

Fragmentation of the Inner Circle of Power: Circulation between the Finnish Elites in 1991–2021

Ilkka Ruostetsaari* 

The study outlines the changes that have taken place in the Finnish elite structure regarding elite circulation from 1991 to 2021. The study first explores the changes in the openness of the elite structure by analysing vertical circulation (i.e., maintenance and accumulation of elite positions), and second, in the coherence of the elite structure by analysing changes in horizontal circulation, (i.e., mobility between the elites). In terms of methodology and data, the study was based on the positional approach, where the elite members were identified on the grounds of previous studies and public documents as individuals who held the highest ranking positions of influential organisations within seven sectors of society. The findings were interpreted in the light of elite structure typology. As regards vertical elite circulation from 1991 to 2021, the maintenance of elite positions and the accumulation elite positions among same individuals decreased. Concurrently, the horizontal elite circulation reduced as a result of decreased mobility of individuals between various elites. Consequently, the elite structure moved slightly towards a fragmented elite structure type since the early 1990s.

Introduction

Mobility, in terms of renewal, replacement, circulation, or interconnection, has played an important role in the classical elite theories (Pakulski & Köröseyi 2012, 16). The most eminent scholar in this field, Vilfredo Pareto (1916/1963), argued that the history of humans is the history of the continual circulation of elites. For him, the recruitment of new members of the governing elite from the lower strata of society was necessary to bring new talent into the governing elite and avoid petrification of the elite (Gulbrandsen 2019, 79). Since Pareto, the notion of circulation has become a key concept for most elite scholars, beginning with Robert Michels and Max Weber.

*Ilkka Ruostetsaari, Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, FI-33014 Tampere University, Tampere, Finland. Email: Ilkka.ruostetsaari@tuni.fi.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

As vertical elite circulation is linked to Pareto, C. Wright Mills is well-known for his concept of horizontal circulation. He referred to horizontal circulation or interlocking between elites as a source of cohesion among the power elite. According to his theory, elite cohesion is determined by the intensiveness of the connections between institutional hierarchies. If several mutual connections and joint interests exist between institutions, the elite members of these institutions will tend to form a coherent group. 'Institutional closeness' is most extensive when individuals frequently move between leading positions at influential institutions (Mills 1956, 10–11, 19, 287–88).

Elite circulation is not only an important part of the tradition of elite theory, but many of the distinguished scholars involved in the theoretical debate about the future of democracy have argued that the understanding of elite circulation is now becoming a crucial issue for the destiny of democracy (Verzichelli 2018, 574, 586). The purpose of this study is to outline the changes that have taken place in the Finnish elite structure regarding elite circulation in the period of 1991–2021. Whereas most elite studies have based on cross-sectional data (Hoffman-Lange 2018a), our longitudinal approach covering three decades is infrequent in international comparison and enables systematic empirical analysis of elite circulation.

We first explore the changes in the openness of the Finnish elite structure by analysing vertical circulation (i.e., retention and accumulation of elite positions), and second, in the coherence of the elite structure by analysing changes in horizontal circulation, (i.e., mobility between the elites). In this study, the elite refers to people, who by virtue of their top leadership positions in influential organisations in various sectors of society, are capable of regularly exercising influence on significant societal outcomes (see Ruostetsaari 2015, 25; cf. Dogan & Higley 1998; Burton & Higley 2001).

The structure of this study is as follows. First, the concepts of vertical and horizontal circulation are combined into a single typology, followed by a portrayal of societal context of the study from which the hypotheses are derived. Next the data and research design based on the positional approach are addressed. The first section of the analysis explores the end result of vertical mobility, that is, the extent to which elite members have maintained their positions and the accumulation of elite positions for the same persons. The second part in turn addresses the horizontal mobility between elites leaning on the models proposed by previous studies. In the discussion, the findings are explained in the light of previous studies on the patterns of elite circulation and career systems in Europe. Finally, research questions are answered and the findings are related to the theoretical framework.

A Typology Synthesising Vertical and Horizontal Elite Circulation: Research Questions

The framework of the present study combines above mentioned reflections on elite theory regarding elite circulation by incorporating vertical and horizontal elite mobility into a single typology which is a modified interpretation of our previous typology (Ruostetsaari 2015, 29; cf. Scott 1991, 199; cf. Higley & Moore 1981, 2001). The innovativeness of the updated typology is based on that it addresses explicitly the concepts of maintenance and accumulation of elite positions linking them to vertical circulation. The typology can be outlined by cross-tabulating the variables of openness and coherence (Figure 1).

The first dimension considered is the openness of the elite structure, which may vary from low – that is, elites being recruited from a single socio-economic group – to high – that is, where elites come from different groups. In the latter case, the proportion of members recruited from any one of the groups (e.g., the upper class) is like that group in the general population. The degree of openness also implies the active vertical circulation of elites, which is vital for their renewal from the citizenry. The second dimension, that is, horizontal circulation, refers to the degree of coherence. The elite structure is highly coherent if its members are closely intertwined in terms of interaction networks, mobility, societal values, and attitudes.

In terms of the typology, an elite structure may be termed *exclusive* if the elite members are recruited from a single social stratum of society and are closely interconnected regarding social values and attitudes, dense interaction networks, and active horizontal mobility between elites. By contrast, the connections of elite members to the citizenry are negligible in terms of interaction networks, societal values, and attitudes. An exclusive elite structure is characterised by persistency: the retention of elite positions is high, while exit from the elites is low. Moreover, the accumulation of several elite

Figure 1. Types of Elite Structures. *Source:* Ruostetsaari 2015, 29.

		DEGREE OF COHERENCE	
		high	low
DEGREE OF OPENNESS IN RECRUITMENT	low	Exclusive	Segmented
	high	Inclusive	Fragmented

Source: Ruostetsaari 2015, 29

positions among the same individuals characterises an exclusive elite structure. Consequently, this type of elite structure epitomizes closed and tightly interconnected elite depicted by C. Wright Mills (1956). In short, the concentration of power is strongest if exclusive social recruitment comes along with high mobility between various elites (Hartmann 2010, 291).

