Laura Naud

PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 16 AND 17 THROUGH COOPERATION
A case study of official development assistance from France to Senegal

ABSTRACT

The growing awareness around sustainable development has led to the introduction of the 2030 Agenda in existing cooperation frameworks. France has been including considerations for assisting its recipient countries with the promotion of the Sustainable Development Goals through a redefined official development assistance that gives priority to least developed countries. The country from this group that receives the most resources from France is Senegal. The latter presents several governance challenges related to themes of Sustainable Development Goals 16, while cooperating and developing capacities to pursue the goals is the focus of Sustainable Development Goal 17. The purpose of this thesis is to show the significance of examining these two goals together, how the goals can be applied through official development assistance, and the representation of national preferences in the Sustainable Development Goals context. This thesis therefore addresses France's official development assistance to Senegal in the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17 by the latter, and how national preferences are presented in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals.

A conceptual framework established for this thesis focuses on: (1) the formalization of donor and recipient countries' relations; (2) the link between strong institutions and strengthened cooperation; and (3) national preferences. A directed content analysis was applied to eighteen governmental documents, with nine of them coming from French sources, and the other half from Senegalese ones.

The findings of this thesis highlight that bilateral cooperation presents a platform that allows for active assistance from France to Senegal; accountability emphasizes the importance of information in cooperation; France's support to Senegal also depends on the international agreements that it is part of; stable institutions contribute to strengthened assistance and they constitute relevant actors for supporting the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17 by Senegal. Though steering elements are included in France's official development assistance, the context of the Sustainable Development Goals suggests to consider its increasing assistance orientation. The findings on the presentation of national preferences in the Sustainable Development Goals context reveal that France and Senegal have begun a process of appropriation of the goals through preference formation, change, and learning. National preferences also reflect the promotion of the goals through cooperation and at the international level by the two countries. Projection mechanism have also been found in the cooperation between France and Senegal and in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. National preferences are revealed as well through the transfer of elements related to the goals. Lastly, these preferences can be presented in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals through metagovernance, which highlights the central role of public actors in this framework.

This thesis contributes to nexus studies and literature related to Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17 and provides a case of official development assistance where these goals are involved. It also applies the concept of national preferences in the context of the 2030 Agenda and presents a framework including the promotion and formation of these preferences through official development assistance. Finally, this thesis suggests two paths for future research. First, studies could focus on the perspective of target populations and recipients toward France's assistance to Senegal in the context of the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17 by the latter. Second, more research on nexuses could provide further insights on the impacts that pursuing a set of goals have on these objectives.

Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals, official development assistance, governance, cooperation, national preferences, France, Senegal

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Abbreviations

AFD	French Development Agency
CASE	Harmonized framework for monitoring-evaluation of public policies
CICID	Cross-ministerial Committee of International Cooperation and Development
CNDSI	National Council for Development and International Solidarity
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DPBG	Directorate for the Promotion of Good Governance
DSEPBG	Directorate of Monitoring and Evaluation of Good Governance Policies
EU	European Union
F.CFA	Franc of the Financial Community of Africa
GNI	Gross National Income
IE	Innovation Ecosystems
IFIs	International Finance Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LMICs	Lower-Middle-Income Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINEFI	Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAMA	Supporting Program to Administration Modernization
PES	Plan for an Emerging Senegal
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEO	Operational Energy Service
TOSSD	Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of this study

Awareness around sustainable development has been increasing since the publication of the Brundtland report in 1987. It refers to "[meeting] the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 24). In 2015, the United Nations (UN) adopted a set of 17 goals in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

According to Gutmann and Gorman (2022), these Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a product of the current era based on their origin, presentation and substance. For instance, they were developed through a process involving a variety of actors from various backgrounds, going beyond state representatives, which does not have any equivalent in terms of international cooperation. Gutmann and Gorman also highlight that the SDGs are based on three pillars: economic, social and environmental; and are non-binding, while traditional international agreements and the predecessor of the SDGs, the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), focused more on the economic aspect of development and had legal obligations for signatory countries. Moreover, Gutmann and Gorman showed how the SDGs have united the concepts of development and sustainability, while they had been contradictory ideas in literature before. Sustainable development is now considered in international cooperation, with the 2030 Agenda and SDGs offering common guidelines for many countries.

Rather than aiming to act as a disruptive program, the 2030 Agenda considers existing channels of international cooperation to enable the fulfillment of its goals in practice. The 17th Sustainable Development Goal, namely "Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development" (United Nations, 2015, p. 26), is conceived as a supporting goal for all others, in the sense that it focuses on the mobilization of resources, tools, policy coherence and cooperation between actors to enable the achievement of the 2030 Agenda. In the financial dimension of this goal, developed countries are expressly asked to put their official development assistance (ODA) policy into action to support the economy of developing countries, and advised to provide 0.2% of their gross national income (GNI) to ODA for least developed countries (LDCs). With the 2030 Agenda, aid is perceived as a means to foster sustainable development all around the world by advocating for further engagement of donor countries.

On August 4, 2021, the French Parliament voted a law which reinforces the international development strategy of France toward concerned countries by increasing of its official development assistance from the predicted rate of 0,55% of its gross national income to 0,70% by 2025 (Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021). In this text, the target countries of French assistance belong to the least developed countries group and consist of 19 countries experiencing or recently recovering from crises, namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tchad and Togo. It also states that 85% of the loans and grants directed toward Mediterranean and African countries are handled by the *Agence française de développpement* [literally, French Development Agency] (AFD). This public agency, by carrying out the international development policy of France and its programs that mean to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in its overseas territories and in 115 countries (AFD, 2022), plays a significant role in the French strategy on international cooperation.

The 2021 law on fair development and global inequalities is part of broader effort from France to rethink its strategy for sustainable development as described in its *Roadmap toward the implementation of Agenda 2030*. Out of the 6 stakes identified by the country, only one expressly indicates its stance regarding international challenges, which consists in 2 priorities: "promoting sustainable development as a necessary ground for international stability", and "renovating the development and international fair policy of France" (French Government, 2019, p. 26). The first priority involves more cooperation with a variety of actors toward the completion of the goals, which relates to SDG 17, while the second one is officially linked to the completion of SDG 16.

The 16th Sustainable Development Goal aims at "[promoting] peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" (United Nations, 2015, p. 25). This objective focuses on the cease of violence, bribery and corruption, illicit arms and financial flows, and the promotion of the rule of law, transparent and effective institutions, access to justice and decision-making, higher participation in global governance and institutions of developing countries, extension of legal identity to all humans, protection of essential freedoms, capacity-building of institutions in developing countries to stop all forms of violence and fosters laws against discrimination. By emphasizing the importance of SDGs 16 and cooperation, the international orientation of the aid policy of France focuses more on the economic and social aspect of the sustainable development of its recipients.

Out of the 19 least developed countries listed above, Senegal is the country that obtains most aid from France. It received €281 million in 2019 (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2021a).

Senegal and France have tight economic, political and cultural bonds. France is the main investor in the country, representatives of each state regularly visit each other, and they both share French as their main language (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2021b). France is also the main backer of Senegal, with a development aid budget of €1,5 billion, from which €250 million come from the French Development Agency (AFD) for the period 2022-2025.

According to the World Bank, Senegal is part of the lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) because its per capita GNI in 2020 was $1,430 (approximatively €1 259,97), but it is also one of the most stable African countries (World Bank, 2021). It is justified by the absence of violence during the last three political transitions. Furthermore, it was less impacted by the conflicts affecting its neighbor states, such as Mali. Senegal has demonstrated its commitment to implementing 2030 Agenda through its Plan for an Emerging Senegal (PES), which encompasses all SDGs.

In its report on the 5 years of implementation of the 16th Sustainable Development Goal between 2015 and 2021, Senegalese non-governmental organization Enda ECOPOP observed that the General Directorate of Planning and Economic Policies of Senegal considered in 2020 that the alignment of the country with the SDGs had already reached 97% with the PES as its driver (Enda ECOPOP, 2021). Regarding SDG 16, the report highlights the significance of governance within the objective. Not only is it an essential element for peace and justice promotion, but its inclusion in the 2030 Agenda marked a historical step in terms of development strategies as it has faced many reluctant attitudes since the 1980s, as well as during the negotiations on the formulation of SDGs, and still does.

Despite some progress after 5 years of implementation of SDG 16 in Senegal, Enda ECOPOP (2021) noticed some limits, including low access to data and information on policymaking and corruption, lack of funds to fulfill the goal, lack of mobilization from non-governmental organizations, and lack of communication and ownership of the objective by the actors concerned. However, Cling et al. (2016) noticed that despite facing the most serious issues regarding governance, African countries were in the lead in terms of showing interest to this topic and internationalizing it. The three scholars observed that regardless of their motivations, African leaders engaged the continent in a process of action toward SDG 16, which was possible because of the flexibility of the institutions of their countries. The question then remains as to how French official development assistance can support this engagement toward SDG 16 in Senegal.

1.2. Purpose of this study and research questions

The purpose of this study is to show the significance of studying SDGs 16 and 17 together, how these SDGs can be applied via official development assistance, and the representation of national preferences in a context of SDGs. The case of the cooperation between France and Senegal through official development assistance, with the former acting as the donor, and the latter as the recipient, will be the focus of the directed content analysis performed in this thesis.

Studies have shown that official development assistance and developed-developing countries partnerships have effects on sustainable development (Huang & Quibria, 2015; Everard et al., 2017). Huang and Quibria highlight that foreign aid provides better conditions for all three economic, social and environmental pillars by supporting the economic growth of the recipient country, which allows governments to allocate more resources to development. Everard et al. emphasize that these financial flows go from more privileged areas to developing ones. It has been shown that supporting Sustainable Development Goal 16 is essential for the progression of all others (Hope Sr, 2020), therefore it is argued in this thesis that official development assistance should promote SDG 16 fulfillment while promoting the capacity of the recipient country to support development initiatives as encouraged by SDG 17. Using France's ODA to Senegal as a case study for this thesis, I will address the following question:

How does France's ODA to Senegal assist Senegal in its pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17?

Biermann et al. (2017) consider the 2030 Agenda as the most ambitious plan to put goal setting at the core of global governance and policy, compared with past top-down and market-based practices. They highlight the novelty of the non-binding characteristic of the goals and observe that it gives more space for national-level preferences and decisions. They recommend taking the latter into account when implementing SDG. This thesis uses the case of official development assistance to illustrate a form of cooperation for two countries to aim at pursuing the 2030 Agenda. It provides a space for debate around the presentation of national preferences within cooperation in the context of SDGs, not only based on the domestic situations of France and Senegal, but according to their respective donor and recipient countries positions as well. I will thus address the following supporting research question:

How are national preferences presented in the context of SDGs?

1.3. Structure of the thesis

This introductory chapter has provided the background, purpose and research questions of this thesis. In the following chapter, I will provide information on the political settings of France and Senegal. More particularly, I will focus on the ministries linked to SDGs 16 and 17 and their attributions. In the third chapter, I will elaborate more on the literature around the 16th and 17th goals. The conceptual framework of this thesis will be developed in the fourth chapter. The data and method that I shall use will be detailed in the fifth chapter. In the sixth one, I will display my empirical findings. I will then provide a discussion and a conclusion in the last chapters.

2. Political settings of France and Senegal

2.1. France

France has a system where power is shared among the President, the Prime minister, and the Parliament since 1958 as established by the Constitution of the Vth French Republic. Some scholars qualify it as a semi-presidential system since Maurice Duverger started to use it in political literature. This term is used when three conditions are met: (1) The President is elected through direct universal suffrage; (2) The chief of state has their own powers; and (3) the Government is accountable to the Parliament (Duverger, 1970). The concept has received many critics over the years, and Duverger himself stated later that France stays a Parliamentary regime as the share of powers established by the 1958 Constitution is rather flexible (Duverger, 1996).

The President holds the executive power, while the Prime minister and the Parliament share the legislative power. The French Parliament is divided between the National Assembly and the Senate. Any bill must be submitted to the National Assembly, which is composed of 577 deputies. It generally amends the text and sends a revised version to the Senate for approval. The Senate can also make amendments, but the decision whether to accept them or not lies with the deputies. The President then as to comply with the will of the Parliament and organize the institutions in order to carry the chosen policies. The Prime minister has the right to make decisions for any regulation that is not categorized as a law. Regarding sustainability, the National Assembly has a permanent commission for sustainability and territorial planning where texts are publicly debated before they are sent to the Senate.

The Government is divided into several ministries, in addition to the Prime minister's office, with each of them focusing on a specific topic. There are currently 17 of them in France. The Ministry of Ecological Transition created a website to follow the French progress on sustainability, called Agenda 2030, where the roles of the main state actors in this context are clearly stated. The cross-ministerial delegate for sustainable development is responsible for the coordination of Agenda 2030 at the state-level, and the delegation for sustainability under his authority manages the website (French Ministry of Ecological Transition, n.d.). Table 1, created from the information available on Agenda 2030, describes the importance of the ministries cited in the case study of this thesis regarding SDGs 16 and 17.

Table 1. The role of French ministries regarding SDG 16 and 17 (created by the author based on French Ministry of Ecological Transition, n.d.)

	SDG 16	SDG 17
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs	Key ministry	All are key ministries
Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty	Associated ministry	

Out of all the ministries, the only one that is a key institution for all SDGs in France is the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Ecological Transition, n. d.). Its main duties are to coordinate and establish the international relations and foreign politics of the country, to inform the President and the Government about the situation of foreign States and the global context, and to promote and protect France's interests abroad (French Government, n.d.).

Regarding SDG 16, the figures communicated by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs show that 20% of the credits that it has given to the AFD are used for projects related to vulnerable populations, human rights and governance (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2017a). They also indicate that a budget of €100 million per year is allocated to the alleviation of international vulnerabilities and crisis management since 2016.

The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs has also been acting for SDG 17 by supporting various initiatives worldwide and organizing meetings with leaders of international development (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2017b). These discussions have been taking place within the National Council for Development and International Solidarity (CNDSI), which includes 50 non-governmental actors among its 67 members. From 2021, the CNDSI is consulted for the yearly report on French international solidarity policy and the evaluation report on this policy is submitted to this institution as well (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022a).

The Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty acts as a key ministry for SDG 17, and as an associated one for SDG 16. Its attributions are related to the financial and monetary policy of France not only at the national level, but at the regional and international as well (Decree on the attributions of the Minister of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, 2022).

All these ministries are overseen by the Prime minister. For instance, former Prime minister Jean Castex gave deputy Florence Provendier a temporary mission in 2021 to suggest cooperation and mobilization elements to strengthen France's action towards SDGs (French Ministry of Ecological Transition, 2021). This report will be used as one of the data for the case study of this thesis.

Some national-scale projects organized by the State have included citizens in sustainability and democracy discussion. For instance, the grand national debate of 2019 offered French people to voice their opinions on four main themes: public expanses and finances, ecological transition, public services management, and democracy and citizenship. Almost 2 million people answered the online survey, 16,000 cities and towns prepared "citizen notebooks", and 10,000 local meetings took place (Le grand débat national, 2019). An example of a result related to both SDG 16 and 17 is that 52% of the survey respondents think that syndicates and associations should be given a more important role (Opinionway, 2019). No data on the effect of this debate on policymaking has been published yet.

France is also involved in multi-level organizations that have defined SDGs or allow for a coherent implementation of the goals at the regional level. It is a member of the United Nations and a permanent member of its Security Council. At the regional level, France is part of the European Union (EU). The latter has been providing policies to implement SDGs in a coherent manner between member states. Regarding SDG 16, the EU has assisted 47 000 victims whose human rights were violated, helped 22 countries organize elections, and it supported 3 156 000 people in contexts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding (European Commission, n.d.). As for SDG 17, the EU stands as the largest donor of ODA (European Commission, n.d.), while France is the 4th largest ODA provider in terms of donating countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020).

