorg” held a joint meeting in the Executive Committee in which it was agreed that the sugar delivery schedule would be placed in every store. At least the people will not need to run to the empty stores, said the vice-director of the Executive Committee of the Petrozavodsk City Administration, V. Tikhomirov.

A reasonable decision on the sugar shortage that has occurred has been made in the Commercial Department of the Executive Committee; it is true, isn't it? Only the information about the delivery schedule has been as before lacking in our stores.

What is the matter? This question I addressed to S. Baklagina, the director of the company “Prodtovarov”.

— The stores of “Rosoptprodorg” really receive the daily quota but – with a delay of one day. Until we have a guarantee that the delivery schedule will be strictly observed, we will not hang up any kind of information in the stores, told Svetlana Adolfovna.

So, the decision has been made, but it is not implemented. It means that not only sugar and information but also the efficiency [*ispolnitelnost*] of the responsible workers here is in the previous state – there is a shortage of it.

Whose purposes does this serve?

O. Mimmieva

(*Leninskaya pravda* 10.9.1989, first page)

Beside this story, the paper published a story by TASS: “On regulations concerning bringing goods from abroad” according to which the import of many goods has been prohibited because there was a shortage of them.

As in the traditional Soviet journalism, the reason was the lack of discipline, but the previous solution, the punishment of those guilty and improvement of their discipline, was no longer proposed. The problem remained in the air, without a solution. Actually the real reason for the lack of sugar, Gorbachev's anti-alcohol policy, was not (could not be) mentioned, as journalism was not yet able to challenge the Party policies. There were a lot of various answers and they did not point in one single direction. A journalist was looking for information and asking questions but she no longer referred to Party decisions.

While the individualisation of guilt in 1985 moved attention away from structural solutions, in 1989 no solution whatsoever was found. While Soviet journalism in 1985 was disruptive at the structural level, in 1989 it was openly demoralising: everything was as before, there were no goods and no discipline.

Another problem story is a good example of Soviet investigative journalism. The story “Concealed nitrates” was based on a letter to the editor;

a journalist had started to look for facts on the nitrate content in cabbage. More questions arose than answers were found. Different authorities ensured that the traces of nitrate were checked and there was no danger. It was found out that the health authorities have no right to demand that the nitrate percentage be indicated in products. The journalist commented that all who can have moved towards self-sufficiency in food and he recommended that the people themselves follow the level of nitrate in food products.

When the story was already written, but not yet published, the journalist got a letter from the vice-director of the local health service department, in which it was stated that “The Ministry of Health of the USSR has prohibited the production and the use of litmus test paper in agriculture and also advertising and selling them to the population”. At the end of the story, the journalist commented in this way: “It means that it is even more necessary that we, the consumers, join together in the fight for our rights.” (*Leninskaya pravda* 14.9.1989)

The story created new kinds of alliances and divisions. A journalist addressed the readers as consumers, in which category the journalist placed even himself. On the other side were the authorities, against whom the readers and the consumers should join. Also the mistrust towards the authorities was presented in public. Similarly, as did the story about the lack of sugar, this story was likely to increase this mistrust and certainly to express it publicly more openly.

Clearly, the journalist was not on the side of the authorities but spoke for the consumers. It was also remarkable that the side of the consumers was taken so openly in journalism: transparent we-rhetoric was applied and it was different than the “we” rhetoric of Soviet journalism, which included all Soviet citizens.

Other problem stories were related to problems in the quality of construction, the lack of railway transportation services, failures in the postal service and the lack of petrol.

8.5.3. Early 1990s: Problems affecting individuals

In the early 1990s social problems became everyday issues, e.g., the shortage of tobacco, the shortage of foreign currency in banks, problems with telephone lines and unemployment. Another example is the following:

From the morning of 9 April, the editorial office of *Leninskaya pravda* started to receive phone calls from the citizens of the Kukkovka district. The people were interested in the question: Why is there no hot water in the houses?”

(*Leninskaya pravda* 11.4.1991, 3rd page).

When the paper had made inquiries it became clear that the problem was related to the repair work, which had already ended, and that the hot water was again available.

There were also articles in which the aim was to warn about problems, e.g. a story about venereal diseases, which had increased in Karelia, especially among the young. The story (an interview with a doctor) exposed the reasons for this and suggested what parents should do in order to help prevent the diseases from spreading.

Also strikes had found their way to the pages of the newspapers: *Leninskaya pravda* (10.4.1991) reported that “today the leasing limited company Petrozavodsk car depot (avtokolonna) 1123 will organise a one day warning strike” because the legislation limited this kind of company from using its funds in order to solve social questions and increase salaries.

Often the comments by the journalist or another author at the end of the story offered no solution:

It seems that the shortage of tobacco will continue for a long time
(in a story written by the director of the statistics administration of Karelia)
(*Neuvosto-Karjala* 9.4.1991).

— Go to Leningrad or Moscow to buy foreign currency in Vneshekonombank or travel abroad without it, that is how the clients are currently advised in Petrobank of Petrozavodsk.

What can the client do? Cursing because of malicious actions by the government toward its own citizens.

(Journalist Irja Raita in *Neuvosto-Karjala* 13.4.1991)

If all this is called market relations in formation, what awaits us in the future?

(Journalist V. Sidorovich in *Severnyi Kurier* 14.9.1991)

The readers would nonetheless like to have solutions: the paper received many letters and a review of the letters pointed out that “when the paper got a department of social policy, many readers, evidently, decided that it is possible to get advice on all the questions of everyday life from here” (*Leninskaya pravda* 11.4.1991). The readers pressed the paper with their complaints and even gave incorrect information.

Social problems that would need common efforts and a struggle were presented in the paper differently than before. The readers continued to contact the newspaper and the paper did ask the officials to investigate their problems, but more because of the news value than in order to solve the problems. The contacts of the readers were also reported in the newspaper as

the basis for the stories. An example of this is a story about the water problem in the Kukkovka suburb. A similar problem had occurred also during the April 1991 sample week.

Kukkovka without water

“Severnyi Kurier! Good morning, you have been disturbed by the citizens from house number 23 on Engels street. We have run out of cold water today. Do you not know what has happened!?”

This phone call came to our newsroom on 9 September. And on the following day we were called by the citizens of the Kukkovka suburb. Neither did they have hot water at home. What caused this interruption? we asked the Vice Director of the Water department, Mikhail Pchelov.

— Concerning Engels street, the break is connected to the repair work for improving the water supply of the city centre, he said.

— When a supplementary, larger pipe has been placed in this street, we will connect it to the city water supply network.

In the suburb of Kukkovka, an accident took place in the water pipe on Rovio street at one o'clock at night. After we had found out whose cables were underground where the accident took place and negotiated with those organisations, our repair brigade started to work. It is possible that on Saturday cold water will be supplied to the houses at Frolov street 16 and Rovio street 20, 34, 36 and 38.

(*Severnyi Kurier* (Saturday) 11.9.1993, 1st page)

In this story the main emphasis is on what has happened and how the problem will be solved. The guilty ones are not searched for. The starting point of the story, the phone call by a reader, was told and the whole story emphasised the role of the paper in finding out what had happened. The given explanation and the authorities' point of view were approved as such without questioning, e.g., why the repair work had cut the pipes and why citizens were not informed beforehand.

Another kind of story on a social problem was based on an interview with a street child. Under the headline “Can I come to you, mother?” and with the strapline “Human world” the paper reported how a street child came to the editorial office:

On Friday morning a boy popped into our editorial office. He had strange clothes that looked almost like a prison (hospital?) uniforms. Hollow, but interested eyes, thin, dirty hands, in one of them a half-eaten Snickers.

He walked in the rooms, discussed boldly with journalists, touched computers and typewriters, and even answered a phone. That is how we got to know him.

— My name is Tolya.

— And your surname?

— I do not know. – Then he thinks for a moment: — It is Prokhorov!
— Where do you come from?
— I do not know. Can I smoke here?
He searched in his pockets and commented sadly: Hmm, the cigarettes were lost somewhere... Do you have?
— It cannot be true, that you do not know anything about yourself! Have you ever been in a school?
— No.
— Never?!
He shakes his head.

The story in question-answer form ended with a comment by the journalist:

I would not like to comment on this simple and awful discussion. I do not know what is true, what is a lie and what is a sob story, so that the helping hand would not complain. Perhaps someone might find it interesting to read with his cup of coffee about the fact that there is such a blond-haired boy, Tolya Prokhorov, who wants to become a driver but perhaps will never do so. And maybe that someone will recognise him at the station, where he will end up again soon, and will give him food....

M. Tikhonov
(*Severnyi Kurier* 14.9.1993, first page)

In this story the journalist let the interviewee speak and did not take a moral standpoint on why things were like that and what should be done to correct the situation. The story was told to the readers, who may not have personal experience of such a case, how the street children live. The function of the newspaper in this case was not to solve a social problem but to tell how other people live. The journalist did not try to investigate whether the story was true or not but told it as he had heard and seen it and expressed also his uncertainty.

In the Soviet era this kind of detached and unproblematic story in the style “someone might find it interesting to read with his cup of coffee” would have been impossible. In Western mainstream journalism this would be a good story, especially in Western popular journalism, just because of the lack of a standpoint and because of its “authenticity”.

8.5.4. End of the 1990s: Problems that the administration is solving

In 1997 and 1999 the framing of problems was changed again. The problems were something that harmed only part of the population, in many cases the

poor or the underprivileged. Many changes can be noticed but also many previous features have been preserved.

School meals

Good food, tasty food...

The capital of Karelia has about 40 000 school pupils. During the last school year and the year before that, the government (city administration) fed 22,000 of them, more precisely all the pupils of classes 1-4 and the teenagers of poverty-stricken families. This year a republican decree was adopted according to which all the schoolchildren should be fed without exemptions with the sum of 4,163 roubles per person, of which around 80 percent should be provided from the republican public purse.

The first part of the decree has been fulfilled – everybody is eating. When it comes to the second part, instead of the planned 11 billion roubles, the government succeeded in collecting little more than 3 billion. In other words, the old food norms have returned. The school food programme costs 1,252 roubles per pupil (for example, baked pudding and tea), and in addition to that those parents who can afford it, can pay 2,500 roubles for other dishes (omelette, tomato salad, stewed fruit).

The representatives of the city administration have checked the school canteens.

It has been noticed that redecoration has been completed before the start of the school year practically everywhere; that the level of manual labour is greater (before it was planned that the food would be available to the cooking staff as semi-finished products, but now the staff have to peel manually, for example 100-200 kilos of potatoes every day; the menu is badly planned, there have been cases in which very often many foodstuffs go to the waste bin (the children particularly dislike kefir, acidophilus milk, milk chocolate, cooked fish); the menu for the whole week is not planned (but this is due to the deliveries), and some other remarks have been made...

By fulfilling the “state order” many companies have forgot the principle of what is best for the children. A report presented by the city commission on commerce led by Olga Bushueva stated that the Zaitsev sovkhos delivers frequently small and poor-quality potatoes, “Teplichnyi” sells tomatoes at 12,000 roubles per kilo (although in the city market the price is twice cheaper). A local dairy, referring to that fact that the purchased concentrate has become more expensive, is selling Frutiko juice to the schools for 4,000 roubles (at the beginning of the school year it cost in the shops a bit more than 2.5 thousand roubles).

It is clear that the higher the prices, the smaller the ration for the children. Although the decree states that the products should be bought at prices no higher than the average wholesale price in the republic.

If this kind of practice continues, then an open competition for the companies will be organised in order to find better suppliers, it was stated in the planning meeting of the city administration.

In order to improve the schoolchildren's nutrition it is planned to purchase bakery equipment for several school canteens (as the experience indicates that they [baked goods] are highly popular among the pupils), it has been decided to organise a competition for the best school canteen cook in January 1998, and a number of other measures have been proposed.

R. Gusev

(*Severnyi Kurier* 16.9.1997)

Just like the Soviet stories, this story began with a description of the situation. The real news — the poor quality and overpricing of the food — was told only in the middle of the story. The story was not timely either: it is difficult to find out when the report was published and when the planning meeting took place. Also the other side of the story (the republican government on the lack of funds, or the suppliers on the prices and quality) was not told (although it is not certain that it would have been done in a Western newspaper either).

A new element in the story is the clearer invisibility of the narrative voice of the story. The story is not making any connection with the readers but is just telling facts about what the administration is doing. The voice of the text itself is the clearest in the beginning of the story but soon it starts to refer to sources, and the division between the story's own narration and quotations remains occasionally unclear (compare Kunelius 1994, 33). The story's own narration appeals to common sense ("The best for the children principle", "It is clear, that") in framing the quoted sources. The story's own narration does not make any comment otherwise than by using ironic language (e.g. in the headline). No one is guilty, if not the companies, which have supplied expensive and poor products. It is worth noting that this kind of criticism against private companies cannot easily be found in Western mainstream journalism, in which the authorities would be the ones to blame. In Western journalism the maximisation of profit by the companies is taken for granted.

Signs of the old practices are also expressions like "some other remarks", which at first glance seem to discredit the reader's faith in the story telling all the necessary facts. On the other hand, this practice may strengthen the faith that the authorities are competent and almighty, but may also alienate the readers both from the paper and from politics.

In 1999 a similar example was a story on the first page of *Severnyi Kurier* on petrol crisis.

Crisis

Petrol Fever

The car-lovers of Petrozavodsk are again confusingly scratching their heads: the interruption in the supply of petrol can be felt in the petrol stations of the city. The situation is especially strained with the most popular — “ninety-two”. In many petrol stations it simply does not exist; where it can be found, one litre of this petrol costs you six and a half roubles instead of six, as it did not long ago.

An obstinate rumour is circulating among the drivers that a still greater rise in the price of the fuel is forthcoming. This threatens not only motorists but also us, pedestrians, which we do not need to be reminded of ...

In order to explain the situation that has developed in the petrol market of the city, our correspondent had contact yesterday with a representative of one of the largest petrol companies — “Ekotek-Rosika”.

The General-Director of the company, Boris Isaev, was in Moscow, in negotiations on the supply of the fuel to the republic. According to the words of the technical director Pavel Belov, yesterday the company received 500 tons of petrol “seventy-six”, but in the conditions of the beginning of the petrol “famine” this amount is hardly sufficient for a long time. There was no “ninety-two” available as of early yesterday, although, as the technical director mentioned, it is expected to be received in the near future.

The “ninety-five” petrol is maintaining first place in the list of petrol prices, the price of which for one litre has certainly passed the level of seven roubles.

A paradoxical situation has been formed: the inhabitants of a country, which possess one of the greatest reserves of crude oil in the world, which exports this very same oil abroad, have not only been forced to buy expensive petrol, but often remain without it at all... Absurd? Of course! Just because of this desperate motorists have, instead of the famous Russian “what to do?”, more and more often started to ask “who is guilty”?

Dmitrii Gordienko
(*Severnyi Kurier* 15.9.1999, 1st page)

In this story the problem is not easily solved and the story suggests that someone (an individual) might be guilty of creating the problem, which on the other hand seems to be very much structural. The story does not suggest any solution and it cannot even point out who is guilty.

The story ends with a conclusion that is not a piece of advice, but a conclusion about the result of the problem. The problem itself is defined as an absurd one, and a solution seems not to be available. Someone might be guilty, but the story does not indicate who that might be. In this respect, the difference in comparison with the Soviet era is clear, but the story does not offer any structural solution. Although the reason for the problem seems to be

found on the structural level, the search for the guilty person or institution would not solve the problem.

8.6. Narrative structures

8.6.1. Change in narrative structures

The narrative force field approach presented by Kunelius (see Chapter 3) has been applied in the analysis of the narrative structures of the stories. The narrative force field is based on analysis of the transparency and the identifiability of the voice of the story itself on the one hand, and on the analysis of the independence and dependence of the story on the other. The movement between these narrative situations is also analysed.

As a result, eight common types of narrative structure have been found outlined. The first (1) represents a structure with narrative transparency and independence. In these stories there is no quotation and the voice of the story itself is transparent. The second type represents the Western professional news structure in which the narrative moves between the transparent voice of the story and the reported speech $1 \leftrightarrow 4$. The cases in which the reported speech is indirect have been marked as $1 \leftrightarrow (4)$. The next situation, pure commentary, includes an independent and identifiable voice of the story (2). The cases in which identifiable commentary is accompanied by reported speech are marked as $2 \leftrightarrow 4$. The situation in which the story starts with its own voice but moves then completely to the reported speech is marked as $1 \Rightarrow 4$. The narrative situations including an interview in which both voices are identifiable (interviews in question - answer form) are combined in the next category ($3, 1/2 \Rightarrow 3$), and finally the stories that include only a reported speech are marked with (4).

