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# THREAD 1
## Introduction: Theatrical Metaphors, Textile Philosophies

In common parlance, 'theatricality' usually comes to connote one of two things.[1] On the positive side, it is understood as a specific style of theatrical production, intimately related to the rise of the modernist theatre director by the early twentieth century. Ranging from the bodily to the political in orientation (Vsevolod Meyerhold, Bertolt Brecht), the value of such *theatricalism* has variously been located in the interrelation of different art forms (Richard Wagner) or in some perceived 'essence' of theatre itself (Georg Fuchs, Nikolai Evreinov, Peter Brook). On the negative side, and much earlier, theatricality has also been equated with a derived realm of mere appearance, denying access to some allegedly prior, authentic, or essential domain of reality – beginning with the eternal world of ideas first posited by the Greek philosopher Plato. Again, the method of this obstruction has varied from the grandiosely Baroque – Gianlorenzo Bernini's mighty colonnade in St Peter's Square, Rome, is a case in point – to the patently minimalistic: the canonical example is art critic Michael Fried's 1967 diatribe against the 'objecthood' of 'literalist' sculpture, precisely for its interrelation of different art forms, and, worse still, its acknowledgment of its bodily spectators. In modern drama, the theatricality of playwrights like Samuel Beckett and Peter Shaffer has tended to be viewed in these more positive and more negative terms, respectively.

Zooming out, the more general category of 'performativity' has been interpreted in equally conflicting ways.[2] While its theatrical usage is not always so distinct from the historical emphases of avant-garde theatricalism – highlighting theatre's non-literary aspects such as liveness or embodiment – its more conceptual range has been delineated by such diverse philosophers as J. L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler. Thus 'performativity' is about bringing forth some change in the world, or conversely, about maintaining the status quo by means of reiterated naturalized practices. The latter range may (and will) be related to such normative 'essences' as were contrasted with the corrupting influence of theatricality, above. The former variety extends from a standard subject matter of dramatic presentation (agency and creativity, or their lack, e.g. in Shaffer and Beckett) to an extratheatrical sense of accomplishment: notably technological effectiveness or the efficacy of political activism. Even in these latter cases, however, the spectre of theatricality is never that far away. If a lineage of 'functional' performativity is traced in domestic technology and architecture – from Le Corbusier's 'machines for living in' to the current ideal of the 'smart home' – it has been variously both helped and hindered by a degree of theatrical ornament. While nonviolent protest may be even more effective if performed by clowns, dwarfs, or mere textiles, such agents also risk its invalidation by sheer antitheatrical suspicion.

This sums up some of the names, concepts, and practices covered in the set of writings that comprise this book. Beyond their apparent connotations with the performing arts, theatricality and performativity function as all-embracing metaphors of social existence, often with few ties to theatre as such. With the concept of 'performance,' in Marvin Carlson's canonical formulation, "the metaphor of theatricality has moved out of the arts into almost every aspect of modern attempts to understand our condition and activities, into every branch of the human sciences."[3] Against this background, the central assumptions and arguments of this study are encapsulated in two fourfold

hypotheses: the 'binary' fourfold implied above and elaborated below, and the more 'textural' or 'perspectival' one that the various writings work to develop in its stead.

Restating the first assumption with reference to some of the key scholars who have influenced this study, the distinctions of theatricality and performativity exceed by far their binary opposition in the wake of performance art and Performance Studies.[4] Indeed, both concepts seem to fluctuate between conflicting values of *novelty and normativity* themselves: theatricality, between the essence of an art form and a more evasive cultural "value that must be either rejected or embraced," as Martin Puchner has argued[5]; performativity, between effective *doing* and mere *dissimulation*. Briefly, the former field of tension evokes what has come to be known as the 'antitheatrical prejudice,' dating back to the mobilization of catharsis and contamination in Plato and Aristotle's early dispute over theatrical mimesis.[6] With performativity, the default tensions pertain to skill and habit, or intention and convention – its theatrical and deconstructive meanings "spanning the polarities" of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick dubs "the *extroversion* of the actor … and the *introversion* of the signifier."[7] Most astutely, Jon McKenzie situates the paradox of performativity between its "subversive" and "normative valences," in the heroic extroversion of (turn-of-the-century) Performance Studies and the docile incorporation of social discipline as theorized by Butler.[8]

The second assumption – one that I only state here but will elaborate throughout – is then that certain *dramaturgical tendencies* can be ascribed to both concepts that not only validate their distinction, but also relativize the above binaries of the normative and the subversive (performativity), or the rejected and the embraced (theatricality). To divest them of a certain taken-for-grantedness, and to avoid the circularity of only defining them in terms of changing theatre or performance practices, this study theorizes theatricality and performativity relatively apart from individualistic notions of 'acting' or 'role-play,' say, in a language of more heterogeneous 'textures' – thus extending a metaphor that is already prevalent in the discourse of dramaturgy. Even though the argument only unfolds as a set of relatively separate writings – or mere 'threads' from a much larger thematic fabric – the underlying metaphors are general enough to weave together a range of cases which at first might appear quite distinct.

Specifically, the approach is inspired by Tim Ingold's ecological anthropology and Stephen C. Pepper's philosophical pragmatism, the latter from the 1940s but now largely forgotten. Where Ingold's ecology of *lines* admits to "no insides or outsides," "trailing loose ends in every direction," Pepper's "contextualistic world" of *events* admits "no top nor bottom" to the ever-ramifying strands of their texture and quality.[9] Rather than individual action or social sanction, both reflect a world of emergence and becoming, but also warrant diagrammatic representation, as is evident in the range of figures and tables that accompany this set of writings. Altogether, I argue that the idioms of theatricality and performativity are both still capable of doing critical work, if only we shift from models of binary containment (the *ins* and *outs* of 'what counts') to a more textured approach along the lines I shall work to propose (*both and*, rather than *either or*). Closer to the nascent tradition of Performance Philosophy, this is akin to the perspectival continuum Laura Cull has suggested between the Deleuzeian tendencies of 'immanence' and 'transcendence,' even if the two initially seemed to suggest a transcendent opposition between – say 'performativity' and 'theatricality.'[10]

Before such philosophical implications can be unravelled, however, the tensions and dualities of the first assumption need to be further clarified at some length. For now, the key to why this book's titular conceptual distinction can still be argued to matter is found in the derivation of the words themselves: Superficially, it would seem that the shared suffix of theatrical*ity* and performativ*ity* only identifies them as general qualities of events or actions, and thus as somehow equivalent – abstracting them away from the specifics of actual theatres and particular performances, while also implicitly essentializing skill and sensibility as do similar words like musical*ity* or human*ity*. More crucially, the core distinction that their etymologies suggest between *seeing* and *doing* (from the Greek *theâsthai*, 'to behold,' and the Old French *parfornir*, 'to do, carry out, finish, accomplish') is casually extended to those of form and function, theory and practice, fixity and change: rigid semiosis as opposed to effective action, inner meaning versus outer effect, the *what* of representation and the *how* of reiteration. As Stephen Bottoms notes, even such 'braided' binaries as Richard Schechner's – of 'entertainment' and 'efficacy' – often come with gendered overtones of "potent virility versus showy sterility" (he takes issue with Schechner's implicitly masculinistic, heteronormative validation of performative efficacy over theatrical 'effeminacy').[11]

Thus, the most innocent of binaries are invested with ethics and judgments of value, tacitly *performative* of ideology and 'world view' as I suggest later in this Introduction. This is a theme that is followed through in all the various Threads of this study: Even if the two perspectives could well be considered as constituting the kind of "binocular vision" that Bert States once suggested of semiotics and phenomenology[12] – themselves readily associated with theatricality and performativity respectively – the tendency is to imbue the 'derived realm' of theatricality with the kinds of negative qualities that Cull attributes to "the two-worlds view of transcendence": a commitment to dualism (mind and matter, subject and object); fixed identifies; imitation and representation; and a "top-down" approach to organization and creativity, as if from "'outside or above' the physical world" rather than "dwelling within."[13] What is at stake in this book is a restoration of theatricality's more positive qualities, even if their affective power might also be used to deceptive and even detrimental ends.

Throughout, this is done by retaining performativity as the domain of 'immanent' change and becoming, and indeed admitting theatricality's 'transcendent' tendencies, only reformulated through a set of metaphors specific to the case studies: the Cave, Colonnade, and Cube of Thread 2 (Plato, Bernini, and Fried); the Image, Platform, and Tightrope of Thread 3 (e.g. Wagner, Brecht, Brook); the 'seams' and ornaments of Thread 5 (domestic design); the 'counter-texture' of colour in Thread 6 (urban activism).

The bulk of this Introduction consists in elaborating how *metaphor*, *dramaturgy*, *philosophy*, and different metaphors of *texture* intertwine in my approach; these are the very yarn from which the more 'perspectival' argument is woven in the case studies. As a necessary background, however, I will now elucidate, in some detail, just how my target discourses appear to fluctuate between values of *novelty* and *normativity*, as summarily suggested in the 'binary fourfold' of Table 1.1: theatricality, between creative essence and elusive appearance, performativity, between doing and dissimulation. From different perspectives, citing Shannon Jackson's oft-quoted summary, their contested common ground "is about doing, and it is about seeing; … it repeats endlessly

and it never repeats; it is intentional and unintentional, innovative and derivative, more fake and more real" – she calls this common ground 'performance.'[14] While both theatricality and performativity have been argued to both sustain and disrupt the powers that be, to think about their tensions and paradoxes is to engage in a *performance philosophy*.

The ensuing discussion proceeds according to the numbering provided in Table 1.1; to retain a degree of brevity, certain key references are further opened in the notes. The rest of the Introduction is outlined at the end of the following section, the rest of the book – apart from the passing explanatory reference – at the end of the Introduction.

<TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE>
The Binary Fourfold:
Normative and creative values of performativity and theatricality.

| **Performativity** | **Theatricality** |
|---|---|
| NOVELTY | |
| [4] Austin: "doing things";<br>singular acts: agency/efficacy;<br>*parfornir*: to "furnish forth";<br>presence, skill, embodiment | [2] art form: modernist essences,<br>"rich" or "poor" (Wagner/Grotowski);<br>literal: "theater-minus-text" (Barthes);<br>expression, staging, directorial control |
| NORMATIVITY | |
| [3] Butler: "dissimulation" of historicity,<br>reiteration of norms/conventions;<br>*per formam*: "through form";<br>status quo sustained by habit/repetition | [1] value/quality, modern epistemology:<br>representation, perception, appearance;<br>figural: derived, hollow, parasitic,<br>detrimental as "excess or emptiness" |

## Novelty and Normativity: A Hypothetical Fourfold

If only to caricature the more negative and more positive valorizations of theatricality and performativity, in four points, I am inclined to frame the debate by what Jonas Barish famously dubbed [1] the 'antitheatrical prejudice': the "ontological queasiness" so easily evoked by theatricality as a value, quality, or condition, evident in its "hostile or belittling" connotations in everyday language (*playing up to, putting on an act, making a scene*)[15] but arguably preceding its specifically 'theatrical' denotations. As noted, the theatre's very etymology evokes sight and spectatorship (the *theatron* as 'seeing place'); add a Platonic prejudice over 'mere appearances,' and theatricality becomes a pejorative term for something derived from, and perhaps even detrimental to art and society alike. As Thomas Postlewait and Tracy C. Davis neatly put it, it seems all but defined by its "excess and its emptiness, its surplus as well as its lack."[16]

Suffice it here to emphasize four implications of this succinct formulation. In its excessive or centrifugal mode, first, the danger of theatricality is seen to lie in its orientation toward an *audience*, and hence its ability to 'parasitize' the body politic by way of mimetic contagion (the 'parasitic' here referencing J. L. Austin's famous exclusion of theatrical speech acts from his initial discussion of the performative).[17] That this poses a threat, second, is because theatricality is deemed all *appearance* ("hollow or

void" for Austin), corruptive of some alleged essence be it of reality, authenticity, literature, or liveness – its empirical 'objecthood,' from Plato's Cave to Michael Fried's modernism, obstructing ideal comprehension and aesthetic absorption alike.

