

7 Finland

From Curious Observer to Active Accommodator of the NPT Process

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Finland has always been like a docile sheep in the fold of power politics, a role usually destined for small powers.

— Risto Hyvärinen¹

Introduction

Finland was a late bloomer in the field of nuclear disarmament diplomacy. Until 1963, when the country proposed a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone (NNFZ), it avoided taking an active stance in matters related to nuclear weapons politics and disarmament. However, even this first shy proposal by President Urho Kekkonen was effectively a non-starter and it did not lead to any serious political consultations between the Nordic countries, not to mention the United States. Nevertheless, this opened new avenues to participate more forcefully in multilateral nuclear disarmament at the United Nations (UN). As the focus in international disarmament diplomacy shifted to questions of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban, key officials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry started to redirect their interest toward multilateral disarmament policies from 1964 onwards.

Unlike its older brother Sweden, who joined the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) already in 1962 and took an active role there with the lead of Alva Myrdal (see Thomas Jonter's chapter in this volume), Finland had to settle for its position as an observer state in Geneva. This position, however, was used rather extensively when certain new generation key officials from the Foreign Ministry such as Ilkka Pastinen, Max Jakobson, and Risto Hyvärinen realized that it was vital to increase expertise on issues related to disarmament and the arms race. It was thought that this could also turn out to be a ticket for Finland to improve its international status and credibility of its policy of neutralism. Indeed, Finnish representatives in Geneva participated actively in informal discussions with other delegations representing both ideological camps and the group of eight non-allied states within the ENDC.²

During the early 1960s, Finland's expertise on nuclear weapons and disarmament was nowhere near that of Sweden, which was able to use the know-how it got from its nascent nuclear weapons program diplomatically in Geneva.³

Documents from the archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry show that Finnish diplomats kept a particularly close eye on Sweden's activities and its role as a leader of the group of eight non-allied states at the ENDC. The practical conclusion made by the Finnish foreign policy elite was that Finland needed to develop its own disarmament profile—discernible enough from Sweden's disarmament activism—and put that into practice should the opportunity arise. Thus, from the mid-1960s onwards, Finland strove toward a more active role in multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy. In fact, whereas Sweden was critical of the profound power asymmetry and lack of equity in the architecture of the NPT (permanent division between recognized Nuclear Weapon States [NWS] and the rest), Finland focused on solidifying the international order led by the recognized nuclear powers, especially the two superpowers.

The main argument of this chapter is that Finland's policy line in the process leading to the signing of the NPT can be characterized as great power accommodation—or, in more abstract terms, accommodation of international order based on the key principle of *great power responsibility*. This policy objective can be traced back to the period after Finland's accession to the UN in 1955–56. During this period, key Finnish diplomat Ralph Enckell formulated a doctrine that would come to define Finland's stance toward multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy for years to come. The so-called Enckell Doctrine emphasized prudence and reticence; it was reasoned that Finland should abstain from taking a stance in any disarmament initiative that could likely cause friction between the great powers. During the 1960s, following President Kekkonen's turn toward more active foreign policy, the doctrine was implicitly reformulated—the idea was not anymore only to abstain from processes that might provoke great power confrontation but to actively support and strive toward processes and initiatives that would solidify great power consensus and, thus, stabilize the bipolar international order.

Indeed, the NPT process goes on to show that although the Finnish policy of neutrality was based on rather conservative tenets of great power accommodation, it did not necessarily lead to an evasive or overly cautious role. Finland did not accommodate great power interests at any cost. It based its policy on principled support for the rule-based international order and stabilization based on great power responsibility, albeit with a clear hierarchical understanding of status in international politics.⁴ It must be noted, though, that the stability-seeking and support for gradual disarmament were also tied to Finland's key national security interests. Especially important in this regard was that the NPT promised to solve the so-called German issue—that is, the prospect of nuclearized West Germany, something the Soviets had used as a boogeyman argument to coerce Finland by appealing to the 1948 Agreement of Friendship Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty).

On the domestic political level, the debate on Finnish foreign policy was tightly controlled by President Urho Kekkonen.⁵ The “harsh geopolitical realities”—that is, being de facto located in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence—meant Finland's latitude to maneuver was limited.⁶ In many ways,

its balancing between disarmament advocacy and great power accommodation during the NPT process was a result of practical reasoning stemming from a rather unique combination of small-state realism and liberalism.⁷ The evolution of Finland's role in the NPT negotiations is clear evidence of that. Helsinki changed from being a silent observer in the ENDC negotiations to a bridge-builder along two axes: in addition to supporting great power consensus, Finland served as a mediator between the "nuclear haves" and the "have-nots" in the final round of the negotiations at the UN in 1968—although with a clear ambition to support the joint US-USSR position against "the rest." This begs the question (especially when juxtaposed with the active and progressive style of diplomacy exercised by Sweden in the field of nuclear disarmament) of whether Finland truly was a 'neutral' country in the NPT process after all.

In conceptual terms, this harks back to the issue of what neutrality is and how it should be defined.⁸ On the basis of this analysis, Finland's policy of neutralism can be labeled as "aspirant" in nature, in contrast to constitutional, traditional, or political neutrality, for example. The maturity of the Finnish policy of neutralism was loosely anchored to the political undercurrents of great power politics, especially the general state of East-West relations, as well as Finland's own historical experiences (or the way the political elite interpreted these experiences). To understand the somewhat conditional status of Finnish Cold War neutralism, one needs to approach fuzzy concepts⁹ such as neutrality as a relational phenomenon that should be analyzed contextually. That is, neutrality is not a substance-like constant in international politics but actualized through the historically stratified interactions of the actors participating in the very practices that define the concrete meaning of the term in any given context.¹⁰

The following analysis of Finland's role in the NPT negotiations is based on existing historiography mostly available only in Finnish, memoirs of key decision-makers, and documents collected mainly from the archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry. The chapter first explains the (geo-)political context of Finnish foreign policy during the first half of the Cold War. Then follows a chronology, explicating the first formulations of Finnish nuclear disarmament policy (the so-called Enckell Doctrine) after Finland's accession to the UN in the latter half of the 1950s. Finally, the chapter describes how Finland's nuclear disarmament policy gradually evolved into a more active phase after President Kekkonen's 1963 NNFZ initiative, shifting Finnish diplomacy toward the multilateral arena from 1965 onwards. The "highlight" of this process was Finland's chairing of the group of sponsors for the joint US-USSR resolution at the UN, in 1968.

