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**AN INQUIRY TO CONTEMPORARY ONTOLOGY  
OF WAR IN MILITARY SCIENCE AND  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS METATHEORY**  
A Framework for Absolute Idealist Ontology of War

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## ABSTRACT

Samuli Lahtinen: An Inquiry to Contemporary Ontology of War In Military Science And International Relations Metatheory: A Framework for Absolute Idealist Ontology of War  
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**Abstract:** This research investigates contemporary philosophy in international relations and military science, reviewing how the ontology of war is grounded in the scientific logic of metatheories. This research outlines five metatheoretical contradictions in contemporary international relations metatheory and military science, arguing that contemporary philosophy of science cannot justify ontological analysis.

Furthermore, this research presents a preliminary framework for absolute idealist articulation on the ontology of war: claiming that Hegelian philosophy can better explain the nature of dialectical change of warfare: this research synthesizes nominalist claims on ontological identity with absolute idealism. In addition, this research identifies different modes of being as the primary source of confusion regarding the form of ontological analysis. This research concludes that the contemporary metatheories are epistemologically contradictory or cannot justify research to ontology.

Keywords: metatheory, military science, international relations, Hegel, absolute idealism, metatheoretical analysis, ontology of war, philosophy of science, military history.

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## TIIVISTELMÄ

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**Tiivistelmä:** Tämä tutkimus analysoi kansainvälisen politiikan ja sotatieteiden metateorioita Hegeliläisen tieteenfilosofian perspektiivistä ja osoittaa että ontologian tutkimuksen esteenä ovat viisi antinomiaa, loogista ristiriitaa, todeten että nykyinen tieteenfilosofia kansainvälisessä politiikassa ja sotatieteissä ei ole kyennyt integroimaan dialektista agenttiutta tai dialektista muutosta sen tieteenfilosofiaan. Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että tieteenfilosofian keskustelun suhde on ongelmallinen sillä tämänhetkinen tieteenfilosofia ei kykene käsittelemään ontologian eri muotojen suhdetta tieteenfilosofiaan.

Tutkimus syntetisoi nominalistien väitteet tieteen filosofiasta absoluuttisen idealismiin ja osoittaa että negatiivinen dialektiikka ei ole välttämättä, täysin epäsopiva Hegeliläisen dialektiikan kanssa, vaan pikemminkin sitä osana oleva prosessi. Tutkimus toteaa, että absoluuttinen idealismi kykenee selittämään sodan ontologisen muutoksen, ihmisen tietoisuuden ja dialektiikan tuottamien erilaisten muotojen kautta paremmin kuin tämänhetkiset metateoriat. Tämä tutkimus myös osoittaa miten negatiivista dialektiikkaa voidaan mahdollisesti hyödyntää ontologian tutkimuksessa ja pyrkii luomaan pohjan hegeliläiselle metateorialle.

Avainsanat: metateoria, sotatieteet, kansainvälinen politiikka, Hegel, absoluuttinen idealismi, metateoreettinen analyysi, sodan ontologia, tieteen filosofia, sotahistoria

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## Table of Contents

1. Introduction .....	5
1.1. Summary of Contents .....	5
1.2. Foreword.....	7
1.3. Purpose of Metatheoretical Analysis and Limitations of its Methodology .....	9
1.4. Philosophy of Science in the Art of War: On the Issue of Succession.....	12
1.5. The Undead Metatheories in International Relations .....	16
1.6. Knights of the Periodical Table: Regression of Military Science .....	23
1.7. Cul-de-Sac in Epistemology: From Warfare to Management Economics .....	25
1.8. From West to East: Dialectical Materialism in Military Science .....	30
1.9. Strategic Deception Maskirovka in The Soviet Union: Changing Paradigm.....	31
1.10. Information Operations in the West: The Solace of Physiognomy.....	34
1.11. An Heir to The Throne: Legacy Of Clausewitz .....	39
2. Literature Review .....	41
2.1. Neopositivists: The Saga of The Eternal Skeptic .....	41
2.2. From Kant to Can: Transcendental Conditions of Knowledge .....	42
2.3. Circular Logics of the Vienna Circle: Carnap and the Void of Subjectivity.....	45
2.4. The Progression of Science: Kuhn .....	47
2.5. Lakatos versus Popper versus Kuhn: Price of Progress.....	49
2.6. Dialectical Materialism: Ontology of The Economic System.....	52
2.7. Nominalism: Thus Spoke...a Relativist?.....	58
2.8. Hegel's Philosophy and Heidegger's Critique .....	61
2.9. Foundations of Frankfurt School and Negative Dialectics: Exclusivity of Identity.....	63
2.10. On Contemporary Critical Theory: Whose Ideology, Which Normativity?.....	68
2.11. Social constructivism: Et Tu Brute?.....	72

2.12.	Contemporary Social Constructivist Ontology: A Way Forward? .....	79
2.13.	Critical Realism: The Sage and The Celestial Heavens .....	83
3.	Towards Absolute Idealist Framework .....	93
3.1.	The Fundamental Problems of Existential Statements: Five Antinomies of Ontology.....	93
3.2.	Table 1. Logical Principles of Reasoning: Ontogenetic Antinomies and Consequences of Contradictions to Philosophy of Science.....	93
3.3.	Absolute Idealism: Relationship between Universal and Particular.....	96
3.4.	On the Nature of Consciousness: Absolute Idealism .....	101
3.5.	Modes of Absolute Idealism: Dialectical Movement .....	106
3.6.	Table 2. Ontological modes in absolute idealism.....	106
3.7.	Table 3. Contradiction between different modes of reality .....	107
3.8.	Table 4. Ontological differentiation in absolute idealism .....	110
3.9.	Table 5: Horizontal model of dialectical movement: production of social ontology. ....	115
3.10.	Synthesizing Negative Dialectics With Absolute Idealism.....	117
3.11.	The Act of War and Act in War: Differentiating Between Act, State, and Ontology.....	122
3.12.	Conclusions .....	128
4.	References .....	130

# **1. Introduction**

## **1.1. Summary of Contents**

This research argues that military science and international relations have failed to integrate the philosophy of science within the disciplines successfully. Furthermore, this study claims that contemporary research does not successfully ground continuity or change to scientific ontology. This research introduces a Hegelian critique of contemporary metatheories of science illustrating the philosophical contradictions on ontology. Furthermore, by utilizing Kantian antinomies as a framework to problematize philosophy of science this establishes an initial absolute idealist framework to study ontology: describing in detail a dialectical model of change to make possible scientific research on basic statements. In essence, this research investigates how the ontology of war is characterized in contemporary metatheory and investigates by metatheoretical analysis philosophy of science in contemporary social sciences, proposes an alternative framework for ontic research, and argues that contemporary research to ontology is metatheoretically contradictory and cannot support the methodology utilized by social sciences to establish ontology.

This study is divided into three parts: introduction (Chapters 1.1-1.11), these chapters describe the philosophical problem of ontology in contemporary social sciences and the introduction frames the research problem in contemporary context and illustrates its relevance. The second part of this research is the critical literature review (Chapters 2.1-2.13) that detail a metatheoretical analysis of contemporary philosophy of science in international relations and military science. The final part (Chapters 3.1-3.13) establishes the main argument for grounding a new metatheoretical framework for ontogenetic analysis. Below is a more detailed summary of the contents of this research.

Chapter 1.3 in this research is dedicated to methodological issues and constraints that this research must consider as well as epistemological questions regarding philosophy of science. The introduction summarizes the contents of this research and outlines some basic assumptions of the research in Chapter 1.2-3. Chapter 1.4 frames the general development of military science as a failure to overcome an ontological problem with dualist ontology: the problem of individuation. In addition, this section discusses the general impact of the philosophy of science on military science and international relations since the influence of positivist epistemology is interlinked to the problem and the lack of subsequent

effort to understand warfare. A more detailed account is in the literature review section. Chapter 1.5 and 1.6 discuss the historical development of Western military science.

Chapter 1.7. summarizes the core concepts of Soviet military science and the infusion of cybernetics to Soviet – and later Russian military science. Finally, Chapters 1.9. review the contemporary discussions in military science, especially regarding cyber warfare, information operations, and strategic communication. Arguing there is a clear gap in research that metatheories have failed to consider. Chapter 1.11. establishes how contemporary military science already in its inception introduced idealist philosophy to military science but did not continue to support theoretical development of the discipline.

The second part of the research: The Literature Review starts from Chapter 2.1. and continues to Chapter 2.13. The second part is dedicated to the literature review detailing the Hegelian criticism of contemporary scientific metatheories both summarizing and establishing the nature of contradiction in their philosophical grounding. These chapters offer a detailed critique of neopositivism, dialectical materialism, social constructivism, nominalism, and influential contemporary critics of absolute idealism such as Adorno, Butler, and Heidegger.

Part three: Towards Absolute Idealist Framework is entirely dedicated to grounding an initial framework on Hegelian ontology, Chapter 3.1 details the philosophical problems of ontology and illustrates the exact nature and problems in the philosophy of science outlining different problems regarding ontology, these antinomies present not only a philosophical but methodological problem for ontogenetic analysis. The relationship of these antinomies is described in detail in Chapters 3.2-3.5., suggesting that the solution for the antinomy between ontology and scientific inquiry can be resolved by integrating negative dialectics to absolute idealism.

Chapters 3.1-3.31. of this research outline three contributions to the philosophy of science; introduces the first systematic description of dialectics; and finally, the use of negative dialectics as the methodology for absolute idealism, in essence synthesizing nominalism and absolute idealism. This research concludes that it is possible to investigate existential statements: to inquiry in the universal and particular determinateness; to make conceptual analysis possible in the present, past, and future without resorting to nominalist epistemology. Suggesting scientific research to ontology is possible by incorporating dialectics to explain a change in ontological development. Chapters 3.5-3.9. are dedicated to grounding an initial dichotomy between different forms of dialectics. Chapter 3.12. introduces a more detailed

reasoning on the universal nature of war. Before conclusions in Chapter 3.13. Part 4 of this research contains references.

## **1.2. Foreword**

This research establishes the first analytical definition of ontological dialectics and introduces an initial framework for scientific research to ontology: offering a solid foundation for social sciences conduct research grounded in a conscious agency; as ontology is actualized by this agency, the particular identity is subjected to both positive will and negative inertia, that constitutes a particular form. This research suggests that by incorporating constraining elements of negative dialectics as a foundation for exclusion, as Adorno suggested, universal ontology can be derived via contrafactual reasoning since the elements that constitute a ‘universal’ ontology, or a type are bound by binary identity of the universal: what the nature of the entity cannot be. Therefore, the development of ideas through dialectical agency particularizes and grounds ontology as a form in history that is an exclusive expression of universal ideas reflected by consciousness. Such reasoning illustrates why despite the universal characteristics particularity of events produces different form through historical change. In essence, the methodology presented in this research is designed to reason how exactly dialectical agency can produce a shared similitude from universal idea, despite having a particular form by excluding universal elements that all logical categories or ideas share.

This research argues that to develop military science ontogenetic research on the nature of warfare should formulate a conception on the dialectics between universality and individuality: to ground an understanding that does not presuppose perfect symmetry but inertia in the actual. Incorporating dialectics as the basis for ontogenetic research allows circumvention of dualistic dichotomy and integrates active agency and meaning to scientific research.

Note that it is obvious that this research alone cannot fulfill all the gaps that have been left, especially in dialectical thought, therefore should be perceived only as suggestive of a new direction and possible avenues of research in the philosophy of science. To fully realize its framework, a more substantial discussion and review on the nature of truth is essential: for something to be “true,” the characteristics include a discussion on how these judgments are made, for separation of ontology is never merely derivative of principles. Hegel still offers valuable grounds for such a task but incorporating a full treatise



on the logical principles of science is simply beyond the means and purposes of this research. It is the intent to create grounding for future research via this thesis. Like a loyal *aide-de-camp*, this research swings the gates open to more mature discussion on ontology, disregarded in the past.

### 1.3. Purpose of Metatheoretical Analysis and Limitations of its Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodological and epistemological issues in this research. This research investigates the following questions: (1) *what basic existential statements are implicit in metatheories and how does contradictory ontology influence*; (2) *how metatheories validate ontological statements epistemologically*; (3) *present a Hegelian critique to ontological posture in contemporary frameworks*.. In international relations, Jackson has argued different epistemologies as ‘paradigms’ and categorize these positions as metatheoretical basis classifying them as different methodologies.<sup>1</sup> Others who argue for the existence of metatheory as a scientific domain, such as Wallis, define analysis of metatheories as: “...*the study of theory, including the development of overarching combinations of theory, as well as the development and application of theorems for analysis that reveal underlying assumptions about theory and theorizing*”.<sup>2</sup>

In this research, metatheories are classified as; (1) *conceptual heuristic devices*; (2) *that make an ontological claim of the nature of reality and existence or analyze ontology*; (2) *formalize a set of theoretical assumptions that are specific to that field* (3) *have a history of development* ;(4) *have a coherent theoretical framework or multiple competing theories that share same (core) theoretical assumptions*; (5) *and form a holistic interdependency between different areas of philosophy of science*.<sup>3</sup> The analytical component of this research investigates the metatheoretical assumptions and summarizes these positions in the literature review, to illustrate contradictions in scientific reasoning. The purpose of metatheoretical research is to further develop and incorporate philosophy of science to contemporary scientific analysis as a practice. Therefore, validity of metatheoretical analysis is dependent the accurate representation of metatheories themselves. In military science metatheoretical analysis is in its infancy, as further illustrated in the introduction, its development is the objective of future research. The critique in this research is not intended to be a total reflection of the different metatheoretical perspectives, but rather illustrate the mainstream conceptions rather than every specific variant of each paradigm, hence can be conceived as a general articulation of their metatheoretical positions or a “Weberian ideal type”

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<sup>1</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations : Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* . New York: Routledge, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Wallis, S. “*Toward a Science of Metatheory*.” *Integral review* 6, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 73–120. 85-86.

<sup>3</sup> My definition also in Lahtinen, S (Forthcoming) “Metatheories in military sciences” in *Handbook of Military Sciences*: Springer.

of their position to the philosophy of science. Neither is it not exhaustive in its criticism but rather selective as to why these metatheories and their problems are relevant to ontic theorizing.

Methodologically, this research appropriates scientific logic as its basis and illustrates how scientific logic based on the 'law of non-contradiction' can be harnessed to study contradictory metatheories: contradictory states cannot be true and false at the same time, this also present in Hegel's work, but can be regarded as a general 'law' in philosophy.<sup>4</sup> These contradictory statements or antinomies as Kant supposed create obstacles to the philosophical premise and therefore, cannot substantiate all methodological or epistemological choices in contemporary research. This research appropriates Kantian antinomies as a model to formulate the set of problems in contemporary ontology, this means utilizing a problem-based analysis to resolve the tension in contemporary metatheory.<sup>5</sup> However, note that this does not mean appropriating his philosophy, but a problem based set of arguments to illustrate the need for different form of logical reasoning.

Fundamentally, this research summarizes and categorizes how philosophical assumptions are integrated in metatheories and their consequences to scientific research. In Hegel's view the idea of "science" presupposes philosophy. For only through the combined effort of communication, language and reasoning thought is inscribed to paper, unlike Aristotle, Hegel does not presuppose that the dominance of logical format such as communication can only resolve the tension between scientific reasoning and philosophy.<sup>6</sup> For example empirical science describes the nature of singular nomological force, not the nature of the system itself that philosophy contemplates. In contrast to empirical science, philosophy describes the system in its totality, thus metatheoretical analysis is the investigation of the logical format of reasoning in science: this logical format is philosophy of science or the contemplation of the logical form of scientific reasoning.

This research is limited to analyzing metatheories with an ontology or presupposition on the nature war or related issues as many of the sections in this research are very detailed. Metatheories that describe the international system or causes of warfare are treated as outside the boundaries of the ontology of war:

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<sup>4</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. Cambridge University Press: The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK. ISBN-13: 978-0-511-78978-6 & Bertrand, Russel. (1998) *The Problems of Philosophy*. 2nd ed. Oxford ;: Oxford University Press, 1998. Print.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, United Kingdom. Cambridge University Press Syndicate; The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, UK.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. and also in Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk. 30-300.

this type of research is purely causal. For example, realist theories are intentionally excluded as they presuppose the causes of warfare but are ambiguous on what the exact nature of warfare is. Yet, it is worth noting that many of the issues below are directly linked to excluded metatheories or theories in international relations and have implications ontic analysis. Regarding constraints on the philosophical discussion in this research, the philosophers of language such as Wittgenstein and Saussure have not been included here, both Wittgenstein and Saussure highlight the nature of language and its consequences to its form of logic but have very little to say on ontology itself. Language is certainly an integral element of social violence, however, integrating all relevant contemporary philosophical discussion is simply outside boundaries of this research, thus a conscious choice was not to include these discussions in this research despite its impact in contemporary research. Secondly, in Hegel's view the linguistic domain is fundamentally interconnected to absolute character of reasoning, hence separation between the linguistic or logical domains is at best artificial as consciousness and its development are tied to social interaction even on a subconscious level.<sup>7</sup>

The objective of the literature review below this chapter is to illustrate how ontology as a domain has been disregarded in international relations and military sciences and therefore failed to incorporate a metatheory for ontological research: this literature review extends this criticism to the philosophy of science and discusses the most important critics of absolute idealism.

Note that the literature review has been intended to be as extensive and in-depth as possible, but not all paradigm-specific schools have been introduced in-depth. This research introduces a general critique of metatheories and can be considered applicable to most paradigms as this research has intended to cover majority of contemporary metatheories in international relation. Limiting the scope of this research is extremely difficult as any division of metatheory from theory is bound to be somewhat artificial. A full account of all metatheories and particularities of each metatheory, including criticism to each theoretical school, would extend to volumes of research; hence not every subfield or variation can be included. Therefore, this research is limited to contemporary metatheories that claim to have an ontology or claim to analyze basic statements.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. This is discussed further in Chapter 2.5

Furthermore, note that Hegel's conception is different from that which treated in this research; he refers to universally determinate categories as *species*.<sup>8</sup> The reason why genus is used to refer to a universal category is simple: it would be far too easy to categorically refer to a species as a concept of biology. In contrast, this research refers to species as a particular concrete taxonomy of entities that share similitude in qualities.

#### 1.4. Philosophy of Science in the Art of War: On the Issue of Succession

According to Aristotle, ontology is a 'first philosophy' that precedes all investigations both in philosophy and in science: "*Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about Wisdom and the wise. Now, of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. ... Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes*"<sup>9</sup> Fundamentally, ontic or ontogenetic research investigates the nature and relationship of universals and particulars, in addition to attributes that predicate ontology or necessary kinds that constitute a particular form. Aristotle's classic Greek definition maintains that ontology is established *a priori* to any other forms of knowledge, as first-order principles must apply to all lower-level propositions in a philosophical system, including scientific theories that first and foremost philosophical systems. First-order principles define the identity of all entities and the conditions that define existence. Here we can also differentiate between 'pure' metaphysics as a field and ontology as its subdiscipline: the 'scope' of investigation in metaphysics accounts for all 'being': both material and abstract being in the world, discussing the basic units of the world such as atoms. Whereas ontology analyzes the existence of entities, how these entities are in the world and their existential nature or their basic statements.

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<sup>8</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk. 176-177.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle (BC.350). *Metaphysics*. 2-3. (Translated by W.D Ross)

Generally, in philosophy ontology is divided into two subfields: ontology and formal ontology. Formal ontology is research to presuppositions in ontology and utilizes mereology in fields such as ethics to derive the essential principles of reasoning. Formal ontology studies a subset of propositions to deduce the foundation or root of the propositions. Formal ontology is often presented as a logical proposition, whereby mereology: the study of propositions and predicates in sets, establishes first-order principles. The objective of this research is to inquire into ontological determinateness: what defines the nature of a phenomenon as a whole. In contrast, ontology investigates the basic statements of existence that establish connections between conscious beings and their nature in a qualitative manner, seeking to answer questions regarding difference between the nature of the individual and the universal being. An example question in ontology could be, for example, what separates a particular human being from all other humans, what constitutes its individuality. This is what Aristotle referred to as the problem of individuation, the contradiction between a category of being and the individual nature of being.<sup>10</sup>

Previously introduced division in ontology is the first ‘modern’ description of ontology as a field introduced by Husserl in his work *Logical Investigation* that formalized phenomenological inquiry as a study of consciousness and segregated mereology and logic from psychologism: “*There are really only two parties. Logic is a theoretical discipline, formal and demonstrative, and independent of psychology: that is one view. For the other, it counts as a technology-dependent on psychology, which of course, excludes the possibility of its being a formal, demonstrative discipline like the other side's paradigm arithmetic.*” ... “. *This is the science intended by Kant and the other proponents of a 'formal' or 'pure' logic, but not rightly conceived and defined by them as regards its content and scope.*”<sup>11</sup> In contemporary philosophy, this ‘paradigmatic’ divide has remained. Husserl argued ontological inquiry is not an area that should be separated from the content of inquiry in science but is a parallel to such investigations. He expressed deep dissatisfaction with the state of logic and science as having failed to problematize and systematize ontic inquiry; he shared the same opinions as many of his predecessors and successors about the positivists' influence on science. Most notably, Hegel and Heidegger have had a lasting impact on philosophy, to which we shall return to later.

Husserl established phenomenology as a science of perception, where engagement with the noematic content of reality and sense-certainty provides phenomenal expressions as the foundation of everyday

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<sup>10</sup> Regis, E. (1976). “Aristotle's Principle of Individuation.” *Phronesis*”, 157-166.

<sup>11</sup> E, Husserl. (1976). *Logical Investigations*. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd: New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE.13-14.

life.<sup>12</sup> Husserl attempted to move the direction of phenomenological research towards Kantian transcendental idealism, where via eidetic reduction, consciousness approaches the essential concept within the form.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the importance of Husserl's contribution to hermeneutic philosophy and successful grounding of phenomenology, he merely popularized phenomenology. Husserl's phenomenology is surpassed both in breadth and depth by the primogenitor of phenomenology, Hegel. In contrast to Husserl, Hegel envisioned phenomenology as a theoretical reflection of general conditions in internal and external dimensions of human consciousness. He argued against Kantian dualism and outlined how to move forward from Kant's apparent failure to establish the pure concept in the unity of apperception: describing the dialectical change via sublimation of contradictory forms that advances the development of self-consciousness.<sup>14</sup> Hegel's central idea is that instead of grounding human perception to the trickery of monotheistic entities such as God or to divine intuition, the referent should be consciousness as nature is barren and empty of the complexities of human social relations, ethics, feelings, and meaning. Nature is barren and unreflective of the meaning human consciousness ascribes to it, there is no consciousness to be found in nature.

Hegelian absolute idealism seemingly vanished from the mainstream debates of philosophy in the aftermath of the '80s due to the surging popularity of critical theory and nominalist philosophy. Replaced largely by discursive theories of Foucault, Adorno, Horkheimer, and other post-modernists. Through empirical research, Kantian dualist metatheories resurged and gained a dominant position in most social sciences. Furthermore, Popperian falsification laid the foundations for the emergence of critical realism in recent scientific discussions.<sup>15</sup>

Still, idealism succeeded in maintaining the interest of Marxist scholars such as Lukács and a vocal minority within dialectical materialism.<sup>16</sup> Marxist scholars were more interested in dialectics and subject-object ontology in idealism rather than reinterpreting Hegel's work as a holistic framework. Works by notable Marxists have contributed to the recent interest in Hegelian philosophy reinvigorated

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<sup>12</sup> E, Husserl. (1976). *Logical Investigations*. 13-14

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 1-30.

<sup>14</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

<sup>15</sup> Popper, K. (1966). *The open society and its enemies. Vol.2, The high tide of prophecy : Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath*. (5th ed. [revised]. ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. Taylor & Francis Group.

<sup>16</sup> See for further information: Lukács, G. (1980). *The ontology of social being*. Merlin Press

largely by Zizek, Adorno, and Bologh.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, much of his central ideas were salvaged by early pioneer of symbolic interactionism: Herbert Mead, whose work later inspired social constructivists in international relations(IR), unaware of the consequences of dialectical agency.<sup>18</sup>

Hegel's obscure writing style and the complexity of his work have done little to ease understanding, and his work is notoriously easy to misinterpret, unfoundedly vilified by post-structuralists such as Foucault who maintained power as the basis for knowledge and Adorno, who dogmatically dismissed his ideas as merely reinterpreted Kantianism.<sup>19</sup> Hegel never established a coherent methodology to study ontology nor perceived it as a metatheory for scientific research; rather, he viewed his research as what could be referred to as meta-philosophy or in more established terminology metaphysics, a view he endorsed in many of his works.<sup>20</sup> For him, the most pressing problem of science — is the nature of consciousness and its relationship to freedom of will: he maintained hermeneutic reasoning is a sufficient method and will be the sole source for philosophical inquiry in the future, an argument that has only fueled the criticism of his opponents.<sup>21</sup>

This research introduces an initial outline for a metatheoretical framework to compliment his metaphysics: to study ontology via the problem of individuation and establish an understanding of the dialectical change that would make possible scientific research on metaphysics — in essence, complimenting his work with a methodology and epistemology already present in his philosophy. Ontology has maintained a rather subdued focus in social sciences, especially military science and international relations. Both sciences have failed to understand what ontology is exactly and how to study ontology, as is further detailed in the chapters below. This failure can be attributed to a number of reasons, primarily the lack of understanding of what radical freedom of will or dialectical agency mean or what

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<sup>17</sup> Bologh, R. W. (1979). *Dialectical phenomenology: Marx's method*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. & Žižek, S. (2012). *Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism*. London: Verso & Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. Continuum

<sup>18</sup> Mead, G., & Morris, C. (1934). *Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. University of Chicago Press.

<sup>19</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. Continuum & Foucault, M. (1974). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock. Or any of his other works.

<sup>20</sup> See for example: Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. Cambridge University Press: The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK. ISBN-13: 978-0-511-78978-6 1-30. Also see below.

<sup>21</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk.



are its consequences in research. In addition to non-existent boundary between qualitative and property based-research in contemporary research, as is established below.

The study of continuity of forms or ontogenetic research must cross the boundary between particularity and universality due to both the temporality and asymmetry of events in history, especially war. Without qualitative paradigms, ontology and phenomenology of war have remained firmly rooted in empirical classifications and taxonomies. Consequently, problems in contemporary research are not merely “philosophical” but also produce “practical” problems via methodologically contradictory reasoning.

This research should not be viewed as theory outside Hegel’s work but as parallel to his work, an analysis of ontology supplementing the lack of methodology, which has been traditionally deemed outside the purview of social sciences, especially by those who consider positivist science as the *de jure* approach to both international relations metatheory and military science. Furthermore, this research challenges most research on ontology, contemporary military science, and international relations that claim to study ontology by illustrating already presupposed ontology that is merely classification rather than analysis, as ontology precedes conditions. This introduction presents these ideas in a more accessible narrative to illustrate the consequences and the contemporary state of research; these arguments are further developed in the literature review.

### **1.5. The Undead Metatheories in International Relations**

Metatheory as a field of science is in itself a controversial area and has caused much headache for researchers who maintain the need for ‘practicality’. Researchers such as Lake argue against the continued relevance of metatheoretical research or point out the impossibility to validate metaphysical claims, relishing the ‘dead’ nature of metatheory.<sup>22</sup> International relations as a discipline prides itself in a holistic analysis of the micro- and macro-levels of analysis, differentiating epistemological understanding between descriptive analysis: as an analytical tool for positing predictive statements of the world and explicative interpretation analyzing reasons for the statements.<sup>23</sup> Although sophisticated metatheoretical debates in IR (international relations) failed to account, how the different levels of

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<sup>22</sup> Lake, D. (2013). “Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations.” *European Journal*

<sup>23</sup> Hollis, M., & Smith, S. (1992). *Explaining and understanding international relations*. Clarendon Press. & Singer, J. David. “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations.” *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1961, pp. 77–92. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/2009557](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009557). Accessed 19 Sept. 2020.

analysis produce and influence reality, what is exactly the relationship between phenomenology and human consciousness.<sup>24</sup> Most theories of international relations simply presuppose ontology and that the nature of scientific ontology is self-evident, perceiving there is only a need to explicate outcomes, not basic statements of reality. Ontological inquiry, in essence, is the *raison d'être* for international relations as classifications and taxonomies established by the field influence policy and outline what the direction of international relations as a science is.

Consider metatheories in international relations, even as complex and advanced theories such as social constructivism: which argue for constitutive or dialectical approaches and claim to disclose sociology as a foundational epistemology of international relations — have developed no account of dialectical agency that produces social ontology. Pioneers of social constructivism Berger and Luckmann envisioned social constructivism as an investigation of everyday social constitution, narratives, and discourses to establish social symbolic meanings that today are a mainstream approach in IR.<sup>25</sup> They openly admit leaving questions regarding dialectical agency outside of their framework.<sup>26</sup> Questions regarding the hermeneutics of consciousness and ontology are left to philosophy and cordoned outside epistemological premise of 'materialist' international relations. Social constructivism has, since its mainstream popularization by Wendt, experienced bitter infighting and 'shattered' to more insular subfields.<sup>27</sup> Some researchers such as Onuf and Kratochwil have called attention to dialectics but are more interested in the systemic logic of macro-level dialectics than the metaphysical consequences of dialectics to metatheories.<sup>28</sup> Yet, call by researchers to understand dialectics in international relations have received only muted responses or are completely ignored as inconsequential to practical issues, much like metatheoretical issues, despite their significant impact to scientific research.

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<sup>24</sup> Singer, J. David. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1961, pp. 77–92.

<sup>25</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

<sup>26</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. 8-20.

<sup>27</sup> Lake, D. (2013). "Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 567–587.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494330> & Wendt A (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>28</sup> See for example: Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism at the Crossroads; or, the Problem of Moderate-Sized Dry Goods", *International Political Sociology*, Volume 10, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 115–132 & Kratochwil, F. (2018). *Praxis: on acting and knowing*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Social constructivism relies on data supplied by narratives and discourses to validate itself as a descriptive account of symbolization: determining the synthetic and true nature of representation through expressed language. More advanced forms of social constructivism describe the social constitution of ideas as actions in discourse: speech acts.<sup>29</sup>

Social constructivism appropriates an *a priori* ontology that discloses a contingent social symbolic universe, suitable for analysis of the experience and social consciousness but ill-conceived for analysis of ontology. In social constructivism, metacognition is explained as a descriptive relationship between actualized customs and language by what meaning is ascribed in society. Yet its contingent nature is unable to penetrate social ontology outside immediate and natural existence, as it's *a priori* social ontology must be taken for granted and is a predicate to any reasoning on symbolization. Statements on ontology can be stated to be partially dialectical; however, as the nature of dialectics is unclear social constructivism is only a representation of *ex-ante* or *ex-post* conditions in becoming or passing of the social context, not ontogenetic analysis.

For example, it is not possible to study Finnish concepts of security if the researcher does not have an idea of what security means for the society of Finland. Epistemologically, the researcher assumes the axiomatic nature of ontology (of Finland) as a predicate. Therefore, any proposed ontologies or symbolizations are conditional to the metacognition of the society (Finland) and, as such, are the social representation of the world: as perceived by Finns. Hence, ontological determinateness that defines how ontology is: is unique and determinate in their own social context but impossible to compare as different social ontologies have no ontological symmetry.

Similarly, we can consider, for example, the Roman concept of war and the Finnish concept of war as research would have to assume similarity of the ontology (of war) via the predicate. The predicate (warfare) in ontology must be conditional to the idea, not to the social content of societies. Otherwise, any ontological comparison is impossible as the predicate (war) defines the ontology differently: both societies have a different understanding of what warfare is and its conduct. Social constructivist analysis can only compare the difference between forms of warfare or the meaning of warfare in society but not the universal nature of warfare as they are equally conditional to the societies.

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<sup>29</sup> Emerson, R. G. (2019). "Towards a process-orientated account of the securitisation trinity: the speech act, the securitiser and the audience." *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 22(3), 515–531. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0110-4>

Crossover metatheories from sociology, such as structuration, have similarly refused to accommodate the need for phenomenological research preferring frameworks for ‘sensitizing’ research questions or practical analysis via reflexivity.<sup>30</sup> Giddens himself stated structuration theory is ill-suited for ontological inquiry as he intended structuration theory to be a strategic conduct analysis detailing the level of knowledge agents possess, motivations, and dialectics of control within social interaction, more plainly descriptive interest formation in *praxis*.<sup>31</sup> Although the advances made by Giddens’s structuration theory, these efforts have mostly been in vain as the majority understand reflexivity as a metatheory in its own right. Reflexivity only describes the form of reasoning a concept, similar to causality, despite Jackson’s claims.<sup>32</sup> For reflexivity predicates, the reasoning between causal capacities of agents and the effects these agents have in or on society.

Adopting structuration as an epistemology would mean cordoning off phenomenology and investigating the social efficacy of discourse, rather than the subsistence of the idea itself: he argues for research in social relations via ontology, this research argues for research into ontology.