2.2.Senegal

The current Senegalese system is similar from the French one. The government is composed of 33 ministries. Data on key and associated ministries for SDG 16 and 17 is not available, therefore a description of the same ministries cited in the French case will be provided. This choice is motivated by the will to provide the most balanced information on both systems and the similarities between both systems, which might show comparable attributions between the ministries of the two countries.

The equivalent in Senegal to the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs is the Senegalese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad. It is tasked with international relations management and negotiating treaties, as well as overseeing services for the Senegalese living abroad (Decree on the attributions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, 2022).

The Minister of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation of Senegal implements the financial, economic, development, statistics, cooperation and population policies (Decree on the attributions of the Minister of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, 2022). In terms of economy and finance, the minister negotiates with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and has a representative role in various international financial institutions, such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, and the Islamic Development Bank (Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, 2020b).

SDGs implementation is cited as part of the planning missions of the minister, as well the coordination of national development strategies (Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, 2020c). Together with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy seeks funding from external sources to support development programs (Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, 2020a). It also supervises the funding of programs and projects in general.

Another ministry whose activity is related to SDGs 16 and 17 is the Ministry of Civil Service and Transformation of the Public Sector. It is tasked with representing Senegal in international organizations addressing civil service, preparing related policies, and managing the performance of public structures and administrations to ensure that they follow the developmental strategy of Senegal (Decree on the attributions of the Minister of Civil Service and Transformation of the Public Sector, 2022).

The Senegalese Ministry of the Environment, Sustainable Development and Ecological Transition represents Senegal in international structures promoting sustainability (Decree on the attributions of the Minister of the Environment, Sustainable Development and Ecological Transition, 2022). Additionally, the Ministry of Territorial Collectivity, Development and Spatial Planning has been directly cooperating with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to create tracking tools for SDG 16, which is essential for good governance according to the international organization (UNDP, 2019). Local and international consultants have been asked by the UNDP to facilitate, animate, implement and run this initiative.

For a long time, Senegal had the same type of system as France, with a President, a Prime minister and a Parliament, with a similar share of power. However, in 2019, the position of Prime minister was revoked by President Macky Sall short after his own reelection, and the powers of the former were distributed between the President and the National Assembly (Constitutional law on the revision of the Constitution, 2019). This policy reinforced the role of the Head of State. It was nonetheless decided in December 2021 to reinstate the position of Prime minister (Boko, 2021). President Sall has yet to announce who would take up this responsibility. The uncertainty around the current attributions of the Prime minister does not allow for an assessment of their involvement in the implementation of SDGs and the coordination of the activities of ministries.

Table 2 offers an overview of the attributions of French and Senegalese ministries regarding SDGs 16 and 17.

Table 2. The distribution of SDGs 16 and 17-related attribution between ministries in France and Senegal (created by the author)

Ministry	France	Senegal
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (France) / Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad (Senegal)	SDGs 16 and 17: foreign policy SDG 16: AFD SDG 17: supports worldwide initiatives	SDGs 16 and 17: international relations management SDG 16: election organization, treaties, services management for diaspora
Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty (France) / Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation (Senegal)	SDG 17: national and international monetary and financial policy	SDG 17: finances, economy, development, statistics, cooperation, projects funding
Other ministries	*Prime minister:* Oversees coherence between ministries	*Prime minister:* Uncertain
		Ministry of Territorial Collectivity, Development and Spatial Planning:

	17	SDGs 16 and 17: cooperation with UNDP to design tool for tracking SDG 16
		Ministry of Civil Service and Transformation of the Public Sector: SDG 16: performance management of the public sector SDG 17: representation of civil service of Senegal at international level
		Ministry of the Environment, Sustainable Development and Ecological Transition: SDG 17: representation of sustainable development of Senegal at international level

3. Perspectives on Sustainable Development Goals n° 16 and 17

3.1. Sustainable Development Goal n° 16: A focus on governance

The 16th Sustainable Development Goal has 12 targets. It covers a wide range of matters and fields, from decision-making to corruption and security, with the focus being put on peace, inclusion, justice and institutions (United Nations, 2015). With its strong administrative and political aspects, SDG 16 highlights the role of governance in sustainable development.

Scholars have been offering various definitions of governance over time. They ultimately converge toward a general understanding of this concept that "refers to the political field and political activity as the vital task of every national government" (Asaduzzaman & Virtanen, 2018, p. 2909). Moreover, definitions of governance "all, to some extent, focus on the role of networks in the pursuit of common goals; these networks could be intergovernmental or inter-organizational […], they could be transnational […] or they could be networks of trust and reciprocity crossing the state-society divide […]" (Kjær, 2004, pp. 3–4). Asaduzzaman and Virtanen (2018) add that this concept questions who should have decisional power and to what extent.

Approaches to governance have evolved over time and are now concentrated into four clusters, namely groups of regimes, institutional interaction and management, metagovernance and orchestration, and nexus approach, which all have a link to global governance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). The review of various approaches, from functionalism to the examination of its analytical or multi-level properties, led Hofferberth to conceptualize global governance as "an approach to studying and doing world politics in which both practitioners and scholars perceive the current state of world order as diffuse, polyarchic, and multilayered" (Hofferberth, 2018, p. 2418). Hofferberth (2018) highlights that current debates on global governance focus on how much and what kind of global governance is preferable, with two opposite trends that either acknowledge or disapprove of its legitimacy.

Three out of the four current clusters of governance focus on international institutions and their relations to other actors or other global structures. The nexus approach focuses on how different sectors are being covered by policies (Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). Groups of regimes analyze the systems that international institutions belong to (Orsini et al., 2013). Institutional interaction refers to the study of the consequences of the actions of international institutions beyond their own prerogatives (Gehring & Oberthür, 2008).

Metagovernance distinguishes itself from the other three clusters as it gives a central role to public actors in global governance. Meuleman (2019) describes metagovernance, also named the 'governance of governance', as "a means by which to produce some degree of coordinated governance, by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market and network governance, to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for the performance of public sector organizations: public managers as 'metagovernors'" (Meuleman, 2008, p. 68). Through this approach, global governance is dictated by preferences from countries as policies are based on the values of public actors.

Laberge and Touihri (2019) believe that the 2030 Agenda offers counter measures against the influence of international organization on domestic governance by encouraging national initiatives toward the domestication of the goals and national reporting on the progress toward the goals. They also observe that the large scope of the issues that SDG 16 addresses has drawn skepticism from scholars regarding the measurement of the concepts of justice, inclusion and peace. However, Laberge and Touihri emphasize that nationally owned and created indicators for SDG 16 could boost the accountability of countries and make it more relevant in terms of governance since measurements would be adapted to their situations.

While through these perspectives, tensions linked to influence seem to arise between the national and global levels, Brown (2018) refers to global and national governance as encompassing categories, with the former focusing on the world and the second on the states, which are interacting dynamically at the empirical and conceptual levels. In a similar way as Gutmann and Gorman for the Sustainable Development Goals, Brown retraces the history of both concepts, showing changes of state behaviors at the birth of the United Nations, and, reversely, the outcomes of global interconnectedness on domestic inequalities, popular sovereignty, and democratic accountability. Brown observes that the traditional assumption that governments directly regulate public policy is no longer applicable to the modern state, which must compose with complex networks involving informal and formal interactions, and negotiations between state and non-states actors and organizations. The process of state-building also now involves a prior stage of transferring governance institutions from one society to another.

In her study of the conceptualization of SDG 16, Smith-Simonsen (2022) argues that it is the only one that is linked to every other SDG, while the rest of them are either intertwined or interlinked. Whaites (2016) examines the current indicators of SDG 16 and argues that while the progress of most countries in reaching SDG 16 is not fast enough, it is too soon to give up. Rather, more attention should be paid to factors that have impacts, whether negative or positive, on how fast governance

reform progresses. These factors are economic growth, global norms, international assistance quality, political settlement, and external incentives. Whaites advises for actors related to development cooperation actors to evolve not only in terms of vocabulary used, but in terms of practices as well. It can be done with: (1) radical innovation; (2) changes in the ways of collaborating; (3) political activity; and (4) effective measures.

Another recurring theme in literature on SDG 16 is the institutionalization of SDG 16. Ivanovic et al. (2018) noticed that this objective is integrated into global institutional frameworks as an international ethical norm, but this process lacks consistency even at the UN level. They observe that innovations have been born at the national level from implementing SDG 16 and consider the enlargement of continued innovation to other countries as an important factor for promoting the goal into a norm. However, in the current discourse of SDG 16, the efforts toward institutional innovation might not be balanced.

Though the targets of this objective were formulated in a way to concern all types of countries, Smith-Simonsen (2022) observed that some of them are directly aimed at addressing issues of the Global South by emphasizing the need for stronger institutions in these nations. Her study nonetheless showed that few evidence backed this vision, meaning that the Global North would also have to deal with legitimacy and trust issues toward its own institutions. Despite these reflections, Smith-Simonsen still considers SDG 16 as a turning point toward more comprehensive and open interpretations of just societies and peace, but this objective would need cooperation between the involved actors to go toward that direction.

3.2. Sustainable Development Goal n° 17: Perspectives on international cooperation

The topic of cooperation is at the core of the 17th Sustainable Development Goal as it calls for partnerships to implement the 2030 Agenda. Implementation refers to "the stage of execution or enforcement of a policy by the responsible institutions and organizations that are often, but not always, part of the public sector" (Jann & Wegrich, 2007, p. 51). Ideally, this process contains three elements: 1) detailed information on the program, including a specification of the executers of the plan and the interpretation of the law; 2) resources allocation, with a clear distribution of the budgets, and appointment of personnel and units; and 3) decisions, including expecting mechanisms to answer to single cases (Jann & Wegrich, 2007).

Regarding the implementation of SDGs, Akenroye et al. (2018) have developed a framework for developing countries to address the wideness of the SDGs, and the massive funding that they need to implement them. Their approach consists of three steps: creating a SDGs steering group, proceeding with gap and baseline analyses, and establishing a road map. According to Akenroye, Nygård, and Eyo, this framework is supposed to help developing countries prevent economic slowdown and the budgetary pressures that it entails, as it happened with the Millennium Development Goals.

Literature on the implementation of the Goals has already started analyzing progress toward the completion of the 2030 Agenda. Allen et al. (2018) have conducted a review of evidence and science-based literature on initial progress toward SDGs in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. Such publications are supposed to produce objective information. The article of Allen et al. highlights that evidence and science-based literature on SDGs will require focusing more on nexuses, which link a limited set of targets, and using a set of various analyses to illustrate linkages between SDGs for policymakers. The challenge would then be to adapt analyses to create a common ground to conduct them from.

Nilsson et al. (2017) have developed a framework to identify and assess the type of interaction between SDGs and the level of coherence that policies mixing them can achieve. They use a goal scoring approach to quantify the coherence performance of policies, according to the following qualification of the interactions: "indivisible" (3 points), "reinforcing" (2 points), "enabling" (1 point), "consistent" (0 point), "constraining" (-1 point), "counteracting" (-2 points), "canceling" (-3 points).

Another important nexus to consider is the convergence of forces at the global level implied by the call of Sustainable Development Goal 17 for international cooperation. As Gorman (2022) reminds, this objective does not address a particular challenge of development but focuses on its implementation by encouraging actors to mobilize existing partnerships and creating new ones when necessary. He argues that SDG 17 was derived from lessons drawn from past cooperation experiences. According to him, an international 'network of networks' was developed in the 1970s, at the same time as the rise of sustainable development narrative at the global level. These networks developed into current structures of global governance and provided norms and tools for SDGs.

After the launch of the 2030 Agenda, scholars began drawing cooperation frameworks to address the collaboration and implementation challenges encompassed in SDG 17. Duane et al. (2021) applied a social marketing approach to partnerships to answer a call from both the field and the United Nations to fill a gap. Their study reveals that trust and commitment are major elements for change strategies.

For the authors, partnerships for change are highly likely to foster smarter and more effective collaboration, as they can tackle more complexities.

Indirectly, Oliveira-Duarte et al. (2021) gave more insights on possible paths for change by investigating Innovation Ecosystems (IE) to offer another perspective for multi-stakeholder partnerships. They come to the same conclusion as Duane et al. (2021): no actor can tackle alone the scope of the SDGs and their implementation. Oliveira-Duarte et al. emphasize the need for stakeholders to act as ecosystems informed and conscious of the demand for innovations to be implemented. In this context, knowledge transmission, geographical governance, value co-creation core drivers, and collaboration, are key information for IE.

A last characteristic of the type of international cooperation promoted by Sustainable Development Goal 17 that scholars have noticed and examined is its normative aspect. Values and principles listed in the goal are expected to be drivers of partnerships, as well as the common vision of sustainable development promoted by the 2030 Agenda which focuses on the planet and the people (Gorman, 2022).

Sondermann and Ulbert (2021) link the concept of metagovernance, which refers to the question of how governance should be conducted and by whom, to the normative aspect of SDG 17. More precisely, the authors consider that the objective is a metanorm of good governance, emphasizing that it promotes "meaningful" cooperations. Sondermann and Ulbert offered an interpretation of such meaningfulness by studying the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in partnerships and found that they could only acquire this characteristic when CSOs could perform the integrality of their roles, from decision-making watchdogs to representatives of social interests. Then, by extension, it could be argued that cooperation is only meaningful when all actors can fill their respective parts.

SDGs are all attributed targets. In Table 3, I have listed the targets that focus on governance and the cooperation between developed and developing countries. In chapter 5, they will be used as a basis to develop codes for the group "national preferences". They are also present in chapter 6 to illustrate findings related to them.

Table 3. Sustainable Development Goals targets examined in this thesis (created by the author and adapted from United Nations, 2015)

SDG	Category	Target
SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels		16.3 Promote the **rule of law** at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
		16.5 Substantially reduce **corruption** and **bribery** in all their forms
		16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent **institutions** at all levels
		16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative **decision-making** at all levels
		16.8 Broaden and strengthen the **participation of developing countries** in the institutions of global governance
		16.A Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for **building capacity** at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
SDG 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development	Finance	17.1 Strengthen **domestic resource mobilization**, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection
		17.2 Developed countries to implement fully their **official development assistance** commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries
	Capacity-building	17.9 Enhance international support for implementing **effective and targeted capacity-building** in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation
	Systemic issues	17.14 Enhance **policy coherence** for sustainable development
		17.15 Respect **each country's policy space** and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development

As shown in this table, topics of SDG 16 related to governance involve the rule of law (target 16.3), corruption and bribery (target 16.5), institutions (target 16.6), decision-making (16.7), developing countries participation (target 16.8), and capacity-building (target 16.A). As for SDG 17, cooperation is linked to domestic resource mobilization (target 17.1), official development assistance (target 17.2), capacity-building (17.9), policy coherence (target 17.14) and policy space respect (target 17.15).

In this chapter, I have reviewed existing literature on the two Sustainable Development Goals that constitute the basis for this thesis. Scholars have highlighted the governance challenges around SDG 16, and the cooperation issues addressed by SDG 17 to improve paths that countries can take for the pursuit of the 2030 Agenda. The following chapter will focus on the main concepts of this thesis.

4. Conceptual framework

As established in chapter 1, this thesis aims at studying the implementation of SDGs 16 and 17, their application through official development assistance, and the representation of national preferences in this context. The following conceptual framework was designed to achieve these objectives.