The change in narrative structures has happened slowly and it has not been unidirectional. The clearest difference is between the Soviet (1985-1989/1991) and post-Soviet (from 1991 / 1993 onward) periods. In the post-Soviet period, there are more interviews, more professional news narratives and less 'pure news' (category 1), less use of a purely reported speech and news that is less commented on ($2 \leftrightarrow 4$). The differences, however, are relatively small and it would be difficult to point out differences with this kind of quantitative analysis.

Table 8.6. Space of different narrative structures in *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier*, %.

Narrative structure	1	1<=>4	1<=>(4)	2	2<=>4	1=>4	3,1/2=>3	4	other
1985	24.0	10.8	0.7	9.6	12.7	2.9	2.6	28.9	7.8
1987	22.2	7.3	1.1	6.5	12.0	4.2	7.0	35.3	4.4
1989	18.4	3.7	1.7	9.2	19.4	2.3	5.8	32.4	7.1
1991	25.3	9.2	1.5	7.7	10.8	2.4	10.0	28.8	4.3
1993	16.0	15.3	3.9	8.9	11.8	3.4	12.5	23.4	4.8
1995	18.4	14.7	7.5	9.5	14.2	4.0	11.8	15.6	4.3
1997	17.7	23.2	4.5	5.8	15.9	3.0	7.0	20.7	2.2
1999 (only SK)	25.7	16.6	1.9	7.3	19.6	1.0	8.4	15.0	4.5
1999 (SK + DV)	24.5	15.4	2.3	8.8	21.8	0.8	9.7	12.6	4.1

A closer look reveals some interesting points, e.g. in 1985 the majority (57%) of the professional news form narratives (situation 1<=>4) came from news agencies, while in 1999 the majority of them were written by staff journalists and only less than 20% came from news agencies.

Although the share of the professional news form has not increased a lot compared with the Soviet period, it has increased compared with the glasnost era. The share of dialogical classes (all others than 1, 2 and 4) have increased from 37% to over half. Also the share of other kinds of narratives has decreased, which may indicate that the stories are more clearly structured than before.

Table 8.7. Space of different narrative structures in *Neuvosto-Karjala* / *Karjalan Sanomat*, %.

Narrative structure	1	1<=>4	1<=>(4)	2	2<=>4	1=>4	3,1/2=>3	4	other
1985	23.3	9.6	3.0	7.3	15.2	6.2	3.5	31.0	0.9
1987	22.6	9.1	4.0	5.7	15.9	10.0	8.7	22.5	1.5
1989	20.2	6.6	11.5	2.6	17.1	0.5	3.1	32.3	4.9
1991	31.2	12.2	5.1	4.3	17.3	2.8	11.1	9.8	6.3
1993	24.4	23.3	7.5	9.9	16.5	2.3	8.8	6.2	1.1
1995	12.8	46.8	6.8	5.0	6.6	2.7	3.9	9.1	6.3
1997	27.4	31.5	10.1	9.0	7.0	—	5.4	9.6	—
1999	19.6	44.8	6.3	8.4	10.3	—	8.4	2.4	—

In *Karjalan Sanomat* the increase in the professional news form has been more rapid and more complete than in *Severnyi Kurier*. The share of the professional news form and its less developed forms has reached over half of the space. It has increased mainly at the cost of both purely reported speech and journalistic monologue, but also at the cost of the opinionated news form (2<=>4) and the single move to the source form (1=>4).

In general, the move has been away from both texts by outside authors and identifiable narrative voices and towards narrative transparency and independence.

8.6.2. *Narrative structures in Soviet journalism*

In the Soviet press the closest to the Western concept of news were the short foreign news stories. They told facts, quoted sources and usually did not comment (other than choosing words) on the events. The explanation for this could be that the foreign news items were “foreign”: they were not relevant to the everyday life of the Soviet citizens. Foreign news was not “our” news, except in cases when the Soviet Union participated in international events. Even then expressions like “our representative”, etc. were rare. A typical example of foreign news was the following:

Bonn. 14.¹ Today the autumn war manoeuvres of Nato have started in the FRG² under the title “Certain strike-87”. Some tens of thousands of recruits of the Bundeswehr³, the armies of the USA, Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands will take part in them. According to the communications of the news agencies, their task is working on “readiness for action under the conditions of battle training”. (*Leninskaya pravda* 15.9.1987, last page)

Even if the topic is the war manoeuvres of Nato, this short piece does not condemn or quote criticism against it, but just mentions what is going on.

Most of the other stories followed another narrative strategy. They were either direct speeches by outsiders, which reported on production successes or commented on important topics of the day, or texts by journalists in which the voice of the story itself was visible and in which the comments were mixed with facts. The outside author could be a veteran of pedagogical work writing about the upbringing of children, a public prosecutor telling about new laws or the head of the Petrozavodsk port writing about success in intensification of the work.

1 In shorter stories only the date was mentioned, not the month.

2 Federal Republic of Germany.

3 German armed forces, the German word (in cyrillic) was used in the original.

The professional news form was not used much in Soviet journalism. Journalism was part of the ideological apparatus and it could not, and should not, independently define situations and use quotations only to prove its own conclusions. Journalism did not need to hide its own role. Soviet journalism did not try to set itself over the events it is telling about. The events were not “over there” but they were at the same level with journalism and the public. The story aimed not to stay aside but to try and influence the reality. There was also no need to set journalism itself over the sources or to doubt them, because this might have only discredited the story. In Soviet journalism the outside authors gave more credibility to the story (at least according to the Soviet doctrine that emphasised the participation of the people in journalism).

The stories that were written by journalists only seldom contained quotations and if they did the quotations were often indirect. The following is an example of a story that was written by a journalist without quotations:

Railwaymen make special effort

Locomotive brigades of the village of Elisenvaara have completed unpaid convoys on the account of the All-Union communist subbotnik. It was started by the brigades of communists O. M. Vasilev and A. A. Zatsipa. And now already about 90 percent of brigades celebrate in this way the 115th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin. It is notable, that almost all of these convoys have been carried out with saved diesel fuel. During the first quarter 52 tons of it has been saved.

A special working effort was also dedicated to the jubilee of the Great Victory. Every worker decided to dedicate for this anniversary 40 hours of unpaid work. The Peace Foundation has already received a transfer of 3,000 roubles and on the 9th of May the contribution by the railwaymen will exceed 4000 roubles. A shock-working special effort has helped significantly to overfulfil the plan for January-March both in the cargo transport and in the productivity of the work.

S. Kirillov

(Our own correspondent)

(*Leninskaya pravda* 10.4.1985)

Despite its ideological context, some elements of this story resemble a Western short news story. The narrative voice of the story is invisible and does not comment on the events except by the use of ideologically loaded words. There are no quotations, which is rather common also in Western news stories of this length. A more typically Soviet feature was that even such a longer story did not necessarily contain any quotation.

The stories in which two voices were present were only less than half of the entire number of stories and even among these there were many stories in which the reported speech was prominent and the journalistic voice was only presenting the reported speech at the beginning of the story and occasionally in the story itself (e.g. in speeches by Gorbachev).

The emphasis on “we” and common interests was important. Journalism told about common issues that were familiar to the public. There was no need to put the event into context by presenting the background and relevance. Soviet journalism contextualised the story in another way: the story began with presenting the situation, the “news” was told only after that and at the end “conclusions” were made: the narrative voice of the text summarised the meaning of the news, encouraged even better performance or urged that the negative phenomena be corrected according to the Party line.

Many of the articles in the periods studied have elements of independent and invisible narration but this kind of narration does not control or contextualise the reported speech of the story; the independent and invisible narration describes the situation and after that gives the floor to the reported speech. Especially the beginning of the article usually describes the situation and only after that the action begins.

There was not much use of the professional news form (see reference to Kunelius in Chapter 3), because Soviet journalism could not, or it needed not, to define a situation and to use quotations of the reported speech in order to present “the facts”. In many Soviet newspaper stories another kind of narrative structure, independent and visible narration, is emphasised. In Western journalism these kinds of stories appear as, e.g., editorials, columns and cultural criticism. In Soviet journalism also many news stories applied this strategy. They did not only present the facts but also interpreted them from a particular point of view and constructed community. The interpretation of the events did not need a separate column but could be presented in the text itself. This was also called “conclusions” made by the journalist.

An example of this kind of story is the following:

Why was the bus not provided?

During these days hundreds of Petrozavodsk people travel for harvesting to the nearby farms. For example, the Zaitsev sovkhos receives every day 150-200 persons. This happened as well on the 4th of September.

As usual the travellers gathered on that day at the pioneers’ park at 8.30. Several small buses arrived. They were filled rapidly. More than 150 persons remained. There were no buses. At last still one bus arrived. Part of the people did not reach the fields during that day at all.

The situation was not better for those who travelled back from the sovkhoz. ... The Brigade of Besovets: After finishing their work in the fields, the urban dwellers (about 80 persons) gathered near the brigade office. The director of the brigade, com. Maslyakov, assured them: the buses will come at 17 o'clock and everybody will get home on time.....

Half an hour passes, then an hour. There are no buses. People start to get nervous, especially women who should get to the town, so that they could pick up their children from the kindergartens. There are no buses even at 18 o'clock. And then com. Maslyakov announced: "There will be no buses, go home as you like". Some succeed by hitchhiking, others walk to Shuya (the distance is almost six kilometres).

About this time the first vice-president of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, V. P. Romanov, and the director of the Sovkhoz, P. V. Shevelev, arrived in Besovets. They took action. Finally a mini-bus appeared at the office. All the rest crowded into it. They arrived home around seven o'clock.

— And this happens very often, almost every day, said the director of the Zaitsev sovkhoz, P. V. Shevelev. Five-six big buses of people come from the city, but when they should go back home, bus depot Nr. 1126 sends three mini buses and even they often arrive very late...

Who is responsible for that?

The transport of the citizens to the agricultural work has been under the responsibility of the transport administration of Karelia, more specifically bus depot Nr. 1126. We discussed with the deputy director A. V. Gogolev, who is responsible for the functioning of the depot:

— Yes I am informed about it, that on the 4th of September the buses to Shuya were cancelled, he answered. Two buses were broken down. They had to be changed. It took time to look for reserve buses. We should have reserve buses...

— Who does it depend on?

— On us, naturally, but there are no buses. I cannot guarantee that in the future there will be no failures.

At the same time, the decision of the Council of Ministers of the Republic "On measures related to the harvesting of potatoes, vegetables and forage in the year 1985" states that the bus drivers are responsible for providing transport services in good time and according to the needs of the sovkhozes. Why then have the workers of bus depot 1126 (under director O. D. Konyushkin) been allowed to carry on with this kind of undisciplined behaviour?

The harvesting has just started. It is necessary that from the first day onward the whole harvesting chain, including the transport of the people, be put in order.

A. Gladkov

(*Leninskaya pravda* 10.9.1985, first page)

The story starts with a description of the situation. A journalist is described who tells what he has seen with his own eyes. A similar beginning does exist even in Western journalism, but it is not common in major news stories.

When the story progresses to the search for reasons, it is quite close to the Western 'stupid questions' -genre, but the end is again different. After the answer the journalist refers to an authority, the decision of the council of ministers, and places the case into a comprehensive frame: the problem should be solved as decided.

The story moves between identifiable and invisible narration. Unlike a Western news story, this story does not hide its own role but puts the case in a clear frame, which, however, is defined outside journalism. Narratively the story moves between identifiable and independent narration on the one hand and identifiable and dependent narration on the other. The narrator tries not to hide his/her own visibility and the reported speech of the story are a result of dialogue and not the citing of a source.

The story is about a common topic that is important for 'us all'. There are common problems which should be solved and in the solving of which the newspaper has its own role. A Western story would not have referred to the decision of the Council of Ministers (it might have quoted another source, which might in turn have referred to it) and the aim would not have been (on the textual level) to have an impact on reality.

The relationships between different actors are interesting. At the beginning a general level to which the problem is related, is defined (harvesting and the lack of buses), but the reason for the problem is not searched for on that general level, but it is transferred to the individuals (undisciplined behaviour). The search for reasons would have directed the criticism towards the social order, but it was at least as harmful to transfer the structural problem (the lack of reserve buses) to individuals or to the working collective. The social system was not criticised and the privatisation of the problems turned the attention away from structural solutions. According to the story, the problem would have been solved if the decisions had been implemented properly.

8.6.3. Change in narrative structures at the end of 1980s

At the end of 1980s (the years 1987 and 1989) the pages of the newspapers were to a great extent transformed into a public discussion forum. The strict format of the stories had started to disintegrate. It was visible primarily in letters to the editor, which had a freer structure. The authors of the letters appealed less frequently to the abstract authorities, and told about very concrete problems. The same was visible in stories the journalists had written on the basis of letters and phone calls.

Journalism spoke more in the first person. For example, the editor in chief wrote about the subscription campaign with his signature and in the "I" or

“we” form (first person singular or plural). Also a journalist could use the “I” form in telling about the preparation of a story:

I tried to write these notes without anger, using mainly the language of the documents. However, I admit, it was not easy. Finally, only now I try to inform without polysemy that the authoritative commission that has investigated the case is planning to give all the material to the public prosecutor.

(*Leninskaya pravda* 10.9.1989, page 3)

The traditional “we” rhetoric was present, e.g. when “our sportsmen” were chosen for the Soviet team (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 13.9.1989), when “the question of whether there will be enough potatoes for us and what we will eat during the winter remains in the meantime without an answer” (*Neuvosto-Karjala* 13.9.1989), or in the first page headline: “Do we prepare for the winter?” (*Leninskaya pravda* 16.9.1989).

In many cases “we” referred to a smaller group of people than to the whole country or republic. For example, the newspaper itself was often referred to as “we”: “A letter was written to us...”, “As we have already reported...” and “we” was also used in referring to the members of one’s own nationality. In some cases forms other than “we” were used, e.g. instead of “our readers” the expression “the readers of the newspaper” was used.

“The reporter in duty” of *Leninskaya pravda* searched for a connection with the readers. He explored the concerns of the readers as a modern professional reporter but his relationship with the readers originated more from a traditional society: while a modern journalist acts on behalf of the readers without contact with them, “the reporter in duty” based his investigations on the personal contacts to the readers.

Many of the longer stories were written by a reporter who got to know about the situation as an investigative reporter and gave his own assessment of the case. Many of these stories originated from letters to the editor, as was also common previously, but in 1989 the journalists were more eager to cover these kinds of stories and they were published with fewer difficulties.

The practice of publishing official announcements on hot news items indicates both the increasing rapidity of the official reaction to these kinds of stories and the impossibility for journalism itself to cover these kinds of stories first or to neglect the official announcement. Interestingly, both the newspapers published the official announcement on both the clashes in Tbilisi and the nuclear submarine accident, although they were able to make selections in publishing the news stories.

The traditionally Soviet forms of news writing and new elements existed side by side. There were stories in which “conclusions” and references to

good and bad experience were present, and stories in which these were lacking. For example, the director of a sovkhoz could report on the progress in harvesting on his farm. In Soviet journalism this kind of story was understood to be more authentic than a story by a journalist who would not know the local conditions. The idea of a possible bias caused by his own interests was not relevant, because harvesting was in the interest of all, a common cause in which the interests of a sovkhoz could not be separated (in the public view) from the common interests of the Soviet people.

In some stories facts were more prominent and the conclusions were general background facts and not encouragement for better performance. The late Soviet stories differed from Western journalism mostly because their structure was more chronological and versatile than Western news stories. The most important facts and recent new developments were not placed at the beginning of the story but could rather be found close to the end. At the beginning was usually a description of the situation or background information. These stories had the structure of a tale, the most ancient narrative of mankind, which used to be common also in Western journalism in the past.

As a whole, the journalism of 1989 followed much the traditions of Soviet journalism. The changes were relatively minor ones. The most important changes were the increase in investigative journalism, the appearance of the journalist's own voice beside the "we" rhetoric, the decline in foreign news and the appearance of new topics.