Currently, IR is unable to offer a unique disposition that can legitimize its existence as a discipline. Owing much to the corrosive preference to ‘borrow’ new perspective from other disciplines, — too much ground has already been lost in the competition between other disciplines which have ‘skin’ in the ‘great’ game. This is evident in the intrusion of economics, biology, sociology, and even cosmology in IR and their use as a basis for new insight.<sup>33</sup> Most often, this charlatanism has only reinvigorated and galvanized Kantian dualism opposing ‘scientific pluralism’ and epistemologies that expose flaws of purist empirical analysis and push for scientific progress.

The dominant positivist methodology in international relations poses yet another obstacle, as ontogenesis requires a methodology to engage in speculation as a negative determination of the possibilities; an experience is determined by the particularity and, as such, reveals only a concrete, positive phenomena,

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<sup>30</sup> Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). *An Invitation To Reflexive Sociology*. University of Chicago. Cambridge: Polity Press, 65 Bridge Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

<sup>31</sup> Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 978-0-520-05728-9 89-90.

<sup>32</sup> Jackson, P. (2011). *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*.

<sup>33</sup> Critical realists often refer to gravity and planets as definitive proof of realist ontology. (See for example: Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*.. & also very clear in Patomäki, H. (2019). “The Promises of Critical Realism in the 2020s and beyond.” *Teoria Polityki*, 3, 189–200. <https://doi.org/10.4467/25440845TP.19.010.10293>. 194-195.)

foreshadowed by contingency.<sup>34</sup> In their dogmatic empiricism, many IR scholars recreated Kantian synthetic categories based on causal inference, as if observing ‘dead’ subjects.<sup>35</sup> Neopositivists often forget that questions regarding ontology are already presupposed in the empirical analysis, as Popper states.<sup>36</sup> This reasoning suggests that IR must increasingly incorporate the philosophy of science to improve the quality of scientific theories rather than dismiss it. The dominance of positivism in international relations means rejecting metaphysics and alternative paradigms that cannot be validated by deductive theory-testing or fit within analyticism.<sup>37</sup> Context-sensitive causal relations exemplified in historical case studies are more akin to tell-tales than descriptive analysis on the international system and are grounded to the utility of explanation, not to the accuracy of the description, hence normative rather than descriptive theories.<sup>38</sup>

Neither is IR research on war immune to the influence of neopositivist methodology, exemplified in Kaldor’s work.<sup>39</sup> Her views should not be viewed isolated from the epistemology at large in Peace Studies: the discipline almost uniformly applies quantitative methodologies to classify conflicts. By proxy defining ontology by empirical research: describing attributes of warfare but not ontology *per se*.<sup>40</sup> It is possible for a single mass casualty terror attack to distort quantitative analysis and provide the sufficient basis for such claims, but this only indicates similarity, rather than a being ontologically separate existence; thus, we can say the nature of the phenomena is at best submerged as we already know that these battle-deaths are measured by violence in war. Therefore, indicating what kind of war it is, not its nature nor change in its nature, but change in its properties such as quantity of casualties.

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<sup>34</sup> (For more information see: literature review)

<sup>35</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. & Jackson, P. (2011). *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*.

<sup>36</sup> Bartley W.W., Popper,K. (2013) *Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. *Realism and the Aim of Science*. Taylor and Francis. See for example: 70-100, Especially in 72-78.

<sup>37</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations : Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* .

<sup>38</sup> Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. United States of America; Massachusetts Reading. Published simultaneously in Canada. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 78-62549.

<sup>39</sup> Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and old wars : organized violence in a global era* (Third edition.). Polity.

<sup>40</sup> See for example: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2020) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: [www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se), Uppsala University. & Singer, J. David, and Small, Melvin. Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2006-01-12. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09905.v1>

Disputes on the direction of the discipline are by no means new in international relations. Some practitioners already called for a conditional surrender during the “great” paradigmatic debates of the ’90s: Keohane maintained paradigmatic stratification and differentiated research programs in subfields: therefore, should submit to neopositivist epistemology rather than oppose it.<sup>41</sup> Paradigmatic debates have since have become a rather commonplace event that could be argued to be the ‘fuel’ for scientific progress rather than its obstacle.

Newest addition critical realism advocated by scholars such as Kurki and Patomäki insist critical realism can offer a compromise through a combination of eclecticism and materialist ontology that can explain the relevant levels of analysis for the practitioners, seeking to rescue mind-independent reality from combined attacks of idealists, nominalism and hermeneutics.<sup>42</sup> Yet unrealized by many is the dualistic ontology and positivist notion science smuggled in the seemingly eclectic epistemology, emphasizing mechanistic-naturalism and social ontology of natural necessity as if observant of direct causation on a ‘hidden level.’<sup>43</sup> This argument rests fundamentally on two positions, the intransitivity of the noumenal realm as directly observable and the plurality of causes that produce a generative mechanism.<sup>44</sup>

The plurality of causes is similarly contradictory as Bhaskar himself states regarding the persistency of generative mechanisms in observation: “*The ‘thing’ which possesses the tendency is not necessarily the same ‘thing’ as that whose behaviour is recorded in the lawlike statement.*”<sup>45</sup> In observing of the law, differentiation between two causes as accidental or as existent must conform to regularity or display itself as merely accidental, as there is nothing to determine the mechanism to be present in all cases; thus, the law can be a coincidental rather than transfactual law. Neither is it possible to distinguish transfactual law from the plurality of causes, as the transfactual law cannot be conditional to its presence in a mechanism. In essence, Bhaskar argues the plurality of causes is conditional to the generative mechanisms — the pertinence or non-pertinence of these ‘transfactual’ laws cannot be distinguished as removal of one of the causes would result in a different outcome and describe a different mechanism. A

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<sup>41</sup> Keohane, R. (1988). “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4), 379-396. doi:10.2307/2600589. 381-382

<sup>42</sup> Kurki, M. (2008). *Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis*. Cambridge; New York ;: Cambridge University Press. & Patomäki, H. (2017). “Praxis, politics and the future: A dialectical critical realist account of world-historical causation.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 20(4), 805-825.

<sup>43</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. & McWherter, D. (2012). *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant*. Palgrave Macmillan Limited.

<sup>44</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*.

<sup>45</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 88-89.

researcher must ‘choose’ the mechanism: this would mean the validity of science for critical realism is staked on the preference of the researcher. Bhaskar implicitly grounds empirical research to utility and choice. This does illustrate the causal necessity of the generative mechanism.<sup>46</sup>

Critical realism posits a stratified ontology that Bhaskar argues should treat causal laws separate from the events.<sup>47</sup> It is easy to argue against such claims as synthetic category exist are abstract entities, hence experience must be synthesized with logical proof as Kant stated.<sup>48</sup> Even ‘mind-independent’ substance studied by natural sciences such as biology are determined by deductions through sense-certainty, hence, are engaged in the phenomenology of subsistence. There is nothing to prevent another property from sanctioning an illusion of appearance as the ‘law of the law,’ and critical realists find a mechanism in the social realm fitting to display a regularity or correspondence.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, if a universal law would exist, this law would be so intuitively ingrained in our reality there would not be any reason to express such a law, as the persistency of the law would have to penetrate our very being; hence contradictory as having to justify itself, as Kant already argued.<sup>50</sup> Thus these mechanisms only express the boundary conditions for such laws but not the generative mechanisms in their actuality.

To achieve the intransitivity in the discovery of the generative mechanisms, he forcefully rejects the deception of sense-certainty and claims observation of thinghood is the same as observing the thing-in-itself; thus, the discoveries of human ingenuity are grounded in a reality that is extratransitive: knowledgeable of the idea (of the universal object) exists beyond perception.<sup>51</sup> Instead, Bhaskar finds

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<sup>46</sup> See below: literature review for more detailed argument

<sup>47</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 1-2. (“It is only if we make the assumption of the real independence of such mechanisms from the events they generate that we are justified in assuming that they endure and go on acting in their normal way outside the experimentally closed conditions that enable us to empirically identify them.”)

<sup>48</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A (2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, United Kingdom. Cambridge University Press Syndicate; The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, UK.

<sup>49</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 176-177 (“The determinateness which attaches to the being-for-itself of the inorganic as such falls therefore in the case of organic being under its being-for-self, just as, in the case of the inorganic, it falls only unclear the being of the latter. Hence, although determinateness in the inorganic is at the same time present only as a property, yet it acquires the dignity of essential being because, as a simple negative, it stands over against outer existence which is a being-for-another; and this simple negative is, in its ultimate single determinateness, a number. The organic being, however, is a singular individual, which is itself pure negativity, and therefore destroys within itself the fixed determinateness which attaches to indifferent being. In so far, therefore, as it has within it the moment of indifferent being, and so, too, of number, this latter can be taken as merely a by-product, but not as the essence of its vitality.”)

<sup>50</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A (2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*. 460-490.

<sup>51</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 30-31. & McWherter, D. (2012). *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant*.

thing-in-itself to be present in the matter and materialist ontology to exist via proxy; thus, as Jackson notes implicitly, dualist ontology.<sup>52</sup> This is contradictory already in assuming the synthetic categories can express the universality of the object as there is nothing that is necessary and true in sense-certainty. Grounding social sciences to biology or to the discovery of ‘generative mechanisms’ establishes boundaries that only needlessly constrain research and reduce the scope of science that is fundamentally interpretive and hermeneutic in nature as conscious agent are by default its primary object of inquiry, that seek to modify social behavior by reflection itself in social relations.

### 1.6. Knights of the Periodical Table: Regression of Military Science

The same ‘dead’ materialistic approach is shared by military sciences is even more dismissive of theory as external to the needs of military institutions. Despite calls for political scientists to develop a ‘critical science,’ little has emerged from the debate on the ontology of war.<sup>53</sup> In addition, burgeoning Hegelian criticism, that is largely disregarded by contemporary discussion within the discipline.<sup>54</sup> In war studies, the instrumental role of science is well noted among scholars and has remained unchallenged, unlike in international relations.<sup>55</sup> IR can hardly argue for the existence of a ‘theoretical core,’ but a plurality of paradigms that occupy different analytical levels. In military science, the lack of theoretical research can be explained, partly by the isolationist nature of military sciences in general, as any theoretical contribution shared with peers can influence the contemporary strategies of opponents or as easily reveal weaknesses in one’s own stratagem. The absence of a theoretical core can only be attributed to a minor role, as the development of the discipline itself has preferred to sanction practical analysis rather than championed theoretical plurality, further detailed below.

A more pressing problem for military studies is the famished state of metatheoretical development. Despite some attempts by military scientists such as Boyd to moved away from Clausewitzian state-

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<sup>52</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus.(2008) “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory.” *Review of international studies* 34, no. 1 (January 2008): 129–153.

<sup>53</sup> Barkawi,T., Brighton,S., (2011) ”Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique.” *International Political Sociology*, Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 126–143, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00125.x> & Nordin, A. H. M., & Öberg, D. (2015). “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard.” *Millennium*, 43(2), 392–410. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814552435>

<sup>54</sup> Gkoutzioulis, A. (2019). “Challenging the association of Hegel with political realism: the contribution of Hegel’s methodological insights to a critique of realism and a richer understanding of war and statehood.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-019-00177-5>

<sup>55</sup> Gray, C. (1999). *Modern strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. & Booth, K. (1979). *Strategy and ethnocentrism*. New York: Holmes & Meier.



centric warfare, his influence has remained strong.<sup>56</sup> For Clausewitz, the first-order problem in theorizing warfare is the polysemous causes and ambiguous form of war. He perceived the nature of war is resistant to systematic analysis reconciling its contradictory nature: “*War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity which are regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability with which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.*”<sup>57</sup> Clausewitz concluded that the nature of war could not be expressed in ‘isolated’ or ‘pure’ form, which discounts policy, causes, and means that constitute war. In essence, he argues the ‘core’ problem of military science is that the object of inquiry cannot be determined as symmetrical due to constant change. There is no unit of analysis with a likeness to ‘atom’ to observe that can provide an essentially and stable existence for analysis to uncover as the fundamental nature of its primary unit is a dialectical agent, a self-aware consciousness: man.

Problemata of interdependency and asymmetry are not unique to military science and are more exposed in Greek philosophy by Aristotle as the problem of individuation. For Aristotle, individuation presented a problem since every entity must consist of something, but what these elements are, remains unknown: these determinations of the ontological necessity are shared between kinds that predicate universality and provide a basis for particular forms.<sup>58</sup> Despite the sophisticated argument Clausewitz presents, he fails to conceive a satisfactory methodological approach outside deductive historicism; ultimately, he concludes contradictory forms emerge in the most unexpected ways, a science dedicated to such task surely be doomed to failure; therefore, pragmatic didactics can provide a basis for training officers.<sup>59</sup>

Clausewitz only intended his work to be initial speculation for systematizing military science rather than the final formalized epistemology of military science. Support for Clausewitz’s notion of war and his epistemology has not diminished over the years. Today, Clausewitzian theories have not only flourished but attained a dominant position in Western military science. At the same time, military science

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<sup>56</sup> See for more information Osinga, F. (2007). *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. In *Science, Strategy and War* (Vol. 18). Routledge. & Mahan, A. (1965). *The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783* (12. ed.). Little, Brown

<sup>57</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 89-90.

<sup>58</sup> Regis, E. (1976). “Aristotle's' Principle of Individuation.” *Phronesis*”, 157-166.

<sup>59</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

epistemology has entertained very little development in all but the different interpretations, as evident in the rift between Clausewitzian and neo-Clausewitzian classification of empirical data or reinterpretation of military history in one form or another that rehash his theories.<sup>60</sup> Brodie and later Boyd similarly argue that history should take primacy in officers' education, but otherwise maintain primacy of empirical science and its essential role in military science.<sup>61</sup> The result of the stagnating development of theoretical research in military science has regressed the discipline into formulating pragmatic 'codes of conduct rather than scientific discipline with a unique nature.'<sup>62</sup>

Military institutions have long perceived pragmatic need for actionable analysis is required by institutions to improve their efficacy. The lack of scientific progress and philosophical understanding was capitalized by neopositivist scholars in strategic studies, who perceived that the failure to find a universal ontology was failure of hermeneutic theoretical research.<sup>63</sup> Disregarding warnings already expressed by Clausewitz: "*Theorists soon found out how difficult the subject was and felt justified in evading the problem by again directing their principles and systems only to physical matters and unilateral activity.*"<sup>64</sup> Western military science and 'strategic studies' promoted behavioral economics and pragmatic epistemology as a solution to modernize strategic thought: despite offering only quantized models to resolve practical issues. As a result, proficiency in theoretical research further decayed, replaced by utilitarian notions of probability and nomology that dominate scientific reasoning in the military today. The next chapter introduces this argument by detailing the scientific development of strategic studies in the United States and followed by similar analysis of strategic thought in the Soviet Union.

### 1.7. Cul-de-Sac in Epistemology: From Warfare to Management Economics

The development of 'Western' military science is defined by the Anglo-American tradition that emerged in the 1960s as an amalgamation of economic policy and positivist methodology. In the United States,

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<sup>60</sup> See for example: Roxborough, I. (1994). "Clausewitz and the Sociology of War." *The British Journal of Sociology*, 45(4), 619-636. doi:10.2307/591886

<sup>61</sup> See for more information Osinga, F. (2007). *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. In *Science, Strategy and War* (Vol. 18). Routledge. & Mahan, A. (1965). *The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783* (12. ed.). Little, Brown

<sup>62</sup> See for example: Liddell Hart, B. (1967). *Strategy: the indirect approach* (4., rev. and further enl. ed.). Faber and Faber.

<sup>63</sup> Brodie, B. (1974). *War and politics*. Cassell.

<sup>64</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition. 134-135.

non-profit think tanks such as RAND accommodated the need for pragmatic —and actionable policy analysis and subsequently influenced both policy — and military science. The influence and development of strategic studies can be attributed to only a handful of scholars who served in key positions within the government and policy think tanks most notably: Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling.

Their views also shaped the development of strategic studies as a field. Kahn argued for formalizing the hypothetic-deductive science of ‘strategic studies’ as anticipative research for a policy that would serve pragmatic efforts: quantification would provide a concrete sign of improvement within military institutions.<sup>65</sup>

Brodie supported empirical science even more fiercely than Kahn, arguing military sciences should be considered as the ‘economy of force’ rather than science with its own distinct logic and need.<sup>66</sup> He (Brodie) intended to establish strategy as a discipline, not as an exclusive domain of the soldier, but a reflective science open to civilian experts, calling for a “*genuine analytical method*” to establish strategic studies as a science with a likeness to economics.<sup>67</sup> Brodie argued strategy and economics share many parallels, each exhibiting principles for ideal conduct and the mobilization of resources for maximal gain.<sup>68</sup> He dedicated much of his academic career arguing for a new framework for strategy, explicitly suggesting military should abandon the pursuit of any abstract principles or laws: “*It is not necessarily damning to the principles of war that they are applicable also to other pursuits, but it does indicate that such principles are too abstract and too general to be very useful as guides in war.*”<sup>69</sup>

The uneasiness that had persisted in applying economics to warfare seemingly disappeared in the 1970s as Schelling and Kahn further formalized nuclear war in bargaining.<sup>70</sup> Neopositivist influence of strategic studies subsequently shaped the epistemology of military science, ultimately galvanizing Kantian empiricism and implicit dualism. The influence of Brodie, Schelling and Kahn on Anglo-American military culture cannot be overstated, as the majority of military institutions adopted pragmatic and utility-based modeling. As Freedman also notes, “management economics” is the common denominator

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<sup>65</sup> Brodie, B. (1974). *War and politics*. Cassell. & Kahn, H., New, A & Jones, E. (2017). *On Thermonuclear War*. Routledge Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315125701> & Schelling, T. (1980). *The strategy of conflict*. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University.

<sup>66</sup> Brodie, B. (1949). “Strategy as a Science.” *World Politics*, 1(4), 467-488. doi:10.2307/2008833.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. 484-485.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 473-476.

<sup>69</sup> Brodie, B. (1974). *War and politics*. 26-27.

<sup>70</sup> Schelling, T. (1980). *The strategy of conflict*.

of Western strategy and strategic culture.<sup>71</sup> This transition also cannibalized the methodology of economics refitted to military institutions.

The entrenchment of positivist methodology has a large influence also outside the ‘practice’ of strategy. Many military institutions have certainly benefitted from cost-benefit analysis and management economic. The value of a theory is more discreet and unobtrusive, which not only would explain the preference in research funding but the devotion to practical problemata. Negligence of theory and by proxy philosophy have in history met with consequences that offset the costs involved with qualitative analysis. The legacy of this neglect is epitomized in the failed policy that led to defeat in Korea and Vietnam.

The Johnson administration enacted economization measures to change the structure of the military from balanced force posturing to defensive deterrence, envisioning nuclear missiles and airpower to be the cornerstone of American military power, a policy which continued well into the Kennedy administration.<sup>72</sup> Brodie presented the outline of this strategy in his books, published during his time outside the military, and reaffirmed his belief in the strategy of deterrence position shared that was shared by Kahn and later Kissinger.<sup>73</sup> Strategic bombing and missile deterrence relied on the formalist logic to calculate the point where the risk for total annihilation would exceed the utility of waging nuclear war. Ontological threats (Soviet Union) outweighed the utility of funding other military branches as conventional warfare become increasingly obsolete.<sup>74</sup> Hence, defense policy orientation rationalized the defunding branches that conducted conventional warfare — effectively stripping the United States of its capacity to conduct limited warfare in Korea.<sup>75</sup>

In Vietnam, reliance on quantification measure strategic success ultimately obscured the political realities of the war. The administration led by McNamara, preoccupied with kill-ratios and body counts,

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<sup>71</sup> Freedman, L. (2013). *Strategy : a history* . Oxford University Press.

<sup>72</sup> Lewis, Adrian R. (2013) *The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom*. Routledge.

<sup>73</sup> Gregg Herken (1986) “The not-quite-absolute weapon: Deterrence and the legacy of Bernard Brodie.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 9:4, 15-24, DOI: 10.1080/01402398608437275 & Lewis, Adrian R. (2013) *The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom*. Routledge. 210-220.

<sup>74</sup> See for example: Lewis, Adrian R. (2013) *The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom*. Routledge.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

committed to quantizing, disregarded the role of human intelligence and damning battlefield reports.<sup>76</sup> Ultimately, he himself realized the futility of the war and advocated for secret negotiations to conclude the war. These examples are strikingly similar to the contemporary Western approach to information warfare, which will be discussed further below.

The positivist approach to war failed to generate the nomological laws that neopositivist perceived would be beyond the ‘veil’ of hermeneutics: as this failure became apparent, positivists transformed the logic of military science to fit the ‘epistemological’ framework and grounded ‘practicality’ and efficiency as its reasoning. Yet the inflexible metatheory of positivism is poorly suited to such claims regarding ontology of war: discussed in detail next.

Logical positivists such as Carnap rejected metaphysics as pseudo-problems due to its focus on non-provable hypotheses; he and others in the Vienna Circle sought to neutralize the language of science by expressing scientific research by formal logic.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, categorical comparison of syllogisms would provide scientists with a universal framework for comparing the best possible explication.

His discipline Popper formulated his own philosophy incorporating many elements of logical positivism but rejected Carnap’s idea of verification.<sup>78</sup> According to logical positivists objective of science is to test analytical validity and function as a neutral descriptive device for explaining the laws of nature to verify scientific truth.<sup>79</sup> In contrast, Popper claimed these hypotheses should be proven false Popper emphasized what science should strive for is a deduction via observation of experience, by “corroboration.”<sup>80</sup> He

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<sup>76</sup> Kaplan, L.S., & Landa, R. D., & Drea E.J.,(2006) *History of the office of the Secretary of Defence: The McNamara Ascendancy 1961-1965*. Historical Office: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington D.C. 291-292.

<sup>77</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in the Supplement to *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic*, enlarged edition (University of Chicago Press, 1956). (“In contrast to this view, we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need any theoretical justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality. We may still speak (and have done so) of the "acceptance of the new entities" since this form of speech is customary; but one must keep in mind that this phrase does not mean for us anything more than acceptance of the new framework, i.e., of the new linguistic forms.”) 7-8.

<sup>78</sup> Walker, T. (2010). “The Perils of Paradigm Mentalities: Revisiting Kuhn, Lakatos, and Popper.” *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), 433–451. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592710001180>. 434-435.

<sup>79</sup> Kuhn, Thomas S. (1996) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 3rd Ed. Chicago; London: University of Chicago. Print. University of Chicago Press, Ltd., Chicago. ISBN: 0-226-45808-3

<sup>80</sup> See for example: Popper, K. (1966). *The open society and its enemies. Vol.2, The high tide of prophecy : Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath*. (5th ed. [revised]. ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Or footnote above for general summary.

argued knowledge from observation is purer than what could be gained by reflection since observation presents a practical problem for testing and is falsifiable instead of ‘inventing’ a solution.<sup>81</sup>

Positivists have maintained the subsistence of the phenomenal reality is expressed by the material *primaefacie* existence that can be calculated and derived to taxonomies, but as all warfare is *sui generis*, the distinction in finding corroboration or validation in data have failed. With the rejection of metaphysics and isolating philosophy outside ‘science,’ contemporary military science has remained on the same course: attempting to distinguish a predicate of the *species via* empirical methodology only to conclude there is no ontologically determinate form of war that could be deduced causally.<sup>82</sup> Attributes are relative to the conditions of the war but do not produce its logic as they express only a consequence but not a cause for warfare. More explicitly expressed by Kant in his *pièce de résistance* that validated synthetic analysis, between logical proof: in addition to causation also the constitution of subjective intent has efficacy.<sup>83</sup> This produces an antinomy or a contradiction between different forms of logical proof; therefore, such science is mutually contradictory as the subjects’ intent is never causal. Antinomies present a possibility to institute analytical boundaries by antithetical investigation: introducing synthetic categories. This research identifies five of these antinomies to formalize philosophical problems in the research of war.

Theories should strive to distinguish similitude or difference in the form of warfare: to deduce ontological determinateness. Therefore, all ontogenetic analyses must incorporate both universal and particular ontology as a different category to validate the analysis. Change is a constant feature of warfare; any attempts to distinguish correspondence between pure logical proof will end in failure. The ‘objective’ Western liberal-economic approach, that understands security as an exchangeable commodity, is merely an extension of economics, a behavioral model of warfare rather than \*a science of war. Having misunderstood the fundamental nature of the problem, between universality and particularity: the problem of individuation. Problematizing ontology of war as a question of particularity radically, alters the way its ontology is understood, not as symmetrical to each instance but in its uniqueness. Therefore, it’s the development of a suitable philosophy of science is a vital task. However, Western military science

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<sup>81</sup> Popper, K. (1966). *The open society and its enemies. Vol.2, The high tide of prophecy : Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath.* (5th ed. [revised]. ed.). L

<sup>82</sup> Cohen, S. (1984). “Aristotle and Individuation.” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Supplementary Volume 10: New Essays on Aristotle, 14*, 41–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1984.10715871>

<sup>83</sup> See for example: Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A (2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason.*

is not alone its failure to develop a mature philosophy of science. Similarly, Marxist military science exorcised metaphysics and by proxy philosophy, in order to purge 'idealism', as illustrated in the next chapter.

### **1.8. From West to East: Dialectical Materialism in Military Science**

Founded on the ashes of the Imperial Russia, The Soviet Union employed many of old officer cadre. Yet its military institutions were directionless lacking in philosophical basis for military science, and only through arduous effort, Lenin grounded Marxist military thought to dialectical materialism political philosophy, reimagining the organic community of the proletariat as the foundation of Soviet doctrines; he appointed Trosky as People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs to reorganize the officer corps.<sup>84</sup>

He (Lenin) embraced Clausewitz as a preliminary formulation for Soviet military doctrine, formulating his theory on class conflict in-between the proletariat and the bourgeois as both material and an ideological rift between the two classes.<sup>85</sup> Later for the Soviet general staff (STAVKA), 'class consciousness' structured strategy as a supranational principle for victory over "perceptions of reality," as the true struggle for supremacy was never only for the determination of the present condition or an armed struggle, but in the total reinterpretation of history as progress towards international communism.

Soviet strategy not only emphasized "class warfare" as a rhetorical device connecting dialectical materialism and military science but embraced "class warfare" as a general principle to achieve political objectives in warfare "against the imperialists."<sup>86</sup> Soviets maintained the exploitative capitalist system and institutional order, reliant on the capitalist state structure for protection is the true enemy: not the 'organic community' of the proletariat. Soviet strategists perceived countering subversive capitalist ideology is its core mission. Therefore, military science should always incorporate an ideological element that highlights the role of consciousness and doxastic logic in addition to the role of the ideological apparatus.

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<sup>84</sup> See for example: Swain, G. (2014) Trotsky and the Russian Revolution. [Online]. London: Routledge. 56-100.

<sup>85</sup> V.I. Lenin, (1931) "*Notebook Of Excerpts and Remarks on Carl von Clausewitz, On War and the Conduct of War*" in V.V. Adoratskii, V.M. Molotov, M.A 8avel'ev, eds., *Leninskii sbomik* (Lenin Miscellany), (2nd ed., Moscow-Leningrad), XII, 389-452. Translated and edited by Donald E. Davis and Walter 8.0. Kohn.

<sup>86</sup> Triandafillov, V.K. & Burhans, W.(trans.) & Kipp, J.W.,(1994) *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*. Cass Series On Soviet Study of War; no.5. United States: New York, 270 Madison Ave. Routledge Ltd. 155-165.

Marxist military science can be crudely divided by their structuring principles to two taxonomies: insurrectionist and state-centric strategies. Insurrectionist strategies emphasize violent resistance to state power exemplified by the works of Bakunin and Mao.<sup>87</sup> Insurrectionist strategies formulated in colonial struggles, such as Vietnam, Algeria, and most importantly in China, highlight the revolutionary character of the political struggle. In general, insurrectionist strategies maintained that political legitimacy in the eyes of the people would popularize the resistance and as the state-controlled the monopoly of violence and superior equipment, guerilla tactics and subversion of state authority to popular resistance would create possibilities for more intense warfare. Giap details the different phases of insurrectionist strategies in more detail, outlining how the revolutionary party would move to escalate warfare.<sup>88</sup>

Only a few communist countries survived to develop sophisticated state-centric strategic culture, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic Of China(PRC). Soviet strategists continued to emphasize the revolutionary agenda and supplement warfare with political action directed to the people to create a balance between organized state-oriented strategies and insurrectionist strategies by information warfare and propaganda. Dialectical materialism perceives that the armed struggle is subordinate to the larger political struggle; in contrast to the Western notion of the state as a singular entity, asymmetry is the foundation for mobilizing resistance to the capitalist system. These theoretical developments suggest a similar trajectory as seen in Western strategic studies: the ideological transformation of military science to economics was instead replaced by dialectical materialism, turning the focus of Western military science around, in arguing the enemy was the economic system.

### **1.9. Strategic Deception Maskirovka in The Soviet Union: Changing Paradigm**

Dialectical materialism grounded itself in military doctrine. Already Triandafillov, in his general outline of Soviet military doctrine, notes the importance of political support activities and the use of “contradictions” in class consciousness to stimulate domestic unrest in the West.<sup>89</sup> To increase its own influence and subvert the support of the local population, the Soviet Union conducted “active measure”

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<sup>87</sup> See: Freedman, L. (2013). *Strategy : a history* . Oxford University Press. 247-400)

<sup>88</sup> Giáp, Võ Nguyên (1970). *Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings*. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-193-8.

<sup>89</sup> Triandafillov, V.K. & Burhans,W(trans.) & Kipp, J.W.,(1994) *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*. Cass Series On Soviet Study of War; no.5. United States: New York, 270 Madison Ave. Routledge Ltd. (“We pointed out at that time the inevitable class, national, and other contradictions that will be found in the armies of our enemies. We indicated the degree to which these contradictions will be exacerbated during the war itself.”) 161-162.



and “strategic deception” (maskirovka) operations for decades with varying degrees of success, as Shultz concludes.<sup>90</sup> These operations intended to utilize the revolutionary means to foster ideological separatism and create sympathy for the Soviet Union.

Yet, Soviet military science contributed very little to the development of new epistemology, as dogmatic party apparatus stifled innovative development, which could undermine official party ideology; instead, Soviet scientists turned to refine the methodology of information operations. Soviet military doctrine always maintained an emphasis on the ideological component of warfare, despite its eventual conversion to Western epistemology.

On the modern battlefield, the contemporary form of Russian information operations reflexive control inherited much of the basic assumptions of ‘strategic deception’ developed in cybernetics. Cybernetics as a discipline explains the transmittance of information and signals via logic; fundamentally, cybernetic research analyzes doxastic logic to understand agent behavior and operating parameters, for example, in computers.

At first Soviet scientists viewed cybernetics with suspicion and labeled cybernetics as “Western pseudo-science” and “idealistic” mechanistic epistemology. According to Gerovitch: “*Soviet critics similarly claimed that cyberneticians reduced biological and sociological laws to “pure” mathematical formulas and equations, which opened a way to “idealistic speculations.”*”<sup>91</sup> & ... “*Soviet scientists rejected the applicability of cybernetics for social sciences, reasoning that integrating mathematical methodology would slowly decay hermeneutical social ontology:.... “&”During the Stalin era, such epistemological barriers served a political purpose: to invalidate the use of mathematical methods in the social sciences*

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<sup>90</sup> Shultz, H.R. & Godson, R. (1984) *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. International Defense Publishers: Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 0BW, England. 10-12 & 36-40.

<sup>91</sup> Gerovitch, Slava. (2002) *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: a History of Soviet Cybernetics*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Print. (“By blurring the line between scientific and philosophical terminology, newspeak provided rhetorical resources for both sides in this debate. Militant critics identified mathematical formalism with the philosophical error of “formalism.” Drawing heavily on the Marxist principle of practice as the criterion of truth, they associated abstract mathematical reasoning with the “detachment from practice.” Their opponents identified abstract thought not with formalism but with generalization (a positive member of the tetrad) and cited Lenin to argue that practice, which always deals with the concrete, can never serve as the final criterion for verifying general knowledge.”) 36-37. & (“Soviet critics similarly claimed that cyberneticians reduced biological and sociological laws to “pure” mathematical formulas and equations, which opened a way to “idealistic speculations.” The critics “creatively” translated Wiener’s vague statement that “information is information, not matter or energy” into a brassy claim that “‘information’ has nothing to do with matter or consciousness,” and concluded that cybernetics marched along a “straight road toward open idealism and religion.”) 127-128.

*and the life sciences and to claim a special status for “natural, historical laws” and “biological laws.”*<sup>92</sup>

Despite her detailed description Gerovitch misunderstands the Soviet epistemological critique to Western transcendental idealism. She claims Soviet scientists were opposed to cybernetics as a theory. Soviet political apparatus feared that it would blend Western scientism to the social ontology of dialectical materialism and re-introduce the idea of *homo economicus*: portraying agents as utility maximizers that operate with perfect knowledge and rationality.

It is easy to conclude that, clearly, Soviet scientists were acutely aware of the potential consequences of dualist social ontology and more knowledgeable in philosophy of science in contrast to similarly ideological denials of metaphysics in Western military science.

