Global mobilities, migration and asylum

Question: Why does the act of people moving from one place to another sometimes become an international 'crisis'?

International migration is a part of everyday life. People move for a wide range of reasons: to look for new opportunities, earn better salaries, reunite with loved ones, escape from social or political difficulties, or to study – amongst others. This chapter explores these issues by asking why the act of people moving from one place to another sometimes become an international 'crisis'. At the heart of this question are several unresolved tensions. These tensions concern, for example, labour-market needs generated by ageing populations and care needs that are unevenly distributed across the world. They also concern different forms of forced displacement, when people move not primarily through choice and may be unable to return home safely. To properly unpack these global issues, the chapter begins by introducing categorizations drawn from research on migration and proceeds by analysing mechanisms used by states to manage and control migration. The chapter then moves on to forced displacement and its international regulation. In the concluding part, the chapter pulls together these dimensions and reflects these considering the present context of mobility.

The International Relations of people's mobility

The first major reason people move is due to security concerns. In this case, moving is an act undertaken to safe one's life: people move in order to flee war and persecution, or perhaps because the place of birth has become uninhabitable due to environmental degradation or for reasons related to climate change. If this takes place within the borders of their country, these people are labelled as *internally displaced persons* (IDPs). If they cross an international border, they become *refugees*, although accessing the formal status as a *recognized refugee* is a complicated process involving assessment, refugee status determination (RSD), by the host country or the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR. In recent years, there has been a multiplication in the amount of people forced to flee their homes and a large majority of these people reside in countries of the so-called Global South. One of the countries with a considerable number of internally displaced persons, and from where a large number of refugees have been forced to flee over the past years, is Syria. Its civil war has raged since March 2011 and was exacerbated by the emergence of the Islamic State who operated across large parts of Syria and Iraq. The combined effects of this compeled people to seek safety elsewhere and, hence, produced forced displacement. Most people who flee across borders stay in nearby neighbouring countries, and this is evident in the Syria case. For example, Lebanon has hosted the most refugees from Syria per capita, whereas Turkey is among those hosting the most in absolute numbers.

The second major reason people move is due to work. These may be employees of multinational companies, diplomats who represent their countries, experts posted in peacekeeping and crisis management missions, or humanitarian workers engaged to alleviate suffering in complex humanitarian emergencies or protracted refugee situations. Migratory

movements of these high skilled populations are perceived as an integral part of the globalised world. Thus, their, and their families', mobility is usually facilitated, and their settlement is sought to be made as smooth as possible on behalf of both sending and receiving countries. This selective facilitation is one example attesting to the classed character of the regulatory frameworks conditioning international migration where the above mentioned globally mobile groups are often referred to as expatriates, not migrants. Migration is often intuitively considered as movement from poorer countries to richer ones. Here countries located in the so-called Global South are perceived as sending countries, from where aspiring migrants move towards Global North destinations. While this has been true in the past, much migration now takes place within the Global South, which will be explored further in this chapter's case studies. At the same time, many sectors such as agriculture, construction and maintenance rely on workforces that are often not as prominently discussed (or as well paid), namely undocumented migrants without a valid residence permit.

It is hopefully clear, then, that global mobilities in their diverse manifestations are an integral part of our world today. Despite this, some forms of global mobility are more visible than others. International migration continues to make headlines as countries, especially in the Global North, mount administrative obstacles and concrete walls in order to impede the entrance of those they do not want in their territory. Usually these headlines concern emergencies that erupt with the outbreak of war or a sudden natural disaster and the interest often fades after the most acute phase of the emergency is passed. When conflicts become prolonged – such as the war in Syria, ongoing conflicts in Central Africa, the exile of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, or gang violence in Central America – more people flee from those conflicts and they become more visible again in the international media.

International Relations has often approached international migration from the perspective of states' attempts to control and manage migration to their territory (e.g. Weiner 1985; Andreas and Snyder 2000; Hollifield 2004; Hollifield et al. 2014). It has also focused on the role of international organisations in regulating regimes of rights related to human mobility (e.g. Betts 2011; Allen et al. 2018). Yet, these approaches focus more on migration as a category than on migrants themselves and have thereby come under scrutiny from critical perspectives. Critical scholars have reversed that trend by unpacking the processes by which some populations' migratory movements are presented as a problem and a threat to national security or cohesion (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2015). Feminist scholars have focused further by asking the gender of the international migrant, and continued by examining and pointing at the multiple relations each migrant embodies and inhabits (e.g. Piper 2008; Runyan et al. 2013; Penttinen and Kynsilehto 2017). In these analyses, the role of the human body is analysed as one of the concrete grounds on which global entanglements play out – as Penttinen (2008) for example argued in her analysis of global sex industry and trafficking in women for sexual exploitation. Finally, postcolonial approaches have pointed out how migration control and management processes are racialized (Bilgiç 2018), often selecting particular populations for closer scrutiny and confinement, and how issues like this keeps scholarship on migration overly focused on the Global North.