Finland's Policy of Neutralism in the Cold War

The Finnish conception of political neutrality always had pragmatic undercurrents. However, it did not fully mature into a shared element of societal identity.¹¹ Especially when compared to Sweden, the notion of political neutrality was more conditioned and instrumental in nature.¹² One can even discuss

whether Finland was a neutral country in the traditional sense, or merely ‘neutralized’ amid the post-World War realities.¹³

One of the key aspects of the conditional, instrumental, and aspirant nature of Finnish Cold War neutralism was the way its credibility as a political doctrine relied heavily on the general state of great power politics. The more dialogical and predictable the superpower relations were, the more credible Finland’s policy of neutralism was. This was mainly due to the FCMA Treaty effectively tying Finland’s geostrategic position to the Soviet sphere of influence and, thus, making Finland’s status sensitive to the fluctuations of great power relations. From the late 1950s onwards, this led to the key realization that Finland should only promote diplomatic processes that might open common ground between the great powers. This, then, would hopefully also increase predictability in Finland’s immediate security political environment.

Finland’s turn toward more active engagement in multilateral diplomacy on nuclear disarmament emerged only gradually during President Urho Kekkonen’s second term as president from 1962 onward. Before that, and under his predecessor, J. K. Paasikivi, nuclear weapons were rarely ever mentioned in public speeches or in Paasikivi’s diary entries.¹⁴ The harsh post-war geopolitical reality and “the years of danger” in domestic policy (stemming from the looming communist threat) forced the Finnish foreign policy leadership to concentrate on more fundamental concerns of small-state survival until the mid-1950s when the so-called Geneva spirit promised a more tranquil period in great power relations. Before the 1960s, there was no room for substantial efforts in the realm of multilateral diplomacy, including issues of disarmament.¹⁵ In fact, Finland was rather an object of disarmament, as exemplified in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty,¹⁶ which stipulated harsh sanctions on Finland, including both territorial concessions and war reparations to the Soviet Union. After the signing of the FCMA Treaty, Finland was also forced to opt out of the Marshall Plan, albeit the wording of the treaty was more favorable to Finland than similar treaties between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.¹⁷

The FCMA Treaty connected Finland’s right to self-defense with the obligation to repel an attack on or through Finnish territory against the Soviet Union. As historian Osmo Apunen explains, the FCMA “[...] expanded Finland’s traditional defence doctrine [by recognizing] a certain military interest of the Soviet Union in Finland, which had been rejected earlier as incompatible with sovereignty.”¹⁸ This proved to be a crucial political tripwire or “fuse” that linked Finland’s (geo)political position and defense architecture, among other things, to the development of nuclear weapons technology, politics, and strategic thinking throughout the Cold War.

The period from Stalin’s death in 1953 to the second Berlin Crisis in 1958 witnessed a significant change in Finno-Soviet relations; the reciprocally felt suspicion and distrust during the Stalin era were replaced with a less confrontational and distrustful relationship, although the basic set-up remained: the Soviet Union wanted to prevent Finland’s slide toward the west and take care that the country would be on the Soviet Union’s side if a major European war flared

up.¹⁹ Finnish accession to the UN and the Nordic Council in 1955 were concrete examples of the country having gained more latitude in its foreign policy.

When the Soviet Union returned the military base of Porkkala to Finland in 1955, a relieved Paasikivi was finally able to say that a pen had fixed what the sword had shattered.²⁰ The short period of *détente* that followed the Geneva spirit also opened room for novel ideas of neutrality in Europe. This was exemplified by the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the anchoring of permanent neutrality by the Austrians themselves in the country's federal constitutional law. Finland also seized the opportunity; during negotiations on the early renewal of the FCMA Treaty with the new Soviet leadership, Helsinki managed to squeeze out a joint declaration that connected the treaty with Finland's aspirations to follow a policy of neutrality.²¹

But new challenges already loomed on the horizon. When it came to Finland's geostrategic position, the most daunting dilemma was the prospect of a rearmed West Germany—something NATO's plans for establishing a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) would have brought along. On the other side, 1958 brought along the "Night Frost Crisis" with the Soviet Union, when Moscow used economic coercion to force the government of Prime Minister Karl-August Fagerholm of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) to step down (Fagerholm's coalition government enjoyed solid parliamentary support despite excluding the election winners, the Finnish People's Democratic League). In Finland, this was understood as an indication of yet another confrontative era and a wake-up call of sorts. For President Kekkonen—whose position in the political structure of Finland was strengthened by the affair—it became evident that Helsinki's passive and circumspect foreign policy posture did not meet the requirements of the day anymore.²²

Paradoxically, the formulation of Finland's "aspirant neutralism" in 1955 also opened a new field of political contestation over the extent of its neutrality. The Soviet Union went on to test Finland's stance several times in the next three decades, causing major diplomatic crises when suggesting joint consultations on military cooperation as prescribed in the FCMA (in 1961 and 1978)—which would have been serious infringements of Helsinki's understanding of its neutrality policy, including the independent status of its armed forces.²³

Origins of the "Enckell Doctrine" and the Initiative to Establish a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Finland's accession to the UN, besides being a highly significant and symbolic event that marked the end of its post-Second World War foreign political isolation, also increased the scrutiny toward its position amidst the great power competition.²⁴ Finland's positioning to the fledgling field of nuclear disarmament diplomacy was articulated by the influential diplomat Ralph Enckell, the son of the former foreign minister, Carl Enckell. The so-called Enckell Doctrine stated that Finland should (only) support reasonable (that is, conceivable in practice) disarmament initiatives or proposals that both leading great powers

would likely support too. This formulation was already in the instructions given to Finland's first UN delegation in 1956, although the basic rationale of the guidelines still emphasized passivity. The delegation should follow the key principle of avoiding participation in negotiation processes and issues that would maintain or increase the clash of interests between the great powers. Should there be even the slightest of uncertainties over the prospect of achieving great power consensus, the delegation should abstain from voting or taking a stance. Finally, the delegation in New York was instructed to align the Finnish position with other Nordic countries whenever possible.²⁵ In 1957, Helsinki instructed the delegation to support all advanced and progressive disarmament proposals if these would satisfy the principles of equality (between great powers) and fairness among all UN member states—a principle that was still understood in the context of the East-West conflict. Moreover, the delegation in New York was also instructed to support gradual disarmament and in general all processes that might lead to *practical* advancements, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament.²⁶

