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THE 1-O THAT RECALLED FRANCO
The Civil War and Dictatorship in Parties' accounts of the 2017 'Catalan crisis'

ABSTRACT

The Catalan Independence referendum in 2017 (1-O) and the following events launched a political crisis unparalleled to anything in Spain during the last decades. However, the conflict over Catalonia's independence has been a long time coming, as the question about the region has brewed since the establishment of the Constitution. Connections were instantly drawn between the past and the present by different actors, and the current conflict carries past grievances on its shoulders. The relationship between the central Spanish state and Catalonia is not only directly affected by the past events, but also how these are interpreted and remembered. The past does not only motivate to act, or guide how actions are evaluated, but outlines how one understands their collective. Therefore, it is not irrelevant what is remembered, how, when and by whom.

However, the use and influence of memory in the crisis has not yet been systematically studied. As the regional politicians were key actors of the events and the Catalan independence movement, this thesis focuses on how the memory of the Civil War and Franco was present in their statements during the last four months of 2017. In total 622 online articles were collected from the websites of six regional parties, all published between the Diada of 2017 (11th of September) and the election day (21st of December), including campaigning before the referendum, declaration of independence and the regional elections. By using Robert Entman's (1993) framing theory and identifying framing elements from the texts, conflict frames, memory's influence in them and memory frames were outlined from the articles. The findings were divided into three by the conflict groups: the independentists, the constitutionalists and the pro-referendum.

The interpretations of current issues somewhat mimic collective memories about the Civil War and Franco's regime and lean on their assumptions. Moreover, the independentists and constitutionalists used memories to describe the contemporary situation, simultaneously outlining their account of the past. Independentists recalled in more detail, focusing on the Second Republic, Civil War and Franco. As elections approached, the independentists discussed memory politics relating to the dictatorship. Ciudadanos referred to that past as well but drew out different aspects and was vaguer in their recalling. Besides, the constitutionalists directed the attention more towards the issues with Basque nationalism and the coup of 23-F, praising the transition. The pro-referendum remembered the past significantly less in relation to the current situation. The groups commemorated, quoted, and celebrated a variety of symbols, champions, songs, and slogans of the past.

Collective memories and memory politics play a prominent part in the conflict, justifying claims, revealing patterns, and evaluating the groups associated. Memory assigns ownership, presence, and inheritance of the past. The memory is not only one side's instrument, but all groups are using, influencing, reacting to and countering it to some degree. Both nations are defined with memory and all conflict groups blame the opponents of being Francoist. The main distinction between the constitutionalists and independentists especially, but also those pro-referendum, lies in how much the current Spanish state has to do with its Francoist past and what the Catalan independentists and Basque nationalists have in common.

Keywords: collective memory, Catalan crisis, Catalonia, Catalan independence movement, Franco, the Spanish Civil War, memory struggles, memory in conflicts, frame analysis, conflict frames

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ACRONYMS

1-O First of October 2017, the day of the independence referendum.

21-D 21st of December 2017, the day of the Catalan regional election.

23-F 23rd of February 1981, the day of the Spanish coup d'état attempt.

ANC Assemblea Nacional Catalana, The Catalan National Assembly

CUP Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, The Popular Unity Candidacy

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Liberty

EUiA Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, United and Alternative Left

GAL Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups

OU Òmnium Cultural

PDeCAT Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català, The Catalan European Democratic Party

PP Partido Popular, The People's Party

PSC-PSOE Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, The Socialists' Party of Catalonia

1. INTRODUCTION

The Catalan Independence referendum and the conflict between Catalonia and the central Spanish state over the vote have been dubbed as the "worst political crisis Spain has seen in decades" (John, 2017; BBC, 2019). Antonio Caño, the previous editor of El Pais, compared it with Spain's failed military coup of 1981 (Caño, 2018), known as the 23-F. The question about Catalonia has been central in Spanish and Catalan politics since 1979 when the region's autonomy was restored after almost 40 years of Francisco Franco's dictatorship (Dowling 2018, 23).

On the 1st of October 2017 the Government of Catalonia, known as the Generalitat de Catalunya, organized a referendum on the independence of Catalonia's autonomous community. The Spanish Constitutional Court had deemed the referendum illegal, and Spain's central government sent Civil Guards (Spanish National Police) to prevent the voting. Boxes and paper ballots were captured, polling places smashed and closed. Rubber bullets, forbidden in Catalonia, were fired. Nearly 900 were injured. The referendum day is known as 1-O.

After a low turn-out, but massive support of 90% for the independence, a general strike against the police violence, and massive demonstrations against and for the independence, Carles Puigdemont, then President of the Generalitat, declared to delay the launch of secession to allow dialogue with Madrid. Finally, he declared independence on the 27th of October, which was followed by the first-ever activation of Article 155 of the Constitution and suspension of the autonomous government by the Spanish government. After taking on the direct rule, the Prime Minister and leader of the right-wing Popular Party (PP) Mariano Rajoy announced new Catalan elections for the 21st of December (21-D). President Puigdemont and five of his councillors fled to Brussels. Nine members of the former Generalitat left the hearing at the Audience National to be imprisoned in Madrid.

Parallels were instantly drawn between the events and Spain's past of civil war and dictatorship. Paul Preston, the author of the Spanish Holocaust, wrote in December 2017 that the state's response of rubber bullets, demolished polling stations and violence directed to women and the elderly, had evoked memories of Franco. He claimed that Spain has not been this divided since the first democratic elections after the dictatorship in 1977 and that Prime Minister Rajoy seemed unaware of the effects of similar patterns of action in the past century of Spanish history. (Preston, 2017)

Before the referendum, the pro-independence, that is, the independentists, and pro-referendum protesters already used anti-fascist slogans ("*No pasarán,*" "*No tinc/tenim por*"; They won't pass, I am/We are not afraid) and chanted anti-Francoist resistance songs (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). Several extreme right associations reacted too, protesting with fascist salutes and flags of Franco's Falange party, to defend the unity of Spain. The impunity they received was not left unnoticed. (Croft, 2017; Camps-Gaset, 2019) The anti-independence, here constitutionalists, accused the independentists of a coup d'état (Wagner, 2018). Pablo Casado, PP's spokesman threatened President Puigdemont with the destiny of the Civil War time President of the Generalitat Lluís Companys, who was executed by Franco's firing squad (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). An independentist party Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) tweeted in response: "Thanks for being so Franco, Pablo Casado" (Croft, 2017). The question carries past grievances on its shoulders not only due to their direct effects but how they are remembered and felt, collectively.

The Spanish Civil War is casting a long shadow on both Spain's present and the future (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 2). The growth in the support for Catalan Nationalism is fuelled by wounds of historical memory (Dowling 2018, 5) and Catalonia's past is constantly present in the independence debate, challenging understandings of historical figures and events being heavily covered in the TV, radio, novels, talks, academic publications, conferences, social media, and the online world (Crameri 2014, 73). Collective memory affects how one understands and defines collectives and their rights.

Therefore, it is not uncommon that in specific contexts and during certain events debates over memories surface, especially when societies go through political change (Jelin 2003, 3). Conflict works as a story, interpreting the context where it occurs (Tint, 2010), and collective memories can be used to explain this story's events, motivating action. James Liu and Denis Hilton (2005) promote

developing better knowledge of the deployment of collective memory for the sake of conflict resolution: The operation of feedback loops between events and people from the past, their representations and social identity, influenced by the dynamics of intergroup relations provide a rich framework for the design of possible interventions.

After analysing media discourses from 2002, Fernando León Solís (2003, 146) did not find it hard to believe that the conflict between Catalonia and Spain would emerge again after a convenient chain of events, with the "immediate past of agreement and harmony" being easily set aside and the "ghost of the Francoist past dusted down again as a de-legitimizing tool." According to him, Spain would be presented in Catalonia as a villainous, ungrateful, primitive suppressor of industrious, modern, moderate, and European Catalonia. (León Solís 2003, 146) The conflict has since re-emerged, and the past brought present by different actors.

Maria Ibáñez Beltrán (2018) interviewed older and younger activists from the independence movement, who actively associated the repression with the dictatorship and the expected nature of the state. Carlos de las Heras Pedrosa, Carmen Jambrino Maldonado, Patricia P. Iglesias Sánchez, and Elena Millán Ceus (2020) studied the coverage of the events by the Spanish and Catalan digital press between September and November 2017 and found discourses referring to the Francoist past. Peter Wagner (2018) describes how in December 2017 The Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) campaigned relating the past not to the period immediately before the application of Article 155, but to Franco's regime. He found that constitutionalists championed as a counterstrategy the democratically successful present, not needing to address the past beyond that. According to Ignasi Bernat and David Whyte (2020), who examined the events of 2017, the re-emergence of fascist symbolism in mainstream politics and fascist violence on the streets, describe that the current conflict is woven into the fabric of postfascism and the struggle against fascism during the Civil War is often compared to the struggle for independence. Of the rationales, values and authoritarianism that moulded the Catalan crisis, many existed in Franco's times (Bernat & Whyte, 2020).

Thus, the linkages of the events in 2017 to remembering and the past have been revealed when it comes to activists, the digital press, and the context of postfascism. However, Catalan politicians inside the Parliament of Catalonia and the Generalitat were central actors in the development of the crisis, and the referendum and regional elections held significant importance in the conflict.

There has not yet been more focused analysis of how – and which – collective memories surfaced and were used as the situation unfolded, concurrently, by different politicians, prompted by the different events and interests of the crisis, as people were encouraged to vote (or not) in the referendum and the elections. This outlining of memory's role in explaining and mobilizing also reveals the different memories present, their similarities and how they contest each other. The overall research aim is therefore to describe how the memory of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975) is present in the online publications of Catalan political parties during the events between September and December of 2017, and how this differs between political parties, conflict groups and the phases of the conflict.

The collective memories work as a pretext guiding the interpretation of new issues, by justifying ownerships and losses, grasping the imagined groups and motivating participation. The thesis aims to discover the relationship between the different conflicts in how they are understood: The focus is on memory, not history, therefore not in catching the sides from committing inconsistencies, inaccuracies or lies. The humane and forgetting nature of collective memory is discussed in the next chapter, followed by the third chapter's exhibition of memory politics relating to the Civil War and Franco's regime, clarifying their ties to Catalonia's independence movement.

The regional parties' websites are not only channels for the parties to regularly report on their statements and activities on a particular date, but a possible site for memory struggles specifically directed towards Catalonia's population and media interested in the party's position on current issues. The number of seats in Catalonia's Parliaments and the availability of articles published during the crisis limited the sample to six political parties, from which three are independentist, one is constitutionalist and two are pro-referendum. Together they published 622 articles between the 11th of September and 21st of December. To outline both the conflict narratives and the employment and influence of collective memory, the study detects and creates frames from this sample by employing frame analysis based on Robert Entman's (1993) framing theory. The methodology and its limitations are further described in chapter 4, continued by the analysis in chapter 5. Finally, the thesis discusses how the past and the present was framed by the different parties, as well as the implications of these findings, revealing collective memory's relevance in the confrontation and polarization around the issue.

2. COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN CONFLICTS

Collective memory is a force to be reckoned with in the field of peace and conflict. It allows a sense of sameness across time and space, unifying a community by developing and sustaining a common collective identity through remembering and forgetting. (Naidu, 2006) On the other hand, conflicting memories can start and further strengthen long-term conflicts, by connecting grievances, both past and present, as the conflict develops (Tint, 2010).

The question over what is remembered often rises as a component of the issue (Lehti, 2016). That is to say, that memory is not a given depiction of things that occurred, but a process, which includes contestation and possible sources of conflict, as discussed further on. It works with memorialisation in its endless journey of re-writing narratives covering the past. Its potential in peace work raises from the opportunities to identify, recognize, and finally assist survivors, by starting a process of healing and reconciliation. (Naidu, 2006)

This chapter aims to define thoroughly the concept of collective memory and highlight its relevance not only to the case of Catalonia but peace and conflict studies in general. After defining the framework by using dichotomies and following the footsteps of James Wertsch and Henry Roediger III (2008), the resulting idea will be tied to the concepts of identity and nation. The final step is to discuss the relationship collective memory has with peace and conflict.

2.1 Collective Memory

The concept of collective memory has its origins in the 1920s when Maurice Halbwachs coined the term describing it as "typically -- understood to express some eternal or essential truth about the group – usually tragic." It is an account covering the shared past, experienced or not by the living

collective, which concerns more the current challenges faced. (MacMillan 2008, *Who Owns the Past?* para. 23) However, collective remembering has been discussed already in the nineteenth century (Renan, 1990/1882). Still, its conceptualizations vary, as does the faith in its relevance. Wertsch and Roediger III (2008) characterize it as a widely used but poorly understood term, lacking due to its loose definitions. It has, however, regained momentum in the last few decades and importance through emerging interdisciplinary memory studies. There are few agreements on what it exactly is, leaving it as "a form of memory that transcends individuals and is shared by a group." (Wertsch & Roediger III 2008, 318).

To comprehensively and thoroughly define the concept, this thesis will discuss collective memory by following the path led by Wertsch and Roediger III (2008). They approach the critique and ambiguity of collective memory by comparing collective memory and collective remembering, individual memory and collective memory, as well as history and collective remembering.

2.1.1 Memory versus Remembering

Collective memory itself is often regarded as an active process (Haugbolle, 2005; Tint, 2010). Wertsch and Roediger III (2008) start by separating collective memory from collective remembering but continue to further define collective memory using the concept 'collective remembering' in contrast to individual memory and history. The process aspect and the activity of evolving, enhancing, and contesting are therefore elemental to collective memory, fundamentally interlinked.

Collective remembering is an active practice of repeated reconstruction of the past's representations and their contestation and contention among people. It is, however, resistant to contradictory evidence (Wertsch, 2008a). Nevertheless, despite being conservative in nature, it is not static: The past and the present are linked. The past is shaped by the present and the present is both haunted by and interpreted with the past. (Wertsch and Roediger III, 2008) Remembrances are selected by remembering actors based on the concerns, needs, beliefs and goals of the present (Tint, 2010): Memory is a product of active selective remembering and forgetting, which support the present identities and explain the group's existence, implying a certain future (Boyd, 2008). The past

therefore cumulatively determines one's existence today and functions as signposts for actions tomorrow.

Susan Sontag (2003) equates collective memory with ideology, disconnecting it from remembering. Collective memory to her is instead demanding and mandating: Pictures lock the important into our minds, and ideologies establish archives of representative images, which hold shared meanings and provoke predictable thoughts and feelings. Therefore, it is an easy instrument for manipulating. (Sontag 2003, 85-86) However, Aleida Assman (2008) argues that Sontag's interpretation forgets the core of collective memory, the interaction with others and the interaction with representations.

There is not one collective memory, but several competing narratives. Through an emotional and mobilizing narrative, visual and verbal aids, institutions of learning, the circulation of mass media, sites, monuments and periodically reactivated commemoration rites a fleeting social recollection is turned into a more durable collective memory (Assman, 2008). In addition to speech, representations and utterances Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger (2010) direct the attention towards overt and covert silences, which can enhance both memory and amnesia. Moments of silences are literal absences of speech that commemorate, but pervasive silences are active silences aiming to not remember. Covert silences are not defined by the absence but include much mnemonic talk and representation: Bland commemorations are efforts to make the remembering of the past attractive to a public as wide as possible by simplifying and carefully hinting. Cacophonous commemoration is on the contrary an attempt at forgetting when the commemoration of certain elements is unacceptable to some, but complete silence would be perceived as wrong. These difficult elements of the past are remembered in a way that minimizes their effect, often done by layering new, invented traditions and meanings on top of the original commemoration, blurring them. (Vinitzky-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010)

Silences and utterances, details and vagueness are used to protect and manage wanted and unwanted memories. Sune Haugbolle (2005) describes collective memory as an interaction between the public and the private, two competing narratives. His study illustrated how the public memory tiptoes around the private memories, turning to vagueness to avoid a clash harming its legitimacy. Symbols and relationships to the past are constantly disputed and negotiated, to redefine the collective present (MacMillan 2008, *Who Owns the Past?* para. 23).

The 'collective' in collective memory has been heavily disputed. Wertsch (2008b) presents Bartlett's well-known questioning of the group's ability to have a memory: memory can happen in a group, but it is not of the group. Boyd (2008, 134) argues against the word 'collective' in collective memory, as to her understanding memory outside of the individual realm is "a metaphor for mediated knowledge of past events." Memory is never really collective, according to her, if remembrance is not practised at that moment collectively. Assman (2008) presents Sontag's (2003) similar critique: all memory is individual, unreproducible.

Memories cannot be embodied by others. However, they can be shared: exchanged, justified, and confirmed, or reviewed, corrected, contested, lent and borrowed. Individual remembering is not set on stone, original or pure, despite being embodied. It changes as do the individual's reactions and emotions connected to the memory. Akin to remembering a collective memory, individual remembering is a process of continuous reinscription and reconstruction. (Assman, 2008)

We constantly present our group's experiences as our shared experience, whether or not we have embodied them ourselves. Assman (2008) argues that human beings live in first person plural, not only in first person. The difference between individual and collective remembering, according to Wertsch and Roediger III (2008) is the generation of the narration: In individual remembering, it is done by the individual, but in collective remembering, the narrative tools are shared with the members.

As Wertsch and Roediger III (2008) weighed, on the other hand, Michael Schudson (1995, 346) argued that there is no other memory but collective, social memory, since the remembering individuals are evidently socially situated. Boyd (2008) also regards memory as always socially framed, existing in relation to the groups to which the individual belongs to. Tint (2010) inseparably connects both individual and group to the social domains the people live in: As remembering is a contextual process, it also occurs in relation to the collective dimension of lived experiences. This social frame is present in Halbwachs' original conceptualization of collective memory, which cannot be understood without it (Assman, 2008).

Hence, is memory not simply history? History is also an account of the past, shared, expressed, challenged in the interaction between individuals. Moreover, its ability to achieve genuine objectivity in its representations of the past has been thoroughly questioned too (e.g., Mink, 1978; White, 1981). Like under political and cultural pressures frequently evolving collective memory, present-day interests and challenges inform the focuses and perspectives of historiography, and history is challenged, as any science should be. At times, the words history and memory are used interchangeably (Boyd, 2008). For example, Margaret MacMillan (2008) describes the uses and abuses of history, but many times the histories presented are indeed memories - one-sided and identity-building, histories selected, created, or embodied and turned into claims.

In many ways, the two concepts are at odds. The difference between formal history and collective memory was outlined by Halbwachs in the 1920s, but the complicated relationship between history and memory has been discussed even before that. For example, Ernest Renan (1990/1882, 11) claims that memory and history stand at fundamental opposition. Memory in fact is forgetting. He describes serious historical research as a threat to collective remembrance efforts. Pierre Nora (1989, 7) explains the emergence of the 'memory boom' with the lack of it: "We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left." The creation of critical accounts of the past push aside and destroy – on purpose – this "real memory" which results in a need to create sites of memory, as there are no real environments of memory left (Nora 1989, 8).

It is necessary to achieve a level of distinction between these two interacting concepts. This is reflected by the significant attention given to the question from 1882 to the present day. The conceptualisations from Wertsch (2008a) and Assman (2008) help clarify the necessary separation.

Assman (2008, 61) argues that both history and memory are forms of memory, but memory is an embodied one, owned and emotional, and history is a disembodied and separated one. Memory is linked to the identity of an individual, a group or an institution, stressing differences, but history is disconnected from those, providing a universal frame (Assman 2008, 61). Wertsch (2008a) shares this view: when one commits to one perspective and displays the group's social structures, the other is distanced from a particular perspective, reflecting no definite social framework. History does not

always achieve this, however, but it is at least critical and reflective, aware of ambiguity, whereas collective memory is not self-conscious. Wertsch (2008a, 150) characterizes collective memory very effectively as "impatient with ambiguities about motives and the interpretation of events" revealing its anxious need for significance, its crucial ingredient. (Wersch, 2008a)

The relationship with the past is similarly little clear-cut. Collective memory denies the "pastness" of the matters that occurred, meaning that the past is not understood by the remembering agent as gone but present, part of the current, often the eternal or essential truth about the group (Novick 1988, 3). History too explains the conditions of today using the knowledge of the past, but the two are kept separate (Wertsch 2008a, 150).

Assman (2008, 61) adds in the bridge to the future, highlighting memory's eternal truth. Additionally, memories link past experiences to expectations (Jelin 2003, 92). MacMillan (2008, *History and Identity*, para. 11) presents that memories can have prophecy-like qualities and might even claim a predetermined end: the suffering is followed by the inevitable paradise of, for example, democracy, modernity, and equality. History's account of the past might be motivated by the attempt to predict the future, but the separation remains since the future is not yet present. History can be interpreted for the sake of coming up with a solution, but it is merely searching for truth. History itself is disconnected from action. Memory, on the other hand, creates values and meaning and is orientated to action. (Assman 2008, 61) Collective memory is an advocate, representative. It is evident that there are overlaps between these two concepts, but their goals clarify the difference.

According to Tint (2010) commemoration, acknowledging, honouring, and reusing certain events links history and memory: The images and events are selected from history on purpose, and some are left unselected - also on purpose. Collective memory can be colourful and rich, but it is always simplified in the realms described above, selective by its nature. On the other hand, history "develops an event and impartial attention." (Assman 2008, 61) Because history aims at accuracy, it revises existing narratives with new evidence and recognizes complexity (Wertsch and Roediger III, 2008). Therefore, despite history being described as a threat to memory, (suspicious of it, aiming to suppress and destroy it (Nora 1989, 9)) it is not a 'superior' memory. History can be debunked, but memory cannot. For history, forgetting equals historical error, but for memory, active forgetting is vital (Assman 2008, 61).

For Renan (1990/1882, 11) memory itself is forgetting, and this historical error is central in the creation of the nation. The aforementioned descriptions by Renan and Nora of memory-threatening history and the need for 'real memory' originate from their discussions about the relationship of memory and nation. This relationship is further discussed in this section, starting with the study of the linkage between collective memory and identity.

The link has already been addressed and repeated: collective memory is often seen as an account of the group's eternal and essential truth, for example, the origin. Collective remembering facilitates the development and contestation of an identity (Wertsch & Roediger III, 2008). The link works both ways: the remembering of a memory happens due to the membership. Identity and memory, therefore, inform each other (Tint, 2010). Like memory, identity too is influenced by time, space, and relationality (Somers, 1994). The present is present in who we understand ourselves to be.

Liu and Hilton (2005) describe how a collective's representation of its past influences not only their action but also their positioning to identities. It informs identification and socialization. The narratives of the past, collective memories involving heroes and villains, define and support charters, which are codes of the collective's origin and historical mission, founding myths that determine legitimacy, define correct responses, and assign roles. (Liu & Hilton, 2005) Shared sorrows and celebrations sustain and foster shared identity (MacMillan 2008, History and Nationalism, para. 2).

Benedict Anderson (2006/1983) famously defined nations as imagined unities: the members cannot be all present and united in one place and time, hence they need to imagine their collective-ness. A nation is an example of a collective that is brought into being using these selective and forgetting collective memories (MacMillan 2008, *History and Nationalism*, para. 2). A large group - such as a nation - has an existential need to nourish and sustain the group identity, and this can be done with narrations (Volkan, 2001).