Structuring and categorising mobility

Over time, migration studies have emphasised pull and push factors to explain global mobilities. These factors refer to the reasons for which people leave their place of birth, and the reasons why they go to particular destinations, and less so to others. Push factors range, for example, from wars and conflicts, lack of possibilities to access paid work or continue studies, and natural disasters or environmental changes that render their home uninhabitable. Pull factors include, for example, personal or family safety, better employment opportunities and healthier environment. Think, for example, recruitment campaigns for seasonal workers in the agricultural sector. This field of work relies on migrant labour in different parts of the world. It is usually considered as short-term, circular mobility in order to meet temporary, seasonal labour force needs – pull factor – in the receiving area, and the necessity for income-generating activities – push factor – in the sending area. It is also politically regulated as such, enabling access to short-term residence permits without a possibility to access social rights and benefits reserved for citizens and permanent residents.

The division between push and pull factors builds on the model of a rational actor who makes calculated choices in life. It has been criticised for presenting human mobility as unilinear and mechanistic, as it draws on the assumption of human action and mobilities that would depend on simple causes and effects and rationally calculated choices (Peterson 2003). Later migration research, drawing especially on feminist scholarship and life-story approaches that look at migratory moves as part of the migrant's overall life course and the meanings they assign to these moves, has shown how decisions on whether or not to move are more complicated than as suggested by the push-and-pull model (e.g. Erel 2007). While the need and will to move from one country to another, and conditions that render certain destinations more attractive than others bear upon this decision-making, these reasons cannot explain alone the multiplicity of mobilities at the global scale. This diversity has, however, proved to be difficult to identify and deal within state-level regulatory mechanisms that recognise only one cause or ground for a residence permit.

Migration studies utilises categories such as economic or labour migration, family migration and student migration to classify and situate these reasons for moving across international borders. Looking at individual stories of people on the move, however, several reasons often occur simultaneously: student migrants may also have families who either accompany them in the country of residence or, due to financial constraints or strict immigration policies, stay at the country of origin. Moreover, student migrants often need to work alongside their studies to cover the living costs in the country of residence. Regardless their field of studies, they usually get employed in positions that do not require extensive skills and constitute a supplementary labour force that fills up vacancies in the country of residence.

Traditionally, migration studies tended to operate from the premise of migrant understood as a man moving from one country to another. He would move in search of work opportunities abroad, often through organised recruitment channels or less formal networks of kin and friends. He would leave his spouse and children behind and send money back home. As for recruitment in sectors such as construction and mining, this continues to be the case.

However, in some other sectors, such as domestic work, care and health professions, recruitment has targeted largely women, who would then become migrants supporting their families staying in the country of origin. Feminist researchers were early to point out the gender bias in migration studies (Morokvaśic 1984), and they have also worked on what has become called transnational care chains (Ehrenreich and Hochchild 2003). These denote the diverse relations of care connected with human mobilities: migrants who come to perform care duties in another country, sometimes on the other side of the globe, caring for children, the sick or the elderly, leave behind persons, children or ageing parents for example, for whom they need to look for other people to care for in order to fill the care deficit.

Feminist migration scholars have drawn attention to the diversity of migration trajectories within and outside regulated channels of global mobility. Ethnographic explorations of irregular or clandestine mobilities have shown how people make choices and cross borders despite the attempts to seal the borders from those considered as not worthy of access to global mobility (Khosravi 2010), and they may and often are accompanied by citizens of permanent residents who do not agree on the political closure of borders undertaken in their name (Doty 2006). These mobilities are far from linear, and they necessitate not only hope and luck but also require keeping oneself informed on the changing practices of the border regime. Collyer has called the travels of people moving northwards from different Central and Western African countries 'fragmented journeys' (2007). With this he refers to the non-linear character of migrant trajectories where journeys are shaped by changing access across borders, and the necessity to work where labour is needed, in order to collect money for continuing to the next location. Indeed, the mundane practices of these mobile individuals call principles such as state sovereignty into question (Brigden 2016). Brigden illustrates this with examples drawn from her research in El Salvador and with Central American migrants seeking to transit through Mexico in order to reach the United States. Due to the tight border control not only at the actual border but also along the journey within Mexico, these migrant trajectories often include lengthy stays along the way while the aspiring migrants try to pass as Mexican nationals. However, despite various dissuasive elements on the way, they go about their journey thereby challenging the border regime and forms of politics it entails.