During President Kekkonen's second term in office (1962–68), Finland started to embrace a more active posture in foreign policy.²⁷ In May 1963, Kekkonen initiated the country's first nuclear arms control initiative by proposing the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone (NNFZ).²⁸ Although the initiative was based on similar ideas of military disengagement as those proposed by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957 and 1958 for Central Europe,²⁹ compared to Rapacki's proposal, Kekkonen's initiative was a rather hastily prepared agenda-setting instrument; it had little or no chance of success due to Norway's and Denmark's NATO membership.³⁰ Although effectively a non-starter, the NNFZ initiative was not completely useless in the political sense. It was used to signal Finland's security political preferences to a wider international audience and to take the initiative on controlling the discussion on Nordic security away from the Soviet Union.³¹ Kekkonen's proposal was also anchored to Sweden's Foreign Minister Östen Undén's proposal of 1962 for establishing a club of states committed to not possessing nuclear weapons (including the placement of foreign nuclear devices on their territory) in exchange for the nuclear powers' commitment to refrain from all further nuclear tests. Thus, despite of not having geographical dimensions in the same manner as the NWFZ initiatives had, the Undén Plan borrowed some elements from the Rapacki Plan and Frank Aiken's initiative to start negotiations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.³² In a similar vein, Kekkonen did not suggest a formal treaty between the Nordic states but merely a series of statements or reciprocal political commitments to the cause.³³

Finland followed the Enckell Doctrine quite obediently until the early 1960s. The rationale was to prove that Finland was able to formulate a coherent policy of neutrality at the UN without provoking a Soviet counter-reaction, albeit, in practice, the policy of abstention, at times, turned into a sort of non-policy.³⁴ The internal balancing between political neutrality and active foreign policy

posture led to problematic overaccommodation of Soviet interests within the region and a reflective political culture of appeasement captured by the (in)famous concept often invoked by Western commentators of “(self-)Finlandization.”³⁵ The country only started behaving more actively at the UN from 1962 onwards—as evident in the rising number of speeches and initiatives at the General Assembly in New York.³⁶ The sympathetic response given by the Finnish government to the Undén Plan is a good example.³⁷ The rather circumspect aspects of the Enckell Doctrine were gradually adjusted in practice during the 1960s. Finland slowly established its international status, which gave Helsinki more confidence in engaging in multilateral diplomacy. The turn toward a more active posture (albeit not an activist one like Sweden) was further exemplified by Kekkonen’s 1963 NNFZ idea. That said, Kekkonen and Finnish diplomats were in pains to promote the initiative as a balanced and genuine process that would serve the interests of all Nordic countries and both great powers alike.

Under the Swedish Shadow: Observing the ENDC Negotiations 1965–68

Although Finland was not a member of the ENDC, it had partial access to the negotiation process via its observer status. This proved to be important for later developments, which saw Finland chair the group of sponsor states advocating the signing of the NPT Treaty in 1968. Documents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives show that Helsinki was not interested in the ENDC just for the sake of disarmament. Finnish diplomats followed closely not only the developments around the ongoing great power rapprochement but Sweden’s status and activities as a member of the ENDC too. Key Finnish diplomats such as Jakobson and Hyvärinen soon reasoned that if Finland would want to become a proactive bridge-builder or accommodator in the disarmament negotiations, it should cultivate its own profile, discernible enough from Sweden.³⁸ This corroborates with the observation that at least in the context of multilateral disarmament diplomacy, Helsinki viewed neutrality in rather pragmatic and relational terms, contrasting it with Sweden’s more activist and principled posture. Sweden’s ambassador Alva Myrdal’s activities were meticulously reported back to Helsinki by Finnish diplomats stationed in Stockholm.³⁹ In addition, the Finnish ambassador to Geneva Pentti Talvitie and Head of Department Risto Hyvärinen, who served as Finnish observers to the ENDC, were also in close contact with other delegations, especially with British and Soviet delegates.⁴⁰

When, in March 1966, Hyvärinen reported his findings from the ENDC to Helsinki,⁴¹ his key takeaway was that the Soviet Union had dropped the criticism of US bombings in North Vietnam from public statements. It was becoming evident that both superpowers regarded the NPT negotiations as too valuable to interlink them with other tensions in great power relations (although this changed briefly in 1967 due to the Middle East Crisis⁴²). Both Talvitie and Hyvärinen reasoned that the great powers had a somewhat

instrumental attitude to the ENDC negotiations—it provided them an arena where they could first and foremost share opinions on issues related to disarmament and international security. The continuation of discussions between the great powers was regarded almost as an intrinsic value itself by Talvitie and Hyvärinen.⁴³ Also in New York, the rapprochement between the United States and the USSR did not go unnoticed. Max Jakobson, the Finnish ambassador to the UN, reported about it in October 1966. It was at this point that key Finnish diplomats started framing the value of the NPT process in terms of positive “general political effects” on great power relations.⁴⁴ This obviously meant that the NPT process started to fit quite nicely with the basic tenets of the Enckell Doctrine.

The nonproliferation agenda also coincided with key political goals the Soviet Union had in Europe—especially preventing Germany from having nuclear weapons and thus solidifying the balance of power in Europe. Hyvärinen noted that although the Soviet Union tried to maintain a strict stance on the question of how the possession and control of nuclear weapons should be defined in the treaty, the Americans held most of the cards at this point. Should the negotiations dry up, Talvitie reasoned, this would effectively remove the legal and political obstacles to the nuclearization of West Germany, something that the Soviets opposed direly. Moreover, the establishment of NATO’s joint nuclear planning group (by making the so-called McNamara Committee permanent) was already a *fait accompli* from the Soviet perspective.⁴⁵

The fact that the stakes in achieving the NPT were so high from the Soviet perspective was perceived as a crucial opportunity for Finland: should the NPT negotiations end in a US-USSR consensus, it would also hinder the possibility of Moscow coercing Helsinki with the prospect of a nuclearized West Germany.⁴⁶ In early 1967, it had become evident that both leading superpowers (and the United Kingdom) had shared interest in getting the deal done, albeit there were still certain frictions about how the monitoring of the treaty should be arranged, and how the status of Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) should be defined. At times, it seemed there were more intra-alliance frictions than issues between the two superpowers. West Germany, for example, criticized the way the United States negotiated directly with the Soviets, and, to some extent, the substance of the negotiation agenda, too. German diplomats thought the treaty would effectively lead to the accomplishment of the “Rapacki Plan” in Central Europe. Reports from their Finnish counterparts show that Helsinki was aware of the stakes for Germany; in the end, Bonn would have to face the cold political facts of great power politics and consent to the developments.⁴⁷