A *fragmentary* elite structure represents the other end of the typology, where the elite members are recruited from various socioeconomic strata and are weakly interconnected regarding social values and attitudes, interaction networks, and horizontal mobility between elites. In contrast, the connections of elite members to the citizenry are close regarding interaction networks and societal values, and attitudes. The accumulation of elite positions for the same individuals remains negligible. A fragmentary elite structure is characterised by low persistency: the retention of elite positions is low, while the exit from the elites is high (Ruostetsaari 2015; cf. Hoffman-Lange 2018a). This elite type epitomizes the pluralist interpretation of an elite configuration depicted by Mattei Dogan (2003).

However, this study does not focus on the differences in values, attitudes, and interaction networks between the elites because the required data is not available. Nevertheless, the amount of mobility between elites can reflect the degree of interaction between them.

Our elite typology addresses specific ways of elite recruitment and the extent of inter-sectoral mobility between the elites, that is, the variables that separate countries in terms of elite formation (Hartmann 2010, 292–95). The replacement of elite members varies with the character of the career system in different regimes, institutions, and organisations. In a *closed career system*, new entrants are normally recruited into beginner jobs at the bottom of the ladder and, most times, directly from educational institutions. They are then gradually promoted when vacancies open at the next level of the career ladder. In contrast, in an open career system, positions are open for any candidate who meets particular qualification requirements. The positions in such a system are not connected to each other in a career ladder, and elite positions may be filled by individuals who are recruited from outside the specific organisation. In sectors in which open career systems are prevalent, there is room for horizontal elite mobility. Those persons who replace incumbents of elite positions in an open career system have probably followed many different paths to the top (Gulbrandsen 2019, 81–82).

In the context of our elite typology, a closed career system indicating weak horizontal mobility between elites undermines the intertwining of elites and the coherence of the elite structure. In contrast, an open career system indicating active horizontal elite mobility increases the interconnections within elites, which is a characteristic feature of the power elite.

We argue that the realisation of democracy ultimately depends both on the openness of the elites (i.e., active vertical circulation) as stressed by Pareto

(1916/1963) and Mosca (1883/1939), and unconnectedness of the elites (i.e., slight horizontal circulation), as depicted by democratic elitism, more than elite competition per se (see Pakulski & Körösiényi 2012). Hence, autonomy of the elites is seen herein as an important precondition for democracy. The openness of elite structure contributes to the functioning of democracy because it enables citizens' involvement, social mobility and the equality of opportunity in society. The increasing differentiation of elites can be seen of paramount importance because it fosters a plurality of competing groups that check and balance each other (Etzioni-Halevy 1993, 99–101; see Higley 2018). In terms of the elite typology (Figure 1), an exclusive elite structure is inadequate, whereas a fragmentary elite structure offers best model for democracy regarding citizen involvement (see Ruostetsaari 2007). Elite coherence, or integration, is an important value in itself but its scope must be limited in a democratic society. In other words, there must prevail within the fragmented elite structure consensus between the members of elites about the norms and rules of the societal decision-making and a readiness for conflict regulation through bargaining and compromise but their values, attitudes, and interests may differ in terms of many societal issues. In fact, this kind of diversity within the elites is good for well-functioning democracy (cf. Higley 2018). However, the fragmented elite structure has its own challenges: an excessive isolation of elites from each other may increase sectorisation (or pillarisation) of society by making coordination difficult between societal sectors, institutions, and organisations.

This study outlines the changes that have taken place in the Finnish elite structure in terms of elite circulation in the period of 1991–2021. The first research question considers the extent to which the openness of the Finnish elite structure has changed by analysing the end result of vertical circulation – that is, retention of elite position and the accumulation of elite positions. The second research question is the extent to which the coherence of the elite structure has changed by analysing horizontal circulation, that is, the mobility between the elites.

Societal Context of the Study and the Hypotheses

The study focuses on the years of 1991, 2001, 2011 and 2021 which represents different periods in the contemporary history of Finland. This three-decade research period was characterised by Europeanisation, globalisation (see Neveau & Surdez 2020) and profound transformations and turning points, even crises in the Finnish society, such as the 'great recession' and the banking crisis (1991–1993), accompanied by rapid economic growth (1994–2007), the electoral funding scandal (2008), the international financial crisis and the euro-zone crisis (2008), the influx of refugees (2015), and, finally, COVID-19 pandemic (2020–). Previous studies suggest (e.g., Dogan & Higley 1998)

that societal crises may erode the coherence between the elites because the effects of crises do not focus identically on different elites.

In the early 1990s, Finland plunged into the deepest recession in the country's history; indeed this economic downturn was deeper than that of the early 1930s. The GNP decreased by more than 10 percent between 1991 and 1993, and the value of the national currency fell almost 40 percent, moreover, unemployment climbed to 20 percent, and a quarter of all industrial employment, were lost. Furthermore, a bank crisis also took place, and many businesses went bankrupt (Kuisma & Keskinarja 2012, 389, 298). The monetary markets were liberalised, and elements of neo-liberalism such as deregulation, competition, and privatisation were launched in the public sector.

Even though Finnish society did not fully recover from the recession in the next decade (Kiander 2001, 62–65), the slump was followed by rapid economic growth based mainly on governmental investments in R & D and the expansion of the electronics industry, especially Nokia Ltd. Finland's economic boom was halted by the international financial crisis in 2008. Since Finland's national economy was heavily dependent on exports, the GNP decreased by eight percent in 2009 compared to 2008. (Pohjola 2010). The effects of the financial crisis on Finland's economy lasted for a decade. The recovery from the crisis was prolonged by, among other things, the collapse of the electronics industry, which halted the growth of productivity. The Finnish economy had not yet recovered from the financial crisis when COVID-19 pandemic hit the country. The GNP decreased 6.1 percent in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the situation a year ago. However, the effects of pandemic were not as deep as that of the financial crisis and the recovery seems to be faster (Sariola & Pönkä 2020). When the pandemic struck, experts, political opposition and the citizenry stood together in the same front ('rally around the flag') with the government in the fight against the crisis. Confidence in political institutions was high (Jallinoja & Väliverronen 2021). However, in the fall of 2020, 'politics returned to politics' and the consensus began to erode.