To justify their existence, values, and norms, nation-states need a narrative of the past. The community's historical memory includes a selection of worthy events, their representation, and

lessons (Aguilar 2002, 1-24). The past provides a rich reservoir of events, heroes and symbols, which is used to support the constitution and integration of the nation (Gershoni, 1992). Vamik Volkan (2001) discusses the effect of chosen traumas, the shared mental representations of significant past trauma, caused by an enemy. The members of a group have inherited these traumas from previous generations and reactivate them to support their threatened group identity. The truth behind the past event is not meaningful, considering that the importance lies in the link the chosen trauma establishes between the members. The reactivation can however tie together past hurt and current threat, magnifying contemporary conflicts and enemies, who now also represent the ancient enemy. This might lead to cruelty and even masochistic decisions. (Volkan, 2001)

Identification attached to the nation is motivated by demonstrating the nation's superiority or uniqueness through these unique narrations (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Levy 2011, 13). Sense of nationalism and group identity is strengthened using memory cultivation, which includes sharing national traumas with members. The impact is not given but depends on how the collective absorbs the recollections and how influential forces respond or use them. (Tint, 2010)

Nationalists present their imagined political community as eternal and original (Anderson 2006/1983, 5). As memory and identity, a nation ties together the present and the past: It is today's shared consent to coexist and maintain the heritage, the common possession of memories, glories, and regrets (Renan 1990/1882, 17). This results in the "invention of tradition" (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi & Levy 2011, 13).

The past is filled with ingredients of traditions and stories. However, too thorough historical enquiry reveals violence and brutality, which in turn affects the unity (Renan 1990/1882, 11). Forgetting, again, is elemental. Renan (1990/1882, 11-13) argues that a nation's essence is not its past of a dynasty resulting from an accepted but forgotten conquest, but its members having a lot in common, and a lot that they have forgotten. Haugbolle (2005) describes national master narratives as an "artfully selective oblivion" - it is a collective memory careful with maintaining its silences, a public memory tiptoeing around the private, more detailed, and sometimes contesting memory.

Nation's habit to forget does not recognize continuity and responsibility. Elizabeth Jelin (2003, 103-104) explains that because the state's identity can be strongly linked to its political regime, changes

in the regime are considered radical, cutting its responsibility for the actions of the past regime. They are not included in the "foundational moments" of the official narratives, which can lead to very conflicting memories of dictatorship (104). Jelin (2003, 104-105) recommends that instead of imposing an interpretation or a minimum consensus of the past, it's necessary to establish spaces for the expression, recognition, and controversy about different memories. Michael Howard (in MacMillan 2008, *History and Identity*, para. 22) claims that the presence of a history that challenges the comfortable assumptions about the collective is painful but also a mark of maturity.

2.3 Memory Struggles

"The past belongs to those who claim it and are willing to explore it and to infuse it with meaning for those who are alive today," writes Atwood (1997, 1516). MacMillan (2008) describes in her book how the past provides many lessons and advice to pick and choose from, plenty of comfort and support with its patterns, an escape, comparisons, stature, legitimacy, heritage, and representations of good and evil. Certain memories are preferred over others: When it comes to the nation's past, triumphs are less valuable in contrast to griefs, because griefs "impose duties" (Renan 1990, 17). Historical memory holds the key to both collective identity and political justice (Boyd, 2008).

Regimes following a fundamental political transformation need to decide what to keep and what to leave from the previous regime, also regarding memory (Aguilar & Humlebæk, 2002). Demands of "truth and justice" and "reconciliation" and oblivion often face at odds (Jelin 2003, 94). Additionally, as the next section discusses, the denial of identity and the neglect of a collective memory are roots for the often most difficult and protracted conflicts (Tint, 2010). Memories have significant potential as instruments in different campaigns, therefore it is not irrelevant which memories are selected, explored, developed, represented, and accepted, or who claims, owns and uses this past.

To better understand dynamics within memory struggles and attempts to further elaborate or apply a memory in a certain context or gain it a hegemonic status, the following concepts result helpful: regimes of memory, memory entrepreneurs and labours of memory. Pablo Sánchez León (2012) re-elaborates Foucault's concept 'regime of memory' as a comprehensive discourse, which controls memory-related public practices, state policies, and the social production of discourse concerning

the past. Memory regimes are characterized by dramatic events that play a part in the development of citizenship.

Jelin (2003, 95) defines memory entrepreneurs as those, who develop policies that make meaning of the past. They initiate the public discussion, promote, and devote energy to gather recognition and legitimacy of their story (Jelin 2003, 33). The past also influences the present as "a presence without agency" independently of will, consciousness, or strategy, but with 'labours of memory' Jelin (2003, 5) seeks to emphasize and contrast the human activity and agency of the processes that make meaning of the past through symbolic transformation and further development. To avoid repetition and acting out, the past losses are in a way worked through by mourning, distancing oneself from the past but promoting active reflexivity (Jelin 2003, 6-7). However, there can be remnants and aftereffects of maintaining certain memories over others, manifesting as the return of the past, oblivion, and influential silences (Jelin 2003, 102).

The transmission of memory is an open and public issue, which is subject to strategic struggles and controversies concerning the politics of memory (Jelin 2003, 95). Schools, museums, and public holidays, for example, function as the battlegrounds of these memory struggles (MacMillan 2008, *History Wars*, para. 11, 17). Education and commemoration are labours of memory. Markers of memory can have many different interpretations, which are given, negotiated, and fought about, transforming their function as sites of (memory) conflict.

Miranda Christou (2007) investigates history education in Cyprus and how it enhances and protects patriotism. She found that patriotism is cultivated by blocking personal, private memories from contesting the national, public narrative, using narratives of 'sacred history' and 'dangerous memory'. Personal memories are perceived in the classroom as dangerous, able to provoke internal conflict. History is idealized and the cohesive memory protected, but the effects on patriotism can be the opposite from intended, as history is mythologized into something distant, disconnected and never changing. (Christou, 2007)

A recollection and its meaning can change, even though the past cannot: the events are reinterpreted, and the new understandings spread to the public by different actors and activists, promoting their view of the situation. Memory entrepreneurs' narratives can legitimate the current

situation, claim privileged links to the events and heroes, allege continuities, or declare disruptions. Contesting memories emerge over time, from antagonistic interpretations to the memories of oppressed and marginalized, to assert the authentic tale and demand justice. (Jelin 2003, 26-29)

The more an event is commemorated, the greater influence it has compared to less visible events (Tint, 2010). Drawing from Foucault's countermemory, Barbara Tint (2010) presents the master commemorative narratives, used by societal leaders to further their political agendas, and the alternative commemorative narratives, which less influential forces use to challenge the master narratives. This memory entrepreneurs' competition over visibility and acknowledgement against the hegemonic regimes of memory breed further conflict.

2.4 Functions of Memory in Conflicts

As previously discussed, memory has various connections to conflicts between and within groups, and not only when the conflict is about the memory. This section discusses how memory unites and divides, mobilizes, justifies claims, keeps the conflict alive, but can also give way to reconciliation and healing. Memory is a force to be reckoned with in a conflict setting: conflicting memories - selected and cultivated for a purpose - linked to conflicting interests initiate and fuel long-term, protracted conflicts (Tint, 2010). Often previously described struggles over the selection, ownership and cultivation of memory form a part of the conflict itself (Lehti, 2016). Chain of memories, connecting past and present injustices and identities can result in intractable, deep, cyclical, complex, continuing, even irreconcilable considered conflicts (Tint, 2010).

For example, through the linkages of collective memory with identity, its denial is simultaneously a denial of identity, which is often considered as the root of an intractable conflict. People are more inclined to act as a member of a group when that said group is in conflict. As the group identity is threatened, the group strengthens it as a strategy against the forces working in its opposition. Through the process the conflict's importance to the group identities establishes through conflict-driven memories, complicating its resolution. (Tint, 2010)

Individual memories can be tied together and moulded into a collective memory and a political force in a setting of a social movement, simultaneously connecting individuals (Eyerman 2004, 69).

Conflict members internalize this lived and learned past, with values, emotion and beliefs associated (Tint, 2010). The events of high trauma can be manipulated to further perpetuate conflict. Remembering is almost inevitably initiated and constructed for urgent, current purposes (Said 2000, 179). This is done through selective forgetting and remembering, invention, decoration and enhancement, the establishment of causal relationships and blames, and reframing of contextual factors (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Tint, 2010). The highly emotionally charged memories are recalled more often but tend to be also less accurate. Collectively remembered they enhance collective feelings of fear and anger, and these, with the memories, are passed from one generation to another. (Tint, 2010)

Memories mobilize groups to work towards common goals. It can be used as a backing for claims, or to belittle, attack others or their ideas. Similarly, memory can protest against marginalization. Past crimes and injustices can be put forth to argue for redress. (MacMillan 2008, *History and Identity*, para. 1) The mobilizing effect is often used by politicians, who influence and represent collective memory with their statements (Verovšek, 2016). Leaders and intellectuals pick national identity conforming elements and promote them by generating occasions where they are highlighted (Guibernau i Berdún 2004, 32). However, the effect goes both ways, as they are also products of their own identities, related memories, and their continuous change (Verovšek, 2016).

Both the genocide in Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda were prompted with carefully chosen and exaggerated past events of hatred and ethnic identities, done by politicians (Barkan 2005, 230-231). In Yugoslavia, all conflict sides called on history to justify their actions (MacMillan 2008, *Presenting History's Bill*, para. 2). Tint (2010) finds that conflict functions as a story, a narrative and a myth that interprets its context. Conflict narratives are created to explain the events and aspects of a conflict, giving people's experiences meaning and influencing how people act in the conflict. The framing techniques in conflict narratives vary across time and affect the conflict's endurance. Collective memories can be used in these narratives. (Mayer 2009, 88, 102-103)

The use of past events is motivated by the aim to prove that 'we' traditionally behave well and 'they' badly, which suggest that 'we' are honest and right here and now too (MacMillan 2008, *Presenting History's Bill*, para. 1). Current repression is interpreted differently in the light of past repression, which then seems a chain, tradition of insults and abuse (Smithey & Kurtz 2018, 172). Additionally,

the opponents can be diminished and labelled, shamed and pressured with the past. (MacMillan 2008, *Presenting History's Bill*, para. 4-5) Rauf Garagozov (2014, 181) shows that if the already existing, symbolic, schematic narrative templates of collective memory are represented in the new narrations, they are more powerful. These effects are not always given, as a group can experience a saturation of memory, where the often-recalled memory loses its effect (Jelin 2003, 36).

Daniel Bar-Tal (2014) argues that collective memories, through both specific and master narratives, determine how the conflict further develops, frequently functioning as obstacles for resolution and peacemaking. As conflict's escalation, its direction, rival's delegitimation and in-group's victim status need to be proven, the struggle between different accounts ensues. Varying and often contradictory representations of the different rivals attempt to maintain a unitary view, persuade the international community, and convince the rival of their tale's falsehood. (Bar-Tal, 2014)

In the process, the conflict and its tale develop into a fundamental part of the group and individual identity. Tint (2010) states that society's unhealed trauma and unresolved issues of the past can manifest themselves as not moving on. Actively recalling and honouring a past causes the participants to repeatedly relive their legacy of struggle and conflict. Relief and solutions are blocked by reopened old wounds and reinforced cycles of blame, immobility, and confrontation. According to her, there is a vital difference between therapists and mediators: If one blindly follows the memory, it can reinforce the factors that brought the conflict parties into the current situation. (Tint, 2010) On the other hand, MacMillan (2008, *History and Identity*, para. 1) supports the idea of a type of therapy to uncover the overlooked and repressed knowledge, empowering by revealing the experiences of marginalization and injustices. She argues that history has in addition to conflicts brought about reconciliation, as the past can be the key for building bridges (MacMillan 2008, *History Wars*, para. 31).

3. THE CATALAN CONTEXT

3.1 The Past and the Catalan Question

The Spanish Civil War is "the past that has not passed away" (Graham 2012, 11). Helen Graham (2012, 23) argues that the violence of its originating strategy is still "live" inside the polity and society of 21st century Spain. The constitutional polity accommodates many of the most harmful outcomes of the dictatorship and the Civil War, which still continue to take their toll (Graham 2012, 125).

Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebæk (2002, 122) highlight the problematic attitude towards Spanish national identity, as one of the most important legacies of Franco's regime. They found that attempts at a national discourse face many negative connotations, rooted in the dictatorship. Leftist and peripheral nationalist parties do not broadcast their national attachment to Spain, whereas during the republican period (1931-1939) before the Civil War the left-wing politicians could proclaim their Spanish identity and patriotism proudly. Furthermore, at the time, this declaration was not at odds with the recognition of Catalan, Basque, Galician, and other national identities. (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 122-123)

To many Catalans and theorists, Spain is not a nation-state (Vargas 2018, 9). Peripheral nationalists – such as the Catalan, Basque and Galician – argue that it is a political structure of various nations (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 133). Catalanism sees Spain as a historically imposed national unity, imposed by an absolutist monarchy (León Solís 2003, 13), and the Catalan independence movement frames itself as an anti-nationalist movement "against the explicitly nationalist-authoritarianism of the Spanish state" (Bernat & Whyte 2020, 774).

León Solís (2003, 24) describes that Spain is considered synonymous with Francoism in the periphery regions. The Civil War was to resolve the conflict about different conceptions of Spain and the role of national diversity within it, the outcome being Spanish nationalism and Franco's victory (Dowling 2012, 3). Anti-Catalanism, Catalanophobia, has even been claimed as one of the key causes of the Spanish Civil War (Crameri 2014, 70).

Today, Spanish nationalism is still strongly associated with authoritarianism and dictatorship (Dowling 2018, 24). This kind of connections, according to León Solís (2003, 24), strengthened Catalan nationalism. Andrew Dowling (2018, 24) explains that it facilitated the legitimization of the Basque and Catalan movements after Franco's death, as they were associated with democracy and modernity, and suggests that the dictatorships of Miguel Primo de Rivera (before the Second Republic, 1923-1930) and Francisco Franco (following the Civil War, 1939-1975) resulted in the de-legitimation the Spanish project of centralised nation-making. However, one can also argue that one of their lasting legacies is its strengthening and persistence.

In fact, Francoism has endured both in the culture, economic relations and the constitutional order, from the nation's key symbols, Franco-era economic elites in charge of state-established corporations, preservation of hereditary titles, statues and street names, as well as the public funding of the Francisco Franco National Foundation (Bernat & Whyte, 2020) – a foundation that promotes a pro-Franco interpretation of the dictator. Thousands of corpses of Republicans remain unidentified and buried in unmarked mass graves, and the exhumation initiatives have been ineffective. In 2018, Franco's granddaughter was given the Dukedom of Franco. Such legacies and the Spanishness of the State make Catalonia feel uncomfortable. (Montserrat Camps-Gaset, 2019)

Bernat and Whyte (2020) argue that the constitutional crisis in Catalonia (the Catalan crisis from 2017) has been bolstered by the exploitation of Spanish cultural nationalism by the revived Spanish identity. The nation-building projects after Franco's death have not fully recovered from the foundational sin of Francoism, that is, the attempted elimination of the distinctive linguistic and cultural heritage (Dowling 2018, 6). The peripheral nations' cultures are assumed to belong in the Spanish whole. One of the most infamous ways the Spanish nationalist culture has practised this hierarchy by marginalizing and stigmatizing the peninsula's diverse cultures is the suppression of

Basque and Catalan languages. Franco did it to weaken popular resistance, and nowadays it is used to ensure Spanish unity. (Bernat & Whyte, 2020)

Growing new Catalanophobia has manifested in and been encouraged by racialised jokes, victimisation for using Catalan in official communication, as well as the extreme right inside and outside the governing PP promoting a boycott directed towards Catalan products. In 2017 this culminated in crowds chanting "*A por ellos*" (Go get 'em) to the Civil Guards who left to prevent the independence referendum. (Bernat & Whyte, 2020)

Many of the same motives and authoritarian attitudes inherent to Franco's regime shape the Catalan crisis of 2017 (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). Bernat and Whyte (2020) indicate that instead of being a 'national' or 'cultural' question, the issue in Catalonia is a struggle for transformation and alternatives – economic and social alternatives, alternative understandings of power. The "resistance represents a direct assault upon the postfascist Spanish state" (Bernat & Whyte, 774), thus, defined by its Francoist past which is present.

Despite Franco's attempt to eliminate Catalonia's cultural identity, it re-emerged more firmly rooted than before the Civil War - Dowling (2012, 3) goes as far as to claim that the impact of Francoism on Catalonia's political culture is beyond anything previously seen. Michael Vargas (2018, 2) finds that the situation in Catalonia is not only strongly influenced by a rich past, but even more by its active and motivated recollection.

The narrative is filled with defeats and survivals of continuous attempts of assimilation (Dowling 2018, 8). Montserrat Guibernau i Berdún (2004, 30) outlines that the emotional arguments of Catalan independentism connect Francoism, the coup d'état of Primo de Rivera and the oppression of both to the current grievances. César García (2018) found the Catalan nationalist narrative to be built on a quest, an escape, revenge, and a transformation, "celebrating" the "defeats" to symbolize the fight against Spain. The pro-independence discourse is frequently embedded with claims of historical injustice (Crameri, 2016).

Wagner (2018, 595) presents some ingredients of the contemporary Catalanist narrative to be the availability of "settler-colonial" and dictatorship histories, as self-government was thus liberation

from a never-changing, oppressing and authoritarian Spain. According to him, these imaginaries emphasize the Francoist prohibition of speaking Catalan and diminishing that the Civil War was not fought between Spain and Catalonia. Some Catalan nationalists claim the war to be imported to Catalonia from Spain (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 3).

Wagner (2018) contrasted how differently the sides referenced the past during the Catalan crisis: In an advertisement, ANC presented Franco's regime – of dictatorship, control of the press, political prisoners and language restrictions – as the past, whereas constitutionalists celebrated the democratic accomplishes of today, counter-weighting the independentists' neglect of the present and very recent past. Going further back is unnecessary due to the successes (Wagner, 2018).

Wagner's description illustrates well the different collective memories and politics of memory in Catalonia and Spain as well as their relationships. Their establishments, contestations and developments are not irrelevant to the Catalan question. Kathryn Crameri (2014, 73) promotes the acknowledgement of the horrors of the war and its aftermath by giving proper burials, which would further the sense of closure. However, the recovery of historical memory can also provide the resources to display historical differences, to protest against historical injustices, their dismissal and neglect, and to legitimise discourses regarding sovereignty and secession (Crameri 2014, 73).

3.2 Politics of Memory after Franco

Franco's regime, owing to its longevity, had a unique opportunity to create and develop its own record of the events before, during and after the war (Graham 2012, 127). The Civil War was officially and publicly remembered as a 'total victory' over the erring and guilty defeated *rojos*, reds, whose memory survived in secrecy in the memory regime's gaps, limited to the clandestine and private domains (Sánchez León, 2012).

During the latter half of Franco's regime, a new, contesting discourse of 'collective error and shared guilt' grew in volume, putting the blame of the terrors equally and collectively on both sides of the conflict, promoting reconciliation and the rhetoric of 'never again' (Sánchez León, 2012). The 'never again' has since achieved the position of the most significant lesson attached to the war (Aguilar & Humlebæk, 2002). Paloma Aguilar (2002) argues that after Franco's death the existence of a

traumatic collective memory of the Civil War informed greatly Spain's transition to democracy, pacifying the process. To prevent the war's repetition the process favoured negotiations and tolerance amongst the actors. (Aguilar, 2002)

In addition, the silence around certain issues, victims, and wrongs, which started from Franco's regime, continued after his death with the assistance of *pacto del olvido*, the pact of forgetting. The pact is the Spanish mainstream political class' political decision and agreement to not discuss the Civil War and Franco's dictatorship (Graham 2012, 129). The transition neither included 'truth commissions', trials to judge the people responsible for deaths, torture, illegal detentions, nor purges of the civilian or military institutions inherited (Aguilar, 2001). Francoism's legacy was ruled off-limits in public discourse during the transition to ensure its smooth progression (Graham 2012, 129). Trauma and emotions regarding the Civil War were legitimate, but only in the private and individual realms (Sánchez León, 2012). One of the most infamous silences was the silenced existence of Republican civilians' mass graves that continued to neglect these victims (Aguilar & Ferrándiz, 2016). The lack of policies regarding the corpses (Aguilar & Ferrándiz, 2016) was a result of the post-Franco ruling regime of memory. This position was gained by the discourse of collective error and shared guilt through the reclamation of oblivion and a contradictory claim of learning from the 1930s' suffering as well as its workings in the 1978 Constitution (Sánchez León, 2012).

During the transition to democracy, the state had to choose what should be kept and what myths should be created. The post-Franco regime does not want to be associated with the second Republic, its only democratic precedent, as its failure resulted in the traumatic Civil War. (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 122, 145, 152) Instead, the legitimacy of the state relies heavily on the continuity across the transition (Graham 2012, 129) - It is its foundational myth (Molina & Quiroga, 2019). Transition is the core of the contemporary Spanish national narrative. 'Spirit of transition' is an epic journey to democracy, where people abandon their disagreements to work together, and according to Ferreira (2019), this journey is omnipresent in hegemonic political discourse. It is reactivated when Spain faces a period of crisis. (Ferreira, 2019)

The Spanish Constitution is seen as the institutional foundation of democracy, a symbol without a history. Its value lacks a story with a temporal beginning of for example discovery or victories. (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 146) The present-focused framing of events starts with Franco's death,

an opening for a shift to democracy (Vargas 2018, 171). León Solís (2003, 25) says that the dominant interpretation is that after Franco Spain made a U-turn: a rebirth, awakening, successful, peaceful, and tolerant shaking all signs of the 'democratic deficit'. To constitutionalists, the 1978 regime equals democracy (Ferreira, 2019). It is however the Franco-instilled myth of 'ungovernable Spaniards' that has caused the mythification of this miraculous transition (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 152).

According to the myth, Spaniards are unable to manage political conflict, which inevitably leads to instability, chaos, lack of order and peace (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 31-32). The current regime has other heritages too in its memory politics from Franco's era. In reality, it has many more continuities with the Francoist period than any other previous period when it comes to its symbolic practices and politics of national commemoration (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 152). The key symbols of the Spanish nation are inherited from the Francoist state: the current, nationalist flag was restored by Franco, whereas the republican tricolour, preceding the Civil War, is not used (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). Similarly, the former King, Juan Carlos I was chosen by Franco as his heir, and depicted as the king of all Spaniards, a myth resisting until today (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 145-146).

Nevertheless, challenging views and active struggles over the memory existed. Sánchez León (2012) argues that through the workings of these two discourses and other factors, alternatives emerged. After Franco's death, the memory movement started its "work of uncovering," growing and gathering pace in the 1990s from its small and symbolic progress of the early 1980s (Graham 2012, 127). However, the Spanish state apparatus was resistant to the movement's deconstruction of Francoism's frame of meaning inside constitutional Spain (Graham 2012, 127). Though exiles returned, social mobilization grew, and initiatives of remembering emerged, they remained at a local level (Sánchez León, 2012). With time, the selective silence of the transition became a resistant, hegemonic component of the institutions and political culture (Kovras, 2012). This tradition of silence gags contesting, dissident voices of the civil society (Graham 2012, 129), and limits the interpretations of national interests and human right issues (Kovras, 2012).