Third, variously identified with fascist spectacle and bourgeois decorum, the notion has itself become an 'empty term,' readily resisted in any and all binaries, differently configured in different times and art forms. As Jackson notes, the 'literal' theatrical attacked by Fried is very different from the 'figural' traditionally despised.[18]

Fourth, even as its metaphorical extension transcends the squarely 'theatrical' (modifiers like *acting* or *illusion*), the value of theatricality remains contingent on historical practices and shifting moral sentiments. Therefore Christopher Balme, for instance, sees in the discourse of 'authenticity,' as it arises in eighteenth-century Europe, a reaction to what was perceived as the "ubiquitous theatricality of modernity." Taking cue from Elizabeth Burns, he very usefully identifies theatricality more generally as a "mode of perception" with *dramaturgical*, *aesthetic*, and *epistemological* facets:

> Theatricality is a mode of perception that brackets moments of action or particular places in such a way that they are imbued with extreme concentration and focus. It invariably emphasizes the visual senses and moves the beholder to become aware of his/her act of spectating. Because this mode of perception depends on the recognition of pre-existing patterns and conventions, it is often framed or, pejoratively spoken, marred by a sense of second-handedness.[19]

(This set of connotations is specifically addressed in Thread 2 of this study – through the emblematic Cave, Colonnade, and Cube of Platonic parable, Baroque architecture, and minimalist sculpture – but also in reference to Shaffer's *Amadeus* in Thread 4.)

[2] By the twentieth century, however, these very qualities would also define theatricality in the affirmative.[20] Newly conscious of its specificity in the modernist moment – in line with concurrent formalisms of *literariness* or *pictoriality* – the *art of theatre* now sought to enlist its epistemological baggage of perception and appearance in an ontology of expressive essence, on which four points can again be highlighted.

First, as Glen McGillivray argues, theatricality remained a *value* but now "operated in reverse," as a transcendent category "to which various forms of practice aspired"[21] – an empty term now specifically emptied of 'theatre' as it was currently practiced by actors and producers (witness the antitheatricality of the newly emerging director). As such, second, it could freely capitalize on many qualities historically charged against it, the aesthetics of excess and emptiness, for example, now ranging from the 'rich' or Baroque or Wagnerian to the 'poor' bare essentials of a Brecht or a Grotowski.

Here, third and fourth, a distinction also becomes apparent between what may be called the intro- and extroversive aspects of such liberatory modernism. With the kind of absorption readily afforded by stage realism and the emergent cinema, it only made sense to specify theatricality through its historically despised objecthood – by 'baring the device' to its now corporeal essence, in a self-reflexive gesture often driven by a distrust of language (cf. Roland Barthes's 'theatre-minus-text'[22]) or some appropriation of archaic or non-Western performance forms. In their concurrent *opening up* to

political or even metaphysical realities, finally, the 'theatricalists' aspired not only to 'retheatricalize' the theatre, but indeed to theatricalize *life itself* as something from which humanity had become utterly alienated by its inert institutions.

So consistent has this discourse remained with the modernist assumptions of the historical avant-garde – stressed by McGillivray and derived, by Puchner, from Wagner – that quite routinely its key academic proponents have also aligned theatricality with either the "essence" or "specificity" of theatre (Josette Féral) or with a "heightened, intensified … celebrative expression of human potential" (Marvin Carlson).[23]

(These trajectories may be related to Beckett's 'detheatricalization' of the theatre in works like *Footfalls* [Thread 4], but are explicitly explored in Thread 3, through the threefold metaphors of the Image, the Platform, and the Tightrope. These are derived from Wagner and Fuchs; Meyerhold and Brecht; and Peter Brook respectively.)

[3] Then again, both expression and essence are precisely opposed to *performativity* as Judith Butler intends it, as a "reiteration of norms" the very historicity of which it tacitly "conceals or dissimulates" as the natural workings of pregiven entities.[24] In contrast to the modern/ist discourse of theatricality, that of performativity is most specifically a postmodern one but has also been extended – from Nietzsche's "no doer behind the deed" to Derridean deconstruction – to define our age more generally (as 'reason' did the Enlightenment).[25] Again a cluster of connotations suggests itself.

As a category of *identity*, first, performativity's opposition to 'expressiveness' also undercuts theatrical dichotomies of reality and appearance. Instead of our "doings" (styles, clothes, gestures) merely exteriorizing what we essentially 'are,' for Butler they "effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal." Rather than providing 'roles' for 'selves' to take on, the performativity of gender she has established "means, quite simply, that it is real only to the extent that it is performed."[26] As a *cultural* category, second, it thus exceeds the "bounded 'acts'" of performance in that its norms "precede, constrain, and exceed the … performer's 'will' or 'choice'." Dissimulated as nature or essence, it also evades the sensory measures of theatricality and rather affords, as Sedgwick notes, such 'absorption' as Fried proposed in its stead.[27] Third, performative accounts of *knowledge* can be contrasted with representational ones. Insofar as discourses and institutions also 'constitute' the realities they claim to only describe – objectively, as if from a theatrical distance – 'performative' knowledge remains thoroughly implicated in surrounding matrices of power.[28]

Altogether, these notions amount to a theory of *normativity*.[29] While it can enable a progressive politics by exposing its pervasive dissimulations, this strand of performativity "names the iterative processes" that in Jackson's words "do the 'institutionalizing' in institutional racism and … the 'internalizing' in internalized oppression."[30] In a sense, this trajectory begins already in J. L. Austin's initial theorization of performative speech acts, in *How To Do Things With Words* (1962), challenging the 'representationalist' view of language with utterances that in "appropriate circumstances" have the power to affect reality (e.g., "I do" at a wedding).[31] After Jacques Derrida had challenged Austin's own normalization of certain circumstances (the "appropriate" as opposed to the theatrically "hollow or void") with the 'iterability' of all utterances, Butler could formulate the general "paradox of subjectification": "that the subject

who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms," any sense of agency thus "immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition."[32]

[4] Such contextual nuances aside, finally, the kind of cultural agency often cherished in Performance Studies is ultimately more akin to Austin's pragmatic vision of performativity as the *doing of things, effectively*, not only with words but in the world. Often, this vision of agency comes with a sense of direct causation, coupled with a subversive politics that seeks to destabilize both social discipline and the near-obsolete art form of theatre (this is only conditionally allowed by Butler). Insofar as it tends to merge with more general notions of either *performance* as such – as "a doing and a thing done" (Diamond), boasting an "ontology of presence" (Phelan) – or with 'cultural performance' and its social *efficacy* (McKenzie),[33] two key contexts of negation stand out for this more discipline-specific derivation of performativity.

First, the very definition of the field of performance depends on stories of *transgression*, ranging from that of performance art – beyond the static bounds of the traditionally visual arts – to the 'subversion of theatricality' in Performance Studies. Indeed, Jackson sees in the latter's "heroic" origin stories of "disciplinary breaking and remaking" a "masculinist … quest to dissociate from the feminized realm of theatre," again serving as the empty term against which it performs its very specificity. (Thus, the 'essentialist strain' of theatre-*minus* is displaced with an 'imperialist strain' of theatre-plus-all-social-behaviour.)[34] Second, once this value of "liminal transgression or resistance itself becomes normative," it soon loses sight of modalities of *efficiency* and *effectiveness* that McKenzie recognizes as anything but subversive.[35] In Stephen Bottoms's recap, these include "the coercive 'performance management' systems [of] the late capitalist global infrastructure, and the 'technological performance' imperatives of the military-industrial machine,"[36] defined by their very obligation to outperform their rivals, to *Perform – or Else*: again, that is, by a sense of *getting things done.*

Besides what *is* performance, then, Richard Schechner may safely argue that 'objects' or 'things' as well can be understood *as* performances, insofar as their "behavior" appears "restored" or "twice-behaved."[37] Succeeding the breakout of performance from the prison of theatricality (see the end of Thread 2), the confines of *re*-presentation are soon taken over by those of *re*-iteration; if ever there was a confining, pregiven identity the subject wishes to escape, it seems she can only perform that escape *per formam* – 'through' a pregiven 'form,' as the Latin etymology[38] suggests.

(The paradoxes of performativity are addressed throughout this study, from the cultural norms contested by 'theatricality' in Threads 2 and 3, through the thematic tensions of both *Amadeus* and *Footfalls* in Thread 4, to the varieties of efficiency and activism, in Threads 5 and 6: Le Corbusier and Apple; knit graffiti and clown patrols.)

Perhaps, then, the more fortunate etymology is that of 'thoroughly furnishing' (*par fornir*),[39] in the sense of *bringing forth* what various threads of this book strive to identify as different kinds of theatrical and performative 'textures' – of interweaving strands or processes, rather than pre-existing parts or components? Crucially to the very argument of this study, the conceptual shift is from the fourfold of fairly static binaries, delineated above, to a more dynamic continuum of shifting perspectives:

*Performatively, 'texture' names an emergent pattern that is, however, only achieved in the iterative process of its weaving (novelty versus normativity again). Theatrically, it can be perceived as the very substance or as the mere surface of something – confirming the validity of what is performed, or revealing it as mere dissimulation.*

More generally, the language of texture helps us turn from rigid semantic conditions ('theatre': hence drama, stage, acting, viewing) to the more temporal or *dramaturgical* dynamics of their discursive and material 'interweaving'; I will return to dramaturgy shortly. On the one hand, to make such a move is only to argue for a change of metaphors – and I will return to metaphor shortly. On the other hand, it is to partake in the "new wave of materialist thought" whose "post-Butlerian accounts of performativity" would challenge a perceived "cul-de-sac of discursive idealism," as the development is summarized by political geographers Reuben Rose-Redwood and Michael R. Glass. As I hope the various threads of this study will show, my sense of both texture and metaphor can be understood as 'non-representational' in their sense, "privileging embodied practices over textual meaning" with an emphasis on "practice, affect, materiality, dwelling, and agency in a more-than-human world."[40] In Cull's and Deleuze's terms, this remains a world of *immanence* much rather than transcendence.