I will first focus on the formalization of the relations between donor and recipient countries. In this perspective, official development assistance acts as a mechanism of the structure of cooperation, by assigning roles through bilateral cooperation, funding and accountability, and international agreements. This perspective will allow me to bring more insights from literature to the bonds that it creates and the influences that it receives from the international level, and connect them to the SDGs context.

Second, I will focus on the link between institutions and cooperation to highlight how the strength of the former has effects on the development of the latter. This is important as implementation of SDGs 16 and 17 involves these two concepts.

Third, I will focus on national preferences through the appropriation of SDGs by states and the mechanisms that these actors use to promote their own preferences within cooperation. This will highlight how partnership is also influenced by the identified issues and strategies of each country.

4.1. The formalization of donor and recipient countries' relations

The relations of donor and recipient countries are structured based on the funding mechanism that they choose, depending on factors such as the nature and number of actors that it involves, the source of the funding, and the target of aid. Literature and governments have been using the definition provided by the OECD to characterize official development assistance, which refers to "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries" (OECD, n. d). The organization also points out that state and local official agencies are the actors who give this type of concessional assistance, which can, for example, take the shape of soft loans and grants. Beneficiary countries must be part of a list established by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD that has per capita income as criterion for registration.

In the following sub-chapters, I will focus on the formalization of the relations between donor and recipient countries through the processes of the ODA mechanism, namely bilateral cooperation, funding and accountability, and international agreements.

4.1.1. Bilateral cooperation

Bilateralism refers to a situation "affecting two parties; often used in relation to negotiations or agreement between two countries […] seeking mutually beneficial solutions to disputes, and improved collaboration and cooperation" (Brown et al., 2018). Abidde (2018) considers that the search for mutual benefits is broader and regards all bilateral agreements.

Official development assistance presents a type of bilateral cooperation where resources are sent from one country to another one. Out of the many inferences that Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) have made on bilateral aid allocation based on their study of 137 recipients and 22 donors, it appears that the grant of assistance is progressive but reduced on the long term, that postcolonial relations are still relevant in the choice of the supported countries by donors though it also tends to decrease over time, and that the most strategic action to keep attracting it is to develop democratic behaviors.

Donor countries tend to focus on nations that present strategic advantages for them and on human rights promotion more than on alleviating the economic difficulties of recipient countries (Younas, 2008). Official development assistance was traditionally meant for poverty alleviation in poorer countries, adopting a North-South cooperation mindset (Chaturvedi et al., 2020). Chaturvedi et al. notice that, while this question is still relevant, the scope of ODA has been broadened and is now largely considered in literature as a contributing mechanism of donors in the developmental policies of their recipients.

Official development assistance as a form of bilateral cooperation presents governance challenges which affect the positions of countries in this partnership. Airey (2022) observed that some legal dimensions of ODA are overlooked by literature or hidden. Airey believes that revealing them: 1) allows for more interactions between ODA and formal governance and law institutions; 2) gives executive authority to recipient states for the policymaking and implementation stages; and 3) reflects highly distinct political and legal subjectivities of both recipient and donor countries, which has implications for the democratic and legal institutions of the former ones, as hidden aspects of ODA distances them from executive positions. Therefore, particular attention should be directed toward the

role of law and the inclusion of the juridical in the regularity, rule and rationality in the governance of ODA.

Despite these challenges and the general skepticism in literature toward the potentiality of foreign aid for developing political economy in target countries that de Milly (2016) observed, the latter states that this type of cooperation has the capacity to bring change. Along with the resources that it mobilizes, official development assistance provides analysis supported by open visions, qualitative data, dynamics, will for change, and most importantly, a neutral stance toward tensions that exist or arise at the local level. This makes de Milly believe that official development assistance has a role to play in the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda Goals.

4.1.2. Funding and accountability

Accountability has been defined as "a rule-based system that stimulates or constrains behavior by holding actors responsible to their actions" (Breuer & Leininger, 2021, p. 3). In the context of SDGs, Breuer and Leininger (2021) argue that horizontal accountability, meaning accountability exercised between independent state institutions, will be a main factor for accountable regimes regarding the pursuit of the 2030 Agenda at the national level.

Dann (2013) identifies several functions of accountability in development aid: guaranteeing compliance, strengthening organizational learning, providing legitimacy, and giving information. Drawing from the claim of Soll (2014) that giving attention to financial accountability is key for the prosperity of society, Barth (2015) studied the role of financial accounting as information-provider of resources allocation. She noticed that there is a distance between literature and practice, created by the disproportionate amount of works on how the information is shared rather than on its characteristics and content.

Focusing on content, Clements (2020) points out that while reports on development and aid projects usually reflect positive performances, data at country-level is less consistent and present various results, from positive to insignificant or only positive in certain contexts, or even negative ones. He also observes that multilateral and bilateral agencies focusing on assessment of development assistance, and funded by the OECD countries, have adopted the five criteria of DAC in their evaluations, namely effectiveness, relevance, impact, efficiency, and sustainability. Clements believes that, as a result, the outcomes reported by these agencies are more positively biased than other measures, such as economic cost-benefit analysis, which is more linked to economic gains.

Roles of actors also influence accountability. In the development aid context, it faces several structural challenges (Dann, 2013). First, the question of who should be qualified as accountability holder, in contrast to the power wielder who is held accountable, can be difficult to answer. The analysis carried out by Dann showed that, in practice, external experts and internal control units act as accountability holders, though their distance to power wielders remains debatable. More importantly, taxpayers, recipient governments and people concerned by the projects are not given enough opportunities to directly hold donors accountable. The second structural issue is standards, as most of them are decided by power wielders. Finally, Dann believes that there is a discrepancy between donors and recipients in terms of sanctions, as consequences for misconduct can lead to funding cuts or paybacks for the latter, while the former is usually less impacted by legal penalties.

Other issues that recipients can face regarding accountability are linked to: the technicalities of the projects, as they are often rendered complex; resources, as the intended beneficiaries might see them being monopolized by other actors in a context of weak institutions and poor countries; and aid resource flows, as they can have negative impacts if the state institutions are not strong enough, such as reinforcing corruption (Wenar, 2016).

Despite these challenges, literature shows that, depending on the use of accountability, it can create opportunities for sustainable development, cooperation and stronger institutions. Majumdar and Mukand (2015) argue that higher levels of political accountability can increase investments in institutions in a context of policy intervention for development. They observe that the outcomes of developmental policies are determined by whether they consolidate democratic systems and their economy or worsen the existing structures.

Accountability can also provide end users of services supported by aid with more voice through participatory mechanisms and, most importantly, threat means by leaving them the choice of exiting the project at any time (Winters, 2010). However, as participatory mechanisms have not shown enough efficiency in influencing the conditions for aid allocation, Winters believes that it is the responsibility of the donors to improve their accountability toward recipients.

4.1.3. International agreements

Official development assistance, which was first introduced by the OECD, is structured by international agreements, including the 2030 Agenda, before being adapted by donor and recipient countries to specific cases. Mawdsley et al. (2014) observed a paradigm shift at the 2011 Busan High

Level Forum and its affiliated agreement, namely the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, from "aid effectiveness" to "development effectiveness", marking the beginning of a "post-aid world" for many policymakers and development professionals. They point out that the "aid effectiveness" paradigm had emerged in the late 1990s, after a hiatus of Western countries donation following the end of the Cold War.

Mawdsley et al. (2014) noticed that, at the 2011 High Level Forum coordinated by the OECD, a new focus was put on poverty reduction and promoting good governance, in a context of global financial crisis, rising voices of aid recipients and the growth of emerging powers. They attribute this change partly to the influence of the Millenium Development Goals. The paradigm of "development effectiveness" thus incorporated official development assistance within development finance, while it had been viewed as a separate flow until then, which also broadened the scope of development actors. For instance, new donors, who unlike France do not belong to the DAC, have been emerging.

Comparison between both donor groups offers the opportunity to emphasize the characteristics of the traditional one. Indeed, while both old and new donors overlook the level of corruption in recipient countries when attributing merits and have been assigned disproportionate levels of influence of their commercial interest over aid allocation, new donors generally attribute less consideration to the needs of recipient countries in contrast with older ones (Dreher et al., 2011). Therefore, while new donors will be important for global development partnerships, DAC ones still have a role to play for the viability of international cooperation (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2019).

The influence of international agreements over official development assistance can also be observed through the conditions of the partnership, or conditionality. Molenaers et al. (2015) highlight that conditions have globally been undergoing changes, with noticeable variations between the 1990s and post-2000s types of conditionality. While punitions and reactions qualified the older one, with threats of backing off if the recipient did not meet the criteria, the current one focuses on democratic governance of both aid and its target country, and adds rewards, proactiveness and selectivity in the aid allocation framework. Molenaers et al. also observe that beside the poverty reduction mechanisms promoted by the World Bank and the Millenium Development Goals, the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness also incorporated mutual accountability, harmonization, ownership, results-orientation and alignment to aid allocation fundamentals

However, linking ODA with conditionality imposed by other actors such as International Finance Institutions (IFIs) shows ineffective and counterproductive effects of the current conditions system, which may result in developing countries looking for other sources of funding if criteria do not become more country-specific, instead of doctrinarian (Jakupec & Kelly, 2016). In that sense, the

2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals, which are non-binding and promote the consideration of national contexts, may offer alternatives to conditionality and the cooperation dynamics that it created.

4.2. From strong institutions to strengthened cooperation

Institutions and cooperation are essential components for implementation. March and Olsen define political institutions as "collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations" (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 160). They identify the legal system, the legislature and the state as traditional representations of this concept. In other words, institutions in a cooperative context bring forward the norms and values of different societies and look for mutual benefits based on their own perception of what is best for them.

Moreover, March and Olsen (1989) highlight that change and stability provision, as well as meaning, actors and interests' construction, are the roles of institutions. They add that "unless we assume that political environment is stable, it is likely that the rate of change in the environment will exceed the rate of adjustment to it" (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 168). Therefore, strong institutions are needed to both bring stability to implement desired changes regarding SDGs 16 and 17, instead of enduring them, and have the capacity to represent the interests of their respective societies within cooperation to construct the most desirable outcome from the pursuit of these goals.

4.2.1. Institutions as pillars of stability

Institutional stability is often studied with and undermined by the literature on institutional change (Galik & Chelbi, 2021). On the one hand, studies on institutional change have highlighted that institutions are reluctant to change, and if change happens, institutions usually adapt to it in a path dependent manner, meaning that the options for novelty are constrained by existing institutional arrangements (Campbell, 2010). Therefore, institutional reproduction can be understood as a form of stability in a context of institutional change.

On the other hand, studies of institutional stability have mainly been focusing on its conceptualization and specific features. It can be qualified in four different manners depending on the intensity of intentionality and directionality, namely: failed action, intended inaction, active stability, and passive

stability (Galik & Chelbi, 2021). On a more practical aspect, institutional stability relies on four pillars: policy sub-fields interdependence, small adaptations of institutions, important switching costs, and dominant coalitions detaining sufficient bargaining power (Lindner, 2003).

Questioning the motivation for institutions to provide institutional stability leads to discussing institutional instability and legitimacy. According to Hartmann and Spruk (2021), institutional instability has both positive and negative long-terms consequences. It can, for instance, come from corruption, one of the issues addressed SDG 16, that acts as an informal institution which does not follow the norm and undermines stability in democracies (Fjelde & Hegre, 2014). In the positive scenario described by Hartmann and Spruk, institutional instability provides adaptive efficiency, whereas in the negative one, it fosters institutional weakening.

Theories of institutional legitimacy emphasize that institutional weakening could lead to interferences in the functions of the state. Indeed, a state is legitimate to perform its missions, such as public goods provision and the establishment of societal structures, if its law-making and law enforcement activities are not interrupted (Adams, 2018). Strong legitimate institutions are then needed for the state to perform its functions, such as implementation, of SDGs for instance. Adams points out that institutions can find legitimacy in their non-interference duty, meaning that they should not commit major wrongdoings such as human rights violation.

4.2.2. Institutions as intermediaries for cooperation

The identification of institutions as relevant intermediaries for cooperation is strengthened by their role in promoting mutually benefiting partnerships. Indeed, domestic institutions influence the benefits and costs of cooperation perceived by leaders, which impacts their behavior and decisions regarding foreign policy and bilateral cooperation (Leeds, 1999). Therefore, institutions have effects on choices regarding official development assistance as a bilateral mechanism for cooperation and the SDGs-related assistance that it provides.

Despite their influence, institutions cannot fully account for the choice to form a partnership. Elhardt (2015) points out that in a situation where countries risk more than what they could get from cooperation, focusing on trust can explain their choice to still engage in cooperation. He considers that, both on a theoretical and empirical aspect, institutions and trust should be conceived as complementary mechanisms that possess interesting risk absorption capacity. Low-level of risk absorption by institutions would require more absorption based on trust, and reciprocally, strong

institutions would allow for less reliance on trust, though it does not mean that trust would not be needed anymore.

Observed trends of bilateral cooperation also show that states tend to commit to larger degrees of cooperation with other countries of similar institutional designs, meaning that democracies would be more likely to engage in partnership with other democratic countries (Leeds, 1999). Additionally, in a democratic setting, Leeds notices that accountability and policy change constraints motivate leaders to consider foreign policy failure as a costly phenomenon, therefore their engagement in partnership can be considered credible.

By seeking mutual benefits, states mobilize their own resources, such as institutions, which also act as intermediaries for resource interdependence. The concept of policy networks illustrates this phenomenon. According to Compston, "a policy network is defined as a set of political actors who engage in resource exchange over public policy (policy decisions) as a consequence of their resource interdependencies" (Compston, 2009, p. 11). Policy networks also influence institutional behavior in the context of cooperation. Warren (1967) argues that the nature of the networks and patterns of organizations influence their interactions with other ones. Additionally, Compston (2009) points out that resources are mobilized to address policy issues perceived by the actors of policy networks, who design strategic solutions that would allow them to add their policy preferences to the design of the plan, which will lead me to review the implications of national policy preferences in chapter 4.3.

4.3. National preferences

The pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals via official development assistance reflects how two countries who are supposed to reach towards the same goals at the national level cooperate for the pursuit of the goals in one nation, while having their own separate preferences. I have chosen the concept of national preferences to qualify this phenomenon to consider both the national contexts of these countries and their policy preferences, as "the making of national preferences is shaped by the configurations of institutions and actors who constitute national polities" (de Maillard & Smith, 2012, p. 259).

Moravcsik defines national preferences as follows: "a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular international negotiation" (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 20). This concept is traditionally part of the terminology of European integration studies, which focuses on how political cooperation is intensified between member states (Dieze & Wiener, 2019). However, examples of its

use can be found in other disciplines, such as academia (Snidjer, 2022), or international politics (Maoz, 1995). With the call of the United Nations to adapt SDGs to national contexts, the concept of national preferences can provide useful insights to understand how goals and values of countries influence cooperation in the case of cooperation involving the implementation of an international common set of objectives. I argue that official development assistance, in this context, is used by donor countries to promote their own preferences in target countries, and conversely, recipient countries look for mechanisms to promote their own.

4.3.1. Appropriation of SDGs

Literature provides many bottom-up approaches to study the formation of national and policy preferences. For instance, Chu and Recchia (2022) demonstrate that public opinion can influence leaders of foreign policy and their preferences; Egan (2014) shows how policy preferences can emerge from the citizens when discontent with how states deal with issues; Jorgensen et al. (2018) argue that considering general political knowledge of the public is important to understand collective preferences formation. Therefore, it can be assumed that national preferences reflect, at least partially, societal contexts, which are then indivisible from national preferences formation.