Although after the initial rejection of cybernetics, theoretical and practical development of cybernetics resumed in the 1960s as Lefevre, Burkov and others continued to work towards a reflexive control theory.<sup>93</sup> By synthesizing cybernetics with dialectical materialism, Soviet scientists adapted cybernetics to model social systems but rejected implicit dualism. Instead of logical proof, much of reflexive control theory is based on observation and assumption of path-dependency.<sup>94</sup>

Lefevre argued cybernetics could reorient cognition by applying representations of cognition “filter” to map impulse path-dependency; likewise, RC can be employed as a methodology for understanding choice selection in a particular set of actions.<sup>95</sup> Cybernetic theory influenced by structural linguistics transitioned away from pure description and depiction of feedback loops to a more active role, manipulation of path-dependent responses or “reflexes.” This path dependency can be applied as a methodology to corrode decision-making loops by triggering causal responses; the influence of reflexive control theory can be seen in contemporary conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia.<sup>96</sup>

The Russian approach to the social ontology of warfare has embraced state-centric strategies and harnessed social contradictions to promote state interest outside the borders of Russia. The novelty of the

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<sup>92</sup> Gerovitch, Slava. (2002) *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak : a History of Soviet Cybernetics*. 200-201.

<sup>93</sup> Thomas, Timothy. (2004). “Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military.” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 17: 237. 237-250

<sup>94</sup> Gerovitch, Slava. (2002) *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak : a History of Soviet Cybernetics*. 258-259.

<sup>95</sup> See for example: Lefebvre, Vladimir. (2010). *Lectures on Reflexive Control Theory*. Los Angeles: Leaf & Oaks Publisher.

<sup>96</sup> Thomas, Timothy. (2004). “Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military.” 237-250

approach is appropriating cognition, and the importance of hermeneutics, as Gerasimov notes, are indispensable elements of combat operations.<sup>97</sup>

Russian understanding in hermeneutics is not limited only to the military sphere; this knowledge has also seeped into practice in the political arena. Dugin is often labeled as \*the ‘political philosopher’ of Russia. He drafted his own political theory on the savaged remains of Heidegger’s philosophy. Subsequently, he formulated his own theory on modern geopolitics, re-imagining the *Dasein* as the ‘being’ and presence of a political ideology in the world.<sup>98</sup> According to Dugin, knowledge and perspective define the boundaries of political ideologies as reified supported act out the ideology, he states knowledge is the ultimate tool for domination.<sup>99</sup> Yet, it is questionable if his philosophy has influence in Kremlin and should be questioned. The consequences of his political ideology cannot be discredited: his supporters are active participants in the ‘information struggle’ blending post-structuralist philosophy and the latest technologies to achieve dominance in the information struggle.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, offer at least a ‘shortsighted’ glimpse to the perception of Russian ‘political technologists’ and their influence on contemporary warfare.

### **1.10. Information Operations in the West: The Solace of Physiognomy**

At the same time, Western scholars have gauged Russian information operations by quantizing and via narratives, an important contribution with theoretical relevance but at the same time have struggled to conceptualize information warfare. The development of Western military science culminated in the emergence of strategic communications as a subfield of military science that is still in its infancy at best, fumbling in the dark.<sup>101</sup> The majority of Western nations have established fact-finding missions and attempted to counter fake news and misinformation via public communications, relying on experts from

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<sup>97</sup> Gerasimov, V. (2016). “*The Value of Science is in the foresight: New challenges demand rethinking the forms and methods of carrying out combat operations*”. *Military Review*, 96(1), 23.

<sup>98</sup> Dugin, A. (2012). *The fourth political theory* (1st English ed.). Arktos. & Shlapentokh, “D. Dugin Eurasianism: a window on the minds of the Russian elite or an intellectual ploy?.” *Stud East Eur Thought* **59**, 215–236 (2007). [https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-007\\_9030-y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-007_9030-y)

<sup>99</sup> Dugin, A. (2012). *The fourth political theory* (1st English ed.). Arktos.

<sup>100</sup> See for example: Darcewska, J. (2014). “The Anatomy Of Russian information: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study”. Center For Eastern Studies. Warsaw. (42)

<sup>101</sup> Freedman, L. (2006). “Strategic communications.” *The Adelphi Papers: The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, 45(379), 73–93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/05679320600661715>

marketing and information sciences.<sup>102</sup> Very little is understood about the impact of reflexive control strategies on the larger decorum, as majority research is fixated on the mechanical nature of information warfare. Quantized and calculative ‘exposure’ analysis do very little if it is not understood why and what are communities and social classes ‘exposed’ to. A few scholars consider strategic communication an extension of foreign policy, but as a discipline, it is unlikely to depart from methodology applied in international relations and military science.<sup>103</sup> The epistemology of strategic communications suggests it has inherited the rigid and dogmatic positivism but retained little of the introspection of the more mature and progressive social sciences.

Ironically, strategic communications exemplifies the overextension of positivist epistemology. Some researchers even claim to gain knowledge regarding social relations from biology: “*A better understanding of brain and mind will make it possible, for example, to construe narrations, stories, metaphors as causes in the scientific sense, not only as reasons for actions in the interpretive, hermeneutic sense.... Although behavioral sciences, cognitive sciences, and neurobiology are painstakingly accumulating knowledge about homo sapiens with its very specific genetic ancestry, conventional social scientists take for granted that they know how humans think.*”<sup>104</sup> Explaining human sociology by biology can only reveal the basest of facts, a position already Hegel mocked as a science of the bone: “*...the aspect of its outer existence, is being qua independent and subject, or qua a 'thing', viz. a bone: the actuality and existence of man is his skull bone.*”<sup>105</sup> Biology is unlikely to yield results as the very concept of information warfare rests on the interpretation of knowledge, experience and contests

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<sup>102</sup> Nothhaft, H., Werder, K., Verčič, D., & Zerfass, A. (2018). “Strategic Communication: Reflections on an Elusive Concept.” *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 12(4), 352–366.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2018.1492412> & Freedman, L. (2006). “Strategic communications.” *The Adelphi Papers: The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, 45(379), 73–93.

<sup>103</sup> Howard, Nothhaft (2016) “A Framework for Strategic Communication Research: A Call for Synthesis and Consilience.” *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 10:2, 69-86, DOI: 10.1080/1553118X.2015.1124277 & Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2018). *Forging the world : strategic narratives and international relations* . University of Michigan Press.

<sup>104</sup> Howard, Nothhaft (2016) A Framework for Strategic Communication Research: A Call for Synthesis and Consilience. 71-72 (“A better understanding of brain and mind will make it possible, for example, to construe narrations, stories, metaphors as causes in the scientific sense, not only as reasons for actions in the interpretive, hermeneutic sense. The accusation of arrogance is handed back to conventional social scientists. Although behavioral sciences, cognitive sciences and neurobiology are painstakingly accumulating knowledge about homo sapiens with its very specific genetic ancestry, conventional social scientists take for granted that they know how humans think. They do not begin with what the human demonstrably is, but what they imagine it or need it to be.”)

<sup>105</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 200-201.

the validity of ‘facts.’: their symbolization. There is little causal connection between a firing of nervous synapse and a conscious act, as there is no necessity to believe in any doxastic logic as intentional acts have little causation.

Information operations are frequent, and an increasing phenomenon is unlikely to pause until a corresponding ‘brainwave,’ ‘final cause,’ or ‘quantum leap’ has been discovered that can sufficiently explain the ‘causal leap of faith’ between consciousness and human biology. Such a physiognomy has nothing to offer to modern science. To combat such afflictions that drive men to utilize primitive tools of the Victorian-era, a coherent philosophy of science must be established alongside the practice of science.

Military science must renounce demonstrative validity to understand, explain and describe new forms of warfare that primarily target cognition. Therefore, it is essential to endeavor to establish a framework that can simultaneously connect material and ideational dimensions, including both mechanical – and abstract violence, to its philosophy. Or be devoured by ‘social biologists’ who lurk in the shadow of science and advocate a return to the so-called science of ‘physiognomy.’

Neither can information operations or cyberwarfare be dismissed as an isolated phenomenon, as warfare ‘spilling’ outside the boundaries of mechanical violence is utilized by all superpowers against their peer competitors. The PRC (People’s Republic of China) has devoted considerable assets to propaganda campaign information – and cyber-operations against the United States, sharing much of the same strategies as Russia. Chinese strategy in recent years has taken on a more active stance in cyberwarfare and information operations as it has continued to emphasize deception.<sup>106</sup> Likewise, the United States has illustrated considerable capability in the cyber domain. Already in 2010 United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities with a sophisticated malware STUXNET, and not a year later reserved the use of force against state and non-state actors targeting the United States via cyberattacks by any means necessary.<sup>107</sup> The increasing trend to target consciousness does not suggest the apathy of ‘political’ objectives in information and cyberwarfare, but the reconsideration of utility of mechanical warfare, as reason and perception are increasingly considered as parallel domains of military action. The difference

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<sup>106</sup> Iasiello, E. (2016). “China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities.” *Journal of Strategic Security*, 9(2), 47–71. <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.2.1489>

<sup>107</sup> Office of the President of United States. (2011) *International Strategy for Cyberspace*. Washington DC: The White House. The United States Government.

between cyberwarfare and information warfare is the application of mechanical force in the former and the absence of mechanical violence in the latter.

The debate on ‘hybrid warfare’ questions should military science maintain the dogma of state-centric warfare or alternatively accept that cognition and hermeneutics are inseparably intertwined in all aspects of warfare. Therefore, subsequently question: What has changed in warfare and how to understand war as subsistence in the cognitive dimension parallel to the kinetic engagements. Where some strategists such as Galeotti have already found the answer to the paradox of “hybrid warfare” and described it as a rehash of the old Soviet strategies such as “maskirovka” and “active measures.”<sup>108</sup> Other researchers present it as evidence of the impact of ideational factors on material existence.<sup>109</sup>

The latter disposition acknowledges at least the impact of the ideational dimension while lacking insight into what exactly the impact is on warfare. What is certain is the unsatisfactory state of the metatheory and methodology in military science. As evaluating and understanding warfare is reliant on quantitative analysis or pragmatic sanctions dictated via the arbitration of the practitioner as deemed ‘useful.’ Western military strategists imply the determinateness of properties or *prima facie* representation is sufficient for understanding warfare.<sup>110</sup>

Philosophy of science to compare the universal aspects of warfare or even their typologies is nonexistent outside quantitative methodology. Seemingly, languishing destitute, alongside monuments of the golden age and left to crumble. Yet contemporary ‘ontologies’ are validated by synthetic category, as a predicate, vacant of any ‘objective’ universality. Universality must contain all the positive accounts(kinds) of the concrete expression, which are without the affirmation of the consciousness ‘inert’ or negative. Therefore, fundamentally the core object of inquiry in military science should first investigate what is the relationship between ontology and human consciousness to understand what exactly dialectics appropriate and what role ideas have in this everchanging play. To achieve this, this military science and

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<sup>108</sup> Galeotti, M. (2019). *Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid*. In *Russian Political War* (1st ed., Vol. 1). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429443442>

<sup>109</sup> Herta, L. M., PhD. (2016). “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare – Why Narratives and Ideational Factors Play A Role In International Politics.” . *On - Line Journal Modelling the New Europe*, (21), 52-76.

<sup>110</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. (“Mathematics may plume itself on its self-evidence, but this self-evidence rests on the poverty of its aim and the defectiveness of its material, in which philosophy should be ashamed to follow it. Mathematics only seeks to establish quantitative relations which belong exclusively to the surface of things . Its materials are space and the unit, an empty, lifeless, repetitive element, set forth in fixed, dead propositions, linked together only by equational identities, and never progressing through opposition to some qualitatively different outcome”) 501-502.

international relations should foster its plurality in methodology and epistemological speculation to survive the ‘current’ predicament, if not unscathed but at least as a limping towards progress. To attain the maturity required by the science of war: military science must embrace philosophy or risk being tantalized by Clausewitz and history as if afflicted by the curse of House Atreus.

In summary, what this introduction illustrates is the poverty of metatheory and methodology in both IR and military science, illustrating the absence of methodological instruments to analyze or even to describe warfare as a phenomenon, highlighting diagnostic, prescriptive, or self-fulfilling analyses that are often epistemologically contradictory. The empirical analysis is useful in the analysis of *praxis* but is unable to content with ontic inquiry and establish a differentiation between forms of existence.

Any ontology claiming to express the essence of being by describing experience (a positive existence) is mind-independent and reflects a particularized subsistence. Therefore, does not reflect universal characteristics of phenomena as its ontology is already predicated by its particularity. Expressing true universality in form is only possible through the negation of the particularity, in the unity of its principles, as Hegel states.<sup>111</sup> For any object that expresses a concrete form, it must already exclude, negate those its possibilities. Therefore, to develop the science of war, international relations and military science must not approach philosophy like a coy and blushing *coquette* but to welcome it back home, like a long-lost brother.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

<sup>112</sup> (a flirtatious girl)

### 1.11. An Heir to The Throne: Legacy Of Clausewitz

To date, only Clausewitz has argued that the epistemology of strategy is a dialectical relationship between policy, probability, and objectives of the war as "... a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets".<sup>113</sup> Clausewitz claimed the nature of war was ontologically indeterminate due to its constantly changing form, as already discussed above.<sup>114</sup> War remains a challenge to scientific reasoning that denies metaphysics and rejects consciousness as the basis of its reasoning, such as Kantian neopositivism. This research argues, only by embracing inquiry into determinateness, the development of the universal ideas to the actual particular phenomenon it is possible for military science to surpass Clausewitzian pragmatism and deductive empiricism.<sup>115</sup> Therefore, a more refined understanding of human consciousness and its relationship to science is required.

A science that integrates a theory of consciousness must also integrate to itself elements outside of empirical domain as Suber elaborately remarks: "*Finally even within the realm of externality itself we encounter objects which cannot be accounted for simply in terms of physical and chemical processes: we encounter other conscious beings, acts of these beings which involve meaningful contexts, cultural products, and higher-level structures of human interaction. In Hegel's terms, we encounter the realm of Spirit. The determinations with which science is involved in this realm are even more complex than those of nature, since, although each may be taken to form a realm of scientific investigation, they also involve a dimension in the object itself which is shared by the observer which confronts it, namely, consciousness.*".<sup>116</sup> For the science of war to progress, we must articulate a system of theoretical knowledge where contradictions or antinomies do not stratify ontic nature but penetrate the phenomenal substance *in* those contradictions, as a dialectical interplay between universality and particularity.

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<sup>113</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 89-90.

<sup>114</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition.

<sup>115</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk.

<sup>116</sup> Surber, J. (1979). "Heidegger's Critique of Hegel's Notion of Time." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39(3), 358-377. doi:10.2307/2106492. 369-370



A phenomenological inquiry is designed to uncover the determinateness to what already Kant referred to as “unity of apperception”: ontology intertwines both abstract entities and material objects.<sup>117</sup> Logically, this study analyzes an abstract form of thought (notion) and its relationship to conscious human action, highlighting the sublimation of the negation as a possibility for ontological theorizing to analyze the development of absolute being, in opposition to the platonic ‘metaphysics’ that presume essential character of ideas.<sup>118</sup>

The flaws of transcendental idealism are evident in Hegel’s main argument against Kant: the abstract entities are negated and become realized only through the mediative transformation(materialization) by a conscious agent. Only through consciousness, an idea is produced as a concrete ‘thing,’ therefore is a synthesis of contradictions as it is sublimated and materialized with contradictions as the inertia of reality resists the intentional effort; this is discussed more in-depth further below.<sup>119</sup>

This research investigates the possibility for philosophy of science to discover a grounding for an absolute idealist metatheory and introduces how different logical contradictions: antinomies, influence the contemporary metatheories linking them to problems of philosophy of science. Furthermore, this research illustrates the consequences of contradictions to scientific logic.

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<sup>117</sup> Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*..

<sup>118</sup> Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*. New York; New York University Press. United States. (trans.) Stambaugh,J. Originally Published by Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen (1953).

<sup>119</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. & Žižek, S. (2012). *Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism*. London: Verso.

## 2. Literature Review

This section introduces all of the contemporary philosophies of science in international relations and military science in the following order: neopositivism, dialectical materialism, nominalism, social constructivism, and critical realism. This chapter introduces the contemporary philosophical assumptions in scientific perspectives, in addition, this chapter also summarizes and discusses the philosophical critique to absolute idealism, following existentialism and nominalism.

### 2.1. Neopositivists: The Saga of The Eternal Skeptic

This chapter summarizes the historical development of neopositivism its criticism and explain how the contradiction between empirical research and ontology is grounded within its premise. Neopositivism is to many scholars the ‘traditional’ form of science, where the conjunction of experiences can give a solid foundation to knowledge due to the independence of the mind from matter; its objective is to derive the nomological laws of nature, similarly as one would in biology. This chapter details history and criticism of neopositivist metatheory that many have claimed is suitable to research ontogenesis. Ontogenetic research via the neopositivist framework is epistemologically contradictory and violates the principles of synthetic reasoning as it is already grounded to an *a priori* ontology.

As empiricism mirrors ontology as an assumption of independent reality against the world that already exists and correlates against the hypothesis made by the rational actor against ‘reality.’<sup>120</sup> The history of neopositivism and its development, is in essence: a debate on the relationship of ontology and logical proof: much of its epistemology is directly annexed from dualism.

Dualism, as advocated by Descartes, offered an escape from the solipsist struggle for justification of knowledge and established a foundation for deductive reasoning based on primary truths, yet his reference to external theistic entity remains a problem of contemporary philosophy.<sup>121</sup> Other empiricists like Locke argued that even the substance of ideas could be reduced to senses, thus connecting us to the

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<sup>120</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus.(2008) “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory.” 129–153.

<sup>121</sup> Butterfield, Herbert. (1957). *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800*. New ed. London: G. Bell, 1957. Print. 126-127. Also in *ibid*.

substance, yet as Jackson noted, rejected the possibility of ‘innate’ knowledge.<sup>122</sup> Grounding an argument to the goodness of God or the innate ‘purity’ of senses cannot establish the validity of reasoning.

In contrast to Locke, Hume argued that the scientist must investigate connections between the matters of fact and relations of ideas since the ‘hidden power’ that exists between the cause and the effect cannot be deduced, *a priori* reasoning cannot be justified by empirical basis. He concluded that the scientific method could not account for the justification of the scientific method.<sup>123</sup> There is no cause that can ever emerge from the experience *a priori* that would be independent of the representation; he concluded that reasoning entails matters of fact or relations of ideas, the latter which is outside the domain of causal inference.<sup>124</sup> Hume argued reasoning must concern the sensible content of experience and attributes that are connected by constant conjunction or causal necessity. As the qualities of internal elements of objects are unknown *a priori*, for example, the taste of an apple, eating an apple the knowledge of the taste remains as a representation of what an apple tastes like; it is an *ex poste* knowledge of our sense-certainty, thus connects the object via constant conjunction.<sup>125</sup>

## 2.2. From Kant to Can: Transcendental Conditions of Knowledge

Hume’s proposal was fiercely opposed by Kant: whose contribution and epistemology are incorporated into the scientific logic of all positivist philosophy. Kant argued against the nature of reasoning pure senses experience, as the mental capacities of reason are articulate the substance of experience. In his writing, this is described as the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’; the synthetic categorizations of knowledge determine the substance of our experience, as these representations are essential to the representation of reality within an experience.<sup>126</sup> Kant claimed human cognition could not access the noumena, an object that is independent of human senses; only the phenomenon is attainable by sense-certainty, hence, only a representation.<sup>127</sup> In his understanding, the world is suspended in synthesis: never

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<sup>122</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations : Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* . 46-48.

<sup>123</sup> Hume, D., Milligan, P.,(ed.) (2007). *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. New York: Oxford University Press. Section IV-V.

<sup>124</sup> Hume, D., Milligan, P.,(ed.) (2007). *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

<sup>125</sup> Hume, D., Milligan, P.,(ed.) (2007). *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. 20-21.

<sup>126</sup> Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. (See for example: 9-10 & 220-240.)

<sup>127</sup> Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 271-280 & 334-354.

truly objective, nor purely subjective, but in the unity of apperception; therefore, grounding knowledge to judgments of experience would be necessary to achieve knowledge from reality.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, he reasoned that by comparing the logical proof for the substance of experience, the validity of knowledge could be established by comparing evidence of senses to *a priori* categories.

Kant argued by determining the classification of knowledge, scientific reasoning can be applied to different segments of the reality and senses to determine the truthfulness of these claims.<sup>129</sup> This could be achieved by presupposing that *a priori* laws govern the world prior to our sensibility of them. Judgment of experience presupposes logical proof to justify knowledge from reality, thus is particular and synthetic knowledge contra universal and necessary knowledge that subsumes the empirical knowledge as it exists outside of human sense despite our capability to derive it by sense.<sup>130</sup>

Kant's own writing suggests an implicit connection between ontology and synthetic statements: "*Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity, but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judgments.*"<sup>131</sup> According to Kant, the objective of synthetic judgments is to relate the experience to identity within sense-certainty in the application of the *a priori* categories that describe its components without adding anything to it.<sup>132</sup> In contrast to analytical judgment, discern the nature of the predicate to its identity as Quine states by "virtue of truth," that contains all the infinite number of deductions within those conditions.<sup>133</sup>

He successfully problematized Humean epistemology as scientific analysis is incapable of integrating the totality of ontology. Therefore, it should be justified by applying the logic of reasoning to particular sets of actions or what is in contemporary science referred to as a 'sample' or 'research data.'

However, by establishing boundaries for scientific analysis, an epistemological problem emerges as the reasoning is never complete without the 'totality of reality.' He referred to these epistemological

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<sup>128</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A. (2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. (See for example: 1-20, 127-160 & 390-395.)

<sup>129</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. (2010) *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations : Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*. 49-50.

<sup>130</sup> Logan, Beryl. (2015). *Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus: Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus*. Taylor and Francis.

<sup>131</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A. (2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 130-132.

<sup>132</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A. (2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 130-132.

<sup>133</sup> Quine, W. V. (1951). "Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism." *The Philosophical Review*, 60(1), 20-43. doi:10.2307/2181906

problems as antinomies: contradictions of reasoning that emerge when the logical proof is compared to reality.<sup>134</sup> Kant maintained that his four antinomies establish the boundary conditions to scientific analysis as knowledge must exclude different mechanisms of analysis to structure the relations in sense-certainty and must conform to the law of contradiction: a proposition cannot be true and not true at the same time.<sup>135</sup> Antinomies establish the premise for a proposition by placing knowledge in the domain and grounding science to *a priori* ontological conditions or theoretical framework presupposed by the analytical frame. As boundary conditions, antinomies can be problematized when metatheories postulate knowledge from outside the metatheoretical premise that justifies scientific knowledge. In essence, metatheoretical research investigates how elements between scientific reasoning are structured to ground the conditions of the premise. It is fundamentally important to understand the consequences of contradictions to ontic research as antinomies form the basis of the logical proof in epistemology and thus are profoundly important for the conduct of this research: utilizing these logical contradictions it is possible to reason the basis of ontological problems in contemporary metatheories and adapt these problems as foundation for articulating an absolute idealist framework for ontological research.

For example, Kant's "Third Antinomy" states that in addition to causality, another form of causation: constitution, must also exist parallel to it.<sup>136</sup> Thus, the nature of the logical proof is different in the analysis. As Kant validated his synthetic analysis between sense-certainty and intuition, he wedded ontology to a presupposed representation of reality: that is compared with logical proof to validate the experience of sense-certainty. His (Kant) Synthetic analysis: the comparison between logical proof and empirical evidence always assumes an *a priori* ontology, even in a scientific realist ontology. Therefore, it is evident synthetic analysis only analyze the conditions(properties) of an already existing ontology but cannot investigate the nature or identity of events or objects: synthetic analysis investigates the truthfulness of the relationship between X variable and Y variable but cannot question the nature of these variables as this would mean this relationship could not be assumed to exist. The Vienna Circle appropriated Kantian analysis for mathematics to ground quantitative reasoning to representation but was

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<sup>134</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 460-490.

<sup>135</sup> Logan, Beryl., (2015). *Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus. Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus*. Taylor and Francis. 44-45 & Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 460-490.

<sup>136</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 460-490.

unable to establish sufficient validity of true statements as a symmetrical measurement to distinguish accuracy of statements would be required.

### 2.3. Circular Logics of the Vienna Circle: Carnap and the Void of Subjectivity

Logical positivists of the Vienna circle attempted to reject and quarantine metaphysics outside of science, that according to their claims, are not relevant to science. As Carnap suggests, scientific reasoning is “...a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language.”<sup>137</sup> Therefore, Carnap argued the most important project of science is a rational reconstruction of the language of science through logic: If an objective metalanguage could be developed to determine the relationship between truth and falsehood would be only a mere comparison of logic.<sup>138</sup> Positivists reasoned that if language could be made independent of the subject or ‘objective’, science could be conducted by a logical comparison and categorization of syllogisms in formal language. Subsequently, positivists rejected any metaphysical claims about reality and existence, as these are not intelligible to scientists but are only pseudo-problems of philosophy.<sup>139</sup> As assessments regarding validity could then be made by verifying the truthfulness of statements by this comparison, there would be little need to argue about the nature of objects or existence, as only the substance can provide concrete proof.

Carnap’s most important contribution is his argumentation on validity.<sup>140</sup> He maintained the theoretical validity of systems of thought must take place in taken within the framework as internal questions of consistency. If the logical propositions adopted from the framework are rejected, the possibility for their neutral evaluation is impossible. Secondly, if the ontological nature of systems is different, logically, both frameworks are contradictory, impossible to compare; thus, validity must be established via the utility of the theory.<sup>141</sup> These questions outside the ontology of the system, he termed as external

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<sup>137</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. 2-3.(“Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question”.)

<sup>138</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. 1-5.

<sup>139</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. (“In contrast to this view, we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need any theoretical justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality. We may still speak (and have done so) of the "acceptance of the new entities" since this form of speech is customary; but one must keep in mind that this phrase does not mean for us anything more than acceptance of the new framework, i.e., of the new linguistic forms.”) 7-8.

<sup>140</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. 6-7.

<sup>141</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. 6-7.

questions, maintain the question of validity must be evaluated within the premise of the logical statement or within the theoretical framework. Fundamentally, Carnap is dogmatic even in his opposition to Hume, denying the grounds for arguing on the subjective representation as illusory and dependent on the description of properties, envisioning science without the criticism from the ‘nominalists,’ who claim the reality is simply phenomenal, not actual.<sup>142</sup>

Further development of logical positivism attempted to reconcile science and the problem of demarcation. Carnap failed to develop a sufficient category for validating between different logic as there is no universal framework that fits all theoretical frameworks.

His student Popper sought to directly introduce his own framework to both natural - and social sciences and rejected verification.<sup>143</sup> Popper emphasized what science should strive for is the deduction of observation from experience by “corroboration.”<sup>144</sup> He established that causal determinism between the logical conditions of statements defines the relationship between cause and effect and probability of its accuracy, assuming the existence of universal causation between the two variables.<sup>145</sup> The demarcating of these laws from the subject experience via experimentalism is based on falsificationism. Where verification establishes a proposal's truthfulness, falsification provides evidence to prove assumptions false, therefore excluding proposals that can be proven untrue.<sup>146</sup> Therefore, explication by falsification will introduce the best possible explication by comparing different theories.

Popper argued observation by induction is purer than that achieved by reflection or deduction as this *prima facie* observation presents us with a practical problem to extend for causal testing, adopting basic assumptions from Kantian idealism concerning *a priori* knowledge.<sup>147</sup> He reiterated the object of science is a technique as a tradition of logic, where theories are systems for testing proposals to see the validity of their reasoning in logical formalistic propositions. Popper maintained that scientific theories are

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<sup>142</sup> Carnap, R(1950) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”. 8-10.

<sup>143</sup> Walker, T. (2010). “The Perils of Paradigm Mentalities: Revisiting Kuhn, Lakatos, and Popper.”. 434-435.

<sup>144</sup> See for example: Popper, K. (1966). *The open society and its enemies. Vol.2, The high tide of prophecy : Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath.* (5th ed. [revised]. ed.). Or footnote above for general summary.

<sup>145</sup> Bartley W.W., Popper,K. (2013) *Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Realism and the Aim of Science.* Taylor and Francis, 2013. See for example: 72-73.

<sup>146</sup> Bartley W.W., Popper,K. (2013) *Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Realism and the Aim of Science.* See for example: 72-73. Also in Jackson, P. (2011). *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics.* 14-15.

<sup>147</sup> Popper, K. (1966). *The open society and its enemies. Vol.2, The high tide of prophecy : Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath.* (5th ed. [revised]. ed.).

immutability, and if core assumptions of scientific theories could be questioned by *ad-hoc* explanations, the scientific value of the theory would be diminished since theoretical assumptions are manipulated to fit the evidence and therefore could not be proven false.<sup>148</sup> This dispute is tied to a larger question on how science progresses as Kuhn and Lakatos promoted divergent a view from Popper's dogmatic stance.

#### 2.4. The Progression of Science: Kuhn

For Kuhn, Popper presented a paradox, as causality-based hypothesis testing is not the only form of science and is unable to explain why science progresses as theories develop over time and seek to correct or explain knowledge gaps. In essence, Kuhn claimed scientific progress is achieved by an already existing paradigm of science providing a playground for “...*normal-scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies.*”<sup>149</sup> This structure of science endorses rigidity to support already-established knowledge, and discoveries are utilized to expand the scientific ‘gaze,’ in practice forcing the field to seek to explicate the new phenomenon. Scientific breakthroughs that constitute paradigm shifts emerge when knowledge is contradictory to the contemporary paradigm, and as a result, create a crisis of knowledge. As Jackson expertly states, for Popper, this was the most problematic aspect of Kuhn and Lakatos, as scientists must engage other paradigms to compare theories.<sup>150</sup> Therefore, a scientific framework would need a criterion of evaluation that could deduce the truthfulness of logic, which Kuhn recognized as a fundamental problem in falsificationism.

Popperian falsificationism, according to Kuhn, demarcated a false line between the science as practiced in ‘normal science’ and that of pseudoscience, as testing challenges the contemporary theory via application, as scientists must make a personal application of the theory in question to account the

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<sup>148</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 65-101.

<sup>149</sup> Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. (“No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies.”) 24-25.

<sup>150</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations : Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* 55-56. (“In order for falsification to correct our knowledge over time, we would have to be clear when something had been falsified and when it had not been falsified; in order for falsification to account for the progress of science, it would have to be the case that practicing scientists actually engaged in the systematic effort to refute their conjectures and those of others.”)



practical under analysis, the research is a test of the application, not of the science or paradigm in general.<sup>151</sup> The system of testing is never isolated from the larger “central theoretical system” of auxiliary explanations, and the failure to account for the testability of theory can result from the auxiliary assumptions.<sup>152</sup> Auxiliary explanations(*ad-hoc* explanations) contribute to the growth of knowledge rather than diminish the scientific value of theories; therefore, theories are never totally ‘refuted.’<sup>153</sup> Kuhn reconciled the testing of knowledge by adopting a dialectical stance to account for the progress in science, but at the same time adopted a “dogmatic” attitude to science as a practice, where the ‘normal science’ proceed to account for the majority of progress by adopting *a priori* theoretical stance, as Kant had done.<sup>154</sup>

Kuhn envisioned scientific change as something bitterly contested between the differing paradigms, to the extent of irrationality. New paradigms emerge only when the magnitude of problems reaches a climax of “...*universally recognized scientific achievement.*”<sup>155</sup> However, what the nature universal scientific achievement is and how scientific reasoning develops, Kuhn does not specify but instead offers almost a mystical account of ‘paradigmatic conversion.’<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). (“At the time when the test was actually performed, as he emphasized in Structure and again stressed elsewhere in his London paper, the negative outcome can only be the ‘final straw’ for some—perhaps most, but certainly not all – members of the community. The whole rhetoric of ‘refutation’ and ‘falsification’ suggests disproofs or at least results that will ‘compel assent from any member of their relevant professional community’ (p.13). But there are, Kuhn was clear, no such things. His real position, then, was that what Popper seemed to be saying about tests never really applies—either in normal or in extraordinary science.”) 69-70 & 70-75.

<sup>152</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). 73-74.

<sup>153</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). 71-72.

<sup>154</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). 83-84. (“Popper, like many others, saw Kuhn as committed to historical relativism, to the claim that critical discussion always presupposes a framework, and therefore to the view that those who operate within different frameworks (support different paradigms) are incapable of fruitful critical interaction (the famous ‘dialogue of the deaf’).”)

<sup>155</sup> Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 158-159.

<sup>156</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). 83-84. Also in: Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 158-159.

## 2.5. Lakatos versus Popper versus Kuhn: Price of Progress

Like Kuhn, Lakatos articulated an alternative solution for the progress of science, as Nickles summarizes: for Lakatos, the growth of auxiliary theories and hypotheses revitalizes the “degenerative research programs,” as contemporary theories would be rivaled by a central theoretical system with new and more consistent auxiliary assumptions, thus increasing the value of scientific theory and eventually replacing it with a more progressive program.<sup>157</sup> Auxiliary hypotheses are the balancing force in scientific logic that defines the progress of research programs. Both Kuhn and Lakatos held the view that one scientific framework would become dominant sooner or later.<sup>158</sup> Whereas Kuhn advocated for the dogma of normal science, Lakatos ‘allowed’ a marginal place for alternative theories.