To argue as much, however, some further Introduction is still in order.

The next section articulates my basic understanding of *metaphor*, in this study – and specifically of Stephen Pepper's 'world hypotheses' and their 'root metaphors' – after which the metaphors of *texture* and *weaving* are further elaborated in three consecutive sections. The first of these considers texture as a metaphor for *dramaturgy*, as popularized by Eugenio Barba; the second takes a more philosophical perspective, centred on Pepper's 'contextualism' but including feminist and ecological approaches as well. The third and most important section then introduces Tim Ingold's *meshwork* as a key figure of plural performative becoming: the interweaving of lines (lives, materials, actions, gestures), as opposed to the *network* as a key figure of theatrical detachment or abstraction – the connecting of points or objects into which the meshwork is simplified when we optically 'zoom out' from its haptic engagement. In the end, having thus introduced the basic vocabulary in which these writings are written, I outline the six chapters or Threads in which the fabric of this study properly consists.

## World Hypotheses, or, The Performativity of Metaphor

In a wonderful 1996 article on "Performance as Metaphor," Bert O. States expresses some reasonable concern over the *limits* of its conceptual expansion or 'colonization': "Spreading on the winds of metaphor," like any good keyword-in-the-making, it "was ideally positioned … to be used in almost any context. … What isn't performance?" If its "outsider" applications to individual or social life (as in Erving Goffman and Victor Turner) still remembered it was a metaphor, the "limit-problem" became an issue, for States, with "insider theorists" (such as Richard Schechner and Peggy Phelan) turning the metaphor in on itself, so as "to define performance itself … and normally in the most basic possible terms."[41]

For present purposes, I derive from States's analysis an observation and a twist. First, while both theatricality and performativity have provided metaphors for more abstract phenomena of social existence, both also remain abstract enough in themselves, so as to ultimately depend on more basic metaphors, still, according to the context and purpose of their varying definitions (take the implied distinction of *seeing* and *doing*). Accordingly, second, I wish to study them not as metaphorical source domains for further understanding, as has usually been the case (as in "All the world's a stage"), but as themselves *target domains*, in effect created by historically specific metaphors of spatiality and conduct, perception and action – that is, by a changing set of extra-theatrical qualities, themselves attributed with shifting values in shifting contexts.[42]

In so saying, I do not intend metaphor as mere figures of speech – 'theatrical' in the sense of merely embellishing or reflecting some pre-existing reality – but instead as deeply performative, in the sense of creating the very textures of thought we take to be real – establishing what they name while rendering natural their means. Thus also the very possibility of change lay in attending to what our metaphors serve to hide or highlight, instead of merely reiterating those we are accustomed to live and act by.

My obvious reference here is to the cognitive-linguistic tradition initiated by linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), introducing 'conceptual metaphor' as a ubiquitous, embodied way of thinking and acting. Basically, this is what enables us to make sense of abstract things in terms of more concrete or literal experiences, such as of *movement*, *manipulation*, or *perception* (if you *see* or *grasp* what I'm *getting at*).[43] In accordance with the profoundly performative connotations of their title, their grand argument is that neither vernacular nor scientific discourses can do without a set of deeply 'ontological' metaphors. Innocent as it may sound, to speak of 'reading meaning' *into* or *out of* an art event, say, such expressions only make the sense they do in terms of literacy and spatial boundedness (this is at the theoretical core of my *Theatre/Ecology/Cognition*). The more abstract the phenomenon to be understood, the more it is in fact created by metaphorical extension: hence, for example, the fully conventional metaphors of Life as a Journey, or of Birth and Death as Coming and Going. As precisely *performative* rather than expressive of some alleged 'similarity,' all such metaphors can only ever be *partial* in what they serve to reveal. As an analytical tool, conceptual metaphor theory does not give us what something 'is,' but only clues as to how it is conceived as so being. Foregrounding some aspects of the imagined 'target domain,' every such metaphor will effectively conceal many others – in other words, metaphors always also carry the implicit assumptions we might refer to as 'ideology' or 'worldview.'

And here we return to Pepper and Ingold. In terms of competing metaphors, the last decade or so of Ingold's philosophical anthropology has explored what he calls the "life of lines" (effectively derived from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) and their "fragmentation – under the sway of modernity – into a succession of points or dots."[44] In his most recent work, Ingold presents variants of the *block* and the *knot* as "mutually exclusive master-tropes for describing the constitution of the world, predicated on philosophies, respectively, of being and becoming" – or in his own terms, of building up or carrying on. Given the long dominance of *blocks*, *chains*, and *containers* as the prime figures of Western thought, he suggests "a reversion to the knot" could now enhance "our understanding of ourselves, of the things we make and do, and of the

world we live in."[45] Not to argue for any direct correspondence, these four metaphors – block, chain, container, knot – are strikingly akin to the four 'root metaphors' of Western epistemology and aesthetics that the American philosopher Stephen C. Pepper (1891–1972) explored in his 1942 book *World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence*.[46]

A historian of ideas and a philosopher or art and ethics – himself a disciple of John Dewey – Pepper dismissed the attitudes of "utter skepticism" and "utter dogmatism" much as he did philosophical eclecticism, arguing that at the time only four such hypotheses stood out as "relatively adequate" in "scope and precision." For each, he identified a distinct root metaphor and theory of truth (as outlined in Table 1.2), drawn from "common-sense" experience.[47] If *formistic* metaphors try to explain what something is like, those of *organicism*, how this something develops, and *mechanistic* ones, how it works, then *contextualistic* metaphors are concerned with how something – anything – happens, occurs, or comes about.[48] (In Ingold's terms, if you allow the extension, *formism* may be related to categorical 'containment,' *organicism* to 'chain' metaphors for organic process, *mechanism* to the 'building blocks' approach, and *contextualism* to his favoured vocabulary of 'knots,' lines, and textures.)

While rarely acknowledged among the likes of Dewey or William James, it is Pepper's 'contextualistic' elaboration of American pragmatism, specifically, that I wish to rescue from relative oblivion – providing as it does an important precedent to current philosophies of 'becoming,' and consequently to my overall project here. However, all four hypotheses warrant brief exposition, if only to imply what is taken to be implied when one or the other is referred to over the course of my argument.

Pepper himself admits to having given his paradigms "slightly unfamiliar names so as to avoid issues over the names themselves," which again are intended to characterize styles of thought rather than individual authors, though a few are tentatively named.[49] As is suggested in the much later Table 7.1, the four may also be playfully superimposed on *some* of the reasoning behind the binary fourfold of Table 1.1; while that discussion is grounded in all the intervening case studies, the basic logic is as follows.

<TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE>
Stephen C. Pepper's *World Hypotheses* (1942) and their 'root metaphors.'

| RM=root metaphor, TT=theory of truth | **ANALYTICAL** | **SYNTHETIC** |
|---|---|---|
| **DISPERSIVE** (inadequacy of precision) | FORMISM<br>RM: similarity of form<br>TT: correspondence<br>E.g. Plato, Aristotle | CONTEXTUALISM<br>RM: historic event<br>TT: operational<br>E.g. Protagoras, Peirce, James, Dewey, Bergson |
| **INTEGRATIVE** (inadequacy of scope) | MECHANISM<br>RM: lever/machine<br>TT: causal adjustment<br>E.g. Democritus, Descartes, Galileo, Locke, Hume | ORGANICISM<br>RM: organic whole<br>TT: coherence<br>E.g. Schelling, Hegel |

First, *formism* "is often called 'realism' or 'Platonic idealism'"; it grounds itself in the intuition of similarity, and endorses the correspondence theory of truth.[50] This is close to the figural or representational derivation of theatricality, Plato's cave its primal allegory in Thread 2. *Mechanism* has the lever or pump as its earliest root metaphor, and causal adjustment as its theory of truth; it "is often called 'naturalism' or 'materialism' and, by some, 'realism'." This may be related to performativity as the reiteration of norms, exemplified by Beckettian repetition and functionalist architecture, in Threads 4 and 5. *Organicism* "is commonly called 'absolute (or, objective) idealism'," and rests its claims to cognitive validity on the coherence of organic processes. Often this is the approach of choice in discourses of performative efficacy, especially those of activist practice cited in Thread 6. Finally, *contextualism* virtually equals 'pragmatism,' seeking to unravel our experience of unique events to their strands and textures by an operational theory of successful working. Perhaps unfairly, the slot it takes in my playful superimposition is the more positive valence of theatricality – understood as a perspectival estrangement of some of the other core premises (in Ingold's terms, a 'knotting' of their respective containers, blocks, and chains.)

Moreover, "these four hypotheses arrange themselves in two groups of two each."[51] First, *analytical* and *synthetic* theories tend to focus on "elements or factors" and "complexes or contexts," respectively, presenting the other orientation as derivative. Applied to Table 1.1, this division maps rather intriguingly onto the very hierarchy of normativity (mechanism and formism) and novelty (organicism and contextualism). Second, if the *dispersive* world views only recognize "multitudes of facts rather loosely scattered about," the *integrative* world is more determinate and theoretically predictable. The implications of this divide seem somewhat unfair, again, insofar as the two categories come to suggest theatricality and performativity themselves. Some justification might be found through the critique of the latter concepts, however, for their 'derivativeness' and 'generality': for Pepper, dispersive theories are "chiefly threatened" with the lack of *precision*, integrative theories with the lack of *scope*.

From a twenty-first century perspective, there are of course obvious limitations to Pepper's scheme. As the only one of his hypotheses to stick to the thick of things, so to say, rather than aiming "to get to the bottom of things or to the top of things"[52] like the others, it is his contextualistic metaphor rather exclusively that lends itself to tentative extension in terms of more recent 'systems' orientations. However, all four have inspired such important overviews as *Geography and the Human Spirit*, by Anne Buttimer (1993), or indeed Hayden White's now-classic *Metahistory* of 1973 (even if the Pepperian strand is easy to miss).[53] Where Buttimer finds in Pepper "a useful narrative frame" for "the story of Western geography" – whether the world is conceived of as a "mosaic of forms" or as an "arena of spontaneous events"[54] – White uses his root metaphors to identify four "modes of argument" in a complex model of historiographical practice, coupled with like fourfolds of trope, genre, and ideology.[55]

Even though White finds the contextualistic "explanatory strategy" occasionally exemplified "in any historian worthy of the name, from Herodotus to Huizinga,"[56] however, I have restricted the examples listed in Table 1.2 to those offered by Pepper himself. If a Marx or a Piaget were easy enough to recruit under mechanism and organicism, say, many 'systems' and 'process' thinkers (what have you) from Darwin to Deleuze and Ingold seem indeed to hover between the concepts of contextualism and

organicism. Likewise with theorists closer to the field of Performance Philosophy: Even if the behaviourist leanings of a Schechner and the more Hegelian bent in Butler justified their placement in relatively mechanistic and organistic camps, respectively, a Pepperian metahistory of theatre and performance studies must remain the subject of another study.[57]

For now, my point is that all four approaches have important insights to offer. While my own version of 'contextualism' might lean toward organicism and mechanism, in its more performative and theatrical modalities, its implications are already well developed in the study and practice of *dramaturgy* that I now briefly introduce.