Consequently, the rapid changes in the economy may have caused turbulence in the business elite. The turnover of CEOs of listed companies was high and increasingly faster. In 2017, one-fifth of their CEOs changed (Finland Chamber of Commerce 2018).

Moreover, several scandals have loomed large in the media during the period under study which have focused on the elites in politics, administration, and business and their activities since the 1970s. The number of scandals involving the elites has grown and to a growing extent, these scandals have led to the resignation of elite members from their positions of leadership. In particular, the political elite were shaken by the electoral funding scandal of 2008, which is the most serious political scandal in Finland to date as

measured by publicity surrounding the events (Kantola 2011). The scandal together with the influx of refugees (2015) undermined the legitimacy of the major political parties and affected the results of the general elections in 2011, that is, the landslide victory of the populist party. In fact, the electoral support of 'The Finns' increased from 4.1 percent in 2007 to 19.1 percent in 2011 and has since then remained at a high level (17.7% in 2015; 17.5% in 2019).

Most of the Finnish scandals have focused on the relationships between the elites in politics and those in business; therefore, these scandals may have disrupted cohesion and mutual trust among the elites. Now, the elites are being treated much more firmly than they were in the 1970s, i.e., when the ascendancy of the decision-makers in politics and the business was more stable and accepted vis-à-vis publicity and the mass media. Therefore, scandals may pave the way for newcomers, especially when they bring down well-established power wielders (Kantola 2011).

Moreover, 'gentlemen's agreements', dating back to the period before deregulation, the great recession, and the bank crisis, lost their relevance, which ultimately caused the disintegration of interaction networks, especially among the business elite but also between the elites of business, administration, and politics (Kiander & Vartia 2001). This 'new era' characterised by liberalised financial markets, increased competition, European integration, and globalisation necessitated new modes of operation. The networks and 'rules of the game' derived from the time of the regulated economy were no longer operational in their typical forms. The core of the Finnish consensus, incomes policy, began to erode in 2015 when the central organisation of employers decided to cease making peak-level incomes agreements with its counterpart representing employees. The consensus continued to erode when the Sipilä government (2015–2019) introduced the Competitiveness Pact, which aimed to strengthen the competitiveness of national economy by increasing financial benefits of employers by cutting that of employees.

Heinrich Best (2018, 332–35) argues that the differential between political and business elites is primordial and fundamental. Political and business elites follow different and sometimes conflicting dynamics, particularly those of electoral versus economic markets. Above-mentioned crises and rapid fluctuations in the Finnish economy and society more generally did not similarly concern all elite groups. The effects related particularly to the political and business elites whose members had to make unpopular decisions focusing on the citizenry and companies regarding the crisis management.

Moreover, we assume that the elites of politics and business differ in terms of their career systems. Recruitment to the political elite is based on general elections and/or elections within party organisations with no professional or educational qualification requirements, while the rise to the business elite requires a long professional work experience in companies and education in engineering or economics (Ruostetsaari 2015). In short,

the differences between the elites of politics and business in terms of vertical and horizontal circulation may be explained not only by changes in the national economy and society, but also by differences in career systems and educational backgrounds.

We hypothesise first that the maintenance of elite positions has become more difficult within the elites of politics and business (H1). Inversely, the second hypothesis supposes that the exit from these elites has increased (H2). Assuming that the maintenance of elite positions has become more difficult, we may hypothesise that accumulation of elite position among the elite members of politics and business has decreased (H3). Due to the increased turbulence among these elite groups, the attractiveness of moving to 'safer' elite groups may have increased. The political elite is the sole elite group whose ascendancy depends mainly on the electoral support of the population (Bachrach 1967). The instability of leadership positions also applies to companies: the mean duration of a CEO's career in one company is increasingly short, averaging 5.1 years (Finland Chamber of Commerce 2018). Consequently, we may hypothesise that the mobility from the elites of politics and business has increased to other elite groups (H4).

Method and Data

The study covers a period of three decades, for which the data were not generated retrospectively but up-to-date in 1991, 2001, 2011, and 2021. The first step was to outline the Finnish elite structure in 1991 (Ruostetsaari 1993) by analysing the power structures and the roles of institutions and organisations in various sectors of society based on previous studies and public documents. Second, the elite members were identified based on the highest-ranking positions that individuals have held in a wide array of institutional fields. The elite structures from 2001 to 2021 were constructed identically, that is, by analysing changes in society, organisational structures and positions that provide the incumbents with significant power resources (Ruostetsaari 2015). The fact that elites are defined by identical criteria for the entire research period enables longitudinal comparison.

This study was methodologically based on the positional approach (see Hoffman-Lange 2018b) which make it possible to account for the different changes that have taken place in the power structure. The composition of the Finnish elite structure in 1991–2021 is outlined in Table 1 (a detailed description of the compositions, see Ruostetsaari 2015, 40–43). The Europeanisation and globalisation were reflected in the elite structure: Finnish MEPs and senior civil servants working in the EU were included in the elites since 2001, a growing number of CEOs and chairmen of corporate boards are no longer Finnish citizens as well as some Finns have acquired top positions in international organisations.

Table 1. Composition of the Finnish Elites in 1991–2021 (Number of Elite Positions)

Elites and sub-elites	1991	2001	2011	2021
The government	18	20	22	22
Parliament	46	59	59	62
Political party organisations	61	59	60	63
Political secretaries of state	1	1	13	15
Municipal governments	18	18	20	22
Regional councils		20	19	19
MEPs and the commissioner		17	14	15
Politics total	144	194	207	218
Ministries	78	90	79	83
Central government agencies	37	30	39	49
Judiciary	18	23	27	30
The armed forces	20	16	22	22
The church	20	22	24	25
Regional state administration	22	21	21	21
Municipalities	18	18	20	22
Regional councils' administration		19	19	19
Civil servants in the EU		29	39	43
Public administration total	213	268	290	314
State-owned firms and public utilities	46	48	51	56
Cooperatives	40	33	25	28
Private companies	98	137	158	167
Property	15	15	16	16
Business total	199	233	250	267
Wage-earner organisations	54	69	64	65
Business organisations	50	69	78	78
Civic associations	54	71	79	79
Organisations of provincial administration	46			
Organisations total	204	209	221	222
Daily press	41	45	42	33
Other press	29	29	30	28
TV, radio	50	61	79	87
Mass media total	120	135	151	148
Universities	22	21	31	28
Governmental research institutes	19	18	28	20
Private research institutes	16	14	15	17
Foundations	14	14	16	16
Associations	15	9	16	15
Academy of Finland	41	53	51	48
Science total	127	129	157	144
Art administration	13	16	16	17
Fields of art	63	63	63	68
Influential persons	27	27	26	27
Honorary professors and academicians of art	11	11	28	30
Culture total	114	117	133	142
Power elite total	1121	1285	1409	1455