The Kuhnian approach is almost uniform with Kahn, Brodie, and Schelling's vision of military science, as illustrated above. Furthermore, the ‘repression’ of normal science does not necessarily mean its facticity or its truthfulness, as this can be a result of reified ideology rather the truth value of the statement or the ‘utility of its explication.’ In military science and military institutions, ideological reification in Anglo-American strategic studies is evident. In research on ontology of war, practices that delegitimize theoretical research have promoted contradictory methodology that emphasizes the explicative nature of properties to that of phenomenology.

For example, Kaldor, in her book she argues for the emergence of new wars; a mix of traditional military, paramilitaries, and criminal elements acting in a conflict where all actors have fixed interest to keep the conflict ongoing for economic gain or identity constitution.<sup>159</sup> Yet her methodological argument is poorly constructed. A value-aspect-choice methodology is a useful tool when inquiring in the social aspects of human life where the unique nature of events often prevents abstraction based on empirical evidence.<sup>160</sup> However, she should have noted how Weber consistently maintained ideal-type as theoretical formulation cannot inquire in the ontological nature of phenomena, but rather it is an analytical spotlight that highlights mechanisms difficult to analyze via quantification.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Nickles, T. (2003). *Thomas Kuhn* (Contemporary philosophy in focus). Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 88-89.

<sup>158</sup> Walker, T. (2010). “The Perils of Paradigm Mentalities: Revisiting Kuhn, Lakatos, and Popper.” 435-438.

<sup>159</sup> Kaldor, M. (2007). *New & old wars* (2.th ed.). Stanford (Calif.): Stanford University Press.

<sup>160</sup> Eliaeson, S. (2000). “Max weber's methodology: An ideal-type.” *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, XXXVI(3), 241-263.

<sup>161</sup> Weber, M (1949). *The Methodology Of The Social Sciences*. (trans.) Shills,E.A. Finch,H. Illinois, Glencoe; The Free Press. 15-30, 50-70 & 160-176

She implies that the ontology is determined by warfare as an action or a mechanism that leverages economics within the conflict, yet introducing a method of war does not determine warfare ontologically stratified *per se*: she confuses ontological change and change in properties of war. Therefore, her argument defines how mechanisms *in* war have changed.

Reasoning, therefore, from empirical data to validate such claims are at best contradictory as they lack the dialectical development and instead suppose a static existence of *a priori* categories like Kant. This is interlinked with how causality is perceived to exist as universal natural law that is deduced from the state of affairs in the initial conditions since causation must be presupposed methodologically as independent of the phenomena. This presupposition is different from transcendental causation, as conditions to the initial nature of events and proceeds to deduction from those basic sets of argument that are regulative to see if the argument can be evaluated in logical form.<sup>162</sup>

The contrast between causal analysis and general ontology is; this linear analysis of cause and effect determines the relationship between attributes, whereas general ontology determines the totality of relationships that structure phenomena as reality. Ontological categories founded via ‘pure’ empirical analysis postulate a false symmetry between ontology and a subset of attributes: empirical analysis is comparable to the existing ontological categories that are assumed to have the same attributes. A new analysis of ontology via correlation does not introduce a new dimension of the phenomena or its particularity but structure the relation within the existing context by correlating the attributes of presupposed ontology. Logically it would follow all emergent features of warfare seem similar, as there is little that concerns the particular intent of ‘a war’ or change in its nature. The confusion over metatheory is an uncritical approach that incorporates both Kantian transcendental knowledge envisioned by Popper’s metaphysical realism and methodologically unvalidated claims.

Consider the evaluation of new wars *ala* Kaldor; if this evaluation is applied to a different type of phenomena, let us say those of the old wars. It would mistake the nature of the old wars as having the same attributes, thus reducing the classification that is outside of the applicability of the *a priori* assumption: it is beyond the symmetry between the phenomena. There is no feature that distinguishes the different ontology between the two categories of wars as they are evaluated as symmetrical and have

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<sup>162</sup> Bartley W.W., Popper,K. (2013) *Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Realism and the Aim of Science.* 70-150.

the same attributes (battle-deaths) to measure the differentiation.<sup>163</sup> This would mean Kaldor is comparing the same kinds of warfare as having different reasons, mechanisms, or features, not ontologically different entities.

Subsequently, theoretical development in military sciences is currently stagnating as the determination of 'new' phenomena and ontology of the 'old' are virtually the same, as the means of the measurement do not provide alternative forms of analysis. Attributes and conditions retain only a partial truth of the phenomena, unable to distinguish any change in the ontology of war: restricted to the domain of sense-certainty in connecting its correlation to a representation of existing hypothesis. Empirical analysis as a logic reduces those cognitive processes of reasoning to that which is bound by different causality found only in nature, yet these cognitive processes apply different basis for their reasoning.<sup>164</sup> The dimension of measurement via empiricism is bound to principles of *a priori* reasoning. Definitions of an ontology of the object via deduction of inference based on representation contradict the linear assumption of reasoning (via causality) as ontological categories are referential to categories of pure thought, as Kant stated; therefore, its mode is different from that of causal logic.<sup>165</sup>

By grounding ontological dependency of relations to empiricist logic, the analysis relegates this recognition to sense-certainty that presupposes *a priori* categories as a *positive phenomenon* rather than grounds knowledge to independent recognition of entities or phenomena. As a result, knowledge in the empirical analysis is conditional and particular to the synthetic analysis of the experiences that are its methodological grounds.<sup>166</sup>

Popper understood this connection between ontology and causal deduction: he stated the nature of the presuppositions (or ontological conditions) are existential and cannot be discovered by the scientific

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<sup>163</sup> Kaldor, M. (2007). *New & old wars* (2.th ed.). & Kaldor, Mary. "In Defence of New Wars." *Stability (Norfolk, VA)* 2, no. 1 (March 7, 2013): 4–.

<sup>164</sup> Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 195-197.

<sup>165</sup> See for example: Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique of Pure Reason*. 195-197. Also in Logan, Beryl., (2015). "Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus." *Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus*. ("All the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance. The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself.") 57-58.

<sup>166</sup> Banham, G (2008) "Kant, Hume and Causation." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 16:4, 801-810, DOI: 10.1080/09608780802407605 ("The relation of resemblance is not for Kant a primitive given in what we observe; rather, the concepts on which such an observation of resemblance must arise are necessarily possessed independently of any such experience. Particular observation and particular events have a condition that enables them to be recognized as such, which is the previous possession of the ability to recognize the distinction between them by reference to pure concepts.") 807-808.

method as they are already conditional to their presupposition; hence causal analysis is definitive of the proof of the components that subsist in the phenomena rather than existential statements of metaphysics, and as such describes the reality that is sensible and independent.<sup>167</sup> This applies similarly to induction, as the inference from probability indicates *a priori* existence of the object, in contrast to existential statements that imply a set of arguments that are a possibility, not a probability. Again, this would chain the logic of the argument to the assumption of positive existence and regularity of the phenomena. Therefore, if the universal nature of war could be quantized, this research would be unnecessary. Hegel's primary criticism is Kant that philosophy must incorporate the dialectical development of the consciousness to explain the totality of history or be confined to naturalism and logic.<sup>168</sup> This reasoning implies that theories of warfare must similarly develop in accordance with consciousness and adapt dialectics as its fundamental component.

In summary, this chapter outlined the development of neopositivism and falsification as methodological traditions broadly. This chapter argues that ontological analysis that presupposes neopositivist dualism contradicts the scientific logic that validates arguments on properties of entities. Neopositivist dualism as a metatheory presupposes existential nature in assuming of its linear and sequential nature, implying that the ontological determination via causation is a *non sequitur*, since the grounding of the scientific method to reality is referential to *a priori* categorization that presupposes ontology of entities. As illustrated by Kant, research on causal relations is situated in different levels of analysis. Most importantly, this chapter identified logical contradictions or antinomies as the basis for ontic analysis to establish a logic of reasoning to ground scientific ontology.

## **2.6. Dialectical Materialism: Ontology of The Economic System**

This chapter introduces the history of dialectical materialism and the basic metatheoretical assumptions. Furthermore, this chapter summarizes how dialectical materialists have reasoned the nature of warfare is directly linked to the economics system: this chapter argues that the nature of dialectical materialism

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<sup>167</sup> Bartley W.W., Popper, K. (2013) *Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Realism and the Aim of Science.* (See for example: 70-100, Especially 72-78.)

<sup>168</sup> Hegel, G.W.F & Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind.*

presupposes ontology of war as an economic conflict of interest between classes rather than as a phenomenon in-itself.

In international relations, Marxist scholars envisioned a possibility for universalist emancipation by removing social constraints to individuals in society, as material constraints created by capitalism constraints intervene on the possibility of the subject to actualize himself.<sup>169</sup> Marxist theory of war contrasts between interests between the ruled and the ruling as a class struggle; the proletariat struggle for emancipation that maintains the progress of history towards universal emancipation. In dialectical materialism, war is not a primordial evil like Kantian cosmopolitanism claims, but an act of resistance that can be justified: the armed struggle for emancipation is always subordinate to the political causes, as Kára notes.<sup>170</sup> The economic analysis and critique retain primacy, as the political is constrained by possibilities of the global capitalist system and sedimentation of productive forces to retain supremacy via imperialism and exploitation that subsumes the productive forces.<sup>171</sup>

In the global socio-economical structure, capitalism imposes a class antagonism and results in unavoidable wars of conquest to expand the reach of the global market<sup>172</sup>. Similarly, this antagonism is fermented between the working class of nations to institute a social divide, the false consciousness to prevent unification under the capitalist system. In dialectical materialism, warfare has an ideational and ideological dimension that is often used for social mobilization and legitimization of violence. For the most important right of the population: the right to property is always guaranteed by the security apparatus. Only when the right to property can be safeguarded, and the future of transactions guaranteed can profit cumulate.

Dialectical materialism argues that European aggression to colonize and imperialism was a direct result of the economic system that sought to appropriate the resources and labor of countries outside the global market. Lenin introduced the idea of revolutionary violence in Marxist political theory: the armed struggle is subordinate to the need for emancipation.<sup>173</sup> He argued appropriation of productive means would lead to conflict as economic interests between these classes would create a sectarian conflict

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<sup>169</sup> Linklater, A. (1990). *Beyond realism and Marxism : Critical theory and international relations*. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 4-5.

<sup>170</sup> Kára, K. (1968). "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, 5(1), 1-27. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422658>. 1-8.

<sup>171</sup> Kára, K. (1968). "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace." 15-18.

<sup>172</sup> Kára, K. (1968). "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace." 15-18.

<sup>173</sup> Linklater, A. (1990). *Beyond realism and Marxism : Critical theory and international relations*. 20-50.

between groups that struggle to survive under a market economy.<sup>174</sup> Dialectical materialism by its nature in one form or another has always investigated how economic conflict and state structure create social injustice that legitimizes political violence.

Scholars such as Merleau-Ponty and Althusser, both problematized social violence, in its totality not only as a condition of expressed violence but also as an internalized repression validated by law and the state, have continued to illustrate the influence of economics on military action.<sup>175</sup>

Before Althusser's more holistic investigation on violence, dialectical materialism perceived warfare as an expression of the violent domination of the ruling class duplicating itself at the world stage; his work provided much-needed context to problematizing violence as a constitutive process in supporting capitalist societies.<sup>176</sup> Fundamentally dialectical materialism is interested in questions of domination of ideological positions that reify ideology and regiment society through violence. Marxist view military supports the capitalist state structure by enforcing the right of the ruling class to organize the means of production in a society, therefore endogenously part of the capitalist system of states.<sup>177</sup>

Several criticisms can be leveled to Marxist theorizing, as Linklater noted the overemphasis on the economic sphere, lack of state theory, and the instrumentality of war as a means for emancipation of labor or liberalization and insistence of war a separate social dynamic.<sup>178</sup> In Marxist theory, military and security apparatus are the extension of capitalist's superstructure, hence subjected to criticism. This typology of warfare can be generally classified as revolutionary and counter-revolutionary wars, as Kára states.<sup>179</sup> For example, colonial wars such as Algeria and Vietnam can be classified as revolutionary struggles. In contrast to warfare that is waged for ideological domination, such as the war in

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid. 20-50.

<sup>175</sup> Althusser, L. (1970). *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. 220-223. & Merleau-Ponty, M. (1969) *Humanism and terror : an essay on the communist problem* . Boston: Beacon Press.

<sup>176</sup> Althusser, L. (1970). *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. 203-204.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Linklater, A. (1990). *Beyond realism and Marxism : Critical theory and international relations*. 51-52.

<sup>179</sup> Kára, K. (1968). "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace." 1-8.

Afghanistan.<sup>180</sup> The critique of neo-Marxists is well established in the works of the Frankfurt school, and its contribution to metatheories of international relations is summarized below.<sup>181</sup>

In essence, dialectical materialism presumes ontological dependency between social relations and economic order and reduces existence to productive labor or to its means of production. Where dialectical materialism attempted to turn away from the principles of absolute idealism, its ontology is grounded in systemic reproduction of the structure that produces the relations between classes.

Where Hegel claimed consciousness explains the development of consciousness, Marx perceived the notion of Spirit(Geist) as a Kantian attempt to integrate external theism into metaphysics.<sup>182</sup> It is also possible to see the transition of global economics away from "material" value that is sublimated by abstract value in new forms of virtual currency. Therefore, we can say that the unity between the particular nature of the system and the universal principles that govern its form cannot be explained just with systemic ontology as its nature is increasingly decentralized and dependent on the dialectical development of the logic of the system, rather than its ability to infuse value: suggesting that the supremacy of thought rather means of production: as the source of value.

Problems infusing materialist ontology and production are also noted by Merleau-Ponty: he synthesized the nature of perception with the phenomenology of *Gestalt's* structures; he argued this description would analyze the constitution of behavior rather than ontology; hence traditional realism cannot substantiate ontology.<sup>183</sup> Likewise, Lukács also opposed materialist interpretation, and like Merleau-Ponty, he was pessimistic of the future prospects of philosophy of dialectical materialisms: viewing Marx's work as a method in a historical explanation of the world that he attempted to integrate with absolute idealism.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Linklater, A. (1990). *Beyond realism and Marxism : Critical theory and international relations*. ("Marx almost certainly did find it useful to separate primary class forces which generated historical progress from "secondary and tertiary" phenomena which could affect and frustrate the promise of class struggle.") 51-52.

<sup>181</sup>Cox, R. W. (1983). "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations : An Essay in Method." *Millennium*, 12(2), 162–175. & Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T., Jephcott, E., & Noeri, G. (2021). *Dialectic of Enlightenment* . Stanford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804788090>  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298830120020701>

<sup>182</sup> Lukács, G. (1982) *The ontology of social being*. 1, Hegel's false and his genuine ontology . London: Merlin Press. (See for example: 1-30)

<sup>183</sup> Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963) *Structure of Behaviour*. Boston: Beacon Press: Boston. (trans. Fisher, A.L) 43-45, 50-55, 180-200 & 129-200.

<sup>184</sup> Lukács, Georg (2000). *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press & Lukács, G. (1982) *The ontology of social being*. London: Merlin Press.



Further evidence to support claims regarding the primacy of the economic system as its referent can be found in Lukács research.

Like Marx, Lukács opposes Hegelian articulation of the *Geist* and claims that dialectics is replicated by labor that objectifies categories of thought or *mimesis*.<sup>185</sup> Paradoxically he is satisfied to state that labor, whether this is an intellectual effort or material production dependent, is dependent on preexisting objectified categories.<sup>186</sup> Ironically, Hegel's argument on dialectics is grounded to the nature of consciousness that merges disciplined labor and reflective hermeneutics; thus, his argument is merely a reinstatement of his philosophy in a materialist perspective, as we can see in Browne's summary of Lukács ontology.<sup>187</sup>

Ontology for Lukács is suspended between an objective category (idea) and production (substance), suggesting that he was unaware of the impact this separation would have on ontology: largely reminiscent of Kantian dualism even if implicitly. His line of reasoning suggests the primacy of logical categories that produce the objectified relations through *bifurcated* ontology or dualist ontology.<sup>188</sup> Hegel rightly posited the supremacy of thought, not independence of substance but unity in representation that is developed in labor or deeds.<sup>189</sup> Fundamentally, a metatheory that, like dialectical materialism, is a system-based ontology: that explains the consequence of the system to individuals but cannot explain its exact nature.

Analysis from the systemic perspective can only explain the reasons for conflicts and the role productive relations play in warfare but cannot establish what elements interlink universal ontology and particular phenomenology without referring to an *a priori* conditions of the premise (the nature of the system). Consequently, any analysis that is bound to these grounds will only have explicative value in a dialectical materialist framework, not as an analysis of universal ontology.

These themes are also extensively analyzed in Bologh's research: where she illustrates how dialectical phenomenology can be grounded to Marx's method.<sup>190</sup> Despite the advanced level of metatheoretical introspection in dialectical materialism, Marxist scholars have developed little new insight but rather

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<sup>185</sup> Lukács, G. (1982) *The ontology of social being*. 80-81.

<sup>186</sup> Lukács, G. (1982) *The ontology of social being*.

<sup>187</sup> Browne, Paul (1990) "Lukács' Later Ontology." *Science & society* (New York. 1936). 54 (2), 193. 202-203.

<sup>188</sup> Lukács, G. (1982) *The ontology of social being*. 61-62

<sup>189</sup> Lukács, G. (1982) *The ontology of social being*.

<sup>190</sup> Bologh, R. W. (1979). *Dialectical phenomenology: Marx's method*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

applied already existing perspectives to warfare, for example, in areas of cyberwarfare.<sup>191</sup> More dated research like Giddens's analysis of the causes of social violence still remains relevant and offers a valuable reflection on why the development of property rights is intimately connected to social violence.<sup>192</sup> He similarly remains committed to the notion of systemic replication. However, it should be noted that Lukács' research on ontology is still relatively unknown and equally difficult to interpret as Hegel's philosophy. Therefore, it would be false to claim that his philosophy could be discussed in-depth here, rather this research notes his work requires much more detailed analysis.

In conclusion, dialectical materialism still offers a variety of valuable perspectives to conflict, but it is evident, Marxist scholars similarly struggle to grasp the exact nature of ontology and dialectical development. Despite Lukács' noteworthy research, the direction of dialectical materialism suggests further integration of Kantian dualism similarly as in other philosophies of science: suggesting a regressive trend in scientific philosophy. Dialectical materialism and its system-based ontology studies the impact of the system on the development of the social ontology under its umbrella, therefore, analyzes the influence of the structure on behavior and constitution of social relations. Research on the influence of the economy on ontology remains a key contribution to the field but cannot ground the universal nature of ontology due to the nature of the proof required by its premise.

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<sup>191</sup> Dyer-Witheford, M. (2019) "Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism." [Online]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

<sup>192</sup> Giddens, A. (1985). *The Nation-state and Violence: A contemporary critique of historical materialism / Vol. 2*. Berkeley ; Los Angeles: University of California Press.

## 2.7. Nominalism: Thus Spoke...a Relativist?

This chapter summarizes ontological and epistemological assumptions of nominalist metatheory. In addition, this chapter discusses how nominalism influences scientific conduct, what impact does nominalism has on ontology. This chapter traces the history of nominalism to Frankfurth School and argues against the common attribution of nominalism to Nietzschean thought.

There is substantial claim to be made in arguing that nominalism is a singular school of thought that contains three different epistemologies that share a similar set of ontological and epistemological assumptions: assumptions relativity knowledge; exclusivity of identity; introspection on the nature of normative positions, and critique to power relations of knowledge. Three different epistemologies can be attributed to nominalism: poststructuralism, Frankfurth school(neomarxism), and critical theory.

In general, nominalists are metaphysical realizes that deny the existence of metaphysics similarly to positivism: nominalism perceives material identity as exclusive, and any form of metaphysics is a mental or linguistic representation of an actual object. In contrast to positivism, nominalists resist the idea of nomological laws of nature as the subjective agency forces a particular perception on the agent. Therefore, the legitimization of knowledge and power relations promotes a particular intersubjective meaning of interest groups and imposes an ideology on society.

The greatest philosophical contribution of the Frankfurt school can be considered *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno where presents his critique to idealist metaphysics.<sup>193</sup> Adorno claims that the particularity of identity (its exclusivity) produces an antithetical relationship between what a conscious being is and what a conscious being wants to be, therefore, creating a contradiction between the representation of \*what one is in his ‘heart of hearts’ and what we represent to others. Therefore, the exclusivity of identity forces us to perform our ‘true’ identity, as he states: “*The systematic trend lives on in negation alone. The categories of a critique of systems are at the same time the categories in which the particular is understood. What has once legitimately transcended particularity in the system has its place outside the system. The interpretive eye which sees more in a phenomenon than it is—and solely because of what it is—secularizes metaphysics.*”<sup>194</sup> For Adorno, these categories of knowledge in exclusivity form the basis of our social systems and should be subjected to critique to open possibilities for universal emancipation.

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<sup>193</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. Continuum.

<sup>194</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. Continuum. 5-6 & 28-29.

For Adorno, these categories of particularity produce oppression by enforcing uniformity of identity by its exclusive nature that forces universal categories of representation to particular identity: these identities should be treated as unique entities instead of expressing likeness to a universal idea.

This idea of exclusivity of identity is especially visible in Foucault's work, whose influence on post-structuralist epistemology shaped social sciences. Similarly, an important contribution is Habermas's turn to 'communicative action'; his work is discussed further below.

Foucault unveiled the origins of the discourse as a genealogical practice and illustrated truth as a suspended antinomy in language that cannot be solved due to the subjective nature of agency, a condition Nietzsche already had established in his discussion on the constitution of power.<sup>195</sup> Nietzschean criticism is directly addressed Kantian idealism, as our ability to articulate the conceptual network built not only on language but internalized *a priori*.<sup>196</sup> Without the possibility to question the limiting conditions; what restricts the relationship of knowledge and truth, positing a systematic condition for transcendental knowledge would be impossible, demonstrating the contingency of sufficient conditions for knowledge.

For Foucault, knowledge, and reason cannot be independent of the contemporary political and ethical considerations, as knowledge and power are infused together and exist in singular form: in language and as an identity.<sup>197</sup> In essence, he rejects transcendental truth and the progressive linear development of history. Instead, Foucault claimed that the progression of history is rhizomatic and renegotiated by projecting meaning in history. The rejection of the transcendental nature of truth implies the temporality of the means, discursive practices, and the practices of power. According to Foucault, only by revealing the typology of the practices of power and renegotiating historically reified meaning change is possible in the equilibrium as emancipation for communities previously oppressed.<sup>198</sup>

Foucault's primary innovation was the systematic methodology of discursive practices that analyze power relations and harness discourse as a technique for criticism of normative and political positions that were previously inaccessible rather than the novelty of his philosophy. His theory on discourse explicitly argues on this position in reframing the Nietzschean method to illustrate the contradictory

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<sup>195</sup> Nietzsche, F., & W, Kaufmann (1974) *The Will to Power*. (4<sup>th</sup> edition) Vintage Books; New York. Random House Publishing. 70-100

<sup>196</sup> Foucault, M. (1974). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock. 41-44.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> See for example: *ibid.* or his other works.

nature of truth in relation to social practices constituted by a discourse by adopting a nominalist metatheory to describe this struggle for power.<sup>199</sup>

Despite the false attribution of post-structuralism and nominalism to Nietzsche that Foucault popularized. In his work, Nietzsche articulated the dependence of human action on power, both as a corruptive and constitutive force, viewing his work as the next progressive stage of the dialectics of German idealists. His work, however, is not as simple as his most ardent student, Foucault, would like to have us understand. This is evident in more recent research by Kauffman, who explicitly states Nietzsche never dismissed monism, nor was he a pure relativist, yet this interpretation is still much under debate and remains unexplored.<sup>200</sup>

Foucault's work is shadowed by the originality of the Frankfurt school's most eminent scholars: Adorno and Horkheimer. Where Foucault's objective formulates a framework for analysis and to ground practical use of discourse for the emancipation of repressed groups, scholars in the Frankfurt schools spearheaded nominalists philosophy as a philosophy of science. In rejecting all systematization as formalisms, Adorno unleashes a Nietzschean subsistence antithetical to itself, a mistake Heidegger similarly made in his argument against Hegel. Furthermore, Adorno similarly integrated Heidegger's argumentation, further confusing Hegelian idealism in his fervent commitment to dialectical materialism finding the determinate identity of an object in non-identity: or more plainly in nominalism.

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<sup>199</sup> Nietzsche, F., & W, Kaufmann (1974) *The Will to Power*. 70-100

<sup>200</sup> Nietzsche, F., & W, Kaufmann (1974) *The Will to Power*. 70-100

## 2.8. Hegel's Philosophy and Heidegger's Critique

This chapter details Heidegger's critique of Hegel and discusses the impact of his argument on both feminist and nominalist philosophy, which is further discussed in the next chapter. Heidegger's critique, in summary, is on the temporality of the *Geist* or totality of history in Hegel's philosophy.

Heidegger argued that the notion of finitude in absolute idealism posits subjective agency as external to its own development guaranteed by a theistic agency that 'infuses' a subject with the totality of history.<sup>201</sup> Therefore, this temporal finitude of the being-in-history is the expression of external force, basically enslaving the subject to an externality or as an 'agent of God'. According to Heidegger means the universality of the notion according does not emerge from the transcendent Spirit outside of time but is within the radical temporality of the *Dasein*. He claims Hegel understood the notion of the Spirit as transcendence in contrast to the temporal finitude of our being.

Heidegger argued that *Dasein*, presence or 'here-being' is itself an extension of the subject's development in time.<sup>202</sup> Time itself reveals its own immanence as successive moments of 'now'; therefore, only the presence of subjective agency is determinate and 'ontological.'<sup>203</sup> His argument claims history, as a development of the thinking subject, is temporally tied to finitude. Consequently, as the grounding of 'our being in the world' is the finitude of our horizon: death, the distortion of language, and the limitation of *Dasein* recreate the problem of finitude. For Heidegger, this negates the presence of universal notion as it is finite alongside our existence. In essence, according to Heidegger, universal development of consciousness and history would be impossible as being only experiences moments of his presence, in contrast to Hegel, who claimed that transcendence 'falls-in-to-time.'<sup>204</sup>

Instead, Heidegger claims that his understanding of the subject's constitution in temporality can provide a more authentic depiction of the ontic nature of our being(*Dasein*). In direct rejection of Hegel's logic, Heidegger states that the relationship to nothing(negative) is not possible, since this would mean something would emerge from nothing, because it is \*nothing: \*nothing can emerge from it, as the temporal finitude of our being is tied to the *Dasein*.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*.

<sup>202</sup> Surber, J. (1979). "Heidegger's Critique of Hegel's Notion of Time."

<sup>203</sup> Surber, J. (1979). "Heidegger's Critique of Hegel's Notion of Time." 361-362.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid. 360-361.

<sup>205</sup> Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*. & Hegel, G.W.F. Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*.

For Hegel, the absolute being or pure universal being is indeterminate; therefore, it is the same as pure nothingness or formlessness.<sup>206</sup> Therefore, its determinateness or its unity of being is tied to nothingness. More fundamentally, the determinateness of our concrete expression, our being is finite, but as nothingness, it is formless, therefore: pure being. As nothing, it is transcendental, but as a concrete being, its \*being is finite.

Heidegger's misconception is that the negative is treated as 'nothing,' it is instead a mode of dormant presence, non-being or not actual, as Suber elaborates; Hegel argues for the development of the notion itself through active agency: by becoming.<sup>207</sup>

In comparison, Heidegger externalizes the subjective experience from consciousness to nature. Hegel states that thought-determination is not external to consciousness, rather the immanent constituent of the experience itself as 'concrete experience' cannot be separated from the consciousness; hence consciousness experiences transcendental finitude as a dialectical process is within history that transcends the moments of 'Now.' Therefore, the 'Now' and 'I' are connected by the notion of passed 'Now'(Then-Now) and form the collection of the moment we regard as presence.<sup>208</sup> The connection between this passing of the temporal moment lies within the notion. The subject is present both in 'the passing' and becoming of the 'Now,' not merely being in the 'Now.' It is only in the passing the development of consciousness is possible as in its 'historical totality.'

Suber correctly points out Heidegger's mistake: the idea of Spirit (*Geist*) as something that is external to the subject, rather something that is identical with the subject or merely its immanent nature that determines the development of consciousness.<sup>209</sup> Heidegger argued that the immediacy of the

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<sup>206</sup> Hegel, G.W.F. Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 59-60. ("Nothing is therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure being is")

<sup>207</sup> Surber, J. (1979). Heidegger's Critique of Hegel's Notion of Time. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39(3), 358-377. doi:10.2307/2106492. 370-71.

<sup>208</sup> Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*. See for example: 10-100, especially 37-38

<sup>209</sup> Surber, J. (1979). "Heidegger's Critique of Hegel's Notion of Time." 365-366 ("*Heidegger claims that Hegel understands Spirit as the activity of thinking by virtue of which the thinking self is grasped in the apprehension of the indifferent externality of the not-I. Thinking, as the essence of Spirit, is understood as the temporal process of appropriating the not-I to the self, the process of grasping, as Hegel puts it, that substance must likewise be subject. Thus, just as time was conceived as the negation of the immediate negation of the spatial point, so Spirit is understood as the negation of the externality of the not-I, which initially presents itself as the immediate negation of the thinking self.*")

present(*Dasein*) is external to the subsistence of the subject: his concept of Being shares the same existence as the Spirit for Hegel but is immanent in nature.<sup>210</sup>

However, he fails to note how the development of consciousness is tied to the passing of time in-becoming: this is exactly Hegel's idea of sublimation. No dialectical development of consciousness would be possible if consciousness experiences reality only at the present moment: it is carried within us, in the distorted language and symbolic reality of society.

In summary, what Heidegger argued is that the immediacy of the present(*Dasein*) is external of the consciousness. This would mean the reference for the development of consciousness is outside of human consciousness; therefore, being is *a* theistic entity (God).<sup>211</sup> For Heidegger, the subsistence of the immediate concrete being is more determinate as it experiences 'being' in its totality. Heidegger failed to establish how the nature of the dialectical subjectivity, which is finite and temporal, integrates itself to the larger totality of history, which is transcendental. For Hegel, this translation is through the dialectical interaction with the 'other': symbolic reality provides the basis for our experience rather distorts the reality it supplies with its content; meaning.

## **2.9. Foundations of Frankfurt School and Negative Dialectics: Exclusivity of Identity**

This chapter details Adorno's argument against Hegel and the foundations for the philosophy of the Frankfurt school. Here this research argues that the contradictory argument Adorno posits against Hegel positions particularity as freedom of any representation, therefore lacks recognition of the universal determinateness of identity. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates that pure exclusivity of identity will lead to confusion regarding identity as taxonomic features of classes have incorporated two-fold dialectics as the predicate for conscious intent. In summary: particularized identity cannot legitimize itself by supplying logical proof via internal conditions of entities these refer to states: of being. Alternatively, the particularization of agent identity will lead to the contestation of taxonomic features of identity.

Adorno criticized Hegel following Heidegger's argument: having smuggled in the existence of a higher form of a presence outside the *genus*(universal object), claiming ontology is determinate only the present

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<sup>210</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. 84-85.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*



and the immediate by exclusion.<sup>212</sup> Adorno sought to invert Hegelian dialectics to force metaphysics on materialism and form the basis of ontological identity by exclusion.<sup>213</sup> He, however, misunderstood Hegelian idealism in his fervent commitment to dialectical materialism in finding the determinateness of the identity in non-identity (nominalism) as he states: “*Contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit it exceeds itself. Dialectics is the consistent sense of non-identity.*”<sup>214</sup> Being for Adorno expresses ‘presence’ that within the subject and rejects existence outside matter.<sup>215</sup> Universal forms are not only the inner experience in the subsistence of the being but subsistence grounded by the subject in productive labor as a movement from the negative to actuality.

Adorno and his successors understood dialectics as surpassing identity and redefining: “*The concept, purified as it rejects its content, functions in secret as the model of a life that is arranged so no measure of mechanical progress—the equivalent of the concept—may ever, under any circumstances, do away with poverty.*”<sup>216</sup> He rightly argues on the subsistence of the concept but disregards that the subsistence of the individual is determined by unity. In this unity, the subject is ‘present’ to the immediate and unmediated existence but alienated from it by the nature of consciousness, as a subject and object of power that mediates identity through representation, similarly as Hegel argues. Being is not something that is only present in the ‘free’ inner identity of the being but also determined by the substance in the external intersubjective ‘real’ as something that has a fixed referential (object) in physical reality: its representation.

Whether or not this reflects the ‘inner’ identity or feelings of entity is irrelevant; a subject cannot be ‘nothing’ at the same as it is ‘something’ as this would only be a state of the object, not its immanent nature or *de facto* ontology but merely its *ab intra* state.<sup>217</sup> Furthermore, the intent is only a state before its consequences are performed. Accepting such reasoning would mean that when \*I am saying that \*I am feeling poorly: my nature as a human being would be referential to my present feeling at the moment

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<sup>212</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. Continuum. 107-108. (See his footnotes)

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.* 5-6.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.* 107-108. (See his footnotes)

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.* 121-122.