It might not be too bold to state that during perestroika the aims of Soviet journalism were realised in an ideal way. The newspaper was the public forum in which discussion was practiced, all the opinions were published, social problems were discussed (but a solution was not found); there were criticism, shortcomings and questions.

The informative role, which was not central in Soviet journalism, was in 1989 even more marginal because of discussion, revelations and questions. In addition, the agitation and propaganda role was set aside. Journalism was likely more truthful — bad news was also reported and solutions were no longer simply found in the improvement of work discipline and effective campaigns.

The professional news form seemed to be difficult for Soviet journalism. For example, the stories about the visit of Gorbachev to Great Britain included indirect quotations and independent reporting but there was very little contextualisation. The quotation marks were not used in order to indicate the specific and dubious nature of the reported speech. The stories were reporting, not interpreting. Although the narrative voice of the story was visible, it made little effort to comment on the reported events.

8.6.4. Narrative structures at the beginning of the 1990s

Already in 1991 the former ideological need for commentaries was largely declining but various articles in which journalists expressed their own action were common. In many stories journalism was a participant in a way that is rather uncommon for Western mainstream journalism. A peculiar feature of this period was also the remarkable number of interviews reported in the question-answer-form.

There were no longer campaign speeches but journalism was still a social actor that felt responsibility for the audience and society in general. Actually the decline of the ideological requirements of the Soviet press increased the attention to the audience that journalism was serving, not only (or not among one of the most important things) by providing information but also by providing assistance and advice.

In many stories, especially in headlines, the style was ironic and playful: “Flags are also lacking”, “Money — to the wind” and “Bread became tastier” (*Leninskaya pravda* 11.4.1991). The former Soviet slogans were ironised as well as the new phenomena. An ironic element was present in many ordinary stories and some stories were completely based on irony. An example of this is the following story:

Let’s go down the right path, comrades...

The district paper of Suojärvi still has the name “Leninist path”. Yet — for the very understandable reason that this name is not convenient, neither for the journalists nor for the readers, not long ago the presidium of the district council sanctioned the change of the name and the newspaper appealed to the inhabitants of the district with the request to send in their proposals.

Among the readers’ proposals can be found downright touching ones, for example: To change from the “Leninist path” to “Eltsin’s path”. To... what? Completely logical: the new leader should be perpetuated...

And we guys, what a pity, we hurried to change “Leninist Truth” to “Northern Courier”! Should it now be “Eltsin’s truth”... And what kind of possibilities will be opened up in the former Soviet republics — “Gamtsakhurdia’s truth” “Nazarbaev’s path”... Thank God, there are, at the moment, many presidents, they will be enough for all the newspapers.

M. Tikhonov
(*Severnyi Kurier* 12.9.1991, first page)

This kind of ironic news story was rather common in 1991. In it the main goal was not to tell the news (the paper is planning to change its name and listing the strange proposals from the readers), although it was told there as well, but

to express a personal view by the journalist on the story and to do that in an ironic way. In Western mainstream journalism this kind of approach is almost absent but it can be found abundantly in satirical and humorous journals. In the Soviet / Russian journalism of 1991 it was present especially in short news stories.

In Western newspapers this kind of topic would fit well into the section of lighter news (especially foreign) but the style would have been different: based only on the proposals of the readers and on the embarrassing situation of the newspaper and not inventing further versions of possible new ideological newspaper names.

Another example of irony and the self-expression of a journalist is a story about the new innovation of the party district committee in Olonets (Aunus):

Address of experience

Enthusiasts of commerce

The “School of future managers” is functioning at the Olonets district committee of the CPSU

I can imagine the reaction of Iosif Vissarionovich, if he would have in his time gotten to know that in the county of Olonets the communists thought to introduce youth to business and enterprise activity. The smart operators might have become famous for the degeneration of the proletarian cell to a counter-revolutionary nest. I bet that the next day no trace would be left neither of the organisers of this event, nor of “the incubator for bringing up young bourgeois people”.

But today it is a reality.

After a story such as this, based mainly on interviews without comments, the journalist returns with his conclusions. Even if he writes “Instead of an ending. We abstain from conclusions” he ends the story like this:

And what can be said about the initiative of the communists of Olonets? It is a logical action. Merchants have been brought up with enthusiasm, and today the education has to be done with enthusiasm.

(Leninskaya pravda 9.4.1991, p. 3)

The mentioned abstention from conclusions seems to mean that the journalist did not take any moral attitude for or against the experiment (like ‘this should be done elsewhere as well’ or ‘the communists of Olonets have made a mistake’) but presented it as such. On the other hand, the tradition of conclusions was so strong that he could not end the story without any personal note. This reflected both the need to change and the strength of the old practices.

There were also “pure news” items which followed the professional news form and even some longer stories that were based on an interview but in which the “sound-bites” of the interviewee played a minor role. The rest of the story was written in the voice of the reporter himself, although the facts apparently had come from the source. There were also stories in which some direct and indirect quotations were included in a transparent narration of the story.

The decline of Soviet practices was visible also in the fact that *Neuvosto-Karjala* had strongly reduced the share of reported speech (the 4th narrative situation) from 32% of the space in 1989 to 10% in 1991. A smaller drop happened in *Severnyi Kurier* only in 1993.

In 1993 the share of journalists’ own stories had increased and outsiders did not get their stories into the newspaper as easily as was the case before. The authors might well have been outsiders but that fact was not mentioned in the paper itself.

The letters and phone calls of the readers gave a basis for the stories as before. The interesting fact is not that the readers called or wrote to the newsroom, but that the journalist mentioned that as the reason for the story. Also the water problem in a few blocks of flats is, as a news story, so insignificant that its coverage in the news would have been very exceptional in a newspaper working with Western news criteria (see page 418) .

Compared with earlier years, the voice of the story itself was more invisible. In Soviet times invisible and independent narration existed mainly in the foreign news, but in 1993 it was applied also in domestic stories and even when the story was a longer one. A good example of this is the already mentioned potato-harvesting story (Pogrom in Velikaya Guba). Even if the story had some commentary elements, the story’s own narration only described events.

For example, in many news stories by the RIA news agency the narration was similar to those in Western news stories. On the other hand, in many stories it was mentioned that information had been told particularly to the correspondent of RIA and it was described how the story was made. This can be interpreted as an indicator of the increased position of journalism in comparison with sources. It was important that the correspondent of the paper or news agency was involved. The personal working process of a journalist was visible in many ways: the journalist described how he had lunch in various restaurants of the city and how he had read various prognoses in various newspapers on the forthcoming results of the referendum.

The story’s own voice was identifiable in many stories even if it was not as much present as before. For example, a story about a conference on new

information technology in Petrozavodsk started like this:

We have already become accustomed that the capital of Karelia has become a place in which the most distinguished international meetings take place. From 23 September to 1 October an international conference: "The new information technology in education and administration" arranged by the Northern Regional Centre for New Technology will take place at Petrozavodsk State University.

(*Severnyi Kurier* 16.9.1993)

The reader was addressed directly and by using the "we" form the author aimed to create a sense of community between the readers and journalism. It is a question of events that are common to all of us. On the other hand, the use of "we" no longer functioned as an indicator of confrontation; there were no examples of "they" opposing the "we" community.

The stories still started with a description of the situation. At the beginning the context was set and only afterwards was the reader told what is new. This feature seems to be a more permanent phenomenon in Russian journalism than the open expression of a standpoint or the mixing of opinions and facts.

Actually this represents a different way "to tell all" than the Western form of giving the new facts first. The readers are expected to have some background information themselves because not everything is necessarily told in the story. The paper could also refer to former issues. For example, a story headlined as "Municipal banks: a political question" started like this:

As we have already told, on 13 September an all-Russian seminar, "Problems in the founding of municipal banks" started its sessions in Petrozavodsk. On that day a final press conference was held in which the questions were answered by the vice president of the city council of Petrozavodsk, Andrei Demin...

(*Severnyi Kurier* 15.9.1993)

The paper aimed to be a participant in social processes and not just an observer. For example, in a story about the initiative of the mayor of Petrozavodsk to nominate the city dweller of the year, the paper announces its willingness to participate in the search for this person and offers its pages for discussion on the qualities of the candidates. The relation of the paper to the other institutions was in some cases a subordinated one.

Karjalan Sanomat had both old and new elements. There were very personal commentaries, for example when a story from the Finnish newspaper *Aamulehti* on the living conditions of the Karelian nouveaux riches was commented on. The story created community between the paper and the reader, who were together horrified because of the *Aamulehti* story and also the poor level of service in Petrozavodsk. Despite the personal tone, the name of the author was not mentioned.

Many stories in *Karjalan Sanomat* were based on a specific viewpoint common to both the newspaper and the reader. This was the case not only because of the Soviet tradition but also because of the small circulation of the paper — the readers had closer contacts with the paper. Many persons interviewed were regular readers of the paper and it could tell, e.g., that “At the end of August a war veteran, Ilkka Takala, visited our office with his son Vesa”, because they “as long-term readers of our paper expect that their story will be published” (*Karjalan Sanomat* 11.9.1991).

Co-operation with Finnish journalists had brought *Karjalan Sanomat* closer to Western journalism. The stories written by Finnish journalists working for the paper were close to Finnish practices. It also reprinted stories from Finnish papers. In addition, many of the paper’s own stories and stories translated from the newspaper *Petrozavodsk* were close to Western practices. For example, the following story includes both Western elements and elements from Soviet journalism or earlier phases of Western journalism:

Bitter bread crust

According to the director of the bread factory Alla Shorova, the increase in the price of bread will not be expected before October 1st.

The recent rise in the price of bread was due to the increase in the price of flour four times. Nowadays, from the price of a round loaf, 40% is spent on raw material, 20 per cent on transportation and only 7.8 per cent goes to the salary of the bakers. The profit totals only 10.3 per cent, although officially 15 per cent is allowed.

Bread will be sold like hot cakes even with the new prices and the orders by the shops will increase in volume.

(*Karjalan Sanomat* 14.9.1993)

From the Western news journalism viewpoint this story differs mainly because of the commentating and ironic headline, but in the story itself there are no signs of this kind of commentary or irony.

A good example of differences between journalistic cultures was offered by *Karjalan Sanomat*, which published both its own story and a story by the Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* on the visit of the delegation of the National Congress of Karelians, Finns and Veps to Finland. The paper’s own story started with the presentation of the situation:

The president of the executive committee of the National Congress of Karelians, Finns and Veps, Anatoli Grigorev, vice president Nikolai Zaitsev and members of the committee, Jukka Akimov and Viktor Kuokkanen, visited Finland 6-10 September at the invitation of the Society of Friendship of the Finnish and Russian peoples. They told about the results of the visit in the Centre for national cultures on Tuesday.

— The aim of the journey was to inform the Finnish civic organisations about the situation of the Finnic peoples of Karelia, to make contacts with organisations and to discuss with Finnish officials. We are happy with the results, they exceeded our expectations, reported Anatoli Grigorev.

The story by *Helsingin Sanomat* started with concrete results:

The Society of Friendship of the Finnish and Russian peoples (SFFRS) intensifies its co-operation with the national organisations of the Finnic peoples of Karelia. SFFRS and the National Movement of Karelia, representing the Karelians, Ingrians and Veps, signed an agreement on co-operation on Thursday in Helsinki.

According to Kaj Bärlund, president of SFFRS, the organisation will do its part to influence the authorities of the republic of Karelia, so that the position of Finnic national minorities would be recognised more clearly.

The story in *Karjalan Sanomat* ended with the prospects for the future:

The next congress of Karelians, Finns and Veps will be held in October-November. Then the programme of the executive committee will be announced.

— Finland will not interfere with the internal affairs of its neighbour but it is ready to support our activities, the participants said at the press conference.

The story did not list the name of the author.

The story in *Helsingin Sanomat*, in contrast, ended with background facts:

The congress had already appealed to the United Nations, The Baltic Sea Council and the Baltic Sea countries. It will also contact the Council of Europe.

Of the 800,000 inhabitants of Karelia, the share of Karelians, Finns, Ingrians and Veps is over 13 percent. Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians comprise almost 85 percent.

Leo PUGIN

(from the newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat*)

(both stories published in *Karjalan Sanomat* 16.9.1993, first page)

Karjalan Sanomat's own story followed the chronological order of events more directly than the story in *Helsingin Sanomat*. In *Helsingin Sanomat* the structure was from the important news to less important and then to background information.

The lack of background information and the presentation of the situation were two of the best-preserved characteristics of Russian journalism. Still in 1993 phrases like "As we have already told..." and "As it is known..." were frequent. Russian journalism did not treat its reader as a person without

history and former knowledge, but trusted that the reader knows what is going on and what the paper has reported earlier.

8.6.5. *Narrative structures at the end of 1990s*

At the end of 1990s (the years 1995, 1997 and 1999) the distribution of different narrative structures had continued to change. Compared with the Soviet era, the citing of sources, the lack of commentary and the transparency of narration had become common practices in journalism. However, the most common type of narrative was still the monologue by the journalist. However, this type of narrative existed more and more only in small stories and the longer stories did include quotations (and also commentaries by journalists). The practice of writing a separate news story and a separate column practically did not exist in the sample.

Commentary reportages and editorials were common but there were no separate commentaries or separate stories on the same topic. If the story was important enough, however, it included both facts and commentaries in one longer story.

The emphasis on news was the most noticeable on the first page of *Severnyi Kurier*. Usually the small news stories had no quotation (direct or indirect) at all; rather the facts spoke for themselves. Over half of the stories could be recognised as news (in 1995 even 64%). In the larger stories, the use of commentary and the identifiability of the text's own narrative voice were clearer. For example, in a news story on the conference of the "Our Home Is Russia" Party, a correspondent of *Severnyi Kurier* ended her story in this way:

After having been in the congress I understood why the rating of the Our Home Is Russia movement is rising despite the criticism in the press. When the members of the opposition, who had two years ago directed their voices with criticism toward the authorities, came to the State Duma, the miracle did not happen. Even moderate, constructive actions are much more convincing than flaming words.

(T. Kolesova in *Severnyi Kurier* 14.9.1995).

This fragment at the end of a rather dispassionate and neutral story indicated the preferences of the author for the party in power and against the opposition.

The selection of news on behalf of the reader happened but it was a new practice, which was indicated even by the comments of old-line journalists in the stories. A rather ordinary larger news report on a meeting concerning the anti-crisis programme of the Karelian government was introduced like this:

Our readers could not digest even a small part of the complex material on business policy presented in the session, which continued throughout the day, and therefore we have ended up presenting only the most important parts.

(*Karjalan Sanomat* 13.9.1997,
a story by Apu Sundelin, one of the old journalists)

A practice that was normal in the Western press (and need not be noticed) was unusual for a journalist of the old school. However, there were no more elements of old practices like “some other remarks” and the story includes both short, direct quotations and indirect speech.

It was also a common feature that a journalist told about the making of the story, starting it, e.g., like this:

A journalist has various meetings. Some of them you forget in a week. It means that you collected routine material. And something else will be stored without visible reason in your mind for years.

(*Severnyi Kurier* 10.4.1999).

This story was based on an interview conducted some years earlier but for some reason published only in 1999. There was no other reason told why the story had been published only afterwards and neither there was any attempt to hide the fact that the story was not current (as would be the case in Western journalism). Actually only the beginning of the story indicated that the interview had been done long ago.

A journalist could also end a story like this:

It is difficult for a reporter to judge: who is right, who is wrong, even if you have listened to both sides. It is possible to say one thing firmly: for years, and not only years, a decade, Kizhi was like a baby with seven nurses, who loses an eye [when there are too many responsible, no one is].

(*Severnyi Kurier* 14.4.1999,
the article dealt with the Kizhi open-air museum).

These examples show that it was possible for a journalist to reveal his/her uncertainty about the truth. It was still not enough to refer to both sides and let the truth be left somewhere in between, but a journalist felt it important to judge who was right and was not happy not being able to do so.

At the end of 1990s many small news stories applied independent and unidentifiable narration. They differed from Western mainstream news journalism in that often the Soviet story was written without any direct or indirect reference to the sources. There were also stories that were similar to Western news stories. The difference was not primarily caused by the topic, but by the author. Some of the authors had applied the Western method of

writing stories with short quotations, while others likely thought this to be an unnecessary practice, although even they had reduced their former habit of telling their own opinions in the stories. The comments in the stories were rare.

