

IN SEARCH OF A JUST APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION

Rhetorical analysis of the Paris Agreement and the world leaders' statements given in the
Leaders Event in COP21

Faculty of Management and
Business
Environmental Policy and
Regional Studies
Master's thesis
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August 2019

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JOKIHAARA, HANNALEENA: In search of a just approach to climate change mitigation – Rhetorical analysis of the Paris Agreement and the world leaders' statements given in the Leaders Event in COP21

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Master's thesis, 73 pages.

August 2019

This research takes part in the discussion of responsibility of different actors to participate in global climate change mitigation. In international climate change conferences, the topic has been debated for years, especially in the post-Kyoto era. It has been claimed that the lack of a shared view about the responsible ones to address climate change has been the main reason that has obstructed international climate change negotiations. However, in 2015, states managed to find a shared view: a new, global climate agreement – the Paris Agreement – was reached in COP21.

The aim of this research is to find out what is universally seen as a just approach to climate change mitigation in the state level: in terms of climate ethics, what is the outcome like which 185 out of 197 states have been ready to ratify. As a research material, I use the world leaders' statements given in the Leaders Event in COP21 and the outcome of the Conference, the Paris Agreement. As a research method I use rhetorical analysis.

The analysis of the world leaders' statements reveals that the views about the responsible ones to tackle climate change and who is now contributing to climate change mitigation vary among states. However, the analysis of the Paris Agreement reveals that states share the view that emissions should be reduced. Additionally, the point of view that in addition to developed countries, also developing countries should aim to reduce emissions is shared universally among states. Hence, the results of this research reveal that even though the presumptions of the responsible ones and the ones already contributing to climate change mitigation vary among states, universally states share a common objective to tackle climate change by developed countries taking the lead and developing countries participating taking the different national circumstances into account. However, the results of this research do not reveal if the Paris Agreement or its negotiation process managed to unify the states' differing approaches to the responsibility of the specific actors to participate in climate change mitigation, or if there are universally accepted means to mitigate climate change.

Keywords: Paris Agreement, international climate negotiations, climate change mitigation, climate ethics, rhetorical analysis

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ABBREVIATIONS

CBDR	Common but differentiated responsibilities
COP	Conference of the Parties
GHG	Greenhouse gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NDC	Nationally determined contributions
PPP	Polluter Pays Principle
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 INTRODUCTION

In international climate change negotiations, national positions of industrialized and developing countries have been notably distinct for already 30 years (Okereke & Coventry 2016, 835). In the negotiations, states have been driving their own national interests despite of the global nature of the problem (Harris 2013, 53). For instance, states have used a nationally favorable interpretation of the principle ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) launched in United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change in 1992 to promote their interests (e.g. Okereke & Coventry 2016, 837; Jinnah 2017, 285). Developing countries have emphasized the part “differentiated” to avoid the emission reduction obligations and to get financial and technical assistance from developed countries whereas developed countries have emphasized the part “common” to extend the required sacrifices to all states (e.g. Okereke & Coventry 2016, 837). Developing countries have answered to the burden sharing requirement by claiming that industrialized countries have caused climate change throughout the history by emitting and thus, claimed developed countries of the exploitation of the South economic- and social wise (e.g. Kortetmäki 2013, 79).

Due to the years of confrontation of the North and the South, in early 2015, the international community did not see the adoption of a new global climate agreement probable. For instance, Méjean, Lecocq, and Mulugetta (2015, 388) argued only a few months before the Paris climate conference that “the current framing of distribution issues is not conducive to an international climate agreement”. However, despite of the different interpretations of common but differentiated responsibilities and the confrontation of the North and the South in international climate negotiations, the states managed to reach a first, almost all states including climate agreement, the Paris Agreement against the expectations. Reaching the Paris Agreement in the late 2015 was globally declared as a success in international climate policy.

In this thesis, I want to find out, what was the solution like of which 185 of the 197 states have been ready to commit until this day. I want to find out what kind of an approach to climate change mitigation was almost universally acceptable among states.

As the research question, I present:

In the state level, what is universally seen as a just approach to climate change mitigation?

To find an answer, I focus on the negotiation process of the Paris Agreement and study different views of who should participate in global climate change mitigation. As a research material, I will use the statements of the world leaders given in the Paris Climate Conference in the Leaders Event on the first day of the COP21 on 30th of November 2015, and the outcome of the Conference, the Paris Agreement. To answer the research question, I will analyze the research material with rhetorical analysis. My aim is to find the point or points of view to which almost all the states have been ready to commit and hence, is seen as a universally just approach to climate change mitigation.

In this thesis, I understand participating in global climate change mitigation in a wide sense. In addition to the principle CBDR, the term participation has been interpreted differently by the industrialized and developing states in the international climate negotiations (see Okereke & Coventry 2016, 840). Industrialized countries have seen that participation means emission reduction obligations also for the developing countries. However, developing countries have interpreted the term participation in a more flexible way by including sustainable development and adaptation into it. (see e.g. Okereke & Coventry 2016, 840) To understand the multidimensionality of the phenomenon under research, it is important to include both mitigation and adaptation points of view in climate change mitigation. Focusing only on the future emission reductions would ignore the effects of the past emissions and need to adapt the changes they have caused (see Risse 2012, 170).

In the next chapter, I introduce the theoretical, climate ethics and responsibility focused research in which this research is attached to. In the chapter 3, I introduce the research material, and continue to the introduction of the research method, rhetorical analysis in the chapter 4. In chapters 5–9 of this thesis, I analyze the argumentation presented in the research material. I discuss and summarize the results of the research in the final, concluding chapter.

2 WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION?

Ethics and the fair distribution of burdens have been in the core of the international climate change mitigation debate for years. According to Jinnah (2017, 286), differing points of view about what is just in addressing climate change have been one of the main reasons that have obstructed international climate negotiations. Additionally, climate change has been claimed to be fundamentally an ethical and moral issue instead of economic or financial one (see e.g. Gardiner 2010a; Risse 2012, 158).

To find out the responsible ones to tackle climate change and a just way to share the burden, the debate has been surrounding the questions of who caused the problem, was the problem caused accidentally or consciously, who is causing the problem now, who can afford to fix it, and where the problem can be solved in the most efficient way (see e.g. Jinnah 2017, 286). In the following subchapters, I will introduce the general framework of the discussion of the responsible ones to participate in climate change mitigation and after that, focus more specifically on states.

2.1 Debate of the responsible ones

One of the widely known principles applied in the environmental law is the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). The principle was first mentioned in the recommendation of the OECD in 1972, and since, it has been applied in many international conventions. For instance, PPP has been set out in the Rio Declaration of the United Nations (UN 1992, art. 16) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EUR-Lex 2012, art. 191.2).

The Polluter Pays Principle states that polluters are the responsible ones to bear the costs of abatement. Thus, the PPP can be seen as a fundamentally economic principle (see e.g. Grubb 1995, 490). The principle has been applied as following in international conventions:

National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution [...]. (UN 1992, art. 16)

Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. (EUR-Lex 2012, art. 191.2)

Even though the principle seems clear, its application has proved to be complex due to the lack of definition of the polluter. It has not been defined if by the polluter it is referred to countries, companies, individuals or other actors. It has been argued for and against for the responsibility of all these actors to fix the problem.