<sup>217</sup> (in latin: from within).

as a state. Therefore, we can refer to this principle as the exclusivity of identity: for being to have a particular identity, it must exclude other possibilities.

For example, we can say when we think of a 'chair' and say that there are certain conditions a chair must fulfill for the object to be a chair. The definition of the chair is dependent on the persistence of what is considered a chair. A decision to refer a chair by a different name or language by a single individual will not change the definition of a chair: for it is shared intersubjectively via the recognition of the object's identity. Hence this would mean that ontology is persistent outside the immediate and present as a notion of the object and is presupposed to be as recognized via discursive dimension, and the object possesses an 'exclusive' and identity through its representative recognition: as a chair regardless of the subjective determinateness of its quality. Therefore, identity is enforced by a dialectic constitution in the unity of apperception as twofold recognition of the object: as both the subject and object through its representation as an object that has particular qualities.<sup>218</sup>

This 'exclusivity' of identity, contrary to claims of Butler and Adorno, is intersubjective: there would be only a relative notion of identity, defined by the internal state of the subject.<sup>219</sup> Substance *per se* is empty of these meanings, yet intersubjective discourse and social consciousness ground shared meanings to identity. Discourse as a shared 'social space' is both at the same time "open" to dialectical movement and closed or exclusive indeterminateness of identity. To have a concrete identity is to exclude other forms; thus, it references an idea that it is not, hence locking negativity permanently to a contest between absolute freedom and concrete expression or the legitimization of identity. It would be contradictory to argue that language could constitute ontological identity as it is temporal: this would be only a synthetic category without recognition.<sup>220</sup> What is true is that it is recognized by its exclusivity, as it becomes a particular via its 'otherness' as unique in its kind, related to its *genus* via its representation. Thus, recognized as a chair among the many: its quality is different, not its ontological identity.

It would be intelligible to argue that this transitive element (of identity) is defined by power relations that shape the discourse, but Adorno did not realize that there is no a negative reference point that can supplement the subject in the material domain, that is free from social dependencies, but rather

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<sup>218</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. & Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*. 37-38.

<sup>219</sup> Butler, Judith. *Subjects of Desire : Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* . New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Print. (See for example: 70-85 and 85-90.)

<sup>220</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. 12-13.

determined by relational dependency. To be social is to be grounded in those affective meanings by virtue of existence in society; thus, exclusive meaning from the identity other it would be just universal notion of such identity. An alternative thesis the denial of the dialectical grounding of human consciousness cannot be referential to 'pure' reality as this would mean representation of that object is true and unadulterated, but this reality thus cannot be the object-in-itself, as it is dialectically constituted thus not relative to absolute negativity but susceptible to power relations along with the inertia social interaction introduces.

Nominalist reasoning implies a deadlock in teleology that forces metaphysics back within nominalism via relativism. This is what Butler tried to reconcile with feminist theories but fails to appreciate this contradiction, misunderstanding Hegel's argument on transcendence as an anthropocentric approach to reality; she dismisses the grounding of consciousness *to* the reality that is within transcendence.<sup>221</sup> What Hegel argued it should be understood as *in* transcendence, but only in passing to the finitude of temporality:

Ontology cannot only be grounded in the inner experience of the being but in recognition of the subject in the world as two-folded recognition. Adorno and his successors rightly understood dialectics as surpassing the abstract and introducing inertia in concreteness "*The concept, purified as it rejects its content, functions in secret as the model of a life that is arranged so no measure of mechanical progress—the equivalent of the concept—may ever, under any circumstances, do away with poverty.*"<sup>222</sup> He rightly argues on the subsistence of the concept but discounts that the subsistence of the individual is determinant of the unity as disclosing identity to gain supremacy over pure *anomia*. In this unity, the subject is present to the immediate and unmediated existence but alienated from it by the nature of consciousness; as both a subject and object of power, there is no pure freedom. Even basic social subsistence is dependent on exclusion in defining identity as this gives substance and meaning to the concept of identity. In pure materialism, we find only the expression of the immediacy of the subsistence, not the whole, which Adorno himself seems to imply.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Butler, Judith. *Subjects of Desire : Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*. (See for example: 70-85 and 85-90.)

<sup>222</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. 121-122.

<sup>223</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. 166-167. ("When a category changes, as those of identity and totality do in negative dialectics, a change occurs in the constellation of all categories, and thus again in each one. Paradigmatic for this phenomenon are the concepts of essence and appearance.")

He seems to suggest the negative dialectics, which he supposes would surpass dialectics as negating the identity, are merely representations grounded to sense-certainty. Instead, he maintained the determinateness of the whole is defined by the dialectical process grounded in shared meaning in the totality of human consciousness; without any coherency, social interaction would be impossible as a social identity would not have efficacy outside internal definitions of the subject.<sup>224</sup> In contrast what is argued here is that the object has a synthetic category which is intersubjectively constituted as the conditionals to which the object must fulfill to qualify as such, since this 'exclusivity' is definitive, change of the identity is not free from dialectical recognition but in constant transition in dialectics that exclude its nature from the universal *genus*. Hegel clearly states it is not the transcendental conditions of identity but its absolute unrest that force the dialectical movement to seek its recognition in 'otherness.'<sup>225</sup>

What is briefly outlined above, is the logic of nominalist metatheory. Nominalism, as envisioned by Adorno, posits identity as non-definitive nothingness as being existent only in immediate 'presence.' The exclusive identity is only definitive in the temporal notion of ontology, hence relativistic in nature. Adorno's idea of the exclusive nature of identity ironically suggests a possibility for us to establish an alternative methodology for ontogenetic research by appropriating adopting negative dialectics as a transitive phase in the dialectical movement, further developed in the subsequent chapters.

The chapter above illustrates the divide between Adorno and Hegel in their different conception of ontology. In ontic research, negative dialectics cannot enforce the material existence as the identity of the object cannot be determined axiomatically either from the 'pure' external elements or from a free-floating concept. As the latter would mean, ideas do not have any influence of ideas to the material world, and the former would mean purely conceptual and subjective definition. For modern philosophy of science, the adoption of nominalist metatheory in research would result in articulation of particularities and expressing a position that is already in a state of flux but expressing a contingent position without a reference can illustrate but mere representation or semantics.

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<sup>224</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.* ("...consciousness itself finds the absolute dialectical unrest, this medley of sensuous and intellectual representations whose differences coincide, and whose identity is equally again dissolved, for it is itself determinateness as contrasted with the non-identical.") 124-125.

## 2.10. On Contemporary Critical Theory: Whose Ideology, Which Normativity?

This chapter introduces the development and history of critical theory and illustrates that the critical theory cannot substantiate ontological analysis due to the need for auxiliary theories that presuppose a normative position for emancipation.

Both post-structuralism and critical theory often overlap in epistemological questions as in the actual conduct of research, frequently challenging notions of agency and exploring discourse that creates constraints for emancipation.<sup>226</sup> The communicative turn advocated by Habermas turned away from the neo-Marxist critique to dialectical materialism: to establish an alternative form of critique to contemporary injustice in society without the limitations of neo-Marxism. According to Habermas scientific community should advocate for the integration of the whole of humanity rather than particularize the interest groups to the proletariat as Linklater states.<sup>227</sup> Linklater further notes how Critical theory is “moralist” as it is objective to attain universalist understanding through communication to erode boundaries between communities perceived as the ‘Other.’<sup>228</sup>

In essence, Habermas attempted to create a moral theory to move away from the path-dependency of actors and introduce a plurality of alternative outcomes to steer action away from the predetermined outcomes, for example, in conflicts and solve reified problems in political relations as Linklater summarizes.<sup>229</sup> The transition of critical theory reimagined its theoretical focus as a general critique of ideology and integrated American pragmatism to its core epistemology.<sup>230</sup>

Consequently, the pragmatic epistemology of critical theory is often supplemented by auxiliary theories that legitimize its use for a particular field and a subject. Paradoxically this epistemological transition has not had a significant influence in its frequent use alongside poststructuralism. The more recent or third-generation scholars in critical theory have increasingly incorporated Weberian cultural criticism

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<sup>226</sup> Linklater, A. (1990). *Beyond realism and Marxism : Critical theory and international relations*.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. 25-26.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid. 25-26.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid. 25-26.

<sup>230</sup> Diez, T., & Steans, J. (2005). “A useful dialogue? Habermas and international relations.” *Review of International Studies*, 31(1), 127-140. doi:10.1017/S0260210505006339. 135-139.

into scientific research. Subsequently interlinking critical theory with feminism, creating precedent on the cultural critique of race relations in areas such as critical race theory and colonialism<sup>231</sup>

The significance of the third generation to its philosophical direction has incorporated much of the original nominalist critique but often is remarkably closer to Foucauldian analysis of power relations to reveal hidden normativity of representation in pop culture, media, or other areas of public discourse. In military science, these theories are rarely used outside of the critique that is presented by post-structuralism. This pluralism has attracted several feminist scholars to expand conflict research to cover gender issues.<sup>232</sup>

The rejection of foundationalism in favor of more constitutive epistemology extended the scope of analysis to areas outside of the traditional critique of dialectical materialism.<sup>233</sup> However, as the main field of critical theory is discourse, its extension of critique outside of semiotics or linguistics is marginal. Still, feminist scholars such as Butler have successfully introduced feminist critique to the ontology of war, in addition to Goldstein's critique on the gendered nature of the war system.<sup>234</sup> Yet, it is unclear if these incorporate critical theory directly or reflect a more general post-structuralist approach.

Such extension is fundamentally problematic as epistemologically critical theory rejects the possibilities of theorizing outside the level of the linguistic sphere, where the 'material' and 'ideational' level meet, rather argues for a theory of universal communication to provide better understanding between the subjects.<sup>235</sup>

This argument is best illustrated by the conception of 'ideal speech act' where no dominant relationship or ideology can be found.<sup>236</sup> In almost sublime irony, Habermas's idea of 'objective' language resembles positivists' attempts to neutralize the language of metaphysics, as discussed earlier. It would be false to claim that language would be free from domination as he himself states: "...*Language is also a medium*

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<sup>231</sup> Cabrera, Nolan L. "Where Is the Racial Theory in Critical Race Theory?: A Constructive Criticism of the Crits." *Review of higher education* 42.1 (2018): 209–233. Web.

<sup>232</sup> Butler, J. (2009) *Frames of war : when is life grievable?* . London: Verso & Goldstein, J. (2001). *War and gender: how gender shapes the war system and vice versa* . Cambridge University Press.

<sup>233</sup> Diez, T., & Steans, J. (2005). "A useful dialogue? Habermas and international relations." *Review of International Studies*, 31(1), 127-140. doi:10.1017/S0260210505006339. 135-139.

<sup>234</sup> Butler, J. (2009) *Frames of war : when is life grievable?*& Goldstein, J. (2001). *War and gender: how gender shapes the war system and vice versa* .

<sup>235</sup> Diez, T., & Steans, J. (2005). "A useful dialogue? Habermas and international relations." 135-139.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.* 137-138.

*of domination and social power. It serves to legitimate relationships of organized force.*"<sup>237</sup> In language inherited grounding in the rules of use or habits of speech, these notions of domination are already incorporated within the discourse. There is nothing to distinguish "critical communicative" theory as a more elaborate version of discourse analysis. Epistemologically eclectic analysis and integration of normative claims often introduce a particularized perspective, immersed in ideology, rather than outside of ideology as the perspective accepts the plurality of standing-points path-dependency of these narratives is as Linklater describes at best "...*utopian*".<sup>238</sup> Normative dispositions such as 'neutrality of ideology' integrate naïve Western multiculturalism to scientific research and revere the 'official ideology' in its paternalistic permissiveness, as Žižek explains.<sup>239</sup> Consequently, either the explicative theory or the analytical posture supplements the critique, but there is little to substantiate claims that these approaches would be in any form 'objective' or independent from ideology rather than its constituent.

Secondly, Habermas argues terrorism and, by extension, for political violence to be: "...[a] *defect of communication...*".<sup>240</sup> Therefore violence, according to Habermas, is a misunderstanding, rather an expression of incompatible ethical stance enacted via violence, both on the symbolic and ontological level.

Critical theory rationalizes the normative causes of war as mere defects in human evolutionary development that has maintained a foothold from our primeval past. Habermas attempts to rationalize violence and externalize it outside of 'civilization.' Rather than admit social violence is not opposed to a peaceful society, but paradoxically its constitutive force prevents more barbaric forms of domination and ensures the stability of the social structure.

It is evident that the "linguistic turn" marks a turning point towards naivety, away from the more elaborate criticism of authors such as Walter Benjamin.<sup>241</sup> As Benjamin illustrates, all social violence has an ethical

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<sup>237</sup> Habermas, J (1988), *On Logic Of Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. The MIT Press. 172-173.

<sup>238</sup> Diez, T., & Steans, J. (2005). "A useful dialogue? Habermas and international relations." *Review of International Studies*, 31(1), 127-140. doi:10.1017/S0260210505006339. 135-139.

<sup>239</sup> Žižek, S. in (1998) *The psychoanalysis of race*. Christopher, L (Eds.) New York. Columbia Univ. Press. 1998. VIII, 445 S.

ISBN 0-231-10946-6. 157-159

<sup>240</sup> Borradori, G. (2003). *Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Parenthesis added [a]).

<sup>241</sup> Benjamin, W. (1978) *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*. New York: Schocken Book. 277-300.

component, as the morality of the society must permeate such acts via the law. The ethics of violence influences how human society limits violence by conducting violence.

While criticism can and should be directed at the permissive nature of the structure which indirectly legitimizes violence, the role of language cannot be dismissed as a contributing cause of violence; as Žižek already stated, this identification of the people produces the substance of politico-ethical order that produces and restrains terror.<sup>242</sup> This semantic dimension of violence has been a key question in critical theory emphasizing reflexivity advocated by Bourdieu in his research.<sup>243</sup> Modern investigations via critical theory are a far cry from the complexity and ingenuity of authors such as Fanon, whose work transformed race theory and explored how indirect violence in colonization played a key role in controlling the population.<sup>244</sup>

In military sciences, critical theory has seen an influx of research in international law, sociology, war crimes, and related topics relating to normative questions of warfare and corporeal agency: yet are locked in discussing representation rather than ontology.<sup>245</sup> Other poststructuralists investigate the economic amalgamation of warfare grounded to socio-political structures of legislation and institutional order such as biopolitics.<sup>246</sup> The recent ‘critical’ turn in conflict research has been referred to by recent scholars as critical war studies but has not achieved a foothold in scientific discourse outside a few prestigious universities in the United Kingdom and can be considered a marginal approach.<sup>247</sup>

In summary, critical theory has a marginal influence in military science, but due to the epistemological limitations of its metatheory: critical theory is limited to analyzing discourse and representation, as illustrated by Butler’s work. Post-structuralism offers more substantial ground for conflict, as illustrated by Reed’s research. Epistemologically critical theory is perhaps the most plural of metatheories if it indeed can be called as such, but its nature as a theory of communication grounded to emancipatory analysis enforces analytical boundaries and limit its ‘horizon’ to social meaning.

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<sup>242</sup> Žižek, S. & Robespierre, M. (2017) *Robespierre: Virtue and Terror*. Verso: London, UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F 0E. 20-34.

<sup>243</sup> Burawoy, Michael. (2019) “*Symbolic Violence: Conversations with Bourdieu*.” Durham: Duke University Press.

<sup>244</sup> See for example: Fanon, Frantz.(1967) *The Wretched of the Earth* . Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967. Print.

<sup>245</sup> Holmqvist, Caroline. “Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare.” *Millennium* 41, no. 3 (June 2013): 535–52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829813483350>.

<sup>246</sup> Dillon, M., Reid, J. (2009) “*The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*.” London: Routledge

<sup>247</sup> Barkawi, T., Brighton, S., (2011) Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique. *International Political Sociology*. 126–143.



## 2.11. Social constructivism: Et Tu Brute?

This chapter introduces basic assumptions of social constructivism in IR and illustrates the Hegelian critique of social constructivism. This chapter argued that the particularized and context-sensitive analysis in social constructivism is unable to support ontogenetic analysis due to the a priori ontology already contained within social constructivist epistemology. Furthermore, this chapter problematizes social constructivist claims regarding intersubjectivity.

Like critical theory, social constructivism entered international relations as a crossover theory from sociology. Berger and Luckmann claimed that the social foundations of human institutions are rooted in the legitimization of behavior by language, extending the domain of human interaction and governance to cover future and past interactions by embedding them with meaning through mutual constitution: dialectical recognition.<sup>248</sup>

In international relations, social constructivism was imported and popularized by Wendt, who argued against the principles of neorealism and argued the structure of the international system is simply the assumption of exogenously given values and generation of outcomes.<sup>249</sup> In contrast to realists, Wendt argues for endogenous constitution of values by the actors as he states: “...*Anarchy is what states make of it.*”<sup>250</sup> In essence, according to Wendt, the interest formation of states is endogenously constituted, but agents' worldview is exogenously constrained by the structure of the international system that limits actors' actions and posits its relationships between other actors.

On an epistemological level, social constructivism is more flexible to cultural consideration and enforces a less rigid metatheory. Research objects in social constructivism are varied: symbolic reality such as cooperative norm establishment is a valid object of analysis, similarly as antagonistic interest formation via ontological security. Identity is mutually constitutive via recognition of the actors: these relationships form the basis of our identity, especially when relations are antagonistic.<sup>251</sup> The relationship and its constitution posit actors in the international system, where the conception of security is the capacity of

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<sup>248</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*.

<sup>249</sup> Wendt, A. (1992). “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.tuni.fi/stable/2706858>.390-393.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.* 394-395.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.* 399-400

the actor to ensure ontological survival, as Wendt states: "...since actors do not have a self-prior to interaction with another; how they view the meaning and requirements of this survival therefore depends on the processes by which conceptions of self-evolve"<sup>252</sup> In essence social constructivism does not differentiate itself of the realist perception system of states, but argues for articulation how the structuration of the scientific community is directed towards pessimism of actors' intent.

There is a preference for questions on how social violence is used as a method of domination to promote the actor's interest and what type of symbological significance does violence have outside of survival, rather than introspection on the existential statement on social violence. There is no single accepted explanation of warfare within social constructivism. Wendt incorporated much of his theoretical aspirations from sociology yet lacked the finesse to tie the structure of international politics together with the dialectical consciousness of agents. Therefore, he failed to channel the social constructivist research to a direction where consequences of constitutive agency to epistemology could be fully realized.

Social constructivism cannot be dismissed as a mere theory of interest formation as Wendt would have us understand but should be perceived to investigate the complexities of the symbolic order of society: in everyday practices.<sup>253</sup> Like nominalism also social constructivists are internally stratified into two groups: conventional constructivists and critical constructivists.

The recent emergence of proponents of critical social constructivism have already articulated a multitude of responses to the 'conventional' social constructivism.<sup>254</sup> Similarly, Jung states there is no single school of social constructivism rather a multitude of shared epistemological interests; Hopf further argues for the attempt to denaturalize the social practices in intra-paradigm debate.<sup>255</sup> Hopf continues to argue that internal stratification is in methodology: conventional constructivism has adapted the methodological requirements from empiricist methodology, contrasted by critical constructivists that challenge the methodological boundary as topics such as identity, norms and social practices are difficult to explain or analyze by neopositivists methodological arsenal.<sup>256</sup> Critical constructivists see themselves as the agents

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<sup>252</sup> Ibid. 402-403.

<sup>253</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*.

<sup>254</sup> Hopf, T. (1998). "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security*, 23(1), 171–200. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267> 180-190.

<sup>255</sup> Jung, H. (2019). "The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present." *SAGE Open*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019832703>. Hopf, T. (1998). "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." 183-186

<sup>256</sup> Hopf, T. (1998). "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." 183-184.

of the power relations, where contestations are similarly possible through the reconstitution of these power relations; much of its epistemology is indebted to the works of Nietzsche and Foucault, as Hopf expertly asserts.<sup>257</sup>

The most recent effort to problematize ontology is spearheaded by leading authors such Onuf and Kratochwil, who illustrate the importance of ontology and its role in the scientific discussion of international relations.<sup>258</sup> Onuf expertly argues for the reconstitution on constructivist claims to reality by emphasizing representation and language-mediated activities as the domain of social constructivists, but notes research on the middle-range phenomenological level is insufficiently explored: “*The process of studying the process of social construction—of going ahead—is beset with diminishing returns. We plea for theoretical modesty, undertake normal science in the absence of theory, worry about the end of theory. We forget that the processes of social construction are guided by what we human beings think (decide, say to each other) that we (might) need, (could) have use for, (should) want, (can) make: it is, as I argued above, a functional theoretical stance.*”<sup>259</sup> In essence, Onuf states that the epistemological functionalism of social constructivism poses both an epistemological and methodological problem. When theorizing on the intersubjective level of human consciousness, the analytical levels must be weaved together to form a unity of reality, as intent and outcome are not a necessity but are meld together in social relationships. Furthermore, Onuf points out that the realization representation cannot be the only source for inquiry but must instead direct research back to ontology and epistemology of social constructivism in order to move away from contradictory assumptions.<sup>260</sup> Clarity of ontology and

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<sup>257</sup> Hopf, T. (1998). “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” 183-184.

<sup>258</sup> Kratochwil, F. (2018). *Praxis : on acting and knowing* . Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. & Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism at the Crossroads; or, the Problem of Moderate-Sized Dry Goods.” *International Political Sociology*, Volume 10, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 115–132, <https://doi-org.libproxy.tuni.fi/10.1093/ips/olw001>

<sup>259</sup> Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism at the Crossroads; or, the Problem of Moderate-Sized Dry Goods.” 127-128.

<sup>260</sup> Nicholas Onuf, Constructivism at the Crossroads; or, the Problem of Moderate-Sized Dry Goods, *International Political Sociology*, Volume 10, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 115–132 (“These choices can also be presented in political terms, though not so obviously. In our world, staying the course, like holding the center, reflects a liberal disposition. Turning to the left typically suggests a head in the clouds, an interest in large, amorphous, normatively infused phenomena subject to large-scale social change, while turning to the right typically implies a conservative respect for the way many small things lock together to give social life its grounding. There is, however, nothing necessary about these correspondences. Once we (constructivists) insist on use or function in understanding how we (all) furnish the world with moderate-sized dry goods, the politics of scale reverses: turning to the small things below the surface is a turn to the left, and turning to the grand, the epochal, and the awe inspiring is a turn to the right.”) 128-129.

epistemology is a necessity to create a clear theoretical and practical conception of causation to derive its necessity from the plurality of reasons for a social constitution.<sup>261</sup>

The most promising development in this regard is presented with Kratochwil to resolve the tension between dialectics and constitution. He states for the need to counter the plea for theoretical validity and abandon obsessive question for causation in the search for constitution: “*As already mentioned, in the classical Humean account, providing a causal explanation means having two independent observations of states of affairs at different times, as well as a “constant conjunction” between these observed phenomena, a conjunction which even for Hume is supplied by the “mind” not by nature! But this is then tantamount to arguing that causality cannot be directly derived from observation, as this category is constitutive for, and antecedent to, every observation.*”<sup>262</sup> He suggests the answer to the problem of theoretical validity is the adoption of pragmatism as a tool for reflexive theorizing.<sup>263</sup> Pragmatic knowledge in this regard is not a way to ‘illumination’ nor clarity but a *preference* for the outcome. Therefore, any substantial input gained from analysis while seeking to accommodate the reflexive notion of agency is at best incomplete or predicated to the existence of its function; *it is already an act* with intent.<sup>264</sup>

Epistemological validity here is dependent on the ontology; as a result, it is knowledge of – how, not of what. The determination of the object of knowledge is already given as the intersubjective level requires an already established parameter for replication in everyday life.

For example, consider the following: two men are arguing, what determines the value of pigs: the first man states it the weight of the pig. In contrast, the second man claims value is determined by the work required to maintain the pig. Logically a social constructivist would state that their reasoning must conform to the socially accepted practice to negotiate the price. Here, we see the problem: the state of the world for these men is axiomatically given. There is nothing that would regulate how the price is negotiated if this a priori ontology would not exist via the symbolic order. Dependency on the ontological

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<sup>261</sup> (Note this does not refer to causality but causation between the effect and the reasons of the constitutive relationship.)

<sup>262</sup> Kratochwil, F. (2018). *Praxis : on acting and knowing* . Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 177-178.

<sup>263</sup> Kratochwil, F. (2018). *Praxis : on acting and knowing* . Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>264</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk. 29-30

intersubjectivity is thus able only to describe the social reality does but not determine its ontogenesis in its production. Consequently, social constructivism can explain interest formation *a posteriori* via ontology, not the ontogenesis of reality itself, as Wendt argues.<sup>265</sup>

Fundamentally, this means social constructivism must accept the already established socio-cultural ontology in society; to make any claims on society or the behavior of agents within the spheres of the social structure.

Already Berger and Luckmann were well aware of the epistemological problems in investigating existential statements and explicitly state: “*Theories about identity are always embedded in a more general interpretation of reality; they are 'built into' the symbolic universe and its theoretical legitimations and vary with the character of the latter. Identity remains unintelligible unless it is located in a world. Any theorizing about identity - and about specific identity types - must therefore occur within the framework of the theoretical interpretations within which it is ontologically presupposed and located in.*”<sup>266</sup> Therefore, as Berger and Luckmann argued, a particularized form of ontology is valid in the context of the analysis but not outside of it. Symmetry is recognized by Leibnitz as a necessary condition for analyzing identity, as entities must share the same properties to be the same entity or more generally known as: “identity of indiscernibles.”<sup>267</sup> We can establish as its antithesis is that when ontological identities share have different properties, they cannot be the same entity: an antinomy of symmetry.

The ontological determinateness of objective reality, dictated by *ex post* empirical analysis, produces knowledge of particularized form; it lacks the ability to universalize the substance of analysis. This contradiction opens social constructivism for claims that it is formalized relativism. There is little to support claims between the symmetrical identity of entities outside the context of the particular analysis, in a particular time, and in a singular society. In contrast, an ontogenetic inquiry must be open to speculate

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<sup>265</sup> Wendt, A. (1992). *Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.tuni.fi/stable/2706858>.391-392.

<sup>266</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. ( “*The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analysed.*”) 33-35 & 194-195.

<sup>267</sup> See for example: Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2020) *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

on the determinateness of the concept and contain both the negative inertia as a possible state(of being) in the world to explain a change in the dialectical agency.<sup>268</sup>

Secondly, such an argument suggests that the temporality of identity would, in effect, contradict claims to intersubjectivity. Indeed, as escapable are social facts of everyday life for the human subject, the temporality of the symbolic order is tied to replication of said society. This would open social constructivism epistemology to another attack: disputing the relationship of knowledge and time the changing nature of social institutions: produces a temporal knowledge that is time-sensitive and context-sensitive.

Intersubjectivity in social constructivism is only nominal as its analytical object is particularized identity. Following this logic, any transhistorical claims regarding the state of human society via social constructivism would be invalidated. Outside of this particular society, the only truly intersubjective level of analysis would for all beings within this instance be the 'objective reality,' reality reduced to observation devoid of any symbolic significance, as Zizek argued.<sup>269</sup> Thus, 'open' to all agents. A theoretical investigation should be limited to the minimal, containing only the most necessary of dimensions, but there is little justification for dismissing or withdrawal from metatheoretical debate by claiming an area is not philosophical but sociological, especially due to the impact of the epistemological contradictions.<sup>270</sup>

Positioning social constructivism as an epistemology, not as an 'ontological' theory, circumvents the logical contradiction against transhistorical claims, retaining the possibility theorize on the current conditions, but only on the realized conditions of social ontology.

Another possible defense is for social constructivism is this can be determined by defining the level of analysis and taxonomy of actors. Since a state shares the sameness in its determination with every other state, then a state must have qualitatively the same features. Hence, it would satisfy the conditions of Leibnitz's law.<sup>271</sup> Yet, in this sameness, we can ask if they share the same qualitative attributes: for

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<sup>268</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 141-142 & 288-289

<sup>269</sup> Žižek, S. (2012). *Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism*. 32-33.

<sup>270</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 33-34. ("It should be evident, then, that our purpose is not to engage in philosophy.")

<sup>271</sup> Bertrand, Russel. (1998) *The Problems of Philosophy*. 2nd ed. Oxford ;: Oxford University Press, 1998. Print or Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo.(2020) *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

example, can one compare democracy and dictatorship as having the same determinateness in their principles of constitution in the ‘form’ of a state. Thus, we see a new problem emerge, if these states are different in the principles of governance, there is little merit to say that they share the same form of a state as they are qualitatively different, therefore, have mutually exclusive features. Therefore, we can posit an antithesis that when ontological identity is not symmetrical, as an antithesis that when the objects of analysis do not have the same predicates: logically analysis is not possible.

Theoretical research should be limited to the minimal, containing only the most necessary of dimensions, but there is little justification for dismissing or withdrawing from metatheoretical debate by claiming an area is not philosophical but sociological, especially due to contradictions.<sup>272</sup> Human intentional action must the possibility for the new dialectical relationship to emerge, as human consciousness is in its primordial state nothing, but a possibility or, as Aristotle argued, potentiality.<sup>273</sup> Dialectics of human consciousness, therefore, remain a crucial area of investigation in social constructivism

To summarize, this chapter argued that due to the context-sensitive presupposed ontology, social constructivism is poorly suited to ontogenetic research. Secondly, this chapter illustrates that social constructivist epistemology is unable to ground transhistorical claims regarding social identity as a social ontology for different societies is particularized and must be presupposed to be true. Therefore, while the symbolic order of societies via cultural representations or discourse can be analyzed, there is little to support claims of social constructivism as ‘an ontology.’ In addition, by extrapolating Leibnitz’s argument regarding symmetry, it was established that social constructivism and its ontology could not substantiate ontological claims.

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<sup>272</sup> Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1984). *The social construction of reality : A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. 33-34. (“It should be evident, then, that our purpose is not to engage in philosophy.”)

<sup>273</sup> See for example: Aristotle (BC.350). *Metaphysics*.

## 2.12. Contemporary Social Constructivist Ontology: A Way Forward?

The alternative approach to social ontology advocated by Searle does not discount questions of ontology; instead, he proceeds to illustrate the relevance of how these social institutions have an influence on ontology is understood via Durkheimian interpretation of social ontology.<sup>274</sup> He argued ontology of human subjectivity must be categorically posited in different classifications between ontological subjectivism and epistemological objectivism. Ontological subjectivity determines the existence of the phenomena for the individual, whereas epistemological objectivism must be demarcated for all subjects. This interplay between the mind and physical world can be considered an implicit dualist account of ontology, divided between epistemology and ontology to describe social interaction: by action and by intent. He claims these material and ideational dimensions are never fully integrated but notes metaphysics is largely based on physics, suggesting a dualist account of ontology.<sup>275</sup> He argues institutional facts operate independently of the individual perception thus constitute a reality that is mind-independent, as institutional facts produce normative effects in society in contrast to epistemologically objective truths that can be validated by any party—further contrasted by ontological subjective elements of reality experienced only by singular subject.<sup>276</sup>

As McCaffree states, Searle's understanding of social ontology should be placed in the context of Berger and Luckmann's work.<sup>277</sup> Searle is interested in refining the epistemology of social constructivism to further ground the truth value of the statement to social ontology by incorporating the use of language in social interaction. Language creates an overlapping dimension of social interaction that is inaccessible to other species, therefore creating an intersubjective social interaction. Speech-acts contextualize the social sphere in creating discursive content in relation to structures, both overlapping and influencing Giddens's structuration theory.<sup>278</sup> Social ontology for Searle can be derived from the structures that human interaction creates throughout language via constitutive rules, mirrored through social ontology imposed

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<sup>274</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*. Penguin. & Marcoulatos, I. (2003). "John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social Ontology." *Human Studies*, 26(1), 67–96. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022579615814> 79-80.

<sup>275</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*. Penguin.

<sup>276</sup> McCaffree, K. (2018). "A sociological formalization of Searle's social ontology." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 48(3), 330–349. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12172>

<sup>277</sup> McCaffree, K. (2018). "A sociological formalization of Searle's social ontology." 330–349.

<sup>278</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*. Penguin. & Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press. & Kort, W., & Gharbi, J. (2013). "Structuration theory amid negative and positive criticism." *International Journal of Business and Social Research*, 3(5), 92-104. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.18533/ijbsr.v3i5.10>



on neurophysiological processes as representations that create symbolic interaction and order that are subsequently assessed by social legitimacy.<sup>279</sup>

Searle maintains that social ontology structures can be analyzed, in contrast to Giddens's structuration theory that studies the reciprocal creation of these structures by internal legitimization.<sup>280</sup> According to Searle, it is possible to validate existential statements by grounding them to epistemological objectivity since intersubjectivity can ground social ontology to scientific methodology and position the structuration of dialectical relationships in the context of negativity. Fundamentally, he means that the potentiality of human consciousness structures reality by language; therefore, indications of social ontology are embedded in these meanings, by intentionality-relativity.<sup>281</sup>

He suggests a form of compromise between phenomenological interpretation and his idea on existential structures as differing typology but presumes modalities that are ideationally and materially stratified.<sup>282</sup> He further argues that the nature of the relationship between structures of human interaction and that of the *logos* determines the form of the structure via intentionality but also adds arbitrariness influences the success of the constitutive action.<sup>283</sup> He continues to elaborate on how the "background" shapes individual motivations and argues that social background contextualizes individual agents' symbolic universe.<sup>284</sup>

Searle's conceptual understanding of ontology foreshadows much of the contemporary ontogenetic research. However, dualistic stratification of ontology between different dimensions still maintains the hallmarks of Kantian synthetic analysis. Paradoxically, his framework seems to suggest the dialectical appropriation of meaning imposed only to logical categories of the symbolic order. Therefore, his framework seems to suggest that the validity of social action is connected to the conformity of social legitimacy rather than the actual facticity of truth, in contrast to Hegelian dialectics that maintain the absolute 'insecurity' of truth that is surpassed by the maturation of consciousness.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Marcoulatos, I. (2003). "John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social Ontology." 67–96.