Paloma Aguilar and Francisco Ferrándiz (2016) present an example of deviant remembrance. The controversial magazine Interviú covered the mass graves during the first years of Spanish democracy, despite risks, violence, and threats from the extreme right. However, the social reaction

and effect of the reporting did not reach as far as similar efforts later on, due to ignoring institutions and a weakened civil society failing to organize. At the same time fears of repeating the past grew more intense due to the failed coup d'état of 23-F in 1981 and the endurance of politically motivated violence. (Aguilar & Ferrándiz, 2016)

One of the challenging interpretations questions transition, claiming that the new regime is a continuation of the old Francoist one, and therefore illegitimate, hinting that Spain's European and democratic nature is suspicious. León Solís (2003, 25) limits the "entertainment" of this non-official account to "mainly radical peripheral nationalism and Republicans", whereas moderate peripheral interpretations see Spain as transformed but weakened by its past.

Textbooks and school curriculums have been one of the battlefields of memory between the central state and the peripheries' contesting accounts. The Organic Act on the General Organisation of the Education System gave autonomous communities, such as Catalonia, regulated over 35% of the curriculum, and though most regional editions of large national publishers were almost identical, publishers focusing on regional markets offered more identity-driven narratives in their textbooks. In these, the history of the region was prioritized over the history of Spain, even vilifying the repressing and centralizing state. (Boyd, 2008)

Ideologically charged narrations of the Franco era reappeared in 1996, bringing back to life the Francoist interpretations, according to which the war was a patriotic crusade against the anarchy during the Second Republic (Boyd, 2008). The rightist PP had won the elections and the regrettable quality of history education became the target of the new Minister of Education. The previous Socialists' government were blamed for the political utilization of history and a new Plan for Improving the Humanities was established - focusing solely on history, which focused on the unitary development of Spain. All the students in Spain were supposed to learn the same, regardless of the autonomous community, and the plan was praised for recovering at least some of the advances in education and national feeling. Catalan and Basque representatives opposed the reform. Intense public debate over education's role in the control over the nation's foundational myths followed and the government behind the plan was connected to the "darkest sides of that same history" they were trying to control (Boyd 2008, 141). All parliamentary groups but PP opposed the plan, but it was revived again after PP won the general elections in 2000, with a supporting report that claimed

that the textbooks of the autonomous communities - especially of the Basque schools - taught biased and nationalist ideas, favouring racism. The Catalan nationalist parties on the other hand saw the report as a furthering of xenophobia and Spanish nationalism. (Boyd, 2008)

The central state and the peripheries have also had their clashes over memory and its artefacts. New accessibility to municipal and provincial archives provided a chance to add depth and complexity to the prior study of the Civil War and the Second Republic's history. The revived nationalist movements of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia ignited the first incentive to emphasize local history, and therefore the local archives and other mementoes. (Boyd, 2008)

In the 1990s, 507 bundles of official papers that belonged to the Generalitat of Catalonia provoked tensions and struggles, as Catalonia wanted to recover them from Salamanca, where they had been archived after Franco seized them in the 1930s (Boyd, 2008; Crameri 2012, 36). The papers had been used to persecute individuals (Crameri 2012, 36). A long legal fight over the documents followed. In 1995, the Socialist government agreed to return the archives, but the mayor of Salamanca compiled an opposing petition with 97 000 signatures. In 1996 PP's government halted the transfer to study it further. After a decade of public debate and experts' consultations, in 2006, the disputed civil war papers were transferred to the Generalitat and Salamanca's civil war archive was turned into a Center for Documentation of Historical Memory. (Boyd, 2008) Salamanca applied for retrial and delays kept some of the papers there (Boyd, 2008; Crameri 2012, 36).

Despite, or specifically due to the previous memory regimes and their inability to consider the public dimension of trauma, the recollection of the Civil War was divided by factors rooted in the issues of the 1930s. At the beginning of the 2000s, due to various external and internal factors, the circumstances were ripe for an alternative memory regime, that of 'instituted remembrance' to struggle into the surface, urging for the long-ignored victims to be recognized. (Sánchez León, 2012) The 'memory boom' took off in Spain (Aguilar & Ferrándiz, 2016; Boyd, 2008). The new Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory linked the local and provincial mass grave excavation initiatives together, and this time the media followed and covered the projects (Boyd, 2008). Literature on the Civil War "flooded the market" (Sánchez León 2012, 500). Demands for memory policies and recognition emerged: Many of the younger generations preferred to be considered heirs of those who defended the Republic, instead of the heirs of transition (Sánchez León, 2012).

Whereas PP and a majority of Spaniards still wanted to avoid the issue, younger generations were less likely to agree with this approach (Boyd, 2008).

The year 2006 was officially declared the "Year of Historical Memory" due to parliamentary discussions and voting on legislation for honouring and recovering victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship, the Historical Memory Law (Sánchez León, 2012), which was enacted in November 2007 (MacMillan 2008, *History Wars*, para. 24). Even then, almost 70 years after the war, the public debate over memory happened in a tense climate (Aguilar & Ferrándiz, 2016; Boyd, 2008). The law refuses to define one true historical memory for all Spaniards, allowing individuals and groups to interpret and recall in their own way (Boyd, 2008). Franco was to be erased from public commemoration, such as statues, street names and squares (MacMillan 2008, History Wars, para. 24). The government was established responsible for supporting the pursuit of historical knowledge and "democratic memory". Franco-era judicial sentences based on political or ideological commitments were declared illegitimate. People could now seek a Declaration of Reparations and Personal Recognition, the pensions of survivors were increased, and local units were instructed on the exhumation of the mass graves. (Boyd, 2008)

MacMillan (2008, *History Wars*, para. 24) doubts that instead of bringing a consensus on the past "the law is opening up old divisions and creating new ones." On the other hand, Sánchez León (2012) reflects how the legislation enforces a vague and traditional spirit of the transition. It omits principles of Human Rights, deviating from typical practices of transitional justice (Sánchez Leon, 2012), and it lacks a truth and reconciliation process (Boyd, 2008).

Furthermore, Montserrat Camps-Gaset (2019) claims that the law never really came into real effect: Francisco Franco Foundation exists, is publicly funded, thousands of corpses remain in unmarked mass graves. Exhumation initiatives are ineffective, and the central state has actively damaged their efforts (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). The Dukedom of Franco remains and was passed to his granddaughter in 2018 (Camps-Gaset, 2019). PP has been continuously unwilling to openly condemn Franco's military coup and dictatorship (Boyd, 2008; Preston, 2017). Powerful conservative Catholic lay associations have actively rehabilitated the foundational myths of Francoism (Graham 2012, 130). There is a reluctance to cover Franco's violence on the TV and radio, and the discourse that threatens those "not moving on" with civil conflict and national failure is still

upheld (Graham 2012, 130, 133). To this day sociological and nostalgic Francoism remains and influences collective memory (Graham 2012, 127).

The law's effects are, however, existent, and relevant, when compared to the atmosphere around 30 years ago: Pelai Pagès i Blanch and Patrick Gallagher (2013, 2) reflect that the Civil War seems to appear daily in the news. Thomas Jeffrey Miley and Roberto Garvía (2019) argue that collective memory is capricious: one generation's victory is seen as capitulation by the next one. They refer to the way the Spanish Constitution is nowadays in disrepute, not only in Catalan nationalist circles. It is now reframed as a pact of forgetting: The still-living remains of the dictator's regime and the impunity towards its officials are stressed more than ever. (Miley & Garvía, 2019)

The previously discussed intense and long fight over the Salamanca papers shows, as Carolyn Boyd (2008) states, how history and historical memory were seen to be key to collective identity and political justice. Alfredo González-Ruibal (2017) similarly reveals the power of such mementoes by narrating a more recent event: the backlash of government institutions and grassroots associations ignited by archaeological findings at two battlefields of the Spanish Civil War. The memory of political conflict was entangled with the contemporary conflict: the issue was framed as one where Spanish researchers had come to meddle in Catalonian history. (González-Ruibal, 2017)

Autonomous Communities of Catalonia, Andalusia, Navarra, and the Basque Country were especially active in the exhumation efforts in contrast with the inaction of the central government (Aguilar & Ramírez-Barat, 2016). In Catalonia and Basque Country, the conflicts of the Second Republic, the Civil War and the Franco era are not only defined in terms of political differences but of those of national identity (Crameri 2012, 35-36). Historian Queralt Solé, defendant of the Memorial Democràtic, an institution that manages the sites of memory related to the Civil War in Catalonia, proposed in 2010 a Catalonian memory, which remembers all dead alike, in contrast to the politicized memory of the Spanish state, constructing a post-political Catalonian nation of the memory of the war (González-Ruibal, 2012). The independence claim and the recovery of historical memory go hand in hand in the Catalanist context, by showing how the dialogue with the central state has been impossible, and that the Catalan living memory, official history and the national mythscape are compatible with each other (Crameri 2012, 49).

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Framing theory

As found in the previous chapters, for example in the case of the magazine Interviú, media provides sites for memory struggles, as it is a path to represent and disseminate different interpretations of the past. Wulf Kansteiner (2002) promotes using the methods of communication and media studies to examine the negotiations of collective memories and what makes collective memory initiatives successful. Collective requires public expression, and collective memory is an inherently mediated phenomenon (Neiger, Meyers & Zanberg 2011, 3).

Media study methods can reveal the interaction between first, the visual and discursive objects and the traditions framing our representations of the past; second, the memory makers selectively adopting and manipulating these traditions; and finally, the receiving, ignoring, using, transforming memory users or consumers of these artefacts. According to Kansteiner (2002), memory studies should conceptualize collective memory as the outcome of their interplay and dialogue.

Linking the study of collective memory and media research helps to approach questions about, for example, media as memory agents, the construction of different memories by different media, the interrelations between other social activity, such as politics, and the cultures in which remembrance takes place, that is, studying 'media memory' as a sign of sociological and political changes. (Neiger, Meyers & Zanberg 2011, 2) Additionally, collective memory and media studies are connected by the nature of the products that are examined: They are results of processes of selection, salience, and construction, resulting in an interpretation, a storyline of events, which is dismissing factors and infused with social morals and lessons. (Neiger, Meyers & Zanberg 2011, 5-6)

Erving Goffman (1974, 21) defines a frame as the "principles of organization which govern events - at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in them" which in turn aids in identification, labelling, locating, and perceiving of events and people. Interpreters such as journalists use frames to organize and explain the world one "arbitrary slice or cut" at the time (Goffman 1974, 10-11). Robert Entman (1993) further develops framing theory in *Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm* and applied it to the study of mass media (Linström & Marais, 2012). Framing is a combination of selection and salience: Some aspects of perceived reality are chosen and made more salient in a communicating text. Frames promote a specific "problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman 1993, 52). Frame influences how a problem is noticed, understood and remembered, as well as how the receiver chooses to act upon it (Entman 1993, 54).

Framing in the communication process is located not only in the communicator but also in the text, the receiver, and the culture. The communicator is influenced by the frames that organize their belief systems. The text establishes frames with both the presence and absence of representations, such as keywords, stock phrases, sentences, stereotyped images, sources, and structures. Frame's influence is not certain and predetermined: The frames are understood, dismissed, challenged, or accepted, depending on the receiver's set of frames. (Entman, 1993)

The more a piece of information is noticeable, meaningful, memorable, that is, salient, the more probable it is that the information is perceived, processed, and stored. Salience happens through repetition, placement, and association with culturally familiar symbols. These influence how the information interacts with the receiver's existing frames. Frame analysis studies the selection and salience of specific parts of an event by examining the communicating text or image. (Entman, 1993)

Frames are used and reused to interpret events and determine appropriate action, which is why frame analysis is useful for analysing conflicts (Neiger, 2020). Elisabeth King (2017) also argues for using framing theory in conflict studies: She describes how politicians, journalists, community leaders, state actors, movements and countermovements, textbook producers, and curricular approvers compete to frame events, since their interpretation is crucial in establishing a consensus, rallying action and promote claims. Public policies and general culture are infused with winning movements' frames. (King, 2017)

Frame analysis, through frame elements, allowed Özden Melis Uluğ and J. Christopher Cohrs to systematically explore how the Members of Parliament in Turkey understood the Kurdish conflict. Jörg Matthes and Matthias Kohring (2008) present the identification of frame elements as a solution to the frame's abstract notion and the resulting variation in researchers' identifying and coding. Frame elements used in the analysis can, for example, be the ones listed by Entman (1993, 52); "problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." It can be assumed that some categories of these elements systematically group together, and these patterns are frames. Therefore, the frames are not predetermined when doing the analysis, nor directly coded with a single variable. Thus, the process is more complicated, due to being done manually. (Matthes & Kohring, 2008)

Memory itself is a framing of the past. It is an outcome and a process of selection and salience, interpretation and meaning-making. Paloma Aguilar (2002, 1-24) describes that the historical memory of a community consists of three elements: the selection of worthy considered events from the past, their representation and the lessons learnt from them. Through selection and salience memories form a story, chain of events, which communicates values and advice. Memory-frame can be used to highlight and promote interpretations of current events, or it can work as an example. On the other hand, memory-frames guide and inform the framing process, as already learnt frames. Iosif Kovras (2012) found by analysing frames in Spanish parliamentary debates from the transition to democracy that selective silences over the past persist in the political discourse and democratic institutions.

Another example of the employment of Entman's framing theory in the context of collective memory and remembrance is Xing Zhang, Elmie Nekmat and Anfan Chen's (2020) study on how crisis response frames and collective memory narratives were presented by government, organizations and public actors on a social media platform. The public contested and criticized dominant narratives about the past crisis by the powerful authorities, providing alternatives, whereas the governmental communicators glorified the national responses in the past and evoked nationalistic sentiments, patriotism and social cohesion. Both the different crisis response frames and past crisis' memory frames, as well as these frames' interaction on the social media platform, could be examined.

The relationship between the interpreter's framing practices and collective memory is complex and easily left unnoticed, as first interpretations might direct towards frames that are considered common practices, independent from memory. Jill A. Edy and Miglena Daradanova (2006) studied the effect collective memory can have on journalists' practices and frames by investigating the frames in the reporting on space shuttle Columbia's destruction. Interpretations of past events influence the direction of reporting and where the journalists look for answers. The effect of collective memory in the sensemaking processes was not immediate, and the past case of Challenger's crash was first treated only as a relevant past but was not used as a tool in the reporting, searching for information and structuring of the narrative. This effect was not obvious, as the link between past and present was not explicitly mentioned. (Edy & Daradanova, 2006)

4.2 Sample

4.2.1 Timeframe

The research question concerns the presence of the Civil War and Franco's regime related collective memories in the mobilizing around the independence referendum and following events and elections in Catalonia, focusing on the campaigning done by the regional political parties. The key events of interest are the last weeks leading up to the referendum (1st of October 2017; 1-O), the day the Spanish government applied Article 155 and enforced direct rule in Catalonia (21st of October 2017), the declaration of independence (27th of October 2017) and the Catalan regional elections (21st of December 2017, 21-D), called up by the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.

The timeframe of the sample begins roughly three weeks before the referendum, on the 11th of September, the Diada (National Day of Catalonia), and ends the day of the regional elections. In addition to the key events of interest this time covers events such as the closing of the Generalitat's website (13th of September), Police and Civil Guard arriving in Catalonia (14th of September), sizing of ballot boxes (15th of September), Operation Anubis, arresting of dozen Catalan officials organizing the referendum, closing of specific websites and the Spanish police storming and occupying the Catalan ministries (20th of September), the general strike condemning 1-O's police violence and the condemning statement from King Felipe VI on 3rd of October, the 'flight' or 'outflow' of businesses

starting soon after, mass protests on the 7th and 8th of October, jailing of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez, the leaders of two independentist organizations, ANC and Òmnium cultural (OU) (16th of October), the following protests, President Puigdemont and five Catalan ministers' departure from Catalonia to Belgium at the end of October and the detention of the Vice President of Generalitat Oriol Junqueras and eight other members of the former Catalan government on the 2nd of November. One of the last incidents was the removal of the long-disputed medieval artwork from the Museum of Lleida at the beginning of December, allowed by the direct rule of Spanish state.

4.2.2 Medium

Catalan nationalism owes a significant part of its progression to social media and the internet (Crameri 2015, 27). An important part of the campaigning and activism happens online. To obtain and examine the parties' statements, campaigning, accounts of the events and the related argumentation, the study material consists of the online publications of six different regional political parties. The audience is assumed to be mostly the population of Catalonia, but this varies.

The online publications are reports from meetings and events, speeches, statements, press releases, shared news articles, interviews, and opinion pieces, available at the party's website at the time of the study. They are, therefore, if not all originally published there, at least endorsed by the party and distributed to the public, interested in the politics of the party. Thus, they are assumed to line with the party's position. The analysis focuses on the text elements of these publications. The relevant articles were gathered using both the Google search engine, controlling for the website in questions and date of publication, as well as the websites' public archives of news, press releases and opinion pieces. The sample did also cover few articles which did not cover or relate to the conflict.

4.2.3 Parties

The regional (Catalan) political parties were chosen for the sample according to 1) their seats in the Catalan parliament of 2015 and 2017 (135 seats), 2) the availability of articles on their websites and 3) the balance between the independentist and constitutionalist views in the sample. The outcome was a sample of articles from the independentist Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (Catalan European Democratic Party, PDeCAT), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of

Catalonia, Esquerra), Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy, CUP), the constitutionalist Ciudadanos–Partido de la Ciudadanía (Citizens–Party of the Citizenry, Ciudadanos), and the pro-referendum Catalunya en Comú (Catalonia in Common, CatEnComú) and Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (United and Alternative Left, EUiA).

Heras Pedrosa et al. (2020) divide the current conflict parties into these three groups. The pro-independence, here independentists, view the Catalan Republic as the solution to the contemporary issues in the region. Wagner (2018) defends the use of the label 'independentist' as it is self-description and free of separatism and secessionism's negative connotations. The second group is the constitutionalists, who claim that the Spanish Constitution and its laws should be respected, meaning that the referendum is illegal and against the priority, Spanish unity. The third, smaller emergent group supports a significant modification of the Spanish Constitution in a way that it would allow Catalans to vote in an effective independence referendum. Those are here labelled as pro-referendum. (Heras Pedrosa et al. 2020)

PDeCAT (30 seats) and Esquerra (24 seats) were the two biggest parties of the Junts pel Sí electoral alliance (62 seats) in the 2015 Catalan regional elections. Ciudadanos (25 seats) was the biggest opposition party both in the 2015 and the 2017 Catalan regional elections. CUP (10 seats) had increased its number of seats in the 2015 elections and after PDeCAT and Esquerra it was the 3rd biggest independentist party. There was only one article available on the website of the constitutionalist Socialists' Party of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE, 16 seats) and none from the constitutionalist People's Party of Catalonia (11 seats) and pro-referendum Podemos, which is why they were not included in the study. Podemos belonged in the pro-referendum coalitions Catalunya Sí que es Pot in 2015 (11 seats), and Catalunya en Comú-Podem in 2017 (8 seats). Five of Catalunya en Comú-Podem's seats were of the party CatEnComú. (Argos n.d., n.d.) Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds belonged in the Catalunya Sí que es Pot and had 3 seats in the Parliament of 2015. However, the party has been dissolved in 2019, and thus their website was no longer available. EUiA had 2 seats in the coalition Catalunya Sí que es Pot from the 2015 elections and, like Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, participated in the establishment of CatEnComú.

The availability of articles seemed to be strongly connected not only to the number of seats in the Catalan parliament but also the party's Catalan roots: Podemos is a Spanish party and People's Party

of Catalonia is a Catalan branch of its national counterpart, PP, which was governing in Madrid. PSC-PSOE was founded in 1978 as a unification of three parties, one of them being the Catalan Federation of PSOE, an affiliate of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. PSC-PSOE is its Catalan branch (Center for Strategic & International Studies, n.d.). Therefore, all the parties chosen for the sample are not only Catalonia-based but also happened to be Catalonia-originated.

Table 1. Sample: All the articles published between 11.9.2017-21.12.2017

	September	October	November	December	Total
CUP	27	41	6	26	100
Esquerra	33	29	22	25	109
PDeCAT	28	17	25	12	82
Independentists, total	88	87	53	63	291
Ciudadanos	52	79	78	45	254
CatEnComú	11	8	13	10	42
EUiA	16	11	4	4	35
Pro-referendum, total	27	19	17	14	77
Total	167	185	148	122	622

The right-centre PDeCAT is the only not left-wing independentists party of the sample. The liberal and Catalanist party was founded in 2016, continuing with the work of its predecessor Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Partit Demòcrata n.d.; Center for Strategic & International Studies, n.d.). The 130th President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, Puigdemont, was during the timeframe of the sample member of PDeCAT. The party's articles in the sample are all in Catalan, and September and November were its months with the most articles (Table 1).

Esquerra was founded in 1931 during the Second Spanish Republic after the rule of the dictator Primo de Rivera (Esquerra Republicana, n.d.). It has been the home of past Presidents of the Generalitat such as Francesc Macià, Lluís Companys and Josep Tarradellas, and at the time of the sample, Esquerra's leader Junqueras was the Vice President of the Generalitat. It is a left-wing,

Catalanist, social democratic, republican and independentist party (Center for Strategic & International Studies, n.d.). The articles available from Esquerra are mostly in Catalan, except for one monograph on the party's history being also available in English and Spanish. Esquerra published the most on their website compared to the other independentist parties (109), its activity decreasing in November. Like PDeCAT, its month with the most publications was September, but October followed closely behind (Table 1).

CUP is a far-left party, and unlike the other independentist parties of the sample, CUP advocates for an independent Catalonia outside the EU and NATO (Center for Strategic & International Studies, n.d.). CUP promotes socialism and pancatalanism (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, n.d.), which supports the unity between all the Catalan speaking regions across the borders of the autonomous region of Catalonia. CUP's articles are in Catalan, except for some, which were also in English and Spanish. October was the party's most active month article-wise and in November the number of their articles dropped dramatically compared to the rest of the months of the sample (Table 1).

The independentist parties of the sample were limited to these three, to ensure sufficient attention on the articles against Catalan independence and referendum, that is, posts made by constitutionalists, which were only available from the party Ciudadanos. Ciudadanos is a centrist, liberal, pro-EU, anti-independence and thus constitutionalist party (Ciudadanos n.d., "Estrategia") founded in 2006 as a Catalan regional party (Ciudadanos n.d., "Orígenes"). They were the biggest opposition party in the Catalan Parliament of 2015 and ended up as the biggest party of the parliament in 2017, although remaining in the opposition. The number of articles published on their page efficiently rivals the three independentist parties combined and covers over half of November's articles (Table 1). Ciudadanos published the most in October and November. Most of their publications in the sample are in Spanish, except for one which was written in Catalan.

There are two parties included from the third group, the pro-referendum: the eco-socialist and left-wing CatEnComú and EUiA. CatEnComú is the newest party of the sample, established in 2017. The party wrote in Catalan and published 42 articles within the sample's timeframe. EUiA participated in CatEnComú and is itself created in 1998. EUiA is a merger of Comunistes de Catalunya (Communists of Catalonia), Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya Viu, and Partit obrer Revolucionari

(Revolutionary Workers' Party) (EUiA, n.d.). EUiA too wrote in Catalan, but also shared interviews written in Spanish.

In total, the sample includes 622 articles, from which 254 were from a constitutionalist party, and 77 from a pro-referendum party. October is the month with the most articles and December, the month of the election, surprisingly the one with the least. (Table 1) However, the timeframe of the sample neither covers the whole month of September nor the whole month of December.