Headlines were still rather puzzling, like “The party and trash”, “With cowberries for vodka”, “From the party with a sinking boat” (a story about the visit of a Karelian delegation to Moscow’s 850th anniversary celebration, during which it became clear that the federal transfers to Karelia would be cut) or “Buying a melon in light of the national idea”. There were also label headlines like “Amnesty”, “Session of the government” and “The contract has been signed”. Some headlines had both a puzzling and an informative part “Do not call me, do not... Over 100 telephones closed in the Muezero district” or “My apartment, the session of the Karelian government had a lively discussion on the housing reform”.

The following is an example of a story that uses completely independent and unidentifiable narration:

Four years without salary

Belomorsk. The workers of one lumbering unit of “Sosnovets TIE”¹ have sent to the general prosecutor of the district a collective letter in which they ask for immediate help. The petition of the workers reveals that they have not been paid their salary in four years. The enterprise has gone bankrupt and on 19 August all received their employment documents, in which they had been registered as dismissed. In addition to this, the workers were not given their insurance documents, without which they cannot get medical care.

G Aleksandrov

(*Severnyi Kurier* 16.9.1997, first page)

This story tells the facts but does not quote any source. Actually the source has been either the letter or the workers themselves. In that story the facts speak for themselves.

The stories representing the Western professional news form were in 1997 not especially common, but in any case more so than before. In *Karjalan Sanomat* these stories were more common than in *Severnyi Kurier* and while their share had been reduced in *Severnyi Kurier* in 1999, in *Karjalan Sanomat* they had increased. One example of this kind of story is a news item transmitted by Ima-press:

1 Timber industry enterprise (abbreviation used in the original text).

Free breakfasts in Karelian schools

PETROZAVODSK. The government of Karelia gave a kind of present to the school children of Karelia by making agreements with the producers. According to the general inspector of the Ministry of Agriculture of Karelia, Vitalii Belov, the funds given from the budget satisfy both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture. After having had negotiations with each other, the ministers came to the conclusion that the developed system of budget allocations makes misappropriation impossible.

(Karjalan Sanomat 10.9.1997, 3rd page)

The story “breaks the rules” of professional news by referring to the headline and leaving out the question what kind of allocation system has been developed and how misappropriation has been made impossible. The most important message seems to be that the Karelian government has given a present to the school children and that the issue is under control, although the reader is not given resources to judge if the situation is as the ministers claim.

There were also many stories in which narration was independent and identifiable. The journalist’s own experiences were important and commentaries were common (as was the case in the story on “Petrol Fever”, page 423-424). More and more comments appeared only in commentaries and columns, although the practice was not to write a column separate from the news report. In commentaries the reader was addressed directly and the tone was stronger than is usually the case in Nordic journalism (even in editorials or comments). The source of comments was not any abstract general level, but the comments came personally from the journalist.

For example, in an editorial-type story: “Topical notes: What can we be proud of?” a journalist, A. Alekseev, wondered why foreign goods overcome Russian ones in the market and why products of good quality have not been produced in Russia:

There is no doubt: the inhabitants of the republic would be proud if they knew that far off in France or cloudy England, the various tinned berries of Karelia are bought and praised.

What about it is impossible and unreal? Forget about customs payments, taxes and intrigues in Moscow.

Finland, as well as Karelia, is situated far from the subtropics. Nonetheless there has been produced pineapple and orange juice in jars, bottles and parcels. But we, when we could achieve something, let the initiative slip away. Forever?

With the same style one could speak about dozens, hundreds confectionery products which are produced in neighbouring countries. Although biscuits are neither a “harvester” nor a “Nissan primera”.

A striking end for the Karelian pretzels as a victim of the cracker from overseas!

(*Severnyi Kurier* 13.9.1997, first page)

In this story the use of language and commentary is close to Western editorials or columns. There is a lot of irony (mainly before the cited paragraph) about the Soviet slogans on quality. There is also irony in the final “slogan” in which the word ‘striking’ (*udarnyi*), one of the most characteristic words of the Soviet-Russian language, has received a new meaning.

Also art criticism could be written from a “general” and from a particular point of view. The voice of the story itself was transparent and independent, it appealed to the public like this: “Often and especially in an exhibition of two artists, the viewer tries to find the link between the artists...” or “The attention of the public is fixed on...” (*Karjalan Sanomat* 10.9. 1997, 7th page).

Also in political journalism the practice not to report but to influence was remarkable (for more details see Pietiläinen 2000). For example, *Oma maa*, presented two ethnic Karelian candidates for the Legislative Assembly by telling that: “The reader knows both of these men” (*Oma maa* 21.3.1998). No need to present them in more detail or to compare their aims. Another example was when *Karjalan Sanomat* reported on a visit by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy; the journalist compared the situation to Germany at the beginning of the 1930s and continued: “There is no need to repeat the unscrupulous speech of Mr. Zhirinovskiy, which did not follow any widely recognised behavioural norms. For him there are no laws and no opinions of the others.” (*Karjalan Sanomat* 16.5.1998). And the newspaper did not report what Mr. Zhirinovskiy said, but criticised him.

Russian political journalism was not about politics but it *was* politics: in this public sphere candidates (at least those favoured by the newspaper), voters and, to a lesser extent, journalists could present their opinions and judgements on politics. The reader was to a great extent a participant who was supposed to have knowledge of the issues and persons mentioned in journalism.

8.6.6. Narratives in popular newspapers

The analysis of narratives and journalism in general has so far been done on the basis of two established newspapers only. However, it would be useful to make a short excursion into the journalism and narratives in other newspapers. This may also shed some light on changes that may have gone further than in

the traditional press. While in *TVR-Panorama* and *Petrozavodsk* most of the politically oriented stories were written by outsiders or press releases were published as such, in *Guberniya* almost all the stories were written by journalists. As the most popular, opposition, weekly newspaper, *Guberniya* represents best the new part of the Karelian press.

During the last analysed period, the second week of September 1999, the news items in *Guberniya* were mainly different. Only very few topics, like the terrorist attacks in Moscow and Buinaksk, the press conference of Communists on preparations for the elections and the new editor of *Kareliya*, were reported both in *Severnyi Kurier* and in *Guberniya*.

Narratively *Guberniya* applied strategies similar to Western popular journalism. The stories are full of ironic commentaries, which are not made in the name of the journalist but included in the narrative voice of the text itself.

Elections

Communists, forward!

Realise the decisions of the 6th congress of the party

In the past few days Vladimir Shilnikov, representing Karelia in the 6th congress of the CPRF, was in Moscow with the list of delegates to the parliament from communist community.

In the vanguard of the federal list the following persons have been nominated: G. Zyuganov, G. Seleznev, Starodubtsev, the Governor of Tula (who has had a conflict with Agrarians), and Amangeldy Tuleev. The regional Party list combines seven regions of the North and Northwest, including Karelia, and starts with the name of a professional deputy of the parliament (working in this duty already 8 years), Nikolai Bendyukov. Our communists reached an encouraging sixth place (Vladimir Shilnikov) and consoling 11th place (Irina Kondrashkina). So that Nikolai Bendyukov would become a MP, the CPRF should receive in the northwest approximately 16-17 per cent of the vote. How much in that case will Vladimir Shilnikov need, holder of the Order "For Service to the Fatherland, second grade" — you can count for yourselves. One hundred per cent would hardly be enough. A Karelian communist "for the direct seat" has not yet been nominated, but all are actively talking about Boris Tyukov (at the moment he is working in the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic).

(*Guberniya* 16.9.1999, second page)

The story is apparently ironic but anyhow tells facts about the candidates and their chances of being elected. Also the report by *Severnyi Kurier* included some elements of irony, e.g.: "By the way, many members of the FWR have

1 Our Home is Russia; Fatherland — the Whole Russia.

built their career smoothly: communists — OHR — FWR¹. The closer to the power, the better”.

Still another example is a story about bread prices, which was published on the last page, and which had a catchline “Painful points”. It was dedicated to various problem topics like the poor, who were eating dogs and cats in the district of Kalevala, or burglary in apartments in Petrozavodsk.

Why it is more expensive here?

Karelian bread – the most expensive in the Northwest

“Guberniya” has written more than once about the prices of bread and about the measures the republican leadership claims to have taken in order to control them. The fact that the Karelian government is not able to influence the increase in bread prices became evident after the recent, regular increase. The new price lists appeared in shops and this means that the leadership officially recognised its impotency.

It is hardly possible to call accidental the fact that our Karelian bread is one of the most expensive in the Northwest. For the sake of comparison here are several figures: In Arkhangelsk one kilo of rye-wheaten (that is, the ordinary black) bread costs 5.86 roubles, in Syktyvkar 5.79 roubles, in Petrozavodsk 5.98 roubles. The average republican price is even higher than the price in Murmansk, where a kilo of “the black” can be bought at 6.6 roubles, while on average in Karelia it is 7.13. The situation seems to be paradoxical, since, you know, the grain from the southern regions of Russia is transported via Karelia to Murmansk over several hundred superfluous kilometres. According to all the rules of commerce, the rise in transportation costs should be shown also in the final cost price of the product. As we see, this does not happen. Not because the authorities in Murmansk, in contrast to ours, not only “hold a hand on the pulse”, but can in reality have an influence on prices?

The disparity in bread product prices exists even in the districts of Karelia. In Kostomuksha black bread is almost four roubles more expensive than in Petrozavodsk; also the prices in Muezero and Segezha are different. In Kostomuksha a long loaf made from first class flour costs 14.20 roubles per kilogram, in Petrozavodsk correspondingly 10.87 roubles. For comparison: in the northern Arkhangelsk it costs 10.57. Even a superficial analysis of prices suggests a commercial increase, which is incongruous with the established norms set by the enterprises earning their living in the bread business. All the sellers of bread products affirm that they are working on the margins of profitability and wait for assistance from the government. However, the republican authorities are not yet planning to distribute subsidies or to lower the tax rates. This means that you should be ready for everything, including still one more metamorphosis of prices.

N.Z.

(*Guberniya* 16.9.1999, last page)

The story was accompanied by a map of Karelia with bread prices in different towns and cities.

In this story the problem is partly a result of a paradox, and partly caused by the impotency of the authorities. The story did not include any quotations or indication of sources. The paper had likely collected the prices by telephone, or they were based on some official report. The conclusions were made on the basis of them and the criticism addressed to the government was made in the name of the paper only. In Western journalism (both in elite and largely also in popular types) the facts might have been provided by consumer organisations and the criticism by opposition politicians. This kind of journalism does not only tell about journalism itself, but also about the structure of society in general: there are not yet active source organisations from which a journalist could easily get ready sound-bites of criticism and analysis, or opposition politicians who would not refuse to blame the government.

It is also remarkable that a rather clear anti-market ideology can be read between the lines and how clearly the story speaks for major state intervention into commerce. Although the story is very different from Soviet stories on similar topics, it also blames the bad will of individuals (the local authorities) for the problems, as was the case with the Soviet press. This kind of approach is certainly very suitable for an opposition newspaper (supporting a businessman who opposes the contemporary leadership), since these kinds of stories decrease the popular trust in the capabilities of the leadership. But without proper civic organisations, this criticism cannot be channelled into success in elections or protest actions that would bring about change. In addition, by presenting criticism in its own name, the opposition press makes itself an easy target for criticism from the side of the authorities.

8.7. Changing journalism in perspective

Karelian, or more generally Russian journalism, underwent major changes during the 1990s. As an Estonian study revealed, in many respects the change in journalism there has been greater during the last 20 years (from 1981 to 1999) than, for example, between the Estonian journalism of the years 1920 and 1930 and the Soviet Estonian journalism of the years 1971 or 1981. This could be interpreted that the development of journalism in the Soviet Union was not as rapid as in Western Europe and Northern America. Therefore Soviet journalism lagged behind and this gap intensified when Western journalism further developed. Soviet journalism could not develop because of barriers

inherent in its political role, or rather it **need not** develop under the pressure of competition and the market.

On the basis of the case of *Leninskaya pravda* / *Severnyi Kurier* and *Neuvosto-Karjala* / *Karjalan Sanomat*, it seems that the change away from Soviet journalism was a rapid one, but on the other hand, some elements in 1999 were closer to Soviet journalism than to the practices of 1995 (or even 1993 or 1997).

A major change has occurred in the outward appearance of the newspaper, the function of the press in the society has changed, the position of the journalist and journalism have become stronger and all these developments have had an impact on journalism as well. In the post-Soviet period the outward appearance of the newspaper has been looking for new forms and therefore has changed several times. The importance of different topics and stories has varied, the technical possibilities have improved and examples have been taken from other countries. One could even speak about some kind of content spiral, although the total amount of the content did not increase before 1999; rather the amount written by journalists increased as well as the amount of space devoted to advertising. On the other hand, almost all the weeklies adopted a tabloid format and so did *Karjalan Sanomat*. For a weekly newspaper with a smaller amount of content, a tabloid format would be more ideal.

While the “distinctly Soviet character” of the Russian language “disappeared almost instantaneously with the collapse of the Soviet system” (Dunn 1999, 20), the transformation of the language in journalism was a slower process. Some elements, mainly linguistic and ideological, disappeared very rapidly but some less distinctly ideological elements and those more bound with professional practices and the status of the journalist transformed more slowly.

There were also elements that did not change much. One of those was the temporal dimension of the news stories. At the end of 1980s the dominant time of the news was the present (the dominant time in stories that covered 58-65% of the space), while both present and past times could be found in the large majority of the stories. The stories in which the future time was present covered around one third of the space. With the increasing emphasis on the news, the past time became more important: in the second half of the 1990s the past time was dominant in stories that covered 42-47% of the space, but the present time kept its dominant position even then. The share of stories in which the future time was present decreased so that these stories covered at the end of the 1990s only one fourth of the newspaper space. *Karjalan Sanomat* in comparison with *Severnyi Kurier* pays more attention

to the present and future. The reason for this is a greater use of combined categories of times, in which the past, present and future (or two of them) are present in the same story. In the Soviet era this kind of difference did not exist.

During the collapse of the Soviet system the letters to the editor became an important part of the newspaper content. Journalism was remarkably unprepared to arbitrate this discussion. The number of opinions increased but they did not produce any consensus or exchange of opinions but rather led to greater disharmony. There was discussion but not deliberation. Therefore, the journalism of perestroika differed from the ideals of public journalism. Journalism was a public tribunal but it was not a forum in which consensus could have been achieved.

Soon after the explosion of discussion, the opinions faded away and news became the most important part of the press. All the other sources of textual material lost their position, while journalists increased their control over the newspaper text. While previously the journalistic texts were largely monologues, either by a journalist or (more frequently) from an outside source, they had now become more plural in the number of voices present. This is also the way in which Western journalism has developed.

The plurality of voices in a newspaper story does not mean that the journalists would not have control over the facts and views presented in journalistic texts. Swedish and Russian comparative analysis has shown that in the majority (71%) of Swedish journalistic stories, more than two voices are present and only in very few (14%) is a single voice present (Korkonosenko 1998, cit. Resnyanskaya and Fomichova 1999, 151-152). In Russian texts of the end of the 1990s, however, the majority of stories (77%) have only one single voice. On the basis of this, the Russian researchers L. Resnyanskaya and I. Fomichova seem to think that a "regime of dialogue" exists in Swedish journalistic texts and they wish that Russian journalism would develop in the same direction. According to Resnyanskaya and Fomichova, monologic media "behave like skilful interpreters — commentators of reality, tough editors, who improve (ispravlyayut) this reality." According to them, the transition to a dialogical mode of communication is difficult and it "requires the recognition of the right of every participant to his/her own approaches, opinions, interests, the refusal of a monopoly on the truth, tolerance for others' opinions and aiming at a concordance of the positions" (Resnyanskaya & Fomichova 1999, 155-156).

Also social change has had an impact on journalism. While journalism could challenge the authorities at the end of the 1980s and the very beginning of the 1990s with irony or more direct opposition, journalism seemed to be

more controlled at the end of 1990s. What makes the conflicts between authorities and the press different from the perestroika period?

An important thing is the changing role of political power. In post-Soviet Russia the authorities are elected and popular support has become a much more valuable currency. Therefore it is necessary to show, or try to show, that authorities are capable (or in the case of the opposition press that they are not) of solving social problems.