Often states, more specifically industrialized countries, have been held as polluters due to their historical contribution to the global emissions. However, in the context of historical responsibility, it should be defined if it is referred to a state as an actor or the activity happened in the territory of a state. Neumayer (2000, 192) points out that the current emissions of industrialized countries have not caused climate change but the *accumulated* ones from the past 200 years. Thus, all the actual polluters, if referred to companies or individuals, do not live anymore.

Stating that currently living should pay for the harm caused by past generations violates the polluter pays principle instead of supporting it (see Caney 2010). However, as a counter argument it has been stated that responsibilities, rights, benefits and costs are heritable due to the long-lasting ignorance of the negative environmental impacts of industrialization and lack of halting the increase of the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Since the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1990, the link between GHG emissions and climate change could not have been ignored with good reason (Singer 2010, 190).

For the heritability of the responsibilities, it is stated that the current generations are not unrelated to the past generations. The generations of today have been enjoying the benefits of the economic development even before they have been born. For instance, the unborn child has benefited from the prenatal care (Shue 2010, 105). Caney (2010), a pioneering researcher in contemporary political philosophy in the field of climate change, points out that the consumption of the fossil fuels in the past has increased the standard of living in industrialized countries. Due to the use of fossil fuels, in the industrialized countries the standard of living is nowadays higher than it would be without the consumption of fossil fuels in the past. The polluting activity of the earlier generations

has thus established the high living standards of people of today. Caney (2010, 128) reasons that due to this benefit, the current generations can be required to pay for it. Briefly said, following this reasoning makes the beneficiaries pay and cover the environmental harm in spite of people paying have not necessarily caused the harm by themselves.

Nevertheless, the so-called beneficiary pays principle is not trouble-free. It can be argued that without industrialization and policies adopted in the past, different people would have been born. As a result, individuals of today would not have been worse off without industrialization because they would not exist without it (see *ibid.*). Thus, according to this thinking, the currently living persons cannot be required to pay for the benefits they have inherited.

Although the beneficiary pays principle seems to be problematic in the case of individuals, it can be applied to collectives. If it is focused on states or other entities, such as nations or even corporations, the polluters may still exist (e.g. Singer 2010, 190). It can be assumed that there is no difference in the existence of states if industrialization had happened or not. As a result, it can be thought that a country or a still existing corporation has gained advantages from industrialization that it would not have without it and thus, these actors can be held responsible for the emissions at a time (see e.g. Caney 2010).

However, the pollution and the following environmental damage were unforeseeable. Thus, it is not fair to punish the last generations because they could not have predicted the results of their activities beforehand. Shue (2010, 104), pioneering philosopher in the justice issues arising in international climate change negotiations, agrees that it would not be fair to punish someone for the unpredictable results of an action, but he points out that a punishment and a responsibility are very different issues. A punishment from unavoidable effects is not fair but it is not fair either to demand the other party to fix the damage caused by the other party. Hence, according to Shue (*ibid.*), the ones who have caused the problem can be required to pay for the costs of it.

Caney (2010, 131) contests Shue's (2010, 104) view by noting that "to make (excusably) ignorant harmers pay is to prioritize the interests of the beneficiaries over those of the ascribed duty bearers". According to Caney (*ibid.*), the view of Shue (*ibid.*) ignores the perspective of the alleged responsible ones while emphasizing the interests of the right holders.

In the debate of the polluter, even though states have often been defined as polluters and thus, stated to be responsible ones to address climate change, in practice also individuals and corporations use electricity and consume fossil fuels in their daily life and business. Thus, they could also be considered as polluters. Consumer pays principle has also been launched as it can be thought that consumers should pay for the emissions caused by the production of the goods they consume (see Risse 2012, 169).

In addition to consumers and companies, also international institutions, such as World Trade Organization (WTO), have done their part in increasing global GHG emissions. For instance, WTO has promoted economic growth and other activities that are related to emitting greenhouse gases. However, their responsibility to reduce emissions can be contested as international regimes are created and governed by states (e.g. Caney 2010, 126–127).

In addition to criticizing the naming of international institutions as responsible ones, holding individuals or corporations as responsible ones is also criticized because the amount of emitted greenhouse gases of individuals or corporations cannot easily be specified, and the states have actually allowed the actions done by individuals and corporations. For instance, Eskelinen (2013) points out that in the case of a single individual, it is more difficult to prove the causality of the acts of a single individual in producing emissions. For instance, an individual can show an interest towards flying by buying a flight ticket. However, the airline would fly the flight even though the seat was empty. Thus, even though it has been proved that human actions have caused climate change, it is difficult to prove the causality of the actions of single individuals. (ibid., 85–87) Also Risse (2012, 169) points out that consumers have the limited power to affect on the emissions of the goods as producers are the ones that control the emissions of the production.

Eskelinen (2013) continues that if it is argued that individuals are responsible for the emissions of their acts, their acts are separated from the societal context. Eskelinen (ibid.) argues that owning and driving a car clearly influences climate change but possibility to choose otherwise should be taken into account when speaking of responsibility. Infrastructure, political decisions about public transport, and place of residence affect on the possibilities of an individual to choose whether to drive a car or take a bus (ibid., 89). In summary, it is problematic to appeal to individuals as responsible ones because their

choices depend on the societal solutions such as available transportation systems and types of accommodation.

Eskelinen (2013, 98) argues that due to before mentioned problems related to the appealing to the responsibility of an individual, collectives such as states should be seen as responsible ones. States as political communities that negotiate internationally about climate change mitigation, are main subjects and almost the only recognized parties in international climate politics. (ibid., 97–99)

Kortetmäki, Laitinen and Yrjönsuuri (2013, 10) do not fully agree with Eskelinen (2013) but argue that both individuals and collectives can be seen as responsible actors in cutting emissions. Every actor can be seen as responsible one in his or her own actions and the damages caused. However, the ability to affect on the decisions of others vary between actors. For instance, states have more power to guide the action of other actors compared to companies whose authority is limited by companies' own action and industry, or the individuals, whose responsibility is based on avoiding harming others (Kortetmäki et al. 2013). Kortetmäki et al. (ibid.) argue that climate change as a global challenge requires action from collectives that have power to guide governments and companies. Authors argue that collectives should bear the burden of climate change and act because climate change is neither caused by a single actor and nor avoided by the choices of an individual (ibid., 11).

Even though responsibility to participate in climate change mitigation is often designated to states in literature, it should be taken into account that states consist of different interest groups (Eskelinen 2013, 97–99; Harris 2013). For instance, in poor developing countries different population groups contribute differently to the climate change. Elites may have high standard of living and consume in the same extent than in industrialized countries while the poor may contribute only a minimally to climate change while suffering from the extreme weather events (Eskelinen 2013, 97–99; Harris 2013).

Harris (2013) argues that consumption should be taken into account when looking for responsible ones because of the global nature of the current economics. For instance, it would be weird to think that China alone should be responsible from its emissions because most of its emissions have the origin in producing products that Europeans and American use (Eskelinen 2013, 99). According to Harris (2013, 132), the focus should be shifted to people with big emissions despite of their place of inhabitation as there are more and more

abundant people in the developing countries, such as China, living and consuming in the same way than the wealthiest people in developed countries. Also Agarwal and Narain (1990, 1) argue that the amount of GHG gases in the atmosphere is a result of “*the gargantuan consumption of the developed countries, particularly the United States*” (italics original). Agarwal and Narain (ibid.) do not argue that developing countries should not contribute to improving environment such as controlling deforestation, but they argue that before demanding environmental constraints from developing countries, developed country parties should fix their systems first because emissions per capita are lower in China and India than in Western countries.