## Meaning in the Weaving: Images of Dramaturgical Organization

Most generally, 'dramaturgy' concerns the *organization* of materials, or the *work* of actions as Eugenio Barba suggests[58] – both of these are derived from the Greek *ergon* (cf. also organism, ergonomics). To the extent that all theories of organization reflect "implicit images or metaphors that lead us to see, understand, and manage organizations in distinctive yet partial ways," as Gareth Morgan has argued in the distinct field of organization studies (with specific reference to Pepper),[59] a few recurrent metaphors also seem to organize our understandings of dramatic organization.

Of those discussed by Morgan, Cathy Turner and Synne K. Behrndt find the *mechanistic* metaphor of dramaturgy appropriate to G. E. Lessing's approach, "rooted in the scientific revolution" in "laying bare the mechanics of dramatic composition,"[60] while the *organic* image may conceivably be traced all the way from Aristotle to Barba himself. Where the former likens tragedy to the most "beautiful" of animals, of a magnitude "easily embraced in one view," Barba would dub performance "a living organism" as well, and dramaturgy an "anatomical investigation" into "its different organs and layers."[61] Altogether, if performance *analysis* "implies a sense of unravelling the different strands of a work" or event (as per its Greek root 'to unloose' cited by Turner and Behrndt),[62] then dramaturgy rather serves to trace their interconnection – whether understood in terms of architecture or orchestration; the design and determinism of machinery; the planting of a plant or the anatomy of an organism; or the rules and patterns of form or structure. (These may be compared to Pepper's four root metaphors once more.)

In theatrical tradition, however, the rich texture of any performative event is often abstracted into the rising and falling progression of *one single line of action*, composed of subsidiary events of change and reversal, over nested segments of dramatic time. In line with Tim Ingold's charming study of *Lines* (2007), one implicit assumption in how this is usually graphed is that lines are prototypically straight – a quality that he argues modern thought has variously related with mind, masculinity and culture, as opposed to the more deviant linearity of matter, femininity and nature.[63] What is more, and equivalent to reducing the *eventness* of dramaturgy to the 'event-full' events of dramatic complication, such rigid linearity also translates their temporal articulation into a spatial sequence of *points* along the line thus outlined. "Much as in a child's join-the-dots puzzle," the pattern is "already given as a virtual object from

the outset," while actually joining the dots is merely a matter of "construction or assembly" – and once that is complete, "there is nowhere further for the line to go."[64]

So, suppose we imagine dramaturgy not on the mechanistic model of the assembly line, but rather, as an assembly of lines: of divergent actions and materials that bring forth a meaningful event in their very interweaving, rather than any *one* of them being prioritized as an overriding sign vehicle for carrying forward a message. This duality immediately evokes two roughly concurrent, powerful models of dramaturgy that I need to cite as an important inspiration for the metaphors elaborated in what follows.




<FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE>
Four models of dramaturgy and scenography: *Chain* and *braid* are inspired by Richard Schechner; *space* and *event*, by Willmar Sauter and Tim Ingold.

The first are Richard Schechner's images of the *chain* and the *braid* (see Figure 1.1) for "Greek" and "Indian" performance traditions. In the one, "all theatrical 'effects' or 'elements' serve the driving idea, the causal chain," in the other, "the performance bunches and relaxes" with "many or few strands operating at any moment."[65] Second is then the hugely influential, dual vision of *weaving* by means of whose tensions Eugenio Barba argues the dramaturgical "work of actions" comes alive as 'texture.' For Barba, "the interweaving by means of concatenation and the interweaving by means of simultaneity" are equally important even if the latter is often considered merely "ornamental" (as if its strands were "not woven together: in the background").[66]

Add the earlier distinctions between spatial mapping and temporal becoming – in Figure 1.1, these are simply graphed as *space* and *event* – and we have at hand a general contrast of overt structure and covert texture (*explicate* and *implicate*) that would seem to undermine overly mechanistic conceptions of making altogether. As Ingold again suggests, "to emphasise making is to regard the object as the expression of an idea," already present as pre-conceived; whereas to emphasize "weaving" is to emphasize the rhythmic process of generation by which it actually comes into being.[67] In slightly different terms, if *text*, as a paradigm for dramaturgy, goes for the linear and

hierarchical – the symbolic economy of print culture and of sequential information processing – then *texture* goes for the simultaneous and heterogeneous: a performative ecology of interweaving trajectories, from which categorical boundaries of dramatic action may only ever be derived as retrospective abstractions.

(In the Figure, 'Scenography' as the heading for *space* and *event* is only intended to evoke the way that the 'scene' or context is dramaturgically 'graphed' in ongoing action. Saving the *explicate* and *implicate* orders for the later Thread 7, the associations of *chain*, *braid*, *space* and *event* with Pepper's world hypotheses are justified by the latters' core intuitions of form, teleology, location, and texture, respectively.[68])

Obviously, this is no grand discovery. While perhaps popularized as a definition of dramaturgy by Barba, the figure of weaving characterizes much of its current theorization to the effect that dramaturgy now appears less a function of the *dramaturg* as an isolated agent or outside eye, than of the wider ecology (weave or texture) of the performative *event*.[69] Nor I am suggesting a transcendent hierarchy of value, with all linear dramaturgies – readily conceived as arcs of scenes or chains of blocks – now subordinate to some immanent vision of textural becoming; indeed, zooming out to such tentative analytical patterns is central to my very concept of 'theatricality' in this book. Rather, I propose an experiential duality, in which whatever vision we may gain over the 'performative' texture of events will only remain vague, since the texture itself keeps weaving on. By contrast to the Aristotelian idea of Whole Action as a Sequence of Events, *eventness* may here be defined as the contextual quality of performance in its unfolding, much of whose '*con*-texture' will always also leak beyond our direct experience – be it in textures of neural configuration, in the relentless undercurrent of code in our digital lives and performances, or, indeed, in the gathering and dispersal of those who co-enact the event (not all of them, necessarily, human).

In Figure 1.1, to recapitulate, the *explicate* order of Pepper's *formistic* and *mechanistic* world views is exemplified by corresponding models of dramaturgy, as a *chain* of discrete events, and scenography, as a *spatial* embedding of discrete locations. By contrast, the metaphors of texture or weaving characterize the *implicate* order of Pepper's *organicism* and *contextualism*, with dramaturgy as a varying *braid* of actions, and scenography as the interweaving of open-ended *events*.

In the specifically theatrical context, accordingly, the use of more textural metaphors might begin to render more 'porous' the cherished idea of theatre or performance as an essentially local art form – not in the sense of advancing some colonial expansion *beyond*, but in the sense that the alleged beyond already inheres in-the-*here*. Unbound by inherited grids of time or place, the 'evental' in performance dramaturgy resides in whatever lines of action or perception enter its ongoing texture. In Ingold's terms, if "containers have insides and outsides" (amounting to the mapping of *space* in Figure 1.1), then "the topology of the knot" – or *event* in the Figure – only consists in 'interstices' of which "it is impossible to say what is inside or outside."[70]

Most important to the argument of this book, however, is Turner and Behrndt's key recognition that, in focusing on "the interconnectivity of things in the world," dramaturgical practices may also "have applications beyond drama, or indeed, the theatre."[71] To the extent that the word itself concerns the 'work' of actions or the organization of

materials, dramaturgy may equally imply the imposition of structure by an author (work *on* actions) or the work *of* actions more horizontally, across fields of practice such that dramatic theatre only appears as one case of a more general phenomenon – indeed, these two definitions come close to theatricality and performativity as I intend them. While I will delve into the dramaturgical textures of two specifically theatrical examples, in Thread 4 (Beckett's *Footfalls* and Shaffer's *Amadeus*), the prime import of the textural metaphor is ultimately philosophical, as I now proceed to argue at length.

## Fabric Philosophies: Feminist, Contextualistic, and Ecological Perspectives

As the geologist Stephen Norwick has demonstrated, in his extensive two-volume historical account of Western metaphors of nature, "fabric figures of speech" all but pervade Indo-European languages. The world's "vital metaphors of spinning, weaving, and knotting" range from the currently mundane – spinning a tale, thread of an argument, fabric of society, moral fibre, biological tissue – to perennial images of nature herself as "a thread, yarn, knot, fabric and chain (of daisies or metal)." Indeed, grand metaphors of the *web of life* themselves extend from Greek antiquity – where world and destiny alike were imagined as a fabric, whether spun by the fates or woven by the poets – to the food chains and webs that ground the modern science of ecology.[72]

Today, fabric philosophies abound. A particular influence on Ingold would have been Deleuze and Guattari's well-worn language of *rhizome* and *haecceity*, with its *lines of flight* or *becoming* and more – *felt* and *fabric* exemplifying their ideas of smooth and striated space: crochet and knitting, patchwork and embroidery.[73] The rising theoretical currency of 'texture,' specifically, is evidenced in a small profusion of book-length studies during the last few years, ranging from cognitive poetics and communication technology – *Texture* as "the experienced quality of textuality" (Stockwell) or as "the weave that binds us in a fabric of interconnection" (Harper) – to organization studies and the entanglement of technology with performance practice.[74] In a sense, texture also defines Erika Fischer-Lichte's recent concept of 'interweaving performance cultures,' intended to avoid some pitfalls of the term 'intercultural': "Many strands are plied into a thread; many such threads are then woven into a piece of cloth … dyed, plied and interwoven … without allowing the viewer to trace each strand back to its origin." (Admittedly, new metaphorical pitfalls do inhere in the relegation of textile production to third-world sweatshops.)[75]

Then again, one reason for the rising academic interest in textiles and textile scholarship lies precisely in their long-term relegation to a domain of tactile femininity, as opposed to masculine vision.[76] As Ingold notes, "the technical and the textilic" stem from the same root but were respectively elevated and debased, in modernity, as masculine technology and "mere craft."[77] As is further discussed in Threads 5 and 6 (especially in the latter's section on textile activism), figures of weaving and embroidery have aroused an important debate within second- and third-wave feminism. For some, they suggest female-specific metaphors of thought, creativity, and collaboration, potentially subversive of patriarchal systems of technology and domination; for others,

they only go to reinforce essentialist stereotypes of domestic womanhood and female submission.[78]

The circulal performativity of such stereotypes is neatly captured by literary scholar Katie Collins: "Women's naturally nimble fingers were to be occupied," she reasons, because they were the "frivolous creatures entirely unsuited to public life" – which again was proven by the "frills and fripperies" their nimble fingers would produce.[79] Recognizing the built-in masculinity of the "theories-as-buildings metaphor"[80] of academic writing – that it is public, orderly, and rational – Collins suggests that *needlecraft* metaphors might better define the decentred activity that it often is, "not individualistic or competitive," nor apart from life (like the solitary scholar of old, sitting in *his* study "while the minutiae of clothing and food is organised for him, around him, despite him"). Most importantly, such practice is about "piecing together … things of varying source and quality … that wouldn't necessarily fit together" in the building metaphor; true of the writings of this book for sure, this also suggests one way of doing Performance Philosophy that I briefly revisit in Thread 7 as well.