Soviet journalism was characterised by the publishing of official documents on the one hand and by creative writing on the other. The publishing of official texts has gone forever, but the creative writing has remained. The independence from sources or striving to stay above them and using the power to define and set the public agenda are not yet common in Russian journalism. It is likely that they will be common someday, as Western experience has indicated, but this development is not only dependent on the choices made by journalists, but also on the development of other social institutions. Currently, with the domination of the authorities and the weakness of civil society and organised opposition, the choices might be either to support the authorities or to oppose them, but an independent, non-partisan position has proved to be difficult.

9. Conclusion

This final chapter first reverts to the main findings of the study and presents some reflections on these findings. Our starting point was that major changes took place in the Russian newspapers and journalism in the 1990s. Both the structure and the content of the press changed. This study has analysed three separate but closely linked developments, first, the modernisation development in Russia and the discussion around it, second, the changes in the structure of the press in Russia in general and in Karelia in particular, and third, the changes which have taken place in the newspaper texts. These three elements are connected with the major social changes which followed the collapse of the Soviet system. Among the key developments are the regionalisation and pluralisation of the press, the disintegration of Soviet journalism and its increasing Westernisation, and the changing place and role of journalism in society.

9.1. Findings

Regionalisation of the press. The post-Soviet development transformed the pyramid model of the press into a regional model of the press. As pointed out in Chapter 4.10 the circulation of the national press dropped to one third of the previous level between 1990 and 1994 while the regional newspapers preserved their circulation. This development becomes even clearer if the regional level and readership choices are analysed: the audience of many national newspapers is small and infrequent in comparison to the local press.

The shift from dailies to weeklies. A major change also occurred in the periodicity of the press. Before the backbone of the press were the daily newspapers which came out every day except Monday. Very rapidly after the collapse of the Soviet state and economic problems of the newspapers the dominant place was taken by weeklies. Statistically, a significant part is among the less frequent newspapers but these are mainly advertisement freesheets. A parallel phenomenon is the change in the form of delivery from subscription to the retail sales. This was an effective way in conditions of high inflation.

Pluralisation and popularisation of the local press. Although the press statistics fail to give a complete picture of the increase of newspaper choices in individual regions, there was a significant increase in the number of competing newspapers, at least at the level of regional capitals. This is clearly

visible in the Republic of Karelia (Chapter 5). In 1992, the traditional and new political newspapers (founded in 1990 and 1991) ran out of money because of economic reforms. Already in January 1992 the newspapers lacked a major part of the money needed for publication. The major part of the newspapers did not succeed in finding advertisement clients or sponsors and needed to collect a new subscription for the second half of the year, which resulted in the collapse of circulation.

The result was not only the collapse of the circulation of the old newspapers but also the flourishing of new newspapers. The new weekly newspapers were more sustainable against inflation: they could increase the cover price in pace with inflation and, boosted by retail marketing, they needed to orient more towards the needs of the largest possible public. The traditional newspapers on the other hand oriented either towards elite audiences (and tried to keep the remaining old readers) or lost their audience. In 1994 the new weeklies have taken the major part of the circulation and continued to grow while the traditional newspapers kept on declining.

Continued turmoil in the press market. The recent stabilisation of the economy and the political development have not caused any impact on the newspaper press. New newspapers have been launched almost every year and there has not been a major wave of bankruptcy yet. The press market is still in turmoil and although the audience begins to have some preferences (Chapter 6), no clear winner in the competition is so far visible. The press market is extremely open: less than one year after founding a new newspaper it may become one of the most popular ones (*Guberniya* was founded in May 1996 and it was the third most popular newspaper at the end of 1996).

Dependency on sponsors, authorities, but also increasing independence. The economic difficulties and the survival of economically unprofitable newspapers have made many newspapers dependent on sponsors, which are big companies, local authorities or businessmen. The state has funded only minority language newspapers and its own unpopular organ (*Kareliya*). In addition to this, there is also increasing reliance on the market, however reduced and poor it may still be. The most popular newspapers seem to survive without sponsorship money and may be even profitable (although this may be questionable and also depends on the definition of the concept of profitability). As paradoxical this may be, the most successful newspapers are those with the highest cover price and the cheaper newspapers have largely failed to attract either audience or advertising.

Pressures from authorities have intensified. The pressures from authorities have intensified after a short period of turmoil. In Karelia, the liberation of the press from Soviet structures occurred mainly without major

conflicts (the most important exception being the conflict over *Komsomolets* newspaper) and new newspapers remained free from outside control at the beginning. However, the stabilisation of the political structures has increased the pressures against the opposition press. This may have increased their popularity as well. Anyhow, it is important that the state is no longer a key player in the local media field. It is still an important player and it has means to exercise influence over most of the media, but on the other hand its powers are far from absolute and there are many ways to resist its control.

Structure of the audience. The results of the audience survey indicate that instead of the division between traditional quality (elite) and popular press, a better division would be newspapers for large and small audiences. The newspapers for large audience resemble the Western popular newspapers more than the newspapers for small audience resemble Western quality or elite papers.

Success of popular newspapers in all population groups. A most interesting feature of the audience structure is the success of popular newspapers in all categories of the population. There are no newspapers read only by workers or the lower classes but all the newspapers are more popular in the upper strata of society.

Age and gender as important dividers. Age and partly also gender are more important factors in the division of the audience between newspapers. Men prefer politically oriented newspapers, older men choose old newspapers more often while younger men prefer new opposition newspapers. Apolitical newspapers are mainly preferred by women.

There have also been several changes in journalism. The most important of them is the **increasing control of journalists over the newspaper text**. In the Soviet time a major part (two thirds) of the newspaper space was given to texts by outside authors or reserved for official texts. By publishing these texts, journalism opened a channel for outside voices but did not control or contextualise them.

Increasing popularity of professional news form. The professional format of the news based on a distinction between the voice of the text itself and reported speech was not unknown in the Soviet press but it was applied in only a few cases (mainly brief foreign news items), while it has become more common in the post-Soviet journalism. There are some elements of this professional news narration which are seemingly difficult for Russian journalism to adapt, like the writing of a separate comment beside a news story and reluctance to interpret the meanings of the sources or to translate the political and economic jargon into plain language.

Changing definition of social problems. In Soviet journalism social problems were defined in newspapers as something which were affecting 'us all' and which could be solved by common efforts and by fulfilling the political decisions, in which the newspaper could assist. In post-Soviet journalism problems mainly affect only some weak groups, caused by paradoxes which cannot be solved easily or exist because of the poor capability of the authorities.

Application of irony. Irony as a style has been one of the remarkable features of post-Soviet journalism. Irony has appeared when the political restrictions on journalism were lifted and also because the absurdities of the post-Soviet reality became visible.

Decreasing participation in the administration of society. The papers (even the state-funded ones) no longer publish verbatim the television interviews or speeches of the leaders, and the society of the press is not organised around campaigns for the press to have an important role in fulfilling the aims set by the authorities.

Diffusion of journalistic culture. The fact that the journalism of the Finnish-language *Karjalan Sanomat* has started to resemble Western practices more quickly than *Severnyi Kurier* indicates that the journalistic culture and innovations have been diffused from the West to Russia. The Russian language press is not free from outside influence either, since there are exchanges and contacts with foreign journalists and foreign journalism. For *Karjalan Sanomat* the adaptation of new practices is far easier (and not only because the major part of journalists have been replaced).

9.2. Concluding reflections

9.2.1. Journalism and the collapse of the Soviet system

Contrary to the claims of some other researchers the Soviet society did not collapse because of knowledge and information. New information (e.g. concerning Stalin etc.) which became public in the last few years of the Soviet power was not unknown for most of the Soviet public. The new element was that previously this information was transmitted through private networks while during *glasnost* it became public. This was, of course, an important change but more important was the style and nature of the coverage in the media. The new information on the past was not as important as was the new information on the present.

Even more important than the information was the increase of different opinions in the official media. Before both the flow of information and the range of expressed opinions were limited, but at the end of the 1980s these limits started to relax and disappear: it became possible to challenge the official points of view. This concerned e.g. nationality problems, which had traditionally been treated in a highly formalised way: the nationality question was resolved and the Soviet nationalities lived in peace and harmony. When the problems emerged in public the official policy was weak in its response to the challenges.

The findings of this study support the views of other researchers that *glasnost* was a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The analysis of newspaper texts reveals that the momentous effect of *glasnost* on Soviet society was not only because of the information the media started to transmit but also because of its Soviet-based role of as a social forum and tool in the administration of society in a way which would be impossible, or unthinkable, for a Western newspaper. During the *glasnost* era, the Soviet newspapers urged the people to discuss, to take part in reform policies and defined their own role only as a mediator of the discussion or one of the participants, but not the one reporting or framing the events or discussions.

All kinds of opinions appeared in public but there was little effort towards consensus or deliberation. The limited range of opinions expressed earlier made the system weak in responding to the challenge of public dissidence. Hence, it was not freedom of information which dismantled the Soviet Union but rather the freedom of opinions and the structure of journalism. It was important that Soviet journalism was based on the idea of public participation and even if this function was ritualised and formal in the decades before Gorbachev, the function was there and when it was liberated for an informal action, its impact was immense.

It would be tempting to argue that had the Soviet journalism been detached, dispassionate Western quality journalism or unpolitical, popular journalism, the effect would not have been as abrupt and intense as it was in the Soviet case. The way the Western media frames events and defines the real sense of what is going on, leaves little space for opposing views and the exchange of conflicting opinions.

In retrospect, it seems clear that the policy of *glasnost* was doomed to fail. The crisis of the Soviet system was so deep that even without *glasnost* the system would not have lasted much longer. With a prospering economy and general public faith in the reform of the social system, the effect of the

glasnost policy would not have been as disastrous as it was¹. The *glasnost* policy, however, precipitated the collapse by making the problems and exchange of opinions public. It abolished the fear of conflicting opinions and expressing of non-conformative views but it did not create a platform on which the opinions could be presented and solutions found in a way which would be constructive and useful for the system. The lesson of democracy was learned but not in a way which would have made possible the conservation of the Soviet system.

9.2.2. *Russian journalism and Western journalism*

This study has examined the “Westernisation” of the Russian press which, as has been shown, is progressing, but not divorced from the idea of “de-westernising media theory”. This study does not argue that the Western forms of journalism are necessarily the best or the only right ones. Rather the Western model has been used as an ideal type through which Russian reality is analysed. The development of Western journalism has been analysed as a part of a modern, market-based society and, as poor or degraded this form of journalism may be, it is the form which has historically developed, and been preserved, as a part of market economy and political democracy (however incomplete it may be in the practice). The Western forms of journalism might well be the best equipped for survival in a society in which media is based on commercial practices and detachment from political partisanship.

In many respects, current Russian journalism resembles the previous phases of Western journalism. As Jan Ekecrantz’s “unedited society” in Sweden in the year 1910, society is not edited, it is not organised into a text by a relatively autonomous journalism institution. The newspapers published outside information often without major editing. During the development of journalism the relationships between journalism and other institutions have changed: the previous text providers have become sources of news. (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994, 129.)

Objective news journalism is a result of a development which has gone through the finding of facts (in the 1830s), faith in facts (up to 1900), distrust

1 During the writing of this dissertation I lived four months in England at the end of 2000. By watching television news about the railway chaos caused by accidents and following speed limitation, I experienced a feeling of *déjà vu*: just as during the *glasnost* era in the Soviet Union, the reporter claimed that in the best case the trains will be running in time only after 20 years and urged the audience to report experiences of the trains. Anyhow, it is not likely that Britain will collapse in a decade.

in facts (in the first decades of the 1900s) and the finding of objectivity (in the 1920s) (Schudson 1978), and started as a commercial alternative in a highly competitive press market becoming a universally accepted way of producing journalism (Ekecrantz & Olsson 1994). There is also evidence that these forms of journalism have been invented first in some (Anglo-American) countries and then imported and spread to other countries (Chalaby 1996). This idea of the cultural diffusion of journalistic practices is also relevant in the case of Russia: compared with the other newspapers *Karjalan Sanomat* was surprisingly “Western” and news-oriented, which can be explained by the close co-operation of the newspaper with Finns.

The collapse of the previous position of journalists between the supervising Party and ideology on the one hand, and the links with the audience on the other has left them with a sense of complete freedom and a sense of serving nobody. Russian journalists are free, perhaps even more free than Western journalists although freedom of the press may be weaker in Russia. The control of journalists over the newspaper text is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of a professional form of journalism (as defined in contemporary Western tradition). When the journalists have first gained control over the text, they should, in the next stage, gain control inside the text.

The success of popular newspapers also offers interesting comparison with the success (usually much more limited) in some Western European countries. Kunelius interpreted it as an indicator of the crisis of the hard news genre and traditional journalism in general: “the news loses its meaning and credibility and journalism becomes something else (talk shows, tabloids and sensationalism redefines professionalism)” (Kunelius 1996, 295-296).

In Russia, as well as in many other countries (one example being Jordan, see Jones 2002) popular or tabloid journalism has been in the vanguard of democratisation and modernisation. Tabloid journalism may also provoke a backlash on the part of the regime. Tabloid journalism, being that part of journalism which is oriented toward those who are dependent and non-participant (Schudson 1978, 120), who do not control their lives but are controlled by the external conditions, is an excellent option in conditions of transition in which a large part of the population has lost direction and control over their lives.

The difference between popular and political journalism has also political consequences. While serious journalism provides a “certain kind of map of the structures of power, with which you can move in the system”, but only on the terms of the system, there is also “the ‘poetry’ of the popular news, offering huge insights, innovative moments and pleasures en route, but it is very

difficult to find from one place to another with a poem” (Kunelius 1996, 362).

This fits well with the crisis of journalism that has occurred in Russia. The old map of serious journalism has lost much of its value in the new conditions while popular journalism has prospered in post-Soviet Russia. The only problem is that a popular poem is a poor map if the task of journalism is to guide its audience in the system of politics and society in general. But if there is no system in which the audience could, or would need orientation, popular journalism may offer a reasonable solution. The result has also been the declining political participation and increasing mistrust in the political system. Even if the lack of the legitimacy of the system does not pose a threat to the survival of the post-Soviet social system, it may have a negative effect on the economic and political development.

9.2.3. Problem of professionalism

Lack of professionalism is often mentioned as one of the problems of post-Soviet journalism. In many comments of Russian scholars, this has to do with the collapse of Soviet professionalism, which could not survive in new conditions. Western observers for their part have typically pointed out deviations from the standards (often idealised) of Western journalism. However, it is important to remember that in the critical (Western) tradition media professionalism is seen as a strategic ritual used to reinforce the established order and promoted mainly by media management.

The problem of professionalism also has to do with the development of widely accepted, unitary professional culture which determines news values and the frames of the various stories. In Russia, there is so far no yet real, market-based competition which would also have an impact on the content of the papers. It seems that the failure to cover issues the other newspapers have reported is not felt to be a major mistake in Karelian newspapers and there is no need to imitate the others in the selection or coverage of the news.

The rules in journalism are seldom absolute: they can be broken if there is a good reason, but it seems that in Russia these rules can be broken more easily than in the West. The former Soviet rules have been broken and discredited and the new ones are not yet developed, widely accepted or internalised.

The formation of the new, unitary professional culture will, however, lead to the loss of originality, freedom of commentary and will make the newspapers more similar to each other. This development is by no means purely positive but also includes many drawbacks. The number of newspapers

will decrease as a result of economic competition but also as a result of increasing professionalisation and similarity between the newspapers. When the papers become similar to another, there is no longer any need or place for those of them with weaker economic possibilities.

It is interesting question whether this development could be opposed, or even more fundamentally, if it is necessary to oppose it. A professional, even tedious newspaper might appear as a loss for journalists of the Soviet (or Russian) tradition, but according to foreign examples it has been the best way to survive in the market.

However, the development of a professional news form may be difficult for a Russian journalist. Its application would mean a reduced capacity to express opinions and even reduced self-reliance in expressing facts. Journalists who learned to work in a different style would certainly experience a limited use of their capabilities and activity which is basically uncreative. Similar lamentations of the loss of elements once important in journalism have also been seen elsewhere. It should be noted that a transition to this kind of news form does not depend on journalists only, but needs institutions and people who are easily available and ready to comment and report facts.

9.2.4. Future of the press in Karelia and Russia

The findings of this study offer some material also for the appraisal of the future of the Russian press. Currently the Russian model with a great plurality of newspapers, wide readership of popular newspapers and age and gender-based newspaper choices does not resemble any other model. These models can, however, offer ideas for the future development of the Russian press.