Harris (2013, 133) continues the discussion and states that the focus of the climate policy should be shifted from the suffering of the nature to the suffering of the people in order to make it more difficult for governments to avoid making decisions to combat climate change. Shifting the focus towards people would encourage international cooperation to combat climate change as it would be necessary to protect human rights (ibid.).

In addition to the discussion of which actor should bear the burden of climate change mitigation, it has also been argued that none of the currently living should do it. It can be argued that the standard of living of the next generation will be higher and people will be wealthier than currently living people. As a result, their ability to prevent and adapt to the climate change will be better than the one of currently living people (Caney 2010, 220). Hence, it can be stated that “[b]ecause the lot of currently living generations *in sum* is worse than that of future generations, it would be unfair to demand a sacrifice from the current generation for the sake of future generations” (Tremmel 2014, 102. Italics original).

However, Tremmel (ibid., 102–103) states that intergenerational justice is about making the improvement of life of future generations possible, not only guaranteeing the same living standard. Climate change is such a great threat to a humankind that, according to precautionary principle, it is not fair to consciously leave the burden of it to the shoulders of next generations (see also Gardiner 2010b). Additionally, it cannot be predicted how well people will adapt to changes climate change causes. Thus, currently living should apply the precautionary principle to avoid the possible catastrophes caused by global warming, not leave acting to future generations (Tremmel 2014, 99–101).

Singer (2011) adds a new point of view to the discussion by pointing out that the individual holds the primary responsibility to give. He argues that paying taxes is not enough to fulfill the duties of the individual, but individuals should also, for instance, push states to provide more state-level aid for the suffering ones (ibid. 209–210). However, even though it can be seen that the global obligations belong to everyone, Chadwick and O’Connor (2015, 29) state that “it cannot be the case that individuals in wealthier countries are under an obligation to spend all their efforts in the relief of suffering: they too should be able to flourish”.

As described in this chapter, to any argument presented for a specific actor’s responsibility to tackle climate change can be presented a counter argument. In the debate, many problems have arisen. Firstly, it is difficult to define the actual polluters. However, if the polluter can be defined, the second question which would need to be solved is how to define how much every polluter owes to the non-polluters (Caney 2010, 126). The following questions that should be solved would be that who should receive the payment and for what and on what grounds (Grubb 1995, 490). Additionally, how much is necessary, what aims are prioritized and how targets should be shared between countries have been debated (see Okereke & Coventry 2016, 837) without reaching a consensus.

The discussion of the compensation faces the same difficulties than discussion of polluters: even though the polluter could be defined in the case of climate change and it could be agreed that the polluter should pay compensation to ones who have suffered from the polluting, international justice point of view reminds that if the polluter have not been aware that their acts cause harm, polluters of the previous times cannot be held responsible for the harm (Méjean et al. 2015, 392; see also Singer 2010, 190).

2.2 Focusing on states

If focused solely on states, the polluter pays principle supports the claim of the responsibility of developed countries to fix the problem (see e.g. Grubb 1995, 463; Singer 2010, 190). It can be seen that the developed countries have unilaterally imposed costs also to the other parties and hence put them at an unequal place. In other words, the world would not be currently struggling with climate change if the emissions of the developed countries would have remained in the same level than the ones of developing countries (Shue 2010, 101; Singer 2010, 190).

It can be also argued from the beneficiary pays point of view that developed countries should fix the problem. While developed countries have increased their wealth during the industrialization, they have left the developing countries poor and underdeveloped. The developed countries are thus the only ones benefitted from causing the climate change and should bear the burden (Shue 2010, 103).

However, in the past, developed countries did not know about the limits of the absorbing capacity of the atmosphere and the harmful effects of exceeding the limit (e.g. Singer 2010, 190; Risse 2012, 166). Industrialized countries did not know either that they would become dependent on fossil fuels and use them for a long time (Risse 2012, 166). Hence, for developed countries, it can be considered fairer to switch the view from the history to the future. However, Risse (*ibid.*, 166) reminds that “one cannot block demands for integration of past emissions into future-directed regulation on the strength of difficulties in assigning responsibilities” referring not only naming responsible states but actors in general.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that, in addition to industrialized countries, developing countries have benefited from industrialization as new technologies and medicines have reached also poorer countries and supported their development (e.g. Shue 2010, 104). Thus, it can be thought that industrialized countries are not the only beneficiaries and should not bear the burden alone. However, Shue (*ibid.*, 104) points out that the developing countries have been charged for the received benefits: for instance, they have run into debt and the gap between poor and rich countries has expanded. Thus, it cannot be said that the poor ones would have also benefited from the polluting action at the same range than the industrialized ones, and hence, make them pay in the same extent than the industrialized countries.

Neumayer (2000) argues for applying the principle of historical responsibility or accountability for GHG emissions. Neumayer (*ibid.*, 192) points out that it has been proven that emissions which have been accumulated during the past 200 years have caused climate change. In other words, climate change is not caused by emissions of the current year or a specific actor but by accumulated emissions throughout the history (also Risse 2012, 159). According to Neumayer (2000, 193) ignoring historical accountability would hurt developing states by accepting the harm developed countries have caused by their historical emissions.

However, in categorizing states into developed and developing countries, it is often ignored that these groups are internally heterogeneous. The groups of industrialized countries and developing countries include diverse countries. For instance, the group of developing countries include both oil-producing countries and small island states: two different groups of states with different contribution to global emissions, national circumstances, and political agendas. Similarly, the group of industrialized countries is the heterogeneous group of states with different contributions to global emissions and political agendas. (see Okereke & Coventry 2016, 836)

To recognize the heterogeneity of countries within the groups of developed and developing countries, it has been suggested to count cumulative historical emissions from a defined date to this day. This way every country would have something to pay. However, estimating emissions is complex. For instance, it is not decided from which year the emission estimates should be counted and if reabsorption of emissions should be included in the results (Grubb 1995, 491).

In UNFCCC, the question of just climate change mitigation has been aimed to solve by applying the principle common but differentiated responsibilities launched in 1992 (see Jinnah 2017, 285). The principle states that responsibility in climate change mitigation varies between states. Additionally, it states that developed countries should be the ones that should lead climate change mitigation by their example. More specifically, the article 3.1. of the UNFCCC states as following:

The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. (UN 1992, art. 3.1)

The principle called common but differentiated responsibilities thus states that every country has a responsibility to address climate change, but it also recognizes that the different countries have different contributions to climate change and capabilities to address it. To take these elements into account and to be just, it is stated in UNFCCC that countries should have different responsibilities to address climate change (Jinnah 2017, 285).

However, Harris (2013, 62–63) argues that nowadays the national good should not be separated from the common good as national emissions influence on every state and global action is needed to tackle the problem. Harris (ibid., 164–169) presents that states should rethink their policies from the sustainability point of view and include individuals to the climate policy and bear the responsibility to tackle climate change with them. Hence, even though the states can be seen as responsible ones to bear the responsibility of climate change mitigation, the implementation of the emission reduction policies may include participation of the individuals.