How can countries apply and adapt external goals into their institutional structures according to their policy preferences and national context? Several conjectures can be made. For instance, countries could have no prior policy related to the goal, or they could have related arrangements but with varying success rates and knowledge gained from them. If the goal has not already been achieved with existing policies, then institutions and policies would undergo changes. Hall (1993) distinguishes three orders of change and their respective three types of policy change, namely adjustments to routinized policymaking, policy instruments creation, and periodic discontinuities. Hall argues that the latter one has more disruptive characteristics than the others. Real-Dato (2009) considers that the scope of change should be examined through the level of adjustments of policy designs, which refer to phenomena perceptible in programs, decrees, administrative guidelines, practices, and statues (Schneider & Ingram, 1997), at a particular timespan. Therefore, policy change induced by national preferences has a timeline and specific designs that integrate policy routine adjustments, policy instruments, and disruptive factors.

In comparative public policy scholars have traditionally studied policy change with another concept: policy learning. Busenberg (2001) considers learning as a process during which policy decisions are

made based on the acquirement of new ideas and information. More recent definitions have given more precisions on the context of learning, qualifying it as "the updating of beliefs based on lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction" (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013, p. 599).

Goyal and Howlett (2018) suggest that, rather than considering policy learning as a distinctive theoretical framework, it should be incorporated in other existing theories. Combined with policy change, research on policy learning has both highlighted opportunities for informed change and mechanisms preventing the process of using lessons to foster change and adapting it to policy preferences to occur (Moyson et al., 2017). While in a policy change approach, learning acts as an information-provider, lessons can also be an outcome originating from failure. Dunlop (2017) notices that policy learning considers all levels of policy failure, namely political, programmatic and processual, and that learning can be incomplete or dysfunctional. Policy experiences and the lessons that countries drew from them, whether they are complete or not, would then be incorporated in national preferences, which would influence national appropriations of SDGs.

4.3.2. Mechanisms of promotion of national preferences within cooperation

As bilateral cooperation involves two countries with their own national preferences, it is expected that they would want to influence the settings and outcomes of partnership to align them with their preferences. Countries have for instance been using projection mechanisms, that Bulmer and Burch (2005) refer to as the establishment of machinery to reinforce one's participation in rules formulation by getting familiar with the existing procedures. For instance, donor countries can reinforce their participation in official development assistance by establishing conditions for aid based on their preferences. However, Killick (1998) shows that the ability of conditionality to bring policy change is limited. Therefore, if the design of official development assistance mainly consists of conditions imposed by the donor, it could then be assumed that it would constrain policy change opportunities for the recipient country.

In the scenario of projection, national preferences of donors are intentionally interfering with the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals of the recipient countries through official development assistance. But, as shown previously, both countries mobilize their resources in this type of cooperation as they enter a resource interdependence process, which can lead to policy transfer. According to Dolowitz and Marsh, who developed this concept, policy transfer refers to "a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or

place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place" (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 344). It can also be both voluntary and coercive, meaning that it can be added to projection as a mechanism for donors to enforce national preferences in recipient countries, but also that recipients can voluntarily choose elements of the preferences of donors, or the 2030 Agenda, and apply them to their own institutional and policy structures

In a later article, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) argued that those who can engage in the policy transfer process are political parties, elected officials, civil servants/bureaucrats, experts and policy entrepreneurs, pressure groups, think tanks, transnational corporations, and non-governmental and supra-national consultants and institutions. They also broadened the scope of what can be transferred, from policy goals and instruments, to ideologies, or even negative lessons. There are also several degrees of transfer depending on how much has been taken from another country's experience.

There is nevertheless a risk of policy failure, as inappropriate, uninformed or incomplete transfer can result in implementation failure. Critique points out that it is hard to prove the existence of learning processes from policy transfer as actors are being over-rationalized in this framework and omits non-rational behaviors (Dumoulin & Saurugger, 2010). However, applying policy transfer to aid has allowed Hwang and Song (2019) to highlight some elements for policy success. They argue that, in a context of official development assistance, governments need to identify those who can network with agencies from donor countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), inform them about the policy to be transferred, and connect with the local political context. Fawcett and Marsh (2012) also identified strong commitment and policy branding to the list of factors for policy transfer success and emphasize that rules that have been tested elsewhere provide further information for the main actors of policy transfer and higher legitimacy to the policy.

4.4. Overview of conceptual framework

In Figure 1, I summarize the main elements provided by the definitions and main characteristics of the formalization of role of recipient and donor countries, strong institutions and strengthened cooperation, and national preferences.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework (created by the author)

Formalization of the roles of donor and recipient countries' relations			From strong institutions to strengthened cooperation		National preferences	
Bilateral cooperation	**Funding and accountability**	**International agreements**	**Institutions as pillars of stability**	**Institutions as pillars of stability**	**Appropriation of SDGs**	**Promotion of national preferences**
Mutual benefits Improved cooperation Resources Governance challenges	Compliance Learning Legitimacy Information Financial accountability Roles Political accountability	Development effectiveness Forced conditions	Institutional stability Change Legitimacy	Benefits and costs Networks	Preference formation Change Learning	Forced Voluntary Projection Transfer

The literature used for this conceptual framework has helped to identify various concepts that I assume will address the assistance provided by France's ODA to Senegal in the latter's pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17. These elements are namely mutual benefits, improved cooperation, resources, governance challenges, compliance, learning (from accountability), legitimacy (from accountability), information, financial accountability, roles, political accountability, development effectiveness, forced condition, institutional stability, institutional change, legitimacy (of institutions), benefits and costs, networks, preference formation, change (from SDGs appropriation), learning (from SDGs appropriation), coercion (for 'forced'), will (for 'voluntary'), projection and transfer.

In the next chapter, I will present the data and method that I will use for this thesis.

5. Data and method

5.1. Qualitative research and case studies

While qualitative research was first conceived as the opposite to what quantitative research is, it is now acknowledged for its own characteristics (Flick, 2007). The variety of analyses that it comprises makes it difficult for scholars to agree on a generic definition. Nevertheless, its general characteristics have been identified as follows: "Qualitative research uses text as empirical material (instead of numbers), starts from the notion of the social construction of realities under study, is interested in the perspectives of participants, in everyday practices and everyday knowledge referring to the issue under study" (Flick, 2007, p. 2).

In their *Encyclopedia of case study research*, Mills et al. (2010) describe the fundamentals of this case study research. According to them, case study approaches cases in their environment and its specificities. This type of research is composed of several steps which determine the reliability and validity of the study, namely: (1) choosing the objects, (2) guaranteeing the availability and access to data, (3) developing a conceptual framework, and (4) collecting data. Once the information is gathered, it is processed through the analysis of the cases and results are interpreted to develop theories by highlighting paradoxes, adding new observations, and revealing the links between cases and their environments.

5.2. Data collection

There are three types of document tools: *tools of knowledge*, which refer to documents used and produced by academia; *tools of the economy*, which can be found in marketing, business and trade activities; and *tools of governance*, which public administration and political actors use with the aim of governing society (Asdal & Reinertsen, 2022). I will analyze the latter one to reflect how France and Senegal use government reports, plans and laws to integrate Sustainable Development Goals within the governance scheme of their own societies and cooperation.

The data that I will analyze is compiled in the following table.

Table 4. Data collected for this thesis (compiled by the author)[1]

Category	France		Senegal	
	Documents (9)	**Year, type, number of pages**	**Documents (9)**	**Year, type, number of pages**
Development and international cooperation	*Law 2021-1031 on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities*	Year: 2021 Type: law Pages: 29	*The Plan for an Emerging Senegal*	Year: 2014 Type: policy Pages: 184
	French policy for development	Year: 2022 Type: policy Pages: 133	*The Plan for an Emerging Senegal: 2019-2023 Priority Actions Plan*	Year: 2018 Type: policy Pages: 144
	French policy on international cooperation within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for sustainability	Year: 2016 Type: report Pages: 106	*The Plan for an Emerging Senegal: Priority Actions Plan 2 Adjusted and Accelerated (PAP 2A) for Economic Boost*	Year: 2020 Type: policy Pages: 56
	Human rights and development strategy	Year: 2019 Type: policy Pages: 32	*Presentation to the 2018 Advisory Group*	Year: 2018 Type: presentation Pages: 38
SDGs implementation	*Report on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals*	Year: 2016 Type: VNR Pages: 54	*2018 Voluntary National Review*	Year: 2018 Type: VNR Pages: 153
	France's roadmap for the 2030 Agenda	Year: 2019 Type: policy Pages: 36	*2022 Voluntary National Review*	Year: 2022 Type: VNR Pages: 96
	France's checkpoint on the implementation of 2030 Agenda	Year: 2019 Type: report Pages: 84	*Sustainable Development Goals: Update on Implementation in 2019*	Year: 2019 Type: report Pages: 68
	SDGs: Everything is linked!	Year: 2022 Type: report Pages: 118	*Senegal by 2030: Analysis of scenarios of progress towards SDGs*	Year: 2018 Type: report Pages: 22
Tools for measuring progression towards SDGs	*French variation of SDG indicators*	Year: 2018 Type: report Pages: 165	*Implementation of a collection, analysis, tracking and monitoring tool for Sustainable Development Goal n° 16*	Year: 2021 Type: report Pages: 72
Total pages: 1590	**757**		**833**	

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[1] Refer to Table 8 in the Appendix for more details on the data collected for this thesis, including their source and description of their content

As all documents presented in Table 4 are all originally written in French, analyzing them will also imply interpreting them, not only to infer findings, but by translating the most relevant parts as well. Therefore, this thesis will enter the field of hermeneutics during analysis. This concept refers to focusing on interpretation and texts within their own contexts, and finally engaging the reader in their examination (Asdal & Reinertsen, 2022). Though it will not constitute the main method to analyze data for this thesis, the presentation of the documents in Table 4, including their titles, year, types, and length, and the precision added in Table 8 in the Appendix regarding their sources and descriptions put them into perspective and allow the reader to understand the selection of the data that I have collected.

In the following chapter, I will introduce the method that I have chosen to examine the documents listed above, namely directed content analysis.

5.3. Directed content analysis

Krippendorff defines content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 24). He considers that its goal is to offer new insights and improve the understanding of a researcher about a phenomenon. Contrary to other types of analyses, content analysis is not attached to a paradigm, such as phenomenology or grounded theory, but finds its origin in quantitative methods (Given, 2008). Payne and Payne (2004) highlight how the use of content analysis differs between quantitative and qualitative approaches. While the former focuses on the recurrence of themes, the latter is more concerned about values, attitudes and motivations. Payne and Payne also point out that researchers of the qualitative approach acknowledge that their own backgrounds influence the meanings that they identify behind the words used in documents.

Krippendorff (2019) identifies several components of content analysis: *unitizing*, which implies defining relevant elements; *sampling*, which requires drafting sampling plans; *coding/recording*, which indicates that the researcher is developing coding instructions; *reducing*, which implies compiling and clarifying the data with established methods; *inferring*: which could also be referred to as the interpretation stage based on analytical frameworks; and *narrating*: which is the final step and consists in answering the research questions and broadening the discussion. Krippendorff also argues that in the logics of content analysis, inferences made from the analysis of the texts are used to answer the research questions.

Methods of content analysis have been evolving, and researchers can be assisted by a growing amount of software. Neuendorf (2017) observes that traditional computer-coding strategy is only analyzing the texts, while the human-coding combination looks beyond words as it serves a broader goal or is completed with human coding when necessary. Among the uses of computer-assisted text analysis, she notes that some programs offer to develop new custom protocols and codes. For this thesis, I have chosen the software Atlas.ti to assist me for the data-coding part as it allows me to create my own codes.

Assarroudi et al. (2018) identify three methods of qualitative content analysis: conventional, summative, and directed. According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), directed content analysis examines a phenomenon using existing research where gaps have been observed. They consider that the aim of this approach is to prove the validity or broaden the conceptual dimension of a theoretical framework. Prior studies can support the formulation of research questions.

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) specify that directed content analysis follows a structured procedure. First, key concepts are derived from literature, which then turn into coding categories. Second, existing research acts as the ground for giving the definitions of the categories. Then, data is either immediately coded, or can undergo a prior stage of highlighting relevant text before the coding phase. I have chosen the second option for this thesis as it allows me to get more familiar with the texts before conducting the analysis. The results are used to validate, or not, a conceptual framework. It is possible to describe findings using the incidence of codes if relevant. Finally, the discussion is supported by the prior literature presented in the study. Hsieh and Shannon identify the use of existing literature as both the strength and the limitation of directed content analysis. They also remind that overemphasizing literature may undermine the contextual dimension of the phenomenon. Figure 2 illustrates how the method described by Hsieh and Shannon is applied in this thesis. I am then giving more information about the steps that it presents.

Figure 2. Application of directed content analysis based on the guidelines by Hsieh and Shannon (created by the author)

The coding group "assistance" was established to highlight how France, through its donor role and its institutions, assists Senegal in its pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17. It is therefore based on literature from sub-chapters 4.1 and 4.2. The coding group "national preferences" relies on elements from SDGs 16 and 17 to identify references to key themes of the goals presented in Table 3, or to the objectives themselves, in data from both France and Senegal. Naming this group after one of the concepts of the conceptual framework and basing its codes on SDGs 16 and 17 allowed to avoid focusing exclusively on literature, which would have undermined the contextual aspect of the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Defining coding groups facilitated the identification of relevant texts and consequently, the coding process of the data.

Assarroudi et al. (2018) add that most qualitative content studies use the conventional, or inductive, method, while there are significantly less available illustrations of directed content analysis to get inspiration from for this thesis. Inductive approach interprets data to construct a theory (Azungah, 2018). In contrast, this thesis partially applies a deductive perspective, where the conceptual framework constitutes the pillar of the analysis, as highlighted by Azungah. Directed content analysis provides the opportunity to expand this framework.

As the conduction of directed content analysis offered by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) relies on coding various texts by using the same categories, the type of analysis carried out in this thesis can be said to be iterative. According to Mills et al., "*iterative* refers to a systematic, repetitive, and recursive process in qualitative data analysis. An iterative approach involves a sequence of tasks carried out in exactly the same manner each time and executed multiple times" (Mills et al., 2010, p. 504). Mills et al. point out that this type of approach applies a philosophy of ongoing change and flexibility toward new information, which creates a process of recurring loops. It means that the research process is not linear but requires to alternate between working on the research design, the data and the analysis methods. Overall, Mills et al. consider that the systematic recurrence of a series of tasks applied to multiple documents provides reliability to the study.

The codes listed in Table 5 have been developed based on the conceptual framework for the assistance group and the SDG targets presented in Table 3. A prior reading of the texts allowed for adapting codes to elements that were most apparent in the data before I conducted the analysis.

Table 5. Codes used with this thesis' data (created by the author)

Code group: contribution	Code group: national preferences
assistance: accountability and availability of information	national preferences: corruption and bribery
assistance: cooperation	national preferences: domestic resource mobilization
assistance: funding	national preferences: effective, transparent and accountable institutions
assistance: international agreements	national preferences: general interpretation of SDG 16
assistance: resources (institutions)	national preferences: general interpretation of SDG 17
	national preferences: official development assistance
	national preferences: participation of developing countries in global governance
	national preferences: policy coherence
	national preferences: respect of countries' policy spaces
	national preferences: responsive, inclusive, participatory decision-making
	national preferences: rule of law and justice for all
	national preferences: strengthen institutions' capacity-building

The conduction of the analysis was done in the following way. First, I read the data, group by group, and highlighted the relevant parts for my thesis. This part was done on a PDF reader software. After finishing reading each document, I would upload it on coding software Atlas.ti, and write a memo containing my first thoughts and findings after finishing the reading for each group of documents as categorized in Table 5. I then started coding each document using Atlas.ti, group by group again, and wrote a memo after completing the coding of a group of data. The report function of the software

allowed me to create a report listing the quotation for each code and proceed to a second selection so that each quotation would be assigned one code only. The next step was to download the reports as Excel files to assign each quotation to an empirical finding category. I then proceeded to analyze the findings and answer my research questions.