The positional approach is based on the premise that members of the elites have, by definition, resources required for the exercise of power on the grounds of their positions at the top of most important organisations in society. However, it cannot be directly inferred from the availability of

Figure 2. Sources of Influence/Power and Resources of Various Elite Groups. *Source:* Ruostetsaari 2015, 45; cf. Kunelius et al. 2009, 33.

Elite group	Form of influence/ power	Resources	Examples of institutions
Politics	political	elections, authority	parliament, local council
Administration	administrative	physical force, authority, expertise	army, police, judiciary, ministries
Business	economical	material and economical	firms, property
Organisations	corporative	economical, collective power	labour market organisations, NGOs
Mass media	symbolic	opinion leadership	the press, TV, radio, social media
Science	symbolic	information, expertise	universities, research institutes
Culture	symbolic	influence on intellectual climate	art, cultural institutions

Source: Ruostetsaari 2015,45; cf. Kunelius et al. 2009, 33.

resources, that the elites actually exercise power or influence. When operating in top positions elite members are expected *de facto* to promote the interests of their organisations, which is done by exercising formal powers within their organisation (power) and informal influence (e.g., by lobbying) in relation to stakeholders and the society in general (Wrong 1979, 23; Ruostetsaari 2015, 38–40). The sources of power or influence and the resources needed differ between different elites (Figure 2).

Besides the sources of power or influence and the resources needed, career paths leading to top positions can vary from open to closed across different sectors of society (Gulbrandsen 2019, 81–82). In practice, different formal and informal professional and educational qualification requirements as well as different incentive schemes may also produce variations across societal sectors in terms of recruitment to elites and the mobility between elites. Achieving elite position is a result of qualities that are valued in that elite (Mosca 1883/1939). Persons belonging to elites tend to elevate individuals like themselves to their ranks.

Vertical Circulation

Maintenance of Elite Positions

We first explore the vertical elite circulation with regard to the extent to which the elite members have maintained their original elite positions in

Table 2. Retention of Original Elite Positions during Three Periods (%)

Elite group	1991–2001	2001–2011	2011–2021
Politics	25.2	18.2	27.0
Administration	27.7	25.7	24.8
Business	17.1	16.6	22.1
Organisations	13.6	9.3	13.8
Mass media	24.2	18.5	17.4
Science	22.3	26.6	16.7
Culture	17.9	13.0	23.5
Mean	21.1	18.3	20.8

Table 3. Exit from the Elites during Three Periods (%)

Elite group	1991–2001	2001–2011	2011–2021
Politics	67.7	64.6	64.9
Administration	68.5	72.0	72.8
Business	66.5	71.0	74.3
Organisations	68.8	68.8	63.8
Mass media	68.3	78.5	64.4
Science	63.6	62.1	71.3
Culture	79.2	84.3	75.0
Mean	68.9	71.6	69.5

1991–2021. Numbers in the Table 2 refer to the proportion of members of the elite group in question who have retained their elite status for a decade. Because an elite member may have left her or his original elite position but acquired one or more positions in other elite groups, we analyse second, which proportion of elite members have left the elite structure altogether (Table 3). Thus, the figures concerning maintenance (Table 2) and exit (Table 3) cannot be counted together. The percentages in both tables were calculated based on the number of elite members, not elite positions (cf. Ruostetsaari 2013).

The maintenance of the original elite positions was the most common phenomenon in the period of 1991–2001, in the elites of administration and politics, but the rarest in the organisational elite. In 2001–2011, it was easiest to retain original elite positions in the elites of science and administration, but most difficult in the organisational elite. In 2011–2021 the retention was most common in the political elite but rarest in the organisational elite. Although the changes during the three decades were not linear, the largest changes concerned the business elite, where the maintenance of original elite positions increased, while in the elites of administration and the mass media it decreased. As for the political elite, elite members' ability to maintain

their positions decreased from the period of 1991–2001 to the period of 2001–2011 but increased significantly since then. Thus, our hypothesis (H1), according to which the maintenance of elite positions within the elites of politics and business has become more difficult, was not verified. Overall, the retention of original elite positions decreased from 1991–2001 (mean 21.1%) to 2001–2011 (18.3%) but increased then in 2011–2021 (20.8%).

‘Exit’ in Table 3 indicates the number of elite members who have left the elite for one reason or another (e.g., lost their leading position in their own organisation, moved to another lower position in another organisation, retired, or died). Leaving the elites (Exit) was most common in the cultural elite since the early 1990s, while it was rarest in the scientific elite in 1991–2011 and in the organizational elite in 2011–2021. Since the early 1990, the exit decreased in the elites of politics and organisations but increased in the elites of administration and business. Overall, the proportion of individuals who left the elite increased from the period of 1991–2001 (mean 68.9%) to 2001–2011 (71.6%) but decreased thereafter in the last period of 2011–2021 (69.5%).

The second hypothesis argued that the exit from the elites of politics and business has increased (H2). However, the hypothesis was verified in the case of business elite but was falsified in the case of political elite. As regards the last-mentioned elite group, the exit was highest in the period of 1991–2001 but decreased since then.

Accumulation of Elite Positions: ‘Elite of the Elite’

Elite theories generally depict power as a cumulative phenomenon: it brings more power to its holder (Parry 1969, 32). However, elite members are not equal in terms of the amount of formal power or informal influence one possesses. In fact, it is justified to assume that reaching multiple elite positions provides an individual with more opportunities for power-wielding than holding only one elite position. Long-term membership in the elite, especially in several different elite groups, enables a person to build the interaction networks and interpersonal relationships necessary for power wielding. Next, the accumulation of elite positions will be analysed from 1991 to 2021.

