5 FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATIC ADJUSTMENT TO A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

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1 INTRODUCTION

For centuries, Finland has been a small 'borderland' between east and west, as part of Sweden, as part of Russia, and then from 1917 on, as an independent state trying to find its position between east and west. This geopolitical context and limited freedom of manoeuvre has shaped Finnish identity and foreign policy and has contributed to a pragmatic approach towards international politics (Tiilikainen, 1998, 2006; Joenniemi, 2002; Alapuro, 2004; Browning and Lehti, 2007; Browning, 2008; Rainio-Niemi, 2014). In the Cold War era, Finnish foreign policy was very much driven by a policy of neutrality, which culminated in 1975 when Finland hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the long reign of President Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981), foreign policy was personally identified with the president, who was more or less visibly supported by the political elites within the Soviet Union. Political debate and contestation on foreign policy were rare during this era of 'compulsory consensus' that placed a premium on maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union (Arter, 1987).

The close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union were consolidated in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed in 1948. The FCMA treaty constituted limitations to Finnish armed forces and prohibited military cooperation with any country hostile to the Soviet Union. The Cold War period, thus, entailed a delicate balancing act for Finland, with priority to good relations with the Soviet Union reconciled with democratic political institutions at home and integration into western markets. While the direct interference of the Soviet leadership in Finnish politics has often been exaggerated, the Finnish political elite was nevertheless always forced to anticipate reactions from Moscow, and this set firm limits on Finland's cooperation with Western European and Nordic countries.[1] And, as will be seen throughout this chapter, the preferences of the eastern neighbor continue to be highly relevant for Finland's foreign and security policy.

Another important tenet of Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War was the importance accorded to international institutions and particularly the United Nations (UN). Here the Nordic identity of Finland was emphasized, with Finland together with the other Nordic countries contributing around 25 % of the personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. The Nordic nations developed a reputation as peace-builders, with peacekeeping a key component of 'Nordicness' or the 'Nordic model'. Peacekeeping and the UN framework mattered also in terms of self-perception and national identity. As Finland was not able to participate in European integration or in security cooperation with the 'west', peacekeeping offered an avenue for participation in international politics. The first Finnish peacekeepers were dispatched to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Suez in 1956, and since then around 45 000 Finns have served abroad in peacekeeping duties.[2]

2 GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION

The end of the Cold War was thus certainly a 'critical juncture' or game-changer for Finland. And Finland did not hesitate when the window of opportunity opened. FCMA was abolished in 1991, in 1992 Finland applied for European Community (EC) membership, in 1994 Finland entered the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and in

[1] The term 'Finlandization' was coined to denote 'adaptive acquiescence', whereby a weaker power endures infringements by a larger power in order to protect its key interests. For Finland, these were independence, democracy, and integration into western markets. (Mouritzen, 1988; see Forsberg and Pesu, 2016)
[2] Puolustusministeriö, Suomalainen rauhanturvaaminen 60 vuotta, 5.2.2016 (http://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/suomalainen_rauhanturvaaminen_60_vuotta.7658.news).

1995 Finland joined the European Union (EU). Although Finland remains militarily non-aligned, in this new, post-Cold War era neutrality has given way to active participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy / Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP / CSDP) of the EU and to close ties with NATO. While the EU has undoubtedly become Finland's main reference group, Nordic countries have also taken steps towards further defense cooperation, with bilateral links to Sweden particularly important for Finland.

But how much has Finnish foreign policy actually changed? Has there been genuine change or is it more the case of pursuing old objectives in a new environment? This chapter answers these questions through the framework of three overlapping basic orientations or schools of thought that have been identified in Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy (e.g., Haukkala, 2012; Haukkala and Vaahtoranta, 2016; Pesu, 2017b; Juntunen, 2018). These orientations are necessarily overlapping and should certainly not be treated as mutually exclusive categories. For example, all three orientations can appear simultaneously in actual foreign policy or in the thinking of a particular politician.

The first is *small state realism*, where state survival and security are paramount concerns. Small countries such as Finland should thus stay out of harm's way in a world where great powers and their military strength dominate. Yet bilateral ties with Russia are seen as important in safeguarding national interests. The second is *liberalism (or Euro-Atlanticism)*, which stresses the role of international organizations and rules. Multilateral cooperation and active diplomacy are beneficial for both small states and for the stability of the international community. According to the more 'Atlanticist' argument, deeper security integration with the west would also help distancing Finland from her eastern neighbor. The third policy line is *globalism*, which views the current world order as unfair and urges Finland to use the multilateral European and global institutions for emphasizing softer or 'Nordic' values such as solidarity, gender equality or development aid. Globalists also stress a broader definition of security that encompasses human rights, environmental concerns, immigration, and other non-military dimensions. While Atlanticism was not an option before the 1990s, otherwise the basic orientations or principles were definitely present also during the Cold War – and continue to characterize Finnish foreign policy thinking today.