5.4. Limits and ethics

Doing qualitative research requires reflecting on the credibility of the study and its findings. As Holliday (2007) reminds, the workings of the research need to be explained to the reader. This includes establishing the aim, key notions, and contextualizing the study; developing a conceptual framework; reporting on the procedures and methods; and emphasizing the relevance of the analysis.

Contrary to quantitative research, ethical considerations of qualitative research go beyond pre-determined methods and outcomes, and are extended to how researchers intend to conduct their research in general (Carpenter, 2018). This further emphasizes the importance of describing the workings of the study. In the previous chapter, I have argued on the purpose of this thesis, reviewed literature on SDGs 16 and 17, and established the conceptual framework. In chapter 5, I have detailed the methodology that this research follows by focusing on qualitative research, data collection and directed content analysis. In the following chapters, I will present the empirical findings before discussing them using the conceptual framework and highlighting the contributions of this thesis.

Regarding SDGs 16 and 17, the large scope of themes that they cover required that I decide to focus on particular aspects of these goals to respect the topic of thesis. Chosen targets were compiled in Table 3. This means that some themes, such as violence and debt, are deliberately not addressed in this thesis. While it constitutes a limit of the understanding of SDGs 16 and 17 for this research, it also means that relevant themes, namely governance and international cooperation, are studied more in depth.

As for the data used in this thesis, they come from governmental sources. As argued previously, this choice was made to analyze tools of governance (Asdal & Reinertsen, 2022). Other types of tools might have offered different perspectives on the topic of this thesis. Also, since all documents were originally written in French, it is important to acknowledge that translating my findings to English implies a subjective interpretation in the process.

The chosen method for this thesis, directed content analysis, is used to verify or broaden the conceptual framework (Assarroudi et al., 2018). This means that this research is limited by its

decisions in terms of literature, but as Hsieh and Shannon (2005) argued, this selection also constitutes the strength of this method. It contributes to the structure of the study, though the importance of the contextualization process should not be undermined.

6. Empirical findings

This chapter first presents the empirical findings of this research regarding the assistance provided by France through its ODA to Senegal and the pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17 in Senegal. An overview of these findings is available at the end of the sub-chapter in Table 6. The empirical findings attributed to the presentation of national preferences constitute the second part of this chapter. Table 7 summarizes these findings at the end of the related sub-chapter.

6.1. France's assistance to Senegal

In this chapter, I will present the findings related to the data on French ODA to highlight the assistance that it provides to Senegal and its links to SDGs 16 and 17. Findings are presented according to the concepts of the conceptual framework including perceptions of mutual benefits, improved cooperation, resources, governance, compliance, learning, legitimacy through accountability, information, financial accountability, roles, political accountability, development effectiveness, coercion, institutional stability, change, legitimacy of institutions, benefits and costs, and networks.

As this sub-chapter focuses on the assistance that France provides to Senegal, data presented in this chapter are the nine documents from France. Documents from both countries will be analyzed together in the next sub-chapter for findings related to the presentation of national preferences in the context of SDGs.

Mutual benefits. A logic of mutual benefits regarding France's assistance to Senegal for SDGs 16 and 17 was emphasized in the data from France. One of the documents expresses that this reasoning created a new form of cooperation between France and African nation where these expectations and their related responsibilities are shared by all parties: "*In continuum of the President of the Republic's speech in Ouagadougou in 2017, partnerships with African countries are rebuilt based on shared mutual responsibility and interests*" (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022b, p. 14). This logic of sharing can be found in another document which reports that a process of exchange of knowledge is expected by recipient countries. However, one document expresses that entering this mutual benefits reasoning would require getting past post-colonial type of cooperation.

Improved cooperation. The four documents for France regrouped in the "development and international cooperation" category[2] show that the ground for France's choice for recipient countries has also undergone changes with the definition of sectoral and geographic priorities. Indeed, this change makes Senegal one of the main targets of France's official development assistance based on its low-developed country status. One of the documents explains that this categorization emphasizes the importance of Senegal for the 2030 Agenda in the new vision of France's aid policy, which constitutes the justification for the means that the latter allocates to the former to fund its pursuit of SDGs:

> "*To face the multiplication of fragilities factors, France reinforces its actions in countries in crisis, end of crisis and situation of fragility. It puts the focus of its development policy on nineteen priority countries defined by the CICID[3] of February 8, 2018, all of them belonging to the least developed countries (LDCs) category [...]. These countries gather the main global challenges to reach the SDGs, whereas their capacity to fund investments for basic infrastructures remains limited. The nineteen countries benefit in this context of [...] two thirds of the grants implemented by the AFD*" (Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021, p. 12).

The concern over fragilities presented in the mutual benefits logic of France's ODA can also be found in its assistance for capacity-building in recipient countries. This support can address various areas as reported by five documents. For instance, one of them connects this initiative to the promotion of recipient countries' resilience by targeting social and institutional fragilities. Another one empathizes France's assistance in the struggle against corruption, one of the themes of SDG 16. One document highlight the support provided by France regarding public finance management.

The cooperation between France and its recipient countries, like Senegal, also benefits from an improved structure as highlighted by one of the documents which integrates the definition of a global partnership framework established by France in 2021. The structure of the assistance provided by France also has a path for further change with the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda as one of the documents identifies them as an alternative to the North/South logic by converging toward shared solutions between donor and recipient countries.

Resources. Improved cooperation can be dependent on resources. Data shows how France assists Senegal by allocating resources and how this allocation is structured. One document highlights that

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[2] Data was categorized in tables 4 and 8
[3] Cross-ministerial Committee of International Cooperation and Development

resource allocation is decided only by France: "*By definition, bilateral aid allocation falls under an exclusively French decision*" (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022b, p. 41). ODA resources are supervised by both the state and the French Development Agency as reported in three documents. Regarding their respective roles, the state gives the AFD the budget that it uses to provide grants and loans to recipient countries. More specifically, one document adds that the AFD is the main funder of least developed countries, like Senegal, in terms of French ODA.

As for the allocated resources, documents indicate that the bilateral part of France's ODA is getting reinforced and address various issues that recipient countries can face. One document indicates that its share has increased from 61% in 2019 to 64% in 2020 (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022b). Additionally, the AFD has been active in the emission of SDG bonds according to one document of the "SDGs implementation" category. As noted by one of the documents, financial resources allocated to the African continent increased to cope with the consequences of the covid-19 crisis by supporting economic revival. Another form of assistance through resources to be noted is the return of *biens mal acquis* [literally, "ill-gotten goods"], as observed in two of the documents.

Governance. One element that can impact France's assistance to Senegal in terms of resource supervision is the governance of ODA. One documents expresses concern over coherence issues linked to the joint management of the AFD by the Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs[4]:

> "*The supervision of the AFD, shared between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MINEFI[5], has long been problematic in terms of coherence. The reform launched by public authorities, resulted in the creation of a structuring convention and two triannual objectives contracts with the two concerned ministries, rapidly replaced with a unique contract. However, this reform could not cope with the imperfections of this double supervision which weighs on the management of the activities of the AFD*" (French Economic, Social and Environmental Council, 2016, p. 35).

Compliance. Despite the joint management of the AFD by two ministries, the AFD has to comply with the French state as a whole and its strategy. As indicated in one of the documents, the contract between the French state and the AFD requires the agency to respect the sectoral and geographic priorities of the French ODA.

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[4] Refer to Table 2 for an overview of the attributions of French and Senegalese ministries regarding SDGs 16 and 17
[5] Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty

Learning. In spite of governance challenges, data also reports on learning experiences concerning the assistance provided by France through its ODA. One of the documents observes that the aid accountability reform in 2019 allowed for France's ODA budgeting and accounting to be clearer. As for the assistance to recipient countries, another document emphasizes that the 2030 Agenda implies the return of what had been a governance tradition for France, namely public policy planning.

Legitimacy through accountability. ODA accountability and resources highlighted in the data are connected with the legitimacy of France's assistance to Senegal in its pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17. Indeed, one of the documents emphasizes that accountability is a democratic necessity in a context of significant ODA resources increase.

Information. The information-provided role of accountability can be illustrated with the data on France's assistance to Senegal through its ODA to pursue SDGs 16 and 17. Information is mentioned in eight of the documents for France. As indicated by five of them, information can be shared through evaluative or consultative commissions. Another document reports that France has the most accessible online information. Three documents emphasize the importance of the availability of information related to ODA evaluation in various formats, by following the OECD or the UNDP's International Aid Transparency Initiative guidelines for instance.

Financial accountability. One of the information that accountability can provide concerns the financial aspect of France's assistance to Senegal in its pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17. Data reflects the complexity of this dimension. Two documents show that AFD has double financial accountability as it owned by to the French state and is tied to the Monetary and Financial Code. The complexity of ODA budget reports has been highlighted by one document.

Roles. Accountability also informs on roles performed by the one held accountable. The duty of vigilance that France is compelled to as a "*société mère*" [literally, "mother company"] is pointed out by one document:

> "*In the context of its policy on fair development and struggle against global inequalities, France considers the demanding characteristic of public and private actors' social responsibility and promote it with partner countries and other funders. For this, it particularly relies on the Law n° 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 related to the duty of vigilance of* sociétés mères *and ordering companies. [...] It ensures that actors of the policy on fair development and struggle against global inequalities integrate as well a duty of vigilance in their governance systems and their operations, particularly by implementing rules to evaluate the [...] social impact of the operations that they fund, to guarantee the respect of human rights*"

(Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021, p. 24).

Three of the documents highlight the human rights-based approach promoted by France through its ODA and its ambition to balance the positions of donor and recipient countries.

Political accountability. The vigilance of France's assistance to Senegal also relies on the political accountability of France as shown by the data. A suggestion for France to perform evaluation of SDG implementation by ministries was found in one of the documents. One document expresses that increased means for ODA requires higher level of political accountability of France's assistance and policy: "*In the context of the unprecedented increase of ODA means, the reinforcement of the evaluation and political accountability of development policy addresses a democratic necessity*" (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022b, p. 15).

Development effectiveness. Despite France's policies and strategies for assisting Senegal, the pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17 implies considering international agreements and France's part in them. Three documents highlight the integration of the foreign and development policies of France within the SDGs framework. France has also expressed interest for the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), a new OECD standard that measures sustainability-related public flows, and started using it in 2020, as reported by two documents. France has both been active in promoting SDGs at the regional level with the European Union and following the European guidelines regarding the human rights-based approach, as shown in four documents. Other documents linked France's action to the agreements that it has with the OECD and the UN, with respectively three documents addressing the former, and five documents addressing the latter. It was also mentioned that the ODA goals of the Addis Ababa action agenda that France is part of are the same as SDG target 17.2[6].

Coercion. Some of the agreements that France has signed create obligations regarding the assistance that it provides. At the regional level, France is bound to respect the European Covenant on Human Rights, particularly the human rights-based approach, as shown in one of the documents. At the international level, five documents observed that France is compelled by ODA targets representing 0,7% of its GNI as set by the Addis Ababa action agenda. Three documents mention the current progress toward this aim:

> "*[France] has dedicated €10,3 billion to its official development assistance in 2018, [which represents] 0,43% of the Gross National Income (GNI) [...]. It has engaged itself in following*

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[6] Refer to Table 3 for the SDG targets examined in this thesis

this ascending trajectory of its ODA with the aim of dedicating it 0,55% of its GNI by 2022,
the first step toward the international goal of 0,7%" (Agenda 2030, 2019, p. 76).

Institutional stability. International considerations in France's assistance to Senegal also concern institutional stability. It is mentioned in four documents as an international goal to implement in recipient countries with security and financial actions, such as contributing to the funds for international stability. Additionally, despite the governance challenges highlighted above, one document emphasizes that the AFD has been expanding its activities since its creation at a fast pace.

Change. The promotion of stability can require to go through changes to provide improved assistance to recipient countries. Several institutional changes have been taking place for France's ODA. One of the documents points out the merger between the AFD and the Deposits and Consignment Fund. The employees of these institutions received SDG training following the merger as observed in one of the documents. The creation of Expertise France, a French agency which offers technical expertise regarding international matters, was cited in three documents as a cooperation tool for France, which particularly supports capacity-building initiatives in recipient countries:

> "*The reform of the apparatus for French technical cooperation, with the creation of Expertise France, allowed to reinforce the actions means for capacity-building benefitting our partner countries by improving the efficiency, the relevance and the pace of our interventions. Therefore, France can better address the demands for capacity-building from our partners. Expertise France is fully part of the realization of the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs*" (French Government, 2016, p. 47).

As highlighted in five documents, another creation is the establishment of the Cross-ministerial Committee of International Cooperation and Development (CICID), which has defined the sectoral and geographic priorities of France's ODA, decided on the increase of ODA, and decided on the elaboration of various strategies, such the *Human rights and development strategy* and *France's roadmap for the 2030 Agenda*.

Legitimacy of institutions. Despite initiatives for institutional improvement to support France's assistance to its recipient countries like Senegal, institutional weaknesses have been identified:

> "*If it has modernized its policy [...], the French cooperation for development is still marked by various weaknesses linked to its complex institutional architecture, to the scope and structure of its funding, or even to the weakness its partnership with its civil society and its support to the latter*" (French Economic, Social and Environmental Council, 2016, pp. 31-32).

Moreover, another document noted a deterioration of the political convergence toward the importance of cooperation for development as part of France's foreign policy, which requires France to convince on a financial basis.

Benefits and costs. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the French ODA sometimes depends on external factors, which come from the context of recipient countries. One document associates ODA efficiency with the state of the democratic features of the recipient country.

Networks. Providing assistance while addressing local contexts through cooperation creates ground for the development of networks as illustrated by the data. For instance, the AFD is both the manager and intermediary of various ODA programs in recipient countries, as highlighted by three documents. Two documents also note that the creation of the National Council for Development and International Solidarity (CNDSI) encourages the participation of all actors of development. Additionally, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs organizes meetings with development actors to discuss support to SDGs implementation in partner countries as observed in one of the documents. A National commission for decentralized cooperation was also established and creates networks on its own will: "*The [National commission of decentralized cooperation] cooperates, if it deems it useful with institutions and evaluative organisms of beneficiary countries involved in the development field*" (Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021, p. 8).

The findings presented in this sub-chapter are compiled in Table 6. They are categorized based on the concepts highlighted in the conceptual framework.