4.3 Phases of Analysis

This study aims to examine how the memory of the Civil War and Franco's regime is visible in the statements concerning the Catalan crisis of 2017. This includes how they influence, contest and are used in the campaigning process, as well as how this differs between the different parties and through the different phases of the crisis. This is approached by using the framing of the Catalan crisis itself and then examining memory's role in these frames, finally mapping out the different memory-frames at play.

Therefore, the study's frame analysis is conducted in three steps. The first one creates the base for the rest of the analysis by outlining the basic, overarching frames of the conflict in 2017 from the three conflict groups. These framings are used to identify the memories' relationship to these basic, core claims. The frames are created from the sample as the research progresses by identifying from the texts frame elements determined by Entman's (1993, 52) definition of frames. Therefore, the overarching conflict frame includes problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation, and it attempts to describe the core of the parties' argumentation. The resulting frame is the umbrella frame that is represented by most of the articles from the conflict group and it defines and positions the actors, dynamics, and events the parties consider relevant.

In the next phase, the main focus of this study, manifestations of collective memory are identified and their relationship to the overarching conflict frames is analysed through answering the following questions:

- **How do collective memories influence the framing?** How does memory influence the choice of words, slogans, symbols, and sources? Is the frame a repetition of a memory? Is memory part of the frame?
- **What topics, people and events of the Civil War and Franco's times are mentioned and hinted at in the articles?** How are they mentioned? What elements recur?
- **How is memory included in the conflict frame's reasoning and interpretation?** Does the framing contest collective memories, establish, reinforce and promote them or present competing memories?
- **How is memory present and used through the rhetorical and technical devices highlighting the frame's argument?** Is memory present through the choice of words, slogans, symbols, metaphors, exemplars, symbols, and sources? How are these situated in the text?
- **How do these findings vary between the parties and different phases of the conflict?**

The last step draws together how the past is framed, that is, selected and made more salient, remembered and interpreted, in these articles, according to the findings. Silences, similarities, clashes, and contradictions are also identified.

4.4 Reflection and limitations

The focus is on Catalonia, and not on the discourses in the rest of Spain or Madrid. However, the study would be more comprehensive if it also included publications from the regional offices of the parties with roots outside Catalonia. The reason behind the lack of their articles is unknown. The other limitation is that the pro-referendum sample only consists of 77 articles.

Furthermore, it should be noted that I have no prior experience with reading or translating Catalan. My translations are based on my knowledge of Spanish, my basic level skills in French and the help of online dictionaries. My prior cultural knowledge is mostly limited to regions outside Catalonia. It is not unlikely that there are probably hues, references, and tones I have missed due to this.

I am a product of collective memory as much as anyone else. However, I consider it relevant to point out that I have learned most of the details about the history of the Civil War and Franco's regime from courses in Finnish Universities. My upbringing has been specifically very not-Spanish in the sense that it was an always present, related identity, but never ours. This results in and is caused by

certain frames, which emerge when analysing the texts. As an attempt to counter and decrease their effect, the identification of frames is approached systematically, through frame elements.

The conflict parties' conflict framing could be a thesis on its own. Their simplification and brief description are justified by the fact that it is not this thesis' focus but used as an aid to detect and interpret the memories by attaching them to this canvas. Additionally, the interpretation of the conflict, a key issue, can be assumed to be carefully defined by the party, and their communication in the websites can be expected to be thoroughly coordinated. Besides, the websites seldom had any mention of the writer of the text, except for the opinion pieces. People are thus writing less as individuals and more as the representatives of the party or as the party itself.

Especially due to this summarizing approach and the delicate situation altogether, it is important to not further heighten, embellish and magnify the polarization and confrontation when revealing the framings and drawing conclusions. Clear communication of the findings should not lean on language that exaggerates or adds on the differences. Though the matter is considered a key issue, it is not the only issue, position, and identity that defines the parties and their representatives in question.

The various pressures behind the statements written during the crisis should be acknowledged. The situation was intense, anxious, confrontational, and in constant change, but the online space's immediate nature is harsh and demanding. Furthermore, the study is not aware of the coordination and processes behind these opinion pieces, interviews, press releases, statements and summaries from events, meetings, and speeches. The texts are public and available online at the time of the study, but the websites had no indications of changes made in the text after the day of publication. This does not mean that there had not been any or that all the articles published then are still available. Tracking these changes, processes and contributors is outside the scope of this thesis.

The aim of the study is not to evaluate the movements concerned or state what the crisis in Catalonia and the Spanish Civil War are about, what or who caused them, what they mean, whose actions were justified, whose accounts are more accurate, or who is the true victim. Instead, the attempt is to reveal the links between the different conflicts and how they are understood and felt: That is, the use and influence of the memory of the Civil War and dictatorship in the political parties' public interpretations of the Catalan crisis in 2017.

5. ANALYSIS: THE FRAMES AND MEMORIES

5.1 Conflict frames

To understand the workings of collective memory in the representations of the conflict between independentists, referendum supporters and constitutionalists, it is necessary to outline how the conflict itself is portrayed and told. The conflict frames described a fundamental, key issue, and their effective and clear expression and repetition are important for the politics of the parties. The frames map out their interpretation of the key problems, solutions, actors, threats, values, and events. The main message did not change dramatically throughout the development of the crisis. Only the path towards the solutions suggested changed, adapting to the situation, finally urging people to vote for the party in question in the next elections.

The repeating theme throughout the four months of the sample was the evaluation that the opponents were not being democratic. The independentists called the actions of the Spanish state, from the arrests and seizing of ballot boxes to the police violence and application of Article 155 - supported by Ciudadanos - antidemocratic. Ciudadanos, the constitutionalist party, on the other hand, blamed Catalonia's Generalitat and the independentist parties for a blow to democracy, an illegal and therefore undemocratic referendum, as well as growing divisive and hateful nationalist attitudes resulting in the silencing of those who disagree. Pro-referendum CatEnComú and EUiA condemned the Spanish government and PP, who trampled on fundamental rights and the principles of a democratic state and questioned the condition of the Spanish democracy. The conflict was for them as well a fight for democracy, but the referendum was not considered an effective referendum, but a right to express their will and a step towards new negotiations with the state.

Another prevalent, reoccurring fundamental element was the relationship to the Constitution and thus the transition to democracy. Ciudadanos stated that the Constitution is the basis and protector of democracy, whereas the independentist parties described it as undemocratic since it puts Spanish unity before democracy and is built on foundations tied to fascism. Its application by the PP government was condemned as "unconstitutional" – suggesting that they do not even follow their own rules. CatEnComú too blamed the constitutionalist bloc for being the first to bypass the Constitution and argued that the Constitution should not be the constitutionalist parties' property but everyone's. Hence their solution for the lack of democracy and legitimacy is its major reform.

The frames of the crisis in 2017 are guided by and constructed with older interpretations of the past and contemporary Spain. The parties' conflict frames by themselves share and contest ideas and assumptions on the past, as well as build on them. Some constructions and dynamics leaning on memory are more obvious than others, as many memory-frames tend to be symbolic narratives on values. However, possible echoes and similarities can be detected.

5.1.1 Independentist conflict frame

The independentist parties' framing of the conflict can be summarized as follows: The self-determination of the traditionally democratic, civic, pacific, and progressive Catalonia is blocked by the antidemocratic, stagnant, totalitarian, authoritarian Spanish state, which stops Catalonia's progress, meddles in its affairs, interferes in its economy, and takes over its institutions and autonomy. To progress, there is a need for more freedom and democracy, which will be achieved by a) voting in the independence referendum for (or against) an independent republic, and later b) confirming the demand for an independent Republic by voting for the independentists in elections.

The 1-O is Catalonia's manifestation of self-determination, which Spain aims to prevent with actions that are characterized as violent, authoritarian, totalitarian and Catalanophobic. These are, for example, the arrival of and the occupation carried out by the Police and Civil Guard, the police violence towards voters, the detaining of Jordi Cuixart, Jordi Sanchez and various members of the Generalitat, the seizing of ballot boxes, arrests, raids, censorship, lack of judicial guarantees for the exiles, lack of separation of powers, threats from within PP, impunity towards fascism, using Article

155 to remove disputed medieval artwork from the Museum of Lleida, taking over the Catalan institutions and the liquidation of autonomy, compared with a siege and a coup.

According to the framing, the current affair indicates how the Spanish state is neither democratic, European nor from the 21st century, but instead old fashioned, in paralysis and acting like a dictatorship. Fundamental rights are disregarded, the separation of powers is lacking and Spain's membership in the European Union should be suspended. The Constitution's foundation and the legitimacy of laws are questioned, as well as the governing PP and the King, with their broken promises and both fascist and Francoist ties. Crameri (2014, 70; 2016) likewise has found the rhetoric of Spain suffering from political immaturity, and an acute democratic deficit or shortage.

Many of before listed matters raised in the moral evaluation of the state and its actions are tied to its Francoist past, despite not always exclusively drawing the connection. The matters under threat or already lost, from self-determination, autonomy, and institutions to members of a political class, were lost during Franco's rule too. Additionally, many of the forces the referendum and claim for independence are stated to be up against are to differing degrees related to Franco's regime, from Francoism and neo-Francoism to the far right, fascism, sexism, the regime of 1978, Spanish nationalism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, dictatorship, lack of democracy, monarchy, PP, the King and Prime Minister Rajoy. The demands repeat demands from the last years of the regime: amnesty, democracy, and freedom.

The independence movement understands itself as a social mobilization in opposition to nationalism and the nationalist-authoritarianism of the state (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). The 1-O is framed as not being about flags, nationalism, or even independence any longer, but democracy, voting 'yes' or 'no'. The discourse of inclusivity and focus on language has presented the movement in civic rather than ethnic terms (Crameri 2014, 54). The democratic deficit of Spain tends to be contrasted with Catalonia's democratic purity (Crameri 2014, 70). Catalonia is described in the sample as democratic, progressive, civic, of the future, and European – the last one highlighted by Esquerra and PDeCAT, not CUP. Catalonia is implied to have this tradition through its socialists of the past, its institutions, parties, and effective employment of general strikes. It is the country of peace, as stated by one exemplar Catalan, Pau Casals, in his United Nations Peace Medal acceptance speech "I Am Catalan" in 1971.

From the contrasting traditions of Catalonia and the Spanish state, only the latter is demonstrated with specific past events as the following sections reveal. The focus is altogether more on the actions of the Spanish state, though the support from the Catalan constitutionalist parties is addressed. Therefore, the threat is mainly interpreted as one coming from outside Catalonia. The dynamic mimics the memory of the Civil War's events in the region being ones between Catalonia and Franco. It differs from the memory of a chaotic Second Republic but is however related to the ungovernable Spaniards myth by highlighting with their difference that Catalans are everything but ungovernable. Catalan nationalism and separatism often forget that the Civil War was not fought between Spain and Catalonia nor imported (Wagner, 2018; Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 3). The reality is much more complicated than what memory often allows: The Francoist dictatorship was not imposed from the outside, and the traditional elites of Catalonia were fractured by the Spanish Civil War, some backing Franco (Dowling 2018, 18). However, the framing of the end of 2017 borrows from this construction and further promotes it, even when only discussing current events.

The continuity is implied with the claimed tradition of struggle, regarded as the "same struggle".[1] This is further highlighted by referencing the many falls down,[2] many aggressions,[3] "other occasions'',[4] "deep wounds",[5] the claim of inheritance of many, many struggles,[6] the generations who fought for the cause and are no longer here, but would have wanted to be,[7] and the idea that

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[1] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September). Rufián: "Nosaltres li diem al món que Franco no va morir un 20 de novembre de 1975, sinó l'1 d'octubre de 2017 davant una urna a Catalunya" La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/rufian-nosaltres-li-diem-al-mon-que-franco-no-va-morir-un-20-de-novembre-de-1975-sino-l1-d-14548

CUP. (2017, 25 September). "To the referendum": the book. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/referendum-book

[2] PDeCAT. (2017, 25 September). Marta Pascal: "L'1-O ens hi juguem la democràcia i la dignitat d'aquest país". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/marta-pascal-l1-o-ens-hi-juguem-la-democracia-i-l/

[3] PDeCAT. (2017, 27 September). Campuzano: "La nació catalana està dempeus i el dia 1-O votarem". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/campuzano-la-nacio-catalana-esta-dempeus-i-el-dia/

[4] PDeCAT. (2017, 11 October). Campuzano a Rajoy: "Aprofiti l'oferta de diàleg del president Puigdemont". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/noticies/campuzano-a-rajoy-aprofiti-loferta-de-dialeg-del-/

[5] PDeCAT. (2017, 27 September).

[6] Esquerra. (2017, 19 September).

[7] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September)

Esquerra. (2017, 18 September) Marta Rovira: "Celebrem i estudiarem la proposta de l'assemblea de càrrecs electes que ha fet Podemos". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/marta-rovira-celebrem-i-estudiarem-la-proposta-de-lassemblea-de-carrecs-electes-que-ha-fet-14551

Esquerra. (2017, 19 September). Junqueras: "O el PP i totes les seves polítiques de prohibició, de repressió, limitació de drets socials o llibertat, democràcia, vot, gent i poble". La humanitat. Retrieved from

staying within Spain means politics of repression and a return, even being dragged back, to the dark past, in black and white.[8]

The frame states that the societal changes needed by the citizens cannot be provided when the Spanish state meddles in Catalonia's affairs. The state's undemocratic nature and immobility, manifested in a long list of blocked laws and reforms in Catalonia, is the reason why independence is necessary, and self-determination should be exercised. One of the areas where Spain lacks activity and progress compared to Catalonia is the politics of memory and specifically willingness to provide redress to Franco's victims through nullified sentences, compensations, and mass grave exhumation initiatives. León Solís (2003, 144) describes a prevalent discourse of pedagogic relationship between Catalonia and Spain, where Catalonia claims to teach Spain. Here such discourse can be traced from individual mentions regarding the claimed contrast in the level of democracy and the dynamic of progressive Catalonia showing Spain by example, asking it to follow along, also in memory politics.

Memories influence also what is mentioned, or not mentioned and further expressed: things that prevent certain connections or that should not be tied to the current conflict framing, building blocks that are present but not wanted as the cornerstones of the argumentation. It is constantly stated by the independentists that the referendum accepts both votes. This claim supports the image of Catalonia's democratic purity, but also the repeated statement that the independence movement is a democratic movement for self-determination and as often articulated, neither

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https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/junqueras-o-el-pp-i-totes-les-seves-politiques-de-prohibicio-de-repressio-limitacio-de-dre-14553

PDeCAT. (2017, 15 September). Carles Puigdemont: "L'1-O ha de sortir reforçada la democràcia i no Rajoy i l'Espanya en blanc i negre". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/carles-puigdemont-l1-o-ha-de-sortir-reforcada-la-/

[8] CUP. (2017, 14 September). La CUP fem manifest el nostre suport a Joan Ramon Casals, alcalde de Molins, davant els atacs de l'Estat per organitzar el Referèndum. News. Retrieved from http://molins.cup.cat/noticia/la-cup-fem-manifest-el-nostre-suport-joan-ramon-casals-alcalde-de-molins-davant-els-atacs-de

CUP. (2017, 18 December). [OPINIÓ] "Ja estem apoderades, ara toca construir la República". News. Retrieved from http://valls.cup.cat/noticia/opinio-ja-estem-apoderades-ara-toca-construir-la-republica

PDeCAT. (2017, 14 September). Bel: "No podran evitar que votem i ens expressem democràticament el proper 1-O". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/bel-no-podran-evitar-que-votem-i-ens-expressem-de/

PDeCAT. (2017, 18 September). President Puigdemont: "La decadència democràtica de l'Estat no ens pot arrossegar. Volem un país on la gent es mobilitzi per defensar els seus drets". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/president-puigdemont-la-decadencia-democratica-de/

PDeCAT. (2017, 26 September). President Puigdemont: "No ens deixarem grapejar la nostra democràcia i llibertat per un Estat que inspira les pitjors pràctiques de la Unió Europea". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/president-puigdemont-no-ens-deixarem-grapejar-la-/

nationalist nor violent. These separations drawn are aware of many memories and work to grow the distance from those about Franco's Spanish nationalism, Basque nationalism, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, 1959-2018), the armed Basque nationalist and separatist organization.

5.1.2 Constitutionalist conflict frame

Ciudadanos frames the conflict as one between peace threatening and anti-democratic nationalism and the Constitution: The absence of the state and constitutional values have resulted in the growth of a hateful and corrupt nationalism and its illegal *procés* (the process towards independence), all resulting in more division, social fracture, the outflow of companies, lack of legality and democracy. To ensure the future democracy and the freedom to be Catalan, Spanish and European, the solution is a) more state presence and restoration of the Constitution, through Article 155, and b) electing a new interlocutor for Catalans, who unites all for a new common project, the Constitution's reform.

Nationalism and separatism are a threat to Spanish unity and coexistence. The frame claims it divides families, friends, neighbours, generations, and communities, as well as silences, points out, and calls *facha* (fascist) those who think differently. According to Ciudadanos' description, the growth in nationalism is the result of the state's absence during the past 40 years and continuous concessions to the nationalist parties. Nationalism has gained a footing through the biased television channel TV3 and ideological abuse at schools, both funded with Catalan tax money. The media glorifies terrorists and forgets the Catalan victims of ETA's terrorism. Simultaneously the Generalitat is implementing a coup, a blow to democracy. The ones who justified independence with economic reasons have now caused instability and the flight of companies.

Following Ciudadanos' argumentation, all this shows how the separatists' cause is one of privilege, chaos, confrontation, rising tension (on the streets, specifically) and egoism, as its corrupt leaders are obsessed with staying in history and when the situation becomes bad enough, they end up escaping justice. The accusations of egoism are directed especially at President Puigdemont and Vice President Junqueras. An opinion piece describes Puigdemont as the poisoned puppet of the anarchist CUP, who gifted him to the bourgeois nationalists.[9] Ciudadanos argues that he is not the

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[9] Ciudadanos. (2017, 17 October). Unos monstruos. Opinion. Retrieved from
https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/unos-monstruos/10046

president of all Catalans, despite using their money for his *procés*. As independentists blame the state for things connected to Franco, Ciudadanos do too, by blaming the independentists for division, human fracture, silencing, ideological abuse, hate, privilege, imposition, supremacy, and biased media. As the next section thoroughly discusses, some of these parallels to the past are also outlined directly.

The fear of division could be understood without the Francoist past, but it echoes memories of pre-Constitution Franco era divisions, the failure and chaos of the Second Republic, the resulting Civil War, and the Basque conflict. Especially the first two support Franco's representation and the myth of ungovernable Spaniards, who are unable to manage political conflict, which further caused the transitions' mythification. The spirit of transition and return to the Constitution is often highlighted by Ciudadanos. The arguments for the Constitution are similar to those for the memory-frame of 'shared guilt' and the establishment of the 'pact of forgetting' as there is a fear of political conflict, disagreeing, which could break the unity.

On the other hand, Ciudadanos calls for courage and pride to be Spanish, and uphold the unity of Spain. However, the conflict framing is aware of memories in this regard too: They promote a combination of multiple identities which brings distance to Francoism and Spanish nationalism: The citizens are told that they do not need to choose one. However, it is assumed that both Spanish and Catalan identities are present. Bernat and Whyte (2020) discuss the hierarchy between these two identities, present during Franco and used post-Franco to maintain Spanish unity. This is why the order in which Ciudadanos present them is interesting: Catalan, Spanish and European. Spanish is not presented first and Catalan second, as described in the traditional hierarchy. However, as one being Spanish is still assumed in their discourse, its status is superior. Moreover, in the 2017's campaigning Catalan is a subcategory within the Spanish identity, just as being Spanish is one identity within the European identities. If the Catalans do not follow the order of Spanish first, Catalan second, they are considered selfish and dissident (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). Yet, this presence of the three is aware of the past of imposed Spanish nationalism and exclusion from Europe.

Ciudadanos refers vaguely to past struggles when promoting defending democracy *again*, offering a hand for a handshake *again* and not giving in, *like before*. According to the party, the Constitution with the King can restore legality and democracy - *once again*. The solution is the real, valid ballot

boxes: The citizens are tired of being afraid to use their flags and express their multiple identities and are looking to protect this right of theirs. Voting for Ciudadanos restores autonomy, the Catalan institutions, equality, freedom, unity, and economic prosperity, echoing the transition after Franco.

5.1.3 Pro-referendum conflict frame

The pro-referendum conflict frame combined elements from the two others. First of all, the referendum is considered a manifestation of the will for self-determination and voting is encouraged. However, according to the parties, it is clear that the referendum of 1-O will not – and should not – lead to a declaration of independence, contrary to the independentists' destructive lie. Instead, it is an expression of the diversity in the political space in defence of democracy, the institutions, the rule of law and freedoms. It should be acknowledged and lead to dialogue, especially on the Constitution, one that would recognize a binding referendum, allowing Catalonia to truly decide their future. The current road map has left half of the population behind.

CatEnComú and EUiA condemn the actions of the state, such as the detaining of political prisoners, the sustaining of the autonomy, prevention of the referendum, police violence, the judicialization of politics and the application of Article 155, which has caused divisions in Spanish society. The fundamental rights and principles of a democratic state are being trampled upon, and the authoritarian PP does not accept offers of negotiation, continuously initiated from Catalonia's part. There is a hint of 'pedagogic relationship' rhetoric, as the population of Catalonia will by voting in the 1-O give a democratic lesson to PP's government.[10]

The international community is urged to react because democratic principles and human rights are violated. The repression has crossed the borders and the situation is grave for both Spain and Catalonia. Additionally, similarly to Ciudadanos, the parties see that the *procés* and current conflict has put on hold the needs of the people. It is social inequality that is breaking Catalonia, not the flags or language. CatEnComú puts these questions forward and its electoral campaign is about the people in Catalonia having a lot in common and being tired of division. On the question of Catalonia, the parties support greater self-government, a bilateral relationship with the state, and an

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[10] Catalunya En Comú. (2017, 28 September). Xavier Domènech: "L'1 d'octubre aquest poble farà possible les llibertats de Catalunya". Press release. Retrieved from https://catalunyaencomu.cat/ca/premsa/xavier-domenech-l1-doctubre-aquest-poble-fara-possible-llibertats-de-catalunya

agreement that defines a future binding referendum. Therefore, like Ciudadanos, their solution is a great reform of the Constitution, but one that looks very different to what Ciudadanos is promoting.

5.2 Explicit references to the past

Besides hinting and mimicking past issues in their interpretation of the issue, the parties recalled specific events and actors from the past to support their argument. The frequency of these mentions of the Second Republic, Franco-era, and the period after is shown by party and month in Table 2.

Table 2. Months and number of articles where the past is mentioned, by party.