While by no means new, then, it can be argued that these notions are very much in the air and do serve to undermine overly mechanistic metaphors of organization and creativity. What I would add, apart from the traditional implications of 'texture' in music, literature, and the fine arts (respectively of harmony, textuality, and pigment), is its specific relevance to the *eventness of performance* as defined in the previous section. Given the word's etymological links with technology, architecture, tectonics, and context – from the Latin *com texere*, 'to weave together'[81] – we now return to Stephen Pepper's 'contextualistic' elaboration of American pragmatism.

As articulated in *World Hypotheses* (1942) and *Aesthetic Quality* (1937), contextualism names for Pepper a process ontology of constant novelty and change, less to do with pragmatic ends than with the larger contexts in which such qualities continuously emerge. Perhaps, it was to avoid the overly instrumentalist interpretations of *pragmatism* that he chose to name his approach with reference to context instead; in any case it applies directly to the dynamics of novelty and normativity that I have used to characterize the range of our present subject matter. Where the other forms of analysis aim at the top or bottom of things – be it in discrete forms, organic wholes, or mechanical parts – contextualistic analysis proceeds in the thick of things, as it were, picking from the scene at hand only the strands of immediate pragmatic concern.

More specifically, the "root metaphor" of this approach is the "historic event" – not as a thing of the past but "the event in its actuality," "alive in its present … when it is going on *now*, the dynamic dramatic active event" one may only describe by verbs.[82] Further key distinctions are between "the *quality* of a given event [as] its intuited wholeness or total character" and *texture* as "the details and relations which make [it] up."[83] Irreducible to hierarchies of content and form or essence and appearance, the two are ultimately intertwined but may also be approached as if they were separate, by way of 'intuition' and 'analysis' respectively. Finally, if "whatever directly contributes to the quality of a texture may be regarded as a *strand*, whereas whatever indirectly contributes to it will be regarded as *context*,"[84] then which is deemed which is ultimately a matter of perspective and distance: up close, there is a texture to every strand, while whole textures may appear as mere strands from afar. In Pepper's terms,

such is the work of *fusion*, evident "wherever a quality is had," yet often obscuring its both temporal and textural *spread*.[85] Where fusion gives us "unity" (e.g. of action or character – Ingold's example of the knot), spread goes to confirm its constitutive heterogeneity (Ingold's "proliferation of loose ends"[86]).

What I will argue is that such a language of overlapping textures may productively accommodate the various tensions and paradoxes charted previously. As opposed to the 'binary fourfold' of Table 1.1, the various case studies demonstrate how qualities of novelty and normativity quite fluently arise from one another, in a cyclical dramaturgy of perspective and distance, action and perception. In Pepper's terms, what is performatively naturalized will depend on widely *spread contexts* of reiteration, but often takes a thoroughly *fused quality* in the present; only occasionally may a novel *strand* of action undermine its assumed normality. Conversely, instants of theatricality work to unravel such performative strands to their local *textures* and perhaps even to their wider *contexts*, in a quasi-theoretical operation that may render their *relations* more perceptible but only ever at the cost of historical specificity.

For now, the 'spread' of texture also implies a sense of 'context' that may not be readily apparent, but whose implications are significant enough to draw out explicitly. As the psychologist Edward Morris puts it, connotations of "background, circumstances, conditions, framework … emphasize context-as-place, not context-as-history" which is the specific root metaphor intended by Pepper.[87] Where the former associations lend themselves to procedures of spatial mapping, *context* is not about containment here, nor is texture primarily a function of its surface; conceived as a strictly *evental* rather than a spatial term, context is constitutively inherent in every texture rather than providing some external 'frame' to its 'references' or strands.

The difference is delicate, yet it points to significant metaphorical assumptions that easily go unnoticed (cf. *Scenography* in Figure 1.1). While Willmar Sauter would agree that the relevant contexts of the 'theatrical event' reside not only in its background but always inhere in the event itself, his original graph, however, depicts them from the closest *spheres* of convention and conception to the wider cultural life world further on out (*space* in Figure 1.1).[88] In Pepper's view, by contrast, a properly contextualistic notion of eventness should conceive of context not on the image of concentric containment, but in terms of the fluid intertwining of its divergent layers or strands – not as a mere mapping of readymade entities, embedded in readymade contexts, but through a more evental cartography of ongoing processes, constitutively interwoven with their ongoing contextures (*event* in Figure 1.1; see also Table 5.1). To rephrase well-worn idioms of the content being *in* the form, or the medium being the message, we might thus suggest that whatever the medium – art form or life form – its meaning resides in the ecology of its weaving, going on and leaking beyond.

Hence, then, the widest 'context' that has been implicit throughout, beginning from Turner and Behrndt's observation that "dramaturgy concerns the interconnectivity of things in the world."[89] For Ingold, seeking not to convert the threads "along which life is lived into boundaries within which it is contained" (as in the "logic of inversion"[90] he finds central to modern thought), *ecology* names "the study of the life of lines," and is "virtually impossible to accommodate … within some neatly ordered system."

This is because such lines of life "always seem to wriggle free of any classification one might seek to impose on them, trailing loose ends in every direction."[91]

Arguably, it is this trailing precisely that constitutes a key image not only for 'the ecological thought' recently defined in like terms by philosopher and literary scholar Timothy Morton,[92] but also for the contextualistic world view outlined by Pepper seven decades previously. Where Morton relates our ecological *interconnectedness* to "thinking big – as big as possible" (to "magnitude beyond any idea of magnitude," beyond Aristotle's notions of the proper organic magnitude of tragedy),[93] the scope of Pepper's contextualistic world is ultimately 'dispersive' as well. If the ecological thought is "intrinsically open, so it doesn't really matter where you begin" – "permitting no distance," its "*here* is shot through with *there*"[94] – then likewise for the contextualist, parts and wholes, the small and the big are thoroughly implicated in each other. Indeed, it is the "sheering character" of tracing out the strands at hand that defines Pepper's pragmatist epistemology.[95] On the one hand, "you never reach the end of it," on the other, any event can be analysed in "many equally revealing ways … depending simply on what strands you follow from the event into its context":

> The reason for this is that what is analyzed is categorically an event, and the analysis of an event consists in the exhibition of its texture, and the exhibition of its texture is the discrimination of its strands, and the full discrimination of its strands is the exhibition of other textures … Contextualism is accordingly sometimes said to have a horizontal cosmology in contrast to other views, which have a vertical cosmology. There is no top nor bottom to the contextualistic world.[96]

## Network and Meshwork: Tim Ingold's Ecology of Lines and Becoming

As shorthand terms for specifically theatrical and performative textures, I now wish to recruit Tim Ingold's notions of the 'network' and the 'meshwork.' If the performative argument is for *coextensivity* over "any originary notion of interiority," as the feminist sociologist Vikki Bell suggests, then Ingold's critique of the modern "logic of inversion" is quite precisely coextensive with the performative critique of any naturalized sense of essential identity.[97] Rather than converting the "pathways along which life is lived into boundaries within which it is enclosed,"[98] *meshwork* names the *becoming* of things in their ongoing entanglement. Embracing the "paradoxically constitutive plurality" in which Bell sees the "promise of performativity," the concept would also seem to account for the immanent creativity and self-organization of *matter* in which she sees a challenge to narrowly psychic or cultural notions of performativity.[99] In what could amount to a novel articulation of the *materialization* that also undergirds Butler's "bodies that matter," Ingold envisions environments and organisms alike as "meshworks of interwoven lines," with "no insides or outsides, only openings and ways through."[100] Twining the two together, *ecology* becomes "the study of the life of lines … trailing loose ends in every direction" (this is somewhat different from the Gibsonian sense of ecology I have developed elsewhere).[101]

In short, ecology entails a thorough entanglement with the lines of the environment:

> Look *at* nature, as landscape, and there are, as Goya said, no lines to be seen. They exist only in its graphic representations. Look *with* it, however, as a manifold of earth and sky, join in the movements of its formation, and lines are everywhere. For they are the very lines along which we and other creatures live. … These lines are both inspired by, and carry forth, our affective lives.[102]

Clearly such a world evokes not only Karen Barad's "posthumanist performativity" (one of being 'entangled,' with no 'self-contained existence') but also the insistence, in Actor-Network Theory, "on the performative character of relations and the objects constituted in those relations" – only in the meshwork "things *are* their relations."[103] As a specifically ecological term for Timothy Morton, the *mesh* implies "the interconnectedness of all living and non-living things." "Vast yet intimate," infinite in both size and detail, it "extends inside beings as well as among them."[104] For Ingold likewise, every organism is itself "a tissue of knots, whose constituent strands, as they become tied up with other strands, in other knots, comprise the meshwork"; thus the concept of meshwork extends from the organic tissue of muscles, nerves, and blood vessels to the wider weaves of weather and landscape which engulf them.[105]

Now importantly, even if the *qualities* of networks and meshworks, in Pepper's terms, will depend on specific strands and contexts case by case, their *textural* dynamics can also be crudely drawn, as indeed they are in Figure 1.2.[106] Moreover, and unlike Schechner's 'fan' and 'web' of performance, for example, these figures derive their value not from the nodes or knots they encompass, but from how precisely these are woven together in "the connecting of points" and in "the entanglement of lines."[107]



<FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE>
Theatricality and performativity as abstraction and absorption: Tim Ingold's 'network' of connected *points* and 'meshwork' of interwoven *lines*, exemplified by the globe (with geographic coordinates) and the spider's web.

Indeed, it is as temporal "lines of life, growth and movement" – or lines of *flight* and *becoming* in the Deleuzo-Guattarian parlance which Ingold also cites – "that beings are instantiated in the world" that he conceives of as meshworked through and through.[108] Critically for the thinking of performativity, not only may such imagery divest the concept of the overly human-centred associations sometimes entertained, but also of any strict division between creative novelty and normative reiteration. "'Issuing forth' along the lines of their relationships," the things of this world enfold

its larger history within their constitution and thus remain *of* the meshwork, "woven into its very fabric" even as they "contribute to its ever-evolving weave."[109] "Knotted together at the centre but trailing innumerable 'loose ends' at the periphery," their meshwork is explicitly likened to the Deleuzeian notions of *rhizome* and *haecceity*.[110]

The one concrete example that Ingold himself repeatedly returns to is the spider's web of Figure 1.2. As opposed to the supposed *connectivity* of networks, "the lines of the spider's web … do not connect points or join things up," but rather they "lay down the *conditions of possibility* … *along* which it acts and perceives."[111] (In many of my case studies as well, performative novelty and normativity alike entail the fluent intertwining of action and perception, as opposed to their 'theatrical' decoupling.)