It is clear that with economic growth the number of newspapers will decrease radically: after ten years there will be significantly fewer newspapers in Karelia and in Petrozavodsk than there are now, and after 20 years there will even fewer newspapers. The size of the Karelian market could perhaps not support more than one daily and one or two weekly newspapers although in addition to them some politically oriented minor newspaper may survive.

Guberniya has good chances of developing into an independent newspaper for Petrozavodsk and the surroundings although its major weakness may be the strong opposition position. *TVR-Panorama* may survive as a rural paper. There will be also a place for a daily newspaper, but whether this is one of the current ones or a completely new one remains to be seen. *Severnii Kurier* does not have the best chances because of its elderly readership.

In the future the competition between newspapers will become more intense together with the importance of the economic profits and changes in the cost structure of newspapers. Currently many costs are dependent on circulation and it is possible to gain profits even with smaller circulation.

It is also clear that bankruptcies and mergers of newspapers will be more common in the future than they have been in the past. Moderate economic conditions are paradoxically more suitable for supporting plural media, but with the increase of economic resources the chances of the secondary newspapers will weaken. The first to lose out are likely to be those papers which have the smallest circulation.

The British model with plurality of newspapers structured according to the social class is rather unlikely in Russia. It is also likely that differences based on age and gender will diminish in the future. The Scandinavian model with strong regional quality newspapers is also rather an unlikely option, since it would require not only the prosperous economy but also equal division of income and unitary culture which the new economic divisions have destroyed. The American system with few newspapers having a monopoly in their localities and television as the only mass medium would be more likely. Still, the decline of newspapers has not yet occurred, rather the trend has been the recovery of the press despite economic difficulties. The Italian model with politicised press and relatively small audience is partly close to the contemporary Russian press, but Russia also has strong popular newspapers which are not politicised. The future of this model is unclear, because it would require strong political parties and political civil society, which is still rather weak in Russia.

The most likely option for Russia will be a mixture of elements. One of the most important and largely unclear developments will be the position of the national newspapers. Nowadays there are several genuinely national newspapers (not only those whose area of distribution falls inside the Moscow ring road) like *Komsomolskaya pravda*, *Argumenty i fakty* and *Izvestiya*, which also have regional editions. Currently, their audiences are small and irregular but if they can combine the local and national content they may pose a severe threat to the regional newspapers. This could also lead to the transformation of regional newspapers so that they would include more national and foreign news. So far the signs of such a development are very unclear.

In Russia the development of the local and regional press is going on in conditions in which television is the leading media and when it is economically viable to distribute advertising in freesheets. This makes Russia different from other (northern European) countries where the development of

the regional press started in a period when there was no television and when the dispersion of the population favoured subscribed press. It is unclear whether the former subscription-based distribution system of the press will be restored. Foreign examples may not give much hope of this. It is clear that the system of distribution will have an impact on the competition between newspapers and that established newspapers would profit from subscriptions while a retail sale-based system favours the breakthrough of new papers. The means used in competition will also certainly be different due to the system of distribution.

9.2.5. Press and society in Russia

The increasing plurality in the number of newspapers is clear and the choices among local newspapers are far greater than in the Soviet time. However, the plurality of channels does not necessarily increase the plurality of content, actually there are many examples where competition and increasing number of channels even decrease diversity. The Karelian case, however, is different. The newspapers differ significantly from one another and a large part of the audience follows many newspapers and can therefore get a reasonable picture of what is going on.

The result of the changes during the 1990s has been a de-politicisation of a major part of the press. The other part is divided between opposition press and the press subordinated to the authorities. The question of the political dependence of newspapers is a difficult one. There are signs of interference of political (and mixed political and business) interests in the editorial content of some newspapers, but there are also not only independent but also partisan opposition newspapers which cannot be influenced by the authorities.

Contemporary Russian political journalism is heavily political. It discusses, produces propaganda rather than informs, it is very outspoken in its comments, it makes people participants (and on the other hand excludes other people) and listeners of the political discourse (as opposed to spectators). This kind of journalism proclaims its connection to public, pays much attention to the letters to the editor and tries to be an advisor of the readers. The idea of influencing public affairs is kept alive and journalism tries to take a moral stand in public affairs. In this kind of political journalism there is no place for a rational choice to support another opponent. Only one truth is accepted. This strategy, however, has not proved to be successful, because the circulation of the old newspapers keeps on falling and the new, more entertaining and apolitical newspapers attract new readers. On the other hand, an oppositional role to the authorities has been a successful strategy, but this

had led to the fragmentation of the audience rather than the formation of a universal newspaper.

The financial dependence is still another problem. The information from the financial sources of Russian newspapers is not easily available (if available at all) and all the data is based on estimations only. The development of the advertising market in Russia has been rapid but the share of GNP used for advertising is still low and the share used on advertising in newspapers is lower than in many other Eastern European countries (see e.g. Pankin 1998). There are currently many alternatives for advertisers which even increase the threat of dependence: in monopoly conditions press alternatives are difficult to find even if the advertiser does not want to place his advertisement in the monopoly newspaper. On the other hand, there is also plurality of advertisers and the likelihood that all of them could be made to follow a single policy (e.g. not to advertise in opposition newspapers) is less than would be the case with few dominant advertisers.

The weakness of organised civil society has made politics a battleground for the elite. This has also had consequences for the media. In a society in which the intermediary sphere between private sphere and state is weak, the few available connections (like the media) with people become crucial for the politicians. The practice of giving space for candidates themselves can be explained by the role which politicians have in society. In contemporary Russia the words of the politicians "have such a status that they can be presented in the public sphere almost on their own", as Kunelius (1996, 176) said about the speeches of Finnish presidents in the early 1950s.

Many features of Soviet society and post-Soviet conditions made the development of clientelism a likely outcome of market reforms. With the development of the market economy clientelistic relationships are becoming more complex and the mixture of this and more liberal or civic forms of social organisation will develop, as has happened in other parts of the world. Therefore the Russian press is developing along the same trajectory as the press in other societies based on clientelism, but on the other hand the rise of the popular press undermines the influence of the political elite on the press.

Contemporary Russian journalism is based on the Soviet background, with the new solutions found during the economic, political and social crisis and the adaptation of Western examples. However, the availability of Western examples will not automatically lead to similar forms of journalism.

Compared with other Central and Eastern European post-socialist countries the Russian development has been slower in Westernisation but internally perhaps even more complex. One of the major distinguishing factors is that the role of foreign capital has been limited in Russia. While in Central

and Eastern Europe most of the main newspapers have been completely or partly owned by foreigners, even in a border region like Karelia, not a single newspaper has so far had any foreign ownership. In Russia the marketisation of the media has progressed more slowly and the journalists have not been as ready to accept ownership battles and market relations as elsewhere. The role of the state has also been different. In Estonia, for example, the role of the state has declined and the administration has been bureaucratised, while in Russia the weakness of the state is based rather on a lack of resources than a lack of desire to control.

Russian journalism is changing, but there is no single direction. Among the several directions in which Russian journalism is going can be found, at first, the advocacy journalism represented by overtly political newspapers and some partisan journalists and stories inside the main press. The second direction comes close to western public journalism, which gives the ordinary people a voice or a civic platform. This direction can be found in the important position given to the letters to the editor in *Severnõi Kurier*. The third direction is apolitical, entertainment journalism which can be found in the new newspapers. For these the elections were not a major issue.

Is it likely that Russian journalism will develop in the same direction as Western journalism? The factors behind the development of Western journalism — capitalism and market relations, the pressure of the market forces and increasing significance of consumerism — are phenomena which, with reasonable probability, will shape the development of Russian society as well. If the place of journalism in society is going to be the same as in Western Europe and North America — the mediator of information and creator of common ground in a highly diverse society — the development will in many ways follow Western models. From the points of view of marketing, for example, voluntary support to one candidate is unprofitable, first because of loss in potential circulation and second because of loss of revenue from political advertisement.

Attention should be paid to two further preconditions. First, professional news journalism seems to presuppose widely accepted common values, which give journalism the chance to speak in the name of us all. Actually, in reality these “common values” may be constructed by journalism or by the hegemonic ideology of society. In any case, when a society is divided (not fragmented as Western societies) as Russian society currently is and when there is no wide consensus on the basic issues of that society, all the issues become politicised. Second, professional news journalism which puts the sources and actors in “proper context” emerges typically after the sources (politicians, specialists) have lost their authority to speak directly to the

public and to define the frame in which reality is presented in journalism. In Russia politicians and other sources still enjoy considerable legitimacy and thus have the power to define reality in journalism.

Other options for the development of (press) journalism may also be possible. The role of television as the main source of news could restrict the development of newspapers (although this is not likely without significant localisation of television programming) so that newspapers may either remain political organs or sources of entertainment. Journalism may also remain dependent on narrow political and economic interests, which may result in a different kind of journalism, and a different place for journalism in society.

The Russian newspapers have not yet been commercialised, at least not all of them and not completely. This leaves more freedom and self-determination for the journalists which on the other hand have been controlled by the political or personal preferences of the owners, financiers and managers. However, such a situation leaves more freedom for journalists than would a market-controlled, commercialised press although in the latter case the sense of freedom might be greater.

The need to control journalists may also have something to do with the increased control of newspaper space by the journalists. In a society in which journalists had only one third of the paper at their disposal and much of the content was determined in advance there was no need to control what the journalists did with the remaining space. But when the leadership can no longer get their message directly to the people, there is a need to make sure that the message will be transmitted by maintaining the control over journalists. Moreover, this is necessary in a society in which journalists do not have a common professional culture and internalised rules of conduct, which would limit their freedom and ensure that the journalists support the status quo and the power elite.

9.2.6. Reflections on Western journalism

This study also dealt with Western journalism and reflected the author's attitude towards it. The author subscribes to the criticism of Western journalism as a decayed form of public participation in the process of modernisation. Yet it also has much in common with those who have pointed out positive sides of this development. Modern, professional journalism (without any positive connotation linked to these concepts) is a form of journalism which is particularly well suited for a pluralistic, fragmented but still coherent and well functioning society. In this sense journalism provides connections

between social institutions, and these connections do not work if the mediating instrument (journalism) is excessively partisan.

This criticism can certainly also be levelled at many Western media. Journalism takes sides, it is rarely neutral, although it may pose as such. The media companies' own interests and even more the conglomerates of which media are only one part, are hidden behind a façade of neutral argumentation and common sense. The main difference between Russian and Western journalism might be that in Russian journalism the expression of the self-interest of journalism is not done as professionally and therefore the aims of the media are more obvious.

One can only admire the ease with which Russian journalism may comment and rely on its own capability to present information without the need to cite anyone, who describes the real state of affairs, which journalism needs only to frame according to the internalised rules of the professional community.¹ On the other hand, Russian journalism is difficult to follow, and to believe, for a person accustomed to the ready-made, plausible news texts. Russian texts appear to present one view of news rather than the news event itself.

9.2.7. Reflections on the public sphere

Public sphere as an open, public sphere for the public use of reason (Splichal 2002) did not exist in the Soviet Union. During the *glasnost* era possibilities for the development of the public sphere were opened up but this development was reduced by the economic collapse which in Russia lasted into the second half of the 1990s. Market competition has provided more opportunities or freedom of expression in countries as diverse as in Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa and even the People's Republic of China (Lee 2000, 35). In Russia the case is much the same, but at the same time the market has brought with it new limitations which are perhaps more visible in a case like Russia, in which the transformation of the media system occurred in conditions of major economic crisis and decline. In Russia the number of new possibilities offered by the market has not been as great as in cases in which economic

1 Many Western journalists, including the present author having experienced that too, have difficulties in making commentaries based on facts which they themselves have found. The usual case is to find a source person to tell the facts in the way journalist would have liked to tell them himself and then frame these facts so that the original idea of the journalist are supported. For example, accident news is difficult for the same reason: a journalist should tell in his own words what happened, but even there it is possible to cite the police.

growth has continued during the transformation. In China the rise of popular journalism is an unintended social consequence of the market-oriented economic reforms (Li 1998, 321) as freedom of speech was an unintended consequence of political reform policies.

After the stabilisation of the post-Soviet social order there have been signs of a return to more authoritarian forms of administration and public communication, both on the regional and national levels. Constitutional freedom of expression may not be under serious threat but the freedom of the mainstream media to oppose the authorities have been diminished. In a sense this kind public sphere has much in common with the Finnish political sphere of the 1950s, in which journalism provided a forum for politicians.

The difference between the Finland of the 1950s and the Russia on the 1990s is, however, in the development of civil society, which is independent of the state. The Finnish public sphere was full of political and other organisation, class-based or other, which provided stable contexts out of which the people could produce interpretations of the political messages (Kunelius 1996, 191), while in Russia the fabric of civic organisations and stable positions of individuals is much weaker. Russian society also abounds in networks, but these networks are not political. Russian society and the political sphere are based on particularism and clientelism: the personal network of friends is more important than an interest-based organisation and the director of the company is a closer ally than a fellow worker or colleague in another company. Politics is based on individuals either supporting or opposing the current holder of power rather than class (ethnicity, etc.) based movements and therefore the newspapers have been reduced to one-way organs of these individuals rather than public forums for political discussion and organisation.

The development of political civil society is a more essential question for the prospects of democracy than the freedom of the press. Without civil society the press remains either a forum for politicians and their opponents or outside political power, which means not only an outside political power struggle, but also outside discussions on political solutions. The administrative resources used to promote the incumbent leadership cannot be counteracted simply by legislative means. Only a strong civil society which supports alternative views and opposition ideas can provide a necessary counter-weight to protect the opposition and alternative media from being marginalised and destroyed.

In Western history the newspapers have been an organic part of the formation and development of the political organisation, but in Russia such a development seems much more difficult since there are not (so far?) political

groups, ideologies or movements which have formed around newspapers.

It is important that the Russian journalists have gained remarkable power in comparison to the Soviet time. The competitive elections and political power based on the votes of the people have increased the power of information. Even if the incumbent has a significant advantage because of power resources, the votes are needed and all kind of outcomes are possible. Currently journalism may be largely subordinated because of a poor financial situation, but this may change rather quickly with economic growth and increase in advertising revenue. This can easily lead to economic dependency and market-driven journalism, which could significantly reduce the plurality of channels and voices in journalism.

However, the post-Soviet Russian press is characterised by the ease with which it approves the official points of view (as the Soviet journalism did as well) and it is even more respectful in its attitude toward the authorities. A new feature is that there is also an opposition press which challenge the authorities but does not offer any alternative programme to be realised. The organised civil society is also weak and the political opposition is based more on conflicts between oligarchs than social classes or political views.

This leaves Russian society in quite a difficult situation. The media may play an important role in the formation of civil society but cannot accomplish this alone. The elite is at least partly divided and this leaves some space for the masses to change leaders. The hope lies more in the development of civic organisations than in the development of opposition parties or opposition media. The time for organised opposition may come from below, with the organisation of the working class or civic interests not necessarily based on classes or from above as a consequence of a split among the elite. However weak these alternatives may be, there is some potential, and not only because of the plurality of the press. The challenge is whether this potential can be used before commercialisation inevitably reduces pluralism.

9.2.8. Reflections on modernity, media and Russia

The discussion on modernisation has become a new theoretical explanation after the collapse of Marxism in Russian social science. The peaceful and largely unexpected collapse has also given the modernisation paradigm new impetus in Western social science. This study has been based on the idea that the Soviet Union was a distorted or fake modern society which collapsed because Soviet modernising produced results which came to be increasingly incompatible with politically enforced pre-modern features. One of those

features was that economy was not monetarised, although modernity should not necessarily be connected with capitalism.

The idea of the start of a new cycle of modernisation after the collapse of the Soviet system has been evinced by several Russian scholars and there is reason to expect that the new modernisation will be more far-reaching than the previous one, because capitalism and monetary relations are now much more firmly established.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union was modernised incompletely, which can be seen to be largely behind the collapse of the Soviet system. After the collapse of the Soviet system remodernisation continues although some elements may rather represent a return to the pre-modern social forms (which had not disappeared in Soviet society). The process of remodernisation is not an easy one; the development may not be linear and the result of this modernisation may differ from the result of modernisation in the West. Nevertheless, the differences are likely to be smaller than those between Soviet society and the modern Western societies.