Before proceeding to the policy questions structuring this chapter, it is essential to introduce the 'domestic politics' side of Finnish foreign and security policy. Here the 1990s were also a turning point, with the fall of the Soviet Union and EU membership acting as catalysts for constitutional change from the early 1990s onwards. The new constitution, which entered into force in 2000, completed a period of far-reaching constitutional reform that curtailed presidential powers and

brought the Finnish political system closer to a normal parliamentary democracy.[3] Leadership by presidents has been replaced with leadership by oversized coalition governments that typically bring together parties across the ideological spectrum. (Karvonen et al., 2016) Under the old constitutional regime foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the president, and hence the new constitution has for the first time granted the government and the unicameral parliament Eduskunta genuine authority in Finland's external affairs. According to Section 93 of the constitution, the government is responsible for EU policy with foreign policy leadership shared between the president and the government. Despite occasional conflicts between the president and the cabinet, overall foreign policy co-leadership has functioned rather smoothly (Raunio, 2012; Raunio and Sedelius, 2020).

Inside the Eduskunta, the Foreign Affairs Committee has displayed active ownership of foreign policy questions. It considers EU issues pertaining to foreign and security policy, while according to section 97 of the constitution the committee 'shall receive from the Government, upon request and when otherwise necessary, reports of matters pertaining to foreign and security policy.' Finally, all international obligations and commitments with legislative or budgetary implications must be approved by Eduskunta. Research indicates that the Eduskunta also uses actively its new-won powers, with the Foreign Affairs Committee not only insisting on government fulfilling its reporting obligations but also requesting further information from the cabinet. Ex ante mechanisms are crucial, with the committee receiving information from the government and hearing ministers ahead of EU or international meetings. However, the decision-making culture in foreign policy, and particularly in security questions, continues to be guided by the search for broad partisan consensus. (Raunio, 2016)

3 DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY

In the Cold War era of 'compulsory consensus' there was essentially no debate about defense and security policy. Any dissenting voices found themselves quickly marginalized, and the official line of neutrality and close ties to the Soviet Union enjoyed virtually unanimous approval among both politicians and the broader public. In the post-Cold War period the situation is very different indeed: with the shadow of the eastern neighbor no longer constraining Finnish decision-makers to the same extent as before, there have been genuine security policy choices on the agenda that have also produced party-political and public contestation.

[3] The Constitution of Finland, 11 June, 1999 (731/1999). An English translation is available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf.

These security and defense policy debates have focused on four inter-related questions: NATO, crisis management, CFSP / CSDP, and Russia. This section focuses on the first two questions, with ties to Russia and the stronger role of the EU context explored respectively in sections five and six of this chapter. Both Russian preferences and the gradual development of the EU's security dimension are directly linked to the question of NATO membership. In addition to PfP cooperation since 1994, Finland is a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council since 1997 and an advanced partner in NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) program since 2014. The programs of the Finnish governments formed since the mid-1990s, as well as the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports (see below), consistently specify that while Finland remains military non-aligned, cooperation with NATO is beneficial for both sides. These official documents also underline interoperability between Finnish armed forces and NATO so that Finland can participate in various NATO exercises and operations.

It is customary in Finland to state that while NATO membership is not currently on the agenda, it is an option that needs to be left open should circumstances change. At least until now Moscow has made it perfectly clear that it would not welcome Finland joining NATO, and Russia's reactions to Finland's potential membership application would be difficult to predict (Giles and Eskola, 2009; Bergquist et al., 2016). Perhaps more important are the domestic constraints, with both public opinion and political parties against NATO membership. In fact, public opinion on the question has remained remarkably stable since the late 1980s, with support less than 30 %, reaching its peaks after the Georgian war in 2008 and Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Of the Eduskunta parties, only the conservative National Coalition is in favor of membership since 2006 and even it does not campaign actively on the issue. Comparing the electorates of the parties, we can observe a clear left-right divide. Support for NATO membership is strongest in the National Coalition and the Swedish People's Party, which represents the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority, while it is essentially below 30 % in all the other parties, and even below 10 % in the Left Alliance, the most left-wing party in the parliament. In addition, a survey from 2004 to 2008 by the Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) asked respondents about support for NATO-led crisis management operations. It was strongest among voters of National Coalition and Swedish People's Party and lowest among Left Alliance supporters. (Raunio, 2018: 163-164) Analyzing Eduskunta debates on NATO since the mid-1990s, Särkkä (2019) nonetheless argues that political parties have, over time, become more pragmatic or positive towards NATO, with strong opposition only found among the Left Alliance MPs, and she concludes that MPs are thus more supportive of NATO than the electorate.

This 'Atlanticist' dimension impacts directly on Finland's role in the development of EU's security and military capacity and in international crisis management. For advocates of NATO membership and of developing closer links with the 'west', the EU route provides a channel for Finland to contribute to European security integration and to practice far-reaching cooperation with NATO. Those more in favor of retaining neutrality, on the other hand, argue that through active partnership Finland is merely entering NATO through the backdoor. These same arguments have manifested themselves in debates concerning crisis management, where the 1990s ushered in a new era: peacekeeping has been replaced with crisis management, the number and diversity of operations has increased significantly, and the UN is no longer the only actor in the scene, with particularly the EU and NATO carrying out missions. The Nordic countries responded by amending their peacekeeping laws so that their troops could both use force beyond self-defense and participate in missions led by NATO, EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Vesa, 2007; Jakobsen, 2006).