In the discussion about responsibilities of different states and just climate change mitigation, various equity principles have been applied to justify the responsibility of a claimed actor or a state. Next, I discuss principles of equality, ability to pay, basic needs, and cost-effectiveness (see e.g. Grubb 1995, 483; Méjean et al. 2015, 391). These principles can be used in providing a justified definition of the states that should participate in global climate change mitigation.

According to an interpretation of the principle of equality, every state has the same right to produce emissions (Méjean et al. 2015, 391) and everyone should be given the same opportunity to use global resources and benefit from emitting despite of place or time (Neumayer 2000, 193). Even though the equality principle sounds fair in the first place, Risse (2012, 158) reminds that the common ownership approach does not mean that the atmosphere should be shared equally as the humanity does not own the atmosphere *in particular* but the earth *as a whole*: as an entity where everything is interconnected. In order to ensure that individuals can meet basic needs, and further, to avoid states causing harm to others, Risse (ibid., 162) argues that some – not all – goods, such as absorptive capacity provided by the atmosphere should be regulated, or the right to produce emissions should be limited.

Principle of equality can also be interpreted in a way that everyone should participate in the problem-solving with the same contributions, and costs and benefits should be shared equally for everyone. Nevertheless, according to per capita -emissions, the burden of industrial states is bigger than the one of developing states. Thus, per capita point of view has discrepancy with the principle of equality: the industrialized countries have bigger burden than the developing ones. (see Méjean et al. 2015, 391)

According to the principle of ability to pay, the one who is most capable to pay should contribute the most to achieve the common goal. Ability to pay principle does not aim to define the polluters or the ones who caused the problem but aims to define who afford to combat climate change (Caney 2015, 382). Applying the ability to pay principle would benefit everyone, including the least-advantaged groups in society, so it would be justified to diverge from principle of equality. Ability to pay principle would make possible that no one has to act in a way that leads to unacceptable loss of welfare. However, there are no consensus of how the ability to pay should be defined. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has been a commonly used measure but also Human Development Index has been suggested. (see Méjean et al. 2015, 391–392)

It is argued (e.g. Grubb 1995, 469) that the states' capacity to combat climate change should be taken into account due to differences between states in their capacity to combat or address the challenges caused by climate change. According to Singer (2010, 183), rich nations have a better resilience against the impacts of climate change. They have better ability to cope with the unexpected challenges such as flood, drought and diseases, whereas poor nations are not able to act as the same extent. However, not only national circumstances define the capacity to address or combat climate change but, for instance, also the ability of institutions. All states do not have strong institutions which would be capable to form and implement climate friendly policies and to protect vulnerable groups (Grubb 1995, 469). Institutions can even be unwilling to protect groups that are vulnerable to climate change (ibid.).

The basic needs principle has the basis in the idea that not everyone should have the same but everyone should have enough (see e.g. Méjean et al. 2015, 392). Basic needs are usually defined to be the ones that are most likely required to avoid premature death (see Chadwick & O'Connor 2015, 28) or take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of the society (Méjean et al. 2015, 392). Caney (2015, 381) argues that it would not be fair to make people living in poor conditions pay for emitting that is required to fulfill basic needs. Paying for emissions could lead to losing a minimal standard of living, and thus, violate the right to have a minimal standard of living of people (ibid., 381). Hence, in the case of basic needs principle, some emissions of a state can be defined to be morally necessary.

However, basic needs can be defined differently in different cultures and regions and over time (Méjean et al. 2015, 392). Hence, finding a universally accepted definition for them can be difficult. As Gardiner (2010a, 17) puts it:

[I]t is hard to see individuals agreeing on an equal division of basic emissions entitlements that does anything less than exhaust the maximum permissible on other (climatological and intergenerational) grounds, and it is easy to see them being tempted to overshoot it. (ibid.)

Gardiner (ibid., 17) argues that in order to define the basic needs it would be needed to define what is the acceptable way of life. However, this is problematic: any emission can be claimed to be essential for the certain way of life. This can lead to exceeding the emission limits set by climate scientists and cause global harm. However, this situation could also force emitters to choose if they want to avoid harm today or in the future (Traxler 2002, 107–108).

It can also be argued that in some countries reducing the emissions is cheaper or more cost-effective than in the others and hence, emissions should be reduced in those countries. However, Grubb (1995, 483) reminds that due to the uncertainties and possible biased assumptions towards national interests, this kind of claims should be treated with caution.

No consensus or a widely accepted point of view of which equity principle should be applied in global climate negotiations have not been reached as the different approaches give differing answers to the same questions (see e.g. Grubb 1995, 483). However, Méjean et al. (2015, 393) remind that often the different principles are used as combined: one allocation rule may include parts of multiple principles. Thus, it might not be beneficial to focus only on discussing which one of the principles should be applied but use them as a useful framework to assess proposals for climate change mitigation.

In this chapter, the discussion introduced surrounded the question of which actors should be held as responsible ones: states, companies, or consumers. In the case of states, often industrialized countries have been required to bear the burden of tackling climate change. However, the claim could be contested: firstly, industrialized countries did not know they were causing a harm, and secondly, developing countries have benefitted from the industrialization at some extent. Additionally, the group of industrialized states is internally heterogeneous. However, the answer to the question of who should participate

in global climate change mitigation is aimed to find by applying different equality principles, such as polluter pays, beneficiary pays, cost-effectiveness, and equality principle.

According to the introduced discussion, in addition to the equality principles, it also matters if the emissions are being viewed from the retrospective or future-oriented point of view. If it is focused on the past emissions, industrialized countries can be required to participate in climate change mitigation as their historical emissions are bigger than the ones of developing countries. However, if it is focused on future emissions, all countries can be required to participate in climate change mitigation as the emissions of any country increase the global emissions. In the debate introduced in this chapter, the points of view about future and past emissions mix with each other, as do mitigation and adaptation points of view. The balancing between bearing the burden of the past emissions and focusing on the reduction of the global emissions in the future is in the very core of the discussion of the responsibility to participate in global climate change mitigation.

3 STATEMENTS OF THE LEADERS EVENT AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS A RESEARCH MATERIAL

The research material of this research includes the world leaders' statements given in the Leaders Event in the Paris Climate Conference (COP21) in 2015, and the outcome of the conference: the Paris Agreement. I chose the statements given in the Leaders Event to be part of the research material because they were the first statements given by the head of states in COP21 and thus, the first opportunity to appeal for the desired outcome of the conference and, as mentioned in the UNFCCC's Message to Parties, "an important opportunity for governments to confirm their support for reaching a meaningful global climate change agreement at this very historic conference" (UNFCCC 2015, 2).

In addition to statements, I chose the Paris Agreement to be part of the research material as it is a concrete result of the COP21 and an embodiment of an almost universally accepted approach to climate change mitigation as 185 states have committed to it. Nevertheless, the Paris Agreement alone would not have been enough to reveal a universally just approach to climate change mitigation because the agreement itself does not reveal the dissenting opinions and points of view emerged during the negotiation process.