As mentioned earlier a form of global mobility consists of diverse professional groups who are posted shorter or longer term in different international missions. Feminist researchers have shown how these formal channels and forms of mobility often create shadow forms of mobility such as sex trafficking. This has involved diplomats, NGO workers and peacekeeping and crisis management missions that move groups of people, including military men with lots of money and free time, far away from their everyday surroundings to locations where war may have killed local men and poverty pushed women to search for livelihood by any means (e.g. Rodriquez and Kinne 2019). In the case of post-war Bosnia, for example, trafficking ring involving people deployed in missions both as customers and traffickers were discovered when police-officer Kathryn Bolkovac decided to investigate cases of raped women who came to her office, yet costing Bolkovac her career in the UN system (Prügl and Thompson 2013). This is one example on which how the selective migration system operates: it privileges certain forms of global mobilities and, while doing so, creates other forms of

mobilities that are pushed into the shadows, yet they are as present in the globalised world as the more privileged forms of migration.

Controlling migration

States seek to control the entry, exit and stay in their territories. This mostly concerns the entry and stay of the non-nationals, but nationals may also face different kinds of restrictions to their international mobility such as, as an encouragement, incitation to return to the country of origin after undertaking studies abroad, or as an impeachment, restricted access to passport that would permit regular forms of travel. In some countries, such as China, also internal migration of Chinese nationals is restricted by the hukou system that refers to the residence permit within the territory. Those moving without the official permit to do so face many difficulties, such as the impossibility for the migrant children to access education in the new place of settlement.

Based on their comparative study between different countries across time, de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli (2018) argue that, while it seems that migration policies have become more restrictive in recent years, they have instead transformed in a different way. What has been perceived as the era of free mobility in the beginning of the twentieth century was, in fact, a highly racialised reality and concerned largely white Europeans. In Australia, this was explicitly stated in the 1901 Migration Restriction Act that excluded all non-white people from migrating – this racial restriction was annulled in 1973 only – whereas the US Migration Act of 1917 excluded all entrants from "the Asiatic barred zone". According to their analysis, contemporary migration policies are increasingly selective in terms of educational background of the aspiring migrant and social class more generally, emphasising migration of the highly skilled and imposing extensive income requirements for those third country nationals who wish to have their family members join them abroad. Moreover, the liberalisation of migration policies has been coupled with tightened visa policies that severely curb international travel possibilities of nationals of countries whose passports offer only limited access to other countries without visa. These factors combined, they argue, it has become easier for wealthy and educated Africans to move to Europe or North America, whilst possibilities for regular mobility have been extensively curbed for the poorer and less educated. This, in turn, calls for more nuanced policy analyses that consider various intersectional dimensions.

One way of regulating migrants' access to territory and their stay in the country is organised through private sponsorship regimes. People move between countries through these channels with a specific job waiting for them upon arrival, and their residence status is tied to the specific employer. These channels have been under critical scrutiny as they can lead to the exploitation as a result of structures and policies in place that render it difficult for workers to escape and denounce exploitative conditions as their migration status is bound with their job (Pande 2013).

Alongside individual states, regional organisations have sought to find ways to ease the mobility of labour from one country to another. Examples of these are the European Union

and Mercosur, the South American trade bloc. These processes have aimed at free movement within their respective economic area and defining measures through which the moving person should be considered when applying for a job, which social security scheme to apply for and what happens to the family members of the worker. While these rules have been possible to agree on rather extensively as regards the mobility of labour *within* the European Union, for example, they have proven to be very difficult when it comes to agreeing on shared measures on the matters of forced migration *into* the Union, namely the issue of asylum seeking. Furthermore, various restrictions have been introduced to fight irregular migration and collectively remove irregularly residing third country nationals. Within Mercosur, by contrast, irregular migration has been addressed through regularization campaigns targeting particular nationalities or more universally, undertaken by different countries since the establishment of Mercosur in 2002 (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015). In Argentina, for example, migration policymaking since the 2003 has explicitly rejected the focus on the removal of irregularly residing migrants that is a prevailing approach in the EU migration policy discourse.

Finally, social class is an important factor not only for regular forms of mobility but also in defining access to permanent settlement. An extreme form of how this plays out at the global scale is the way in which it has been possible to access citizenship of a given country in a fast-track manner after investing a set amount of money in that country. In the context of the European Union, Malta is a frequently cited example of this practice.

Governing forced migration

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the UN Refugee Convention, is the main international instrument that regulates international protection. It defines as a refugee someone who has been forced to flee due to persecution, war or violence, identifies five criteria – persecution due to race, political opinion, nationality, religion and belonging to a particular social group – that need to be met in order to qualify for refugee status, outlines the rights pertaining to that status, and defines states' obligation to protect refugees. It defines the core principle of international protection, the principle of *non-refoulement*, which means that the refugee cannot be returned to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened. The Convention has been ratified by the bulk of the world's states.