Although the elite positions have accumulated for the same persons, overall, the accumulation remains low, and the trend is even declining. When 8.9 percent of elite members held at least two elite position in 1991, the share was 6.3 percent in 2001, 7.3 percent in 2011, and 6.9 percent in 2021, respectively. The share of political elite members who acquired 2–9 elite positions was 22.0 percent in 1991, 8.2 percent in 2001, 14.1 percent in 2011, and 15.5 percent in 2021. As regards the business elite, the respective

proportions were 23.8 percent in 1991, 15.2 percent in 2001, 18.1 percent in 2001, and 16.3 percent in 2021.

Although these trends were not fully linear, we can conclude that the accumulation of elite positions decreased among these elite groups. Consequently, our hypothesis (H3) according to which, accumulation of elite position among the elite members of politics and business has decreased, was verified.

Because the accumulation of elite positions was scarce within one year, next we address accumulation during the whole research period of 1991–2021, that is the elite of elite (Table 4). The accumulation of elite positions was the most common phenomenon in the elites of administration, business and politics in the period of 1991–2021. The lowest accumulation concerned the elites of culture and mass media. Although accumulation of elite positions among the members of political and business elites decreased annually since the early 1990s, the accumulation of four or more elite positions was highest just among these elite groups throughout the study period of 1991–2021.

In the three decades, most elite positions, nine, have accumulated for one person, Mr. Björn Wahlroos (born 1952), who is one of the wealthiest men in Finland. Currently, he serves as chairman of the board of Sampo (a Nordic insurance company) and UPM-Kymmene (a forest industry company). Moreover, he was chairman of the board of Nordea Bank until 2020. All but one of his elite positions in 2001–2021 were reached in the business elite.

Two persons have acquired eight elite positions, Mrs. Tarja Filatov (the Social Democrats, born 1943) and Mr. Ilkka Kanerva (the Conservatives, born 1948). The Deputy Speaker of Parliament (at the moment of compilation of the data of 2021), Filatov, has served as a member of parliament since 1995 and as a cabinet minister from 2000 to 2007. Kanerva is Finland's longest-serving MP of all time, since 1975. He was a member of the government from 1987 to 2008.

Table 4. Accumulation of Elite Positions for Individuals within the Elite Groups in 1991–2021

Elite group								
Number of elite positions	Politics	Public administration	Business	Organisations	Mass media	Science	Culture	Total
2	100	159	106	84	78	62	56	645
3	37	32	45	21	6	26	8	175
4	15	11	23	4	3	7	2	65
5	9	–	9	1	1	1	–	21
6	2	–	2	1	–	2	–	7
7	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	2
8	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
9	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1
Total	166	202	187	111	88	98	66	918

Horizontal Circulation

The bold numbers in the Tables 5–7 refer to the proportion of members of the elite group in question who have retained their elite status for a decade. The percentages in the tables are calculated based on the number of elite members, not elite positions (cf. Ruostetsaari 2013). Consequently, the sum of row percentages is not 100 because one person may have had more than one elite position. The circulation index shows the proportion of persons who have moved to another elite group or acquired a new elite position in another elite group but have concurrently retained a position in their original elite group.

The circulation between elite groups was clearly most common phenomenon among the political elite from which the move was mainly to the organisational elite in 1991–2021. Mobility, for instance, to the business elite has decreased since the early 1990s. The second most common mobility was from the elites of business and organisations. Members of the business elite moved mainly to the organisational elite but the trend was declining. Also, there was minor mobility, even declining from an organisational elite to administrative and business elites. Concerning the amount of circulation, the third group comprised the elites of administration and science, while in the mass media elite, mobility was less common. Some members of the administrative elite moved to business elite until the beginning of the 21st century, while members of the scientific elite moved mainly to organisational and administrative elites, but to a lesser extent.

Strikingly, the cultural elite remained an enclave; no single member of this group moved to another elite group throughout the research period. Our finding of scanty accumulation of elite positions in the cultural elite supports a previous Finnish study, according to which the connections of the cultural elite to other elite groups have remained scarce. Similarly, the connections of other elite groups to the cultural elite have been the least (Ruostetsaari 2015).

As regards changes between research periods (circulation index), the mobility increased, especially from the political elite but also from the mass media elite, although its amount was marginal. Excluding the cultural elite from which no one moved to another elite groups, the mobility decreased from the elites of administration, business, organisations, and science. Consequently, our hypothesis according to which mobility from the elites of politics and business has increased to other elite groups (H4), was verified in the case of political elite but was falsified in the case of business elite. In conclusion, the mobility between the elite groups decreased since the early 1990s: the circulation index was 6.8 in the period of 1991–2001, 5.1 in 2001–2011, and 4.6 in 2011–2021, respectively.

Table 5. Circulation of Individuals between Elite Groups in 1991–2001 (%)

Original elite position in 1991	Elite position in 2001										Number of individuals in 1991
	Politics	Administration	Business	Organisations	Mass media	Science	Culture	Exit	Circulation index		
Politics	25.2	1.6	3.1	5.5	–	–	–	67.7	10.2		127
Administration	0.9	27.7	2.8	1.9	–	0.9	–	68.5	6.5		213
Business	0.6	1.2	17.1	5.5	–	2.4	1.2	66.5	10.9		164
Organisations	–	4.0	3.0	13.6	0.5	–	1.0	68.8	8.5		199
Mass media	0.8	–	–	–	24.2	0.8	0.8	68.3	2.4		120
Science	–	2.5	–	5.0	0.8	22.3	–	63.6	9.1		121
Culture	–	–	–	–	–	–	17.9	79.2	0		106
Total									476/7 = 6.8		1050

Table 6. Circulation of Individuals between Elite Groups in 2001–2011 (%)