Table 6. Overview of empirical findings on France's assistance to Senegal (created by the author)

Assistance categories	Key findings
Mutual benefits	• Mutual benefits, interests and responsibilities • Paths for change of the nature of the relation with Senegal
Improved cooperation	• Definition of sectoral and geographic priorities • Paths for change of the nature of the relation with Senegal • Support of capacity-building in Senegal • Formalization of partnership framework
Resources	• AFD gives loans, grants, SDG bonds • Increase of France's ODA and share of bilateral aid in France's ODA over time and during covid-19 crisis • Return of "ill-gotten goods"
Governance	• AFD managed by two different ministries
Compliance	• AFD must respect sectoral and geographic priorities
Learning	• Reform and planning reflect learning
Legitimacy through accountability	• Accountability as a democratic necessity
Information	• Open information and voluntary publications
Financial accountability	• Double financial accountability of ODA • Complexity and reform of ODA
Roles	• Duty of vigilance of *sociétés mères* • Redefinition of roles with human rights-based approach
Political accountability	• Evaluations • Higher ODA means require higher political accountability
Development effectiveness	• Promotion of integration of foreign and development policy in the SDGs framework • Interest for TOSSD • Regional agreements at the EU level • International agreements with the UN and the OECD
Coercion	• Binding agreements at regional and international levels
Institutional stability	• An international goal for France • AFD activities expanding at a fast pace
Change	• Merger of AFD with the Deposit and Consignment Fund • Creation of Expertise France • Various initiatives related to SDGs and ODA promotion
Legitimacy of institutions	• Some weaknesses linked to institutional and funding structure • Deteriorated consensus on the necessity for development cooperation
Benefits and costs	• Democracy is necessary for the efficiency of development assistance
Networks	• Creation and engagement of agencies and ministries with partners

6.2. Presentation of national preferences

In this sub-chapter, I will present findings related to the presentation of national preferences in the data from France and Senegal. For more coherence, the findings are organized in the same manner as the precedent sub-chapter, by concepts from the conceptual framework, namely preference formation, change, learning, coercion, will, projection, and transfer.

Preference formation. From the data about France and Senegal, four factors of preference formation have been identified: representation of public opinion, drive, public knowledge, and representation of governmental preferences.

Representation of public opinion through the participation of citizens in SDGs is considered as essential for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in France, as emphasized by three of the documents. In Senegal, the focus is more on information sharing to populations and partners for SDGs appropriation, and ethics. The latter is linked to putting the well-being of the population as the priority: "*Ethics: the satisfaction of Senegalese people's well-being is the ultimate goal that should guide actions within the Administration*" (Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, 2020d, p. 24).

Beside the representation of public opinion, the drive for preference formation can also differ between countries. One of the documents expresses that the history and role of France at the international level creates a sense of obligation to fulfill its commitments through international cooperation. Nevertheless, this engagement alone would not be enough to complete the 2030 Agenda and needs to be integrated into a larger drive as observed by one of the documents: "*ODA alone will not be enough to tackle the SDGs challenge by 2030: it should be conceptualized as a component of a larger financial flows set, public and private, national and international, from the North and South, contributing to sustainable development*" (Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021, p. 23). The presentation of the drive for Senegal adopts a different perspective. As shown in PAP 2A, the developmental efforts of Senegal are driven by the expected effects of its plans. For instance, PAPA 2A indicates that the expected effect of Axis III "Governance, Institutions, peace and security" of the PES is to increase the attractiveness of the territory.

Focusing on preference formation through public knowledge highlights factors that could influence public opinion and drive. As expressed in five documents, policy coherence between the 2030 Agenda and national policy is implemented through *France's roadmap for the 2030 Agenda*, but one of the

document highlights that this strategy is still unknown to the general public and has not been approved by the Ministers' Council. Senegal has been developing general awareness of public matters through the promotion of civism as shown in two of the documents.

Presentation of preference formation can reflect other preferences than those expressed by or for the people. Technical aspects of policies reflect government preferences as shown in seven documents. ODA technicalities in France demonstrate a preference for loans and an increased amount of donations toward LDCs. Also, French institutions have been promoting the human rights-based approach and identified priority countries for its ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa to counter possible stability threats:

> "*In a world marked by increasing negative impacts from the climate and environmental crisis and the rise of humanitarian, political, social and security crises, France place the struggles against fragilities and global inequalities at the core of its fair development policy. In 2030, if the current trends continue, fragility and crisis areas, particularly in Sub-Saharan African, will concentrate 80% of worldwide extreme poverty. The persistence of fragilities can lead to major political, social and economic crises, affect in the long term the development and stability of many developing countries and be the origin of humanitarian crises*" (Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021, p. 14).

Governmental preferences in Senegal are reflected through its resource mobilization as illustrated in the various development plans, namely the PES, PAP 2 and PAP 2A. For instance, Axis III of the PES has been getting 11% of the funds for PAP 2A. Another example is the calculation of the funding gap for each development plan which shows how much assistance is expected from the financial and technical partners of Senegal, which includes ODA.

Change. In addition to preference formation, national preferences can also be presented through changes. In the SDGs context, these changes can concern resources, establishment of strategy and program, crisis management, and policymaking.

Data shows that, while France adjusted its ODA resources, Senegal modified the resources allocated to governance, one of the themes of SDG 16. Three documents observe that France has adjusted its resources allocation based on its redefined sectoral and geographic priorities. For instance, one of them underlines the attribution of almost €890 million of its ODA to the governance sector in 2019. Resource allocation in Senegal is divided among the three Axes of the PES, respectively focusing on (I) structurally transforming the structure of growth and the economy, (2) sustainable development,

social protection and human capital; and (III) peace, governance, security and institutions. Resources allocated to the latter has been increasing from 7,5% of the PES funding for the 2014-2018 period to 11% for the 2019-2023 period as observed above with PAP 2A.

Changes reported in the two countries address common topics, like human rights promotion, differently. In France, change has been occurring through the establishment of the *Human rights and development strategy*, and its integration in its ODA, as highlighted by the strategy itself and three other documents: "*France thus brings evolution and reinforces its action means at the service of a new sustainable development and international solidarity model, particularly through [...] the "human rights and development" strategy*" (French Government, 2019, p. 26).

Senegal has also been engaging with human rights promotion, particularly by signing agreements on women's rights as shown in its *2022 Voluntary National Review*. Additionally, three documents report the establishment of the Supporting Program to Administration Modernization (PAMA), which has been modernizing the institutions of the country since its launch in 2019:

> "*The economic and social development of Senegal relies, partly, on a modern Administration that is able to play a driving role in the realization of the fixed objectives and to serve as a pivotal point in the efficient and effective implementation of its interventions. [...] For this purpose, the PAMA constitutes in itself an answer to this problem*" (Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, 2018, p. 85).

Beside planned changes, national preferences are also presented through adjustments that have been made in unexpected situations. Two documents observe that France has been reinforcing its support to the African continent through support to tackle covid-19 challenges, by increasing resources allocated to this area. Senegal has reacted to the issues created by the pandemic with the adjustment of PAP 2, which resulted in the PAP 2A and the update of monitoring-evaluation tools. Additionally, Senegal committed with PAP 2A to respect the timeframe for reforms agreed with their partners such as public finance reforms. It was also noted in the *2022 Voluntary National Review* that covid-19 situation had impacts on the alignment of the country with SDGs, which is prospected to reach 37% by 2023 and 74% in 2030 if every needed resource is mobilized.

The political tools that countries use to address planned and unexpected changes present other national preferences. France's ODA policymaking has been going through policy and strategies establishment as illustrated above, as well as programs mentioned in five documents. For instance, the AFD has governance programs that it implements in Senegal, such as programs for death sentence abolition and the creation of an African network of the struggle against sexual exploitation of children

(AFD, n.d.). Senegal has been using priority actions plans, namely PAP 1, PAP 2 and PAP 2A to implement its PES and its vision of "*an emerging Senegal by 2035 with a united society within the rule of law*" (Senegalese Government, 2014, p. 48). PAP 2 also reports that Senegal has been using conventions for its external funding and signed 246 of them for PAP 2.

Learning. Learning from changes present national preferences regarding the type of lessons drawn and their content in the SDGs content as reported in the data from France and Senegal. Both similarities and disparities in terms of learning tools have been found. While Senegal has been cooperating with the Millenium Institute to develop scenarios to assist its decision-making, which revealed respectively revealed negative and positive synergies of SDGs 16 and 17 with other SDGs, such strategy was not found for France's ODA.

Similarities between the two countries regarding learning tools have also been found. The learning process in France was more shown through surveys, with one of them pointing out that the general public considers SDG 16 as the second most important SDG in France as reported in one document. Surveys were also carried in Senegal by the Ministry of Civil Service, which constituted the basis of the definition of national indicators, as observed by the Senegalese Government and UNDP. However, "*an alignment with the SDGs in general and SDG 16 in particular cannot be certified*" (Senegalese Government & UNDP, 2021, p. 37).

Learning can also regard policymaking itself, not only its tools. Documents that report on policy adjustments indicate that France learns from its developmental policy and adjusts it after pre-defined periods of time, whether it regards its own development or its assistance to other countries'. The long tradition of ODA provision by France has allowed it to learn about its practicalities and choosing its target countries based on its knowledge: "*Generally, ODA facilitates the funding of reduced-scope projects with uncertain viability, that attract few private investors, and, in LDCs, it remains the first funding source; this is even more the case in a development funding context*" (French Economic, Social and Environmental Council, 2016, p. 58). Risk identification in Senegal has shown the dangers of slow and non-implementation of the 2030 Agenda through two documents in terms of security and how security threats conversely jeopardize public policy implementation in the country. Senegal has also expressed concerns through PAP 2A over the covid-19 situation and tensions regarding the budgets of donors.

Despite tools and policymaking, learning in the SDGs context also concerns indicators about SDGs and evaluations of elements involved in their pursuit, such as ODA, plans and frameworks. As indicated in the data, France has been learning about the SDGs, including SDG 16 and 17, by designing its own SDG-related indicators. For instance, as reported by the *French variation of SDG*

indicators, measuring tools were overall missing in France for a lot of issues addressed by SDG 16. The only SDG targets with existing related indicators were targets 16.1 on violence, 16.3 on the rule of law and 16.6 on responsible institutions[7]. As previously reported, Senegal also designed its own indicators. It revealed that its informing capacity regarding SDG 17 exceeds 70%. The self-identification of PAP 2A as a learning-based plan shows that Senegal has also been learning from its planning policy. Additionally, it was observed in one of the documents that the establishment of the Harmonized framework for monitoring-evaluation of public policies (CASE) highlights difficulties caused by the lack of access to information and the dysfunctions of the framework itself.

Coercion. In a context of cooperation for the SDGs, national preferences can go beyond the national context and express bilateral and international influences. While the *Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities* does not expressly address conditionality of French ODA to Senegal, one of the documents highlights the impacts of the discrepancy in terms of negotiation abilities between donor and recipient countries:

> "*The capacity of [recipient] countries to negotiate on an equal footing with their partners, particularly in the context of economic agreements is also quite weak. As an illustration, the fragile position of Sub-Saharan states before the European Union in the context of economic partnerships that currently concern them could have serious consequences in terms of fiscal revenues linked to the obligation of customs fees reduction*" (French Economic, Social and Environmental Council, 2016, p. 30).

Nonetheless, France must comply with conditions established by the international agreements that it is part of and provide recipient countries like Senegal with the adequate resources as indicated in documents addressing the Addis Ababa action agenda.

Will. Not all bilateral and international influences create obligations. France offers other recipient countries assistance with human rights pacts and conventions implementation as indicated on one of the documents. Senegal stresses in its *2018 Voluntary National Review* that the will and capacity of developed countries to follow international agreements impacts the performance of least developed countries in terms of SDGs implementation.

Projection. Influences can also come from countries themselves, when they project their national preferences. Projection mechanisms for France can be observed through bilateral cooperation, multilateral instruments, SDGs interpretations, and participation in the definition and promotion of SDGs. The projection logic is expressly used in the promotion of the French priorities through

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[7] SDG targets that this thesis focuses on are available in Table 3

bilateral cooperation: "*Bilateral action [...] is essential to project internationally our geographic and sectorial priorities*" (Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities, 2021, p. 22). The human rights-based approach is also used as a strategy to promote France's vision on human rights and their importance as shown in the *Human rights and development strategy*: "*The French approach underlines the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, encompassing civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights*" (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2019, p. 10).

Regarding projection within cooperation, Senegal has been noticing in its 2018 VNR that the discussion with its financial and technical partners has improved and considers that the SDGs create a context where further technical assistance, compared to financial one, should be developed by its partners. Nevertheless, it has been estimated in this document that the completion of the Addis Ababa goal, which aims at allocating 0,7% of the GNI of donors to recipient countries, would only cover a fifteenth of the needs for SDGs implementation, making funding the main challenge of the 2030 Agenda implementation by Senegal. The country also stresses that non-assistance from its partners would constrain its resources to create a rupture from its former developmental path with its PES.

Data expresses that projection can go beyond the cooperation framework in the SDGs context. France has been using multilateral instruments to promote its vision of sustainability as illustrated by its role in the definition and promotion of SDG 16 observed in one of the documents. It has also been engaging in promoting multilateralism itself as indicated in the *Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities* by integrating its foreign policy within multiple international frameworks. For instance, five documents mention that its foreign policy follows the guidelines of the Addis Ababa action agenda, which influenced SDG target 17.2 definition. Additionally, the international development policy of France is conceived in one of the documents as a tool to project its values in a context of questioning toward international cooperation and multilateralism and the emergence of new donors with different values. Senegal has been promoting its developmental strategy in international institutions as and to its partners as illustrated by the two VNRs and its *Presentation to the 2018 Advisory Group*. The PES is conceived as a way for the country to demonstrate its credibility toward its partners as expressed in one of the documents.

In addition to the cooperation and global levels, projecting can concern the SDGs themselves. Data shows that both France and Senegal have been developing their own interpretations of SDGs 16 and 17 and promoting them. In terms of governance, the Voluntary National Report of France indicates that its main orientations regarding SDG 16 concern for instance the rule of law, death penalty abolition, exemplary institutions and efficient justice. As for cooperation and funding orientations of

SDG 17, France prioritizes the increase of international aid, as well as the improvement of domestic resource mobilization for sustainability funding and capacity-building initiatives in developing countries. However, Florence Provendier warns in *SDGs: Everything is linked!* that a phenomenon of "SDG-washing" is happening: "*Some actors use the SDGs in an image logic [...] to serve their ambitions and not as a reference to measure the impact of their activities*" (Provendier, 2022, p. 40).

The interpretations of SDGs 16 and 17 by Senegal can be found in the two VNRs and the 2019 *Update on Implementation*. These documents demonstrate that Senegal portrays Axis III of its PES as its orientation for reaching SDG 16. As for SDG 17, Senegal emphasizes the dialogue structures created with its partners in application of the 2011 Busan Agreement guidelines on development effectiveness. These discussions were established to improve cooperation, and the economic and social efficiency of the policies according to the 2019 *Update on Implementation*.

Transfer. Simultaneously to projection, national preferences are presented in the transfer of SDG-related elements in France and Senegal, both in their domestic context and through cooperation. In addition to funding and the SDGs, the French Economic, Social and Environmental Council considers that French and European social rights must be promoted within the cooperation with developing countries, stressing that the latter expect this type of transfer. Senegal points out that SDGs transfer should be done according to national contexts: "*Like Senegal, all countries should implement the entire agenda, while taking into account the diversity of situations*" (Senegalese Government, 2018, p. 7).

National preferences can also be presented in the identification of the transfer actors. France identifies the State as the relevant agent as shown in the report of Florence Provendier: "*Regarding [the achievement of the 17 SDGs], the State must, if not being a pioneer, be exemplary. [...]. It is its responsibility to establish a strong political drive and get the whole Government and its services onboard*" (Provendier, 2022, p. 44). With the conception of the PES as the main policy for implementing the 2030 Agenda, the State also appears as the main driver for the transfer of SDGs 16 and 17 into national policies in Senegal. Ministries have also developed initiatives, such as the establishment of a national platform for actors to follow SDG progression in their respective fields by the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable development, as reported in one document.

The content of transfer also shows national preferences as indicated in the data. Transfer mechanisms of SDGs 16 and 17 targets into national policies and indicator are respectively reported in the *French variation of SDG indicators* for France and the *Implementation of a collection, analysis, tracking and monitoring tool for Sustainable Development Goal n° 16* for Senegal. The latter shows in its joint evaluation of indicators with UNDP how transfer can sometimes be partial or incomplete for some

targets. For instance, SDG targets 16.A is estimated to be entirely aligned in Senegal, while SDG targets 16.3, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.7 are all considered to be partially aligned.