The ambition of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons to “irresponsible nations outside Europe,” as Hyvärinen described the standpoint in a rather ethnocentric manner in 1966,⁴⁸ brought the superpowers closer together. Indeed, Hyvärinen included only scant remarks on the positions of the so-called eight-state group of neutrals and non-allied countries in the ENDC negotiations in his reports. The dissatisfaction expressed by the United States and USSR toward Sweden’s initiative on verification and safeguard measures

was instead reported back to Helsinki in a detailed manner.⁴⁹ The picture emerging is that as a truly politically neutral country with relatively strong and independent defense forces, Sweden did not see as much intrinsic value in great power détente as Finland did, where the positive dialogue between the superpowers was perceived as an opportunity to enhance Finland's security by political means.⁵⁰ Already in July 1967, approximately one month before the United States and USSR presented their first joint draft resolution at the ENDC, Soviet representatives in Geneva hinted to Talvitie that Finland's active endeavors in facilitating great power compromise were "highly appreciated."⁵¹ At this point, Ilkka Pastinen started to include more details on the diverse interests of the eight-nations group at the ENDC in his reports—already hinting at the possibility of playing a "bridge-building role" when the negotiations would eventually move to the UN General Assembly.⁵² Indeed, the "feel of the game" of multilateral disarmament diplomacy acquired from the discussions at ENDC was made full use of when Finland eventually went on to act as the chair of the group of NPT draft resolution sponsors at the UN in the Spring of 1968.

The Patience of a Saint Rewarded? Finland's "Perfect" Role as a Mediator in the UN Negotiations between the Superpowers and the Rest

The eight non-allied states were generally dissatisfied with the fact that the draft resolution presented by the United States and the USSR in October 1967 made demands only to the NNWS, thus already pointing to the fundamental imbalance of the NPT architecture—namely, between international order (stabilization of the status quo, based on hierarchy) and equity among sovereign states.⁵³ More specifically, India and Romania (at the time the latter strived for increasingly autonomous foreign policy within the Warsaw Pact) were disappointed that the issue of negative security assurances was left out of the joint US-USSR draft resolution. Moreover, Sweden increased pressure on the two superpowers by presenting its own draft of the verification measures of the treaty. According to Finnish reports, this irritated both the US and USSR representatives. They had left the issue of verification out of their draft deliberately to continue negotiating it on a bilateral basis.⁵⁴

Despite the mixed response to the first US-USSR draft treaty, Helsinki already saw an emerging great power consensus as an opportunity to profile itself as a status quo-oriented country and, thereby, establish a diplomatic position discernible from that of Sweden. In 1967, at the UN General Assembly, Finland's Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen presented the Finnish position that would welcome the signing of the NPT already by the end of that session. Karjalainen did not shy away from highlighting the positive "general political consequences" the treaty would have on great power relations.⁵⁵

Thus, between 1965 and 1967, Finland clearly started positioning itself as a bridge-builder along two axes. First, it was keen on supporting détente

between the superpowers, albeit from a position dictated by its own security concerns (Kekkonen's key idea was that any genuine notion of peace in Europe would not be possible without peace between the two leading superpowers). Second, the tension between the great (nuclear) powers and the rest—the nuclear haves and have-nots—needed to be solved in a way not jeopardizing the emerging great power consensus. This formed the basis of Finland's great power accommodation and led Finnish diplomacy to highlight the need for the institutionalization of the international nuclear order with explicit agreements—something that would concretize great power responsibility.

When it came to the latter question, at the ENDC, the United States and the USSR seemed to be very reluctant to give concessions to the group of non-allied states. Sweden's proposals on a verification regime with linkages to a comprehensive test ban and international control of the transfers of fissile materials were rejected with frustration by both, Moscow and Washington.⁵⁶ The only concession the superpowers seemed willing to make in the fall of 1967 related to Mexico's suggestion that there should be an additional article in the draft treaty articulating binding commitments to nuclear disarmament by the NWS.⁵⁷

More concessions followed in the form of a refined US-USSR joint draft resolution in January 1968, this time echoing Sweden's demands on pervasive verification and a supervision regime. However, the proposed measures concerned only NNWS—something Sweden's proposal had explicitly tried to avoid—and hence caused notable resentment among NNWS. India's long-pursued negative security assurances were also left out of the draft, as the United States and the USSR still had disagreements on the question (e.g., how it would affect the status of East and West Germany). Eventually, shortly after the NPT was approved by the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States formulated a joint UN Security Council resolution on the matter.⁵⁸ Finally, almost five years after President Kekkonen's NNFZ initiative, the fact that nuclear weapon-free zones were also mentioned as a separate article (VII) in the latest draft was noted with satisfaction in Helsinki.⁵⁹

In February 1968, it was becoming evident that the latest joint US-USSR draft resolution presented at the ENDC would serve as the basis for the final UN negotiations (only minor tweaks presented by Sweden were added to the final draft resolution before the ENDC deadline in mid-March). Finnish diplomats keenly reported that their country's active use of its observer status in Geneva did not go unnoticed by the superpowers. Of the ENDC members, only India, Brazil, and Romania were considered unlikely to agree on signing the treaty in its present form.⁶⁰

Finally, in April 1968, Finland's consistent presence as an observer at the ENDC negotiations was rewarded when representatives of the United States and the USSR asked Helsinki to lead the group of sponsors for their joint draft resolution at the forthcoming UN negotiations. On April 16, the Finnish ambassador to the UN, Max Jakobson, who would eventually chair the group of

sponsors, asked permission from Helsinki to take an active role in the negotiation process, including opposing all efforts to postpone it.⁶¹ Hyvärinen, now the head of the Political Department at the Foreign Ministry, sent his agreement the very next day.⁶²

Jakobson presented the draft resolution on behalf of the group of sponsors at the beginning of May 1968.⁶³ In his speech, Jakobson highlighted the “long and complex process of negotiations and debate” since the first proposal presented by Ireland’s Frank Aiken. Finland’s priority was to address any gaps “in the international order relating to nuclear weapons.” He noted that albeit China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations they, too, would most likely continue acting according to the principles of the treaty in the future. He also recognized the prominent role of Sweden at ENDC, as well as the basic concerns of the nonaligned movement. The NPT was presented as the future cornerstone of the international order that might eventually lead to genuine disarmament. In essence, one can read from Jakobson’s speech that to end the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the international community should put a halt to horizontal proliferation. It elucidates between the lines that Helsinki already had an implicit hierarchical reading of the significance and urgency of what would later be known as the three pillars of the NPT.