		Elite position in 2011										Number of individuals in 2001
Original elite position in 2001		Politics	Administration	Business	Organisations	Mass media	Science	Culture	Exit	Circulation index		
Politics	18.2	2.8	1.6	3.9	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.6	64.6	10.6	181	
Administration	1.1	25.7	0.7	1.1	0.4	1.1	0.4	0.4	72.0	4.8	268	
Business	–	–	16.6	2.8	0.5	3.2	0.9	0.9	71.0	7.4	217	
Organisations	2.0	2.4	2.4	9.3	–	1.5	–	–	68.8	8.3	205	
Mass media	–	–	–	0.7	18.5	–	0.7	0.7	78.5	1.4	135	
Science	–	2.4	–	0.8	–	26.6	–	–	62.1	3.2	124	
Culture	–	–	–	–	–	–	13.0	–	84.3	0	115	
Total		–	–	–	–	–	–	–	37.7/7	= 5.1	1245	

Table 7. Circulation of Individuals between Elite Groups in 2011–2021 (%)

Original elite position in 2011	Elite position in 2021										Number of individuals in 2011
	Politics	Administration	Business	Organisations	Mass media	Science	Culture	Exit	Circulation index		
Politics	27.0	2.7	1.6	4.3	1.6	2.1	1.1	64.9	13.4		185
Administration	0.3	24.8	0.3	1.0	–	1.0	–	72.8	2.6		290
Business	–	0.4	22.1	1.8	–	1.3	0.9	74.3	4.4		226
Organisations	2.4	1.0	1.0	13.8	–	0.5	1.0	63.8	5.9		210
Mass media	–	1.3	–	1.3	17.4	–	0.7	64.4	3.3		149
Science	–	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	16.7	–	71.3	2.8		150
Culture	–	–	–	–	–	–	23.5	75.0	0		132
Total									32.4/7 = 4.6		1342

Discussion: Explaining the Accumulation of Elite Positions and the Mobility between Elites

Michael Hartmann has outlined three different basic types of elite formation in Europe that differ from each other in two decisive aspects: their specific ways of recruitment and the extent of their inter-sectoral mobility. Elites are most homogenous, where their recruitment is considerably socially standardised based on education at special elite-related educational institutions and if they regularly move between different elite groups. In Europe, this holds true only in France. Hence, whoever wants to make his or her way to the top positions of the French society must usually attend one of the famous *Grandes Écoles*, and if possible he or she should pass through one of the elite institutions of public administration, one of the *Grands Corps*. Due to these institutions, the horizontal mobility between the elites of politics, administration, and business ('pantouflage') is very high in international comparison. This is the basis of the high and unique homogeneity of French elites and the very close contacts between them (Hartmann 2010, 292–95).

The UK represents the second type. Traditionally British elites, just as their French counterparts, are educated at special institutions of elite education. Even if the well-known public schools (e.g., Eton) and the universities of Oxford and Cambridge ('Oxbridge') are not as dominating as the *Grandes Écoles*, they doubtlessly play a major role in elite recruitment. However, there is little mobility in the UK between different elites, partly due to a more specialised (liberal) education tradition at elite universities compared to France (Mangset 2017, 140). Frequently, elite members remain loyal to their respective elite groups, and they are bound by common education and the fact that the overwhelming majority of them come from upper and upper middle class. Hence, they are still appreciably away from homogeneity, which is typical of the French elites (Hartmann 2010, 298–301).

Germany represents the third type where special institutions of elite education do not play any role in elite recruitment at level of schools nor of universities. Accordingly, although about four-fifths of the German elites are university graduates, they have achieved their degrees at a number of universities. Hence, there exists no hierarchical structure at German universities; that is, the university of achieving the M.A or Ph.D. goes not matter. Homogeneity of German elites is severely affected concurrently by a lack of institutions of elite education and because of the traditional course of careers being a rather disintegrating than integrating effect. Normally, advancement to elite positions occurs within one societal sector. Accordingly, inter-sectoral mobility is rather low, even if it has increased (Hartmann 2010, 302–4).

The structural features of the German type also characterise very well the Finnish case. For instance, education is free from the basic level to the university level and lacks impact on the career at which university the degree was completed. In other words, there is no elite educational institutions in Finland. This case is more the rule than the exception as Hartmann (2010, 304) argues that “a lack institutions of elite education and a (more or less) low degree of elite mobility across sector boundaries can be observed in almost all other European countries”.

The variations between the Finnish elites in terms of elite circulation can be explained by the differences within closed and open career systems (see Gulbrandsen 2019, 81–82). In Finland, politics can be characterised increasingly as open career system. There are no formal qualification requirements. The educational background of the politicians is heterogeneous even if social sciences is most common field of science. Although the traditional recruitment route is still valid – from local party organisations to municipal boards and councils, regional party organisations, parliament, and finally to the government, it has become increasingly rare. Today, it is possible to rise to the top of politics without long experience in elective offices in public bodies or political party organisations. Members of the political elite themselves perceive the reduced role of organisational activities as a merit promoting their career advancement which can be explained by the disintegration of political party organisations and the mediatisation of politics (Ruostetsaari 2015). High, though decreasing accumulation of elite positions in the political elite, can be accounted for by the fact that MPs serve as cabinet members and chairmen of political party organisations, boards and supervisory boards of companies, especially state-owned firms and cooperatives, and civic associations.

The career pattern leading to the organisational elite can also be characterised as open. There are no formal qualification requirements although most of elite members are educated in social sciences and economics/business (Ruostetsaari 2015). The organisational sector is composed of various interest groups and civic associations where experience gained in jobs and elective offices contributes to career advancement. Although business leaders generally hold elective position in business organisations, the waged leaders of these organisations rarely move to business executives.

The career system of the Finnish business can be depicted as closed. Although there are no formal qualification requirements, rising to the top requires *de facto* education in economics/business or engineering and a long experience in company leadership (Ruostetsaari 2015). Of CEOs of listed companies in 2017 45 percent were educated in engineering, 49 percent in economics/business, and six percent in law, respectively. The appointment as a CEO usually requires experience in leading an operational business unit or a company board. (Finland Chamber of Commerce 2018). Moreover, the

large accumulation of elite positions, though decreasing in the business elite can be mainly explained by the fact that CEOs often serve as chairmen of the boards of other companies and business organisations.