The UN Refugee Convention was a product of its time: drafted shortly after the end of Second World War, it was founded on the experience of the events, namely the Holocaust that took place on the European continent. With this backdrop, it defined as a refugee someone who had been forced to flee because of events that occurred in Europe before 1 January 1951. This definition was amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees that lifted time-based and geographical limitations as regards to accessing the refugee status. However, some state parties that had ratified the 1951 Convention, such as Turkey, currently one of the top-five refugee hosting countries globally, kept the geographical limitation outlined in the 1951 Convention and, therefore, only persons fleeing Europe can qualify for refugee status in Turkey. What this means in practice is that a person from Syria, for example, who arrives in Turkey and applies for asylum, will not qualify for

the strongest international protection status that the refugee status provides. Since 2012, Turkey has applied a special protection scheme for Syrian refugees, but that scheme is dependent on the goodwill of the state, not based on international obligation. As such, it is one example of the context-dependent dimensions of forced migrants' access to safety and increased precarity of protection status if not formally recognized as a refugee. Even if the Convention status can be lifted from an individual or a group, it provides the strongest form of protection as this lifting can be done only according to strictly defined and internationally agreed criteria.

The Convention definition of a refugee has been criticised for that it does not correspond to the multiple reasons for which people flee in the contemporary world, and that it requires a very individualised account of persecution (see Betts 2013: 12–14). As a major default, the definition of refugee encompasses only those who have crossed an international border and are seeking safety in another country, leaving aside all those who are forcibly displaced within the country's borders (Ganguly-Scrase and Vogl 2008). Moreover, feminists have pointed out how the definition does not recognise persecution based on gender as one of the central criteria, but gender-related persecution has been later identified under the criteria of belonging to a particular social group (Freedman 2007). While this category is the most encompassing among the five, it shows how gender again gets allocated to a subordinate position as regards to reasons for persecution observed as more fundamental. However, it would be difficult to amend the Convention completely, as it would be difficult to establish a consensus for a similarly strong renewed convention. Attempts towards renewing the international protection regime and establishing one on migration have been undertaken in the past years through the UN Global Compacts. However, despite the goodwill on pushing the process through, the Global Compact on Refugees, signed in December 2018, does not fulfil that aim due to its non-binding character as opposed to a stronger convention. The same concerns the simultaneously negotiated, drafted and signed Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration that would have bridged the needs and responsibilities related to those people who do not, for one reason or another, enter the category of a recognised refugee but who need to be recognized by the international community. Their non-binding character makes them declarations of intent without establishing actual regulatory regimes that signatory states would need to comply with and that would thereby provide migrants with a trustworthy regime under which their rights would be guaranteed.

Moreover, feminist researchers have shown how those who inhabit the context of a righteous, passive and feminised victim are perceived as deserving refugees whereas those who become deviant, engage in further mobility in an active manner and become seen as masculinised and threatening, and thus less likely to be considered as entitled to international protection (Hyndman and Giles 2011). A major paradox in this way of distinguishing those considered as deserving from those that would not qualify for international protection, lays in the very limited possibilities for resettlement at the global scale. These limitations prevail despite the prolonged stay in refugee camps initially designed as temporary dwellings; often even more likely so, the longer the stay becomes. Thus, if refugees to try to continue their lives outside the camp, they usually are compelled to do so by their own means. One example of this is the

way in which boat migration across the Mediterranean has been presented visually over the years, as compared to fund-raising campaigns for particular refugee situations.

Successive crises around the Mediterranean make constantly headlines in the international media. In terms of refugee populations, over the past years the war in Syria and the forcibly displaced due to this war have been the biggest concern for major international donors that seek to organise and contribute to conditions that would permit the stay of the forcibly displaced in the neighbouring countries. At the same time, large-scale forced displacement in other locations, such as long-term persecution leading to the genocide of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and their escape in Bangladesh and Thailand have been addressed to a much lesser extent, with much fewer donors to continue supporting the regions hosting hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced who are likely to stay. This is a cruel example of how farther the refugee movements and any connected phenomena are from potential Global North destinations, the less important the crisis becomes for the international community.