Changes to Finnish peacekeeping legislation, enacted incrementally from the mid-1990s onwards, reflect the domestic constitutional reforms, the changing security context, and specifically the development of CSDP (Tiilikainen, 2008; Palosaari, 2011). Until the mid-1990s, the legislation was based on two leading principles – the necessity of a UN or OSCE mandate and the impossibility of peace enforcement as Finnish soldiers were allowed to use force only for self-defense. An amendment from 1995 created the right to 'extended peacekeeping', implying the possibility for more extensive use of force.[4] Five years later, another amendment increased the compatibility of Finnish legislation with the EU treaties which, since 1999, have entitled the EU to carry out all types of crisis management operations. The prohibition to participate in peace enforcement was abolished, and according to the same amendment Finland can participate in humanitarian operations or in the protection of such operations at the request of UN organizations or agencies.[5] The most recent significant change was introduced in 2006, with the title of the new law explicitly referring to 'crisis management' instead of 'peacekeeping'. The government argued that 'military crisis management' describes the EU's tasks more accurately than 'peacekeeping' and that the reform was needed in order for Finland to participate fully in crisis management operations led by UN, EU or NATO and

[4] Laki Suomen osallistumisesta Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien ja Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestön päätökseen perustuvaan rauhanturvaamistoimintaan (1565/95).
[5] Rauhanturvaamislaki (750/2000).

in EU's Battlegroups. Since 2006 Finnish troops can be assigned to all types of crisis management operations, even to missions lacking the mandate of the UN Security Council.[6]

In terms of the domestic politics of crisis management, the government is the key actor, negotiating operations abroad and planning Finnish participation. However, the president, as the commander-in-chief of the defense forces, has the final say about troop deployment, but the presidents have not contested the decisions. Essentially the Eduskunta and specifically its Foreign Affairs Committee are heard before the issue is decided in the cabinet, and the parliament receives regular reports on the operations, for example in the form of biannual crisis management overviews.

Public support for crisis management operations remains solid, at least in part because so far the number of Finnish troops sent abroad has been low and their tasks have mainly related to the 'peacekeeping' or civilian side of the missions.[7] For example, in Finnish National Election Study (FNES) surveys carried out at the time of the 2007, 2011 and 2015 Eduskunta elections, comfortable majorities in every party – except the Finns Party in 2011 – agreed with the statement that Finland's participation in international crisis management is a positive thing. Yet, there was party-political contestation, especially in the 1990s. There was clear consistency in party positions irrespective of government-opposition dynamics. The National Coalition and the Swedish People's Party were the strongest supporters of the legal reforms, with Social Democrats also backing the proposals. The most vehement dissent was expressed by the Left Alliance which criticized the moves towards peace enforcement and crisis management and the relaxation of the requirement for UN or OCSE mandate. The Left Alliance in several instances also argued against the intrusion of NATO into peacekeeping operations. In opposition from 1995 to 2003, the Centre Party attacked the reforms and defended traditional forms of peacekeeping, but the party line changed when it became the leading cabinet party after the 2003 elections, with Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen justifying the 2006 reforms with the need to adapt to the EU's expanding military dimension. Also, the Christian Democrats, the Finns Party, and occasionally the Greens, were against the abolishment of the requirement for a UN mandate, with the Greens in particular advocating a pro-active role for Finland in civilian crisis management.

[6] Laki sotilaallisesta kriisinhallinnasta (211/2006) / The Act on Military Crisis Management (211/2006) (http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060211.pdf).

[7] The number of crisis management personnel, excluding rotation personnel and personnel in training, must not exceed 2000. In recent years the number of personnel has dropped and stabilized at around 400-500, largely because the operations have become more expensive. See Findicator, International military crisis management, http://www.findikaattori.fi/en/100.

Decisions to participate in individual operations have produced less contestation. The notable exceptions were the NATO-led missions which sparked lively debates characterized by concerns about the nature of the operations, the safety of Finnish personnel, and the move away from UN mandate towards peace enforcement. This applied especially to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with considerable unease among MPs about the whole operation and the situation in Afghanistan (Salonius-Pasternak, 2010). Participation in Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999 also inspired intensive debates, not least on account of NATO bombing Yugoslavia ahead of the operation (Forsberg, 2000). Operations carried out by the UN or EU generally enjoy cross-party consensus. The exception has been the Finns Party, which has stressed credible national defense, and much of its criticism of the operations was based on their costs. The Left Alliance is the only party represented in the Eduskunta that has consistently criticized those operations moving away from UN mandates and traditional peacekeeping. Overall, crisis management has become less politicized, with broader backing for stronger international engagement in crisis management and for EU-led operations in particular. (Raunio, 2018)

While both NATO and crisis management have produced party-political differences, the 'official' national foreign policy line continues to be based on deliberately constructed partisan consensus, particularly regarding security and defense matters. Here, a key role is performed by the 'grand strategy' document, titled since 1995 the Government Security and Defence Policy Report and published roughly every four years or once per electoral term (Limnéll, 2008; Pesu, 2017a). The report is based on a broad conception of security and provides an overall framework for subsequent foreign and security policy decision-making. The first reports were produced in the 1970s and 1980s by parliamentary defense committees where parties were represented based on their share of Eduskunta seats. Since 1995, the government has produced the reports, but the process is closely monitored by a parliamentary working group that brings together representatives from all Eduskunta parties, opposition included. Inside the government, the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the president, oversees the drafting of the report.