3.1 Statements given in the Leaders Event in COP21

The research material includes 136 statements in total. UNFCCC had noticed the speakers that statements should not exceed three minutes (UNFCCC 2015, 4). However, the length of statements varied: some statements stayed in the 3-minute limit, some exceeded even 10 minutes. In written, the length of statements varied in between 1 and 16 pages.

As a research material I used statements in the written form in the first place. To be in a written form and posted to the UNFCCC website, a state should had sent the statement in advance to the organizers via email (UNFCCC 2015, 7). Most of the statements were published in the website of UNFCCC but if the statement was not, I listened it from the recording of the event and transcribed it. In the case of the statement being in a written form but in another language than English or Spanish, I listened the official English interpretation of the statement and transcribed it. Three statements (the ones of Burkina

Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo) were available in the written form in other languages than English or Spanish, but they had not been given in the Leaders Event. I marked these statements out of the research material.

Next, I introduce party groupings of the Conferences of the Parties. Even though I study the statements of the world leaders as the statements of the arguer states, not as statements of the negotiating groups, for understanding the political background and the hypothetical agenda of states, it is important to know on which group the state belongs to. As the research material contains 136 statements and studying the national agendas and political histories related to climate change politics of each one of the states would not be realistic and expedient for this thesis, I decided to introduce the party groupings of the international climate negotiations to give a general view about the agendas of the countries in international climate negotiations. This supports the analysis of the statements: according to Tindale (2004, 6), when studying argumentation from the rhetorical perspective, in addition to argument itself, it has to be taken into account of who is arguing and why. To provide answer to these questions, the background of the arguers should be known.

In Conferences of the Parties that have been organized since 1995 (Grubb 1995, 464), each government negotiates individually but they also form groups where they negotiate. In international climate negotiations states do not usually negotiate in their regional groups but in groups representing their interests (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.). The groups are formed between governments with same ideas and approaches (Christensen 2011, 306). The host of the negotiations should be neutral to achieve the trust between negotiation parties (ibid., 319).

The main groups are the G77, the Umbrella Group, the European Union, and the Environmental Integrity Group (ibid., 306). In addition to these groups, there are several other groupings such as the Arab Group, group of countries of Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM), the Cartagena Dialogue, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the group of Brazil, South Africa, China and India (BASIC), the Like Minded Group, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations and Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.).

The group G77 and China consists of 133 developing countries. Nevertheless, the group members have different economic size and interests (ibid.). The subgroups of G77 are

groups such as emerging powers, the small island developing states (SIDS) and the least developed countries (LDCs), and OPEC oil-exporter countries (Christensen 2011, 306). Although the size of the economies, national circumstances and political interests of the members of the group may vary (see e.g. Okereke & Coventry 2016, 836–837), according to Christensen (2011, 307) the group is holding together because of their experiences after World War II. The group G77 consists mostly of former colonies which had only few possibilities to influence in creating international system. G77 countries have been regime-takers which unites the members of the group. (ibid.)

China, India, Brazil and South Africa are the members of the group emerging powers or group called BASIC. Emerging powers are states whose economy is growing and emissions increasing. For instance, the emissions of China are already bigger than those of USA. Emerging powers argue for fair emission reduction sharing and have an interest in technology cooperation. (Christensen 2011, 306; also UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.) As seen in the case of China, a country can belong to more than one group.

The group of small island developing states have approximately 40 low lying island state members and the least developed countries group have 48 member states (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.). The main interest of small island states and LDCs is to reduce emissions ambitiously and quickly (Christensen 2011, 306). These countries are being held as the most vulnerable countries to climate change. Even the existence of low-lying states is under threat due to rising sea levels. These groups speak for international climate support for adaptation to the changes climate change causes (ibid.).

OPEC group contain oil producer countries such as Saudi-Arabia. The group calls for scientific evidence for the demand of decreasing the consumption of fossil fuels. The group is concerned about the negative economic effects of the stricter climate governance for developing countries and calls for technical solutions for any action. (ibid., 307)

The Umbrella group is a loose group formed by non-EU developed countries (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.). These countries are the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and Ukraine (Christensen 2011, 307). Additionally, Kazakhstan can be seen as the member of the group (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.). The US, Japan, Canada and Australia share the same view to some extent, but Norway, Russia and Ukraine stay out of it. In Japan, the Kyoto Protocol was strongly criticized domestically because Japanese industry had to reduce its emissions while some of its competitors and

trading partners, such as China and the US, had no emission targets. As Japan was hosting the negotiations, it had no options to withdraw from the Protocol. Canada concerns about its overshoot of Kyoto commitment. Australia did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol at first but after all, ratified it in 2009. This created pressure over other developed countries, such as Canada and the US. In addition to Australia, New Zealand was ready to join the commitments in Copenhagen. Norway was also ready to make emission reduction commitments and provide finance for developing countries to reduce their emissions. Russia and Ukraine are called as “strategic sleepers” because they do not take actively part in the negotiations but are benefiting from being so called economies in transition. (Christensen 2011, 307)

The US is a central actor in the Umbrella group but also in the international climate negotiations and climate regime. It has been one of the largest emitters in the world for a long time but had not accepted to reduce its emissions. (ibid., 308) The United States has also criticized the idea of developing states’ right to develop (Okereke & Coventry 2016, 836–837).

The European Union member states negotiate as a regional group. The EU committed to 20% emission reductions by 2020 compared to the levels in the year 1990 by adopting a climate and energy package in 2009. Nevertheless, the interests of EU member states varied, and the package was agreed after difficult negotiations. Some new member states were concerned about the competitiveness of their economies and some larger states, such as France and Germany, faced pressure from the industrial sector in their country because the package meant stricter emission rules for instance for cars. (Christensen 2011, 309) Although the European Union is a party to the Convention, it does not have a separate vote apart of its member states (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.).

The states that belong to the Environmental Integrity Group are Mexico, South Korea and Switzerland (Christensen 2011, 309). Additionally, Liechtenstein and Monaco can be seen as members of the group (UNFCCC “Party Groupings”, n.d.). Although they form a group, its members primarily negotiate individually (Christensen 2011, 309).

3.2 The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement (PA) is a global climate agreement that builds upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; the Convention). The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4th of November 2016 (UNFCCC “The Paris Agreement”, n.d.). In April 2019, 185 of the 197 parties had ratified the Agreement (UNFCCC “Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification”, n.d.).

The main goal of the Paris Agreement is to strengthen global response to climate change. The Agreement aims to keep global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celcius above pre-industrial levels, increase adaptation ability, and mobilize climate finance (PA art. 2). To reach the goal, the Paris Agreement requires states to undertake ambitious climate change mitigation efforts and prepare, communicate and maintain nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (PA art. 4). NDCs shall be updated over years and progression shall be reported (PA art. 13). Additionally, the Paris Agreement requires the Conference of Parties to follow the global progression of implementation of the Agreement and towards the goal of the Agreement. This global stocktake will take place every five years to inform parties of the needed efforts (PA art. 14).

It should be noted that the Agreement does not obligate states to cut their emissions but to prepare nationally determined contributions and report their progression. Thus, the Agreement is based on the voluntarily set emission reduction targets by each country itself. According to Falkner (2016, 1119–1121), the Paris Agreement emphasizes national approach instead of global one and aims to create peer pressure to the end that states would strive to great emission reductions. Falkner (*ibid.*, 1112) argues that in this manner it was possible to get developing country group members China and India involved.