<sup>280</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*. Penguin. 14-20

<sup>281</sup> McCaffree, K. (2018). "A sociological formalization of Searle's social ontology." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 48(3), 330–349. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12172>

<sup>282</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*. Penguin. 14-20

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>284</sup> Marcoulatos, I. (2003). "John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social Ontology." 81-82.

<sup>285</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

In essence, he suggests that comparative logical categories can supply social ontology, but the consciousness is stratified by individual experience. Yet this experience or lack of experience does not necessitate the derivation of value statements regarding social ontology, nor is the individual stratified from a particular ‘background’ that influences the perception of his experience. There is no absolute separation between ontologically subjective and epistemologically objective phenomenon, especially in the context of constituted phenomenology: as there nothing to separate the fundamental reality from its meaning in the linguistic realm. Its production is dependent on subjective intent; therefore, its objectivity can be questioned even if constitutive rules, according to Searle, are shaped by the collective.<sup>286</sup> In addition Searle separates intension from intent, thus suggesting the separation between meaning and ontological objectivity.<sup>287</sup> This research can only suggest an epistemological contradiction between the dialectical nature of consciousness and the ontological objectivity of phenomenon. Further research is required to clarify both Searle’s claims on ontology and its use as a metatheoretical framework for ontogenetic analysis.

In security studies, social constructivists have successfully introduced concepts such as ontological security to the scientific discipline. Steele theorized that the collective nature of states humanizes the state structures, and similarly, as human self-identity, states self-identity should be understood as a key area for security: “...*physical security is (obviously) important to states, ontological security is more important because its fulfillment affirms a state’s self-identity (i.e. it affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others).*”<sup>288</sup> Epistemologically, Steele does not steer far from social constructivism but incorporates new elements from sociology and social psychology to describe collective security issues.

Others, like Cormier, state it is the ethical disposition of states that produces the normative injunction of war as an institution of international law.<sup>289</sup> However, he does not note that it is not the nature of our norms that produce the content of ontology, but ethics merely regulate its conduct and affirm the authority of the state. Yet his work on Kant’s third antinomy remains unique but has little insight on Hegel’s

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<sup>286</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*.

<sup>287</sup> Searle, J. (1996). *The construction of social reality*. 6-9.

<sup>288</sup> Steele, B. J. (2007). *Ontological security in international relations: Self-identity and the IR state*. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203018200. 1-3.

<sup>289</sup> Cormier, Youri. (2016) *War As Paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics*. Vol. 67. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016. 135-136.

understanding of warfare: he merely reiterates Kantian synthetic analysis instead of moving away from the requirements of logical proof.<sup>290</sup>

This chapter argued that the nature of contemporary social constructivist ontology has many unexplored areas but still remains firmly invested in the Kantian synthetic analysis, as illustrated by Searle above. To transition from Kantian synthetic analysis and to ground analysis of consciousness, social constructivists should investigate the possibility to ground Searle's framework to the Hegelian understanding of agency. Therefore, this research suggests incorporating truth in a suspended possibility that is subsumed by the progress of consciousness. This would also make existential statements regarding social ontology possible by particularizing universal phenomenon: as stratified from universal principle but maintaining regularity via the constitutive rule, thus are particularized in the social context, but universally 'existent.' Thus, would make transhistorical statements regarding history comparable and epistemologically possible by appropriating constitutive rules as normative dispositions that produce different forms. However, such epistemological transition would have to ground its ontology to monist metaphysics.

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<sup>290</sup> Cormier, Youri. (2016) *War As Paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics*. 135-136.

### 2.13. Critical Realism: The Sage and The Celestial Heavens

This chapter details basic metatheoretical assumptions of critical realism and introduces a critique of contemporary philosophy of science that illustrates critical realism still maintains *a priori* dualistic ontology within its framework. Under attack from dualists and idealists, scientific realists nurtured another yet more elaborate version of positivism. Where positivism failed to evaluate the validity statements, a move that ultimately saw the incorporation of Kantian dualism to neopositivism, its primogenitor, Bhaskar, sought to deny the importance and impact of Kantian critique to development of scientific conduct.

Bhaskar opposed both philosophies and Humean conception of causality; much to the dismay of empiricists, he argued: 1) that as empirical knowledge is only concerned with cumulating descriptive elements of experience; 2) empiricism contains implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions, empiricism is fundamentally anthropocentric.<sup>291</sup> He claims Kant and transcendental idealists attributed a false presupposition that forced an anthropocentric agency on natural structures. Bhaskar rejects the supremacy of human consciousness on the ‘natural order’ that, in his view, surpasses the synthetic analysis.<sup>292</sup> Bhaskar firmly opposes metaphysics since physical reality is ontologically determinate structure; therefore, there is no need to explain ontology as this answer is apparent.<sup>293</sup>

Bhaskar posits critical realism as progressive philosophy, merges merits of positivism with the dialectical notion of science as a transitive and productive enterprise.<sup>294</sup> In essence, metaphysically, Bhaskar rejects the divide between the traditional notion of the subject and the object, rather preferring to produce a new synthetic categorization in the dormant structure penetrating transient reality by intransitive nomological mechanisms: the generative laws. According to Bhaskar, more fundamental transfactual processes lie dormant under reality, these mechanisms “... *are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs*

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<sup>291</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 25-26.

<sup>292</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. (“If the bounds of the real and the empirical are co-extensive then of course any ‘surplus-element’ which the transcendental idealist finds in the analysis of law-like statements cannot reflect a real difference between necessary and accidental sequences of events. It merely reflects a difference in men’s attitude to them. Saying that light travels in straight lines ceases then to express a proposition about the world; it expresses instead a proposition about the way men understand it. Structure becomes a function of human needs; it is denied a place in the world of things. But just because of this, I shall argue, the transcendental idealist cannot adequately describe the principles according to which our theories are constructed and empirically tested; so that the rationality of the transitive process of science, in which our knowledge of the world is continually extended and corrected, cannot be sustained.”) 28-29.

<sup>293</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*.

<sup>294</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*.

*imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure and operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us access to them.*"<sup>295</sup> Critical realism 'reconciles' the position between empirical science and critique expressed by transcendental idealism, namely the role of consciousness as legislator of knowledge, without abandoning the scientific community completely as an active participant, by denying the influence of subjective agency to scientific conduct.<sup>296</sup>

An ontological and epistemological inquiry must emerge from the particular conditions' world is.<sup>297</sup> He reasons as the world is structured upon matter and science exists, and it works, therefore its nature must be descriptive of reality. Therefore, if science works, a natural state of causal laws must exist and endure despite being undetected or inactive by current methodology or reasoning.

He continues to differentiate between open and closed systems: "...causal laws endure and continue to operate in their normal way under conditions, which may be characterized as 'open', where no constant conjunction or regular sequence of events is forthcoming. It is worth noting that in general, outside astronomy, closed systems, viz. systems in which constant conjunctions occur, must be experimentally established."<sup>298</sup> Bhaskar's notion of science is invested in the scientific discovery of causal laws by floating Kant's third and fourth antinomy, not as a contradiction but necessary conditional for the truth to emerge.<sup>299</sup> Fundamentally, critical realism argues for mind-independent reality, where the human agency can discover deeper causal structures through science. These structures are (in an open system) conditionals subject to Boolean logic, where we can assign a certain factoring for their emergence or necessary action in an open system by agents invested with causal powers.<sup>300</sup> In contrast, closed systems have causal laws that are independent of human causal capacities to influence the totality of the system.

Critical realists like Patomäki establish this reasoning to function through INUS-conditions, the "plurality of causes" for creating the total chain of the mechanism: "...an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result."<sup>301</sup> It is not possible to distinguish

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<sup>295</sup> See for example: Bhaskar, Roy. *Dialectic : the Pulse of Freedom* .

<sup>296</sup> See for example: Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations : Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*.

<sup>297</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 13-44.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid. 33-34.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid. 37-38 & Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*..

<sup>300</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 50-51 & see for example 223-250.

<sup>301</sup> Tooley, Michael., & Sosa, Ernest(eds.), Jaegwon, Kim. (1993) "Causation." Oxford University Press. 60-73. & Mackie, J. (1965). "Causes and Conditions." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2(4), 245-264. 34-35.

between the events' fundamental cause and the sequence of the mechanism since removing some might result in a marginally different or totally different outcome, thus descriptive of the possibility of a mechanism, not of the causal law itself. Explaining the various incoherencies emerging from the influence of multiple social agents acting in conjunction or of the process is yet to be discovered. Despite the attempts by Patomäki to create a causal basis for reflexive history: he claims constitutive rules of social interaction create the basis for causal capacities of agents: therefore, enforce regularity.<sup>302</sup>

Like Carnap, Bhaskar envisioned science without the need for meddlesome influence of metaphysics, as this influence was corrosive to the traditional praxis of empirical science. Critical realism should not be interpreted as a total refutation of the empirical science but as an attempt to create a deeper causal link to substance, reinstitute the 'normalcy' of empirical science in a different logic.<sup>303</sup>

Bhaskar's argument is a sleight of hand that appeals to the idea of nomological causality that takes the best of both worlds, explaining both the function and transcendental nature of gravity but also gives room for social sciences that operate outside the rigidity of causation.

He presents the world as a dichotomy that either accepts the 'true' causal relations as generative mechanisms and 'causal agents' that are the performative 'components' of the process or alternatively states theories abandon the 'real' scientific progress for nominalism and endless philosophical debates of epistemological relativism.<sup>304</sup> He states: "*The intelligibility of sense-perception presupposes the intransitivity of the object perceived. For it is in the independent occurrence or existence of such objects that the meaning of 'perception', and the epistemic significance of perception, lies. Among such objects are events, which must thus be categorically independent of experiences.*"<sup>305</sup> Simply stating that

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<sup>302</sup> See for example: Patomäki, H. (2002). *After international relations : critical realism and the (re)construction of world politics*. Routledge. Also more detailed account can be found in his other works cited below.

<sup>303</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. "It is my intention here, in working out the implications of a full and consistent realism, to describe such a limit; in rather the way Hume did. As an intellectual exercise alone this would be rewarding, but I believe, and hope to show, that it is also the only position that can do justice to science. Transcendental realism must be distinguished from, and is in direct Opposition to, empirical realism. This is a doctrine to which both classical empiricism and transcendental idealism subscribe. My reasons for rejecting it will be elaborated in a moment. 'Realism' is normally associated by philosophers with positions in the theory of perception or the theory of universals. In the former case the real entity concerned is some particular object of perception; in the latter case some general feature or property of the world. The 'real entities' the transcendental realist is concerned with are the objects of scientific discovery and investigation, such as causal laws. Realism about such entities will be seen to entail particular realist positions in the theory of perception and universals, but not to be reducible to them."

<sup>304</sup> Ibid. 240-260.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid. 31-32

subjective consciousness does not have an influence on ‘events’ does not mean subjective consciousness does not have meaning to the knowledge interpreted from these events. It is clear already from the reasoning above that Bhaskar clearly integrated an implicit ontology to his framework that is ironically epistemologically dualist but claims to be ontologically materialist.

McWherter summarizes this contradiction with excellence as this means the representation of the senses can always be doubted as having a different nature than the supposed ‘real’ object and are external to senses as independent entities.<sup>306</sup> Therefore, the object of natural representation is ‘unreal’ according to him as the subject must know the nature of the independent object(thing-in-itself) through sense-certainty.<sup>307</sup> Subsequently, this argument means that the noumenal or transcendental dimension of independence that posits the ‘true’ and ‘natural’ mechanism is interconnected with the subject's ability to know such a thing, thus not outside representation but as conjoined in its representation. This creates an awkward position where both the propositions of classical platonic essentialism of the object and the metaphysical realism of critical realism must be true at the same time.<sup>308</sup>

This means the determination of the nature of the law is not independent of the substance of subjectivity but is dependent on our way of knowing the substance of senses: perception. Therefore, as Bhaskar’s argumentation flows to reject ontology as presiding over the epistemic production of knowledge, the stratification of ‘pure’ sciences emerges as a contradiction to our perception and presumes subjective knowledge of the ontological status of the causal law in-itself as a transcendental law. The stratification of cognitive experience and empirical experience do not remain separate spheres of symmetrical action, action where the encompassing world can be distinguished via synthetic categorizations but fundamentally remain an overlapping category of being, as McWherter elaborately concludes.<sup>309</sup> Suggesting that critical realism is rooted in dualist epistemology but paradoxically retains a contradictory realists ontology.

Further evidence to support these claims can be seen in the stratification of the dimensions of critical realism. As he assumes the conjunctions of events and the subject interact as causal agents, he argues that “...two dimensions must be established in the philosophy of science: a transitive dimension, in which

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<sup>306</sup> McWherter, D. (2012). *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant*. 28-30 & 49-50.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid. 28-30 & 49-50.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid. 28-30 & 49-50.

<sup>309</sup> McWherter, D. (2012). *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant*. Palgrave Macmillan Limited. (See for example 140-147.)

*experiences and conjunctions of events are seen as socially produced; and an intransitive dimension, in which the objects of scientific thought are seen as generative mechanisms and structures which exist and act independently of men.*"<sup>310</sup> The reformulation of the 'conjunctions' as a natural structure can take place on the substance (matter or physical level), which is, of course, self-evident. The contradiction emerges when the sequential structure is claimed to retain explanatory value and as 'causal agents' or self-conscious agents act with intention. Neither is sequential analysis segregated from the reality of the phenomena or of the actuality of events but is the field of engagement of the subjects; there is nothing to separate the transitivity from the transcendental and objective 'real.' Both are simultaneous the representation of the senses; Bhaskar remains locked to the classical subject-object division, and in claiming to do away with the empiricist account, critical realism instead reproduces dualism only in a refined sense and implicitly, as Jackson also concurs.<sup>311</sup>

Critical realists are merely begging the question: if transfactuality is symmetrical to the transitive theories, then how can validity be established if the events are separated from events themselves. Already Aristotle argued different classes of entity entities must share the same typology to be comparable.<sup>312</sup> As its antithesis, we can formulate the following: the entities outside of the same taxonomy are not comparable. If one already intuitively knows the truth, there is little to discern the units of analysis between intuition or reality as it is already necessary to know truth in-itself. What Bhaskar claimed is that the logical proof is separate from reality, and thus events do not necessarily provide a sufficient basis for nomology. There is no correspondence between logical proof and material reality as the typology of the referent is different: the former being an idea and the latter matter. Even more outlandish is the epistemology of social sciences that incorporate critical realism as its metatheory(CR).

Paradoxically, the possibility to produce knowledge of social systems, according to Bhaskar, emerges from what is determined as a 'complex systems' where 'causal law' are active and inert simultaneously, leading to an argument on nature and conditionals of the force that generates these mechanisms.<sup>313</sup> As he argues, the predicates for each open-ended system can be stratified and rooted differently, to various

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<sup>310</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. 234-235.

<sup>311</sup> Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2008). "Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory." *Review of international studies* 34, no. 1 (January 2008): 129–153. ("Critical realism is just as dualistic as neopositivism, and as such the differences between the two approaches may be regarded as more tactical and operational than strategic and fundamental." 138-139.

<sup>312</sup> Regis, E. (1976). "Aristotle's' Principle of Individuation. *Phronesis*".

<sup>313</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*.



systems of human causal agency, where the choice between the mechanisms result in propositional logic: if X happens followed by the Y condition that is active, then this process has the tendency of outcome Z.<sup>314</sup>

The idea of an open system reconciled the nature of the human consciousness as having a notion tendency for operation contains the negative conditional: the non-activation of the law. Yet this presents a paradox what is this 'it'; that demands its activation, as or as Hume put it, the 'hidden power' that compels the mechanism.<sup>315</sup> Bhaskar argues the causal necessity that pertains to the sequential order of the proposition of the causal structure and determines the conditionals must be present for the mechanism: there is no necessity for this causal structure to enforce a certain structure: since its nature is unknown. For example: If one knew the exact mechanisms and the sequence of numbers in the lottery, then would it not be possible to get the correct answer in every single lottery. These mechanisms are, as McWherter states: a conceptual tool; the mechanism of the event cannot be subtracted to necessary or non-pertinent elements, or this would mean adopting falsificationism.<sup>316</sup>

Ultimately there is no neutral arbitration of 'the undiluted' science free from the influence of subjectivity but countless contingencies that affect the formulation of the processes, as Bhaskar himself admits.<sup>317</sup> Suggesting, necessity is by no means differentiated from contingency but rather coerced to form a structure that is pertinent only to the particularity of the subject, thus assumes *a priori* ontology that is an ontological nor causal necessity as McWherter notes.<sup>318</sup>

Formulating the conceptual analysis events also has significant affectivity to what the conditional nature of truth conditions are, reducing events to logical propositions also promotes a synthetic conditional for truth, the appropriation of the law, as an 'objective legislator' open to all possible interpretation, to all

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<sup>314</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. ("Two further misinterpretations of normic statements must be guarded against. Normic (or transfactual) statements are not counterfactual statements. They legitimate the latter; and, like them, are only validatable in relation to an antecedently and independently established body of theory." & "Normic statements have also sometimes been justified as 'averages' or 'rough approximations'; or alternatively as elliptical probability statements. Both ideas involve a confusion of epistemic and natural possibility. For, on the one hand, I may be quite certain about the activity of a natural mechanism on a particular occasion but incapable of any judgement about the outcome; and, on the other, I may be sure that some rule of thumb will hold though quite uncertain about the reasons why. ") 109-110

<sup>315</sup> Hume, D., Milligan, P.,(ed.) (2007). *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>316</sup> McWherter, D. (2012). *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant*. 76-80.

<sup>317</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science* . 94-95.

<sup>318</sup> McWherter, D. (2012). *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant*. 78-80.

tendencies. In such proposals, the significance of the conditional to the sequence of events cannot be assessed as they are not stratified from the logic of the natural structure. This structure then cannot be assessed as a condition of truth, but a moral arbitration of judgment, outside the ‘natural structure,’ that grants the power of arbitration of the ‘true mechanism’ to an agent: implying that truth is relative to the standards of the methodology, thus not a test of nature but a test of methodology like Kuhn suggested.

In international relations, the recent paradigm shift advocated by Kurki simply expands this logic to encompass the linguistic and social dimensions. Following Bhaskar, she argues for the rejection of the Humean model of causation and reorientation of causal mechanisms. The linguistic realm she maintains: “*constrains or enables*” particular actions, but the material cause remains as the primary ontological realm of action, ordered by three different causes: the formal cause (the shape or effective form), the efficient cause, (a source of change or a ‘mover’), and the final cause (the cause of an event).<sup>319</sup> Yet, the study introduces little but intrigue to the inner debate of realists. She does not make any claims on the primacy or the properties of the mechanism that determinate the form of the ‘final cause.’ Rather she integrates a pragmatist explanatory model where the purposive explanation is fitted to the context of inquiry due to the ‘utility’ of analysis: fitting contextual particularization to its analytical framework. This means the truth itself does not inquire on the exogenous structure but is constituted as a tautological premise unaware of its own origins. Any supporting evidence from material ‘actuality’ is rather the reconstitution of this premise, via supportive evidence as *a posteriori* as its validity can only contribute to an already known conclusion: established by the utility of analysis. Therefore, its synthetization only inflates the explanatory value of critical realism by a cheap parlor trick that violates the premises of reasoning by incorporating contingency to ‘causal necessity.’<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> Kurki, M. (2008). *Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis*. Cambridge; New York :: Cambridge University Press. 200-220. (She clarifies the formal cause as: “*Formal causes, for Aristotle, referred to that which shapes or defines matter. For Aristotle, a formal cause is that which makes or defines a given thing, its ‘structure’, its qualities and its properties. In modern discourse formal causes are often understood ‘ideationally’ (in the Platonic sense), that is, a form is taken to refer to the ‘idea’ of a thing. While this is, indeed, a valid interpretation, it is useful to remember that Aristotelian formal causes were not defined by ‘ideationality’ alone, but rather by relationality (which ideas can reflect): formal causes describe and define the structure or ‘internal relations’ that give meaning and ‘being’ to things. If the material cause of a table is the wood it is made of, the formal cause of it is the structure (embodied in the ‘idea’ of a table) that defines the relationship between pieces of wood to make it into a ‘table.’*”)

<sup>320</sup> In essence truth cannot be ‘pragmatic’ and at the same time ‘absolute’ truth. In a nutshell: this would make reasoning circular such as because something is useful therefore it is true and since it is true then it must be always true.

A more refined form of this argument is presented by Patomäki. His work on the notion of temporality and dialectical possibilities is especially valuable, in addition to his criticism of Bhaskar's notion of metaphysics.<sup>321</sup> His work is not enough to save critical realism from itself, as he simply refines the concept of causal necessity and places emphasis on the dialectical distribution of change, e.g, the complexity of the structures of human society.<sup>322</sup> However, his emphasis on the requirement to re-engage in the debate on the subject-identity, should contribute deeper understanding for formalizing a more holistic critical realism framework.<sup>323</sup>

The current state of CR is problematic for Bhaskar's successors, since the emphasis on the dialectical nature of critical realism highlights the importance of hermeneutical interpretation on the mechanism of the particularized context: "*Causal mechanisms are transfactually efficacious across contexts, but their precise effects in open systems are always context-dependent (being contingent upon what other mechanisms are at play, etc.)*."<sup>324</sup> This suggests there seem to be contingencies in the causal mechanisms or dependent structures that do not change when the higher-order is causally effective in a holistic system. At the same time, the level of the 'causal agent' action is subjected to contingencies, as he himself seems to be suggesting.<sup>325</sup> Arguments regarding causal capacities of actors again raise the question of determination: if the agent is causally effective, then what is the exact nature of these contingencies, how is the analysis any more transfactual than a temporal description of conditional factors that are present in the phenomena: it adds no value to the scientific analysis. The implication of the argument above should be obvious; analysis of processes only describes the properties of the phenomena, not the phenomena

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<sup>321</sup> See for example Patomäki, H. (2019). "The Promises of Critical Realism in the 2020s and beyond". *Teoria Polityki*, 3, 189–200.. <https://doi.org/10.4467/25440845TP.19.010.10293>. & Patomäki, H. (2002). *After international relations : critical realism and the (re)construction of world politics* . Routledge.

<sup>322</sup> Patomäki, H. (2019). "The Promises of Critical Realism in the 2020s and beyond". 197-198.

<sup>323</sup> Patomäki, H. (2017). "Praxis, politics and the future: A dialectical critical realist account of world-historical causation." *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 20(4), 805-825. doi:<http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.tuni.fi/10.1057/jird.2016.17>.

<sup>324</sup> Patomäki, H. (2017). "Praxis, politics and the future: A dialectical critical realist account of world-historical causation." *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 20(4), 805-825. 808-809

<sup>325</sup> Patomäki, H. (2002.). *After international relations : critical realism and the (re)construction of world politics*. ("Indeed, we can distinguish between different 'How is action X possible?' questions. When we are concerned with the identity of X, we need an account of relevant constitutive rules. This analysis freezes, so to speak, the social world in question. Then we can move towards the world of historical, causally effective interaction and ask: What are the INUS-components which made that action possible? At this level we are analyzing processual complexes in open systems, and we cannot find general necessary conditions of X. Instead, we are interested in the actual constellation of conditions that made X contingently possible".) 91-92.

itself. CR is dependent on the representation of mechanical logic according but cannot establish what the “...real power” among those causes is.<sup>326</sup>

It is easy to extrapolate what the argument above means for the nomological laws. The determination of the causal law only applies to the higher-order objects, the conditionality of the agent’s action determines the outcome, but this means the interpretation of the motivations of the actor and subsequent adjustment to ontological dualism. Where the emphasis is on the constitution of the rules by human agency, which may be causally effective, there is a *causal necessity* for action, but no causal path-dependency suggesting that via rules govern constitutive nature of agency as for example, Patomäki claims.<sup>327</sup> Thus, it would seem only the higher-order (closed) system structures are slaved to the universal causal proposition, but on the lower levels, the ‘mechanism’ of causation are merely suggestive of certain synthetic categorization pending the notion of utility of the analysis. Consequently, unaware of the implication constitutive agency has on transitive theories: theory cannot be at the same time nomological and grounded in utility but express transfactual theory by a transitive theory, as Hostettler concurs.<sup>328</sup>

The categorical replication of the contradiction between transitivity and transfactuality is replicated in later research by Suganami: he argues that with sufficiently grounded concept of causation, critical realism can surpass philosophical explication of world politics.<sup>329</sup> Similarly as other critical realists above, he does not explain how the contingency of the open system, influences the rules of reasoning.

Fundamentally critical realism is, in actuality, total objectification of human consciousness: epistemologically reified and logically contradictory. Szecsi expertly summarizes this position in his research on Lukács: “*Explanations confined to facts, argues Lukács, lead to superficial re-editions of empiricism, while pragmatic adherence to immediately given facticity excludes actually existing relationships, which are less directly apparent, from the overall conception and leads to a form of fetishism.*”<sup>330</sup> The final arbitration on validation of the necessity thus remains simply intuitive and subject

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<sup>326</sup> Patomäki, H. (2019). “The Promises of Critical Realism in the 2020s and beyond.”. 190-191.

<sup>327</sup> Patomäki, H. (2017). “Praxis, politics and the future: A dialectical critical realist account of world-historical causation.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 20(4), 805-825.

<sup>328</sup> Nick Hostettler. (2010). “On the Implications of Critical Realist Underlabouring: A Response to Heikki Patomaki’s ‘After Critical Realism?’”. *Journal of Critical Realism*, 9(1), 89–103.  
<https://doi.org/10.1558/jcr.v9i1.89>

<sup>329</sup> Suganami, Hidemi. “On the Hume/Bhaskar Contrast in Philosophical Metatheory of International Relations.” *Journal of international relations and development* 20, no. 4 (2017): 667–688.

<sup>330</sup> Szecsi, G. (2015). “Knowledge, reality and manipulation.” *Studies in East European Thought*, 67(1-2), 31–.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-015-9227-4>. 37-38.

to contingencies of the agent, not of the ‘true mechanism.’ This is truer in social sciences than in the sciences poorer of the substance such those of the ‘natural kind.’ This love, hollow love for the calculus reveals naught, but the cheap epistemological deception by a gambler in his favorite dice game: tweaking the game by probability to illustrate causality.

For they offer little intelligent attempt to understand the complexity of human social relations but instead seek to reduce it to a mere number. Almost ironically, many critical realists openly advocate for the conversion of the science of the ‘celestial heavens’ or risk expulsion from the larger ‘constellation’ of *Scientia*.<sup>331</sup> This question of how reality is, in itself, irrelevant to the notion of the world if the representation is the additional supplement, not the mangled and \*true state of the real, where fantasy and reality intermingle. Then the ultimate question if the coordinates of our reality cannot be expressed via calculus, is as Lukács states: “*The question is not: is X present in reality? But rather: does X represent the whole of reality?*”.<sup>332</sup>

To summarize, this section has presented basic statements of critical realism and illustrated how ontologically, and epistemologically contradictory critical realism is. In summary, the fundamental arguments against critical realism in section argued; against the adoption of propositional causality based on formal logic; the mechanical conception of the generative mechanisms can only describe representation; is fundamentally relativistic, as based on the utility of analysis not on truth claims is based on synthetic *a priori* categories; validity in critical realism is fundamentally subjective to moral judgment based on synthetic categorization (teleological); is implicitly dualistic; as presenting the human agency as an unspecified contingency in an open system; is self-contradictory in the determination of the structure causal mechanisms. To conclude, critical realism is at best self-contradictory and poorly grounded philosophically; its epistemology is inflated and contradictory, owing much to the eclectic integration of epistemological relativism and pragmatism that produce competing claims regarding nature of truth.

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<sup>331</sup> See for example: Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A realist theory of science*. & Patomäki, H. (2017). “Praxis, politics and the future: A dialectical critical realist account of world-historical causation.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 20(4), 805-825. & Kurki, M. (2008). *Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis*. Cambridge; New York ;: Cambridge University Press. (Science in latin)

<sup>332</sup> Lukács, G. (1962). *The meaning of contemporary realism*. London: Merlin. 76–78.

### **3. Towards Absolute Idealist Framework**

#### **3.1. The Fundamental Problems of Existential Statements: Five Antinomies of Ontology**

Above in the literature review, this research identified a number of logical contradictions or antinomies within contemporary metatheory that introduce epistemological obstacles to ontogenetic theorizing. These antinomies form the basis for scientific logic. This research suggests a foundation to resolve these antinomies with the adoption of an absolute idealist framework. Furthermore, the literature illustrated the critique expressed by more modern philosophers such as Adorno and Heidegger misconceived absolute idealist philosophy. This section introduces the formal nature of the logic and presents the consequence of the logic that philosophers have tried to resolve. These logical rules only apply to ontology; therefore, a multitude of other forms of reasoning can be at this point excluded from consideration: to establish the boundaries of ontological reasoning and limit the scope of the research framework. These antinomies are directly appropriated from the research literature or are directly referenced by respective authors in their works. Here these are merely inverted and extrapolated by the consequences of their contradiction. On the next page this research introduces the problems that this research has come to conclude are the contemporary problems in ontology, as some of these have already been recognized, by philosophers this research intends only to illustrate that there is no tension between Hegel's unity of being and nothing and Adorno's exclusivity of identity.

### 3.2. Table 1. Logical Principles of Reasoning: Ontogenetic Antinomies and Consequences of Contradictions to Philosophy of Science

	Antinomy	Principle	Statement	Contradiction	Consequence
Aristotle	Problem of Individuation	Principle of Individuation	Particular kind must share universal characteristics to be of same category (type/kind)	If particulars do not share universal characteristics they cannot be the same kind	Universality and particularity must share similitude in typology
Leibniz	Problem of Symmetry	Law of Indiscernibles	"...it is not true that two substances resemble each other entirely and differ solo numero, <sup>13</sup> and that what St. Thomas affirms on this point about angels or intelligences (quod ibi omne individuum sit species infima), is true of all substances..."	If two expressions do not have same predicates they refer to different subjects	Identity is symmetrical to the properties of the kind (lowest order of the species)
Kant	Problem of Free-Will	Third Antinomy	"Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them."	Both causation and constitutions cannot be analyzed the same time	Only logical proof cannot validate identity: causal analysis validates logical proof
Hegel	Problem of Universality	Unity of Being and Nothing	"Nothing is therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure being is."	Pure being is formless, therefore its modality is pure undeterminateness	Dialectics particularizes universality: logical proof predicates particularity, therefore describes only its manifestations not is actual ontology
Adorno	Problem of Constitution	Exclusivity of Identity	"Contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit it exceeds itself."	All universal characteristics cannot be present in a particular, as universality is equal to its undeterminancy	Particularity excludes possibilities therefore cannot be universal. To posit an particular identity: possibilities must be excluded

Table 1: above explains the different impact of ontological antinomies and connects particular problems of ontology to philosophers who have articulated them. Stating the contradiction and the consequence to philosophy of science.<sup>333</sup>

In philosophy, any logical principle is subject to the law of non-contradiction: contradictory statements cannot be true at the same time. Above, in the literature review, for example, in the chapter regarding neo-positivism, Kantian synthetic analysis violates these principles as in its premise causation and

<sup>333</sup> Regis, E. (1976). Aristotle's Principle of Individuation. *Phronesis*, 157-166. & Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. 47-48. & Kant, I., Guyer, P., Wood, A. (2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*. 460-490(485). & Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2020) *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics*. 14-15 & 10-50. Hegel, G.W.F., Giovanni, G. (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 59-60. Note: Aristotle's principle of individuation is formatted to fit the table, and a generally accepted understanding, see Regis, E. (1976). Other statements are direct quotes.

constitution are mutually contradictory: there cannot be determinist human will at the same time as it is radically free. Similarly, Aristotle noted that the universal and particulars must share similitude to be considered the same kind: therefore, kinds must share some form of commonality. Therefore, every war must share something with the previous ‘war’ to be considered a war. There are five antinomies that must be resolved to ground scientific analysis of ontology.<sup>334</sup> These are detailed above in Table 1, including the consequences of these antinomies.