Figure 1 Finland's annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1995-2017)

The reports have largely followed the same structure, with analysis of the security policy environment, not least in the neighboring areas, followed by various topical matters from crisis management to NATO, Nordic defense cooperation, and cyber security, with the exact issues covered obviously depending on real-world developments. Finland's non-aligned status and credibility of national defense are ever-present in the discussions[8], with broad cross-party and also

[8] Also, when discussing various security policy issues the political debates often center around the implications for Finland's international position and defense capability. For example, parliamentary debates on crisis management have often focused on the effects the operations will have on either the defense forces or on Finland's 'non-aligned' status, not so much on the actual operations (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011). The same applied to the long process of Finland joining the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty in November 2011. (Pesu, 2017a). Both Rieker (2004) and Wivel (2014) make the broader point about Finland seeing international operations as a way for improving its defense capabilities.

public support behind the defense budget (Figure 1), arms purchases, and the conscript army.[9] Nonetheless, the left-right cleavage does often structure the discussions, with center-left parties emphasizing a more comprehensive or broader approach to foreign affairs, including human rights and development policy, while center-right parties are more against cuts to defense spending and more supportive of developing closer links with NATO – ideological differences which were already visible even during the Cold War era (Joenniemi, 1978). Here we must remember that the fragmented party system, with no party as a rule winning more than 20-25 % of the votes in elections, and the tradition of forming broad, cross-bloc coalition cabinets, also facilitate consensual governance and ideological convergence between political parties.

4 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY

Development policy has overall remained a low salience issue, but it clearly mattered during the Cold War era in terms of Finland's international identity. Working together with the Nordic countries, Finland pledged its support to the development policy goals of the UN from the 1960s onwards, although its aid levels have remained consistently below that given by the other Nordics. Finland has contributed much of its aid through multilateral UN channels, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), but since the 1990s the EU framework has obviously become increasingly important. During the Cold War the debates concerned mainly the balance between bilateral versus multilateral aid and the choice of the recipient countries[10], while since the 1990s the limited debates have focused more on levels and types of aid. In terms of Finland's profile in development aid, some long-term features can be identified: a holistic approach underlining the links between various aspects of development, eradication of poverty, involvement of civil society actors, and a strong emphasis on education, reducing inequalities, sustainable development, and the role of women in developing countries. (Koponen and Siitonen, 2006; Koponen et al., 2012; Siitonen, 2017)

[9] The reports are available at http://www.defmin.fi/julkaisut_ja_asiakirjat/suomen_turvallisuus-_ja_puolustuspoliittiset_selonteot. Only the Green League is against compulsory military service, arguing instead in favour of a more selective model such as those used in Germany and Sweden.

[10] Long-term partner countries include Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Zambia.



Figure 2 Finland's annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending

Aid levels have primarily been explained by the domestic financial context. In times of trouble, such as during the severe recession of the early 1990s, aid plummeted, while periods of economic growth have seen more money allocated to development projects (Figure 2). Following the 2015 elections, the new center-right coalition that included the Finns Party cut annual official Finnish aid by around 30 % (the government also made cuts to crisis management budget). At the same time aid was more explicitly tied to business and export interests, particularly through Finnfund (Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation), a state-owned development finance company that provides long-term risk capital for private projects in developing countries. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) criticized these developments in its peer review. It recommended that Finland reverses the decline of official development aid, including to least-developed countries, whilst stating explicitly that Finland should keep "its focus on poverty and untied aid as it increasingly makes investments linked to Finnish

businesses." (OECD, 2017). In Finland many politicians, primarily from the leftist parties, expressed strong concerns about Finland drifting away from its traditional Nordic reference group and how the cuts would influence Finland's image. The government responded by referring to the poor economic situation and underlined the long-term goal of 0,7 % of GDP for development aid. (Ojanen and Raunio, 2018b: 414) Critics have also argued that the 'private turn' and prioritizing Finnish business interests undermines the core objectives of development policy. Beyond such questions aid policy is not subject to any major domestic party-political contestation. The political left and especially the Greens are more willing to increase aid levels and are more critical of the 'private turn', but only the Finns Party is strongly critical of aid.[11]

5 BILATERAL RELATIONS

Relations with her eastern neighbor are always a top priority for Finland.[12] The Cold War period constituted a balancing act, with close and friendly ties with Kremlin co-existing alongside Finland's economic integration with western Europe. The Soviet Union has been succeeded by Russia, but the same balancing act remains. Moscow continues to set constraints on Finland's security policy choices, while Finland carefully follows developments in Russia. In the new EU context, however, the main question is finding a proper balance between bilateral ties with Russia and the EU's common policies towards Russia.