Furthermore, while the above example refers to a refugee situation that fits under the criteria of persecution due to ethnic origin and religion, there are reasons for forced displacement that are not recognized by any international protection frameworks yet. One such example is those who are forced to flee due to environment-related reasons and climate change. Questions such as whose responsibility it is to receive people who have no other choice than migrate when large areas become utterly inhabitable, due to drought or floods, for example, remain unanswered. What about the inhabitants of islands in the Pacific Ocean that are disappearing under water completely? Where should they go, and under which regulatory framework, as climate refugee as an internationally recognized category doesn't exist? Lack of access to drinking water is already a major issue in different parts of the world and it is a source of conflicts worldwide. Those who have the means and possibility to do so will afford buying water or moving to a place where such basic rights can be guaranteed. Those who are not able to use regulated channels to look for greener pastures, quite literally in this case, will be bound to find ways to do so for the simple reason of staying alive. Examples like this illustrate the discriminatory way in which access to global mobility is ordered in the contemporary world, here highlighting again its classed character. Moreover, this set of concerns highlights some of the wicked problems that will need to require some form of collective responsibility in the near future, yet resolving these will require moving beyond nationalistic discourse and thinking collectively the future of the humankind.

Case study 1: The crisis in Venezuela and people forced to flee

Once the wealthiest country in South America, Venezuela's economy collapsed in 2013. An oil producer, the falling price of petrol in 2015 further hit its already damaged economy. International sanctions against the government, placed due to political repression, human rights abuses and corruption, have made the situation more acute due to restrictions on exporting oil and importing food and medicine. The inflation rate has skyrocketed leading to hyperinflation of over 50 million per cent since 2016. This has rendered vitals such as food and medicine unavailable, or unaffordable, to most people and resulted in large-scale protests. In addition, armed gangs have taken over entire towns and social order has collapsed. Thousands of extra-judicial killings have been reported. No

fewer than five million people have left the country through different channels as a result of the aforementioned issues. This is all the more disturbing as a case study as, in the past, Venezuela actually hosted large numbers of refugees. It was a prosperous country, and its location in the Northern part of South America made it accessible from different directions. Therefore, it illustrates how the Latin American migration dynamics are shaped by contextual dynamics shifting the roles of sending and receiving countries and how migration movements are not unilinear. The crisis and responses by different countries to those fleeing the crisis also serve as an example of how protracted displacement necessitates policy responses regionally and by individual countries hosting displaced populations, and how these conditions may change when the end of the crisis is not in sight.

The impact of the Venezuelan crisis has been visible across South America for many years. Those who were the first to leave were individuals who had the means to choose their place of residence. This was either due to accumulated wealth, by their professional skills that permitted them to access work abroad, or by a combination of these factors. Others later fled to the nearest borders to seek safety in neighbouring countries (Freier and Parent 2019). Colombia hosts the largest number of refugees from Venezuela: some 1,4 million according to official figures, although actual number may be closer to 2 million people. Some 4 million more may need to arrive still (Nasr 2019). While Colombia has the longest border with Venezuela and thus provides the easiest access for refugees, it has also served as a transit country for people to continue their journeys southwards the continent. Further destinations such as Ecuador, Peru and Chile have, however, begun to limit the number of incoming persons by different measures, which means that most Venezuelans are likely to stay in Colombia. In August 2019 Ecuador, for example, began to require a specific humanitarian visa from incoming Venezuelans, despite the practical impossibility to apply for such a document complying with the set criteria (WOLA 2019).

The plight of Venezuelans and the questions over how to best offer a regional response to this displacement crisis have been addressed in the multilateral regional forum, Quito Process. As part of this, representatives of eleven countries from Central and South America convened in September 2018 in order to discuss the collective refugee response and signed a declaration to reaffirm their will to provide response to this humanitarian crisis collectively (Ministerio de Relaciones Internacionales y Movilidad Humana 2018). The outcome of this was the continuation by individual countries to provide Venezuelans specific channels to regularize their stay as well as apply for family reunion in order to provide family members safe access to the receiving country. However, despite the affirmed collective will that can be seen as an enhancement of the liberal and rights-based approach to mobility Latin America has been developing since early 2000s (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015), with the continuation of the crisis and forced displacement it engenders, the signatory countries have begun to restrict the entry of newly arriving Venezuelans.

The ongoing crisis in Venezuela has also pushed migrants to reverse their migratory trajectories. For example, a large group of people who have left Venezuela consists of returning Colombians. They had moved to Venezuela to seek work and safety from the conflicts in their own country. Some had stayed in the country for a long time, had children and had accessed Venezuelan citizenship. With the present turbulence and somewhat calmed situation in Colombia, they have decided to go back to Colombia. In Chile, a reverse movement has also begun. Heralded as the most prosperous and