An overview of the findings reported in this sub-chapter is available in Table 7. Concepts of the conceptual framework constitute the categories under which the findings have been organized.

Table 7. Overview of empirical findings on national preferences (created by the author)

Category	France	Senegal
Preference formation	Representation of public opinion: participation of citizens	Representation of public opinion: information and ethics
	Drive: Perceived obligation to engage in cooperation	Drive: Expected results of the plans
	Public knowledge: Lack of general knowledge regarding state-created SDG tools	Public knowledge: Promotion of civism
	Representation of governmental preferences: human rights-based approach, ODA priorities and technicalities	Representation of governmental preferences: PES resources allocation
Change	Adjusted resources through policymaking	Adjusted resources through adjusted plans
	Establishment of the human rights strategy	Establishment of the Supporting Program to Administration Reform
	Reinforcement of support to African countries during the covid-19 crisis	Adjustment of PAP 2 which led to PAP 2A during the covid-19 crisis
	Policymaking with policies and strategies	Policymaking with plans and conventions
Learning	No sign of reliance on scenario analysis	Informed decision-making with scenarios
	Surveys	Surveys
	Learning through developmental policy	Learning through risk analysis
	Learning through national indicators, and SDG and ODA-related evaluations	Learning through national indicators, Priority Actions Plans evaluations and the CASE
Coercion	Stronger influence in ODA negotiations	Lack of influence in ODA negotiations
Will	Offered assistance for human rights-based approach implementation	Impact of the will of developed countries to assist LDCs on their progression toward SDGs
Projection	Projection through bilateral cooperation and the human rights-based approach	Projection through discussions with the partners, the call for more technical assistance and the identified risk linked to non-assistance
	Projection through multilateral instruments with the participation in defining and promoting SDGs 16 and 17 through its foreign policy	Projection through the promotion of PES at international level and with the partners of Senegal
	Projection through the interpretations of SDGs 16 and 17	Projection through the interpretations of SDGs 16 and 17
Transfer	Transfer of French social rights by partners wanted by France	Adapting transfer to national contexts
	State as the driver of transfer	State and ministries as the drivers of transfer
	Transfer of SDGs 16 and 17 targets into national policy and indicators	Transfer of SDGs 16 and 17 into national policy and indicators with the assistance of UNDP for SDG 16

7. Discussion

This chapter presents the analysis of the empirical data through the lenses of the literature which composes the conceptual framework. It is organized in a similar manner as chapter 6, with a focus on France's assistance to Senegal before moving to the examination of national preferences.

7.1. France's assistance to Senegal

Mutual benefits brought by bilateral cooperation (Brown et al., 2018; Abbide, 2018) were sought in the case of France's official development assistance to Senegal. This mutual logic can be expanded, based on the empirical findings presented in chapter 6, to mutual interests and responsibilities as France expressed its will to rebuild its relationship with Africa based on these principles. The choice of Senegal as a recipient country based on its LDC status and the identification of post-colonialism as a constraint to mutually benefiting cooperation echoes with Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) who observed a declining trend of post-colonial-motivated cooperation. The observation that recipient countries expressed interest in an exchange of knowledge indicates supports the idea that ODA has change potential through the data, visions, will for change, and dynamics that it mobilizes (de Milly, 2016).

The redefinition of France's ODA, which integrates since 2021 sectoral and geographic priorities, brings focus on the development of recipient countries. It illustrates the observation by Chaturvedi et al. (2020) that ODA is adopting a developmental mindset. Additionally, Chaturvedi et al. had expressed that North-South logic was traditionally adopted for this type of cooperation. The case of France's ODA to Senegal shows that SDGs are conceived as an opportunity to change this perspective. The findings of this thesis also stress that capacity-building initiatives, through the support of public finances in the recipient countries and the fight against corruption, as well as the establishment of a partnership framework, can bring further improvement to bilateral cooperation.

Regarding resources, the French ODA has been growing over time, and not reducing as literature expected (Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004). The same phenomenon has been observed for the share of bilateral cooperation within it. This resource mobilization and allocation mainly takes the form of loans and grants provided to recipient countries by a specifically created institution, the French Development Agency. Its launch of SDG bounds further illustrates the implication of donors in developmental policies (Chaturvedi et al., 2020). Younas' (2008) argument that donors invest in

countries where they have strategic interests could only be partially verified with the data, as mutual benefits logic would tend to confirm this point, while the increased assistance during covid-19 does not expressly indicate that France could benefit from it. The findings highlight another role that donors can have through resources mobilized in their ODA, which is the restitution of *biens mal acquis*, or "ill-gotten goods".

The introduction of the *Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities* addressed governance challenges by clarifying the goals and structures of the French ODA. Probabilities regarding the existence of hidden legal dimensions (Airey, 2022) are then reduced. However, concerns expressed toward the double management of the AFD, and its related coherence issue toward governance, could impact its change potential (de Milly, 2016).

Findings show that France's ODA to Senegal performs the four functions of accountability (Dann, 2013), namely compliance, learning, legitimacy and information. In terms of compliance, the data shows that AFD is contractually accountable toward the French state regarding its activities, which means that it must respect the sectorial and geographic priorities defined by the government. The various reforms and plans, such as the aid accountability reform and the public policy planning tradition, illustrate the learning process by the French ODA. Regarding legitimacy, data shows that accountability is seen as a democratic necessity. Findings about information availability and content emphasize the existence of open information, for instance with online databases accessible to partner countries and the general public, and publications under various types of formats.

The information-provider function of financial accountability regarding resource allocation (Barth, 2015) is twofold in the case of France's assistance to Senegal. Indeed, the AFD is accountable toward the French state and tied to the Monetary and Financial Code, which requires it to provide information about its activities in recipient countries and resource allocation. The publication of data under various formats reduces the probability of positively biased results for donor countries, which was a concern brought by Clements (2020).

Being provided with both resources and information makes Senegal an "accountability holder" and France a "power wielder" in their cooperation (Dann, 2013). Nevertheless, findings show that power wielders can also perform accountability activities through ODA concerning their recipients with the duty of vigilance of *sociétés mères*, [literally, "mother companies"], promoted by France. This vigilance provides opportunities to give more voice to target populations, that Dann considers not heard enough. Roles of countries are also supposed to be redefined with the human rights-based approach emphasized in French data, though it is still unclear what attributions each country should have in practice to make them stand on a more equal footing in this perspective. Concerns of Wenar

(2016) about whether resources are monopolized or used for the right target population can also be addressed through the duty of vigilance of *sociétés mères*.

Political accountability was not addressed a lot in the empirical data. Therefore, it is hard to analyze the impact of French ODA on the democratic system of Senegal, however the suggestion by France to have ministries perform SDG implementation evaluations could increase the level of political accountability and contribute to higher investment incentives (Majumdar & Mukand, 2015). The various evaluation commissions create more participatory mechanisms for recipient countries (Winters, 2010).

Initiatives toward aid effectiveness, which were highlighted by Mawdsley et al. (2014), were found in the context of French ODA through the encouragement to integrate France's foreign and international development policy in the SDGs framework and the interest expressed toward the TOSSD. France also includes thoughts about the rising needs of its recipients through the increase of ODA in accordance with regional and international agreements, which is identified as a traditional donor behavior by Dreher et al. (2011). Additionally, given the various initiatives that France is part of, with the Addis Ababa action agenda for instance, it is still a relevant actor of development despite the emergence of new donors (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2019).

Empirical findings highlight a variety of binding agreements and charters that count France as one of their signatories. As emphasized by Molenaers et al. (2015), these agreements focus more on proactive assistance by donor countries, rather than punitions in case of non-compliance by recipient countries. It also was theorized that less conditionality would limit the search of recipient countries for alternative sources of funding (Jakupec & Kelly, 2016). The global shift of attention to the duties of ODA providers rather than its recipients could have meant that Senegal would not be actively looking for other financial partners. However, as it will be highlighted later in the sub-chapter about national preferences, data show that it aims at attracting a larger diversity of funding and investors.

Findings point out that stability is one of the international goals of France. In the perspective of March and Olsen (1989), this attitude should foster adaptation if a stable political environment is indeed created. One of the paths for France to support strong institutions is by contributing to the funds for international stability, and strengthen its own institutions, as illustrated by the fast pace at which the activities of the AFD are developed.

Though some institutional changes can be noted in France, its institutions are rather actively stable (Galik & Chelbi, 2021) and present some path dependency characteristics highlighted by Campbell (2010). For example, the merger of the AFD with the Deposit and Consignment Funds concerned two

already-existing institutions, and Expertise France, which was created in 2015, acts as a branch of the AFD. Policy sub-fields interdependence and small adaptations of institutions (Lindner, 2003) could be found through respectively the creation of the Cross-ministerial Committee of International Cooperation and Development, which promoted sectoral and geographic priorities for France's ODA, and the SDGs-focused formations offered to the employees of the AFD and the Deposit and Consignment Funds after their merger.

State activities were not found to have been interrupted in the French case, which in the perspective of Adams (2018) makes it legitimate to pursue its functions and continue supporting other states. However, institutional complexity and weakened convergence of institutional actors toward the necessity of cooperation for development has been found in the data. These phenomena could still have positive effects if institutions react by developing their adaptive efficiency (Hartmann & Spruk, 2021). Literature warns that if adaptation does not happen, stability could be jeopardized. Previous reflections on the adaptive attitude of French institutions would tend to indicate that risks for stability are reduced for its ODA. Additionally, despite mentions of the fight against corruption in the data, it was not found that corruption was interrupting French institutional stability (Fjelde & Hegre, 2014).

Democracy was identified in the data as a necessity for the efficiency of development assistance. The observation by Leeds (1999) that democracies would rather cooperate with other democracies is therefore verified in the case of France's assistance to Senegal. The combination of strong ODA-related institutions with a drive to cooperate creates conditions where institutions are able to absorb enough risks (Elhardt, 2015) to make them intermediaries of cooperation.

The existence of the AFD, an agency dedicated to the conduction of development projects and aid allocation, and Expertise France, which provides knowledge on development, illustrates the argument by Compston (2009) that resources in policy networks are exchanged and used to address identified issues. Therefore, France's ODA to Senegal creates a policy network of development and transfer of resources related to SDGs 16 and 17. With the noted engagement of the French state, public agencies and Ministries in this cooperation, the nature of the policy network (Warren, 1967) at hand can be qualified as institutional.

In this sub-chapter, some steering mechanisms from France to Senegal regarding the pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17 in Senegal have been identified, through the developmental aspect of the aid effectiveness perspective or the launch of SDG bounds by the AFD for instance. This means that donor countries can go beyond the boundaries of assistance and influence the pursuit of SDGs in the recipient country. However, the definition of sectoral and geographic priorities and the various forms of accountability included within the cooperation between France and Senegal suggest that overemphasizing steering

effects might undermine the observed initiatives of France to develop an assisting vision for its ODA in the context of SDGs, by considering the background and challenges of its recipient countries, as suggested by the 2030 Agenda.

7.2.Presentation of national preferences

Findings show that both France and Senegal are considering public opinion in their pursuit of SDGs, which allows it to influence SDG-related policy implementation (Chu & Recchia, 2022). Rather than public discontentment (Egan, 2014), France seems to be driven by a sense of obligation to engage in cooperation due to its role and history, and Senegal by expected outcomes of its strategy, such as attracting more funding and investors by improving its governance. The focus on civism by Senegal supports the claim of Jorgensen et al. (2018) that the general political knowledge of populations influences the formation of national preferences. Meanwhile, it has been observed that SDGs-related policy tools in France such as the roadmap are still not made known to the public though they are in open access. Another finding that contributes to understanding preference formation is how technicalities of ODA and plans reflect government preferences.

The three orders of change theorized by Hall (1993) were found in both countries. France and Senegal made adjustments to routinized policymaking with respectively various policy reinforcements in regarding French resources and the different priority action plans developed by Senegal. They both created policy instruments with the *Human rights and development strategy* for France and the Supporting Program to Administration Reform for Senegal. These countries have undergone periodic discontinuity with the covid-19 crisis, but it created in France a sense of stronger commitment toward supporting African countries and Senegal reacted by adjusting the second part of its PES. Also, policy design (Real-Dato, 2009) tools, such as plans, policies, conventions and strategies (Schneider & Ingram, 1997), were used by both countries.

Using policy learning to examine the development and analysis of scenarios to inform policymaking in Senegal illustrates the argument by Busenberg (2001) that decisions are made using new information and ideas. Update of beliefs can be observed in both France and Senegal through surveys (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013). Additionally, in the case at hand, policy learning has been integrated in developmental strategies and risk analysis for respectively France and Senegal (Goyal & Howlett, 2018). Moyson et al. (2017) argued that combining policy change and policy learning both increases chances for informed change and reveals the existence of constraints for lesson-drawing. Findings

show that these two effects are happening with France and Senegal. For instance, SDG 16-related indicators developed by France brings information on some aspects of the goal, like the rule of law, violence and institutions, but leave other aspects of the goal out. As for Senegal, the Harmonized framework for monitoring-evaluation of public policies was established to assess policies, which revealed issues linked to information-sharing and the framework. Nevertheless, the development of national indicators by both countries to adapt SDGs to national contexts reduces the risks for incomplete learning and policy failure (Dunlop, 2017).

Findings support the observation by Killick (1998) that change is constrained if conditions are associated with ODA. Though access to French assistance is only limited by sectoral and geographic criteria, it was acknowledged that there is an imbalance between the negotiation abilities of donor and recipient countries, and that the French ODA itself had to follow the guidelines of international agreements.

Coercion is not the only way to promote national preferences. In fact, initiative such as the voluntary offer of France to bring assistance for human rights pacts and conventions implementation should produce higher change than conditioned cooperation (Killick, 1998). Findings also show the impact of the will of developed countries to fulfill their international commitments for LDCs, which Senegal is part of.

Projection mechanisms (Bulmer & Burch, 2005) are used on the bilateral cooperation between France and Senegal, multilateral mechanisms, and SDGs 16 and 17 to promote their respective interests and views beyond national borders. Data demonstrates that France has been projecting its sectoral and geographic priorities through partnerships as well as its vision on human rights, encouraged the creation of governance-focused SDG 16, and interprets both SDGs 16 and 17 as goals that require its assistance in developing countries. As for Senegal, findings indicate that it has been projecting its concerns to require further assistance from its partners, and adopting the perspective of PES to address partnerships and SDGs 16 and 17.

Processes of policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996) have been found in the cooperation between France and Senegal. In the perspective of the broadened framework of policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), actors of policy transfer in the case of France's assistance to Senegal are states and institutions. What is transferred are the SDGs at a simultaneous time and with different understandings, which influences the comprehension of what is to be achieved and how. While France wishes to use cooperation to facilitate the transfer of its social rights, Senegal encourages the adaptation of transfer according to national contexts. It is hard to evaluate with document analysis if France and Senegal are being over-rationalized (Dumoulin & Saurugger, 2010), but the case at hand

tends to indicate that governments act rationally in their transfer of SDGs as they adapt them to their own national preferences. It can then be stated that policy transfer in the ODA context (Hwang & Song, 2019) has started to integrate SDGs 16 and 17 elements and perspectives. Additionally, the claims of Fawcett and Marsh (2012) regarding strong commitment and policy branding in the context of policy transfer are both observed in this case study as SDG target 17.2 repeats the Addis Ababa binding agreements that France has signed and the development of national indicators by both countries integrate partially or fully SDGs.