In the Paris Agreement, it is referred to developed countries and developing countries. The terms are not defined in the Paris Agreement but in the Convention. By developed countries it is meant the so-called Annex I countries. This group of countries consists of industrialized countries, the Baltic states, Central and Eastern European states and Russia. The Annex I countries are industrialized country parties who we members of the OECD in 1992 and the countries whose economies are in transition. Respectively, in the Paris Agreement, by the term developing countries it is referred to the group of non-Annex I

countries defined in the Convention. (UNFCCC “Parties & Observers”, n.d.; United Nations 1992)

The Paris Agreement is the first climate agreement that has brought all nations together to undertake efforts to combat climate change (UNFCCC “The Paris Agreement”, n.d.; Dimitrov 2016, 2). Before, global climate politics was governed by the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. I will briefly introduce these instruments and the background of the Paris Climate Conference to provide a historical framework for the Agreement and its negotiation process.

The negative impacts of the climate change have been noticed in international politics. The very first World Climate Conference of the United Nations took place in 1979 and 13 years later the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted. Since 1995, the parties of the Convention have met every year in the Conferences of the Parties (COP).

One of the main achievements of the Conferences of the Parties has been the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997. In the Protocol, most of the industrialized countries agreed of the legally binding greenhouse gas emission reductions and recognized the responsibility of developed countries to tackle climate change due to their previous industrial activity. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol stated the principle about the common but differentiated responsibilities. Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 and its first commitment period took place in 2008–2012. (UNFCCC “What is the Kyoto Protocol?”, n.d.)

In the Kyoto Protocol, binding emission reduction targets were set only to industrialized, so called Annex 1, countries (Falkner 2016, 1110). Kyoto Protocol thus reflects the polluter pays principle (Jinnah 2017, 290). Some of the most central terms of UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol concerning justice are the ‘common concern for mankind’, ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, ‘per capita emissions’, and ‘historical responsibility’ (Okereke & Coventry 2016, 836). In the 1990’s, also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) saw that developed countries should not restrain the development of the developing countries (ibid., 836).

Even though the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, it was not considered as a great success. During the first commitment period of the Protocol (2008–2012), United States, the biggest emitter at the time, dropped out of the Protocol. According to the US, it should

have been focused more on the current emissions than on the historical ones and thus, it is unfair that, for instance, China and India can avoid binding emission reduction targets (Okereke & Coventry 2016, 837). Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol did not manage to cut the rise of global emissions (Falkner 2016, 1110).

After adopting the Kyoto Protocol, international climate negotiations were not considered as successful. In 2009, there were high expectations towards COP held in Copenhagen. In Copenhagen, it was aimed to reach a binding agreement for the time after the first commitment period of Kyoto Protocol. However, the negotiations failed to reach a new agreement. One reason for the failure was the different views of the parties about how to define what is just in addressing climate change (Jinnah 2017, 286). Great powers, such as United States and China, could not be forced to reduce their emissions (Falkner 2016, 1107). Additionally, it was found politically challenging that big investments for emission reductions would be needed instantly but their benefits are not seen immediately but in medium- or long-term (ibid., 1109). Additionally, free rider – aim to benefit from the investments and emission reductions of others by doing nothing by itself – problem hindered negotiations and big investments in emission reductions (ibid., 1110).

In general, it has been challenging to start global emission reductions because the intensity of the effects of climate change vary between countries: in other countries the impacts are stronger and more easily seen than in the others. Additionally, the long-term effects of climate change cannot be precisely predicted. Due to these reasons, national interests towards emission reductions may significantly differ from each other. Governments have had to decide what are their national interests towards mitigation, and many of them have decided to follow the situation (Falkner 2016, 1110). Big emitter states have tended to free ride (Méjean et al. 2015).

After the disappointment of Copenhagen, the new global climate agreement was finally adopted in the Paris Climate Conference in 2015. The Paris Agreement was considered widely as a great political success. According to Falkner (2016, 1107), the Paris Agreement formed a new basis for international climate politics.

4 RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH METHOD

Traditionally, argumentation has been seen as giving, receiving, and assessing of arguments (e.g. Tindale 2004, 2–3). However, this description can be challenged as a too narrow approach as argumentation is used in multiple situations, such as negotiations and debates, for instance to persuade the audience, change views, explore meanings, develop concepts and achieve understanding. Adding the rhetorical perspective to the traditional approaches of argumentation will help to evaluate the arguments from a wider perspective, for instance, to open the context of the argumentation and the backgrounds of the arguers (*ibid.*, 6–7).

I chose the rhetorical analysis to the research method of this thesis because rhetoric is a way to market different solutions, affect people, and guide them to make wise decisions (Perelman 1996, 173). According to Kuusisto (1996, 270), marketing of the different solutions is done because people do not have a chance to rely on their own experiences and estimate alternative truths in every decision-making occasion precisely. Hence, they must choose among different explanations and meanings of events and issues in which they rely on. To help people make a choice, marketing a certain explanation can be used to legitimize an act. (*ibid.*) This is in the very core of politics and international climate negotiations. Negotiators aim to convince the audience and the other negotiators to support their point of view to reach their goal set for the negotiations (see also Kuusisto 1996).

In international climate negotiations, in other words in the field where there is no well-established policy, it is useful to study argumentation because it is necessary to argue for a claim only if it is not obvious or convincing for everybody (see Perelman 1996, 156). According to Perelman (*ibid.*, 178), argumentation and rhetoric play an important role when there is not obvious and universally applicable issue. Otherwise, there would not be need for argumentation. When communication is aiming to influence or shape the way of thinking of one or more persons, it is in the field of rhetoric (*ibid.*, 181).

In the international negotiations, values play a big role. It has been claimed that instead of being a financial issue, climate change is, actually, an ethical one because decision-making requires judging values (see e.g. Grubb 1995, 473; Gardiner 2010a, 3; Gardiner 2010b, 87). According to Gardiner (2010b, 87), science can offer information but in the

decision-making process, ethical considerations and weighting interests are playing a fundamental role. By studying argumentation, Perelman aimed to find an answer to the question if it is possible to make rational decisions about the value-based questions (see e.g. Summa 1996, 62–63). Values can also be used as a mean in argumentation. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 75), in argumentation in politics, it is usual to appeal to values to justify making certain choices before the audience. Hence, it is fruitful to apply rhetorical analysis as a research method in this thesis.

Not only has the approach of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) set the foundations for the modern rhetorical argumentation research (see e.g. Tindale 2004, 8) but also I see their approach useful for this thesis as their focus is in argumentation and its techniques as a use of language which consciously aim to convince (see also Summa 1996, 52). The approach developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is useful in this thesis because the statements given in the Leaders Event in Paris aim undoubtedly to influence other negotiators to reach the desired outcome in the Conference and convince the audience. I use the approach of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also because it focuses on the intention of the speaker instead of the effect on the audience as the focus of this thesis is in the views of states.

In the following subchapters, I introduce the main elements of the approach of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca to the rhetorical analysis. First, I introduce audience, secondly starting points of the argumentation, and third, move on to argumentation techniques. I finish the chapter with application of the method.