stable country in Latin America, Chile has been a favoured destination for migrants for the past few years, and immigrant population has increased rapidly. In line with similar campaigns in other countries in the region, Chile introduced a process called humanitarian regularisation for Venezuelans and Haitians in 2018 to facilitate access to a residence permit in the country. The process has, however, been very slow and being in the process does not provide the person with right to work. This has meant that the people waiting for their permits are compelled to find work outside the regular channels, for lesser salaries and without access to social rights connected to a regular labour market status. Moreover, domestic political issues within Chile have caused immigration policy to enter a state of redrafting and flux, making it more difficult for migrants to access the country without an already allocated work permit and widespread political protests within Chile itself that broke out in 2019 making many Venezuelans to reconsider their decision to stay in Chile. Many have, in fact, decided to return to Venezuela which underlines how people on the move, including those who fled unbearable conditions, make decisions concerning their mobility based on various factors. While Chile can still be considered much safer than Venezuela, especially those with pending residence permits who don't have access to formal employment and face uncertainty with how the context might evolve and influence their prospects of building a life abroad, both their own and perhaps that of their family members waiting in Venezuela, weigh the decision of whether to stay or return in light of these different aspects. This serves as an example of how a simple model of push and pull factors determining human mobility is limited in its capacity of explaining why some move, others stay, and yet others decide to return even if the conditions pushing to leave have not changed.

Overall, the crisis in Venezuela shows how large-scale population movements change destinations depending on global and societal contexts at a given time, how mobilities are multiple and not unilinear from one sending country to a receiving one, and how the regional reception dynamics change when the crisis prolongs over many years forcing always more people to leave. In the prolonged crisis, receiving countries need to make policies that go beyond immediate humanitarian relief towards settlement and integration which is not an easy task especially when these countries may also undergo societal upheavals that pose additional challenges to rights-based policymaking.

Case study 2: Mediterranean migration crises and the evolving migration context in Morocco

The Mediterranean Sea has been a prominent stage for diverse migration crises in recent years. These crises usually concern the attempts of people from different Central and Western or North African countries to access the European continent by irregular means, paralleled with European states' quest to stop these attempts, and push the responsibility to control borders and host people further down southwards the African continent. Over the years, main routes have been identified fluctuating from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Central and Western Mediterranean. While each of these routes has operated most of the time, to an extent at least, there is usually one that is the most in the spotlight any given time, and one where movement is relatively easier as compared with other routes at that time, despite the increased surveillance and corresponding funding that a peak in arrivals and international attention accompanying it entail. The border between Morocco and Spain was the focus of international attention in 2005 when several migrants were shot at the fences of the land border separating the Spanish exclave of Ceuta in the African continent from the Moroccan territory, and in 2006 with a record number of arrivals to the Canary Islands. Since then,

international attention has become more focused on other routes such as the border between Greece and Turkey or between Italy and Libya, giving the impression as if no movements are undertaken from Morocco to Spain. The border deaths in 2005, however, served as a trigger for a large-scale migrant mobilisation in Morocco that was at least partly contributing to a policymaking process on migration since 2013. Moreover, the case of Morocco serves as one example of a neighbouring country where the EU is seeking to outsource migration management and border control (Bialasiewicz 2012), and how this is responded to in policy discourse and practices on the ground.

The reasons for successive crises are manifold, but together they culminate in major dilemmas: lack of access to legal channels for mobility, whether for work or for accessing an international protection status, meets the quest to control and manage mobilities in a context where the needs and the quest for control do not match. The spectacular border closure efforts by the European Union can be seen as a way seeking to show how the Union is capable of protecting its citizens' welfare from people coming from the outside. This quest has been coupled by an increasing pressure on the Southern Mediterranean countries such as Morocco and Tunisia to develop their hosting capacities, with European states financing in many cases at least part of these efforts (e.g. Andersson 2014; Vaughan-Williams 2015) even if these countries have declined multiple proposals by the EU to host formal camps or transit centres on their soil and thereby formalize their role as gate-keepers to the Union. At the same time, Morocco has developed a migration policy of its own, in order to meet the new realities: responding to the outside pressure by a major economic player, the EU, but also to the call from other countries in the African continent and the possibilities good continent-wide relations would offer in terms of economic exchanges and political support, and the internal pressure emanating from civil society organisations and broader migrants' rights movement in the country.

In the regional migratory landscape, both sub-regionally pertaining to the context of Maghreb and in a broader Northern African context, Morocco has performed several roles. For long considered as a country of emigration only, transit migration began visible in the Moroccan context in the early 2000s onwards (Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Collyer 2007), coupled with persistent migrant activism within which migrants from various Central and Western African countries claimed their presence by organising demonstrations and sit-ins despite police violence, calling for channels of being formally recognised as part of the Moroccan society (e.g. Üstübici 2016). Especially through these mobilisations and rights-based activism by Moroccan nationals, the ruling elite slowly realised that what had been conceived of as transit migration only had become a form of more permanent settlement, turning Morocco into a country of immigration too.