In contrast to such positive associations, however, Ingold's notion has yet to incorporate what we might call 'the prey's perspective,' in the spider example. In Bell's terms, this equals the Foucauldian lines of *power and knowledge* in which performed subjects are "caught" and which they are pressed to "continue or at least to negotiate"; as the "effects" of which they are sustained and which they themselves sustain; which they "literally incorporate" yet must also deny in order to assert themselves as subjects.[112] As distinct from Ingold's enabling sense of immersion – with bodies "enlightened, ensounded and enraptured" "in the currents of a world-in-formation" – one is here, in Butler's words, "*in power* even as one opposes it."[113] Furthermore, as Morton notes, *mesh* itself has etymological "antecedents in *mask* and *mass*, suggesting both density and deception," and may also denote (he cites the *OED*) "'a complex situation or series of events in which a person is entangled; a concatenation of constraining or restricting forces or circumstances; a snare'."[114]

For Ingold, however, what rather ensnares our thought is the popular imagery of *networks* in which, instead of being actively enacted and entangled, "all lines [merely] connect: objects into assemblies, destinations into itineraries, letters into words."[115] With its extension to domains of modern transport and communication, "the network metaphor logically entails that the elements connected are distinguished from the lines of their connection," things from their relations.[116] As "connections *between* one thing and another" – rather than experienced "*along* their severally enmeshed ways of life" – the lines of the network lack both duration and material presence.[117] What they "connect up, in reverse" are essentially reduced to *objects* (etymologically '*against* us,' not '*with* us' as *things* would be in Ingold's reading of Heidegger[118]), while the network itself remains "a purely spatial construct."[119]

Again, the one solid example that Ingold himself repeatedly returns to is the globe of Figure 1.2. Inverting the meshworked world itself into a contained object, the planetary and the classroom variants alike are for him the epitome of deadly abstraction – "a full-scale model" that he often, and not altogether accidentally, likens to "a stage set"[120]:

> [We] must cease regarding the world as an inert substratum, over which living things propel themselves about like counters on a board or actors on a stage … . [If mere objects were laid about like] scenery on a stage … how could anything live or breathe? … As in a stage set, … the appearance is an illusion. Absolutely nothing is going on. Only once the stage is set, and everything made ready, can

> the action begin. But the open world that creatures inhabit is not prepared for them in advance. It is continually coming into being around them.[121]

Then again, there is a way of shedding such decidedly antitheatrical valences, insofar as Ingold's networks of connected objects – but *not* his meshworks of interwoven lines – can also be taken to afford focused acts of theatrical manipulation: acts of *de*-contextualization that specifically enable the drawing of novel connections between the objects thus abstracted – the dots on the globe – on scales of texture distinctly below the default networks of society and information, transport and communication. (In their relative closure and openness, the globe and web of Figure 1.2 also lean toward Pepper's formistic and organistic metaphors, respectively.) In other words, the prime advantage of both the globe and the theatrical stage lies in their *synoptic* aspect rather than the mediated one; hence also the link from the medieval *theatrum mundi* to the modern, spectatorial understanding of the world by way of a world *view*.[122] Ingold himself admits as much elsewhere, casting the "topologies" of meshwork and network not as "mutually exclusive" but as perspectivally contingent:

> [When] attention is focused, it sets us in a distanced or "optical" relation with objects in the world; it is "zoomed out" … . [When] attention is dispersed, it sets us in a close or "haptic" relation with things in the world; it is "zoomed in". … Zooming in, up close, we see the meshwork of things; zooming out, from a distance, we see the network of objects.[123]

Again, the contextualistic metaphor of zooming or sheering will also apply to the dynamics of theatricality and performativity. Up close, absorbed or implicated in entrenched meshworks of embodiment and discourse, one is prone to perceive none. While it does afford an efficacious transparency to one's engagements, such 'zooming in' has both body and performance recede from consciousness, as the meshwork itself is habitually dissimulated by the apparent qualities of action and behaviour it serves to furnish forth. These are the *strands* and *local textures* we grow to live and perform by, mostly oblivious to the larger contexts of social sanction they may serve to dissimulate. (Read this with the spider's web of Figure 1.2 in mind.) To recap, it is only in theatrical acts of 'zooming out' – or stepping aside – that the entangled lines of such performative meshworks gain the optical quality of *objecthood* prerequisite for acts of attentive manipulation, and also perhaps for a Brechtian sense of estrangement. (As a fairly extreme example of defamiliarization, compare the dots on the globe, in Figure 1.2, to the more meshworked experience of actual cities.)

Even as Ingold's performative notion of the (immanent) *meshwork* provides a welcome critique and estrangement of the popular concept of the (transcendent) *network*, in short, the latter's epistemic value resides in its synoptic *theatricality*.

## The Fabric of the Book: A Guide to Some Key Trajectories

With the binary and perspectival conceptions of the network and the meshwork, we return to what is ultimately at stake in this study: how we should assess the pragmatic, at times ethical or political value of theatricality and performativity respectively. Picking a useful comparison from the very beginning, Laura Cull defines immanence and

transcendence as "*two tendencies of the same (differential) process*," yet however she relates them to "life's power" to either "liberate" or "imprison" itself: "We need to ask whether tending towards immanence is necessarily 'a good thing'," and "whether any traces of transcendence are necessarily 'bad'."[124] While I will only take this comparison further in the final chapter – suggesting, in effect, that these tendencies rather align with novelty and normativity than with performativity and theatricality, in the 'binary fourfold' I have previously outlined – these are questions that the reader might want to keep in mind while weaving her own way through the writings that follow.

Rather than portraying the processes of performativity as 'bad,' I will present their very immanence as one that often escapes human perception, with theatricality as *one* (fake transcendent) perspective from which to pick up the strings, as it were. The reader may freely assess whether the latter's synoptic networks, in their different guises, provide any perspective on her own processes of art, life, politics, or research.

To exemplify possible applications to research, the present approach might be considered somewhat theatrical in itself. While each chapter will draw on a range of specialists in each given area or topic, the book's main ambition is not historical or historiographical, nor even one of necessarily original scholarship, but one of thematic synthesis. Historical specifics are addressed throughout, but often also kept at a 'theatrical' distance that I understand is prone to irritate or even infuriate more historically-minded readers. With regard to the 'synoptic' project of theatricality just suggested, however, such 'stepping back' would also seem to span the very themes that I seek to understand: history as a process of performative becoming or emergence,[125] on the one hand, and the 'theatre of history' as how this process is analytically engaged, made sense of, or narrated, on the other. (Hence also the implicitly antitheatrical arguments against the writing of history where, on etymological grounds, it is accused of reducing the world to 'mere stories.') In Pepper's terms, a purely theoretical perspective lacks 'precision,' while a properly historical perspective lacks 'scope.'

In order to fully flesh out the concepts introduced in this chapter – or, to move from their surface theatrics to what they are capable of *doing*, in the performative sense – the rest of this book unfolds as a wide-fabric of roughly-chronological case studies. Admitting that it is scope that I hope to gain most of all, the five chapters that follow are roughly focused on theatricality (2–3), theatre (4), and performativity (5–6), themselves addressed as specific 'threads' within the book's overall texture.

Thread 2 takes on the question of value directly. In this chapter, the *antitheatrical tradition* is addressed through the emblematic Cave, Colonnade, and Cube of Platonic parable, Baroque architecture, and minimalist sculpture. As text-book cases of 'antitheatrical prejudice' – of theatricality as a term of contempt – it is argued that all three exhibit an empirical and *aspectual* quality of theatricality, in which their historical opponents have perceived a distinct threat to performed norms of mimesis, measure, and modernism. If the theatricality that Plato attacks is one of ontological emptiness, then that of the Baroque is one of flamboyant gestural excess, ever overflowing any canonical containment projected on classical ideals in Renaissance retrospect. (I focus on Gianlorenzo Bernini's Colonnade in St Peter's Square in the Vatican, but also address the work of his rival Francesco Borromini.) Conversely, when the modernist art critic Michael Fried attacks the 'theatricality' of sculptural 'literalism' in

1967, it is to defend just the sort of caved absorption that Plato arguably opposed. Through its related dramaturgies of *escape*, from Plato's Cave to Performance Studies, the antitheatrical prejudice is here presented as a specifically anti-*textural* one.

To further qualify the *textures* of theatricality, seen destabilizing performed norms in the previous chapter, Thread 3 takes the more pro-theatrical perspective of the modernist theatre director. As perhaps the default connotation of theatricality, within the theatre, the 'theatricalism' of the avant-gardes is dissected into three fairly distinct models of directorial theatricality: the Image – deep or shallow, as for Richard Wagner and Georg Fuchs; the Platform – of skill or tension, as for Vsevolod Meyerhold and Bertolt Brecht; and the Tightrope – this is Peter Brook's metaphor for a kind of theatrical immediacy that navigates between the 'holy' and 'rough' aspirations of the above, and may also be related to the 'theatrical instinct' postulated by Nikolai Evreinov early in the century. Again, what marks each of the three models as specifically *theatrical* is how the very density or sparsity of their textures (and these compare with the excesses and emptinesses of the previous thread) ostensibly deviates from some historically specific performative norm – be it operatic convention, stage naturalism, capitalist society, literary or 'deadly' theatre. Lengthwise, the chapter focuses on Brook most extensively, not only as a perceptive commentator, but also as someone harshly ridiculed for his theatricalist essentialism.

The only chapter to engage with specific plays or performances, at any length, Thread 4 then zooms in on the fine textures of dramaturgy in performance, on the unlikely coupling of Samuel Beckett's *Footfalls* (1976) and Peter Shaffer's *Amadeus* (1979). Formally akin in staging a monological but widely-textured weaving of *memory*, the two exemplify not only the theatrical tendencies to emptiness and excess, but also the dynamics of performativity both aesthetically (Beckettian repetition) and thematically (novelty and normativity in the form of genius and mediocrity). Apart from the texts themselves, the chapter addresses some habitual patterns of criticism – often dismissing Shaffer's theatricality while embracing Beckett's – as well as such staples of the theatrical as *witnessing*, *narration*, and the *play within the play*. The theoretical argument is for an easy intertwining between the *there* of performative absorption and the *aside* of theatrical distance: the first person and the third, the meshwork and the network, the memory and the monologue. In the context of this set of writings as a whole, the studied plays also exemplify a contrast of fading and flourish that the two final chapters then open out on the social sphere at large; beyond the preceding discussion of social and artistic norms, or dramatic subject matter, the emphasis now shifts to territories often seen as the province of performativity.