4.1 Audience

The aim of argumentation is to affect the audience, for instance, get or strengthen acceptance or support of the audience (Perelman 1996, 16). According to Perelman (*ibid.*, 16), argumentation never happens in an empty space because if the speaker is not listened to, the speech has no effects and the argumentation lacks a meaning. Audience is an important element in argumentation as the audience is finally the one who decides which one of the claims is more convincing (*ibid.*, 173).

Perelman (*ibid.*, 11– 12) and the approach of new rhetoric study presentations pointed to all kinds of audiences aimed to convince or persuade them. Argumentation analysis

focuses on how to add or reduce the credibility of a claim and how to achieve the acceptance of the audience (see Summa 1996, 66). However, in addition to the situations aimed to convince the audience, rhetoric can also be used to please and facilitate to accept beforehand known truths (Perelman 1996, 170).

Nevertheless, the audience can be difficult to define. According to Perelman (*ibid.*, 21), the audience contains everyone that the speaker wants to influence with their speech or anybody who can understand the orator (see also Summa 1996, 67). For Perelman (1996, 21), the audience can be the anything from a person him- or herself to the universal audience. In between the person him- or herself and the universal audience lies countless amount of special audiences (*ibid.*).

The means of argumentation are modified for the audience and the issue discussed because different audiences support different claims (*ibid.*, 20, 57). For instance, convincing large, even universal, audience requires convincing argumentation that is based on reasoning. The special audience can be convinced by persuasion and appealing to their special interests. By separation of the universal and the specific audiences Perelman aimed to separate the argumentation appealing to reason and to emotions (see e.g. Summa 1996, 67).

According to Perelman (1996, 24), when speaking to the universal audience, the speaker cannot base their argument on axioms that are widely accepted in a certain group. Instead, the speaker can attempt to find presumably universally accepted facts and appeal to them. In addition, the speaker can appeal to the common sense, common opinion, intuition or foregone conclusions supposing that the members of the universal audience all share the same intuitions and believe in same axioms (*ibid.*, 24). To be convincing, premises and arguments directed to universal audience should be generalizable to be acceptable to universal audience (*ibid.*, 25).

Summa (1996, 68) sees the universal audience of Perelman as a culturally, temporally and spatially bound standard. This standard is such as a value base of culture of universally applicable argumentation. It includes the issues which can be appealed on in discussing about values. It can also include the idea of moral: if argumentation achieves the acceptability of universal audience, in other words, if argumentation is acceptable for anybody, argumentation is moral (*ibid.*, 68).

However, the concept of universal audience cannot be applied in single occasions. Universal audience can be seen as a circular reasoning because the acceptance of the universal audience demands timeless and universally applicable issues but these issues cannot be figured out without knowing what is acceptable in different times (see Summa 1996, 69).

4.2 Acceptance of the premises - starting points of argumentation

Perelman's presumption is that in argumentation, there is a so-called mental connection between the speaker and the audience (Perelman 1996, 16). To avoid the negative reaction in the audience, the speaker must ensure that the audience accepts the premises, the basis of argumentation (ibid., 155). Hence, the speaker must modify his presentation suitable for the audience (ibid., 28) and do the selection of values and facts. The speaker describes and presents them and their value and meaning in his/her speech (ibid., 42).

Perelman (ibid., 28) states that in argumentation, after all, the orator's aim is to move the acceptance of premises to acceptance of conclusions. To move the acceptance of premises to the acceptance of conclusions, it is important for the speaker to choose the premises wisely. Premises should be ones which have got enough acceptance. Without sufficient acceptance, the speaker cannot succeed and he or she makes the mistake called *petitio principii*: begging the question. It means that assumptions are made without acceptance of them. (ibid., 28)

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 67) see that premises, or objects of agreement, can be divided into two classes: a class concerning the real and a class concerning the preferable. The class concerning the real includes facts, truths, and presumptions. Facts and truths are issues that can be supposed to have the acceptance of the universal audience. The class concerning the preferable includes values and hierarchies. They are pointed to a specific audience because they have a specific viewpoint about what is preferable. (ibid., 66–67)

I start with introducing facts, truths, and presumptions. After them, I move on to values and hierarchies.

4.2.1 Facts, truths, and presumptions

To reach universal audience, facts, truths and presumptions can be appealed to. By facts, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 67) mean issues that do not need argumentation. Facts have the position in which they do not require to be justified. Nevertheless, facts can lose their status as facts if the audience have doubts about the fact or if the audience has expanded and the new members of the audience do not accept the previously agreed fact (*ibid.*, 67). In argumentation, it can be seen that the fact has lost its status if it becomes the conclusion of an argumentation, not the starting point (*ibid.*, 68).

Even though facts and truths have similarities, they also differ from each other: facts cover smaller, more specific fields than truths. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (*ibid.*, 68–69), truths are wider entities and contain connections between facts. Hence, truths cover more complex and wider systems than facts. Both facts and truths can be applied as starting point of argumentation but not at the same time. Nevertheless, the choice between them must be made only if they are confronted (*ibid.*, 68–69).

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (*ibid.*, 69) see the separation of facts and truths beneficial in argumentation because sometimes in argumentation it is appealed to facts and in other times to wider systems. They point out that their goal is not to solve the philosophical discussion of the relationship of facts and truths, but they see separation of them useful because in argumentation it is sometimes appealed to the specific facts and sometimes to wider systems (*ibid.*).

In addition to facts and truths, presumptions can be starting points of argumentation (*ibid.*, 74). Usually presumptions consider what is normal. For instance, it is commonly presumed that people are telling the truth, and that the quality of an act is linked to the quality of the person who did it. It is presumed that the normal will happen or has happened if there are no doubts or proofs that the exceptional will happen or has happened (*ibid.*, 71). Agreement on presumptions has, supposedly, the same validity in front of the universal audience than the agreements of facts and truths thus the agreements are not easily distinguished from each other (*ibid.*, 73).

4.2.2 Values, hierarchies, and loci

In addition to facts, truths, and presumptions, also values, hierarchies and loci belong to the premises. With them, it can be appealed to the specific audience. In the words of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 74), values, hierarchies and loci are objects of the agreement of a specific group.

By appealing to different values, the acceptance of different audiences can be reached. However, also the acceptance of the universal audience can be reached by appealing to universal values such as truth, goodness, justice and beauty, but only if they are not defined. When defined or applied for a specific situation, disagreement arises and specific groups seem to be put against each other. After defining the universal value, the acceptance of the universal audience will be lost but the acceptance of the specific group reached. (Perelman 1996, 34)

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 77) see the distinction between abstract and concrete values: abstract values are, for instance, justice or truth and concrete values, for instance, France or Church. Concrete values are linked to unique entities, such as particular group or object (ibid.). Concrete and abstract values can be used as the foundation of the other one (ibid., 78).

In addition to values, hierarchies are used in argumentation. For instance, it can be argued that gods are superior to men. Concrete hierarchies can be justified using values (ibid., 80) but also values have hierarchies. For instance, justice over benefit (Perelman 1996, 36). Additionally, quantity can make the hierarchy. It is common that the greater amount of something is valued more than the smaller amount (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 81).