In 2013 King Mohammed VI initialled a new migration policy to Morocco. This new policy has included two successive campaigns in order to provide migrants access to residence permit. Regularisation was accessible to those who fulfilled one of the five criteria, the most important of which being proved residence in the Morocco for at least five years, and was expected to benefit nationals of different Central and West African countries who are perceived as the large majority of undocumented migrants in Morocco. When the first campaign was launched, however, the number of those applying for a residence of status remained below 30,000 individuals and included people in diverse positions: foreign spouses of Moroccan nationals and refugees from Syria who should have

benefited from an international protection status, not of a specific campaign for any irregularly residing migrant in the country. The amount of those regularized during the second campaign remained very low and, as it used the same criteria as the previous campaign and was thus already at the outset unlikely to reach people who would be able to fulfil the five-year-residency requirement in particular. Many migrants' rights activists contend that this campaign was more of a cosmetic effort to show other states in the African continent that Morocco continues actively working on its migration policy, rather than something meeting a need identified on the ground and administered as such. These campaigns, their results and the analyses of why and how these came about illustrate the difficulties of making proactive migration policy especially concerning people on the move who already are in the territory when necessary resources to execute these policies are not there, or are at least partially dependent on other states or groups of states that don't simultaneously provide with a broader structure to develop these policies.

A question posed by migrant individuals, associations and migrants' rights groups concerns the follow-up of the regularisation process. This includes the criteria for the renewal of one-year residence permits and the broad question of formal integration into the society. For most migrants, the major issue is finding employment and an income that permits a decent life. The integration process has thus far largely consisted of professional trainings provided by civil society organisations but access to formal labour market remains very limited. These possibilities influence the ways in which especially younger migrants see their future: whether they can think of staying in Morocco or whether they decide to try and continue their journeys onwards.

Harsh forms of violence from the border officers and the police against those perceived as migrants has been part of the everyday life in the border areas before and after the shootings in 2005. A part of the process towards a new migration policy has been even firmer control than before 2013 on the areas close to the Northern borders. This has meant continuous dismantling of makeshift campsites nearby the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and removal of migrants without residence papers to Central and Southern locations in the country; these removals seeking to deter migrants from approaching Spanish borders. Many migrants' rights activists have contended how there are two realities in Morocco since 2013: one the changed landscape especially in the capital city Rabat, where migrants are an integral part of the urban environment, and the Northern border areas, where the chase of Black migrants continues on a daily basis, and has only backlashed especially since the summer of 2018 (see Kynsilehto 2019). All these contribute to the evolving migratory dynamics in the close proximity of the European Union territory, which becomes visible to international audiences only when constructed as a spectacle within the continuing Mediterranean migration crisis.

Conclusion

As the chapter has discussed, global mobilities, migration and asylum are manifold topics that entail issues ranging from global phenomena to state actions at different national and international configurations and to a multiplicity of lived experiences of people on the move that are shaped by gender, race, social class and migration status. The issues that are likely to shape migration in the not so distant future are related with other planetary challenges many of which have been covered in the second half of this book – especially climate change which stands to make large areas

uninhabitable due to drought or flooding. A challenge for international relations will be to determine where these displaced persons should go and under which regulatory framework. What is certain, however, is that we need more careful analyses of how the limited resources in this shared globe can be used in a more equitable manner, including the access to mobility and the possibility to stay put in decent conditions. These challenges also require creative solutions to the problem of how to transform the right and actual access to international protection in a way that corresponds better to contemporary conditions, and how to proceed with this in a way that will not to crumble the progress achieved thus far.

References

Acosta Arcarazo, Diego and Freier, Luisa Feline. 2015 "Turning the Immigration Policy Paradox Up-side Down? Populist Liberalism and Discursive Gaps in South America." *International Migration Review* 49 (3): 659–696.

Allen, William; Anderson, Bridget; Van Hear, Nicholas; Sumption, Madeleine; Düvell, Franck; Hough, Jennifer; Rose, Lena; Humphris, Rachel and Sarah Walker. 2018. "Who Counts in Crises? The New Geopolitics of International Migration and Refugee Governance." *Geopolitics* 23 (1): 217–243.

Andersson, Ruben. 2014. *Illegality, inc: Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Andreas, Peter and Timothy Snyder, eds. 2000. *The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in the West.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. 2006. "'Between a rock & a hard place': North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration & transit migration." *Review of African Political Economy* 33 (108): 311–324.

Betts, Alexander, ed. 2011. *Global Migration Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Betts, Alexander. 2013. *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bialasiewicz, Luiza. 2012. "Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean." *Geopolitics* 17 (4): 843–866.

Bigo, Didier. 2002. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27 (special issue): 63–92.

Bilgiç, Ali. 2018. "Migrant encounters with neo-colonial masculinity: Producing European sovereignty through emotions." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 20 (4): 542–562.