Chapter 5 addresses a specific thread of domestic design and technology, from the *dwelling machines* of modernist functionalism to the *smart homes* of the present, as exemplified by Le Corbusier's Villa Savoye (1928–31), in Poissy, France, and Apple's Home application, introduced in 2016. In this technological and architectonic domain, the performative staples of efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness are traced in projects of functional transparency, from the Corbusian 'machine for living in' to the 'ubiquitous' technologies that now are destined to "weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life," as envisioned by Mark Weiser.[126] Conversely, the theatrical resides in the dramatic, the aesthetic, the sensuous: in synoptic networks that help control and understand the technological meshwork, but also enable a distinctly anti-

technological variant of the good old antitheatrical prejudice – beginning from the modernist distrust of 'ornament' in Le Corbusier's time. After a critique of terms like 'user' and 'function,' the chapter concludes on 'ecological' notions of mind, action, and perception – of *extended* and *enactive* cognition – that not only bear some affinity with those of theatricality and performativity, but also neatly define 'textures of thought' in which dwellings and inhabitants are equally interwoven.

As a further instance of how the theatrical may enhance the performative, Thread 6 discusses instances of artistic activism in which the often-grey concrete of the 'urban fabric' is momentarily overflown with its carnivalesque counter-textures: the Orange Alternative of the Polish 1980s; rainbow symbolism; the 'knit graffiti' of contemporary 'craftivists'; and an anti-fascist clown patrol in Tampere, Finland. A staple in the *performativity* literature, the particular theatricality of political protest is located in more ephemeral qualities of surface texture and, specifically, its abundance of *colour* – deemed empty or excessive much as theatricality has been; *adding* to urban texture rather than fading into its fabric; resisting such monochrome order as was discussed in the previous thread and rather making visible its diversity. Zooming out to a more evolutionary time frame of more-than-human performativity (in accordance with the often-organistic metaphors of political protest and activism), the metaphors entertained help imagine a more permissive politics of textural porosity and thus also of diversity – predicated not on antagonistic tropes of transgressive opposition, but on *saturating* the world perhaps with the merest hues of textures to be.

The study closes by revisiting, in Thread 7, not only the various case studies but also many of the central themes, figures, and tables from this Introduction: dramaturgy, contextualism, and especially the field of tensions between theatricality and performativity. In a central section, the 'binary fourfold' of Table 1.1 is developed into a 'perspectival fourfold,' relativizing the categories of novelty and normativity, immanence and transcendence, action and perception, and indeed the four world hypotheses that Pepper proposed, now presented as potential approaches to Performance Philosophy. In a final section on the emergence of change and novelty (an immanent approach very much presupposed by Pepper's contextualism as well), the processes of weaving and unweaving are themselves imbued with not only pragmatic, but also aesthetic and ethical value. Zooming in and out between the diverse textures addressed in the writings – of events and objects, time and space, doing and seeing – a general approach is outlined in which performativity names the way we tacitly weave worlds and identities, variously concealed or clarified by the step-aside tactics of theatricality.

Admittedly far and wide, this fabric of topics is woven tight in theme and perspective. On the one hand, the key tension explored is always between theatrical appearance (its excess or emptiness) and performative becoming (its novelty or normativity). On the other hand, while each thread is tightly woven around two or three key scenarios, each also brings to focus some specific strand of literature pertinent to either theatricality (e.g. the pro- and the anti-) or performativity (e.g. activism or technology). While it is possible to see the very emphasis on those two terms as somewhat moot, they do indicate the crucial 'family resemblances' – a textural term itself[127] – that draw together the wider weave of concepts and discourses addressed across the writings. In this theatrical 'glossing' of contextual differences, as elaborated in Thread 7,

words like *appearance*, *excess*, or *ornament* will belong to the 'theatrical' family, words like *efficacy*, *function*, and *normativity*, to the more 'performative' one.

In a sense, again, there is a certain theatricality to the research strategy itself, insofar as it often relies on the juxtaposition of well-iterated stories with well-chosen contexts: on a degree of wilful manipulation, that is, suggesting new angles on iconic examples by simply weaving them into what I hope are not the most predictable contexts. (This equals theatricality as the synoptic distance from historical specificity.)

A second way in which the text may appear 'theatrical' is through its proclivity for excessive quotation. The 'stitches' are openly there to be seen, and while they may thus 'estrange' the text's more performative pretensions, they also point to the amount of 'normative' reiteration on which of the emerging argument depends, for its performative 'novelty' or otherwise. Extending the image, my soft metaphor for 'argument' is the pattern that emerges when the strands of different ideas are sufficiently interwoven, rather than a virtual war between perspectives predetermined as antagonistic.[128] Especially when vast underlying metaphors are at issue, attention must be paid to how they are actually used in different contexts and discourses. In more humble terms, the sometimes lengthy strands of interwoven quotations provide direct reference to still-wider contexts for the interested reader to explore further – whether or not s/he cares for my arguments.

Finally, applying the slightly awkward language of strands and textures (where something like Ingold's *blocks* and *containers* might seem more 'natural') is bound to appear vaguely ostentatious at first (and therefore again somewhat 'theatrical'), but might just effect a modification of perception as it keeps being reiterated in varying contexts. Indeed, were it not for linguistic necessity, the ontology of strands, textures, and contexts should ultimately be conceived as one of *verbs*, as it is for both Pepper and Ingold. Where Schechner's world of performance occurs "as practices, events, and behaviors, not as 'objects' or 'things'," so is Pepper's a matter of "doing, and enduring, and enjoying: making a boat, … laughing at a joke."[129] In one possible scenario, the networked world of *nouns* – the traditional one of scenes, actors, and actions – will come to appear as 'mere theatre' as the study proceeds, even as this world remains invested – indeed, it becomes so *as theatre* – with distinct epistemic virtues. Even if the immanent ontology of 'textures' were properly described by the concept of performativity, theatrical epistemology is all about providing *perspective* on its workings – beginning with the 'aspectual' approach outlined in the following chapter.

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[1] While the literature on theatricality and performativity is obviously too vast to even suggest in a couple of notes, I take the opportunity to list here what would have been my first 'go-to' references. Apart from Shannon Jackson's nuanced discussion of the American genealogy of both concepts (2004), that of theatricality is very helpfully outlined in McGillivray 2004, and more concisely in Postlewait and Davis 2003. I have also been much influenced by Burns 1972; Puchner 2002; Weber 2004; and by many individual essays in the special issues on theatricality in *Theatre Research International* 20:2 (Fischer-Lichte 1995) and *SubStance* 31:2–3 (Féral 2002). To give an idea of theatricality's range of application, the books I have consulted include – chronologically – Gevork Hartoonian, *Crisis of the Object: The Architec-*

*ture of Theatricality* (2006); Yann-Pierre Montelle, *Palaeoperformance: The Emergence of Theatricality as Social Practice* (2009); Caroline van Eck and Stijn Bussels, eds, *Theatricality in Early Modern Art and Architecture* (2011); André Loiselle and Jeremy Maron, eds, *Stages of Reality: Theatricality in Cinema* (2012); Henry S. Turner, ed., *Early Modern Theatricality* (2013); and Tiffany Watt Smith, *On Flinching: Theatricality and Scientific Looking from Darwin to Shell Shock* (2014).

[2] Without even going to the key theorists of performativity, here, a very readable introduction to its conceptual developments is provided in Loxley 2007. For discussions and provocations closer to theatre and performance studies, see also Sedgwick and Parker 1995, and – more pertinent to the present work – McKenzie 2001. Most substantially, however, my understanding of the term has probably been influenced by Bell 2007, and more lately, by Glass and Rose-Redwood 2014. Their introductory piece can only be recommended for the clarity with which it presents their three "takes" on performativity, as the concept proceeds from language-as-representation through speech acts to performative subjectivities and non-representational practices (1–11).

[3] Carlson 2004, 6.

[4] The 'binary' approach is exemplified by Féral 1982; 2002. Other such dualities include the relations of theatricality and performativity with modernity and postmodernism, respectively, and their relative popularity among continental and Anglo-American theorists (e.g. Reinelt 2002).

[5] Puchner 2002, 31.

[6] See Barish 1981. Insofar as the notion of theatricality is *discursively predicated* on a binary value of antitheatricality, it may then be deployed "in either a pejorative or affirmative way" as Glen McGillivray argues in his major doctoral study on its 'discourse' (2004, 11, 14–15). For Shannon Jackson, this represents the concept's "flexible essentialism" (2004, 143, 126).

[7] Sedgwick 2003, 7.

[8] McKenzie 2001, 15.

[9] Ingold 2007, 103, 50; Pepper 1984, 251.

[10] Cull 2013; I return to this distinction occasionally below, and more extensively in Thread 7.

[11] Bottoms 2003, 181; Schechner 2003, 112–69. See also Bala 2013, 14–15; Brewer 1985, 18. The etymologies are cited from www.oed.com and www.etymonline.com.

[12] States 1985, 8. This notion is revisited in Thread 7.

[13] Cull 2013, 6–8, 25–6.

[14] Jackson 2004, 15.

[15] Barish 1981, 3, 1.

[16] Postlewait and Davis 2003, 4. Later on, they relate the philosophical dichotomy of "appearance and reality" to an entertaining "series of related antinomies" worth keeping in mind, here: "real versus false, genuine versus fake, intrinsic versus extrinsic, original versus imitative, true versus counterfeit, honest versus dishonest, sincere versus devious, accurate versus distorted, revealed versus disguised, face versus mask, serious versus playful, and essential versus artificial. All things theatrical are on the negative end of the polarity." (17.) See also Carlson 2002.

[17] In *How to Do Things With Words* (derived from a series of lectures in 1955), the philosopher J. L. Austin notoriously dubs the "performative utterance … *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or introduced in a poem, or

spoken in soliloquy … Language in such circumstances is … used not seriously, but in ways *parasitic* upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the *etiolations* of language." (Austin 1962, 22, his italics.)

[18] Jackson 2004, 126, 143–4; the 'empty term' notion is first suggested in Krauss 1987, 62–3.

[19] Balme 2007, 3–6; Burns 1972.

[20] See e.g. Postlewait and Davis 2003, 12; Carlson 2002, 249.

[21] McGillivray 2004, 31.

[22] Barthes's often-quoted definition of theatricality appears in a text on "Baudelaire's Theater," that is, on literature rather than theatre at all: "It [theatricality] is theater-minus-text, it is a density of signs and sensations built up on stage starting from the written argument; it is that ecumenical perception of sensuous artifice – gesture, tone, distance, substance, light – which submerges the text beneath the profusion of its external language." (Barthes 1972, 25.)

[23] McGillivray 2004, 77–115; Féral 2002, 94–108; Carlson 2002, 246, 249.

[24] Butler 1993, 234, 12.

[25] Bell 2007, 11ff. In *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887), Friedrich Nietzsche asserts that "there is no 'being' behind doing, … [that] 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (1969, 45); in Jon McKenzie's "speculative forecast" of 2001, at the other end of the line, "performance will be to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries what discipline was to the eighteenth and nineteenth, that is, an onto-historical formation of power and knowledge" (18, italics omitted).

[26] Butler 1988, 527–8.

[27] Butler 1993, 234; Sedgwick 2003, 7.

[28] See e.g. Barad 2007, 46–50.

[29] Cf. McKenzie 2001, 166.

[30] Jackson 2004, 183.