That specific question is addressed in the next section of this chapter. At this stage it is sufficient to point out the obvious: apart from influencing Finland's security policy decisions, Russia is economically a major trading partner[13], with also an increasing number of Russians living in Finland nowadays. Various official documents, such as the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports, government programs, or presidential speeches consistently emphasize the importance of

[11] Reflecting the consensual practices in foreign policy decision-making, the Development Policy Committee, first established in 1979, monitors and evaluates and issues statements on Finnish development policy, focusing particularly on enhancing policy coherence. It brings together representatives of political parties, NGOs engaged in development cooperation, the relevant ministries, the business community, researchers, the agricultural sector, and trade unions.

[12] Addressing the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington in September 2007, the Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies remarked that "Finland is privileged to be located in one of the safest corners of the world. However, given our geographical location, the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia." The speech, titled 'Finland: similar yet different' is available at https://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/speeches/minister_of_defence_jyri_hakamies_at_csis_in_washington.3335.news?663_o=10.

[13] See figures by Finnish Customs available at https://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_kotimaankauppa_en.html, and https://tulli.fi/en/statistics.

maintaining good bilateral relations with Russia, both for economic and security reasons. In addition to stressing the need for conciliation and international diplomacy, EU included, at least until now Finland has tended to underline the role of bilateral ties when skies grow darker. As explained in the next section, this applies particularly to developments since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Relations with Russia are thus active and at the highest level based on regular talks between the respective presidents. The underlying rationale – that applied already during the Cold War – for the meetings seems to be to avoid further escalation of tensions between Russia and the 'west' and to tie Russia into the international community, developments that would also serve Finland's economic and security policy interests. Here, a notable difference is found when compared with the Baltic countries and the other Nordics that have essentially not held bilateral meetings with Putin in recent years.

Overall, Finnish politicians and other security policy stakeholders still talk in rather cautious tones about Russia, with actual direct critique or defections from the 'official line' quite limited. This partisan consensus is facilitated by the institutional arrangements for relations with Russia. As the president is the main actor vis-à-vis Russia, the political parties do not adopt policies or issue statements that would contradict the president's positions. Here we must remember that for a lot of Finns the president is the guarantor of national security that has historically handled negotiations with Soviet / Russian leaders. However, particularly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, Finnish politicians have started to 'call a spade a spade', accusing Russia more directly of breaking international laws and of creating instability. Government Security and Defence Policy Reports, comments by presidents, ministers and other stakeholders, as well as public and media discourse, do pay attention to increasing Russian assertiveness and rivalry in the neighboring areas, not least in the Baltic Sea region, with air space violations, new hybrid threat scenarios, and of course the continuing conflict in Ukraine. (Siddi, 2017; Pesu, 2017a: 91-95)

The Nordic countries have traditionally functioned as an essential reference group for Finland. Arguably, a small country like Finland needs cooperation and institutional backing not only for material or practical reasons, but also for building actorness in international relations. The Nordic connection has made Finland more easily recognizable and increased its credibility and reliability in international relations from the 1950s onwards. Membership in the Nordic Council (1955) meant that Finland could cooperate even with Nordic NATO members, while Nordic cooperation featured prominently in the UN, peacekeeping included. Through its Nordic identity, Finnish foreign policy is often associated with 'Nordic' values such as internationalism, peace, disarmament, cooperation, human rights, ecologically sound development, gender issues, and solidarity with the Third World.

However, Finland has also been ready to abandon the Nordic reference group when needed, and Nordicness can sometimes also be a burden, as became evident in the failed campaign for a seat in the UN Security Council in 2012. A report on the reasons for the failure was commissioned from the International Peace Institute (IPI), and the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE reported the findings with the telling title of "US think tank: Not everyone cares for the Nordic "know-it-all" attitude."[14] According to the report "The core values which the Nordics stand for ... like human rights, the rule of law, the responsibility to protect, etcetera, is (sic) not necessarily that popular amongst the majority of the membership in the United Nations. And this is paired with a perception that the Nordics consider themselves to be morally superior, that there is a "besserwisser", condescending attitude towards others based on the values and ideological issues."[15]

Nordic security and defense cooperation has intensified since the turn of the millennium (Forsberg, 2013; Brommesson, 2018). This cooperation with the Nordics is viewed almost exclusively in positive terms, both among the political elites and the broader public. An ABDI poll from November 2017 shows this very clearly. When asked which factors improve Finland's security, the order was as follows: participation in Nordic defense cooperation (83 %), participation in the EU's common defense (70 %), EU membership (62 %), increasing international economic interaction (52 %), participation in international crisis management (51 %), military non-alignment (46 %), and possible NATO membership (29 %). In these annual polls, the question about Finland's military cooperation with the Nordic countries has been asked since 2012, and public support for Nordic cooperation has been consistently high.[16]

Examining the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports and the related parliamentary debates since the mid-1990s shows, in turn, the broad partisan consensus behind Nordic links. In the first reports from the 1990s Nordic cooperation was primarily referred to in the context of crisis management, although it was also seen important in terms of regional stability in northern Europe and the Baltic area. Since then, practical arrangements and treaties come up repeatedly, such as NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation), established in 2009 to bring together the various forms of Nordic cooperation under one structure. The most far-reaching ones are with Sweden, where