Brigden, Noelle K. 2016. "Improvised Transnationalism: Clandestine Migration at the Border of Anthropology and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (2): 343–354.

Collyer, Michael. 2007. “In-between places: Undocumented sub-Saharan transit migrants in Morocco.” *Antipode* 39 (4): 668–690.

Doty, Roxanne L. 2006. “Fronteras Compasivas and the Ethics of Unconditional Hospitality.” *Millennium* 35 (1): 53–74.

Ehrenreich, Barbara, and Arlie Russell Hochchild, eds. 2003. *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in New Economy*. London: Granta.

Freedman, Jane. 2007. *Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freier, Luisa Feline and Nicolas Parent. “The Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus.” *Current History* 118 (805): 56–61.

De Haas, Hein; Natter, Katharina and Simona Vezzoli. 2018. ”Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection? The Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies.” *International Migration Review* 52 (2): 324–367.

Erel Umut. 2007. “Constructing meaningful lives: biographical methods in research on migrant women.” *Social Research Online* 12 (4), http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/4/5.html

Ganguly-Scrase, Ruchira and Gillian Vogl. 2008. “Ethnographies of gendered displacement: Women’s experiences in South Asia under neo-liberal globalisation.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 31 (1): 1–15.

Hollifield, James F. 2004. “The Emerging Migration State.” *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 885–912.

Hollifield, James F.; Martin, Philip L. and Pia M. Orrenius, eds. 2014. *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*. 3rd. ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Huysmans, Jef. 2006. *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.

Hyndman, Jennifer and Wenona Giles. 2011. “Waiting for what? The feminization of asylum in protracted situations.” *Gender, Place & Culture* 18 (3): 361–379.

Khosravi, Shahram. 2010. *’Illegal’ Traveller. An Auto-Ethnography of Borders*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kynsilehto, Anitta. 2019. “Bearing witness to violence at borders: Intermingling artistic and ethnographic encounters.” In *The Politics of Public Memories of Forced Migration and Bordering in Europe*, edited by K. Horsti, pp. 71–86. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Ministerio de Relaciones Internacionales y Movilidad Humana. 2018. “Declaración de Quito sobre Movilidad Humana de ciudadanos venezolanos en la Región.” Last accessed 23 February 2020. https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/declaracion-de-quito-sobre-movilidad-humana-de-ciudadanos-venezolanos-en-la-region/

Morokvaśic, Mirjana. 1984. “Birds of Passage are also Women…” *International Migration Review* 18: 886–907.

Nasr, Vali. 2019. “Don’t Let Venezuela’s Crisis Take Down Colombia too.” *Foreign Policy*, 25 October 2019. Last accessed 23 February 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/25/dont-let-venezuelas-crisis-take-down-colombia-too-refugees/

Pande, Amrita. 2013. “’The paper that you have in your hand is my freedom’: Migrant domestic work and the sponsorship (Kafala) system in Lebanon.” *International Migration Review* 47 (2): 414–441.

Penttinen, Elina. 2008. *Globalization, Prostitution and Sex-Trafficking: Corporeal Politics*. London: Routledge.

Penttinen, Elina and Anitta Kynsilehto. 2017. *Gender and Mobility: A Critical Introduction*. Lanham, MD, and London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Peterson, V. Spike. 2003. *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating reproductive, productive and virtual economies*. London: Routledge.

Piper, Nicola, ed. 2008. *New Perspectives on Gender and Migration. Livelihood, Rights and Entitlements*. London: Routledge.

Prügl, Elisabeth and Hayley Thompson. 2013. “The Whistleblower. An Interview with Kathryn Bolkovac and Madeleine Rees.” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 15 (1): 102–109.

Rodriquez, Marisella and Brandon J. Kinne. 2019. “Blue Helmets, Red Flags: Institutional, Societal, and Military Determinants of Peacekeeping Abuses.” *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (3): 626–640.

Runyan, Anne Sisson; Lind, Amy; McDermott, Patricia and Marianne H. Marchand, eds. 2013. *Feminist (Im)Mobilities in Fortress(ing) North America: Rights, Citizenships, and Identities in Transnational Perspective*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.

Vaughan-Williams, Nick. 2015. *Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weiner, Myron. 1985. “On International Migration and International Relations.” *Population and Development Review* 11 (3): 441–455.

WOLA. 2019. “Visa Imposed by Ecuador on Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees Goes Against International Human Rights Obligations.” Last accessed 23 February 2020. https://www.wola.org/2019/08/ecuador-visa-venezuela-migrants-refugees-human-rights-obligations/

Üstübici, Ayşen. 2016. “Political activism between journey and settlement: Irregular migrant mobilisation in Morocco.” *Geopolitics* 21 (2): 303–324.