Quite interestingly, Jakobson also managed to mention President Kekkonen’s 1963 NNFZ initiative (which he himself had drafted) in his speech, as well as Finland’s status as a “neutral country” seeking security by “promoting the development of a peaceful and rational world order based on the efficient functioning of a universal collective security system.”⁶⁴ Jakobson ended his speech on Finland’s stand in a rather apt manner:

It may be too bold to say that this [the immense political significance of the NPT] foreshadows the transformation on the balance of terror into an internationalized nuclear deterrent within the institutional framework of the United Nations. But it does carry the promise that the collective security system of the Charter, based as it is on cooperation between the permanent members of the Security Council, can be revitalized in the interests of peace and security for all nations.⁶⁵

During the next few weeks, Jakobson actively promoted the draft resolution and tried to get more states to join the group of sponsors.⁶⁶ In his report to Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, Jakobson highlighted the unprecedented level of cooperation and understanding between the US and USSR delegations over the matter.⁶⁷ At the end of May, Finland (through Jakobson) arbitrated the last minor revisions in articles V and IV of the treaty, mostly to accommodate the demands made by Sweden and Mexico. The basic dilemma remained, though: the political issues that the NPT solved were mostly European and concentrated on the “German question”; this was hard to sell to states outside of Europe, especially to Africa and Latin America.⁶⁸

After the final changes (May–June 1968), several states of the nonaligned movement also joined the group of sponsors in quick succession. On June 6, the NPT was accepted at the UN with 94 votes in favor, 22 abstaining, and 4 voting against the treaty (Tanzania, Zambia, Cuba, and Albania). Sweden had informed Finland already on May 31 that it would vote in favor of the treaty, although with major critical observations and reserving the right not to ratify the treaty.⁶⁹ In an official statement, Finland's Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen once again emphasized the "general political significance" of the NPT and the way it exemplified the responsibility felt by the two superpowers on maintaining world peace.⁷⁰ In June, Keijo Korhonen recommended further strengthening Finland's diplomatic profile in the matter by signing the treaty first—something that would be duly achieved.⁷¹

Hence, when it comes to understanding the gradual development of Finland's nuclear disarmament diplomacy in the 1960s, the more proactive interpretation of the Enckell Doctrine was clearly visible in the way Finland participated in the NPT negotiations between 1965 and 1968. Finland not merely supported this process that was evidently based on a certain level of great power consensus, but also tried actively to promote great power interests in negotiations with small powers, especially the counter-hegemonic group of non-allied states. Thus, it can be argued that Finland's Cold War disarmament politics was a rather peculiar amalgamation of small-state realism, idiosyncratic interpretation of Finland's unique geopolitical position within the Cold War international order, and certain liberalist ideals on great power responsibility.

Conclusion

Although the Geneva spirit and accession to the UN in 1955 gave Finland more room to cultivate its agency in world politics, the nature of its more active foreign policy posture and notion of neutrality were always somewhat limited or contested. In theoretical terms, the example of Finland highlights the need to interpret neutrality as a relational and context-dependent concept. This was also evident in Finland's role in the NPT negotiations at least in two related aspects.

First, Finland positioned itself alongside the leading nuclear powers by accommodating their agendas. This was evident already during the preparatory ENDC negotiations when key Finnish diplomats perceived the value of the NPT process in terms of enhancing great power consensus and, thus, strengthening the bipolar structure of international politics, as well as solving the "German question." In the NPT process, Finland strove to position itself as a mediator, accepted by both the United States and the USSR, between the nuclear powers and the rest. This policy of accommodation was not completely unconditional, though, but tethered to the goal of great power "responsibilization."

Secondly, Finland juxtaposed its status and pragmatic policy line with Sweden's more activist and progressive foreign policy habitus. Finnish diplomats

followed Sweden's active role at the ENDC closely between 1965 and 1967, acknowledging the need to cultivate a disarmament profile discernible enough from Sweden. Together with the policy of abstaining from great power rivalries, this led to a rather peculiar, pragmatic gradualism that prioritized the ordering effect of the emerging nonproliferation regime over more ambitious and progressive disarmament agendas favored by the nonaligned movement and other neutrals.

During the latter stages of the hectic NPT negotiations in the spring of 1968, Finland had a short spell in the limelight of multilateral diplomacy when it was asked to join the group of sponsors of the joint US-USSR draft resolution. Moreover, Finland's ambassador to the UN, Max Jakobson, who had been a key architect of President Kekkonen's 1963 proposal to establish an NWFZ in the Nordic region, was offered to chair the group of sponsors—a position in which he took on the role of a persuader more than a neutral mediator. The challenge was to convince most of the UN members, especially members of the nonaligned movement, to accept the NPT, even without ambitious disarmament commitments on the side of the recognized NWS. The concerns of the nuclear “have-nots,” like those related to guaranteed access to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, had to be mediated in a way that would not compromise consensus over shared great power interests.

Hence, neutrality in the case of Finland's diplomacy toward the NPT exhibits strong contextual and relational traits. The Finnish foreign policy elite did go through a lot of trouble to receive recognition for its policy of neutrality both from the East and the West. Unlike Sweden, Finland's status as a neutral state during the Cold War was always limited and tied to the currents of great power relations due to the 1948 FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union. Hence, during the NPT process, Finland started promoting itself as a diplomatic bridge-builder—or as President Kekkonen had famously said in 1961—as a physician rather than a judge of international politics.⁷² However, the bridge-building capacity was limited to projects with relatively safe expectations about great power consensus, or at least to projects with close to zero prospects of causing conflicts between the United States and the USSR.

Albeit there are no signs in the archives that the Finnish foreign policy elite would have regarded the establishment of a *de facto* codified nuclear duopoly as its goal, the combination of the limited peacetime neutrality and great power accommodation drove it to support the agenda of the two leading nuclear powers. Thus, it was also natural that the Finnish government was among the first signatories of the NPT in the summer of 1968—a symbolic gesture that key Finnish diplomats participating in the disarmament negotiations strongly encouraged.

Of course, Finnish foreign policy genuinely prioritized the importance of nonproliferation, as this was a question very much at the core of the country's national security; the prospect of nuclearized West Germany would have given the Soviet Union a justification for demanding closer military-political cooperation with Finland, based on the FCMA Treaty. This would have effectively

put Finnish aspirations of even limited peacetime neutrality to an end. Thus, the policy of pragmatic gradualism—although something that would most likely not lead to genuine disarmament anytime soon—was quickly perceived as a virtuous choice by the Finnish foreign policy elite. Paradoxically, this meant that Finland was ready to accept it would live with a nuclear superpower as its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

To conclude, Finland perceived the NPT process first and foremost as a logical continuum of great power politics; the accomplishment of the NPT was always as much about the management of international order and “responsibilization” of great power politics as it was about the question of non-proliferation as such—not to mention more progressive notions of nuclear disarmament. This was evident in the way key Finnish diplomats in the process learned to appreciate the negotiations as an intrinsic value and contrasted with Sweden’s position that emphasized the NPT merely as a first minor step toward genuine disarmament. In this sense, Finland’s role as a neutral country should be understood equally as relational—constructing a profile discernible enough from Sweden—and contextual—prioritizing superpower consensus for stability in Europe over rapid advancements in nuclear disarmament.