	CUP	Esquerra	PDeCAT	Ciudadanos	CatEnComú	EUiA
President Francesc Macià			October 1	September 1 October 1		
President Lluís Companys	October 1	October 1 December 1	October 2	September 2 October 2		October 1
The Civil War * the civil war within the Civil War	September*1 October(*) 6	September 2 December 5	September 1 November 1	October* 1		October 2
Franco's regime	September 4 October 7 November 1 December 3	September 4 October 3 December 5	September 5 October 2 November 2 December 1	October 5 November 1	November 1	October 1 November 1
Transition to democracy	September 2 October 3 November 1	September 1 December 1		October 4 November 1 December 1		
the Basque conflict, ETA * GAL and the 'dirty war'	October* 1			September 3 October 3 November 2		September 1
Coup of 23-F	October 1			September 1 October 4		

October, the first month following the referendum, in addition to the most articles published, also has the highest number of definite references to the elements of past chosen for Table 2 (52) and like September, has mentions to all these topics. The difference to other months is clearest when examining CUP's articles, but also Ciudadanos' recalling activity is the highest in October. In November and December, the target of remembering was more focused, covering only 4 different eras or actors a month. However, especially in the case of the independentists, the mentions were longer, and more pieces were dedicated to memory. September, the month before 1-O, has 28 explicit remembrances, and December 17, despite, on the other hand, having the fewest articles. The quietest month recalling-wise was November (11).

There are clear differences between the parties in how the past is directly and explicitly mentioned. Some parties have gaps and silences, where others are repeatedly and systematically remembering and reminding. Despite publishing more articles, Ciudadanos recalls Franco's era less than the independentists parties, who cover it throughout the four months, multiple times. The party's mentions are briefer and vaguer too, as the following sections show. A couple of the listed times the Ciudadanos' articles are commenting on how the independentists are falsely accusing others of Francoism. The party covers only the anarchists' Catholic genocide from the Civil War period.[11]

Moreover, only Ciudadanos, EUiA and CUP recall the coup of 23-F or ETA, but CUP's standpoint is extremely different to Ciudadanos'. The party covers the concessions following the 23-F and the state's dirty war against ETA through the death squads Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups, GAL).[12] EUiA discusses the inadequacy of applying the solutions to Basque nationalism to the current situation in Catalonia, contrasting the lack of violence with ETA.[13]

The independentist Esquerra and PDeCAT's references to the past are quite focused, concentrating on 4 different topics of the table. The clearest example of a drastically different silence is the pro-referendum CatEnComú, which does not cover the past at all, except for presenting one of their

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[11] Ciudadanos. (2017, 17 October).
[12] CUP. (2017, 26 October). Aprovada la moció contra la suspensió de l'autonomia de Catalunya. News. Retrieved from http://santceloni.cup.cat/noticia/aprovada-la-mocio-contra-la-suspensio-de-lautonomia-de-catalunya
[13] EUiA. (2017, 18 September). "L'Estat de les autonomies s'ha acabat". Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/joan_josep_nuet_eltemps.pdf

candidates as an anti-Francoist activist (María Salvo Iborra, 27.5.1920-16.11.2020).[14] However, one must bear in mind that CatEnComú only published 42 articles in total within the sample's timeframe. Even so, the other pro-referendum party, EUiA, had six different references to the past in its 35 articles, excluding the list of candidates, which was shared from CatEnComú.

After the pro-referendum, PDeCAT made the fewest direct mentions to the past, and Ciudadanos, made the most, though they are briefer. Furthermore, the constitutionalist party focused more on the post-Franco eras. The independentists and EUiA remembered mostly Franco and the Civil War, CUP writing frequently about the transition too. When comparing frequencies of Table 2 to the number of articles, the independentists recalled the most, and the pro-referendum the least.

The mentions by month somewhat reflect the parties' publishing activity. Esquerra did not refer directly to the past in November, the month with the least articles. Ciudadanos barely recalled in December, its least active month, but recalled broadly in October, its most active month. However, CUP only published 6 articles in November but recalled more than it did in December (26 articles). Of PDeCAT's two most active months, only September stands out mentions-wise from the rest.

Table 2 shows the recalling frequency within a month, one unit being an article, but all mentions are not equal: some are briefer and vaguer, whereas some are entire pieces dedicated to the past. Some are discussed through memory politics; some are criticism directed towards those bringing up the said past. After November's pause in recalling, Esquerra's December is very memory heavy, including campaigning for memory politics, parallels drawn with the present, and a longer history piece on the party itself, published in Catalan, Spanish and English, aimed at an exceptionally wider audience. The articles published in Spanish and English by CUP also included references to the past, as did EUiA's interview shared from the Greek newspaper Avgi, translated into Spanish. These details, volumes, directions, and tones of remembering are further reported in the next subsections.

5.3.1 Before and during the Civil War

All parties of the sample but CatEnComú recalled the past Presidents to some degree. For Esquerra and PDeCAT this was prompted by the anniversary of President Lluís Companys' execution, and for

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[14] CatEnComú. (2017, 18 November). La llista de Catalunya en Comú . Podem recull la pluralitat del país. Press release. Retrieved from https://catalunyaencomu.cat/ca/premsa/llista-de-catalunya-en-comu-podem-recull-pluralitat-del-pais

CUP and PDeCAT by the threat directed to President Puigdemont from PP's Pablo Casado. EUiA recalled that the President was shot by Franco's regime and the party paid homage to Companys during the 10th Lluís Companys Race and Walk, which was held in honour of the anti-fascist *Olimpiada Popular* (People's Olympiad) in Barcelona, 1936, a counter-games to the Olympics held in Nazi Germany.[15] CUP described how Companys proclaimed the Catalan state on the 6th of October 1934 within the Spanish Federal Republic and was the victim of 1940's Francoist regime,[16] akin to what Esquerra recalls in its history piece in December.[17] The anniversary of the declaration itself was not commemorated. On the anniversary of his execution, however, Companys is presented as an example, a role model, who was faithful to its commitments and fought to change an unjust world, which motivates Esquerra's representatives to fulfil their mandates given by the citizens.[18]

PDeCAT commemorated Companys in more length on the 15th of October, calling 2017's anniversary that of exceptional transcendence and drawing parallels between Franco's regime and the current situation. The representatives of the party gathered to pay tribute to the first democratically elected president assassinated by fascists, but also to the dignity, freedom, and continuity of the institution of the Generalitat. Due to the Parliament of Catalonia declaring Franco's trials illegal, the representatives feel more worthy to pay tribute to Companys this year. PDeCAT highlighted "we are still here" claiming a presence in the past and the inheritance of past struggles, while the contemporary opponents were described as the heirs of Francoism. President Francesc Macià represents a link in the long chain between all the 130 Presidents – in other words, the continuity and responsibility for the Catalan institutions.[19] PDeCAT's focus on this continuity ties the legacy of the institution's dignity to the party through the President of the time, Puigdemont.

In its longer history piece in December Esquerra frames President Companys as a part of the party's history and the history of Catalonia's oppression. It recalls how Companys declared the Catalan State

[15] EUiA. (2017, 25 October). La 10a Cursa i Caminada Lluís Companys homenatja l'Olimpíada Popular del 1936. Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/la-cursa-i-caminada-lluis-companys-arriba-a-la-desena-edicio/
[16] CUP. (2017, 30 October). Crida a la solidaritat internacionalista des del poble català. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/crida-la-solidaritat-internacionalista-des-del-poble-catala
[17] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December). Monographic: The strength of the resistance. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://en.esquerra.cat/en/la-forca-de-la-resistencia
[18] Esquerra. (2017, 15 October). Esquerra Republicana, amb Companys. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/esquerra-republicana-amb-companys-14597
[19] PDeCAT. (2017, 15 October). Marta Pascal: "Rendim homenatge a Companys sent conscients del moment que estem vivint i de l'encàrrec que ens van fer els ciutadans l'1-O". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/marta-pascal-rendim-homenatge-a-companys-sent-con/

within the Federal Republic of Spain, which was followed by the suspension of Catalan autonomy and imprisonment of the Generalitat for 30 years, naming it the beginning of a period of repression. Following a victorious election, the Generalitat returned, President Companys famously saying "We will fight again, we will suffer again, we will win again," which emphasizes the struggles' continuity and the collective's persistence. Companys' execution by Franco's regime after the Civil War was described as "the most symbolic episode of this repression." He had been detained in France and handed over by the German military police to Franco's regime for trial described as questionable. Like PDeCAT, Esquerra too highlights that Companys became the first and only president of a democratically elected government to have been executed by fascists.[20] The text ties Companys not only as a part of Catalonia's history and its institutions, and the predecessor of current grievances but also as a fundamental part of Esquerra and the international efforts against fascism. It is noteworthy, that the piece is the only piece also published in English by Esquerra: the targeted collective that collectively remembers is thus different, wider, and more international.

Ciudadanos referred to President Companys almost as many times as the independentists did in total, but did not commemorate him on the 15th of October. Altogether, Presidents Companys and Macià are portrayed in a negative light or to denounce the current independentist movement. Both have declared the Catalan Republic from the Generalitat's balcony, Macià after the declaration of Second Republic in 1931 and his successor Companys in 1934 (Preston 2017; Crameri 2014, 14). Neither of the declarations resulted in the Catalan Republic: Macià was talked out of it with a promise of a wider Statute of Autonomy (Preston, 2017). Companys was imprisoned for 30 years and Catalonia's autonomy was suspended (Crameri 2014, 14). Before President Puigdemont declared independence on the 27th of October, Ciudadanos shared an opinion piece ridiculing the independence movement, one of its absurdities being "presidents of republics that barely last seconds" referring to Macià and Companys.[21] While discussing how the obsessed Puigdemont looks more like a CUP spokesman than the president of all Catalans, the Ciudadanos deputy would not put it past Puigdemont to think about going out on the balcony and declaring independence.[22]

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[20] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).

[21] Ciudadanos. (2017, 13 October). Los camareros del Majestic. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/los-camareros-del-majestic/10049?lg=ca

[22] Ciudadanos. (2017, 25 September). Roldán: "Puigdemont ha mostrat la veritat del seu frau, sembla més un portaveu de la CUP que el president de tots els catalans". News. Retrieved from http://parlament-catalunya.ciudadanos-cs.org/2017/09/25/roldan-puigdemont-ha-mostrat-la-veritat-del-seu-frau-sembla-mes-un-portaveu-de-la-cup-que-el-president-de-tots-els-catalans/

Therefore, Puigdemont is described as following in their footsteps of failure. Ciudadanos repeatedly blamed Puigdemont for his egoism and alarming obsession to stay in history.

Earlier in September, President Puigdemont and Vice President Junqueras were stated to be competing to embody President Companys, in an egocentric fixation, aiming to mimic his coup against the Second Republic.[23] This interpretation differs from how the independentists tell the events. In October, the anti-system's – probably referring to CUP – admiration towards Puigdemont was equated to that towards Companys from the anarchists behind the Catholic genocide. It is unclear, which fight for democracy is implied, when Ciudadanos described the recent developments and Puigdemont's declaration of independence as an insult to all who fought for democracy and a cause of an unprecedented clash between Catalans.[24] It can refer to the Civil War, the anti-Francoist movement during Franco's regime, or to any struggle which is framed as one for democracy. Hence, the anarchists' Catholic genocide is the only mention of the Civil War from Ciudadanos, and it recalls the chaotic end of the Second Republic and the civil war within the Civil War: Dowling (2012, 3) describes the killings in 1936 in Catalonia as "the greatest anti-religious outbreaks in modern European history."

EUiA remembers the breakout of the war in its article on the 10th Lluís Companys Race and Walk. The *Olimpíada Popular* of 1936 was cancelled at the last minute due to the start of the Civil War. One of the participants of the event's awards ceremony is Antoni Cánovas, who in 1936 had to change the pool for a rifle, when preparing for the games, to go defend the Republic.[25] The event paid tribute to President Companys and the *Olimpíada* organized by civic and workers' organizations, recalled the start of the Civil War, reflected on the current situation in Europe, demanded the Jordis' release and objected to the measures of Prime Minister Rajoy's government against the referendum. Instead of the Catalan crisis, "the current situation in Europe" is the refugee crisis and rise of racism and xenophobia.[26]

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[23] Ciudadanos (2017, 18 September). Los héroes de Cataluña. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/los-heroes-de-cataluna/9948?lg=va

[24] Ciudadanos. (2017, 27 October). Arrimadas a los catalanes: 'Salgan en masa a votar en las próximas elecciones para recuperar la convivencia, las instituciones y el sentido común'. Press release. Retrieved from http://parlament-catalunya.ciudadanos-cs.org/es/2017/10/27/arrimadas-a-los-catalanes-salgan-en-masa-a-votar-en-las-proximas-elecciones-para-recuperar-la-convivencia-las-instituciones-y-el-sentido-comun/

[25] EUiA. (2017, 30 October). Centenars de persones participen a la X Cursa i Caminada Lluís Companys. Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/mes-de-300-persones-participen-a-la-x-cursa-i-caminada-lluis-companys/

[26] EUiA. (2017, 30 October). EUiA. (2017, 25 October).

Otherwise, EUiA's memories of the time before Franco's regime seem disconnected from the current crisis. In October, EUiA advertised and participated in the 79th-anniversary event for the farewell of the International Brigades in Barcelona.[27] The International Brigades came to join the anti-fascist struggle against Franco. After two years of significant help, they were sent back by Juan Negrín, the Second Republic's Prime Minister, in hope that the German and Italian military units supporting Franco would withdraw too. (Brothers 1997, 51) The article did not include any linkages to the Catalan crisis. Nevertheless, the recollection was considered relevant in October of 2017.

In September PDeCAT declared that on the day of the referendum Catalonia will be able to build a country from the bottom up, and this time without a Francoist military in the next room.[28] This is a probable reference to the social movements and the degree of Catalan independence gained before Franco's victory over Catalonia. The Civil War had a significant impact on the political, social and economic life of Catalonia, which experienced a profound revolution and achieved self-government in 1936-1937. (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 169) It was the stage for a civil war within a civil war amongst the anti-fascists (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 3): When General Francisco Franco launched his Spanish nationalist military insurgency against the recently elected Republican leftist government, the Catalan anarchist workers' efforts put down the insurgency occurring in Barcelona and responded with their own social revolution (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 24-29). Due to the anarchists and socialist militias' victory, Catalonia was for the first time since 1714 free from Madrid. However, as the Statute of Catalan Autonomy was challenged, so were Catalonia's political structure with the Parliament and Generalitat. (Bolloten 2015, 388)

During the years of the Civil War, tensions rose within the anti-fascist bloc between the militant anarchists, Catalonia's Generalitat, ruled by Esquerra and President Companys, and the Spanish Republic (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, Bolloten 2015). Neither the fighting in May 1937 between Esquerra and those behind the social revolution nor the aggravating transfer of the Republic's

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[27] EUiA. (2017, 19 October). 79 anys del comiat de les Brigades Internacionals a Barcelona. Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/79-anys-del-comiat-de-les-brigades-internacionals-a-barcelona/
[28] PDeCAT. (2017, 23 September). President Puigdemont: "La Constitució espanyola trepitja els drets més bàsics dels catalans". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/president-puigdemont-la-constitucio-espanyola-tre/

Government to Barcelona, aiming to backpedal decentralisation, are recalled and their memories do not seem to incite dispute in the independentist camp.

In November PDeCAT justified the memory politics of nullifying Francoist courts' sentences with the fact that they resulted from Franco's coup d'état.[29] CUP tied the application of Article 155 to Franco's armed uprising by describing it as a coup, executed through the Constitution, "never seen since Franco."[30] However, like Ciudadanos, CUP too mainly focused on the uprisings happening within the Civil War, but the framing is different. CUP equated the dreams and uprisings of the current popular movement with the dreams and uprisings of the popular movement of 1936.[31] In October these revolutionary dreams are repeated, and they are the seeds of the current population's memory, seeds on which Franco's fascist cemetery has been built. This cemetery is the basis of the 1939's regime, as well as the regime of 1978. The piece further describes transcendence and heirship, repeating that actors of today and the past are and were memory and seeds.[32]

Parallels were drawn by CUP between the Republicans in exile and the clandestine ballot boxes, as it happened in the same place, Elna, "cradle of the memory of *our* Republican exile," again claiming ownership of the past. This, according to CUP, is a political metaphor and poetic justice; "evidence that a parallel and silent network, solid and tenacious, knew how to get around the siege, using wise discretion, by those who wanted to seize everything."[33] The party also honoured some women who fought in the Civil War: Aurora Picornell, Amparo Navarro Giner, Lina Òdena, and Federica Montseny are presented as examples of often forgotten but important women who fought against fascism.[34]

As the current movement is the heir of that of 1936, sharing their dreams, PP and Ciudadanos are the heir of the Francoist military, the nationalists of 1936, as for them the Spanish state always

[29] PDeCAT. (2017, 14 November). Xuclà defensa al Congrés declarar la nul•litat de les sentències dictades pels tribunals franquistes. News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/ca-xuclu00e0-defensa-al-congru00e9s-declarar-la-n/

[30] CUP. (2017, 31 October). Comunicat de la CUP Molins davant l'expulsió del PSC-PSOE del govern de Molins de Rei. News. Retrieved from http://molins.cup.cat/noticia/comunicat-de-la-cup-molins-davant-lexpulsio-del-psc-psoe-del-govern-de-molins-de-rei

[31] CUP. (2017, 25 September).

[32] CUP. (2017, 18 October). A nuestras amigas del estado. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/nuestras-amigas-del-estado

[33] CUP. (2017, 10 October). "And wanting to be a republic, we have learned to be a people", by David Fernández. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/and-wanting-be-republic-we-have-learned-be-people-david-fernandez-0

[34] CUP. (2017, 12 October). No passaran! News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/no-passaran

comes before democracy.[35] This is declared also directly in an article that is a call for international solidarity from the Catalan people. In the same article, CUP recalls that the Spanish state during Franco's dictatorship persecuted and destroyed with blood and fire the highest degree of national and social freedom achieved during the Republic and the Social Revolution of 1936,[36] which continuously seems to be a golden age the following history and the present are contrasted to.

Esquerra referenced less the social revolution and more the Second Republic lost in the war. The party presents the referendum as an opportunity for the Republicans in Spain – *Madrid de No Pasaran*, (The Madrid of 'They will not pass') that is, the Madrid against Franco's siege – to achieve their freedom against the status quo, Prime Minister Rajoy and Francoism, the regime of 1978. The independent Catalan Republic is framed as the third Republic or an opportunity for the Spanish to achieve their third Republic, as the referendum is about democracy, not independence. The causes of the Republic's Tricolor flag and the independentists' Estelada flag are linked and shared with the audience in Madrid.[37] This does not only further frame the current and past conflict as one against fascism and Francoism, but also literally *recalls* pre-Civil War dynamics. The republican-socialist coalition in power before the Civil War were prepared to transfer some political powers to the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalities (Graham 2005, 5-6, 10). After their election victory, they released President Companys and restored his presidency (Vargas 2018, 26-27), as he had been imprisoned due to his declaration of the Catalan Republic (Preston, 2017).

Barcelona was recalled by Esquerra as always being the Bastion of Freedom.[38] Catalonia was often considered 'the Bastion of Republic' due to the worker's movement and popular organisations' strength. Through that, it gained considerable political independence. (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 3) Before Franco's victory, the Government of the Second Republic moved to Barcelona, partly due to the tensions within the anti-fascist bloc, and as Barcelona fell to Franco's siege in early 1939, it was clear that the war was over (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 137, 167). The referendum in Catalonia was recalled as an opportunity for the Spanish democracy to be reborn, suggesting that the transition to

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[35] CUP. (2017, 26 October).
[36] CUP. (2017, 30 October).
[37] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September).
[38] Esquerra. (2017, 26 September). Marc Sanglas: "Sr Maza, hem recapacitat i ens mantenim ferms amb el compromís que tenim amb el poble per votar l'1 d'octubre". La humanista. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/marc-sanglas-sr-maza-hem-recapacitat-i-ens-mantenim-ferms-amb-el-compromis-que-tenim-amb-e-14565

democracy was not sufficient or rebirth at all. Esquerra representative stated that calling the current dreams impossible shows a lack of respect towards the grandparents' and their struggle.[39]

Esquerra more thoroughly drew parallels with the Civil War again in December, with its monographic piece on the party's history and a shorter one on Aurora Bertrana, a "free and committed spirit" who committed itself to the Republic, was forced to go into exile and contributed to the Catalan cultural resistance in the 1960s.[40] Esquerra promoted the Josep Irla Foundation's new biographical pamphlet on her. The longer monograph reminds of the 70,000 imprisoned, shot, exiled, or killed members of Esquerra from President Companys to mayors, members of the Catalan Parliament, and the president of FC Barcelona.[41] The past is also referred to when covering a location: While describing the history of the town of Solsona, the article highlights how different regimes transformed it. The Second Republic is stated to be present in the town's wellbeing and pleasing architecture, bringing tourism, compared to the urban nonsense inherited from Francoism.[42]

Through these recollections and stated inheritances, the Second Republic is claimed as *their* past by at least one pro-referendum and two independentist leftist parties. CUP claimed the Republican exile, and EUiA honoured the International Brigades and the athlete, who left to defend the Republic. Esquerra's campaign slogan for 1-O was 'Build a new Republic'.[43] However, from the independentists, CUP narrated especially the civil war within the Civil War, Esquerra focused on the Second Republic in general, and PDeCAT recognized the gained degree of independence before Franco's victory. All in all, despite differences in the focal point, the current conflict was presented by the independentists as the heir of the war. Other than that, there are more vague references too that were not included in these, because they are not specific enough: use of words like state of

[39] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September).

[40] Esquerra. (2017, 1 December). Qui era Aurora Bertrana? La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/qui-era-aurora-bertrana

[41] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).

[42] Esquerra. (2017, 2 December). Solsona: un nucli històric motor d'una transformació. La humanista. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/solsona--un-nucli-historic-motor-duna-transformacio

[43] Esquerra. (2017, 12 September). Sabrià: "El proper dia 15 engegarem la nostra campanya més transversal amb més de 500 actes al territori per explicar els motius del Sí al referèndum". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/sabria-el-proper-dia-15-engegarem-la-nostra-campanya-mes-transversal-amb-mes-de-500-actes--14540

siege[44] and occupation forces,[45] as well as in Ciudadanos' repeated warnings of divisions. However, they do prompt memories of the Civil War, an effect that should still be considered.