[14] http://yle.fi/uutiset/us_think_tank_not_everyone_cares_for_the_nordic_know-it-all_attitude/6571358.
[15] Taking stock, moving forward. Report to the Foreign Ministry of Finland on the 2012 Elections to the United Nations Security Council". April 2013. International Peace Institute, https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/130406-UNSC_Elections_Report_Final.pdf. However, the Nordic Image was probably not the main reason for not getting the Security Council seat (Seppä and Tervo 2020).
[16] ABDI polls are available at https://www.defmin.fi/en/tasks_and_activities/media_and_communications/the_advisory_board_for_defence_information_abdi/bulletins_and_reports.

cooperation is said to extend beyond peacetime.[17] Cost-effectiveness and practicality seem to be the main drivers of cooperation, not least in the form of arms purchases and training sessions, but Russia's aggressive foreign policy plays a role as well. Moreover, Nordicness is more broadly seen as a starting point for international cooperation and identity in world politics. For example, the 2009 report concluded that "because their societies are so similar, the Nordic countries have common goals in several issues that are central to security, such as climate change and working together in a globalizing world. … The Nordic countries have the possibility to bring up jointly agreed goals and advance them also in other forums, such as the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO."[18]

The more recent debates emphasize bilateral ties with Sweden. A clear political will to deepen security cooperation with Sweden is expressed and the 'historical, special relationship' between the two countries is often repeated. The other Nordic countries are hardly mentioned individually, with the exception of Norway in the 2009 report (as a result of a 2008 report between Finland, Norway and Sweden on deepening security cooperation between the three countries) and the Icelandic Air Policing exercise, which divided opinions as many saw it taking Finland uncomfortably close to NATO. This closeness to Sweden results quite simply from the basic understanding that Denmark, Iceland and Norway are NATO members. There is also quite widespread frustration regarding the lack of concrete contents in Nordic cooperation and particularly regarding bilateral links with Sweden, with at least some mistrust amongst Finnish decision-makers that can be traced back to Sweden applying for EC membership in 1990 without consulting Finland (Juntunen and Pesu, 2018). Several pro-NATO politicians in turn question whether a defense alliance with Sweden would offer any real value for Finland. Potential NATO membership application is in the debates nonetheless strongly linked to Sweden's choices, with Finland arguably only joining NATO together with Sweden. (Ojanen and Raunio, 2018b)

6 EU, MULTILATERAL AND NICHE DIPLOMACY

The UN framework was highly valued in Finland during the Cold War, with Finland, together with the other Nordic countries, promoting peacekeeping, conciliation, and disarmament whilst stressing the importance of development aid. Since the early 1990s the status of the United Nations in national discourse and actual foreign policy has declined, but the same priorities still characterize

[17] Recent agreements and memoranda are available at https://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/kansainvaliset_sopimukset.

[18] Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2009. Valtioneuvoston selonteko, VNS 11/2009VNS 11/2009, 56.

Finland's behavior in the UN. Finland continues to stress peace mediation and conflict prevention in line with a famous speech given by President Kekkonen in the UN General Assembly in 1961: "We see ourselves as physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn. It is rather to diagnose and to try to cure".[19] Finland has also continued to emphasize global solidarity and development aid, for example through the Millennium Development Goals. In that context Finland has paid special attention to education and the role of women in developing countries. (Vesa, 2012) In terms of political preferences, the left-leaning parties tend to be more supportive of the UN, but the basic approach towards the United Nations and Finland's priorities therein have not been seriously challenged at any point.

The EU has replaced the UN and the Nordics as Finland's primary reference group. When the Cold War had ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland wasted no time in seizing the opportunity to become fully engaged in European integration. Once the membership application was made in spring 1992, a broad majority of the national decision-making elite – government, parliamentary majority, trade unions and employers' organizations, main political parties, the president, most of the media – emerged in favor of EU membership. Finland joined the EU from the beginning of 1995, following a membership referendum held in October 1994 in which 57 % voted in favor of entering the Union.

Economic factors were strongly emphasized in the membership debates. Finland is heavily dependent on trade, and the demise of the communist bloc increased trade dependence on the EU countries. The heavy recession of the early 1990s further convinced the industry and the trade unions about the importance of joining the Union. In addition to any lessons learned from history and the Cold War, the rather uncertain political situation in Russia brought security concerns to the fore. While security policy considerations were downplayed during the referendum campaign, there is no doubt that the security dimension was a key factor behind the decision of both the elite and the voters to support EU membership. Moreover, there was a broader cultural argument about (re-)joining the West. While the pro-EU camp argued that by joining the Union Finland would merely be maintaining or consolidating its place among west European countries, there is little doubt that especially among foreign observers the 'western' identity of Finland had been far less clear. Indeed,

[19] Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yleiskokouksen kolmas erityisistunto sekä kuudestoista istuntokausi ja sen jatkoistunto. Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeriön julkaisuja 1962, pp. 165-166. The most famous Finnish 'physician' is undoubtedly Martti Ahtisaari, a long-standing diplomat who also served as the Finnish president from 1994 to 2000. After the presidency he founded the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and in 2008 Ahtisaari was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to Namibian independence, Serbia's withdrawal from Kosovo, and the autonomy for Aceh in Indonesia.

the significance of EU membership for Finland should not be underestimated, for it clearly constituted a key element in the "process of wholesale re-identification on the international stage" (Arter, 2000: 691; Arter, 1995).