Notes

- 1 Risto Hyvärinen, *Virkamiehiä, viekkautta ja vakoilua* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 2000), 171. The quote is taken from Risto Hyvärinen’s memoirs when he describes the nature of Finnish disarmament politics during the Cold War. Together with the likes of Max Jakobson, Ilkka Pastinen, and Keijo Korhonen, Hyvärinen was one of the key architects of the Finnish disarmament and arms control diplomacy of the 1960s. Hyvärinen served as an officer in the Finnish Defence Forces, specializing in arms control and disarmament issues, until 1965 when President Kekkonen appointed him the head of the Political Department at the Foreign Ministry—the most influential position within the ministry. The department was responsible for strategic planning of Finnish foreign policy, as well as to follow key trends in the international sphere through the prism of national interests, and it was tightly controlled by the president, not that much by the foreign minister, in the 1960s and 1970s. After a three-year assignment as ambassador to Belgrade, Hyvärinen was selected as the special representative of the UN secretary-general in the Geneva disarmament negotiations—a position he “inherited” from his colleague, Ambassador Ilkka Pastinen. See Hyvärinen, *Virkamiehiä*, 63; Timo Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja ulkopoliittikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella* (Hämeenlinna: Ulkoasiainministeriö, 2003), 273.
- 2 The eight non-allied states’ group consisted of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic (UAR). Finnish diplomats of the era generally referred to these states together as a group of eight “non-allied powers” (*liittoutumattomat vallat*), “neutral countries” (*puolueettomat maat*), or simply “the eight states’ group” (*kahdeksan vallan ryhmä*). In contrast, the term “nonaligned states” was not used as often, as it was perhaps regarded a more specific, referring to what was to become known as the nonaligned movement, thus excluding Sweden, for example. The term N+N (nonaligned and neutral states) was not yet used at this point. See, e.g., The Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland [from here on MFA], 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Risto Hyvärinen’s memorandum “Genèven asestariisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe,” March 23,

- 1966; MFA 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Keijo Korhonen's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen päätyminen Genevessä," March 30, 1968; Joel Pekuri's telegram from Stockholm, "Geneven aseriisuntaneuvottelut," September 1, 1966. Another term used by the Finnish diplomats was "the group of eight mid-powers." See, e.g., *ibid.*, Ralph Enckell's telegram from Stockholm "Aseidenriisunta Ruotsin valtiopäivien ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa," April 2, 1968. I would like to thank for the editors of this volume on highlighting the significance of correct terminology in this matter.
- 3 See Thomas Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
 - 4 Jargalsaikhan makes similar observations on Mongolia's disarmament advocacy. See Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, "The Role of Small States in Promoting International Security: The Case of Mongolia," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1, no. 2 (2018): 404–35.
 - 5 See Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu, "The Role of Public Opinion in Finland's Foreign and Security Policy," in *National Security, Public Opinion and Regime Asymmetry: A Six-Country Study*, eds. T. J. Cheng and W-C. Lee (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2017): 147–73.
 - 6 When it came to weapons of mass destruction themselves, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 explicitly forbade Finland from acquiring, possessing, or owning nuclear weapons.
 - 7 I have elsewhere labeled this policy of great power accommodation as small-state liberalism. It can be separated from the more passive and circumspect reading of small-state realism. See Tapio Juntunen, "Harmaantuvaa pienvaltiorealismia: Suomi, ydinaseiden kieltosopimus ja ulkopoliittikan koulukuntavalinnat," *Kosmopolis* 48, no. 4 (2019): 39–63.
 - 8 On the concept and historical evolution of the international practice of neutrality and small-state foreign policy, see further Clive Archer, Alyson J. K. Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds.), *Small States and International Security. Europe and Beyond* (London: Routledge, 2016); Baldur Thorhalsson, *Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland's External Affairs* (London: Routledge, 2019); Christine Ingebritsen, Iver B. Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl and Jessica Beyer (eds.), *Small States in International Relations* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); Herbert R. Reginbogin and Pascal Lottaz (eds.), *Permanent Neutrality: A Model for Peace, Security, and Justice* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020); Pascal Lottaz, Heinz Gärtner and Herbert R. Reginbogin (eds.), *Neutral Beyond the Cold War. Neutral States and Post-Cold War International System* (Lanham: Lexington Book, 2022).
 - 9 See Pascal Lottaz, "Introduction," in *Neutral Beyond the Cold War. Neutral States and Post-Cold War International System*, eds. Pascal Lottaz, Heinz Gärtner and Herbert R. Reginbogin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), xi.
 - 10 See also Christine Agius, *The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality: Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
 - 11 Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi, "Neutrality as Identity?: Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 51–78; Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen and Tapio Juntunen, "From 'Spiritual Defence' to Robust Resilience in the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model," in *Nordic Societal Security: Convergence and Divergence*, eds. Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard (London: Routledge, 2020), 154–78.
 - 12 Already in 1952, then prime minister Kekkonen described Finland's international standing as "a certain kind of neutrality" (*tietyntyylinen puolueettomuus*). The fact that Kekkonen followed ideas that originated from Soviet Union and consulted Soviet diplomats on whether it would be appropriate for him to develop the idea of a Nordic neutrality in his forthcoming speech has been widely documented in Finnish historiography. That said, there are evidence that Sweden's prime minister