The question is not so much whether Russia can or should modernise itself but rather how it will modernise and what consequences this modernisation will entail. Russia will be linked more closely to the world economy and this will also have consequences in the media market. Because Russia does not have strong media companies of its own it is possible that foreign owners will acquire a major part of the media market in Russia as has happened in other Central and Eastern European countries. The greater size of Russia may slow down this development but it is not likely that it can halt it. Until recently economic and political uncertainty has kept foreign investors out, but there are signs of changes in this development. In the magazine market, which was not as developed in the Soviet Union, foreign owners (and even formats) have already taken a major part of the market.

It should not be forgotten that modernisation is not solely, or not even mainly, a positive process which will provide benefits for everybody. It is, in fact, at its worst, a process which will create new social divisions, leaving large parts of the population aside and benefit only few. Modernisation is more a process of compulsion and necessity than of freedom of choice and liberty. Therefore, it is no wonder that resistance to the modernisation process might be strong. In the positive case modernisation may benefit a larger and increasing part of the population and its negative effects may be cured but even then many may feel traditions a more promising alternative.

Media and modernisation are closely linked, as has been argued in Chapter 3. Kunelius (1998) has even called journalists “salesmen of modernity” and links, together with many others, the formation of professionalism to the

modernisation and division of labour and to the development and growth of the market. Professional communicators produce messages which do not necessarily have any relation to their own thoughts; they usually mediate someone else's ideas and objectivity of the message has become primarily a technical issue and not an issue of content (Kunelius 1998, 211-212). The transformation of journalism from political or literary activity to an activity of the professional communicator has significantly decreased the intellectual role of the journalist and reduced it to a largely technical activity. While in Russia (both before and during the Soviet era) journalists were often placed among intellectuals, in contemporary Western societies such would not be the case (even if the role of intellectuals is largely different).

9.2.9. Lessons from Russia

Finally, we may ask what lessons could be learned from the Russian case. This question has been posed several times in other fields of science (e.g. Kopecký & Mudde 2000; Grancelli 1995) and they seem to argue for more multidisciplinary approaches and the primary task "to understand the institutional and cultural legacy left by a regime in which two or three generations have been socialized" (Grancelli 1995, 37).

Some attempts have also been made to define lessons of Russia in the light of media theory (Downing 1995; Gunther & Mughan 2000; Nordenstreng & Pietiläinen 1999; Nordenstreng 2001) and this approach has been more latently present in some other studies (e.g. Sparks 2000 and 2001; Jakubowicz 2001). This brings us to the idea of systemic continuity which counteracts the ideas of transition and rapid shift from one system to another (Nordenstreng 2001, 220). As Sparks has argued both during the communist system and after its fall, media "are still large-scale, hierarchically organized, bureaucratic establishments in which there are elaborate procedures for ensuring acquiescence to the will of the directorate" (Sparks 2000, 45). Naturally there were differences but in general more time is needed for the modernisation process to be completed, there is no single or rapid way to "return to the Western world" (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1997).

The impact of the press during the *glasnost* era was an excellent case of the power of the media in undermining the existing political system under conditions where society is not prepared to tolerate dissenting views and opinions. This lesson, however, may appear to be too particular, applicable only to the Soviet case, so particular and special were the functions of the media in the Soviet system. It is hardly likely that similar cases would occur elsewhere and it is unlikely that journalists in other societies would transform

the pages of their newspapers into public discussion channels and that this exchange of opinions would appear to be harmful for the legitimacy of a social system. In China, where some scholars like Colin Sparks (2001) have expected a possibility for free media after the collapse of the contemporary social system, market control has already been established before the collapse of Party control.

The first post-Soviet decade offers an example of the transformation after the collapse of the Soviet system. The media were important at the beginning of the democratisation development but later the role of the media decreased in this, not only or even mainly because of journalism and media themselves but because of the poor development of civil society. There are few mass-based political movements or other organisations and journalism has had only a diminished function as the tribune and organ of a political movement. Political journalism has been reduced to mostly one-way transmission of messages from a political leader to the citizens. In point of fact, journalism cannot create civil society out of nothing; however its role in strengthening the emerging public forms of civil society may be important. By giving civil organisations a voice journalism could assist them in making their claims public and making the organisations themselves known among the people, but first these organisations must be in existence.

Close relations between politicians and the media are not unique in Russia but can be understood in the framework of a more general system of clientelism. In Russia as elsewhere this system is under pressure from globalisation and marketisation processes and these market mechanisms affect the media in Russia in much the same way as elsewhere.

One of the indigenous factors in Russia has been the traditional role of the intelligentsia in promoting social and political change. This has resulted a conviction-driven journalism in which media and journalists are most likely to be mere mouthpieces of whoever owns or controls particular media outlets, while the audience has been assigned mostly the roles of followers and 'pupils'. Thus, the professionalisation of journalists both as a group and as individuals should include the rejection of the messianic vocation. They should become an autonomous group serving the public and not the authorities or some ideology (Jakubowicz 2001, 75; Šolkay 1998).

The conditions under which the Russian regional press is developing could be defined as post-modern. The unitary culture has in many respects vanished with the collapse of the Soviet system and the divisions (class etc.) which have been so important in the development of modern societies in the West are not politically articulated. There are few media which support the

right of the unprivileged groups to express their views in public in accordance with the honourable traditions of the political press.

Such a situation may make the dangers of commercialisation even greater than they have been in the West. If the commercialisation of the modern mass media in the West “have created a new type of ‘public’ which is largely depoliticized, commercialized and excluded from public deliberation” (Splichal 2000, 29), there may be no hope that the situation will be any better in Russia. In the West, the commercialisation of journalism has given rise to concerns about the future of journalism and there has even been talk about “the end of journalism” as journalism is being replaced by a commercial solution (Hardt 1996). Russian journalism is today in better shape than it was during the Soviet era and it is certainly far too early to speak about the end of journalism in Russia.

Despite the increasing commercialisation and monetarisation of society compared to the Soviet time, some features of the Russia of the 1990s resemble societies in a relatively early stage of modernisation. For example, the number of newspapers has increased and a permanent decline has not yet started. The structure of the press is still in turmoil and the success of new papers does not immediately lead to the closure of old ones. In any case, Western examples indicate that in cities of over 280,000 people only rarely do more than one or two major newspapers survive. With reasonable confidence it can be said that this will be the case in Russia as well.

The Russian case, and more particularly the Karelian case, demonstrates that the plurality of the press is at the highest level in conditions where market relations are not completely developed and where newspaper publishing is not completely regulated by economic factors. The improvement in the standards of living and better economic possibilities, parallel to the development of the advertising market, will not offer better possibilities for most of the newspapers but better possibilities only for some and worse possibilities for others.

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Tiivistelmä

Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee muutoksia, joita venäläisessä sanomalehdistössä tapahtui 1980-luvun lopun poliittisten reformien aikana ja Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. Tutkimus kohdistuu alueelliselle tasolle ja tarkastelee Karjalan tasavaltaa esimerkkitapauksena.

Neuvostojärjestelmän hajoamisen myötä entinen lehdistörakenne, jossa johtavassa asemassa olivat valtakunnalliset lehdet, hajosi ja alueelliset lehdet, jotka säilyttivät levikkinsä paremmin, tulivat lehdistön tärkeimmäksi osaksi. Alueellisella tasolla muodostui uudenlainen lehtienvälinen kilpailu ja lehdistön moninaisuus. Esimerkiksi Karjalassa venäjänkielisten aluelehtien määrä kasvoi kahdesta yhteentoista ja suomen- ja karjalankielisten lehtien määrä yhdestä kolmeen. Kehitys on ollut samanlaista muillakin alueilla. Lehtien julkaisemisessa eri alueilla havaittujen erojen syinä ovat niin entiset perinteet lehtien julkaisemisessa, kansalaisyhteiskunnan kehitys kuin taloudellinen hyvinvointikin.

Teoreettisesti tutkimus perustuu ajatukseen siitä, että neuvostoyhteiskunta oli epätäydellisesti moderni ja sen modernit piirteet, kuten joukkotiedotusvälineiden runsas käyttö, olivat osaksi pinnallisia rituaaleja ja niiden modernisoiva vaikutus jäi puutteelliseksi yhteiskunnan esimodernien piirteiden aiheuttamien rajoitusten vuoksi. Yksi neuvostojärjestelmän hajoamisen syistä oli se, että järjestelmä ei neuvostoaajan erityinen, epätäydellinen modernisaatio ei kyennyt käsittelemään niitä paineita, joita modernisaatiokehitys aiheutti. Neuvostojärjestelmän hajoamisen jälkeen modernisaation uusi kierros on alkamassa vaikkakin talouden ja modernisaation pakotettujen muotojen romahdus on vahvistanut perinteisiä elementtejä.

Tiedotusvälineillä oli tärkeä rooli neuvostojärjestelmän hajoamisessa ja tämä tutkimus väittää, että tieto ei ollut yksinomaan järjestelmän hajoamisen taustalla vaan suurempi merkitys oli siinä miten tieto neuvostoyhteiskunnassa esitettiin. Kun lehdistö alkoi vuodesta 1985 lähtien toimia entistä paremmin neuvostojärjestelmän perinteiden mukaisesti osallistumalla yhteiskunnan rakentamiseen ja tarjoamalla tilaa erilaisille mielipiteille, se osallistui yhteiskuntajärjestelmän hajottamiseen. Järjestelmä ei kyennyt sopeutumaan eriäviin mielipiteisiin. On paradoksaalista, että jos neuvostolehdistö olisi toiminut länsimaisen journalistisen käytännön mukaisesti ja esittänyt tiedon niin, että se jättää yleisön katsomoon, poliittisen prosessin ulkopuolelle, neuvostojärjestelmän hajoaminen ei olisi tapahtunut yhtä äkillisesti.

Neuvostoliitossa ei kyennyt kehittymään erityistä journalistista sfääriä vaan journalismi oli sekä poliittisen että kirjallisen toiminnan osa. Neuvostoliiton jälkeisessä oloissa journalistisen sfäärin kehittymismahdollisuudet ovat paremmat vaikkakin monissa Keski- ja Itä-Euroopan maissa läntisen moderni sanomalehti ja moderni uutismuoto ovat kehittyneet nopeammin. Yksi syistä on siinä, että ulkomainen omistus, joka on tuonut muihin alueen maihin mukanaan länsimaisia toimintamalleja ja -tapoja, on jäänyt Venäjällä hyvin vähäiseksi. Lisäksi omaperäisillä journalismin muodoilla on Venäjällä pidempi historia eikä niiden voida odottaa muuttuvan yhtä nopeasti.

Myös poliittisen järjestelmän ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan kehityksellä on vaikutuksensa: journalismi, joka perustuu sitaatteihin ja niiden tulkintaan yleisestä maalaisjärjen näkökulmasta, voi kehittyä vain oloissa, joissa lähdeorganisaatiota ja kommentteja on helposti saatavana, ja joissa vallitsee yleisesti hyväksytty, yhteinen tulkintatapa. Nämä olosuhteet ovat toistaiseksi heikosti kehittyneet Venäjällä. Myös sillä on merkitystä, että vanhan koulukunnan toimittajien parissa uusien kantaaottamattomien ja standardisoitujen muotojen omaksuminen koetaan menetyksenä. Venäläinen journalismi on omaksunut vaikutteita ulkomailta mistä osoituksena on esimerkiksi se, että Karjalan Sanomat on alkanut muistuttaa länsimaista journalismia nopeammin kuin venäjänkieliset lehdet.

Petroskoissa helmikuussa 2000 kootun kyselytutkimusaineiston mukaan yleisö on selvästi jakautunut iän mukaan sekä vähemmässä määrin sukupuolen mukaan. Skandaalinhakuinen, oppositiossa oleva lehti on osoittautunut menestyksekkäimmäksi lehtityypiksi, kun taas niin vanhat kuin uudet eliitteihin vetoavat "laatulehdet" saavuttavat vain pienen osan yleisöstä.

Journalismin muutoksen tarkastelu kahdessa sanomalehdessä osoittaa että toimittajat ovat saaneet journalistisen tekstin tuottamisen selvästi valvontaansa. Neuvostoaikana sanomalehdet olivat täynnä ulkopuolista kirjoittajien juttuja ja lyhyen glasnostin ajan aikana lukijakirjeillä oli keskeinen rooli. Toisaalta, erilaisten tekstuaalisten rakenteiden joukossa professionaali uutismuoto on saanut enemmän suosiota vaikkakin kantaaottamaton monologi ja juttutyyppejä, jossa lähteiden siteeraaminen ja toimittajan kommentit on yhdistetty ovat edelleen suosiossa. Ainoastaan pelkästään vierasta puhetta sisältävät tekstit ovat selvästi vähentyneet.

English summary

This study explores the changes which took place in the Russian press and journalism during the period of political reforms (1985-1991) and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The study is focused on the regional level and uses the Republic of Karelia as a case.

With the collapse of the Soviet system, the former press structure with dominant national newspapers collapsed and the regional newspapers, which preserved their circulation better, became the most important part of the press. At the regional level, a new kind of competition and pluralism emerged. For example, in Karelia the number of regional newspapers published in Russian grew from two to eleven and in the number of those in Finnish or Karelian from one to three. The development has been similar in other regions as well. According to an analysis of factors influencing the local newspaper publishing the circulation of local newspapers is higher in areas with the earlier traditions of newspaper publishing, the development of civil society and the economic welfare.

Theoretically the study is based on the notion that the Soviet Union was a fake modern society and its modern features, like the extensive use of mass media, were partly rituals with little modernising impact. One of the reasons behind the collapse of the Soviet system was that the peculiar, incomplete modernisation of the Soviet era could not handle the pressures caused by the modernising development. After the collapse of the Soviet system a new round of modernisation is beginning although the collapse of economy and the forced forms of modernisation have also strengthened the traditional elements.

The media had an important role in the collapse of the Soviet system and this study argues that it was not only the information itself which assisted in the collapse of the society but that the way in which the media presented that information was also important in discrediting the former system. After 1985, the Soviet media started to realise the traditional slogans of the media's participation in the construction of the society and offering space for various views. In so doing the press actually participated in the destruction of the social system, which was not equipped to adjust to conflicting opinions. Paradoxically, if Soviet journalism had functioned according to the Western journalistic practice of presenting the information in a way which leaves readers in a detached and non-participant relationship to politics, the collapse of the Soviet system would not have been so sudden.

In the Soviet Union, no proper journalistic sphere could develop; journalism was an extension of both political and literary spheres. In the post-Soviet conditions the possibilities for its development are better but in many other Central and Eastern European countries the development of Western-type modern newspaper and modern news form has been more rapid. One of the reasons for this is that Russia has so far also remained outside major Western investments in the media sector which in other Central and Eastern European countries has been accompanied with imported formats and models of making journalism. Moreover, Russia has longer traditions in endogenous forms of journalism which could not be expected to change as rapidly.

The problems with the development of civil society and political system also play a role: journalism based on quotations and interpretation from the universal, commonsense point of view can develop only in conditions in which source organisations and comments are easily available and where a widely accepted common sense point of view exists. These conditions are so far poorly developed in Russia. It is also important that among the old school of journalists the adaptation of detached and standardised forms of journalism has been seen as a loss. There is some evidence that journalism has adopted practices from abroad, for example, the Finnish-language *Karjalan Sanomat* started to resemble Western journalism more rapidly than Russian newspapers.

According to a survey conducted in Petrozavodsk in February 2000 the audience is clearly divided on the basis of age and partly on the basis of gender. The scandalous, oppositional newspaper has proven to be the most popular and successful part of the press, while the old and new “quality”, elite-oriented newspapers appeal to only small part of the audience.

An empirical examination of journalism in two newspapers indicates that journalists have gained clear control of the production of newspaper text. In the Soviet era the newspapers were filled with articles by outside authors and official texts, while during a short period of *glasnost* the letters to the editor played an important role. On the other hand, journalistic control has not become complete inside the texts. Among the different textual strategies the professional news form has received more popularity although non-commentary monologue and a news form in which the citations from the sources are mixed with the comments by journalist are still common. Only the texts written solely by outside authors have clearly lost their share in the newspapers.

Resumo en Esperanto

Tiu ĉi studo esploras ŝanĝojn kiuj okazis en la rusa gazetaro dum la politikaj reformoj fine de la 1980-aj jaroj kaj post la kolapso de la soveta sistemo. La fokuso de la studo estas sur la regiona nivelo kaj ĝi uzas la respublikon Karelio kiel kazon.