Finland's integration policy has typically been characterized as flexible and constructive. According to the political elite, national interests can be best pursued through active and constructive participation in EU decision-making. Underlying this stance is a conviction that strong and efficient European institutions and common rules can best protect the rights and interests of smaller member states, as intergovernmental processes tend to favor the larger countries. Pragmatism and adaptability, behavioral traits influenced by Cold War experiences, are arguably the leading qualities of Finnish EU policy. Finland is the only Nordic country that belongs to the euro zone, with the single currency adopted without much political contestation. Finland has also consistently emphasized the unity of the EU, not least in foreign and security policy. The outbreak of the euro crisis and the rise of the Eurosceptical Finns Party have brought about contestation over Europe, but overall both the parties and the public opinion remain supportive of integration. In fact, public opinion has become more supportive of the EU. (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003; Raunio and Saari, 2017; Ojanen and Raunio, 2018a)

Many voices questioned whether a neutral country with a long border with Russia could contribute meaningfully to European security integration. Calming such doubts is probably one of the reasons why Finland has actively supported the development of CFSP/CSDP (Jokela, 2011; Palosaari, 2011, 2016). In the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-97, Finland and Sweden formulated an initiative according to which the EU should create a military crisis management capacity. The focus on crisis management was understandable: not only does Finland have a long-standing reputation for active participation in peacekeeping operations, crisis management also offered a way to make a positive contribution to CSDP when NATO membership is not an option. Finland has also subsequently contributed actively to the EU operations and to the Battle Group.

Finnish decision-makers underlined the security-enhancing impact of EU membership, not least vis-à-vis Russia. Finland has often seen itself as a bridge-builder between EU and Russia (until 2004 Finland was the only EU country that shared a border with Russia), but whether this perception is shared throughout the member state capitals or in Brussels is another matter. Finland was also promoting the importance of the Arctic, including through the Northern Dimension initiative launched in 1998. A fundamental worry from the beginning had been that Finland could be entangled in the problems between the EU and Russia, should their relations deteriorate and should Finland have to choose sides in case the EU could not act with a single voice towards Russia. Not even the first years

of EU membership were problem-free, as the Chechen wars in 1994 and 1999, the latter during Finland's first EU presidency, showed. During its second EU presidency in 2006, Finland did not manage to secure the commencement of negotiations on a new agreement ("post-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement") with Russia. When EU actions were seen to fail, Finland engaged itself in 'damage control' of some kind through more active bilateral relations. (Haukkala and Ojanen, 2011: 157-159.) This applies to the whole period under observation: when EU's common policies have been at odds with Finland's interests towards Russia, or perhaps when there are question marks about the cohesion of the EU and Finland's position, bilateralism is valued more than during harmonious times.

The annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine have certainly brought to the fore the 'special relationship' with Russia and the question about the proper balance between bilateral and EU policies. Given the close economic ties with Russia, the sanctions imposed by the EU and the Russian countermeasures are hitting Finland particularly hard. Nonetheless, Finland has supported the EU line, with the government and President Sauli Niinistö underlining that there is no other option. Again, the importance of bilateral ties has been highlighted, with particularly President Niinistö meeting President Putin on a regular basis. Finland has also tried to preserve the unity of the EU for fear of having to take sides. In 2015 Finnish politicians complained about the EU countries leaving Finland alone with hard choices in the decision concerning the participation of Russians that are on the EU's sanction list in an OSCE parliamentary meeting in Helsinki.[20] Overall, as already argued in the previous section, Finland has sought to bind Russia into international and European cooperation as further decline into authoritarianism and potential isolation would surely make Russia a more unpredictable actor in world politics. This has applied also to the post-2014 context where Finland has underlined the importance of upholding cooperation with Russia, not least through institutions such as the Council of Europe or the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (Siddi, 2017: 150-156).

Adapting to a planned common EU defense policy has proven rather unproblematic. However, inserting a mutual assistance clause in what was originally called the Constitutional Treaty caused Finland and the other four ex-neutral member states headache. They proposed a watered-down version of the clause in which the member states "may request aid", leaving out the obligation of aid and assistance altogether (Ojanen, 2008: 61). This was not acceptable to the other member

[20] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 6 July 2015, "Niinistö: Suomi jätettiin yksin Venäjä-ratkaisun kanssa", http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/a1436145697408?ref=hs-art.artikkeli; *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 7 July 2015, "Niinistö: Finland satt i en rävsax", http://hbl.fi/nyheter/2015-07-07-762030/niinisto-finland-satt-i-en-ravsax.

states and the mutual defense commitment prevailed, but the policy of the Union "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States" (article 42:2 Lisbon Treaty). Afterwards Finnish decision-makers have underlined their commitment to the mutual assistance clause. However, the legislative changes enabling the defense forces to receive and give military assistance (outside the realm of crisis management) were not introduced before 2017. As was already referred to earlier in this chapter, the further development of CFSP / CSDP enjoys broad support among the political parties. The Finns Party tends to be more critical, prioritizing national defense, while the Left Alliance has shown more hesitation in developing the military dimension of European integration.