In addition to the business elite, a closed career system characterises the recruitment to the elites of administration, science, mass media, and culture. In the first three elites formal educational qualification requirements and a long work experience are prerequisites for recruitment to the top. In turn, in the cultural sector there are no formal qualification requirements but this sector deviates clearly from other societal sectors in terms of educational background. In 1991–2001, two-fifths of the elite members had university education in humanities or arts but seven out of ten in 2011. This educational background was rare among other elite groups (Ruostetsaari 2015).

The decreasing accumulation of elite positions had a connection to reducing horizontal circulation between the Finnish elites since the early 1990s. In Finland, the elite circulation was of the German type, characterized by relatively low inter-elite mobility and the absence of elite schools in the education system. Recruitment to elites was based mainly on a closed career system (excluding the elites of politics and organisations), as in Germany and the UK. This is shown by the fact that mobility to other elite groups was most common among the elite groups with the highest accumulation of elite positions (especially political and business elites, but also administrative and scientific elites) and least common among the elite groups with the lowest accumulation (cultural and mass media elites).

The closed career system was maintained by formal educational requirements in the administrative, media and science sectors, as well as informal requirements in the business and cultural sectors. For instance, unlike in Norway (Gulbrandsen 2019, 82), an open career system does not seem to be typical of the Finnish cultural sector, where the accumulation of elite positions and mobility between the elites is marginal. Unlike other elite groups, the dominant educational background in the business elite was economics/business and engineering but arts and humanities in the cultural elite. In fact, divergent educational profiles of elite groups decrease the mobility between elites. Although the management methods of different sectors of society, mainly borrowed from business (e.g., New Public Management), have converged, the elite positions acquired in different sectors of society as well as different sources and resources of power and influence within the elites are interchangeable to a lesser extent. This is shown by the fact that, although the top positions in public administration are based on fixed-term contracts, the mobility from the administrative elite has not increased but decreased. The declining mobility from the business elite to other elite groups can also be explained by the differences in remuneration systems. The widespread stock options and share awards since the early 1990s have

led to a detachment of the income level of the business elite from that of all other elites (Ruostetsaari 2015).

The increased mobility from the political elite to other elites can be explained by the temporary nature of elective offices and the uncertainty caused by the elections which increase the willingness to move to 'safer' elite positions. In fact, this uncertainty is emphasised by the special features of Finland's proportional electoral system. Finland is a sole Nordic country that uses an open list system with mandatory preferential voting. The ranking of candidates running for each party is determined solely by the amount of votes each candidate receives (Bengtsson et al. 2014, 84). Political parties cannot prioritise their candidates by their ranking order in the electoral list. As a result, not even leading politicians can be sure of their election to parliament, unlike in the other Nordic countries.

In fact, re-election to parliament has become more uncertain since the 1991 parliamentary elections: Of the incumbents who stand for election, 67 percent were re-elected in 2003, but only 55 percent in 2011 and 2019, respectively (von Schoultz et al. 2020, 113). Moreover, parliamentary turnover has increased: share of new incumbents was 33.5 percent in the general elections of 1991, 37.5 percent in 2011, and 40.4 percent in 2019, respectively (see Forsten 2014, 87).

However, the mobility of political elite members to other elite groups is just a tip of an iceberg of the political career mobility in which a larger part takes place at a lower hierarchy level than the elite. Ministers' political advisers and assistants (political state secretaries and special advisors), who operate on fixed-term contracts, move increasingly to firms, interest groups, lobbying organisations, communication agencies, and public administration. This Finnish type of *pantouflage* has been criticised as a phenomenon of 'revolving door': while it reduces the barriers between various sectors of society ('sectorisation') and creates new career paths, it can disclose inside information from political decision-making to stakeholders. More generally, this change hints to the spreading of an open career system in Finland (e.g., Blom 2018).

Conclusions

We expected that political crises and rapid fluctuations in the economy since the early 1990s did not similarly affect all elite groups. The effects of these societal changes were expected to be related particularly to the political and business elites whose members had to make unpopular decisions focusing on the citizenry and companies regarding the crisis management. Thus, we first hypothesised that the retention of elite positions within the elites of politics and business has become more difficult (H1). This hypothesis was not verified. This can be partly a result of the fact that Finns' trust

on all public institutions, including political and financial institutions has remained, even higher than that in the OECD countries on the average (OECD 2021). The second hypothesis, which supposed that exit from these elites has increased (H2), was verified in the case of business elite but falsified in the case of political elite. The third hypothesis, which expected that accumulation of elite position among the members of elites of politics and business has decreased (H3), was verified. According to our fourth hypothesis (H4), the mobility from the elites of politics and business has increased to other elite groups was verified in the case of the political elite but was falsified in the case of the business elite.

As regards the business elite, these findings can be a result of increasing turnover and shortening career length of CEOs (Finland Chamber of Commerce 2018) which was reflected in the increasing exit from the elite structure, decreasing accumulation of positions and reducing mobility to other elite groups. In the case of the political elite, increasing career uncertainty in terms of re-election and turnover (Forsten 2014; von Schoultz et al. 2020) was seen in the decreasing accumulation of elite positions and increasing mobility to other elite groups. Due to increasing mobility the exit from the political elite has not increased. These unexpected, even contradictory findings refer to that the increasing political and economic turbulence since the early 1991 have not caused transformations in the elites of politics and business but these changes have been a result of internal developments in politics and business.

Although the changes were not fully linear and congruent between all elite groups since the early 1990s an overall picture of the transformations in the Finnish elite structure can be outlined. As regards vertical circulation, the retention of elite positions has become more difficult, the exit from the elites has increased, and the accumulation of elite position among same individuals has decreased. In short, the openness of the elite structure has increased. In terms of horizontal circulation, the mobility of elite members between various elites has decreased.

All in all, in terms of Figure 1, the Finnish elite structure has moved slightly towards a fragmented type since the early 1990s, which best meets the criteria of a well-functioning democracy. Consequently, the Finnish elite structure can be to a lesser extent characterised by the concept of power elite (Mills 1956). These conclusions can only be, however, tentative due to the limitations of data available. Our analysis of vertical circulation did not address the socioeconomic background of elite members but only the end result of vertical circulation and the approach on horizontal circulation did not address the interaction networks and attitudinal unanimity within the elites and between the elites and the citizenry. Obviously, further research on vertical and horizontal elite circulation is needed.