Post la kolapso de la soveta sistemo kolapsis ankaŭ la antaŭa gazetara strukturo, en kiu la dominan rolon havis la tutlanda gazetaro. La regionaj gazetoj, kiuj konservis pli bone sian cirkuladon fariĝis la plej grava parto de la gazetaro. Sur la regiona nivelo formiĝis novtipa konkurenco inter gazetoj kaj gazetara plureco. Ekzemple, en Karelio la nombro de ruslingvaj regionaj gazetoj kreskis de du ĝis 11 kaj la nombro de gazetoj en la finna aŭ la karela de unu ĝis tri. Simila evoluo okazis ankaŭ en aliaj regionoj.

Teorie la studo baziĝas al la ideo, ke Sovetio estis nekomplete, false, moderna kaj ĝiaj modernaj trajtoj (kiel amasa uzo de amaskomunikiloj) estis parte supraĵaj ritoj kies moderniga influo estis malhelpata de antaŭmodernaj sociaj obstakloj. Unu el la kialoj malantaŭ la kolapso de la soveta sistemo estis, ke la stranga, nekompleta moderniĝo de la soveta epoko ne povis rezisti premojn kaŭzitaĵn de tiu sama moderniĝo. Post la kolapso de la soveta sistemo nova ciklo de moderniĝo komenciĝis kvankam la kolapso de la ekonomio kaj de la truditaj formoj de moderniĝo fortigis ankaŭ la tradiciajn ecojn de la socio.

Amaskomunikiloj havis gravan rolon en la kolapso de la soveta sistemo kaj tiu ĉi studo emfazas ke ne nur la informo mem sed ankaŭ la maniero en kiu la komunikiloj prezentis tiujn informojn gravis en la diskreditiĝo de la antaŭa sistemo. Sekvante la sovetan tradicion de partopreno en la konstruado de la socio kaj donante spacon al diversaj opinioj (kio tamen ne estis realigita en Sovetio antaŭ 1985), la gazetaro fakte partoprenis en la malkonstruado de la socia sistemo kiu ne kapablis ensorbi malkonsentajn kaj konfliktajn opiniojn. Paradoxse, se la soveta ĵurnalistiko estus funkcianta laŭ la okcidenta ĵurnalisma praktiko, en kiu la informoj estas prezentataj en maniero, kiu lasas la publikon kiel spektantojn, ekster la politika procezo, la kolapso de la soveta sistemo estus eble okazinta malpli abrupte.

En Sovetunio propra sfero de ĵurnalismo ne kapablis evolui ĉar ĵurnalistiko estis aldona parto de la literatura kaj politika sferoj. En la post-sovetaj kondiĉoj la eblecoj por la evoluo de tiu sfero estas pli bonaj sed en multaj aliaj landoj de Centra kaj Orienta Eŭropo la okcident-tipa moderna gazeto kaj ĵurnalistiko evoluis pli rapide. Unu el la kialoj estas, ke

Ruslando ĝis nun restis grandparte ekster signifaj okcidentaj investoj en la amaskomunikilojn. En aliaj landoj de la Centra kaj Orienta Eŭropo investoj kunportis eksterlandajn formatojn kaj modelojn por produkti ĵurnalismen. Krome Ruslando havas pli longan tradicion de propraj formoj de ĵurnalismo, kiuj ne malaperas rapide.

Ankaŭ la problemoj en la evoluo de civila socio kaj politika sistemo havas influon: ĵurnalisma praktiko, kiu baziĝas sur citado kaj interpretado de tiuj citaĵoj el komunsenca vidpunkto povas evolui nur en kondiĉoj, kie font-organizoj kaj komentoj estas facile haveblaj kaj kie vaste akceptata, komuna vidpunkto ekzistas. Ĝis nun tiuj kondiĉoj evoluis malbone en Ruslando. Krome la malnova skolo de ĵurnalistoj opinias la akcepton de la senidentiga kaj normigita formo de ĵurnalismo kiel perdon.

La unua ĉapitro prezentas la temon de la studo kaj analizas la defion kiun la Ruslanda realo ofertas por la sociscienca esplorado.

La dua ĉapitro pritraktas teorion de moderniĝo kaj reflektas la taŭgecon de la koncepto "moderna" en sovetaj kaj rusaj kondiĉoj kaj atentis la ruslandan diskuton pri moderniĝo kiel nova baza teorio en la eksplikado de la evoluo de la ruslanda socio.

La tria ĉapitro resumas la ideojn de lastatempaj studoj pri la evoluo de ĵurnalistiko kaj ĝiajn ligojn kun la moderniĝo ĝenerale. La ĉapitro prezentas ankaŭ tiujn konceptojn kaj vidpunktojn laŭ kiuj tiu ĉi studo analizas la ruslandan ĵurnalismen.

La kvara ĉapitro resumas la evoluon de la gazetaro en Sovetio kaj la ŝanĝojn post la kolapso sur ĝenerala nivelo. La ĉapitro enhavas ankaŭ analizon de la faktoroj influantaj la evoluon de la gazetaro en diversaj regionoj. La rezultoj indikas ke la loka eldonado de gazetoj havas ligojn kun la antaŭaj tradicioj de gazet-eldonado, kun la evoluo de la civila socio kaj kun la ekonomia bonfarto.

La kvina ĉapitro atentis la evoluon de gazetaro en Petrozavodsko, ĉefurbo de Karelio, de 1985 ĝis 2001. Dum tiuj ĉi 16 jaroj la gazetaro transformiĝis de malgranda nombro da relative oftaj gazetoj (3 aŭ 6 foje semajne) al granda nombro da ĉefe semajnaj gazetoj. En tiu ĉi ĉapitro la ĉefa fokuso estas ĉe la struktura ŝanĝiĝo de la gazetaro kaj en la ŝanĝoj, kiuj okazis ĉe individuaj gazetoj.

La sesa ĉapitro prezentas la nuntempan staton de la gazetaro en Petrozavodsko. Ĝi enhavas kritikan ekzamenon de statistikaj metodoj analizantaj la konkurencon inter la gazetoj kaj proponas novajn vojojn por analizi konkurencon. Ĝi prezentas ankaŭ la strukturon de la publiko de diversaj gazetoj kaj analizas kiel la legado de tiuj gazetoj estas strukturita en novaj kondiĉoj. La ĉapitro baziĝas al intervjuoj de 508 civitanoj en Petrozavodsko en februaro 2000. La tasko de tiu ĉi ĉapitro estas ankaŭ testi

diversajn statistikajn metodojn en la analizo de gazetlegado. La rezultoj indikas ke la publiko estas klare dividita surbaze de la aĝo (la maljunuloj legas malnovajn gazetojn, dum la junuloj ĉefe legas nur la novajn) kaj parte surbaze de la sekso. Skandalemaj, opoziciaj gazetoj pruvigis la plej populara kaj sukcesa tipo de gazetoj, dum la malnovaj “kvalitaj”, elit-orientitaj gazetoj altiras nur malgrandan parton de la legantaro. La divido surbaze de socia klaso ne estas same klara kiel ekzemple en Britio.

La sepa ĉapitro prezentas empirian analizon de la ĵurnalistiko en du gazetoj, unu publikigita en la rusa kaj la alia en la finna de 1985 ĝis 1999. Samplo de gazetoj de du semajnoj estas kolektita de ĉiu nepara jaro. La ĉapitro prezentas la enhavon kaj ŝanĝojn en tiuj gazetoj ĝenerale, i.a. prezentante la strukturon de la gazeto kaj la fontojn de ĝiaj artikoloj.

La oka ĉapitro profundigas en la strukturon de ĵurnalistiko kaj kvante kaj kvalite. En la fokuso estas temoj, geografia orientiĝo kaj la tempo de la artikoloj, prezentado de la sociaj problemoj en ili kaj narativaj strukturoj de la tekstoj. La rezultoj indikas ke ĵurnalistoj akiris klaran regon super la produktado de gazetara teksto. En la soveta tempo la gazetoj estis plenigitaj per artikoloj de eksteraj aŭtoroj kaj de oficialaj tekstoj, kaj dum la mallonga periodo de glasnosto la leteroj de legantoj havis gravan rolon. Inter la tekstaj strategioj la profesia novaĵ-formo ricevis pli da populareco, kvankam plu popularas ankaŭ senkomenta monologo kaj novaĵ-formo en kiu la citata parolo estis miksitaj kun la komento de la ĵurnalistoj. Nur la kvanto de komplete neredaktita fremda voĉo klare perdis sian pozicion en la gazetoj.

La naŭa ĉapitro sumigas la eltrovojn kaj ligas ilin kun la moderniĝo, la evoluo de la ĵurnalisa sfero aliloke, la ĵurnalisa historio kaj la publika sfero.

Юкка Пиетилайнен

РЕЗЮМЕ

Данное исследование посвящено изменениям, происшедшим в российских газетах и журналистике, в целом, в период политических реформ (1985-1991 гг.) и после распада Советского Союза. Исследование сфокусировано на прессе регионального уровня, а именно, на Карелии.

С распадом советской власти прежняя структура прессы, главным образом, центральной, также распалась, и местные газеты, сумевшие сохранить свои тиражи, стали более важной частью прессы. На региональном уровне возросли такие новые для всех явления, как разнообразие изданий и конкуренция между ними. К примеру, в Карелии количество республиканских газет на русском языке увеличилось с 2 до 11, а на финском и карельском – с одной до трех. Подобное развитие наблюдалось также и в других регионах.

Теоретически исследование строится на идее, согласно которой Советский Союз представлял собой незавершенно-модернизированное общество и, соответственно, характеристики этой модернизации (такие как традиционно активное использование аудиторией средств массовой информации) представляли, в определенной степени, ритуальную сторону функционирования этого общества, а само модернизирующее воздействие было ограниченным. Одной из причин разрушения советской системы было то, что она даже в условиях подобной неполной модернизации, начавшейся еще в Советскую эпоху, не смогла управлять процессами развития, вытекающими из данной модернизации. После распада советской власти начался новый цикл модернизации, хотя развал экономики и несостоятельность поверхностных форм модернизации усиливали традиционные уклады в обществе.

Средства массовой информации (СМИ) также играли важную роль в деструктуризации советской системы, и в данном исследовании показано, что не только информация как таковая способствовала распаду общества, но важную роль в дискредитации бывшей системы также сыграли и способы ее подачи. После 1985г. советские СМИ начали на практике следовать традиционно звучавшим и ранее лозунгам, призывавшим прессу к участию в дальнейшем построении общества и отражению в изданиях различных точек зрения. Тем самым, пресса фактически непосредственно участвовала в

разрушении общественной системы, которая не была готова принять и усвоить конфликтующие с ней оценки и подходы.

Как это ни парадоксально, но представляется несомненным, что если бы советская журналистика функционировала по западному образцу, когда подача информации делается так, чтобы всячески удержать читателя в стороне от политики и отвлечь от участия в ней, то распад Советской системы не был бы таким обвальным, если не неизбежным вообще.

Сфера журналистики в Советском Союзе развиваться не могла, но журналистская деятельность приняла политические и литературные формы общественного сознания. В условиях пост-советской активности возможности для развития этой сферы представляются лучшими, но во многих странах Центральной и Восточной Европы развитие современных новостных и, в целом, газетных форм по западному образцу осуществлялось гораздо более быстрыми темпами. Одна из причин такого отставания объясняется тем, что Россия до сих пор остается лишенной западных инвестиций, которые осуществляются в сектор СМИ стран Восточной и Центральной Европы одновременно с «экспортом» журналистских технологий, стандартов и моделей. В России, к тому же, существуют давние традиции своей, отечественной журналистики, которые не могут измениться в течение короткого промежутка времени.

Процессы развития СМИ обусловлены также проблемами становления гражданского общества и политической системы: журналистика, основанная на цитировании и эксплуатации общепринятого мнения, может развиваться только в условиях, когда действительно существуют всеобщие ценности и когда источники информации – организации и личности – легко доступны. До настоящего времени такие условия в пост-советской России практически отсутствуют. Важно и то, что среди журналистов старой школы переход к формам независимой и стандартизированной журналистики был воспринят как собственное поражение. Тем не менее, есть основания считать, что журналистика в России перенимала зарубежную практику, как это имело место, к примеру, в финноязычной газете *Карьялан Саномат*, начавшей походить на западное издание ранее, чем русскоязычные газеты Республики Карелия.

В первой главе диссертации представлен предмет исследования, а также изложен анализ российских реальностей, динамика которых служит объектом такого социального исследования.

Во второй главе рассматриваются теория модернизации и применимость концепции современности («модернити») к советским

и российским условиям. Особое внимание уделено в главе имевшимся в российском обществе дискуссиям относительно модернизации как объяснительной силы тех изменений, которые в российской действительности воспринимались как факторы поступательного развития.

В третьей главе обобщается имеющийся в литературе вопроса опыт изучения общего развития журналистики и ее связи с развитием модернизации в целом. В этой главе представлены концепции и точки зрения, на основе которых в данном исследовании осуществляется анализ российской журналистики.

В четвертой главе подытоживается развитие прессы в Советском Союзе и на общем уровне рассматриваются изменения в ней после распада советской государственности. В главе также содержится анализ факторов влияния на развитие региональной прессы на примерах ряда регионов. Исходя из результатов этого анализа делается вывод, что издание местных газет связано с такими основными факторами, как опора на старые традиции в газетно-издательском деле, уровень развития гражданского общества и уровень благосостояния в нем.

Пятая глава посвящена анализу газетной прессы, издававшейся в период с 1985 по 2001 годы в Петрозаводске, столице Республики Карелия. В течение этих 16 лет пресса трансформировалась из СМИ с небольшим количеством наименований с достаточно частой периодичностью выхода в свет (от 3 до 6 раз в неделю) в значительное количество газетных изданий преобладающе еженедельного типа. В этой главе основное внимание сфокусировано на структурных изменениях прессы и на изменениях, происшедших в конкретных газетных изданиях.

В шестой главе рассматривается нынешнее положение газетной прессы в Петрозаводске. Здесь содержится критический обзор методов статистического анализа конкурентоспособности газет на свободном рынке и предлагаются новые подходы к подобным статистическим задачам. В этой главе также исследована структура читательской аудитории различных газет и показано то место, которое занимает чтение газет на новом этапе расстановки СМИ в системе общественных институтов. Глава построена на практическом исследовании, осуществленном в Петрозаводске в феврале 2000 г. В данной главе также решалась задача выявления применимости различных статистико-аналитических методов при изучении структуры чтения со стороны аудитории. По результатам анализа выявлено, что читательская аудитория четко делится по возрастному признаку (представители старшего поколения предпочитают старые

газеты, в то время как молодые читают, главным образом, новую прессу) и частично по половому признаку. При этом, скандальные и оппозиционные газеты доказали свою наибольшую популярность среди всей прессы, в то время как старые издания и новые «качественные» газеты, ориентированные на элитарного читателя, имеют лишь небольшое количество приверженцев. Структура же аудитории по социально-классовому признаку выглядит не так отчетливо, как это, например, наблюдается в Британии.

Седьмая глава посвящена анализу изменений в журналистике на материале двух наименований газет, за период с 1985 по 1999 гг., одна из которых издавалась на русском, а другая – на финском языке. Материалом здесь явилась выборка двухнедельных выпусков данных газет за каждый нечетный год в течение указанного периода. В главе представлены содержание и изменения в этих газетах в целом. Результаты анализа свидетельствуют о полном контроле со стороны властей над содержанием газетных текстов. В советский период газеты были насыщены материалами авторов «со стороны» и официальными текстами, в короткий же период *гласности* важное место среди газетных материалов стали занимать письма читателей.

В восьмой главе материал исследован детально, с применением методов количественного и качественного анализа. Здесь основное внимание уделяется структуре газет, источникам газетных материалов, заголовкам, изложению социальных проблем и нарративной структуре текстов. Среди различных типов материалов и приемов их подачи наибольшую популярность приобрела новостная информация без комментариев, хотя свой удельный вес сохранили и материалы, в которых цитаты смешивались с комментарием журналиста, а также материалы, в которых авторский монолог следовал без каких-либо комментариев и ссылок на другие факты и точки зрения. Только тексты, написанные авторами со стороны, в проанализированных газетах значительно уступили свои позиции.

В девятой главе обобщается полученная картина и проводятся параллели и сопоставления с журналистикой и развитием журналистской деятельности в других странах, а также оценивается роль прессы в переходный период.