[31] Austin 1962, 5–6. In his typically elaborate language (not that I could complain), "to utter the sentence" in conditions proper to his examples (the wedding, naming a ship, bequeathing a will, betting sixpence) "is not to *describe* my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it," "the performing of an action" with no truth value attached (1962, 5–6). See also Glass and Rose-Redwood (2014, 7), for a useful distinction between Austin's "theory of *sovereign performativity* … naturalizing the social conventions and institutional assemblages that make a claim to authorizing legitimate uses of language," and theories of *political performativity* in which "absolute authority is never achieved but must rather be continuously reasserted, recited, and reenacted to acquire any degree of performative force," as indeed "the 'political' as a space of social action is performative through and through."

[32] Derrida 1988, 13–19; Austin 1962, 22; Butler 1993, 15. In a more recent rebuttal of the "wildly divergent responses" to her work – "that we radically choose our genders" or "that we are utterly determined by gender norms" – Butler stresses the concept's necessary duality: "performativity describes both the processes of being acted on and the conditions and possibilities for acting," and cannot be understood without both dimensions (2015, 63). See also Culler 1981; 2000.

[33] Diamond 1996, 1; Phelan 1993, 146ff.; McKenzie 2001, 22–3, 29–53.

[34] Jackson 2004, 8–9, 25. In 2003, Postlewait and Davis oppose theatricality, "in its essentialist strain as the defining trait of dramatic and performance texts," with per-

formativity, "in its imperialist strain as the unifying idea for cultural and social behavior" (31). See also the section on "*Performance*, or the Subversion of Theatricality," in *Modern Drama* 25:1 (Féral 1982, 154–81).

[35] McKenzie 2001, 50 (quoted), 23–4, 55–135.

[36] Bottoms 2003, 182.

[37] Schechner 2006, 2, 38–42. If technological *effectiveness*, organizational *efficiency*, and cultural *efficacy* define "the respective performances of missiles, workteams, and initiation rituals," for McKenzie (2001, 97), for Schechner "to treat any object, work, or product 'as' performance – a painting, a novel, a shoe, or anything at all – means to investigate what the object does, how it interacts with other objects or beings, and how it relates to other objects or beings" (2006, 30).

[38] Suggested in Sauter 2000, 38.

[39] This etymology was popularized by Victor Turner (1982). Derived "from the Old French *parfournir* – *par* ('thoroughly') plus *fournir* ('to furnish')," *performance*, in Turner's influential view, need not "have the structuralist implication of manifesting form, but rather the processual sense of 'bringing to completion' or 'accomplishing.' To perform is thus to complete a more or less involved process rather than to do a single deed or act." (Turner 1982, 91.)

[40] Glass and Rose-Redwood 2014, 9–10. Cf. Barad 2007 and Thrift 2008, specifically pp. 124–50 on the "push of performance."

[41] States 1996, 1–8; cf. Williams 1976.

[42] The cognitive-linguistic concepts of source and target *domain* correspond, more or less, with the traditional *vehicle* and *tenor* of literary metaphor. See e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980.

[43] Lakoff and Johnson 1980. For further discussion, see Paavolainen 2012, 6–9, 38–41, 87–92.

[44] Ingold 2007, 75; Deleuze and Guattari 1988.

[45] Ingold 2015, 15. As he elaborates, biologists, psychologists, and physicists alike tend to speak of "the building blocks" of organisms, thought, and the universe itself, yet "a world built from perfectly fitting blocks could harbour no life at all" (2013, 132–3). For extended arguments on the cognitive dominance of 'containment' in very different sociopolitical contexts during the Cold War, see McConachie 2003, and Paavolainen 2012, especially 97–107 on Poland.

[46] Pepper 1984; see also 1963; 1970. The following is also inspired by the fine introduction in Buttimer 1993, 79–85.

[47] Pepper 1984, e.g. 3, 141–50, 91.

[48] See the respective chapters in Pepper 1984, 151–85, 280–314, 186–231, 232–79.

[49] Pepper 1984, 141–2.

[50] Pepper 1984, 141–2; the reference is for the whole paragraph.

[51] Pepper 1984, 142–3; the reference is for the whole paragraph.

[52] Pepper 1984, 251.

[53] Buttimer 1993; White 1973. Near concurrent with Buttimer's, other book-length applications of Pepper that have influenced my own include *Varieties of Scientific Contextualism* (Hayes et al. 1993, showcasing a Pepperian tradition in the psychological analysis of behaviour), and Diane Gillespie's *The Mind's We* (1992), opposing mechanistic strands in cognitive psychology with newly contextualistic research in what now is called embodied cognition.

[54] Buttimer 1993, 84.

[55] White 1973, 13–21. Of specific interest are also White's experiments (1973, 14n.8) in conciling Pepper's categories with Kenneth Burke's 'dramatistic pentad' of scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose – the contextualist focussing on the scene; the formist on the uniqueness of the acts or agents; the mechanist on "extrahistorical 'agencies'"; the organicist "inclined to see 'purpose' everywhere" – and Victor Turner's derivation of his 'social drama' from the "contextualist model" even as he reasonably criticizes both White and Pepper for "cognitive ethnocentrism." (Turner 1980, 144–6; see also Burke 1969, 3–20.)

[56] White 1973, 18.

[57] Not that the effort might not be fruitful: where Marvin Carlson (2004, 2–5) "warns us against seeking some over-arching semantic field to cover such seemingly disparate usages as the performance of an actor, of a schoolchild, of an automobile," his triple derivation of performance as *display of skills*, *patterned behaviour*, and the *keeping of standards* does seem to intertwine strands of organistic, mechanical, and formistic ontologies. See also Butler 1987.

[58] Barba 1985, 75.

[59] Morgan 1997, 4.

[60] Turner and Behrndt 2008, 21–2; see also the Lessing epigraph for Thread 7.

[61] Turner and Behrndt 2008, 21, 31–3; Barba 2010, 9; Barba 1985, 76.

[62] Turner and Behrndt 2008, 5.

[63] Ingold 2007, 152–5.

[64] Ingold 2007, 74.

[65] Schechner 1985, 140–1.

[66] Barba 1985, 75–6, 78; see also Barba 2010.

[67] Ingold 2000, 346.

[68] E.g., spatial location is central to Pepper's understanding of mechanism in the sense that not only is the "functioning of the machine" determined by the "configuration of [its] parts," but so is the very "reality" of things certified by their "particularization … in a line, or path, or volume of these locations": "An object is where it is, says the mechanist" (Pepper 1984, 197–9).

[69] See Paavolainen 2015; and the special issues "On Dramaturgy" and "New Dramaturgies," of *Performance Research* (14:3, 2009) and *Contemporary Theatre Review* (20:2, 2010).

[70] Ingold 2015, 15.

[71] Turner and Behrndt 2008, 36.

[72] Norwick 2006, 343–457: 345, 457 cited. On the 'Great Chain of Being,' see also Paavolainen 2012, 16–23.

[73] Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 3–25 (rhizome, line of flight), 262–5 (haecceity), 475–7 (fabric).

[74] Stockwell 2009; Harper 2010; Gherardi 2006; Salter 2010.

[75] Fischer-Lichte 2014, 11–12. I take the latter point from Paul Rae's comment to Fischer-Lichte's keynote address at IFTR's Cultures of Modernity conference in Munich, 28 July 2010.

[76] See Hemmings 2012.

[77] Ingold 2011a, 211–2.

[78] Paasonen 2005, 173–8; Parker 2010.

[79] Collins 2016. I thank Hanna Suutela for drawing my attention to this beautiful essay.

[80] Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 46, 52–3.
[81] Ultimately, all of these terms derive from the Proto-Indo-European **teks*-, 'to weave, to fabricate, to make' (see *OED*; etymonline.com).
[82] Pepper 1984, 232.
[83] Pepper 1984, 238.
[84] Pepper 1984, 246, my italics.
[85] Pepper 1984, 239–46.
[86] Ingold 2013, 132; ultimately, this is his definition of 'life' itself.
[87] Morris 1997.
[88] Sauter 2000, 9–10.
[89] Turner and Behrndt 2008, 36.
[90] See Ingold 2011a, 68–70.
[91] Ingold 2007, 2, 103, 50.
[92] Morton 2010.
[93] Morton 2010, 20.
[94] Morton 2010, 12, 39, 52.
[95] Pepper 1984, 252.
[96] Pepper 1984, 249–52.
[97] Bell 2007, 11; Ingold 2011a, 67.
[98] Ingold 2011a, 145.
[99] Bell 2007, 29, 20, 98, 114.
[100] Ingold 2007, 103; see also Butler 1993.
[101] Ingold 2007, 103, 50; cf. Gibson 1986, Paavolainen 2012.
[102] Ingold 2013, 136, 140.
[103] Barad 2007, ix, 66; Law 1999, 7; Ingold 2011a, 70.
[104] Morton 2010, 28, 40, 30, 39.
[105] Ingold 2011a, 70, 86–7; on weather, see also Ingold 2015, 51–111, and the end of Thread 6.
[106] Cf. Figure 3.1 in Ingold 2007, 82.
[107] Ingold 2007, 81–2; cf. e.g. Schechner 2003, xvi–xix.
[108] Ingold 2011a, 63, 71.
[109] Ingold 2011a, 71, 168, 120.
[110] Ingold 2011a, 85–6.
[111] Ingold 2011a, 85. In his 'social theory for arthropods,' Ingold contrasts the ANT of Actor-Network Theory with SPIDER, for 'Skilled Practice Involves Developmentally Embodied Responsiveness' (2011a, 89, 94).
[112] Bell 2007, 4, 11–12, 17, 21.
[113] Ingold 2011a, 135, 129; Butler 1993, 241, my italics.
[114] Morton 2010, 28.
[115] Ingold 2011b, 14.
[116] Ingold 2007, 80; Ingold 2011a, 70.
[117] Ingold 2011a, 91; Ingold 2007, 103.
[118] Ingold 2011b, 5.
[119] Ingold 2011a, 215; Ingold 2013, 132.
[120] Ingold 2011a, 117.
[121] Ingold 2011a, 71, 96, 117; for an extended example of theatrical inversion, see 2015, 74–5.

[122] This Heideggerian link is neatly elaborated in McGillivray 2008, "Globing the Globe."
[123] Ingold 2011b, 15, 5. Importantly, Ingold here refers to archaeologist Carl Knappett's application of his terms, in the same collection; for a book-length discussion see Knappett 2011.
[124] Cull 2013, 231, 225, 212.
[125] Here I am indebted to Ingold's ultimately Marxian idea that humans "produce themselves and one another … by reciprocally laying down … the conditions for their own growth and development" (2011a, 7–9).
[126] Weiser 1991, 78.
[127] Pepper hints at Ludwig Wittgenstein's term, implicitly, in noting that the very "relativism of contextualism" implies "a family likeness among the qualities … running through our technically different situations" (1963, 60).
[128] See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 4–5, on the more usual Argument Is War metaphor.
[129] Schechner 2006, 2; Pepper 1984, 232–3. See also Ingold 2015, 115–18, 124, suggesting that we understand 'human' as well not as a noun but as a verb: 'to human.'

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