- Tage Erlander also might have promoted the idea to Kekkonen in late 1951; it was Sweden, after all, who had made the 1948 initiative to establish Scandinavian Defense Union. See, for example, Kimmo Rentola, *Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo* (Helsinki: Otava, 2016), 212–13; Jukka Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui?* (Helsinki: Otava, 1996), 65–71; Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 40.
- 13 See Reginbogin and Lottaz, *Permanent Neutrality*, 5.
 - 14 Kari Miekkaavaara, *Ydinaseiden uhka Suomen puolustukselle. Päätäjien käsitykset uhkasta ja toimenpiteet sen torjumiseksi vuosina 1945–1971* (Turku: University of Turku, 2004); Jukka Rislakki, *Paha sektori. Atomipommi, kylmä sota ja Suomi* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2010), 31–32.
 - 15 Although disarmament was not a pivotal foreign policy tool for Finland during the inter-war period, Finland did participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations and was an eager early supporter of the League of Nation—at least until the mid-1930s turn toward relying on Scandinavian neutrality (see further Unto Vesa, *Finnish Disarmament Policy* (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1983), 10–12, 27.
 - 16 Pekka Visuri, *Puolustusvoimat kylmässä sodassa. Suomen puolustuspolitiikka vuosina 1945–1961* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1994), 45–52.
 - 17 Kimmo Rentola, “From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953–58,” *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (2000): 75.
 - 18 Osmo Apunen, “Finland’s Treaties on Security Policy,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 15, no. 5 (1980): 255.
 - 19 Juhana Aunesluoma, Magnus Petersson and Charles Silva, “Deterrence of Reassurance? Nordic Responses to the First Détente, 1953–1956,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 32, no. 2 (2007): 183–208; see also Rentola, “From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally.”
 - 20 Osmo Apunen, *Paasikiven-Kekkonen linja* (Helsinki: Tammi, 1977), 95–98.
 - 21 Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, “Neutrality as Identity?” 54; see also Rainio-Niemi, *The ideological Cold War*.
 - 22 Jukka Nevakivi, “Kekkonen, the Soviet Union and Scandinavia — Aspects of Policy in the Years 1948–1965,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 22, no. 2 (1997): 69–76. Kekkonen’s role in the Night Frost Crisis has been one of the most contested issues in Finnish political historiography. What is not contested, though, is that the episode solidified Kekkonen’s status and power both in foreign and domestic politics. Although the Night Frost Crisis was effectively caused by Moscow’s irritation toward certain right-leaning anti-Soviet members of the Social Democratic party in Fagerholm’s cabinet, the period also coincided with rising Soviet resentment toward NATO’s MLF plans.
 - 23 After the so-called Note Crisis of 1961—perhaps the most serious diplomatic crisis between the Soviet Union and Finland during the Cold War—we have to go all the way to the year 1989 when Soviet Premier Gorbachev acknowledged Finland’s neutrality publicly without any reservations.
 - 24 See Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956–1962* (Helsinki: Otava, 1992), 87–88.
 - 25 See MFA, 113 B YK:n yleiskokous v. 1956, “Ohjeet Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yleiskokoukseen sen 1. istuntokaudeksi määrätylelle valtuuskunnalle,” November 7, 1956. The doctrine was put into test immediately when Finland abstained from voting in the resolution that condemned Soviet Union’s actions in Hungary in 1956—despite of the fact that domestic opinion in Finland was strongly against Soviet Union in the matter. On Finland’s traditional alignment with other Nordic states, see Hanna Ojanen ja Tapio Raunio, “The Varying Degrees and Meanings of Nordicness in Finnish Foreign Policy,” *Global Affairs* 4, no. 4–5 (2018): 405–18.

- 26 See MFA, 113 B YK:n XII yleiskokous v. 1957, “Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yleiskokouksen 12. istuntokaudeksi määrätyle valtuuskunnalle,” September 13, 1957.
- 27 Miekkavaara, *Ydinaseiden uhka Suomen puolustukselle*, 42–43; Suomi, *Kriisien aika*, 89.
- 28 See Tapio Juntunen, “Käytännöllistä viisautta vai kaavoihin kangistumista: Suomen alueellinen ydinasevalvontapolitiikka kylmän sodan aikana,” *Kosmopolis* 46, no. 1 (2016): 27–44.
- 29 See Cecilie Hellestveit and Daniel Mekonnen, “Nuclear Weapon-free Zones,” in *Nuclear Weapons under International Law*, eds. Gro Nystuen et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 360. Ryan Musto, “‘A question of survival’: Canada and the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe, 1957–59,” *Cold War History* 21, no. 4 (2021): 509–31.
- 30 Finland did eventually go on to support Rapacki plan—a move that caused notable resentment in the West—although Kekkonen’s initial reaction to the plan, according to his diary notes, was more evasive than enthusiastic (see Urho Kekkonen, *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 1. 1958–62*, ed. Juhana Suomi (Helsinki: Otava, 2001), 48.
- 31 See further Juntunen, “Käytännöllistä viisautta”; Osmo Apunen, “Three ‘Waves’ of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980s,” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 11, no. 1 (1980): 16–32.
- 32 See further Katarina Brodin, “The Undén Proposal,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 1, no. 4 (1966): 18–29.
- 33 There is rather convincing evidence that the incentive for the NNFZ initiative came from Moscow already in 1958–59. Moscow’s aim was to use Finland as a medium to increase pressure towards Denmark and Norway due to their somewhat ambivalent nuclear status within NATO. With the Note Crisis still fresh in mind, Kekkonen wanted to wait for the right occasion and formulate the initiative so that it would not be completely associated with the Soviet Union’s foreign policy ambitions within the region. See Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan*, 211–15; Osmo Apunen, *Linjamiehet. Paasikivi-seuran historia* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 2005), 129–30; Juhani Suomi, *Presidentti. Urho Kekkonen 1962–1968* (Helsinki, Otava, 1994), 123. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the conditions for such an initiative seemed to be more favorable. Moreover, the head of political department at the Foreign Ministry Max Jakobson, who also prepared Kekkonen’s speech on the matter, instructed the Finnish embassies to highlight the independent nature of Kekkonen’s initiative and to associate it with similar ambitions Josip Broz Tito had in the Balkans. See Max Jakobson, *Veteen piirretty viiva. Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953–1965* (Helsinki: Otava, 1980), 317–19; MFA, 89 H Pohjolan ydinaseeton vyöhyke—December 31, 1968, Jakobson’s telegram to the embassies. See also Apunen, *Linjamiehet*, 131.
- 34 See Max Jakobson, 38. *Kerros. Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965–1971* (Helsinki: Otava, 1983), 44–49.
- 35 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu, “The ‘Finlandisation’ of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27, no. 3 (2016): 473–95; Tapio Juntunen, “Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics,” *New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 25, no. 1 (2017): 55–83.
- 36 Apunen, *Paasikiven-Kekkonen linja*, 227–30.
- 37 Apunen, *Linjamiehet*, 125–31. Finland’s support for the Undén plan was significant in the sense that the plan involved demands toward the nuclear powers, which they were not ready to concede at the time. Nevertheless, the Finnish response to the plan still fulfilled the key principle of equity between the great powers.
- 38 Although the objective is mostly implicitly present in the reporting, it was also articulated explicitly by Jakobson in his correspondence with Helsinki in 1968. See

- MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimuksen poliittinen sanoma," May 17, 1968. See also Hyvärinen, *Virkamiehii*, 173; Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 141.
- 39 See for example MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Henrik Blomsted's telegram from Stockholm "Geneven aseriisuntaneuvottelut; yhteenveto suurlähettiläs Alva Myrdalin lausunnosta 10.5.1965," May 13, 1965; Joel Pekuri's telegrams from Stockholm "Geneven aseriisuntakonferenssi; suurlähettiläs Myrdalin puheenvuoro 4.8.1966," August 9, 1966; "Aseriisuntaneuvottelut Genvessä; suurlähettiläs Alva Myrdalin puheenvuoro 23.2.1967"; "Aseriisuntakomitea. Ydinsulkuneuvottelut, Ruotsin lausunto," February 9, 1968.
- 40 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Pentti Talvitie's telegrams from Geneva, May 5, 1966; February 23, 1967.
- 41 See two key memorandums from Risto Hyvärinen: MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, "Genèven aseistariisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," March 23, 1966; "Aseriisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," August 15, 1966.
- 42 See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Talvitie's telegram from Geneva, July 22, 1967. When discussing great power relations, the role of China was not at the center of Finland's focus at this point. In other words, great power politics was emphatically observed from the perspective of the competition between United States and Soviet Union.
- 43 See e.g. MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Pentti Talvitie's telegram from Geneva, February 23, 1967; Risto Hyvärinen's memorandum "Aseriisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," August 15, 1966.
- 44 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakysymys; YK:n 21. ja 22. yleiskokous, Jakobson's telegrams from New York, October 20, 1966 and November 3, 1966; Jakobson's confidential memorandum to Foreign Minister Karjalainen, January 4, 1967.
- 45 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Risto Hyvärinen's memorandum "Aseriisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," August 15, 1966. See also Ambassador Leo Tuominen's telegram from London, "Englantilaisia käsityksiä aseriisuntanäkymistä Genèveen kokouksen kynnyksellä," January 28, 1967.
- 46 Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 133.
- 47 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Leo Tuominen's telegram from London "Englantilaisia käsityksiä aseriisuntanäkymistä Genèveen kokouksen kynnyksellä," January 28, 1967. One representative of West Germany went as far as describing the joint US-USSR draft resolution to Talvitie as a "modern form of colonialism in worst possible sense," see *ibid.*, Risto Hyvärinen's telegram from Geneva, March 17, 1967.
- 48 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Risto Hyvärinen's memorandum "Geneven aseistariisuntaneuvottelujen nykytilanne," March 23, 1966.
- 49 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, telegram from Geneva, August 31, 1967.
- 50 Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 141-42.
- 51 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Talvitie's telegram from Geneva, July 22, 1967.
- 52 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Ilkka Pastinen's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," September 28, 1967.
- 53 See Hedley Bull, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," *International Affairs* 51, no. 4 (1975): 175-89.
- 54 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Ilkka Pastinen's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," September 28, 1967.
- 55 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Pastinen's confidential letter to Hyvärinen, February 16, 1968.
- 56 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, telegram from Geneva, October 4, 1967. Officially Finland had joined other Nordic countries in supporting the "package deal" of nonproliferation, comprehensive test ban, and international control of fissile material transfers in 1965. The agreement as such left open on what

- elements in the three-piece package the countries would emphasize, including the sequence in which the elements should be agreed on in the multilateral arena. Finland clearly emphasized the non-proliferation component of the package as a first step in a process of gradual disarmament, whereas Sweden supported a more holistic and comprehensive approach that would not dissect the elements in a way that would lead to effective gradualism.
- 57 This was reported to Helsinki in October 1967. See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Telegram from Geneva, October 16, 1967.
 - 58 UN Security Council, S/RES/255, June 19, 1968. In the resolution the three NPT depositaries only committed to aid the NNWS should they become “a victim of an act or an object of threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used,” thus merely affirming their UN Charter responsibilities without giving proper negative security assurances. See further John Simpson, “The role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, ed. J. W. Knopf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 57–85.
 - 59 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Keijo Korhonen’s memorandum “Uusi luonnos ydinaseiden leviämisen estäväksi sopimukseksi,” February 6, 1968. This was also due to the fact that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, or the Tlatelolco Treaty, was opened for signatories already in 1967.
 - 60 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Ilkka Pastinen’s memorandum “Neuvottelut ydinsulkusopimuksesta,” February 23, 1968; Keijo Korhonen’s memorandum “Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen päättyminen Genevessä,” March 30, 1968.
 - 61 The group of sponsors, established in mid-April 1968, advocated and presented the draft resolution of the NPT on alongside United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union at the UN. It consisted of the small European neutral countries (excluding Sweden), states from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and a group of Arab states. According to Jakobson, the initiative to establish the group came jointly from United States and Soviet Union (United Kingdom was not mentioned). They wanted the composition of the group to be geographically as representative as possible, but the whole of Latin American and Africa, as well as majority of Asian countries, decided, for various reasons, not to support the first draft resolution. Thus, the key task of the chair of the sponsors group was to persuade more states to join the group and probe their possible demands. By the end of April, according to Jakobson’s telegram from New York, the group of sponsors consisted of United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Iceland Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Iraq, Morocco, Iran, Sudan and Lebanon. MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegrams from New York, April 16, 1968; April 29, 1968. See also Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 143–47.
 - 62 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Hyvärinen’s telegram to New York, April 17, 1968.
 - 63 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegram from New York, April 29, 1968.
 - 64 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegram and draft text of speech from New York, April 30, 1968.
 - 65 Ibid.
 - 66 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegram from New York, May 16, 1968.
 - 67 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s report “Ydinsulkusopimuksen poliittinen sanoma,” May 17, 1968.
 - 68 In his reporting from New York, Jakobson does not give any details about his negotiations with representatives of specific countries, but on the basis of the reporting, it

- can be reasoned that Jakobson's focus was directed to Sweden's and Mexico's demands in particular, and the remaining Latin American and African countries more generally. Certain countries, such as the "outspoken Albania," who aligned with China, was deemed as a "lost cause" by Jakobson. See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Jakobson's telegrams from New York, May 27, 1968, and May 31, 1968.
- 69 See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Telegram from Stockholm, May 31, 1968.
- 70 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, "Ulkoasiainministeri Ahti Karjalaisen lausunto ydinsulkusopimuksen johdosta," June 13, 1968.
- 71 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Keijo Korhonen's memorandum "Ydinaseiden leviämisen estävän kansainvälisen sopimuksen allekirjoittaminen," June 24, 1968.
- 72 Urho Kekkonen, *Neutrality: The Finnish Position* (London: Heinemann, 1970), 94. The speech was written by the architect of Finland's disarmament policy, Ralph Enckell.

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