Since the early 1990s relations with the United States have also become more important. In this context, an interesting detail concerns the purchase of American Hornet fighter jets in 1992, less than a year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Decision-makers did their best to deny any 'political' motives behind the purchase, referring instead to the price and technical capability of the plane. (Pesu, 2017a: 29-31) Apart from bilateral meetings between the respective presidents or other senior political figures and links with NATO, Finland has even twice hosted a summit between the American and Russian presidents, in 1997 and more recently in 2018 the controversial meeting between Putin and Trump. Whatever the impact of the latter summit on Finland's foreign policy image, it nonetheless presents continuity in the sense of Finland emphasizing efforts aimed at reducing tensions between 'east' and 'west'.

7 CONCLUSIONS

Referring to the typology of foreign policy change of Hermann (1990) introduced in the introductory chapter of this volume, the main driver of changes has been the external context of Finnish foreign policy that has altered quite fundamentally from the Cold War period to the current era. The EU is now undoubtedly the main reference group (international orientation change), Finland has edged closer to NATO (goal change), and Finland contributes actively to various crisis management missions (goal change). In a nutshell, Finland is simply much more present in international politics than before. Foreign policy has also become more parliamentarized (program change). Decision-makers face considerably less external constraints and this has opened the door for domestic public debates and party-political contestation about foreign and security policy.

Adjustment Change	Redefined role of Nordic cooperation towards closer security ties	• Drivers: end of the Cold War, political will to deepen relations in security and defence, EU now the main reference group (handling many of the issues previously more on the agenda of Nordic cooperation)
Program Change	from presidential leadership to more parliamentarized foreign policy decision-making	• Drivers: end of the Cold War and broad elite consensus in favour of reducing presidential powers (following the excesses of presidential rule under President Kekkonen)
Goal Change	Amending peacekeeping legislation to enable participation in all kinds of military operations	• Drivers: EU membership (and the development of the CFSP) and the end of the Cold War
	Moving closer to NATO (without applying for actual membership)	• Drivers: end of the Cold War and EU membership • Inhibitors: close ties with Russia, hesitant public opinion and political parties (due to tradition of non-alignment)
International Orientation Change	EU becomes the main reference group	• Drivers: end of the Cold War and economic importance of western (EU) markets

Yet we can detect strong elements of continuity. Relations with the eastern neighbour remain highly salient for Finland, both in terms of security policy and trade. Regular bilateral ties with Moscow are maintained while Finland feels more comfortable when the EU manages to avoid internal splits vis-à-vis Russia. Nordic cooperation is very much intact, particularly in the form of bilateral agreements with Sweden (adjustment change), while in the context of UN, aid policy, and also CFSP / CSDP Finland continues to emphasize 'soft' Nordic values such as conflict mediation, gender issues and disarmament. In his historical account of the Finnish strategic culture, Heikka (2005) also underlines continuity where Finland defends an anti-hegemonic security order in Europe and through integration with the 'west' (EU and NATO) seeks to contain or transform the Soviet Union / Russia.

Returning thus to the three orientations in Finnish foreign policy outlined in the introductory section of this chapter, we can observe that small state realism, where state survival and security are the key concerns, are behind many of the choices made since the early 1990s – from EU membership to active role in CFSP / CSDP, advances in Nordic security cooperation, to active ties with Russia and the high support shown for territorial defence and the conscript army. At the same time these choices also fit the liberal interpretation of Finnish foreign policy, with the end of the Cold War enabling Finland to both participate in and to actively promote the role of multilateral European and global organisations, not least in terms of conflict-resolution. Atlanticism manifests itself primarily through partnership with NATO, but public opinion remains solidly against actual NATO membership. The third policy line of globalism is also very much present and becomes more prominent under left-leaning governments and/or presidents, such as during the presidency of Tarja Halonen (2000-2012). When these orientations have clashed, small state realism and concerns about security have arguably come on top.

While there is now genuine choice in foreign and security policy, the consensual approach prevails. The 1990s saw even quite heated debates within and between political parties over changes to crisis management legislation and developing closer links with NATO, but since then contestation has subsided, and there is overall broad partisan consensus regarding major foreign and security policy choices. Here a key role is performed by the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports as well as the dual leadership between the president and the government. Underlining the Finnish appreciation of consensus is the belief that such a small country is vulnerable if it shows internal differences of views, especially when dealing with Russia.

To conclude, this chapter has, thus, produced evidence of both continuity and change. The Finnish approach has been characterized by pragmatism, with foreign policy decision-makers adjusting to the post-Cold War era through deeper integration with EU and NATO whilst prioritizing good relations with Moscow. Concerns about national security, regional stability, and being left alone and vulnerable may not always be publicly aired, but they lie behind Finland's choices since the early 1990s.

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