It is not the intent of this research to resolve all of these antinomies as some of them are already; for example, Hegel resolved Kant’s third antinomy by introducing dialectics to accounting change and progress, he similarly incorporates the law of contradiction as the basis of his system.<sup>335</sup> What he failed to do was to conceive a methodology to introduce how particularity exists despite universally shared ‘genus’ Adorno further noted define themselves by exclusion thus particularize identity from ‘universal’ possibilities, but in turn failed to incorporate the nature of the universal: as it is already contained in the representation of the subject: as was argued above.<sup>336</sup>

Yet, a significant gap in philosophy remains: if particularity is exclusive of possibilities, this process of particularization must be incorporated to inquire to the nature of universality, since universal must similitude in kind, as Aristotle stated. Two of these contradictions remain unresolved: Adorno’s exclusivity of identity and Leibnitz’s law: consequently, this research discusses how to resolve these by incorporating Adorno’s negative dialectics to substitute absolute idealism; in addition, this research claims that Hegel’s unity principle validates epistemological truth claims regarding the stratification between particular and universal ontological identity. The following chapter discusses how change and symmetry of predicates can be reconciled: this is exclusively dedicated to discussing Leibnitz’s law. The chapters following will discuss how the nature of consciousness affects change: demonstrating how Hegel resolved Kant’s third antinomy and Aristotle’s principle of individuation. Finally, this research introduces a novel suggestion to resolve the tension between particularity and universality: integrating negative dialectics to absolute idealism.

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<sup>334</sup> Regis, E. (1976). Aristotle's' Principle of Individuation. *Phronesis*, 157-166. & Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. 47-48. & Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*. 460-490(485),. & Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2020) *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics*. Hegel, G.W.F., Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 18-19.

<sup>335</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 18-19.

<sup>336</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*. Continuum.



In essence, what this research is explaining: how different kinds of events can still be regarded as similar despite the historical particularity: therefore, it explicates how absolute idealism understands the consequences of consciousness to social ontology. The ontology of war is never absolute or determined; therefore, understanding how its nature can qualitatively change is fundamentally important for ontic research.

### 3.3. Absolute Idealism: Relationship between Universal and Particular.

These positive materializations of objects or phenomena, or particulars share universal elements that must be of the same category but are not symmetrical. A universal object must contain *in-itself* all possibilities; thus, universality is predicative to a particular kind of ontology as otherwise, this ontology would be referential to another universal principle.<sup>337</sup> The universal determinateness such as the genus: must contain in-itself all the negations or possibilities. In contrast, the particular expression of a kind: species, the taxonomy of unique entities sharing the same qualities as a concrete entity. In essence, the universal kind must contain all possible particularities. For example, consider the notion of cold weather: there are different types of cold weather, either due to chilling wind, rain, or merely freezing temperature. These all can be called ‘cold weather’ regardless of the reasons why it is such.

Yet its particularity we can identify why it is cold: its particularity expresses a universal idea of cold; that is formless.<sup>338</sup> Similarly, warfare as a universal notion it cannot be only referential to the singular form of war, like a form of weather, as it would be ‘that’ day’s weather or ‘that’ war: this implies that is its properties, not its nature is the basis of ontological identity, hence a contingent expression or a representation. Suppose the previous argument is true, then there must exist a differentiation of the form not as nothingness but as a negative ‘property.’ Particularity is defined by its nature as it is exclusive of possibilities.

Particularity is differentiated from the universal notion, as it is excluded by other possibilities sharing only similitude with this particular expression of ‘war’ or that of the ‘cold weather’ it is: *a species*, an *expression of an immediate and concrete particular kind*. In contrast to the universal genus: a universal notion that contains the negative possibilities within itself as a pure being.<sup>339</sup> As Hegel himself states:

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<sup>337</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

<sup>338</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 18-19.

<sup>339</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. & Bologh, R. W. (1979). *Dialectical phenomenology: Marx's method*. 15-40.

*“The unitary being, qua a being-for-self or negative being, stands in antithesis to the universal, draws away from it, and remains free for itself, so that the Notion, being realized only in the element of absolute singleness and isolation, does not find in organic existence its true expression, viz. to be present as a universal, but remains an outer or, what is the same thing, an inner of organic Nature. The organic process is only implicitly free, but is not explicitly free for itself; the being-for-self of its freedom appears in purpose and exists as another being, as a wisdom that is conscious of itself and is outside of the process.”*<sup>340</sup> For example, it is possible for us to distinguish the symmetry between the imperialist wars of conquest or those of self-determination. The similitude of the type is referential to the universal idea of ‘a war’ in its absolute form, rather than its materialization as ‘a particular war,’ such as the Thirty Years War or the Winter War.

All determination of ontology must, by default, determine the nature of entities by negative differentiation that rejects a particular form but express a regularity, a shared self-sameness in the *genus as shared unity of self-sameness*. For concrete objects, it may be the attributes such as ‘softness’ or ‘roundness’ that apply to all beings of the same taxonomy. Where matter is restricted to the self-sameness of sense-certainty and the properties of objects, phenomenology is only limited by the material production of its affirmation.<sup>341</sup> Only by presenting the phenomenal as the unity of appearance and the ideal sameness is possible, as a negation of the particularity must be contained in the genus: the determinateness is expressed through dialectical production in contrast to the species that expresses its form in immediate concreteness. Therefore, its referent is not the same as the concrete objects that share symmetry in properties but in its principles, as these are affirmed by the consciousness. Its form is subjected to contingencies only in its finite form.

In this the self-determinant nature of consciousness, the contradiction between universal notion and the affirmation its intent is materialized: as it is a subject to both productive(positive) and inertia(negative) force and consciousness produce its historical particularity: in dialectics. It is here Hegel references the notion of the Spirit(*Geist*) or, more plainly, the totality of historical development of human consciousness that supersedes itself. In the maturation of consciousness and materialization of the subject’s intent, the particular form sheds those features that are unnecessary or unfit to fulfill its reason.<sup>342</sup> Therefore, the determinateness of ideas is relative to the genus, not to its immediate form. In an intersubjective ontology,

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<sup>340</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 240-241.

<sup>341</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 15-30.

<sup>342</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

a phenomenon must have a historically determinate particularity; in contrast to the universal being without determinacy, it is pure being and pure nothingness: absolute being.<sup>343</sup>

For example, let us say France and Germany are at war. These entities are states, France, and Germany. Let us suppose France and Germany have been at war for some time; therefore, we can say that there is 'a war' between Germany and France. This means the 'war' between France and Germany cannot be the same as 'a war' between states such as Austria and Serbia since its *particularity excludes this possibility*. Therefore, it would make little sense to argue for the universality of the notion of 'a war' is unless its particularity excludes other possibilities. Therefore, we can imagine the possibility for Germany and Austria to be at 'war,' but it has no particular form: thus, it can be imagined as a logical category and as a possibility. Similarly, it is impossible to say that there will never be a 'war' between Germany and Austria; as an absolute idea, its form is without determinateness, thus applicable to all entities.<sup>344</sup>

Rejecting the previous argument, the intelligibility of 'a war' would be reduced to its essence. Therefore, suggest that Second World War is, in essence, the same 'war' as the Thirty Years War. If this argument is true, there wouldn't be any differentiated particularity, as all phenomena referred to as 'war' would be the same essential 'war.' In such conditions, we would find a primitive general lawlessness or 'a state of nature' as Hobbes argued to be accurate of the relationship between nations.<sup>345</sup> The barbaric conditions of 'a state of nature' can be only found the most remote fringes of civilization that have little significance to our analysis, there would be little continuity or history to mention; thus, any analysis be rendered impossible, nor can we say such is the contemporary state of civilization.<sup>346</sup> It is the lack of such conditions that make it possible for states to declare such a state.

Therefore, in the philosophical reasoning, we find the symmetry of ontological identity that Leibnitz is noted for, only in the similitude of between kinds or in a species as Aristotle supposed: not, in the particular, that is merely its representation.<sup>347</sup> Consciousness transforms the notion of war to fit its own

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<sup>343</sup> Hegel G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 18-19.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid. 18-19.

<sup>345</sup> Hobbes, T. (2018). *Leviathan*. Lerner Publishing Group: First Avenue Editions.

<sup>346</sup> Hegel, G.W.F. (1956) *The Philosophy Of History*. New York: Dover Publications. Philosophical Classics Sibree, J(trans) Friedrich, C.J & Hegel, C. 30-60 & 60-100.

<sup>347</sup> This was already discussed above for comprehensive reference see: Regis, E. (1976). Aristotle's' Principle of Individuation. *Phronesis*, 157-166. & Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*.. 47-48. & Kant, I., Guyer,P., Wood, A(2000) *Critique Of Pure Reason*. & Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2020) *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics*.

particular intent; therefore, the transcendental nature of the notion can only be found in the unity of its principles: in dialectical change through mediated deeds.<sup>348</sup>

A notion or a pure being is negative and latent has no actuality of its own, therefore a comparison of the shape of the *genus*: its reasoning must deduce the similitude between the ontological structure of the particular and universal, in its unity of principles.<sup>349</sup> Hence, is an attribute or ‘content’ (form) of such phenomena cannot substantiate comparison empirically, in these principles the nature of the phenomena subsists in continuity through the development of notion, in its history, and as such its dialectics define it.<sup>350</sup>

Ontological inquiry *a priori* is speculation of the negation, given shape in its concreteness, thus losing the purity of its indeterminateness, as the universal is made particular. Yet this particularity in itself has sameness in shape as a predicate to the form, as its referent is the notion, not its particular. However, the determinacy of the notion is only referential to its direct contradiction: ‘a war’ cannot be peace. Therefore, even in its absolute form, we can find that the notion is determined by its contradiction. Only the form is retained in ‘production’ or actualization: as a first order-principle, ordering of relations that transition in development.

Consider, for example, the similarity of the Battle of Cannae and the Schlieffen plan.<sup>351</sup> Hannibal sought to flank the Roman forces and direct his cavalry directly to the rear echelons; In enacting the Schlieffen plan, German general staff sought to flank the Entente forces through Belgium and encircled French forces. There is nothing similar in the concrete forces, organization, or weapons. What we can say of the similitude is only on a level of the notion. As the same movement, ‘flanking’ can be made intelligible as a universal type (*genus*) of movement of forces to the rear, but similarly affected uniquely by the metacognitive level.

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<sup>348</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. 119-120 (“Just as little as the pure form can become essential being for it, just as little is that form, regarded as extended to the particular, a universal formative activity, an absolute Notion; rather it is a skill which is master over some things, but not over the universal power and the whole of objective being”.)

<sup>349</sup> Hegel, G.W.F. (1956) *The Philosophy of History*. 60-100. & Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 124-125.

<sup>350</sup> Hegel, G.W.F. (1956) *The Philosophy of History*. 60-100. & Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 124-125.

<sup>351</sup> This example is intentionally not of war itself as it will illustrated in more detail below

Secondly, this only makes sense in comparison to the particularity of the movement - and to rationale structuring the principle of flanking: in its ontology. It would not make sense to anyone to argue 'flanking' would be considered a direct attack to the front line, as this would not share the same content or universality (*genus*) of the principle of 'flanking.' Then there must be an principle of unity in the relationship between the form of the movement 'flanking' and the notion substantiating the movement. This distinction is affected by the present form of life as grounding the notion to the present condition, and both in 1914 and 216 BC. Otherwise, this concept could not be the same, act of 'flanking.' We can think of this as a usurpation of the concept for a similar intent in 1914.

Thirdly, this essence, as articulated before, is dependent on already the previous conditions of emergence; there could be no Schlieffen plan if the Battle of Cannae had not existed, but they are of different kinds as determined by its historical particularity: both in the properties of warfare. There is nothing suggesting necessity, but the opposite contingency determines the new substance of these categories as emergent in differentiated forms: in its dialectics. Its nature would be referential to different history that of the Romans and the Germans.

Phenomena emerge as a dialectical relationship between the notion and principles of unity as produced by self-determinate consciousness, to paraphrase Hegel's argument; only the notion subsists as a pure category, before superseding itself through affirmation through the mediative agency, that is then produced, thus negated by the concrete; therefore, it is only partially absolute.<sup>352</sup> However, as we saw earlier such inquiry would be only a reflection of the notion as subsisting in a negative form, contrary to our objective: it is incomplete as speculative analysis only expresses its universality, but not the particularity of being that discloses its unique nature.

What is argued above is that the referent for symmetry that Leibnitz mistakes for properties in phenomenology are dependent on the consciousness, and as the consciousness is self-determinate: the dialectical nature of change transfigures the 'pure' being from the transcendental and indeterminate form to the particular. This transition from transcendental notion to temporality suggests that the referent for its symmetry cannot be its particular entity but its relationship to the universal idea and its development through a dialectical change in history. Therefore, the ontology of war should reference the validity of the notion of war and its ontological structure to establish scientific reasoning.

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<sup>352</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 209-210.

### 3.4. On the Nature of Consciousness: Absolute Idealism

According to Hegel, the consciousness emerges from slumber lacking signifiers, struggling to understand itself in relationship to others, subsisting in only as *for-itself* (*an sich*) to ultimately overcoming itself by mastering the body and senses, taming ‘wild desire,’ giving consciousness life in discipline and reason, in essence ‘maturing’ to rationality.<sup>353</sup> Hegel illustrates this reasoning by a metaphorical *struggle-to-the-death*: subjecting consciousness an eternal alienation between — the conscious ‘self’ and external ‘self’ as both object and subject to power since the ‘true’ desires are constrained by reason.<sup>354</sup> For *in-itself*, consciousness finds the ‘natural’ existence only available to itself in thought. For self-consciousness to become fully complete, it defines itself against its contradiction, its otherness.<sup>355</sup> Via recognition of the ‘other’ consciousness affirms itself as master.<sup>356</sup> For example, it is easy to think of a legal subject; one is only responsible if one can understand the consequences of one’s own actions.

As an internal condition, the *struggle-to-the-death* between the self and ‘otherness’ is eternally unresolved: men remain subjects to both reason and desire: desire is always found wanting in the achievement of its object. Similarly, reason cannot completely tame desire. This Faustian bargain with the ‘other,’ self-consciousness celebrates its existence as both *for-itself*(*an-sich*) and *for-the-other* (*fur-sich*) as mediated through otherness. Therefore, Hegel states this desire for recognition forces consciousness to wander unhappy, unable to attain absolute satisfaction as its desire is never truly recognized by the ‘other.’<sup>357</sup> In essence, reason seeks its purpose, but the desire is wanting of recognition in social relations that are the foundations of its recognition.

Society demands compliance to affirm the ethical order and its principles via discipline and servitude.<sup>358</sup> On an individual level, these social rules constitute the cultural sphere of life, in addition to the moral conduct of society; fundamentally, these are the abstract principles that govern society.<sup>359</sup> For example,

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<sup>353</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 141-142.

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.* 141-142.

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.* 210-211.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.* 141-142.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.* 130-150. (“In both of these moments the lord achieves his recognition through another consciousness; for in them, that other consciousness is expressly something unessential, both by its working on the thing, and by its dependence on a specific existence. In neither case can it be lord over the being of the thing and achieve absolute negation of it. Here, therefore, is present this moment of recognition, viz. that the other consciousness sets aside its own being-for-self, and in so doing itself does what the first does to it.”) also in: 115-116.

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.* 116-117.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.* 123-124. (“Thus the foregoing has defined the nature of the activity of skepticism as such, and the way in which it operates. It exhibits the dialectical movement which Sense-certainty, Perception, and the

consider a child who does not understand does not understand virtues of good from evil deeds; why one must not steal; he must be taught to behave accordingly or face the consequences of his actions according to the principles of society.

Man is subject to the ethical-political symbolization, not by an external condition, but by internal responsibility to define himself as in social relation to others; this is what Žižek refers to as the “Big Other”: the internal symbolic efficacy experienced as an external moral order.<sup>360</sup>

For example, we may think of a criminal, it is not so that he does not ‘recognize’ or ‘understand’ the ill-nature of his intention, but precisely because he knows his ill-intent; he is committed to committing a crime; in deceiving society; he can deceive himself by exonerating himself of the responsibility of this act. Žižek’s recognizes the importance of the Kantian categorical imperative and duty in the context of violence: “Recall the proverbial example of a severe and sadistic teacher who subjects his pupils to merciless discipline and torture; his excuse to himself (and to others) is: ‘I myself find it hard to exert such pressure on the poor kids, but what can I do – it’s my duty!’ This is what psychoanalytical ethics thoroughly forbids: in it, I am fully responsible not only for doing my duty, but no less for determining what my duty is.”<sup>361</sup> In the determination of the self, the subject is responsible through the intent of his deeds as the principles of society apply to his conduct.

In contemporary warfare, we can think of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIS), as a supreme example of the struggle-to-the-death that seeks out recognition by compelling ‘others’ recognition. This ‘(un)holy’ war, for higher virtue, distinguishes the duty to inflict violence towards the ‘other,’ as in doing so, ISIS affirms the subsistence of the Islamic state by externalizing it’s being on the ‘Other.’ Therefore, the ethical order of the Islamic State provides a duty to inflict violence; to attain a right for recognition in selfhood; to achieve equal recognition through the ‘other.’ Violence is only instrumental value as a mean to attain the *raison d’être* of its ontological identity: to force this externalization on to the ‘other.’

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Understanding each is; as also the unessential character of what, in the relationship of lord and bondsman, and for abstract thinking itself, is held to be a determinate element. That relationship at the same time embraces a specific mode in which ethical laws, too, are present as sovereign commands.”)

<sup>360</sup> Žižek, S. (2014) *The Most Sublime Hysteric: Hegel with Lacan*. Polity Press; Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK.

<sup>361</sup> Žižek, S. & Robespierre, M. (2017) *Robespierre: Virtue and Terror*. Verso: London, UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F 0E. 27-28.

The members voluntarily delight in the violence as a seeing it as their ‘divine’ duty to God. This is the reason Žižek defines the declarative or ideological so vital to violence and warfare.<sup>362</sup> With the recognition of the other, mechanical violence is not only possible to the affirmative agent as permitted by the ethical order, but the most sublime duty of the subject. It is for states, in times of war, recognition of the right of the victor is the objective of war: its intent to coerce this recognition from the ‘other.’

Similarly, we can consider, for example, ‘a war’ for independence since the cause is not material but the right for self-determination. There would be little reason for violence, if not for this right to be recognized, that has an abstract value outside the immediate subsistence that is affirmed by the ‘Other.’<sup>363</sup> Therefore, as its cause is interlinked in its form to determinateness of the means: causes of war determine its moral justification and thus its purpose for others.

The reason remains tied to a deed as it is attributed purpose via intent as Hegel concludes: “*Notion and reality are thus separated into purpose, and that which is the original essentiality.*”<sup>364</sup> He argues deed at first as negative moment transfigures the *genus* into the particular object as if having a ‘force’ or ‘movement’ to the action.<sup>365</sup> What we are considering here is only the immediate nature of reality as ‘objective,’ to which consciousness seeks to affirm our being via shaping objects in relation to our intentions. These immediate and natural objects are only given purpose and intention by consciousness, thus forming a unity that is antithetical to itself in-existing in both as a substance and as a notion. This means ‘any’ object in our subsistence is determined by dialectical sublimation of the objective form as ‘transfigured’ by production.

For example, imagine a formless mass of sand, which I aim to mold to a decanter; what this transition requires is the imagining of the ‘absolute’ form of the glass, which I then proceed to mold to a glass. This process requires us to interact in the externality, which is not the same as ‘I’ but is in the same subsistence as my connection to my external being, which is similarly alien as the ‘external’ reality. Self-consciousness differentiates between what \*I am and the externalities of sense-certainty. The formless sand mass is given form at the same time, as it is given purpose as a mean and an end. The glass surrenders

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<sup>362</sup> Žižek, S. (2012). *Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism*. London: Verso. 346-348.

<sup>363</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk. 201-202.

<sup>364</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk. 190-208 & 244-245.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.* 332-331.



its previous subsistence by giving away its mass that I mold to a decanter. The decanter would not exist without the purpose to hold the wine that determines its purpose.

The individual deed as labor defines relations of the subjects to others; by recognition: *“The labor of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labor of others. As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work as his conscious object; the whole becomes, as a whole, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.”*<sup>366</sup> Hegel argues that our need for recognition engages us in reciprocity in society; in contributing to society, we actively seek out the recognition and thus contribute to the universal development of human society. Hence, society provides us with some framework in purposefulness, and our deeds are integral to the functioning of society as having subsistence in the higher forms of life. Therefore, the development of the ethical-political order is governed by reason.<sup>367</sup> It is through the state the principles of reason are constituted, such as those of acts of war.

It is the purpose of ‘a war’ that differentiates the nature of war and imprints the deeds with its form of violence. Like a decanter is an instrument for wine, the instrument of warfare is violence. It is important to note the different modes of violence: mechanical violence is action imposed on the subject to terminate its capacity function in its originality as a singular entity, in essence projecting power over the being to determine its finitude as a particular object.<sup>368</sup> In contrast to more abstract violence, the stripping of an entity of the particularity of unique to its kind(reduced of any identifiable attributes), reducing the being to an indeterminate container of the essence: such violence removes the right for recognition of the individual. Abstract violence legitimizes mechanical(performative) violence to be imposed on the being,

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<sup>366</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 213-214.

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.* 213-214.

<sup>368</sup> This notion of violence is partly based on Hegel. Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. (Violence against an object is for the latter something alien only according to this second aspect. Power becomes violence when power, an objective universality, is identical with the nature of the object, yet its determinateness or negativity is not the object’s own immanent negative reflection according to which the object is a singular. In so far as the negativity of the object is not reflected back into itself in the power, and the latter is not the object’s own self-reference, the negativity, as against the power, is only abstract negativity whose manifestation is extinction.) 639-640

reducing the subject to pure thing-hood. For all concepts in the determinateness of the form are similarly shaped by self-consciousness in twofoldness in the concrete and in the notion.<sup>369</sup>

Unfortunately, there are numerous examples in history: this was the faith of the Jews in the Second World War: A Jew for the Germans was a 'pure' representation without subjectivity: treated as nothing more than as an object. Similarly, persecuted were the Indians in the United States.

It is due to the externality of this force the purposefulness requisitions the deed and shapes according to its intent. Therefore, the intersubjective nature of war is 'open' to all, but only those who participate in its immediate concreteness relate to its purpose individually: via their deeds within a war, thus constitutes a different meaning. These individual deeds, according to Hegel, manifest the totality of history and actualize reason in its time. Therefore, constituting universal progress of history: a struggle to recognize its maturation in a new form. Only through the destruction of the 'old' civilization sublimation, its reason becomes actual and concrete.<sup>370</sup>

In summary: above, we have argued for the foundation of the dialectical relationship of consciousness as transitioning different substances to another, connecting purpose and meaning in form. The previous two chapters lay the groundwork for arguing that the individual consciousness is part of the universal progress of history, therefore an agent in the transcendental development of consciousness. This explains why dialectical change occurs, and events are differentiated from the absolute form as a particular. Furthermore, this chapter explained how violence and different forms of warfare are defined by their causes and moral justification: to this, we will return to in chapter 25 for a more detailed discussion. In

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<sup>369</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 100-150.

<sup>370</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. ("War is the Spirit and the form in which the essential moment of the ethical substance, the absolute freedom of the ethical self from every existential form, is present in its actual and authentic existence...&... Just as previously only the Penates succumbed to the national Spirit, so now the living Spirits of the nation succumb through their own individuality and perish in a universal community, whose simple universality is soulless and dead, and is alive only in the single individual, qua single. The ethical shape of Spirit has vanished and another takes its place.") 289-290. & G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. ("When we say of things that they are finite, we understand by this that they not only have a determinateness, that their quality is not only reality and existent determination, that they are not merely limited and as such still have existence outside their limit, but rather that non-being constitutes their nature, their being. Finite things are, but in their reference to themselves they refer to themselves negatively – in this very self-reference they propel themselves beyond themselves, beyond their being. They are, but the truth of this being is (as in Latin) their finis, their end. The finite does not just alter, as the something in general does, but perishes, and its perishing is not just a mere possibility, as if it might be without perishing. Rather, the being as such of finite things is to have the germ of this transgression in their in-itselfness: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death".) 101-102.

addition, this chapter establishes the connection between historical development and warfare with Hegel’s logic, which is further below used to argue for synthesizing negative dialectics with absolute idealism and ground the argument for differentiating acts of warfare and acts in warfare.

### 3.5. Modes of Absolute Idealism: Dialectical Movement

This chapter outlines how change is conceived in different modes of reality that produce the consciousness as a whole set of relations in principles of unity by sublation: a unity between reality and representation constitutes the whole determination of relations in the principle of unity. Reality, according to Hegel, is divided into three domains: the supersensible(ideal), the immediate (actual), and the second supersensible world: its negation.<sup>371</sup> He argues the existence in that the consciousness and through it: notions are the actual existence. In contrast, the domain of the immediate experience is devoid of the true nature of the things and merely represents the actual world of thought. Negative or inverted reality contradiction between immediate reality and consciousness as if by another dimension; the second supersensible world. In essence, these modes are different states of being in reality.

Domain	Supersensible World	Immediate World	Second Supersensible World
Form	Notion(Positive & Actual)	Experience(Negative & Passive)	Negation (Inverted)

### 3.6. Table 2. Ontological modes in absolute idealism

Table 2. Explains the different ‘domains’ in absolute idealism in more familiar terminology

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<sup>371</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind..* 96-98 & 100-105.

### 3.7. Table 3. Contradiction between different modes of reality

Domain	Antinomies Between Modes of Ontology		
	Supersensible World	Immediate World	Second Supersensible World
Supersensible World	-	Yes	No
Immediate World	Yes	-	No
Second Supersensible World	No	No	-
Force	Actual (Positive Force)	Immediate (Inert/ Passive Force)	Inverted(Negation)
Mode	Purpose for the form (notion)	Resists the form (nature)	Produces the form (via consciousness)
State	Pure form / Nothingness (indeterminat	Immediate and concrete (meaningless)	Act

Table 3. Explains how Hegel perceived contradictions between domains are structured, according to him only through dialectical interaction this tension between reality and intent is resolved as different forms of force produce a state via the dialectical differentiation of the mode of being.

The dialectical interplay between the whole (all domains), is sublated by its contradiction through negativity, suggesting that the nature of the dialectical movement produces varied outcomes: that stratifies ontology to different forms. For Hegel, this negative domain is slaved to *Force* or movement between the modes: solicited by self-consciousness.<sup>372</sup> Force *qua* twofold distinction is actualization analogous to pushing and pulling as a force that is resistance and force that produces it through the labor of agency that strives to realize its purpose.<sup>373</sup> The negative domains transfigure modalities of ontology between its inversions as a possibility since any concrete form cannot exist without a determination that demarcates its existence as a positive ‘thing.’ above Table 3 illustrates how absolute idealism considers antinomies between different states.

<sup>372</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. (“This also means that they are absolutely porous, or are sublated. This sublation in its turn, this reduction of the diversity to a pure being-for-self, is nothing other than the medium itself, and this is the independence of the different 'matters'. In other words, the 'matters' posited. as independent directly pass over into their unity, and their unity directly unfolds its diversity, and this once again reduces itself to unity. But this movement is what is called Force. One of its moments, the dispersal of the independent 'matters' in their [immediate] being, is the expression of Force ; but Force, taken as that in which they have disappeared, is Force proper, Force which has been driven back into itself from its expression. First, however, the Force which is driven back into itself must express itself; and, secondly, this still Force remaining within itself in the expression, just as much as it is expression in this self-containedness.”) 81-82 & 85-86.

<sup>373</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. in 105-106 (“In the previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it. What the object immediately was in itself-mere being in sense-certain ty, the concrete thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force proves to be in truth, not this at all; instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other”.) 105-106 and also 81-82

The contradiction between ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ is resolved through the negation as an inversion of both as ‘a presence’; a state that is both ‘being’ and ‘nothing’; pure being, as already discussed above.<sup>374</sup> Dialectical movement defines how the determination of the relations between the inner and immediate dimensions reflects the supersensible world.<sup>375</sup> Vi dialectics absolute idealism secularizes dualism and materializes this transition from the ‘pure’ idea of the inner nature (supersensible) as experience that represents (immediate) universal nature but cannot fully materialize the nature universal nature of the notion: due to the resistance of reality.<sup>376</sup>

For example, imagine painting a picture when a mistaken stroke of the brush ruins the idea that you had in your mind. Therefore, the nature of the painting is no longer the ‘pure’ representation of the idea but its representation. The inner form of the idea is the absolute character that is incorruptible, whereas the external nature of the object, substance in its resistance, imposes this corruption. It is through the dialectical movement this ‘relationship’ is managed.

Hegel maintained ontological determination within the dialectical process sublates (Aufheben), the previous phenomenon to itself: therefore, present notions are determined by the previous expression of the notion. Simple particularity of the sensuous is not enough to deduce the universality of anyone object; this would be the same to say that actions of men are determined by one man; as Hegel himself states;

*“What is perceived should at least have the significance of a universal, not of a sensuous particular. . This universal is thus, to begin with, only what remains identical with itself; its movement is only the uniform recurrence of the same action. Consciousness, which thus far finds in the object only universality, or the abstract ‘it is mine’, must take upon itself the movement proper to the object and, since it is not yet the understanding of the object, must at least be the remembrance of it, which expresses in a universal way what in actuality is present only as a single item out of singularity, and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sensuous object is merely taken up, without becoming in*

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<sup>374</sup> G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*.

<sup>375</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 86-87.

<sup>376</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 87-88. (The different moments tor of self-sundering and of becoming self-identical are therefore likewise only this movement of self-supersession; for since the self-identical, which is supposed first to sunder itself or become its opposite, is an abstraction or is already itself a sundered moment, its self-sundering is therefore a supersession of what it is, and therefore the supersession of its dividedness.) 101-102 & 87-90

*its own self a universal, this activity of describing things, is not as yet a movement in the object itself; the movement is really only in the describing of the object.*"<sup>377</sup>

Dialectical movement is a process of actions that, due to radical freedom of will, contain a possibility of stratification or, in Hegel's terminology: self-sundering: that is both creative and destructive, explaining how the moments of dialectical movement progress and differentiate, yet retain some characteristics, but at the same time disposes of others features in progress of history.<sup>378</sup> However, dialectical movement does not presuppose change; rather, it suggests that the nature of the movement appropriates different forms as its means. (See example below: Caracole) What follows below is a more detailed explication regarding different forms of dialectical change.

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<sup>377</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 148-149.

<sup>378</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. ("Its becoming self-identical is equally a self-sundering; what becomes identical with itself thereby opposes itself to its self-sundering; i.e. it thereby puts itself on one side, or rather it becomes a sundered moment.") 101-102 & also in 480-500.

These tables below introduce how different forms of dialectical movement in absolute idealism transfigure the ontological identity of objects: this identifies three different modes of being in the dialectical ‘process’. The table below explains how the logic of absolute idealism regarding dialectics is constructed and what the consequences are for the ontological identity of the ‘object’ or event.

### 3.8. Table 4. Ontological differentiation in absolute idealism

Dialectical Movement						
Determinateness	Moment(stage)	Opposition	Self-Sundering Moment	Sublation	Sublimation(Becoming)	Similarity of Form
Self-Superseding	identical	synthetized	yes	yes	unity	Semblance
Self-Same Entity	identical	negative	no	yes	same	Self-Same
Divided Entity	identical	contradictory	yes	yes	pure change	Different entity

Table 4. Hegel perceived that that an entity must stratify itself or maintain change through the dialectical process by renewing itself as a same entity. Table above illustrates the different outcome of the dialectical process; however, this is a constant rather than a linear process.

As already stated above Hegel grounded the movement of dialectics to consciousness that produces the reality of a phenomena, therefore the similitude between determinateness is connected by the inner mediation(negative) to the immediate representation.<sup>379</sup> Ontological change is categorical contradiction to that its antinomic to its previous form and actualized. In Hegelian terminology; the entity self-sunders itself through the contradiction.<sup>380</sup>

- If the contradiction is self-sundering but sublimates this contradiction, it is self-superseding or bears semblance to its previous form.
- If it is self-sundering, then it is an inversion of itself (negative) the self-sundering(change) is determinate as singular to the previous existence as a self-same entity.
- If the ontological form is antithetical to its previous form and self-sunders itself through sublation between ontological forms, it can be determined as a different entity.

The negation establishes the ontic determinateness through the mediative agency as giving force to the movements towards actualization. In comparison, the supersensible supplies the content of this negation, the immediacy of reality introduces resistance to the movement of the force via the freedom of

<sup>379</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 60-100. & Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 717-718.

<sup>380</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 60-100. & Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 717-718.

consciousness that constrains its affirmation. For example, as the object exists in the pure form, it exists *for-itself* but is at the same time an object *for-the-other* in the immediate experience, is reflected back to itself through the active consciousness in its negation: therefore, making it possible for consciousness to imagine other possibilities of similar events or objects.

Following this reasoning, we can state that the elements of the universal notion are within the representation rather than outside of the immediacy of subjective consciousness. This interplay between the notion and that of the actual is the dialectical movement, but as dialectics presuppose resistance to its particularization, the same ontology is not always persistent but ontologically stratified as a different entity.

Hence it is possible to make the following conclusions that the: (1) universal notion is contained within the form when produced by the consciousness (2) there is a form of stability to the structure of ontic representations as a transgression from the supersensible world (3) ontology contains in existence its own inversion, thus must be negated and produced by the mediative agency to become concrete (4) ontology is actualized via mediative agency through sublation that transfigures the nature of the phenomena, actualizing its determinateness as self-same, differentiated or a self-superseding phenomenon. This implies the possibility of reasoning from the concept in interlinking the logic to the relationships that produce the phenomena as existence.