REFERENCES

- Bachrach, P. 1967. *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K. M., Harðarson, Ö. Þ., Narud, H. M. & Oscarsson, H. 2014. *The Nordic Voter. Myths of Exceptionalism*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Best, H. 2018. 'Elite Sectors: Differentiation and Integration', in Best, H. & Higley, J., eds, *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, 331–38. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Blom, A. 2018. *Veljeskunta. Lobbauus Suomen poliittisessa järjestelmässä*. Helsinki: Gummerus.
- Burton, M. & Higley, J. 2001. 'The Study of Political Elite Transformations', *International Review of Sociology*, 11(2), 181–99.
- Dogan, M. 2003. 'Introduction: Diversity of Elite Configurations and Clusters of Power', in Mattei, D., ed, *Elite Configurations at the Apex of Power*, 1–15. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
- Dogan, M. & Higley, J. 1998. 'Elites, Crises, and Regimes in Comparative Analysis', in Dogan, M. & Higley, J., eds, *Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes*, 3–27. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Etzioni-Halevy, E. 1993. *The Elite Connection. Problems and Potential of Western Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Finland Chamber of Commerce. 2018. *Huipulla tuulee. Vaihtuvuus pörssiyhtiöiden johdossa*. Helsinki: Keskuskauppakamari.
- Forsten, T. 2014. 'Keitä kansanedustajat ovat?', in Raunio, T. & Wiberg, M., eds, *Eduskunta. Kansanvaltaa puolueiden ja hallituksen ehdoilla*, 77–90. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Gulbrandsen, T. 2019. *Elites in an Egalitarian Society: Support for the Nordic Model*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hartmann, M. 2010. 'Elites and Power Structure', in Immerfall, S. & Therborn, G., eds, *Handbook of European Societies*, 291–323. New York: Springer.
- Higley, J. 2018. 'Patterns of Political Elites', in Best, H. & Higley, J., eds, *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, 155–59. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Higley, J. & Moore, G. 1981. 'Elite Integration in the United States and Australia', *American Political Science Review*, 75, 581–97.
- Higley, J. & Moore, G. 2001. 'Political Elite Studies at the Year 2000: Introduction', *International Review of Sociology*, 11(2), 175–80.
- Hoffman-Lange, U. 2018a. 'Theory-Based Typologies of Political Elites', in Best, H. & Higley, J., eds, *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, 53–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoffman-Lange, U. 2018b. 'Methods for Elite Identification', in Best, H. & Higley, J., eds, *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, 79–92. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jallinoja, P. & Väliverronen, E. 2021. 'Suomalaisten luottamus instituutioihin ja asiantuntijoihin COVID19-pandemiassa', *Media & Viestintä*, 44(1), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.23983/mv.107298>.
- Kantola, A., ed. 2011. *Hetken hallitsijat*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Kiander, J. 2001. *Laman opetukset. Suomen 1990-luvun kriisin syyt ja seuraukset*. Julkaisuja 27:5. Helsinki: Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus.
- Kiander, J. & Vartiainen, P. 2001. *Suuri lama: Suomen 1990-luvun kriisin syyt ja talouspoliittinen keskustelu*. Helsinki: Taloustieto.
- Kuisma, M. & Keskisarja, T. 2012. *Erehtymättömät: Tarina suuresta pankkisodasta ja liikepankeista Suomen kohtaloissa*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Kunelius, R., Noppari, E. & Reunanen, E. 2009. *Media vallan verkoissa*. Tiedotusopin laitos, julkaisuja, sarja A 112. Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto.
- Mangset, M. 2017. 'Elite Circulation and the Convertibility of Knowledge: Comparing Different Types and Forms of Knowledge and Degrees of Elite Circulation in Europe', *Journal of Education and Work*, 30(2), 129–44. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080.2017.1278903>.
- Mills, C. W. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mosca, G. 1883/1939. *The Ruling Class*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Neveau, E. & Surdez, M., eds. 2020. *Globalizing Issues. How Claims, Framers, and Problems Cross Borders*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- OECD. 2021. *Drives of Trust in Public Institutions in Finland*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/52600c9e-en>.
- Pakulski, J. & Körösenyi, A. 2012. *Toward Leader Democracy*. London: Anthem Press.
- Pareto, V. 1916/1963. *The Mind and Society: a Treatise on General Sociology*. New York: Dover.

- Parry, G. 1969. *Political Elites*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Pohjola, M. 2010. 'Taantuma ei ollut ennätysellisen syvä', *Helsingin Sanomat* 1.9.2010.
- Ruostetsaari, I. 1993. 'The Anatomy of the Finnish Power Elite', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 16(4), 305–27.
- Ruostetsaari, I. 2007. 'Elites and Democracy: Are They Compatible?', in Engelstad, F. & Gulbrandsen, T., eds, *Comparative Studies of Social and Political Elites*, 265–74. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Ruostetsaari, I. 2013. 'Opening the Inner Circle of Power: Circulation in the Finnish Elites in the Context of Major Societal Changes 1991–2011', *Comparative Sociology*, 12, 255–88.
- Ruostetsaari, I. 2015. *Elite Recruitment and Coherence of the Inner Core of Power in Finland. Changing Patterns during the Economic Crises of 1991-2011*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Sariola, M. & Pönkä, H. 2020. *The depths of the COVID-19 Crisis, and the Recovery*. Bank of Finland Bulletin 6. Helsinki: Bank of Finland. Available online at: <https://www.bofbulletin.fi/en/2020/6/the-depths-of-the-covid-19-crisis-and-the-recovery>
- Scott, J. 1991. *Who Rules Britain?*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Verzichelli, L. 2018. 'Elite Circulation and Stability', in Best, H. & Higley, J., eds, *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, 573–92. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- von Schoultz, Å., Söderlund, P. & Kekkonen-Kestilä, E. 2020. Ehdokkaiden menestys vaaleissa. in Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. & von Schoultz, Å. eds, *Ehdokkaat vaalikentillä: Eduskuntavaalit 2019*. Oikeusministeriön julkaisuja 16, 103–17. Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö.
- Wrong, D. H. 1979. *Power. Its Forms, Bases and Uses*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.