5.3.2 Franco's regime

The texts published are heavy with vague descriptions that similarly might be references to Franco's dictatorship, but also have an independent meaning. They can incite memories of Franco's era, but because they weren't clear-cut mentions, they are not included in Table 2: Franco's regime can be heard from, for example, the list of PP's obsessions,[46] from the references to chains,[47] Catalanophobia,[48] fear towards rising fascism and the impunity it faces,[49] and claim of the opponents aiming to silence for political opinions – a fear shared by independentists and constitutionalists alike.[50]

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[44] PDeCAT. (2017, 19 September). Artur Mas: "Estem en un estat de setge". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/artur-mas-estem-en-un-estat-de-setge/

[45] Esquerra. (2017, 7 November). Esquerra exigeix al govern espanyol respectar el resultat del 21-D, la llibertat dels presos polítics i la retirada de les forces d'ocupació. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/esquerra-exigeix-al-govern-espanyol-respectar-el-resultat-del-21d-la-llibertat-dels-presos

[46] PDeCAT (2017, 7 November). Cleries exigeix "el compromís del Govern espanyol d'acceptar el resultat de les eleccions". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/cleries-exigeix-el-compromis-del-govern-espanyol-/

[47] PDeCAT. (2017, 12 September). Cleries a Rajoy: "Ni vostè, ni el PP, ni cap tribunal decidirà pels catalans". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/cleries-a-rajoy-ni-voste-ni-el-pp-ni-cap-tribunal/
CUP. (2017, 21 September). Manifest concentració per la Llibertat dels Pobles, per la Democràcia i pels Drets Civils i Polítics. News. Retrieved from http://pedreguer.cup.cat/noticia/manifest-concentracio-la-llibertat-dels-pobles-la-democracia-i-pels-drets-civils-i-politics

[48] PDeCAT. (2017, 5 December). Ciuró a Sánchez Melgar: "La Fiscalia considerarà violenta qualsevol acció que contribueixi al pla independentista?". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/ciuro-a-sanchez-melgar-la-fiscalia-considerara-vi/

[49] CUP. (2017, 13 October). Comunicat sobre agressions 9 octubre. News. Retrieved from http://pedreguer.cup.cat/noticia/comunicat-sobre-agressions-9-octubre
CUP. (2017, 30 October). CUP. (2017, 31 October).
CUP. (2017, 10 December). La CUP denuncia identificacions de la Policia Nacional mentre encartellava a Girona. News. Retrieved from http://nordoriental.cup.cat/noticia/la-cup-denuncia-identificacions-de-la-policia-nacional-mentre-encartellava-girona
CUP. (2017, 6 November). Prou impunitat feixista: exigim responsabilitats penals. News. Retrieve from http://mataro.cup.cat/noticia/prou-impunitat-feixista-exigim-responsabilitats-penals
Esquerra. (2017, 3 October). Esquerra Republicana presentarà una querella contra Rafael Hernando arran de les acusacions que ha fet aquest matí. La humanitat. Retrieved from: https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/esquerra-republicana-presentara-una-querella-contra-rafael-hernando-arran-de-les-acusacion-14574
Esquerra. (2017, 7b November). El Congrés aprova una moció d'Esquerra Republicana en defensa de l'escola catalana i reprovació del ministre d'Exteriors. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/aprovacio-mocio-congres-en-defensa-escola-catalana

[50] CUP. (2017, 29 November). La CUP posa en coneixement de la Junta Electoral i dels Mossos una concentració que l'extrema dreta organitza davant la seva seu. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/la-cup-posa-en-coneixement-de-la-junta-electoral-i-dels-mossos-una-concentracio-que-lextrema
CUP. (2017, 18 December).

When it comes to the direct mentions, the most prominent ones are those which argue that the Spanish state's methods of responding to current issues are the same as those of Franco's regime, used since 1939, Franco's victory in the Civil War.[51] This link is deliberate and emphasized: For example, PDeCAT wrote that current democratic setbacks shamefully remind of late Francoism.[52]

The previously mentioned longer history piece on Esquerra also draws parallels between the current state of affairs and the years under Franco.[53] The party reminded that Prime Minister Rajoy is taking away autonomy, just like King Felip V and Franco did.[54] Under Franco, Catalonia lost its political autonomy, as well as its social, economic and political advances (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 173-174). When discussing how Casado threatened President Puigdemont with President Companys' faith, PDeCAT's spokesman asked from the governing PP if they are planning to act like Franco, connecting the shouts 'Go get'em' of September and the 893 injured of 1-O to PP, "the heirs of '*todo atado y bien atado*'" – All tied up and well tied up, a quote from Franco, which refers to controlling the unity of the ungovernable Spain.[55] This description as Franco's heirs was repeated later in relation to PP.[56] The pro-referendum EUiA too links PP to Francoism, by stating that PP's mentality is based on

Ciudadanos. (2017, 29 September). Albert Rivera: 'No quiero división ni separatismo, quiero igualdad entre todos los españoles porque esa es la bandera de Cs'. Press Release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/albert-rivera-no-quiero-division-ni-separatismo-quiero-igualdad-entre-todos-los-espanoles-porque-esa-es-la-bandera-de-cs/9996

Ciudadanos. (2017, 18 October). Arrimadas: 'Por mucho que nos amenacen y nos ataquen no nos callarán, porque nuestro compromiso es con la libertad, la convivencia y la unión'. News. Retrieved from http://parlament-catalunya.ciudadanos-cs.org/es/2017/10/18/arrimadas-por-mucho-que-nos-amenacen-y-nos-ataquen-no-nos-callaran-porque-nuestro-compromiso-es-con-la-libertad-la-convivencia-y-la-union/

Ciudadanos. (2017, 15 November). Entrevista a Fernando Giner: 'El 'procés' ha dado alas a la parte más radical de Compromís'. Cs in the media. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/noticia/entrevista-a-fernando-giner-el-proces-ha-dado-alas-a-la-parte-mas-radical-de-compromis/10140

Ciudadanos. (2017, 5 December). Inés Arrimadas: 'Estamos a 14 días de tener un gobierno que respete y represente a todos los catalanes'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/ines-arrimadas-estamos-a-14-dias-de-tener-un-gobierno-que-respete-y-represente-a-todos-los-catalanes/10193

[51] CUP. (2017, 14 September).
CUP. (2017, 27 September). Article del nostre regidor "Per amor a Espanya". News. Retrieved from http://lacanonja.cup.cat/noticia/article-del-nostre-regidor-amor-espanya
[52] PDeCAT. (2017, 23 September).
[53] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).
[54] Esquerra. (2017, 25 October). Tardà a Rajoy, sobre el 155: "No és la primera vegada que es liquida l'autogovern. Ja ho van fer Felip Vè i Franco". La humaniat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/joan-tarda-a-rajoy-sobre-el-155-no-es-la-primera-vegada-que-es-liquida-lautogovern-ja-ho-v-14625
[55] PDeCAT. (2017, 10 October). Cleries a Santamaría: "L'1-O van venir a destrossar-nos, però van sortir-ne perdedors". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/cleries-a-santamaria-l1-o-van-venir-a-destrossar-/
[56] PDeCAT. (2017, 15 October).

Franco's heritage, and this Francoist mentality results in the inability to do anything else but "crush, humiliate or exterminate" their political rivals.[57]

During Franco's era, there was a significant exodus of an entire political class to France (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 170). Esquerra recalled its continuation as the leading party of the Catalan progressive left and its anti-Francoist activities both inside the country and in exile during Franco's regime and episodes of repression. The Presidents in exile are described to have maintained the legitimacy of the Generalitat.[58] PDeCAT argued that as the President and councillors are in exile and taken as political prisoners, the events remind of the past era.[59] While the independentists talk about the representatives in exile and discuss the legacy of previous Presidents in exile, Ciudadanos condemned this wording.[60] To counter the moral evaluation of 'exile' the party's articles state that President Puigdemont fled, ran from justice. The contrast is stark compared to how the party once referred to the outflow of business as an exodus.[61]

In Spain, governed by PP, supported by PSOE and Ciudadanos, political prisoners have returned.[62] This message from Esquerra and PDeCAT, with the aim of exceptionality, forgets other political prisoners and closed newspapers after the transition, relating to, for example, the Basque conflict. In the interview for the Greek Avgi, EUiA's representative advocates for the pro-referendum and independentists' use of the term amnesty in demands for the release of the detainees. He connects

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[57] EUiA. (2017, 5 November). Solución política, no repression. Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/entrevista_joan_mena.pdf

[58] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).

[59] PDeCAT. (2017, 4 December). Cleries: "Amb el 155, la democràcia a Catalunya ha quedat en suspens i recorda a èpoques passades". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/cleries-amb-el-155-la-democracia-a-catalunya-ha-q/

[60] Ciudadanos. (2017, 14 November). De Páramo: 'TV3 se ha convertido en 'Telepuigdemont', porque es el reality de Puigdemont en Bruselas'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/de-paramo-tv3-se-ha-convertido-en-telepuigdemont-porque-es-el-reality-de-puigdemont-en-bruselas/10124?lg=gl
Ciudadanos. (2017, 24 November). De Páramo: 'No entendemos el veto de Sánchez e Iceta a Inés Arrimadas en un momento en que podemos acabar con el Procés'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/de-paramo-no-entendemos-el-veto-de-sanchez-e-iceta-a-ines-arrimadas-en-un-momento-en-que-podemos-acabar-con-el-proces/10170

[61] Ciudadanos. (2017, 13b October). Independencia sin blanca. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/independencia-sin-blanca/10048

[62] Esquerra. (2017, 18 October). Tardà, a Sáenz de Santamaría: "A més repressió, més convenciment del valor de la llibertat i de la independència". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/tarda-a-saenz-de-santamaria-a-mes-repressio-mes-convenciment-del-valor-de-la-llibertat-i-d-14616
PDeCAT. (2017, 15 November). Campuzano: "El 21D serà un plebiscit al 155 i a l'empresonament dels consellers i de Jordi Sànchez i Jordi Cuixart". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/campuzano-el-21d-sera-un-plebiscit-al-155-i-a-lem/

the word's symbolic strength in Catalonia to the demands for liberation of imprisoned communists, democrats, and socialists, dating to the last years of Franco's regime. The representative considered it regrettable, that it is still necessary to fight for the freedom of political prisoners.[63]

Esquerra published that when one of the independentist political prisoners was freed in October, he went straight away to the first act of the morning, which was held at the old Modelo Prison. He would not miss it, as he had closed the prison as the Minister of Justice of the Generalitat that year.[64] The article highlights current grievances and Francoist politics, powerfully showing the power on the hands of the ex-political prisoner. It is also repeated, that the prison is a notorious symbol of the Francoist repression.[65] When Franco's regime started to fill the state's prisons and concentration camps with an estimated 700 000 prisoners, the Modelo Prison in Barcelona had the most lockups compared to the others (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 171). Now its symbolic value is particular to Esquerra and the independentists, as its closing and their article brought another layer of meaning to the story: A layer of continued struggle, but also an ex-prisoner's victory over the ex-prison.

The Modelo Prison holds symbolic significance also to EUiA, which reported of the "emotional" posthumous act of homage to Enric Pubill (28.12.1930-29.3.2017), the former president of l'Associació Catalana d'Expresos Polítics (the Catalan Association of Former Political Prisoners) and member of both Joventuts Socialistes Unificades de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Youth of Catalonia) and Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia). The event took place in the former prison, where the anti-Francoist fighter Pubill had been imprisoned by Franco's regime (1949-1958). The Association is told to work to guarantee the social and economic rights of prisoners and to transmit the memory of the resistance. During the event, actress Maria Rodríguez Sandía read letters from the prisoners under the title "Defend me, because it's a lie". The article does not tie the occasion to the current conflict, but political prisoners were a very topical issue at the time.[66]

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[63] EUiA. (2017, 5 November).
[64] Esquerra. (2017, 4b December). "L'Oriol m'ha demanat que no descanseu per guanyar la llibertat. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/mundo-apareix-campanya-erc
[65] Esquerra. (2017, 4b December).
Esquerra. (2017, 16 December). Esquerra Republicana, garantia de bon govern. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/esquerra-republicana-erc--garantia-de-bon-govern
[66] EUiA. (2017, 25b October). Barcelona homenatja a Enric Pubill, referent de la lluita antifranquista. Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/barcelona-homenatja-a-enric-pubill-referent-de-la-lluita-antifranquista/

As previously discussed, the state's actions are described by the independentists as reminders of the dark past, where it aims to keep Catalonia. The repression characteristic of this dark past is cited, and that past is framed as that of the dictatorship 40 years ago. Esquerra recalled how, like Catalonia, the party has suffered repression and defeats throughout the years.[67] The rights under threat today were also under threat during Franco's last years.[68] CUP described today's responses of the state as the greatest aggressions against the Catalan people's rights that have occurred since the dictatorship,[69] taking Spain over 40 years back.[70] These actions are stated to be foreign to some of the population, suggesting that others still remember them. The *procés* is presented as the only prevention against returning to this specific past of over 40 years ago.[71]

At the same time, all independentists parties suggested that Franco's dictatorship is still present and that this is nothing new: Antoni Comín from Esquerra told how those who imprisoned his father during Franco's regime are still present today, in the speech represented by the people who recently came to give Comín a request.[72] CUP shared how Franco's regime has continued past the transition, through judges, continued activity of the Falange, the only party allowed by Franco's dictatorship, the repeated impunity towards fascism, the succeeding political, economic and media powers and the links of the old regime to the current political elite, especially PP.[73] The regime of 1978, that is, of the transition, is the heir, or practically the same as the regime 1939,[74] meaning the dictatorship. PDeCAT claimed the government is run by a hundred pre-democratic families,[75] and the Spanish

[67] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).
[68] Esquerra. (2017, 19 September).
[69] CUP. (2017, 23 October). Contra l'agressió del 155 de la Constitució espanyola; autoorganització, autotutela i respostes en defensa dels drets civils i polítics des del municipalisme i l'internacionalisme. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/contra-lagressio-del-155-de-la-constitucio-espanyola-autoorganitzacio-autotutela-i-respostes
[70] CUP. (2018, 18 December).
[71] CUP. (2017, 13 December). [OPINIÓ] "Cal escollir: entre el 155 i la retallada de drets o la República i una nova societat". News. Retrieved from http://valls.cup.cat/noticia/opinio-cal-escollir-entre-el-155-i-la-retallada-de-drets-o-la-republica-i-una-nova-societat
[72] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September).
[73] CUP. (2017, 22 September). "Sí", la clau que obre tots els panys. News. Retrieved from http://cervera.cup.cat/noticia/si-la-clau-que-obre-tots-els-panys
CUP. (2017, 30 October).
CUP. (2017, 2 November). Interpel·lació al govern sobre justícia democràtica i estat autoritari de dret. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/interpellacio-al-govern-sobre-justicia-democratica-i-estat-autoritari-de-dret
[74] CUP. (2017, 26 October).
[75] PDeCAT. (2017, 26b September). Santi Vila: "Espanya té un projecte d'uniformitat, d'eliminar tot allò que ens distingeix, però els hi hem posat les banyes. Tenim dret a ser distints". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/santi-vila-espanya-te-un-projecte-duniformitat-de/

institutions are kidnapped by families inheriting Franco's regime.[76] PDeCAT reminded that while the Generalitat's websites are closed by the state, the Francisco Franco National Foundation is perfectly visible and visitable,[77] showing the state's standing towards these two camps.

The efforts for the referendum are efforts for democracy, not independence, and the struggle is equated to that of the previous, Franco-era generation trying to achieve democracy, teaching that the risks are worth taking.[78] The neo-Francoist state's paralysis is countered using Catalonia's "unprecedented democratic creativity".[79] CUP highlights that the conflict and movement are about Catalonia and the state, which has Francoist tendencies, and not against Spain.[80] Esquerra too presents the referendum as a common solution against the still alive Francoism and lack of democracy, for both Catalonia and people living in Spain.[81]

In September PDeCAT remembers those who lived the Franco regime, again bringing up transcendence and creating a sense of collective.[82] CUP claims the heritage of disobedience,[83] and dictatorship era's independentists – as well as presence by saying "*we* lived in a dictatorship" – who supported the cause even though it was prohibited to think independentist.[84] Catalan national movement and the organised labour did not have the most trusting relations before the Civil War, but Francoism, as a common enemy, worked in uniting the two (Dowling 2012, 5). The left-wing opposition parties and Catalan and Basque political forces cooperated in exile, which aided to motivate the left to support devolution and decentralization (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 133).

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[76] PDeCAT. (2017, 23b September). Santi Vila: "Estic disposat a anar a la presó perquè ens hi juguem la dignitat personal i col·lectiva". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/santi-vila-estic-disposat-a-anar-a-la-preso-perqu/

[77] PDeCAT. (2017, 27b September). Bagué: "El govern espanyol ha reaccionat amb extrema agressivitat, vulnerant els drets fonamentals de la ciutadania". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/noticies/bague-el-govern-espanyol-ha-reaccionat-amb-extrem/

[78] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September).

[79] Esquerra. (2017, 27 September). Junqueras: "El país està a les vostres mans i us necessita, segur que no fallareu aquest 1-0". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/junqueras-el-pais-esta-a-les-vostres-mans-i-us-necessita-segur-que-no-fallareu-aquest-1-0-14567

[80] CUP. (2017, 27 September).

[81] Esquerra. (2017, 17 September).

[82] PDeCAT. (2017, 25 September).

[83] CUP. (2017, 18 October).

[84] CUP. (2017, 26b October). Intervenció de la CUP en contra de l'aplicació de l'article 155. News. Retrieved from http://molins.cup.cat/noticia/intervencio-de-la-cup-en-contra-de-laplicacio-de-larticle-155

Esquerra explains how calling the referendum illegal is questionable, as once speaking Catalan was illegal, democratic rights have been illegal before, and the current laws are post-Francoist.[85] Franco's regime hunted down its anti-Spanish opponents, 'reds', who were not only the left but also those fostering and expressing their regional, historical nationalities, resulting in the persecution of all manifestations of Catalanness (Blanch & Gallagher 2013, 172). "They call us coup plotters" the representative states,[86] as Franco's regime, the root of current post-Francoist laws was exactly that, a result of a coup.

The past is naturally touched on with memory politics, which Esquerra and PDeCAT covered actively before the elections. The memory politics discussed focus, for example, on nullifying the sentences of Franco's courts, and as mentioned, are justified with the fact that Franco's regime was a result of a coup.[87] The parties argued for the further implementation and development of the Historical Memory Law, in the forms of legal reparation for victims and annulation of the dictatorship's sentences.[88] Esquerra frequently described how the elections are crucial for sufficient memory politics, as the application of Article 155 is stopping, amongst other things, the mass grave exhumation initiatives, and their continuation will depend on the elected Generalitat's will. The long silence after the wrong, even post-1975, is blamed on the Spanish dictatorship. Parallels between the current events and the past harms are actively drawn, but the current claim for independence is supported by the Spanish state's inadequacy and active building of obstacles in the field of memory politics. The choice on the election day is one of learning or taking steps back.[89]

The connections to Franco's era are drawn, although differently and less, also from Ciudadanos' part, and the independentists' account is acknowledged in the texts. Ciudadanos for example delegitimized and ridiculed the independentists' accusations by claiming that in today's Catalonia

[85] Esquerra. (2017, 21 September). Rufián en reconeixement als detinguts ahir: "Sou la dignitat d'aquest país". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/rufian-en-reconeixement-als-detinguts-ahir-sou-la-dignitat-daquest-pais-un-pais-que-es-mol-14555
[86] Esquerra. (2017, 21 September).
[87] PDeCAT. (2017, 14 November).
[88] Esquerra. (2017, 16 December).
[89] Esquerra. (2017, 15 December). Les polítiques de memòria i el 155. La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/les-politiques-de-memoria-i-el-155-14655
Esquerra. (2017, 16 December).

crying out for equality is called Falangist.[90] Francoism and Franco's regime was linked to the fate of the autonomy and institutions, the denial of disagreeing positions and the divisions in society.

At the beginning of October, Ciudadanos wrote that the separatists are lying to the international community, claiming that current Spain has something to do with Francoism.[91] Ciudadanos often pointed out how the nationalists call politicians and musicians, who disagree with them, *fachas*, fascists. The next mention of the Francoist past states that the independentists have closed the precious Catalan institution, the Parliament, one that cost so much to reopen after the 40 years of dictatorship.[92] Later in October, the human and emotional fracture caused by the independentists was described to only correspond to the fractures of the times before the transition, suggesting the times of Franco's regime and beyond.[93] Finally, the Generalitat's "full-blown coup" and nationalists' disapproval of constitutionalists are presented as comparable to a dictatorship, to Francoism.[94]

In November the independentists are described as neo-Carlists, who have seduced the left that once was ready to sacrifice its freedom for equality, but "today sacrifices it, simply, in exchange for regionalists of all stripes not withdrawing their salute." Ciudadanos' representative further claims that equality and progress are meaningless to today's left.[95] This mention is not explicit: The conservative, traditionalist, and regionalist Carlists were part of Franco's coalition, but Carlists have fought regionalist wars in history long before the Second Republic. Therefore, the moral evaluation connected to the use of the word is not necessarily rooted in Franco's regime. It is also unclear, which specific sacrifices of the left are referred to here, and whether that vagueness is intentional or unintentional. In its final reference, Ciudadanos recalls that while the dictatorship opposed any

[90] Ciudadanos. (2017, 13 October).

[91] Ciudadanos. (2017, 11 October). Girauta a Dastis: 'Le reprocho la ausencia de una estrategia de comunicación internacional que haya explicado el golpe en Cataluña'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/girauta-a-dastis-le-reprocho-la-ausencia-de-una-estrategia-de-comunicacion-internacional-que-haya-explicado-el-golpe-en-cataluna/10033

[92] Ciudadanos. (2017, 18b October). Rivera a la vicepresidenta: 'Ante la liquidación de la autonomía en Cataluña aplicar la Constitución es una obligación y no una opción'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-a-la-vicepresidenta-ante-la-liquidacion-de-la-autonomia-en-cataluna-aplicar-la-constitucion-es-una-obligacion-y-no-una-opcion/10051

[93] Ciudadanos. (2017, 25 October). Lecciones de la crisis catalana. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/lecciones-de-la-crisis-catalana/10076

[94] Ciudadanos. (2017, 30 October). Entrevista a Carlos Carrizosa: relata cómo plantó cara el viernes a los 'indepes' vociferantes. News. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/noticia/entrevista-a-carlos-carrizosa-relata-como-planto-cara-el-viernes-a-los-indepes-vociferantes/10092?lg=va

[95] Ciudadanos. (2017, 11 November). El día que la izquierda española votó contra la igualdad. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/el-dia-que-la-izquierda-espanola-voto-contra-la-igualdad/10130?lg=es

attempt at self-government, the Constitution luckily allows autonomous governments, continuing with the reminder that the Constitution received large support from Catalonia.[96] This emphasizes that the problem presented by the independentists has been solved in 1978.

5.3.3 Post-Franco

The transition was lies and rotten foundations for CUP and Esquerra, and a tale of success, unity, and democracy for Ciudadanos. For CUP and EUiA, *règim de 1978*, meaning the Regime of 1978, is a commonly used title for the current, post-transition regime of the Spanish state. When referencing the powers of the central state the name used itself remembers and evaluates transition. Naturally, the constitutionalists, considering their conflict frame, highlight the value and achievements of the Constitution, which is the key product of the transition. The support of the Constitution in itself promotes a certain interpretation of the transition to democracy, though the period of time would not be mentioned or explicitly recalled.

On the day of the Constitution, in its commemoration gathering, President Puigdemont and Vice President Junqueras were described as the scarecrows of convivence.[97] Like the previous section showed, the transition signifies to Ciudadanos an end to fractures of this degree, which are now reawakened by nationalism. The coexistence of 500 years with Spain was broken by the current *procés* laws.[98] The transition and process behind the Constitution are remembered as a time of cooperation, handshakes between past opponents, *darse la mano,* (also offering a hand, joining hands) something that should be done again.[99] Ciudadanos reminded how the Constitution gained large support in Catalonia.[100] The party urged people to vote on 21-D with the same will and passion

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[96] Ciudadanos. (2017, 15 November).

[97] Ciudadanos. (2017, 6 December). Arrimadas: 'El 21D hay que salir a votar con la misma ilusión con la que se fue a votar a favor de la Constitución'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/Arrimadas_El_21D_hay_que_salir_a_votar_con_la_misma_ilusion_con_la_que_se_fue_a_votar_a_favor_de_la_Constitucion/10195?lg=va

[98] Ciudadanos. (2017, 25 October).

[99] Ciudadanos. (2017, 28 September). Rivera: 'A partir del 1-O los partidos que creemos en España debemos darnos la mano y configurar otros treinta años de libertad y democracia'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-a-partir-del-1-o-los-partidos-que-creemos-en-espana-debemos-darnos-la-mano-y-configurar-otros-treinta-anos-de-libertad-y-democracia/9989

Ciudadanos. (2017, 29 September).