When the dialectical process moves to actualize the notion as a concept: a logic is purposing the actualizing the movement of self-consciousness, the determination of the negation in that movement is comparable to the determinate nature of the notion: the concept defines the nature of the production. To be more explicit, the notion that is negated as actual can be deduced to be connected to the nature of the notion, as its principle which posits the structure; its relationships to reality, then its nature must be singular to those principles. Alternatively, these principles stratify ontological identity to something that is different from the concept, thus something else, or a synthesis of such events.

It is easy to illustrate this point by referring to the concept of flanking. 'Flanking' refers to a movement of military forces against the 'rear' of the enemy in a hostile movement. It is intelligible to everyone regardless of its actualization. Similarly, we think of a 'flanking' maneuver in a football game or at the field of battle. Yet, the concept of flanking at the stage of the notion is a pure concept applicable to every form of flanking, thus having a principle of unity that is determinate. As the concept can be applied as



actualized or successful similarly, it can be negated as a movement if the enemy has expected this movement, thus seizing to be the concept of ‘flanking’: becoming an attack.

This expression or ‘the act’ of ‘flanking’ would then be, at first, a concept that is immutable as having principles that determine the relations of its parts; and an agent with an intent to conduct such a maneuver. In acting ‘on’ the concept, the mediative agency introduces dialectical movement as \*this expression of flanking that is met by both productive and passive force. The expression of force determines its success in ‘flanking’; the act itself is actualized in its context. These forces determine to what degree of representation is flanking: its result is of little consequence to its nature. What separates its nature from the other maneuvers conducted in warfare is the relative difference to ‘other’ maneuvers conducted in the war; it cannot be a retreat.<sup>381</sup>

What we have now established here is that the dialectical movement towards its actualization is dependent on the purposefulness of the action and the determination of the actualization, which is independent of its outcome as its nature is dependent on its efficacy to produce the concept in reality. For example, the nature of ‘flanking’ regardless of the outcome is ‘a flanking’ maneuver. Therefore, its nature must either through its representation of the logical concept produce a universality or it must have a ‘pure’ notion of the concept: that is produced in the act.

Force via inertia or its resistance determines its differentiation as action, as Hegel states: “*The universality of the genus is inherently such as to reveal itself in alternative individual ways. But between the universal and the individual the determinate universal or species necessarily has its place.*”<sup>382</sup> The radical freedom of the consciousness to redirect the movement of the phenomena is necessarily contingent in its *outer* form. According to Hegel, the natural is a ‘void’ before consciousness reflects itself against reality: objective reality exists contained within the sphere of consciousness, parallel to symbolic meanings that fulfill reality with content or its affective ontology.<sup>383</sup>

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<sup>381</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. (“What vanishes is the determinate element, or the moment of difference, which, whatever its mode of being and whatever its source, sets itself up as something fixed and immutable. It contains no permanent element, and must vanish before thought, because the ‘different’ is just this, not to be in possession of itself, but to have its essential being only in another. Thinking, however, is the insight into this nature of the ‘different’, it is the negative essence, as simple.”) 124-125.

<sup>382</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk. 534-535.

<sup>383</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Oxford University Press; Oxford. ISBN-13 978-0-19-824597 Pbk.

Ontological determination between the universal and particular Hegel states: *“In such a case, the genus would have to be altered and a justification would have to be given for regarding another group of species as the species of the one new genus; that is to say, the genus would receive its determination from what we group together on the basis of some standpoint or other that we choose to assume as a principle of unity; this standpoint thus becomes itself the ground of division.”*<sup>384</sup> The similitude between concepts can be established, but its difference is of a much more important degree; it is a particular difference that establishes its unique actuality. Whereas the unity between universality and particularity establishes ontic differentiation, as a relationship that mediates the phenomena and the permanence of conceptual rationale in the dialectical movement within history: relating the pure principles that sublimate contingencies in its development. In essence, this explains why despite the development of human society, historical forms of events such as revolutions or wars maintain a similar format as a concept and share a similarity in their reasons.

To summarize, the ontological determinateness of warfare is the relationship between the principle of unity: its purpose connected by its means, produced, and recognized by the consciousness; sublimated as an immediate concrete representation of the universal notion. Furthermore, this chapter illustrated absolute idealist modes of ontology: in Table 2. Table 3 illustrated the antithetical relationship between different forms of being that are sublimated through dialectics: grounding the different forms of dialectical movement to ontological identity.

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<sup>384</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. Cambridge University Press: The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK. ISBN-13: 978-0-511-78978-6. 717-718.

### 3.9. Ontological Structure Of Absolute Idealism

This chapter illustrates the ontological structure of absolute idealism as a horizontal model to clarify how different modes are interlinked by the negation of the antinomy between modes of being. The explication of different modes are detailed in the previous chapter.

The different stages of dialectical movement transition from the supersensible towards the immediate concreteness of experience: transfiguring through different moments of dialectics. It is important to note that this is the process of coercion between the universal and particular distills from itself the pure or the absolute form of that particular object.<sup>385</sup> Consciousness is the active force through the production of its purpose, this deed opposed by the passive forces of reality: that have no purpose or meaning like nature; it has no agency to actualize its intent; merely it resists its actualization. Therefore, we distinguish different states of ontology: such as the immediate: a concrete being, contrasted with the supersensible: these are mediated by dialectics as discussed above.

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<sup>385</sup> Adorno, T. (1999). *Negative dialectics*.

**3.10. Table 5: Horizontal model of dialectical movement: production of social ontology.**




Table. 5 Positions the different domains to illustrate interdependency between different domains and articulates how the transition between domains transforms ontology from the pure (indeterminateness) universal to the concrete particular.

Supersensible domain is the domain of logic; therefore, pure form, in contrast to the immediate pure nature that is without meaning or purpose: only by via the negation of the agent's purpose in the deeds both modes are provided concrete form and transition towards the concrete particularity. The transfiguration between the absolute being to immediate determinateness is the dialectical movement through different states: the modes of being that are sublimated as a singular unity.

Consider, for example, the Clausewitzian notion of absolute warfare in this context, as he illustrated how inertia influences warfare: intent is sublimated by the inertia of reality that contradicts the intent of the agent.<sup>386</sup> The absolute character of warfare is negated by conditions of reality in the immediate experience, yet the purpose of the act remains the same: its absolute form is its purpose that is transfigured from supersensible mode to being by an active force, but as reality resists its materialization its absolute nature does not manifest as an actual but is superseded by concrete particular. The nature of the dialectical change, therefore, is materialized according to the model above: see **Table 4**.

<sup>386</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition.

The contradiction between the concept and actual nature of warfare is the reason for modeling the dialectical movement: its nature is constantly self-superseding. In the ‘becoming’ of war, the nature of phenomena itself is in the process of development as the resistance of active and passive force transfigures its development. Consider, for example, the dependency between renaissance warfare and contemporary armored warfare: armored warfare essentially expresses the same principles of action as a cavalry caracole: *a formation that fires and maneuvers to avoid counterattacks by minimizing enemy exposure to enemy fire*. Similarly, ontologically express a continuity as singular relationship to the concept of warfare: historical determinacy excludes possibilities of form. Yet, the emergence of armored warfare is dependent on the ‘conditional development’ imposed by history. It is its connection to the universality of warfare that imposes the historical development of rationality through the concept of ‘cavalry.’

It would, at first glance after reflection, seem that the universal nature then seems unreachable as the dialectical process sublimates the development of history: therefore, it maintains only formal similitude in logic. However, the concept of war has several different principles that the dialectical process must fulfill to produce transcendental ontology. Antinomies presented above can be leveraged to contrafactually present some deductions on the metaphysical nature of warfare: in epistemology, these contradictions must be resolved for the scientific logic to be valid and grounded. Therefore, the different ontological ‘states’ or the modes of warfare can be illustrated, as if deducing the presence of the different components that ontology must have to ‘represent’ the concept of war.

In summary: in this chapter, we have illustrated how the metaphysics of absolute idealism are structured around different modes of dialectical movement: the transition through different modes of being. Fundamentally, the determinateness of ‘war’ or the relationship between the universal and particular elements can be analyzed contrafactually by deducing the relationship of the binary identity of its contradiction.<sup>387</sup> Next chapter details this argument in-depth. Furthermore, this chapter illustrated that different forms of dialectical change could cause potential stratification of ontology; therefore, the form of warfare in history can have similitude in the rationale but not necessarily in its nature.

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<sup>387</sup> (Note: Here binary identity refers to either being or non-being, such as being in reality and should not be confused with definitions of binary identity in other contexts e.g feminist literature)

### 3.11. Synthesizing Negative Dialectics With Absolute Idealism

This chapter argues that where Adorno posited the impossibility of Hegelian universal history, the development of reason, Hegel anticipated this move, and instead, absolute idealism already contains this differentiation. Still, Hegel did not anticipate the consequences of the law of contradiction to the exclusivity of identity. Therefore, this chapter harnesses Adorno's argument regarding negative dialectics to complete absolute idealist reasoning and establish how the relationship between universal and particular can be reasoned to be ontologically stratified existence.

Adorno opposed Hegel's articulation of the subjective mediation as a rational and determinate process that would result in the subsumption of all the parts of the process into a whole: Hegelian dialectical movement determines ontology of both the particular and universal. In comparison, Adorno perceives this concept to be irreducible as nature dominates the subject-object-relation and forces the nature of entities over beings.<sup>388</sup> Allison similarly illustrates Adorno's claims are unfounded as Hegel surpassed identity-based ontology as classifying concepts to their singular nature:

*"Hegel expands the range and kind of universals that ontology recognizes (by adding particularity and individuality; by recasting the universal as concrete and self-differentiating), so as to recapture this resistant element in things. Dialectic is his tool for effecting this expansion. The particularity of things outreaches the (abstract) universal and threatens to dissipate it (dialectically); yet, since the universal cannot exist without suffering this dispersal, the dispersal is necessary for the universal, thus its means of self-realization (resolution). By tracing this dialectic, Hegel rethinks the universal in an enlarged sense, as self-differentiating into the whole range of universals including those of singular individuality and particularity."*<sup>389</sup>

What Adorno failed to realize is that as the purpose of the dialectical agency is embedded in the deed, thus the agent appropriates its own material nature to transfigure: the nature of an object or that of reality which originally contradicted it. By applying negative dialectics, universality Hegel imagined diffuses as mutual dependency between actual and ideal. Adorno learned coercion within the domain of becoming individuates the object contra-factually by determining its nature as a contradiction against something that it itself is not: a negative property. In the dialectical process, these absent elements are negated in

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<sup>388</sup> Alison Stone (2014) "Adorno, Hegel, and Dialectic." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 22:6, 1118-1141, DOI: [10.1080/09608788.2014.952264](https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.952264) .1130-1135.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.* 1133-1135.

the process of transfiguration, hence becoming the ontological identity of the ‘particular’: a concrete expression in temporal history. As we previously reasoned, the ontological determinateness through representation must conform to similitude as alternatively, it would reduce the identity of man: to a relativist determination.

Therefore, the exclusivity of identity merely presupposes the nature of ontological identity as representing an already established universal category in cross-comparison of the concept between the “inner” conceptual form and the ‘outer’ immediate existence. What Adorno is suggesting is that this representation is categorically wrong and does not define the universal existence as objective material reality already predicate reality: deeming each man as unique. Hegel already presupposed this exclusion in dialectical movement in transitioning from universal notion: *“But here the Notion as an abstraction cuts itself off from the multiplicity of things, and thus has no content in its own self but one that is given to it.”*<sup>390</sup> Therefore, the nature of the dialectical movement in its exclusivity produces the conceptual and ontological differentiation: by mirroring excluded elements to the immediate representation to its opposite.

The determinateness of war itself is tied to the question: how the principles of unity connect its outer and inner form in negativity. Through the exclusion of these elements that are fundamental to ‘a war,’ its nature is produced as immediate and concrete. As earlier, we established that the outer nature or form is contingent and relative to history as means of warfare change, in contrast to the inner form that is the purposefulness or the notion. This concrete, particular as a subsistence of its own, is moved in the trajectory of the dialectical movement via the force. Instead, the particularity contrary to intersubjectivity is the determination of the particular relationship, as the form of being is already determinate and presupposed. Contrary to reasoning from pure idea, Hegel presents Kant’s example in a radically different light inserting intention as transposition of the concept into actual determination:

*“This determinate content itself, the hundred dollars, also abstracted by itself, is unaltered the same in the one as in the other. But when being is further taken as a financial state, the hundred dollars refer to this state, and for this state their determinate content is not a matter of indifference; their being or non-being is only an alteration; they are transposed into the sphere of existence. When it is therefore urged against the unity of being and nothing that it is not a matter of indifference whether this or that (the*

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<sup>390</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Miller A.V (1977) *The Phenomenology of Mind*. 122-123.

*hundred 21.75 dollars) are or are not, the deception is to project the difference, whether I have or do not have the hundred dollars, into the difference merely of being and non-being. And this is a deception, as we have shown, based on a one-sided abstraction that leaves out the determinate existence present in such examples and retains only being and non-being; just as, conversely, it transforms the abstract being and non-being that should be apprehended into a determinate being or non-being, into an existence. Only existence contains the real distinction of being and nothing, namely, a something and an other. – This real distinction is the one that comes to mind in representation instead of that of abstract being and nothing and their merely intended distinction.”<sup>391</sup>*

This has significant consequences to reasoning as the determination of the concrete particular via intent is diffusive as it affirms how the concrete particular is expressed *in* the dialectical movement. In inquiring to the concrete particular that must have a condition that is present in all cases, the determination of the universal genus must be contrafactual proposition: if war has feature A, then this feature must be an either determinate of the genus: universal feature, or a concrete particular expression *sui generis* with similitude to its genus, or that of different phenomena. Then it would not be the same species, despite sharing the same genus or “war” as its constituent part. Yet, it is defined as relational to its ‘otherness’: to the binary identity of peace.

Consider, for example, Galtung's reasoning on negative peace that is merely the absence of violence: this statement presupposes the lack of violence that constitutes the means of warfare.<sup>392</sup> If such a statement turned to its antithesis, this would say that: there is no peace that is violent. Already a contradiction represents itself: as there is no ‘peace’ that has no violence. Similarly, we can see that there is no war that can fully realize its destructive potential. Therefore, as ‘war’ cannot be peace, its binary identity predicates a contradiction between ‘peace’ and ‘war.’ Hence, war must be something that is not ‘peace,’ but ‘a peace’ can similar qualities to war, this is discussed below in Chapter 25.

The universal principles must be deduced via contrafactual elimination, as understanding the positive as a subset contained within the universal. The universal principles which definitive of the genus, the contingency must be derived as synthetically separate from the pure principles so change can be seen as a contradiction of predicates; as predicates which are present in the species must be present in the genus;

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<sup>391</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 64-65.

<sup>392</sup> Galtung J., Fischer D. (2013) “Positive and Negative Peace.” In: Johan Galtung. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, vol 5. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32481-9\\_17](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32481-9_17)



hence the contradiction of the categories which substantiates the change in warfare are expressive of the predicates; can be determined via elimination of the particularity as a process of comparison between (universal) concept and its particular expression in actuality as acted out by purposefulness or intent.

For example, consider the Third Punic War and Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the similarity between these two wars. The treaty, which concluded the hostilities in the Second Punic War (201 B.C), dictated harsh terms in return for peace. The treaty dictated that Carthage should only declare war with expressed consent from the Roman senate. Hence when Carthage responded to provocations from Numidia and marched against them without seeking approval from Rome. Roman senate moved quickly to organize a punitive expedition and declared war on Carthage. The formal cause (*casus belli*) for warfare cited by Polybius as a breach of the concords.<sup>393</sup> This formal clause determines the declarative dimension of the war in connecting the intention to the substance of warfare itself. In breaching the concords, Rome has a justification via formalized conditions of the moral authority(law) to reduce Carthaginian citizens to an essence (Carthaginian).

Violence can only be directed at the immediate and present existence (Carthaginian citizens) are Carthage ontologically: therefore, are its externality, mechanical violence is directed to mediative existence. Abstract violence is already contained in the moral justification: Rome's purpose was to punish Carthage. Therefore, the predicates for war to be a punitive war; must be; the breach of right *pacta sunt servanda* as a structuring principle (the rationale giving shape for the form); declaring the pact broken purposefully and with intent via moral authority, and the actualization of organized mechanical violence(war) as a punishment for moral transgression(punitive expedition) then effective against the capacity Carthago to function in its originality.

All these same conditions are similar on the level of the notion for something to be a punitive war. Then we can say that if the engagement is something that is contradictory to the notion of peace: that its constitutive element is violence or warfare. Subsequently, we can state that the binary identity of such an entity cannot be peace: it would be contradictory to the nature of peace as the absence of violence. Subsequently, we can say that a state of being: that imposes and sanctions the use of performative

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<sup>393</sup> Goldsworthy, A. (2003). *The fall of Carthage : The Punic wars, 265-146 BC* (Cassell military paperbacks). London: Cassell.

violence; is a state that is not peaceful. Therefore, we reason that war is first a state of being and, secondly, an imminent experience that produces violence.

In comparison, the United States cited similar justifications, presenting as the *casus belli*; the provocations by Iraq in direct a breach of the 1991 ceasefire agreement; possession of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction).<sup>394</sup> Despite legal obligations forbidding Iraq from acquiring such armaments. The same principle of unity is fulfilled and, therefore, it determines the form of war in (breach of contract); the purposeful intent (declaration of war); actualization of organized mechanical violence(war) as a punishment for moral transgression (breach of international obligation). Thus, the invasion of Iraq and the Third Punic War are synthetic; punitive war is its *species*(kind). Therefore, the predicates that fulfill the logical principles for something to be a war are similar in kind and can be in comparison compared by their principles of unity but express themselves in a plurality of form through dialectics.

The particularity of the phenomena must be distinguished and negated to analyze and determine the nature of phenomena; we can say that the nature of the ontology is tied to its principles: then these principles follow a pattern of ideas that are universal and negative. Therefore, we say if a punitive war must have a moral grounding that is presupposed by an agreement, then can we say a kind of war that presupposes a breach of agreement as its moral justification is a punitive war. To analyze the universal nature of warfare, particular predicates are negated: then the binary identity of the universal nature is defined by the elements of identity that cannot be eliminated, or the phenomena would cease to be that of war: thus, defined by its opposite.

To summarize: in this chapter, we established how negative dialectics function within absolute idealism and provides Hegelian philosophy grounds to exclude particularity and form grounds for the analysis of the universal through dialectical stratification of form. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates how such

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<sup>394</sup>The Congress of United States (2002) "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq." H. Rept. 107-721. Public Law No: 107-243 ("Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998; Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in "material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations" and urged the President "to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.";... & ("(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.--(1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.")

logic can function as the basis for defining the principles of warfare for further analysis. However, it must be noted that this is only a preliminary justification for ontogenetic analysis; therefore, further research is required on the epistemology of absolute idealism.

### **3.12. The Act of War and Act in War: Differentiating Between Act, State, and Ontology**

In the previous chapters, this research has articulated the logic and basis of reasoning for the absolute idealist ontology of war. This chapter further demonstrates how different forms of action in dialectics are contained within the ontology of war. In essence, this chapter illustrates how acts of warfare and acts of violence within warfare are differentiated and what kind of reasoning can be imposed to follow the logic above.

Based on what we have argued in this research, here are some initial conditions that warfare as an abstract ontology can be argued to have, as connected to the intersubjective dimension of human existence. It was illustrated already that the external nature of war is performed by a mediative agency with violence: exertion of power on the capacity of the individual to function in its original capability. The act of violence is the ‘outer form’ of the act of war and an affirmation of the phenomena as something that exists outside the principles of that which make an act of violence: an act of warfare.

What can be stated is on the phenomena of war is that it is not equal to its causes and that it is the pure imposition of the will over the other, determined by its purposefulness: the logic of its notion.<sup>395</sup> Similarly, the same can be said of the production of warfare, via mechanical violence, as a singular act is only warfare when it is a referent to something that is outside of the act itself a relationship: its purpose. Then ‘this act’ is the force of its actualization.

Without its purpose: an act of violence is only immediate emotion, *qua* pure unadulterated hate devoid of purposefulness; therefore, it is not a conscious act. The multiple forms of violence connected to the progress of history itself have differentiated means thus are contingent in the determination of the warfare, displaying only the act of warfare, not the determinateness of warfare itself as being *qua* the ‘performance’ of a play.

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<sup>395</sup> Von Clausewitz, C. & Howard, C et al. (1989) *On War*, Indexed Edition. (Note that this references the opposite of Clausewitzian idea of war)

Yet the previous definition of violence applies to that of an act of violence as a sole act, which is not an act of warfare, but a deed of a madman reconciling with reality, since it would only concern itself with the immediate nature of the act and would serve no higher purpose than that of desire. Then the nature of this act as a reference to something else that it is not the principle that gives it form; this act then must define by purposefulness as differentiating the act of violence by a madman from an act of warfare. Similarly, a violent act in multiplicity would only be an act that is quantitatively different, not a different kind of action being only; murder in quantity, without transfiguration of its quality.<sup>396</sup>

Reason or the rationale of military science is a strategy and, through its purposefulness, differentiates the primordial violence purposed by desire from the conscious acts. Therefore, there is a contrast between enmity and purposeful act that is reflected by reason since reason introduces a discipline or restraint; and reduces violence to an instrumental, slaved to its purpose. This restraint *in-itself* enforces the constraint of discipline to the conduct of violence, as otherwise, it would be unrestrained desire without order or authority. Consider the nature of genocide; this act would not be an act of warfare but that of pure enmity as grounding itself in desire; desire for the total destruction of the enemy, hence without the constraint of discipline, that guards purposefulness of violence.

Then it would logically follow that the isolated act of violence without a referent to a concept would not be an act of warfare but an act of violence. Such an act could not be recognized to justify its legitimacy, which itself would be questionable: asunder from the principles that claim legitimacy and consent of the political authority above him; this would be only an act *for-itself*.

Such an act *for-itself* would not mediate a concept but expresses a pure desire. This act would then be that of a crime *contra* act recognizable *by-the-other* as related to the purposefulness as the act of violence is recognized by the other as an act of force that is illegitimate, without the political authority to legitimize such force. This legitimacy is either imposed by force or recognized via legitimacy.

An act of warfare is determined by its purposefulness and legitimized by the moral principles grounded to rights of political authority: that recognize itself as such. Despite the act itself being moral, this principle does not relate to what this principle is: but states that it is recognized as a moral act with a purpose. Mere moral purpose is not sufficient ground for war; consider the acts of terror as phenomena; such grounding presupposes symmetrical authority that is independent of 'law of men.' A hostile act

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<sup>396</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 50-70.

taken to uphold the moral principle presupposed by the 'law of men' and legitimized by the political authority would be policing, not warfare.

Act of warfare itself must be recognized by others as use of force that reasons with itself the nature of the act that is conducted *as it must be* recognized in the declarative dimension as an act by and for authority to the *for-the-other*. Similarly, is it possible to be recognized by enforcement of compliance on the other in the inversion of this principle. Therefore, the presence of nations presupposes a symmetrical recognition between the political authority or the force that it imposes on the state. This is also the reason why acts of terror cannot be considered as a legitimate act of warfare as nations are subject to the 'laws of nations,' but men are subject to the laws of the state; therefore, the conduct of criminals, not acts of war: but acts in warfare.

Similarly, any community can declare war against 'a state', but that declaration is void as this community, through its members, are subjects to the state, hence not equally recognized. The act of violence against the state is recognized only as an infringement of the protection and authority of the state, rather than claiming equal authority as its peer. Hence, acts of terror are subterfuge, the conduct of policy, and a concept of warfare or a crime if outside the political conduct of the state: void of legitimacy required by an act of war.

The state itself recognizes no compliance to treaties but to those which it itself has agreed to. For it is the state itself as through its legislation that upholds the supreme power over the sanctioning of use of violence: through its protection similarly, it can deprive the subjects of this right. Just as much as the state must protect its subjects against the use of violence by guaranteeing the legitimacy of its laws and its protection, in its inversion or negation of this principle: a state where no law is legitimate, and no authority is recognized as supreme then its control must be asserted by violence to guarantee its rights for sovereignty: its self-determination. In such a case, then its character is to impose order by the people that perceive it as their right: through the disciplined force.

This contest between nations, as expressed over the recognition, is actualized by the mediative agency between the sovereign will, as the extension of the state or the outer political nature of war that is between the states. In contrast, the 'inner nature' is determined by the sovereign will of the people to self-determination. As already stated, the use of violence cannot determine something as a war.

Similarly, as mere presence in the likeness of war is not sufficient to be considered as a phenomenon of war as it must be reciprocated, otherwise this would only be a mere semblance. This semblance is the negation of being, an existence between 'being' and 'nothing' hence a presence, *qua* being the state of war, not the phenomenon of war.

The act and the presence of the condition in its becoming must be reciprocated and exist independent of the act as a phenomenon. The ontology of war is determinate and intersubjective existence, regardless of the perception of the participant there must exist *for-itself* and *for-the-other*, as the mediated individual act warfare, is be mirrored back on to itself, as a reflection of its principles of unity defining succession of its actions, to be contained within that particular phenomenon but have retained uniformity in its principles: recognized as a war. This succession of action is determined by boundaries that are recognized intersubjectively as if having an independent existence: therefore, the determinate relation between the notion and that of the particular. What the state of warfare denotes is the inversion of the rights afforded to the subject as a being, therefore rightful subjects to violence in warfare. Therefore, such a political authority presupposes its right to exert enmity by abstraction that deprives the protection of the rights afforded by its equals: both to its own subjects and to its opponent's subjects.

Otherwise, there would be no more reason to say that there is a war, no more than there is a society that we know exists regardless of its nature, via the intent of consciousness. The existence of a state of being termed as war may exist as in perpetuity between states, but only in contrast to war intersubjectively, this state only exists as a whole, as its principles are transfigured and affirmed as immediate and concrete. A presence without affirmation would be a half-life of the phenomena, a semblance to its existence, a warlike state: not war as an intersubjective phenomenon. Therefore, its mode would be a state of war without being.

This contradiction, therefore, between 'being' and 'nothing' remains in the context of actual and concrete phenomenology of war as permanent subsistence between that which is and that which is not. Likewise, it remains suspended in the universal manifestation shared by the participants but expressed in its present history by the subject, its mediative agent.

Intersubjective ontology of war shared regardless of the particular interpretation of the symbolic order then must have the principle of unity that transfigure ontology structuring the relations that are sublated in its form. Otherwise, this entity could not exist independently of the subjective consciousness and could not be an intersubjective phenomenon. This phenomenon must exist then in *in-and-for-itself* and as a

reflection *for-the-other* that is mutually reciprocated and present regardless of the particularized perception, as a succession of actions that relate and reflect the principle of unity in its acts transfiguring its quantity to quality and affirm singularity to its nature.<sup>397</sup>

Otherwise, this would mean an act of violence would be *in war*, not an act *of war*. This determination is similarly made in international law as regarding those acts of depravity, or crimes outside of the conduct of war, prosecutable by the nations according to laws of men: that serve the sovereign's purpose. Therefore, it would not be an act of war, and singular to the phenomena of warfare, but an act of the individual hence subject to laws of men instead of those between states.

Finally, as the phenomena mediated in its own right, the phenomenon of war must exist as independent of the perception of the participant as *for-itself and for-the-other*. Perception of war may be varied, but the concept of that war is intersubjectively shared. Otherwise, a paradox would emerge that war would exist only in the subjective sense, but for the phenomena of war to exist, this must be reciprocated, thus existing intersubjectively and maintained as its mode: a state and being. For to say that only meaning presupposes war would only impose it as presence.

The concept of war in relation to itself is purely negative as a notion without a form, and as such, the particular nature of its positive determinateness is the form relative to its historical progress. Through the dialectical movement, this particularity differentiates its nature as a particular kind in opposition to others of that same nature, but this particularity must express the same principles of being to be considered the same kind of phenomenon. The idea must be determinate in the principles of the dialectical movement that relate to principles to the parts of the whole to the notion of war. It is through the dialectics of the subject that warfare is transfigured to that immediate form: as a concrete particular that is actualized as concrete ontology.

This chapter has reasoned with the particular concrete act of violence, illustrating its connection to dialectical movement and to the ontology of war: arguing the particular nature of war as a kind is interlinked to the principles that relate itself as a whole and singular phenomenon, this concrete particular that is at the same time a particular expression but contains a universal idea as to its determinate being, as otherwise it could not be related to the same concept.

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<sup>397</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 50-70.

In summary: what is argued here is that this notion started at first as a simple, pure idea transfigured itself in reasoning to the concept and basis of logic. This reasoning is actualized by the mediative agency by an act of violence, purposed by the logic of reasoning. Actualized in the immediate and negating the pure notion in its force, hence must exist *for-itself*. For an act to be an act of warfare, the existing political and moral order must condone and recognize the act as relating to the concept via its mediation that is sanctioned with the consent of the political community. It is the intersubjective phenomenology of warfare that actualizes the immediate and concrete form of warfare: for it is the mutual recognition of the intersubjective phenomenology that produces the nature of warfare regardless of the perception. Therefore, war must exist as both: as *a being for-itself* and *for-the-other*. Furthermore, this chapter illustrated the difference between different modes: the state of warfare and concrete warfare that is concrete and immediate. What is implied here is that the nature of logic itself is already metaphysical in its presupposition.<sup>398</sup> Finally, we established how different statuses could influence the nature of ontology in relating presence to reciprocity and intersubjectivity.

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<sup>398</sup> Hegel, G.W.F, Giovanni, G (2010) *The Science of Logic*. 50-70. & Žižek, S. (2012). *Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism*. London: Verso.



### **3.13. Conclusions**

The objective of this research is, in its essence, to illustrate the contradictory nature of the contemporary philosophical foundations of international relations and that of military science. The first part: containing the literature review and introduction chapters 2-17. In the introduction, this research outlined how military science perceives and is fundamentally devoid of the philosophy of science: ultimately resulting in its stagnated state as science.

In the literature review, this research identified five antinomies that contradict the logic of science and present an obstacle to ontogenetic analysis. These antinomies, like those established by Kant, offer scientific research a direction and what this research suggests as the fundamental problems for philosophical foundations for the ontology of war. The consequences of these antinomies are crucial to understanding as the philosophy of science or logic is integrated into the scientific enterprise, if it can be called as such. The later chapters discussing Heidegger's and Adorno's philosophy are much more meaningful for the development of dialectical consciousness and directly address ontogenetic research. In addition to the critique presented by nominalist and existentialist philosophers. The criticisms expressed in this research are intended as a direct response to the challenges presented to absolute idealism.

The third part of this research formalized the antinomies and harnessed these contradictions to resolve the tension between universal and particular: by appropriating dialectics and consciousness as the principal referent. These chapters also established how absolute idealism perceives the role of the subject consciousness and the reasons for the development of consciousness, in addition to the progress of history and Hegel's understanding of dialectics and ontology. In these chapters, the most important contribution of this research can be found: the identification between the state of war and modes of warfare that this research attributed as a basis for the subjective agency to produce or actualize ontology. Furthermore, these chapters suggest a possible solution to Leibnitz's law by resolving the symmetry of predicates by arguing that the referent of the predicate is not the immediate and actual reality but the rationale in ontogenesis, since it is produced from the pure indeterminacy to actuality. By illustrating the ontological structure of absolute idealism: this research suggests that the majority of contemporary philosophers have purposefully misunderstood Hegel's ontology; in contrast, this research illustrated its continued relevance: laying the groundwork for its use in the future as a scientific metatheory.

Absolute idealism explains the change in intentional acts and the change via history through the development of consciousness that other metatheories have poorly integrated into their epistemology. This research suggests that absolute idealist understanding regarding warfare can explain how the change in material conditions of warfare can be explained and understood as a natural process: while still maintaining that scientific reasoning is possible.

In the final chapters of this research illustrated how Adorno's negative dialectics could be integrated into Hegelian philosophy to explain how exclusivity of identity is connected with universality. This research argued that the representativeness of identity is its universal element. In chapter 33, it was illustrated that this reasoning is not contradictory to Hegel's but rather its supplementary condition: as through otherness, the binary ontological identity or the 'pure' being is still subject to exclusivity as relational to its otherness: suggesting scientific metaphysics would be possible.

To conclude, this research has outlined one of the most complex and complete scientific frameworks for the ontology of war: that can explicate the difference between the universal and particular forms of warfare. Much of this research is suggestive of the solutions but remains at a preliminary stage: far from the conclusive or actionable theories that would be preferable. Despite the discoveries made in this research: a comprehensive metatheory cannot be established singularly by this investigation. However, this research also suggests a multitude of solutions to the contemporary metatheoretical problems that contemporary international relations research has not yet discovered and suggests several directions of future research especially, in military science that has seemingly regressed to positivism. On the contrary, any articulation of ontology must be grounded to the subjective consciousness instead of the nomological laws or analysis of properties. Therefore, this research argues for deeper integration of philosophy to international relations and its introduction to military science: to further increase the explicatory power of science.

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