A final addition to this discussion chapter concerns metagovernance. It was presented in chapter 3 as a cluster of governance which gives an important role to public actors in global governance (Meuleman, 2008). This choice was motivated by its strong relation with the global-scale dimension of SDG16. Therefore, it was not included in the conceptual framework because the latter focuses on elements that could influence cooperation between two countries rather than on all nations. However, the analysis in this thesis leads to the conclusion that metagovernance unifies discussions on national preferences in the context of SDGs.

With metagovernance, Meuleman (2008) emphasizes coordination of governance, combination of governance of networks and hierarchies, and the perspective of metagovernors, namely public actors, on most desirable outcomes. All these elements were found to be significant in the presentation of national preferences in the context of SDGs. What focusing on metagovernance in the SDGs context brings is the emphasis on public actors in SDGs appropriation and promotion of national preferences, and how they can coordinate these phenomena to reach what they perceive as most desirable outcomes.

8. Conclusion

In this final chapter, I will offer the conclusion of this thesis. Answers to my two research questions based on the analysis of my case study will be presented before the limitations of this thesis and suggestions for future research.

It was first argued that awareness around sustainable development has been growing since the 1980s. Literature regarding the United Nations' 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals has emphasized the challenges around their implementation and the central role of SDGs 16 and 17 in this regard. However, there is a need for a study that considers these two goals together. This thesis examines how a donor country can assist the pursuit of SDGs through official development assistance in the recipient country and how national preferences are represented in this context with a case study of France's ODA to Senegal.

This thesis aimed at showing the importance of supporting SDG 16 through official development assistance while assisting the development initiatives capacity of the recipient country, which is encouraged by SDG 17. The following research question was formed to meet this end: *How does France's ODA to Senegal assist Senegal in its pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17?* A sub-question was developed to consider national preferences in this situation: *How are national preferences presented in the context of SDGs?*

A directed content analysis was performed on 18 documents, from which 9 originated from French institutions, and the other 9 from Senegalese institutions. The conceptual framework of this thesis was divided into three parts, respectively regarding the formalization of relations between donor and recipient countries, the path from string institutions to strengthened cooperation, and national preferences. Inferences were made from the analysis of the empirical data using the conceptual framework.

8.1. Answers to the first research questions

In this chapter, I will answer the main research question of this thesis, namely: *How does France's ODA to Senegal assist Senegal in its pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17?*

Bilateral cooperation offers a platform for France to actively support Senegal's path towards SDG 16 and 17. The introduction of the 2030 Agenda in the partnership between these countries, tied by

mutual benefits, interests and responsibilities, provides opportunities for improving this cooperation by adapting it further to the context of Senegal and getting past North-South perspectives. It also goes through supporting capacity-building processes in Senegal. Formalizing these engagements in a global partnership framework provides a structure for France's ODA contributions to Senegal's SDGs 16 and 17. It should also be noted that both French ODA and its bilateral component have been increasing over time, which could not be explained based solely on potential strategic interests. Rather, France intervenes in the developmental policies of Senegal by providing SDGs-related resources in addition to exceptional funding in case of crisis and giving back ill-gotten goods. Grants and loans are granted by a development-dedicated agency, the French Development Agency, which prioritizes least developed countries such as Senegal. In terms of governance, possible hidden legal dimensions of France's ODA were reduced with the introduction of the Law on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities in 2021, which defines the goals and aims of the partnership between France and the recipients of its aid. Governance challenges related to the contributions of the AFD could arise from its double management by two ministries.

In terms of funding and accountability, the French ODA performs the various functions of accountability, which contributes to informed action toward the pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17 in Senegal, and the reinforcement of access to information for Senegal. Similar inferences can be made regarding financial accountability. The analysis highlighted that France acts as the power wielder and Senegal as the accountability holder in their cooperation, but this vision is starting to change with the introduction of the human rights-based approach in this partnership. More voice could still be given to the Senegalese recipients of the projects and resources provided by the French ODA. Paths for higher political accountability and higher investment incentives have been observed and participatory mechanisms have been developed through evaluations commissions.

The various international agreements that France is part of influence its assistance to Senegal's SDGs 16 and 17-related improvements. The promotion of the integration of development and foreign policies in the SDGs framework by France and its expressed interest toward the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development tool echo with the global aid shift toward development effectiveness. Considerations regarding the context and needs of recipient countries were again found through the regional and international agreements that it is part of, and France as a traditional donor still has a role to play in international development. This thesis' analysis found that coercive mechanisms bind France toward contributing to the development and SDGs of Senegal in Senegal, which could also limit the incentives for Senegal to look for other partners.

Stable institutions related to French ODA provides stronger assistance to Senegal. Path dependency patterns of French institutions were observed, as well as active stability, policy sub-fields interdependence and small adaptations. France has been legitimated to pursue its state functions as its activities have not been interrupted by its institutions, which enables it to keep supporting Senegal. The challenge regarding complex institutional settings and the convergence of its actors toward the importance of cooperation could however threaten stability, or on the contrary, increase adaptive efficiency of ODA-related institutions. One of the main disruptive factors for institutions, namely corruption, was not found to have influence on the institutional stability of French ODA in the analysis.

Institutions have been found to be the relevant actor for cooperation involving ODA and assistance to SDGs 16 and 17 in Senegal. The analysis has shown that the democratic features of France and Senegal were necessary for official development assistance to be effective. The stable features of ODA institutions also involve less reliance on trust and more on the institutions themselves to carry out activities of SDGs promotion in Senegal, which develops an institutional network between the two countries and more opportunities for exchange of the appropriate resources. France's ODA also contribute to Senegal's achievement for SDGs 16 and 17 with the creation of the AFD which acts as both a partner and a project-carrier in the country.

Though France's assistance to Senegal can include steering elements, the efforts of France to increasingly include an assisting perspective within its ODA by adapting its aid to recipient countries' contexts, as recommended by the SDGs, also has to be acknowledged in the SDGs context. The latter is further addressed in the following paragraph through the presentation of national preferences.

8.2.Answers to the second research question

This chapter presents the answer to the sub-question: *How are national preferences presented in the context of SDGs?*

France and Senegal have both entered a process of SDGs appropriation which was expected to impact their cooperation and contribution to SDGs 16 and 17 in Senegal. Patterns of public opinion influence over policies were found in the analysis of the data through the existence of participatory mechanisms for France and share of information and ethics for Senegal. The assumption that public discontent would also have effects on decision-making was challenged by the sense of obligation of France toward its ODA recipient and the desire of Senegal to attract more investments. General public

knowledge of SDGs has been more observed in data about Senegal and its promotion of civism rather than in France where some main SDGs tools remain unknown. In addition to the conceptual framework of this thesis, it has been found that governments can form national preferences through technicalities of policies, programs and funding.

A second mechanism of SDGs appropriation, namely change, has been observed in the case study. Both countries adjusted their policymaking routines, created policy instruments dedicated to development and SDGs, including SDGs 16 and 17, and underwent discontinuity with the covid-19 crisis, which reinforced the engagement of France to mobilize resource for African countries and led to the creation of an adjusted development plan for Senegal. Both countries have shown preferences for policy design tools such as strategies, plans, policies and conventions to implement these changes.

A last aspect of SDGs appropriation is learning. Senegal showed preference for scenario analysis to benefit from new information and ideas for its decision-making process. Both countries have updated their beliefs with the introduction of SDGs 16 and 17, as reported by surveys carried in France and Senegal. France has been incorporating its learning process within its developmental policy, while it is more apparent for Senegal with its risk analysis. The combination of policy change and policy learning highlights both paths for informed change and constrained lesson-drawing in the two countries. Still, the development of indicators related to SDGs in France and Senegal should reduce the risks of incomplete learning and policy failure.

In addition to the appropriation of SDGs, national preferences are being promoted at the level of the cooperation between France and Senegal and beyond, which influences the understanding and progress of Senegal towards SDG 16 and 17 and how French ODA contributes to them. France has conditioned the access of its ODA to sectoral and geographic priorities, which include Senegal. This could constrain the change potential of France's ODA. Additionally, imbalances in terms of negotiating power have been found between donor and recipient countries, and French ODA itself has to integrate international goals. In a reversed manner, initiatives based on will should have a higher change potential, therefore the human rights-based approach assistance offered by France should produce more change.

Various projection mechanisms have been observed in both France and Senegal. These mechanisms are both used at the cooperation level and the SDG implementation level. France uses bilateral cooperation, multilateral instruments, and its own interpretation of SDG 16 and 17 to promote its sectoral and geographic priorities and the human rights-based approach, in addition to having participated in the definition of SDGs and particularly of SDG 16 by promoting the integration of governance in the 2030 Agenda. Senegal adopts a different projection logic, by emphasizing the need

for its partners, such as France, to respect the international agreements that they are tied to, and the limits of the assistance allocated to Senegal regarding the needs that it can cover. Senegal has also been projecting its emergence plan ideas and results in partnerships.

Both France and Senegal have been transferring SDG-related elements into their national preferences. States and institutions have been acting as the actors for this transfer of SDGs which has influenced the identification of what is to be achieved and how. Both countries have shown a rationalized approach toward SDGs 16 and 17 transfer by adapting them to their national preferences. This transfer has also affected the ODA context which now incorporates SDGs 16 and 17-related considerations. Strong commitment and policy branding phenomenon linked to policy transfer have also been observed for both countries with both SDGs 16. A common pattern of development of national indicators using SDGs as a reference should be noted.

Finally, national preferences in the context of SDGs can be presented through metagovernance. It allows to highlight further the central role of public actors, or metagovernors, in appropriation of SDGs and preferences promotion. Additionally, national preferences in the context of SDGs can be presented through the most desirable outcomes perceived by states and institutions and how they coordinate to reach them.

8.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research

The findings of this thesis are limited to the case study that it has analyzed, namely the official development assistance of France toward Senegal and its support to the pursuit of SDGs 16 and 17 in Senegal. This thesis uses countries as cases and governmental data; therefore, it is expected that the application of its findings to organizations of other nature would produce different results.

This thesis contributes to literature on SDGs 16 and 17 by studying this nexus, as well as literature on official development assistance by providing a case of ODA from France to Senegal whose interactions are influenced by the pursuit of the goals and their respective preferences. Additionally, this thesis provides an application of national preferences in the context of SDGs implementation, and a framework to highlight their formation and promotion through ODA.

It would be interesting to study the perception of the impact of the assistance of France to Senegal regarding SDGs 16 and 17 from the perspective of the target populations and recipients. This implies addressing this case from the societal level, rather than at the governmental level as was the case for this thesis. Such studies would help highlight the areas where further assistance could still be needed

and provide more information for policymakers about the impact of ODA. Another path for future studies would be to continue producing analyses on nexuses, where various SDGs are examined together, to provide more information on how pursuing a set of goals impacts each other.

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10. Appendix

Table 8. Description of the data collected for this thesis (created by the author)

Category	France		Senegal	
	Documents (9)	**Description**	**Documents (9)**	**Description**
Development and international cooperation	*Law 2021-1031 on programming related to fair development and the struggle against global inequalities* Year: 2021 Source: Official Gazette of France Type: law Pages: 29	This law describes the main orientation and goals of French official development assistance starting 2021. It states that this policy, at the multilateral level, follows the guidelines of the 2030 Agenda. It outlines the priorities of the French aid program. Additionally, attached to this law is the comprehensive partnership framework.	*The Plan for an Emerging Senegal* Year: 2014 Source: Senegalese Government Type: policy Pages: 184	This policy has been the main driver of the development of Senegal since 2014. This document also includes the first Priority Action Plan (PAP) for the period 2014-2018.
	French policy for development Year: 2022 Source: French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Type: policy Pages: 133	This document is a budget plan for French ODA. The strategic planning for French international development policy is detailed there. It is based on three goals: (1) controlling better globalization through cooperation; (2) approaching development globally through multiple steering actions; and (3) strengthening performance. It also presents credits for these strategies.	*The Plan for an Emerging Senegal: 2019-2023 Priority Actions Plan* Year: 2018 Source: Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation Type: policy Pages: 144	This policy paper is PAP2 and gives the orientation of the Plan for an Emerging Senegal for the 2019-2023 period.
	French policy on international cooperation within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for sustainability	This is an opinion paper of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council as requested by the Prime minister. It traces the French international cooperation	*The Plan for an Emerging Senegal: Priority Actions Plan 2 Adjusted and Accelerated (PAP*	PAP 2A reflects the adjustments that Senegal has made to PAP 2, particularly to adapt to the situation created by the covid-19 crisis.

	Year: 2016 Source: French Economic, Social and Environmental Council Type: report Pages: 106	policy since 1998 and ends with recommendations for France.	*2A) for Economic Boost* Year: 2020 Source: Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation Type: policy Pages: 56	
	Human rights and development strategy Year: 2019 Source: French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Type: policy Pages: 32	The first part of this document presents the French approach toward the integration of human rights reflections into its ODA policy. The second part is an action plan to implement this strategy.	*Presentation to the 2018 Advisory Group* Year: 2018 Source: Advisory Group on the Funding of PAP2 Type: presentation Pages: 38	During the 2018 Advisory Group on the Funding of PAP 2 in Paris, the assessment of PAP 1 was presented.
SDGs implementation	*Report on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals* Year: 2016 Source: French Government Type: voluntary national review Pages: 54	The VNR describes the progress of France towards reaching the SDGs and is presented to the United Nations.	*2018 Voluntary National Review* Year: 2018 Source: Senegalese Government Type: voluntary national review Pages: 153	The VNR describes the progress of Senegal towards reaching the SDGs and is presented to the United Nations.
	France's roadmap for the 2030 Agenda Year: 2019	This roadmap aligns France's implementation of the SDGs around 6 stakes.	*2022 Voluntary National Review* Year: 2022	The second VNR of Senegal reports on its progress by 2022.

	Source: French Government Type: policy Pages: 36		Source: Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation Type: voluntary national review Pages: 96	
	France's checkpoint on the implementation of 2030 Agenda Year: 2019 Source: Agenda 2030 Type: report Pages: 84	This document reports on SDGs implementation in France by 2019. It also presents the background and preparation procedures for the *Roadmap for the 2030 Agenda*. This checkpoint focuses on the implementation of 6 SDGs: 4, 8, 10, 13, 16 and 17.	*Sustainable Development Goals: Update on Implementation in 2019* Year: 2019 Source: Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation Type: report Pages: 68	This document reports on the progression of Senegal towards SDGs by 2019.
	SDGs: Everything is linked! Year: 2022 Source: Florence Provendier (Deputy) Type: report Pages: 118	This report was made by Florence Provendier, who was granted a special mission for SDG evaluation by the Prime minister. It aims at understanding why SDG are not more used and known.	*Senegal by 2030: Analysis of scenarios of progress towards SDGs* Year: 2018 Source: Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, & Millenium Institute Type: report Pages: 22	This is a joint document by the Millennium Institute and the Planning Direction of the Ministry of the Economy. It reports on the results of scenarios about possible futures for Senegal by 2030 in terms of SDGs.

Tools for measuring progression towards SDGs	*French variation of SDG indicators* Year: 2018 Source: French National Council of Statistical Information Type: report Pages: 165	This report from the National Council of Statistical Information gives recommendations on a French variation of each SDG indicator.	*Implementation of a collection, analysis, tracking and monitoring tool for Sustainable Development Goal n° 16 (2021): 72 pages* Year: 2021 Source: Senegalese Government & UNDP Type: report Pages: 72	The Senegalese Government and UNDP collaborated on a tool for SDG 16 monitoring. Their procedures, remarks and conclusions are presented in this report.
Total pages: 1590	**757**		**833**	