Ciudadanos. (2017, 28 October). Hay que ganarles. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/hay-que-ganarles/10088

[100] Ciudadanos. (2017, 15 November). Ciudadanos. (2017, 6 December).

as they did for the Constitution of 1978. They are told they won't regret it, as no one regrets voting for the Constitution.[101]

The Constitution received large support in Catalonia, also compared to the rest of Spain (Dowling 2018, 41). After the death of Franco, the Spanish National Identity was in crisis (Quiroga & Molina, 2020) and the constitution needed to redefine Spanishness (Ferreira, 2019). The transition was turned into a zero hour of political consensus, reconciliation, amnesty and forgetting (Quiroga & Molina, 2020). In this situation, the question of Catalonia was a significant challenge, as the aspirations of the historical nationalities had grown but the armed forces' hostility towards regional autonomy had not disappeared (Preston, 2017). Finally, this resulted in a compromise, in which the whole of Spain was divided into 19 autonomous communities and cities.

However, in contrast to the Constitution, the Statute of Autonomy regarding Catalonia and the Constitutional Court decisions on them were considered a disappointment and a betrayal (Crameri 2014, 62). Due to the changes, Catalonia was neither recognized as a nation nor were its financial demands met (Preston, 2017). Crameri (2014, 60) argues that these disappointments worked as proof for Catalonia that they could not achieve their aims within the Spanish state of autonomies. CUP interprets that the autonomy began with the Statute of Autonomy in 2006 but was reduced by the court decision in 2010.[102] EUiA too accounts that the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2010 cut the Statute endorsed by the majority of Catalonia, initiating the Statute's death.[103] Esquerra shares the interpretation of betrayal. The agreement was described as mockery, where no commitments and promises have been fulfilled. Instead, Catalonia has found itself in a political blockade of all decisions since 1978.[104] Backpedalling the Francoist centralisation had been seen as the key solution to the Basque and Catalan estrangement, but this assumption forgot that the historical nationalities and their aspirations were much older than Francoism (Crameri 2014, 61).

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[101] Ciudadanos. (2017, 6 December).
[102] CUP. (2017, 26 October).
[103] EUiA. (2017, 29 September). Cataluña, más allá del 1 de Octubre. Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/article_elsiglodeeuropa.pdf
[104] Esquerda. (2017, 24 September). Marta Rovira: "El debat que tenim entre mans és clar, entre avançar i construir un nou país o bé quedar-nos en l'immobilisme". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/marta-rovira-el-debat-que-tenim-entre-mans-es-clar-entre-avancar-i-construir-un-nou-pais-o-14560

To CUP the current Regime of 1978 is a system that should be ended,[105] ruled by the nationalist-catholic and Francoist right of always, with PP.[106] The current antidemocratic state is the result of the fascism of the transition, embodied by the Regime of 1978. The issues at hand were described as inherent to the current state, not a result of a democratic involution.[107] People in the Spanish state have long suffered from it, and this has provoked a popular movement, which is most visible in Catalonia.[108] The Regime of 1978 was equated or at least linked with the regime of 1936.[109] Like the previous section demonstrated, the shared aspects and actors between the two were put forth, which questions the existence and realization of a transition to democracy.[110] There was no tabula rasa, CUP claimed, as Franco's judges and the justice system were sustained[111] and most of today's Catalans have not voted for the Constitution.[112]

 The self-proclaimed transition to democracy was imposed by a head of state no one voted for, that is, the King.[113] He is described as the head of unity of Spain[114] and the one who "received as a heritage the duty of maintaining all tied and well tied up".[115] The King is considered the way how Franco stays in power.[116] To Ciudadanos he represents the unity of Spain and is, therefore, the independentists' target.[117] The contrast between the two descriptions is palpable: The current Spanish King Felipe VI is both the son of Franco's direct heir, chosen by Franco and the successor of the hero of 23-F, who firmly defended democracy against the coup.

However, the transition-time President of Generalitat Josep Tarradellas is a character celebrated by both the constitutionalist Ciudadanos and the independentist Esquerra. When telling the party's history, Esquerra pointed out that the Generalitat is the only institution of the republican period

[105] CUP. (2017, 21 September).
[106] CUP. (2017, 26 October).
[107] CUP. (2017, 21 September).
[108] CUP. (2017, 25 September).
[109] CUP. (2017, 25 September). CUP. (2017, 18 October).
[110] CUP. (2017, 30 October).
[111] CUP. (2017, 2 November).
[112] CUP. (2017, 21 September).
[113] CUP. (2017, 21 September).
[114] CUP. (2017, 21 September).
[115] CUP. (2017, 18 October).
[116] CUP. (2017, 26 October).
[117] Ciudadanos. (2017, 7 October). Entrevista a Albert Rivera: 'Hay que activar el 155 antes del lunes, se acaba el tiempo'. Cs in the media. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/noticia/entrevista-a-albert-rivera-hay-que-activar-el-155-antes-del-lunes-se-acaba-el-tiempo/10024?lg=es

that was recovered in transition and its legitimacy was protected by the Presidents in exile, one of which was Tarradellas.[118] Tarradellas is considered the key to a peaceful solution after Franco's death, and the negotiations he participated in resulted in the re-establishment of the Generalitat (Preston, 2017).

On the 40th anniversary of President Tarradellas' return from exile, the regional leader of Ciudadanos, Inés Arrimadas, who aimed at the position of the President of Generalitat in the 2017 elections, paid tribute to him. She described how to her Tarradellas is the opposite of President Puigdemont: Where Tarradellas defended institutional loyalty and fought to build bridges, Puigdemont is breaking them and "rising borders."[119] With the first democratically elected Spanish Prime Minister after Franco's death, Adolfo Suárez, Tarradellas is told to have recuperated the autonomy that the separatists have now liquidated.[120]

Darse la mano was also used with the achievements of political parties in the Basque country concerning coexistence through and after the nationalist conflict.[121] Ciudadanos repeatedly linked the Catalan independence movement with the violence, social confrontation and harm caused by Basque nationalism and ETA. It narrated that today the far-right and ETA lawyers support the independentists.[122] The linkages to ETA hints at criminalizing the independentist movement. To illustrate the danger of the independentists' efforts, an opinion piece used the famous novel of Fernando Aramburu, *Patria*.[123] The novel covers how the Basque conflict divided families and villages, narrating the death of Txato, a victim of ETA. The opinion piece "Patria… again Patria" explains how this destructive collective delirium poisoned relationships, frightened the disagreeing

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[118] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).

[119] Ciudadanos. (2017, 23 October). Inés Arrimadas: 'Unas elecciones permitirán devolver la autonomía y sus instituciones a todos los catalanes'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/ines-arrimadas-unas-elecciones-permitiran-devolver-la-autonomia-y-sus-instituciones-a-todos-los-catalanes/10068

[120] Ciudadanos. (2017, 24 October). Rivera: 'Confiamos en ganar las elecciones porque los catalanes están perdiendo el miedo a salir a la calle y a utilizar los símbolos del país'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-confiamos-en-ganar-las-elecciones-porque-los-catalanes-estan-perdiendo-el-miedo-a-salir-a-la-calle-y-a-utilizar-los-simbolos-del-pais/10069

[121] Ciudadanos. (2017, 10 October). Rivera: 'El Espíritu de Barcelona vivido el domingo tiene que ser nuestra bandera para defender la convivencia cívica'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-el-espiritu-de-barcelona-vivido-el-domingo-tiene-que-ser-nuestra-bandera-para-defender-la-convivencia-civica/10026

[122] Ciudadanos. (2017, 5 November). Entrevista a Xavier Pericay: 'Hay docentes que adoctrinan por pura inercia'. Cs in the media. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/noticia/entrevista-a-xavier-pericay-hay-docentes-que-adoctrinan-por-pura-inercia/10098?lg=eu

[123] Ciudadanos. (2017, 24 September). Patria... otra vez Patria. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/patria-otra-vez-patria/9977

into silence and covered the country in shame. The development can still be stopped in Catalonia, the piece claims and urges the readers to not leave Txato alone. Divisions in the Basque country, told by Fernando Aramburu in Patria, are used as a warning in Catalonia.

On the anniversary of Franco's death, a day during which radical right-wing groups' demonstrations keep the police forces busy with public security issues (Aguilar & Humlebæk 2002, 129), Ciudadanos did not mention the anniversary but recollected, for example, the police victims of ETA, when arguing for the equalization of security forces' salaries.[124] The indifference of the independence movement towards the 54 Catalan victims of ETA is deduced by Ciudadanos from Arnaldo Otegi's participation in the Diada, which was applauded, cheered and broadcasted in Catalonia's public television channel TV3.[125] Arnaldo Otegi is a Basque politician who has been convicted of being an ETA member. After entering politics, he has been convicted and imprisoned for glorifying terrorism, participation in discussion on ETA's ceasefire and trying to rebuild a forbidden party, and the imprisonments have also received international attention. Ciudadanos told how "terrorist Otegi" was received like a rock star, the independentists trying to turn him into a superhero.[126] The TV3 was accused of using the Catalans' money to clean the image of its "new recruit", Otegi.[127]

From the independentists, only CUP recalls the Basque conflict. The party concentrated on the dirty war and state terrorism against ETA and explained how attitudes behind today's responses from the state's part are similar. Dictatorships are dictatorships, CUP described, even though stated otherwise, as much as GAL's murders were state terrorism. Accepting the dirty war against ETA is condemned, as Catalonia will face the state's similar attitudes in the following state of emergency.[128] In contrast, EUiA representative reflected that Catalan society would not let the situation develop as it did in the Basque Country. The circumstances are different: there is no ETA violence, but a post-crisis context and Catalans won't accept whichever solution from the state.[129]

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[124] Ciudadanos. (2017, 20 November). Nuestra policía. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/nuestra-policia/10152

[125] Ciudadanos. (2017, 15 September). De Páramo al director de TV3: 'Basta ya de lavar la imagen de Otegi con el dinero de todos los catalanes'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/de-paramo-al-director-de-tv3-basta-ya-de-lavar-la-imagen-de-otegi-con-el-dinero-de-todos-los-catalanes/9944?lg=es
Ciudadanos. (2017, 18 September). Ciudadanos. (2017, 28 October).

[126] Ciudadanos. (2017, 18 September).

[127] Ciudadanos. (2017, 15 September). Ciudadanos. (2017, 28 October).

[128] CUP. (2017, 26 October).

[129] EUiA. (2017, 18 September).

Ciudadanos claimed that the citizens do not accept blackmail anymore, like with ETA and the coup of 23-F:[130] The conflict today will be won similarly with democratic firmness and the leadership of the King.[131] King Juan Carlos I condemned the coup and called for rule of law and the democratic government to continue. The following day, the Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero and 200 armed Civil Guards who had stormed the Congress of Deputies surrendered. Ciudadanos recalled the coup as the last challenge of this degree and supports similar solutions: arrests and restoration of constitutional order.[132] After the King spoke against the independentists on the 4th of October, Ciudadanos wrote how the King again marked the way for them to defend democracy and freedom.[133] Juan Carlos I's son, the current King, having to speak up to defend democracy was considered unbelievable, as these threats should be part of the past.[134] Like 23-F, the 1-O is also going to merely further unite the citizens in the battle for democracy,[135] a fight against an ideology that tries to divide the Spanish.[136] CUP however recalled that the laws on autonomy, dividing Spain into 19 autonomous communities, were a concession to those behind the coup of 23-F.[137]

5.3 Symbols, sources, songs, and slogans

Besides direct mentions and explicit accounts of the past, the events and actors from history are present through rhetorical and technical devices in the texts. The relationship between these and

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[130] Ciudadanos. (2017, 9 October). Rivera: 'El espíritu de Barcelona salió a la calle sin complejos para marcar un antes y un después en este país'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-el-espiritu-de-barcelona-salio-a-la-calle-sin-complejos-para-marcar-un-antes-y-un-despues-en-este-pais/10025?lg=es

[131] Ciudadanos. (2017, 7 October).
Ciudadanos. (2017, 21 October). Rivera sobre el 155:'Hay que aplicar la Constitución para cambiar al gobierno en Cataluña, restituir la democracia y devolver la voz a los catalanes'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-sobre-el-155-hay-que-aplicar-la-constitucion-para-cambiar-al-gobierno-en-cataluna-restituir-la-democracia-y-devolver-la-voz-a-los-catalanes/10066

[132] Ciudadanos. (2017, 11b October). Rivera: 'Si no se aplica la Constitución en Cataluña la inmensa mayoría del pueblo español se enfadará'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-si-no-se-aplica-la-constitucion-en-cataluna-la-inmensa-mayoria-del-pueblo-espanol-se-enfadara/10036
Ciudadanos. (2017, 18 September).

[133] Ciudadanos. (2017, 4 October). Albert Rivera: 'El Gobierno tiene que salir del inmovilismo porque lo irresponsable empieza a ser no actuar'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/albert-rivera-el-gobierno-tiene-que-salir-del-inmovilismo-porque-lo-irresponsable-empieza-a-ser-no-actuar/10007

[134] Ciudadanos. (2017, 4b October). Rivera: 'Es el momento de actuar porque, o nos ponemos en marcha, o podemos perder este país'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/rivera-es-el-momento-de-actuar-porque-o-nos-ponemos-en-marcha-o-podemos-perder-este-pais/10010

[135] Ciudadanos. (2017, 7 October).

[136] Ciudadanos. (2017, 11b October).

[137] CUP. (2017, 26b October).

the campaigning around the conflict is complex as the flags are not only waved, slogans repeated, and different activists referenced, but their employment and rejection are also debated and questioned. The statements are filled with varying authorities and representations. Here the focus is on symbols connected to the Civil War, Franco's regime, and Francoism.

Like the before-mentioned Modelo prison, other representations of the past were given new layers of significance too. Namely, October 1 transformed from the *Día del Caudillo* (the day of Caudillo) into the day of Catalonia's independence referendum. Indeed, exactly 81 years before the referendum, on the 1st of October 1936, Francisco Franco was named the Head of Government of the Spanish State by his military colleagues (Casanova 2010, 275). The title was intended to be temporary (Casanova 2010, 275), but Franco adopted the title of *Caudillo* until his death (280) and the day was commemorated yearly during his regime. After Franco's death, in 1988, a hospital named after the day and inaugurated by Franco, *Ciudad Sanitaria 1º de Octubre*, was renamed after the National Day of Spain, *12 de Octubre* (Pieltáin Álvarez-Arenas 2003, 112). But, in 2017, the date was yet again presented as a representation to honour: This time the independentist CUP advocated for renaming a street after 1-O, the 1st of October.[138] This transformation or occupation of a date has been recognized both before and years after the referendum but neither challenged nor raised in any articles of the sample. Again, after years, the 1-O recalled and recalls Franco, but this time quite differently, in the form of an independence referendum and reactions to the state's response.

The independentists movement uses the same arms as the movement against Franco's regime: The regionalist national symbolism was a mighty rallying point for demonstrations opposing the dictatorship (Dowling 2018, 18). CatEnComú argues that Catalonia is not breaking due to flags and language, but due to social inequality. The conflict is many times, by the independentists too, stated to not be about flags, but they are repeatedly mentioned and waved. The conflict's relationship to national symbols is multidirectional. For example, the cause of 1-O was described as one of the Spanish republican Tricolor and the Catalan independentist Estelada, not the official flag of Catalonia, Senyera. EUiA narrated how neither constitutionalists nor independentists' methods effectively protect the diverse plurality of Catalonia and Spain. The resulting experience of exclusion

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[138] CUP. (2017, 18b October). Sant Cebrià condemna la violencia policial de l'1-0 i insta el Govern municipal a assumir responsabilitats. News. Retrieved from http://santcebria.cup.cat/noticia/sant-cebria-condemna-la-violencia-policial-de-l1-0-i-insta-el-govern-municipal-assumir

and mistreatment from the independence *procés* has, for example, turned some Catalans to hang the Borbón flag (of the Spanish royal family) from their balconies.[139]

Ciudadanos, on the other hand, blamed the biased media for only showing Esteladas[140] and discussed how prompted by the 1-O, people are finally daring to use their Spanish flags with pride, even outside the World Cup, now in defence of democracy and Spanish unity.[141] The Estelada of imposition, privileges and division is contrasted with Ciudadanos' heart of the three flags (the Senyera, the Spanish flag and the flag of the European Union) of freedom, equality and union.[142] Those who are fine with the imposition of the Estelada are called out for their hypocrisy when they do not want the "flag of everyone" to be visible.[143] The key symbols of the Spanish nation are strongly associated with the Francoist state – for instance, the nationalist flag restored by Franco is the current Spanish flag, instead of the republican Tricolor (Bernat & Whyte, 2020). Despite the inheritance not being mentioned, Ciudadanos is aware of the social reactions connected to them. Their new heart of three flags is as a symbol freer from these attachments, the connotations of the Spanish flag being, in a way, blurred by the other flags.

Esquerra told that the commemoration event of President Companys ended with the song *Els segadors*.[144] After the Diada, a representative of PDeCAT, Josep Lluís Cleries, referenced the song's lyrics, stating that the referendum would "cut the chains".[145] In an article describing the Regime of 1978, CUP opens with a quote about chains that can only be heard if one moves.[146] Els segadors, Catalonia's official national anthem since 1993, has its origins in a hymn on the revolt of 1640-1959, and like many other symbols of Catalanness, it was prohibited during Franco (Vargas 2018, 62). The chains as a symbol gather a cumulative meaning of past repression, including that of Franco.

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[139] EUiA. (2017, 6 December). "Puigdemont, A Partir Del 21-D, S'ha Acabat". Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/entrevista_nuet_6_12_17.pdf
[140] Ciudadanos. (2017, 15 September).
[141] Ciudadanos. (2017, 13 October).
[142] Ciudadanos. (2017, 17 December). Arrimadas: 'Quedan cuatro días para que en Cataluña haya un cambio de verdad y vuelvan los valores de libertad, igualdad, solidaridad y unión'. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/prensa/arrimadas-quedan-cuatro-dias-para-que-en-cataluna-haya-un-cambio-de-verdad-y-vuelvan-los-valores-de-libertad-igualdad-solidaridad-y-union/10228?lg=es
[143] Ciudadanos. (2017, 9b October). Barcelona, 8 de octubre. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/barcelona-8-de-octubre/10059
[144] Esquerra. (2017, 15 October).
[145] PDeCAT. (2017, 12 September).
[146] CUP. (2017, 21 September).

In addition to the former Presidents, other members of previous generations as well are considered heroes. Past generations, who would have wanted to vote on 1-O, are commemorated. One of the past champions is Antoni Comín's father, Alfonso Carlos Comín, who was imprisoned by Franco's regime but taught that the risks are worth taking. Comín reflected this to the responsibility he has towards his child. Other prisoners are also considered heroes by the independentists, as they are written encouragements, and their letters are read at events and published on the websites. Ciudadanos recalled fictional and real victims of ETA's terrorism and nationalism, *Patria*'s Txato symbolizing an unknown, but still a specific group of victims of hate and division. Ciudadanos honours the day President Tarradellas returned from exile, but protests against President Puigdemont being described in the media as President in exile,[147] thus acknowledging the legacy of the past Presidents in exile.

The parties mentioned and quoted respected individuals who lived the dictatorship in Spain or fled it. EUiA introduced and honoured the anti-Francoist fighter Enric Pubill and Antoni Cánovas, one of the popular athletes that joined in the Civil War.[148] One of CatEnComú's candidates was presented as an anti-Francoist activist.[149] Ciudadanos quoted the lyrics by Paco Ibáñez to demonstrate nationalists' hate and aim to divide,[150] and PDeCAT referred to Casals' speech about Catalonia when describing the typical peacefulness, coexistence and civility of Catalonia.[151] These two are musicians who have gained respect through their work but are also known to have lived in exile during Franco, a fact which is especially prevalent in Casals' famous speech. Pau Casals never could return to Spain.

Esquerra's spokesperson urged the people to continue with a positive attitude against the repression, with songs and smiles.[152] The past is present through the music and musicians of the *Nova Cançó* (New Song) movement. They are participating in the discussion and referenced in the parties' publications, which marks their importance. The movement or genre emerged during

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[147] Ciudadanos. (2017, 14 November). Ciudadanos. (2017, 24 November)
[148] EUiA. (2017, 25b October). EUiA. (2017, 30 October).
[149] CatEnComú. (2017, 18 November).
[150] Ciudadanos. (2017, 24 September).
[151] PDeCAT. (2017, 26 October). Cleries: "S'està perpetrant un cop d'Estat del nacionalisme espanyol contra les institucions democràtiques de Catalunya". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/cleries-sesta-perpetrant-un-cop-destat-del-nacion/
[152] Esquerra. (2017, 19 September).

Franco's regime, promoting the use of Catalan language in the song and protesting against Francoist repression (Dowling 2012, 77).

The singer-songwriter Lluís Llach, a candidate of Esquerra, spoke for the referendum and performed his famous *L'estaca* from 1968 – a song about a common effort against Francoist repression – for the first time in a long time in Esquerra's event just before 1-O. The song's age of 41 years was mentioned too.[153] On the other hand, in an opinion piece, which lists aspects that make the independence movement look ridiculous, Ciudadanos described Lluís Llach as "expired", wearing a woollen beanie, now "singing to supremacism,"[154] contrasting to his legacy in Nova Cançó. The party also criticized how Joan Manuel Serrat – also one of the most prominent members of Nova Cançó – is now called fascist by the independentists, as he has spoken against the independence movement.[155] This undermines the independentists' accusations of fascism and Francoism. One piece from Ciudadanos mentions that in the demonstration against the referendum and independence on the 8th of October Serrat's famous *Mediterraneo* from 1971 was sung. CUP quoted the song of Ovidi Montllor when discussing the *'A por ellos'* response the voting citizens received from the state.[156] On the day the majority of Catalan Parliament signed a document establishing Catalonia as an independent republic, the same quote "*Un dia que durarà anys*" (the day that will last for years) was published with the title "Welcome Republica!"[157]

Quotes and slogans from the past – both recent and older – were used to justify and describe both 'us' and 'them'. Before the 1-O both the independentists and pro-referendum referred to *por*, fear, and repeated the quote "*No tinc por*" or "*No tenim por*" (I'm not afraid, we are not afraid).[158] This

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[153] Esquerra. (2017, 29 September). Junqueras: "Amb la superació de la por comença el camí de la llibertat. Persistiu, Catalans. Persistiu!" La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/junqueras-amb-la-superacio-de-la-por-comenca-el-cami-de-la-llibertat-persistiu-catalans-pe-14570
[154] Ciudadanos. (2017, 13 October).
[155] Ciudadanos. (2017, 2 October). Devuélvanme Barcelona. Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/opinion/devuelvanme-barcelona/10058
[156] CUP. (2017, 10 October).
[157] CUP. (2017, 10b October). Bienvinguda República!! News. Retrieved from http://calella.cup.cat/noticia/benvinguda-republica
[158] PDeCAT. (2017, 12 September)
PDeCAT. (2017, 14b September). Carles Puigdemont: "L'1-O no votin els que ens volen deixar a les fosques. Posem llum a una foscor que fa massa temps que dura" News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/carles-puigdemont-l1-o-no-votin-els-que-ens-volen/
PDeCAT. (2017, 15 September).
PDeCAT. (2017, 16 September). President Puigdemont: "No subestimin la força del poble de Catalunya". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/president-puigdemont-no-subestimin-la-forca-del-p/

is a quote from a song of a Catalan children's tv show, but it gained significance as a counter-terrorist response to the terrorist attacks on the 17th of August 2017 in Barcelona and Cambrils (Gray 2019). Caroline Gray argues that its application to 1-O was natural, as the attacks were recent and the "Uh! Oh!" from the song's title is pronounced like 1-O in Catalan. This play on the song's words had been utilized before the attacks too. (Gray, 2019) Here the cry is directed not towards the terrorists, but against the discourse of fear of the state,[159] PP's and Prime Minister Rajoy's government's strategy of fear,[160] and to encourage citizens to show on 1-O that they are not afraid,[161] that they instead have hope[162] despite repression,[163] and that in reality 'they' are afraid of 'us'.[164]

"*A por ellos*" is used by the independentists and the pro-referendum CatEnComú to describe the Spanish state and its hateful, Catalanophobe[165] strategy used in response to the Catalan question: CatEnComú's article for example claims that the majority of Andalusia is not of '*a por ellos'*.[166] The

PDeCAT. (2017, 25b September). Bel: "No ens faran canviar de criteri, els nostres ciutadans es podran expressar lliurement el proper 1-O". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/bel-no-ens-faran-canviar-de-criteri-els-nostres-c/

PDeCAT. (2017, 27c September). Artur Mas: "L'Estat espanyol ha perdut tota la mesura". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/artur-mas-lestat-espanyol-ha-perdut-tota-la-mesur/

PDeCAT. (2017, 29 September). Artur Mas: "Els que volen rebentar l'1-O, en el fons volen rebentar la democràcia". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/artur-mas-els-que-volen-rebentar-l1-o-en-el-fons-/

CatEnComú. (2017, 15 September). Defensem la sobirania de Catalunya enfront de l'estratègia de la por del PP. News. Retrieved from https://catalunyaencomu.cat/ca/actualitat/defensem-de-sobirania-de-catalunya-enfront-de-lestrategia-de-por-del-pp

Esquerra. (2017, 14 September). Junqueras: "Tot el que queda per fer només depèn de nosaltres. Sortim a votar massivament l'1 d'octubre". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/junqueras-tot-el-que-queda-per-fer-nomes-depen-de-nosaltres-sortim-a-votar-massivament-l1--14545

Esquerra. (2017, 16 September). Junqueras: "El món municipal és una peça clau de cara a un referèndum que s'ha convertit en defensa de la democràcia i les llibertats fonamentals". La humanitat. Retrieved from https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/junqueras-el-mon-municipal-es-una-peca-clau-de-cara-a-un-referendum-que-sha-convertit-en-d-14547

Esquerra. (2017, 21 September).

[159] PDeCAT. (2017, 14b September).

[160] CatEnComú. (2017, 15 September).

CatEnComú. (2017, 15b September). Catalunya en Comú participarà a l'1-O. Press release. Retrieved from https://catalunyaencomu.cat/ca/premsa/catalunya-en-comu-participara-l1-o

[161] PDeCAT. (2017, 19b September). President Mas: "Quan en lloc de fer de súbdits decidim fer de ciutadans, s'empipen i amenacen amb les manilles". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/president-mas-quan-en-lloc-de-fer-de-subdits-deci/

CatEnComú. (2017, 15 September).

[162] PDeCAT. (2017, 15 September).

[163] PDeCAT. (2017, 12 September).

[164] PDeCAT. (2017, 16 September).

[165] PDeCAT. (2017, 5 December).

[166] CatEnComú. (2017, 6 December). Xavier Domènech: "El PSOE s'està especialitzant en que li robi la cartera el Partit Popular". Press release. Retrieved from https://catalunyaencomu.cat/ca/premsa/xavier-domenech-psoe-sesta-especialitzant-en-que-li-robi-cartera-partit-popular

state's "only response" of force falsely assures them of victory over the independentists[167] and is an attempt to paint a false image of them.[168] As with '*no tinc por*', the roots of this cheer are not in Francoism, but after recalling Franco, it is presented as a fascist slogan, one that widens the emotional gap between Spain and Catalonia.[169] It is a manifestation of Spain's violent and authoritarian nature,[170] raised with Franco's '*todo atado y bien atado*.'[171] Those behind '*a por ellos*' are pitted against those shouting the anti-fascist slogan '*no pasarán'*.[172]

'*No pasarán'* or the Catalan '*no passaran*' is used by both Esquerra and CUP, but CUP repeated it often in its publications as a last salute at the end. Elisenda Alamant, teacher and candidate from CatEnComú's list, used the phrase and invoked the sentiment when defending the value and work of the Catalan schools against the attacks of PP and Ciudadanos.[173] Esquerra addresses the Madrid of *no pasarán*, referring to the Republican-controlled Madrid during the Civil War. Dolores Ibárruri first used the call for unity against fascism in her radio speech after Franco launched his military uprising and it became the republicans' motto (Nelson 2001, 219). "*Hemos pasado*" (we have passed) is known as Franco's reply to this slogan when he took over Madrid after a long siege.

"*Todo atado y bien atado*" – like established before – is a quote from Franco, which describes the Francoist attitude towards Spanish unity. Both the party PP and the King are described as heirs of this quote specifically, the first by PDeCAT[174] and the second by CUP.[175] King Felipe VI is the son of the heir Franco chose for himself. PP is the descendant of the ruling elite that governed under Franco (Vargas 2018, 172), and has refused to affirm that Franco's military uprising and dictatorship illegal (Preston, 2017). Michael Vargas (2018, 173) explains that "from this perspective, the vice that had squeezed the Catalan people for hundreds of years simply changed its form." Their heirship to

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[167] Esquerra. (2017, 18 October).

[168] PDeCAT. (2017, 18 December). Cleries: "No volem un Estat que empresoni a qui pensa diferent o 'escapça' a un Govern si no és del seu agrat". News. Retrieved from https://www.partitdemocrata.cat/news/cleries-no-volem-un-estat-que-empresoni-a-qui-pen/

[169] Esquerra. (2017, 25 October).

[170] PDeCAT. (2017, 10 October). CUP. (2017, 10 October).

[171] PDeCAT. (2017, 10 October).

[172] CUP. (2017, 9 December). El feixisme entra en campanya al Baix Montseny. News. Retrieved from http://santceloni.cup.cat/noticia/el-feixisme-entra-en-campanya-al-baix-montseny

[173] EUiA. (2017, 13 December). Xavier Domènech: "Catalunya està atrapada entre els qui ataquen l'escola pública I els que la retallen". Retrieved from https://www.semprealesquerra.cat/xavier-domenech-catalunya-esta-atrapada-entre-els-qui-ataquen-lescola-publica-i-els-que-la-retallen/

[174] PDeCAT. (2017, 10 October).

[175] CUP. (2017, 18 October).

Franco is claimed continuously by the independentists, but this quote highlights specifically the continuation of the strategy and attitude.

The parties claim and point other inheritances and traditions too, linking them to their movement, party, nation, or political ideology. Esquerra, for example, published its history, promoting a tradition of leading the Catalan left through repression.[176] Most of the parties discussed the tradition of the socialists and evaluated how this tradition is followed. Another legacy often touched on is the continuity and tradition of the Catalan institutions, underlining the responsibility for them.

On the day of a general strike against the police repression, CUP celebrated the tradition of general strikes, maintained during both democracy and dictatorship.[177] The party described it as the biggest known socio-political stoppage in decades,[178] since the end of dictatorship.[179] During the last years of Franco's rule, the labour protests and strikes grew exponentially (Dowling 2018, 22). However, Bernat and Whyte (2020) point out that the strike was the workers' first mobilization around the issue of self-determination. Nevertheless, the framing of the strike as a tradition works to unite a collective through generations, and thus the mobilization has an aspect of a commemoration event.

Some of these legacies are clearer with their connections to the past, while others might not be justified at all. For example, the independentist parties and the pro-referendum CatEnComú state and enforce the notion that Catalonia – or the independentist movement – has a tradition of being peaceful, civic, progressive, democratic, antifascist, and of defending democratic, social and labour rights. Some of these can be understood as references to certain aspects of the past century, but they are not further explained. Either the explanation is considered a given, or these are not connected to any specific memories: The movement's association with democracy and modernity was inherited from the link between Franco's regime and Spanish nationalism, and the Catalan movement's opposition to them (Dowling 2018, 24).

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[176] Esquerra. (2017, 4 December).
[177] CUP. (2017, 3 October). No podem mês, ho poder tot. News. Retrieved from http://cup.cat/noticia/no-podem-mes-ho-podrem-tot
[178] CUP. (2017, 18 December).
[179] CUP. (2017, 3 October).

6. COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN THE CATALAN CRISIS

The past works as a pretext, through which current issues are interpreted and approached. Further, new grievances do not only remind of old ones, but contemporary claims are also justified with old losses and ownerships. Past is used to highlight the magnitude and exceptionality of the current crisis but also, contrarily, to imply continuation, tradition, and expected patterns. Memory guides at grasping the imagined 'us', 'them' and the nation altogether, whether Spain or Catalonia. Today's positions and opponents are borrowed from, supported by, and experienced like the interpretations of the past. Sometimes memory is used as a threat, accusation, or reminder of past harms, but at times it brings optimism regarding the future, a sense of collective, shared joy, responsibility, pride, gratitude, and hope. All conflict parties alike are using, influencing, reacting to, and countering memory in their arguments, though the manner differs, as do the contents of the memory itself, even within the conflict groups. The dynamics and framings of the Catalan crisis are inseparable from the Francoist past and how it is felt and understood. The main differences are in the similarities between the current state and Franco's regime, as well as the current crisis and the Basque conflict.

All the sides state a lack of democracy – and therefore the actions and positions of the opponents – to be something that belongs in the past, not the future. This lack shown by a collection of events is contrasted with the fact that this is supposed to be the 21st century. The issue is not regarded as normal for a democracy, and nationalism, its root cause, should be overcome. For both constitutionalists and independentists, the opponents represent the past that ought to end. The remedy is somewhat akin to the one against the dictatorship: All three groups frame their suggested solution as bringing more democracy or a return to democracy. The difference is what that means.

The framing of contemporary issues and events contests or builds on past frames, which work as an already acquired lens, strengthened in the process. The Spanish state imposing Spanish unity on

Catalonia mirrors the accounts of Franco's repression, and this guides how the development of events is understood, as its memory sticks to contemporary matters and representations. *'A por ellos'* is framed Francoist, '*No tinc por'* anti-Francoist. Moreover, political conflict is considered dividing and inherently harmful, as the myth of ungovernable Spaniards threatens with a violent escalation. As Ferreira (2019) describes, the spirit of transition rises to the surface when Spain encounters a crisis: Ciudadanos leans its hope on this spirit, which did not only bring democracy after the dictatorship but was understood as a victorious solution against the coup of 23-F and terrorism of ETA. The same gestures, the same Constitution and the King's similar leadership are urged and celebrated, but this time without the shame connected to the Spanish flag and no room for peripheral nationalism.

Representations function as weapons, burdens, and territories to defend, seize and challenge. Memory influences the choice of words, symbols, sources, places and dates for events and publications. The correct combination can add powerful volume to the message, but other utterances and associations are carefully avoided. For example, Ciudadanos encourages the use of everyone's flag and talks of Spanish unity. However, against the Estelada the party rallies behind a symbol it created, the heart of three flags and identities, not leaning solely on the Spanish, which would not be received as well. Esquerra and PDeCAT deny connections to nationalism and dodge the past of the Basque conflict, which only CUP mentions from the independentists. President Companys is commemorated on the anniversary of his execution, but not on the day of his declaration of the Catalan Republic. However, the declaration is not forgotten or set aside, but recalled by Esquerra and CUP. Its anniversary would have a different tone, and the commemoration of an emotional, final loss at hands of a known enemy has reached the status of a tradition.

Dates, places, and people are both leaned on and challenged as symbols. The cultural Nova Canço movement and its prominent members have considerably high status regarding this issue. Their authority is acknowledged by both constitutionalists and independentists, as participants, singer-songwriters, and sources for quotes and tunes that unite the population. Their accounts and positions are not left uncriticized, even using their anti-Francoist past against them, further confirming their relevance and power. Moreover, previously powerful date 1st of October and places like Elna or the Modelo prison gained brand new layers of memory and significance: In the case of

1-O and the Modelo prison, something that was Franco's is now seized and transformed into an important representation for the anti-Francoist, anti-fascist, and independentist.

Especially the independentists point to inheritance, discuss traditions, declare transcendence, as well as suggest ownership and 'our' presence in times when the narrators were not themselves present. Constitutionalists do not explicitly claim ownership over anything that happened before the transition, the victorious considered basis of the current, democratic state. Even so, unlike Wagner (2018) concluded, Ciudadanos' discourse describes as the most recent past the growth of nationalism, allowed by the Spanish PP and PSOE, and the absence of the state during the past 35 or so years, not the successful, peaceful democracy.

Additionally, contrary to Wagner's (2018) findings, there is a past even before that, which is actively referenced in Ciudadanos' campaigning: the anarchy of the Second Republic, the failed declarations of independence of the past, as well as the long dictatorship of division and no autonomy. The party discussed the widest range of events and topics (Table 2) even mentioning the 500-year-old relationship between Spain and Catalonia. Like the other groups, Ciudadanos does not fully comply with the 'pact of forgetting' but does not articulate and narrate these references as explicitly and in detail as the independentists and EUiA either. This might be rooted in the narrative's more established status within Spain, or purposeful avoidance, preventing crossing the line when it comes to the possibly contesting private memories of the public. Vagueness spreads uncertainty to the rest of the analysis of the party's statements: Because the independentists make more explicit references, the argumentation and hints are easier to interpret in their vaguer mentions too.

León Solís (2003, 146) predicted correctly, that the "ghost of the Francoist past" would be "dusted down again as a de-legitimizing tool." However, both the constitutionalists and the independentists in Catalonia used the memory of Franco to delegitimize the opponents. Independentists drew connections between current powers and Franco, through the state's responses and legacies. Constitutionalists linked the independentists to Francoism through nationalism, division, and rejection of those who disagree. They also brought the independentists' claims into question, by implying that they are falsely blaming for Francoism, Falangism, or fascism actors, who have nothing to do with them. Many aspects of the dictatorship remembered by independentists, from language prohibitions and political prisoners to Franco's military uprising altogether are forgotten – or

remembered to be disregarded – by Ciudadanos. These memories still influence their campaign: The party for example actively counters President Puigdemont's association with the past Presidents in exile.

Likewise, the independentists forget or remember to not bring up. Infighting and clashes within the anti-fascist front in Catalonia during the Civil War is not remembered. The dictatorship of anti-Catalanist Miguel Primo de Rivera was not directly recalled in the sample either, though Guibernau i Berdún (2004, 30) includes it as an important part of the Catalan narrative, connecting past grievances to contemporary issues. The Second Republic and the past before and during the Civil War were remembered, but there were variances between the parties' focuses. Transition to democracy is remembered less, and its success is denied by highlighting the relevance of the Francoist past. Moreover, PDeCAT does not explicitly recall the transition at all and only CUP covers ETA and the coup of 23-F in its texts.

Other than that, independentists' framing of the past is quite uniform. They recall that President Companys declared the Catalan republic within the Second Republic and was Franco's victim. Franco's military coup destroyed the Second Republic (Esquerra, CUP), the gained degree of independence (CUP, PDeCAT) and the social revolution of 1936 (CUP). To impose Spanish unity, Franco restricted the use of Catalan, removed the autonomy, as well as imprisoned and executed masses of those fighting for democracy. The transition to democracy is broken promises, betrayal and not a transition at all, as the same powers continue to rule through the same families and the King. Esquerra and CUP's articles in English connect the struggles across time with the international efforts against fascism.

Ciudadanos remember the chaos of the Second Republic, specifically the anarchists' genocide against Catholics, and the rebellious declarations of President Macià and President Companys. These belong in the recollection of chaotic illegality and disorder of the time, which Franco sought to conquer. The party recalls that Franco took the Catalan institutions and autonomy, caused emotional and human fractures, and did not accept disagreeing voices. The transition brought legality, democracy and most of all unity and coexistence, as instead of confrontation, there were handshakes. The Constitution – strongly supported by Catalonia – democracy, and Spanish unity,

with the leadership of the King, have won other challenges to the Spanish democracy, namely the coup of 23-F, dividing Basque nationalism, and terrorism.

These two simplified understandings and interpretations differ significantly, as one's success and possible solution is another one's loss or failure and somebody's hero is someone else's villain. The spirit of transition as a success is heavily contested by the independentists. The claiming of the Second Republic further complicates the dynamic, as the Spanish state avoids being associated with it and Ciudadanos covered it only in negative terms. Altogether, stories defining the collective, where they were, and what is theirs varies greatly between – but also somewhat within – the sides.

When arguing for and promoting their stance in the conflict, the parties focus on separate aspects of the past, which do not always contradict each other. These rooms for similarities are partly a result of vagueness or silences, done more or less intentionally. For example, the Basque conflict and the 23-F's narrations differ between Ciudadanos and CUP, but the articles do not state how Esquerra and PDeCAT interpret the issues. Another vagueness that allows compatibility is how Franco's regime and Francoism are remembered. Franco's moral evaluation is shared by all. Yet, like stated, the reasons narrated are not explicitly the same, although all remember silencing and the prohibition of disagreeing. The difference in the details in which they are described is systematic, intentional, and notable. Besides, for all groups, the opponents represent Franco at least to some degree, linking the strongly felt condemnation of Franco to them. Furthermore, while the independentists accuse of silences around the past, the constitutionalists blame for misusing it.

The pro-referendum frame of the past and its potential to build a bridge between the conflict groups are left less defined. CatEnComú made almost no reference to the past, but their campaign was not about defining and imagining a nation per se, at least not as much as it was for Ciudadanos, PDeCAT, Esquerra and CUP. The party does not seem to promote any memory frame but does not contest any of them either. Transition is not considered fully a success, as CatEnComú suggests important reforms to the Constitution. Anyhow, it is accepted as a big enough change from the previous dictatorship, because the changes are not supported with claims of Francoism. EUiA is clearer with its memories, actively commemorating the anti-Francoists and anti-fascists in Catalonia and abroad, honouring political prisoners of the past, and portraying PP as having a Francoist mentality.

However, many conclusions cannot be drawn, as the study's sample was lacking in the pro-referendum articles.

Towards the elections, memory politics regarding the Francoist past became a more prominent feature in the discussion of PDeCAT and Esquerra. Memory politics are not only a way of showing that Catalonia progresses ahead of the rest of Spain, and is therefore different, but their continuation is also secured by voting for the independentists. Only the acknowledgement of history allows evolution, and the Spanish state is blamed for blocking this process. This dynamic and decision over moving forward or going backwards were equated to the question on Catalonia: only greater self-determination allows advancing as a society, as Spain currently blocks laws. Restitution and memory politics are regarded as vital in building a Republic.

In addition to the past further away, CUP discusses the memory politics of how 1-O is remembered, presenting a motion allowing a street to be renamed after 1-O. All the parties are aware of the last months of 2017 being of great importance and a topic of discussion for years, and all guess or state how they and the others will be recalled by different actors and groups. The 1-O and the events around have joined the network of collective memories as one of the most recent layers, with something familiar from the past, this familiar varying amongst the recallers. The familiarity makes sure that the past issues continue to be present and strengthens certain interpretations of them.

Like the past that is present through it, the Catalan question itself has not disappeared anywhere during the last three and a half years. People remain in exile and imprisoned. In 2017 the independentists won a majority in the Parliament, although Ciudadanos became the biggest party. A long debate over the President of the Generalitat ensued, as three candidates were blocked by Spain. The direct rule of the Spanish state ended, and the trials of the independence leaders resulted in nine of them being given 9-13 years in prison. In 2019 Tsunami Democràtic emerged protesting these sentences. Last year President Quim Torra was disqualified, due to not removing independentist partisan symbols from the Palau de la Generalitat de Catalunya. This study did not find any dramatic differences in the use of memory across the timeframe. As the Catalan question and the past linked to it are still on the table, some of the arguments, connections, and interpretations might have changed, developed, strengthened, or disappeared after 2017. Some memories-as-instruments might have lost their effect, and others have faced emergent contesting

accounts as the conflict carries on – for example about 23-F and its consequences 40 years ago, recently compared with both the 1-O and the storming of the United States Capitol in 2021.

New elections, called by Torra, were stalled by the pandemic, and finally held in February 2021. Ciudadanos lost 30 seats, a new far-right party Vox gained 11, and the pro-referendum coalition En Comú Podem maintained its position. The constitutionalist PSC-PSOE rose as the biggest party, but the independentist parties maintained the majority of the votes, winning 74 seats of 135. In a similar study focusing on the statements today, the parties of interest would be others. Especially the rise of Vox in Catalonia is a significant factor in the realm of memory politics and how Franco is understood and recalled. The role of the organisations such as OU, ANC and Tsunami Democràtic in memory cultivation and the movement altogether should not be forgotten either.

The parties' campaigning has increasingly moved online, and specifically into the realm of social media, its importance further emphasized by the pandemic and remote campaigning. There are tweets, Instagram posts, and an exhaustive catalogue of YouTube videos, available before and after 2017. They allow for interaction with the public and encourage participation in a way that articles published on the party's website do not. This data is not only valuable for memory studies because it would be available from more parties, but because the interactive aspect of remembering, between recallers, representations and audiences, could also be revealed. Questions on the participation and role of the public could be answered: Who initiates the remembering, and how this possibility of interaction on the platform influences the recalling practised concerning the conflict? How do the justifications and memories vary within a party's interactive platform?

The events of Catalonia evoked memories of Basque nationalism. Additionally, different regions have their distinctive histories of the Civil War and Franco's regime. This study focused on Catalonia, but the conflict of 2017, the constitutional crisis, understandably received significant attention and was constantly covered elsewhere in Spain too. Accounts from the parties or other actors from the rest of Spain and especially other regions with historical nationalities could reveal if these linkages differ, exist at all, or which collective's memories are present. For example, the connections to ETA and the Basque conflict were used in Catalonia to get certain points across, but these were Catalonia's collective memories of these events and actors. It is most probable that the past's meaning, traumas, and use would differ in the Basque Country and Navarre.

Collective memories of the Civil War and Franco's regime play a prominent part in the conflict in Catalonia. Memories draw patterns and evaluate the groups associated, but also aid at grasping the collectives in question and assign legitimacy to them and their claims. It is thus not irrelevant what is remembered, publicly and privately, and how the earlier violence was and is handled. Not all divisions and conflicts of the past are considered significant today, whereas others resurface and are relived, further framing, fuelling, and complicating present-day clashes. Without working with the different, enduring, collective memories and how they can relate, the hostilities stemming from them will not stop being real and resonating, one round after another.

Independentists, pro-referendum and constitutionalists alike are using, influencing, reacting to, and countering memory in their arguments, citing, avoiding, and moulding different representations. The approach, regularity, thoroughness, and clarity differ, as do the aspects selected into the memory frames. Results speak for plurality in recollections within the pro-referendum and independentists too. The same cannot be concluded from the constitutionalists, as the sample included only one constitutionalist party. The main distinctions in the memory frames between the conflict groups are situated in the relationship with the Second Republic, how much the current Spanish state has to do with its Francoist past, and how much – and what – the Catalan independentists and Basque nationalists have in common.

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