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid., 81) see value hierarchies as more important than the actual values because many audiences share most of the values with each other. Nevertheless, there are differences in ranking them between the audiences. Additionally, the degree of their acceptance can vary between different audiences. (ibid., 81)

Premises of a very general nature are called loci (see ibid., 83). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid., 85) discuss loci of quantity, quality, order, the existing, essence, and the person. In general, by loci Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca mean criteria that are detached

from the content of an argument. Loci are already accepted by the audience and they can be used to convince the audience of a previously unfamiliar argumentation.

4.3 Argumentation techniques

As stated earlier in this thesis, the aim of argumentation is to affect the audience, for instance get or strengthen acceptance or support of the audience (see Perelman 1996). If there is a lack of acceptance of the premises, it can be strengthened by strengthening the presence of the premises and by amplifying the meaning and weight of them among the audience (ibid., 155). Instead of the lack of acceptance of the premises, the problem may be the weakness of the argument. In argumentation, after comparing the arguments for and against the claim, one claim can be chosen over the other one (ibid., 58).

In aiming to convince or persuade the audience, different argumentation techniques can be used. Perelman (ibid.) divides argumentation techniques into associative and dissociative techniques according to the arguments presented. By associative techniques Perelman (ibid.) refers to the techniques by which the acceptance of the premise is transferred to conclusions. By dissociative techniques Perelman (ibid.) refers to the techniques by which the audience is aimed to convince by separating the elements that have previously been connected.

In the following subchapters, I start with introducing three associative techniques: quasi-logical arguments, appeals to reality, and establishing the real. After them, I introduce dissociative techniques.

4.3.1 Quasi-logical arguments

Quasi-logical arguments have similarities with formal reasoning. Nevertheless, although they may seem they follow logics, they have inconsistencies. To be logical arguments, all the terms used in argumentation should be precisely defined and to have only one meaning, in other words, the possibility to interpret terms in more than one way should be removed (Perelman 1996, 62). In the quasi-logical arguments, there is a possibility to interpret used terms in different ways. According to Perelman (ibid., 72), when something can be defined in more than a one way, the definition of it requires choosing. The quasi-logical arguments are not, thus, incorrect logical arguments but weaker or stronger arguments depending on the other arguments stated with them (ibid., 62).

Choosing of the definition is needed in the case that a quasi-logical argument contains incompatibilities or discrepancies (Perelman 1996, 63). In the case of incompatibility in the argument, it is usual to remove it for instance by interpreting the claim in the way in which it is not absurd because it is not supposed to hear absurdities from the other person (ibid., 63). However, using an apparent discrepancy can be a mean to attach several meanings to a term (ibid., 74).

In quasi-logical argumentation, also reciprocity-argument can be used. In this argument, the two situations or creatures are equated. In other words, the situations or creatures are assumed to be symmetrical. This equation is used to justify same action in both situations or concerning the two creatures (ibid., 81). However, Perelman (ibid., 81–83) points out that which applied to the entity, does not necessarily apply to its parts or vice versa.

In quasi-logical argumentation, also two issues can be compared to one on another. Then, the two issues are thought to be in the same category. This can uplift the other and lower the another. When comparing in quasi-logical argumentation, the issue can be compared to another using its relative size, not by numbers (ibid., 86–89). In addition, comparison can be used to belittle something.

In summary, quasi-logical arguments may seem logical but are not due to the possibility to interpret the terms in multiple ways and to question the arguments after analyzing them. Thus, the logic of these arguments is purely illusory as Gross and Dearin (2010, 44) state, but despite, it can serve the goal of the arguer.

4.3.2 Arguments appealing to reality

Arguments appealing to reality are based on the relationships of the different parts of the reality (Perelman 1996, 60). In arguments appealing to reality, it is usually appealed to succession for instance cause and effect, or coexistence, for instance relationship between a person and his acts (ibid., 93). First, I introduce relations of succession and then, relations of coexistence.

According to Perelman (ibid., 93–94), relations of succession can be applied in searching the causes, noting the effects or valuing the fact by its effects. A phenomenon can be explained with relations of succession. When correlations, natural laws or other similar

principles are accepted, the hypotheses can be made and verified (Perelman 1996, 93–94).

An argument is called as a pragmatic argument when the act is judged by its consequences. The orator aims to make use of the positive or negative relation of the audience towards the act, event or circumstance in his/her argumentation. Nevertheless, acts can have various effects both good and bad, and it is not clear when one act alone has caused a specific effect. (ibid., 94–96) Thus, the argumentation cannot be claimed to be logic.

The same series of causality can be seen through causes and effects but also through means to achieve a specific goal. Then the acts can be seen as intentional. A mean can also change to be a goal or vice versa. (ibid., 96–98)

In addition to relations of succession, also the relations of coexistence can be used to appeal to reality. Instead sequential relations, the relations of coexistence attach phenomena from different levels (ibid., 102–104). It is not clear which one came before the other one. For instance, it is controversial if a person is shaped by his or her acts or if his or her acts shape the person. Nevertheless, Perelman (ibid., 102–104) states that a person is the actor of his/her acts and that shapes our view of him/her. The act-person connection creates a model for other arguments appealing to coexistence: for instance, it can be thought that a member of a group reflects the characteristics of the group (Gross & Dearin 2010, 59-60).

4.3.3 Arguments establishing the real

In arguments establishing the real, the specific situation is made to be a precedent, a model or a general rule (Perelman 1996, 60–61). The argumentation can thus be based on it. When arguing with an example, it is denied that the situation would be unique: the aim is to reach a rule or structure on which it is based (ibid., 120). By presenting more examples of the similar occasions, generalization is made.

When the rule has already been accepted, it can be illustrated with examples. Illustration makes a rule more present before the audience (ibid., 122). According to Gross and Dearin (2010, 74), well-chosen examples, illustrations, and models can switch the total perspective of the issue under discussion.

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971), analogical reasoning is among the most important elements of any argumentation as it can make audience prefer one hypothesis over the another. By analogy, it is referred to prove the similarity of two issues with the following formula: A is to B as C is to D (Gross & Dearin 2010, 74–75).

Analogy is used to build a view of the real for the audience and aim to convince them about it. As a mean, it connects elements that have previously been thought to be independent from each other. However, it is the audience that finally decides to accept the claim or not. (Gross & Dearin 2010, 78; Perelman 1996)

4.3.4 Dissociation

Dissociation structures the information in a new way (Perelman 1996, 61). By dissociation techniques, it is referred to affirming the audience about that the certain elements should remain as separate ones or breaking the connecting links between two elements (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 411).

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (*ibid.*, 411–412) see breaking connecting links and dissociation as different issues. When breaking connecting links, it is denied that the link or connection between two issues exists. It can be stated that two elements are connected incorrectly. In dissociation, the elements of a single conception are not only separated from each other but also the structure of them is modified (*ibid.*, 412). Nevertheless, the division of these terms can be debatable, and some people can see dissociation where others see only breaking the connecting links (*ibid.*, 411–412).

4.4 Application of the method

According to Kuusisto (1996, 269), the speeches of the world leaders shape the reality of the big audience. In the speeches, the complex issue is usually given a simple explanation and connected to something familiar. In addition, actors are named and meanings are given to certain events. (*ibid.*, 269) Thus, the speeches of the heads of state and government include not only empty words but they take part in shaping the reality of the audience. Rhetoric and narratives are used to organize the world and define the roles and status of different actors (*ibid.*, 271).

I studied the statements given in the Leaders Event as an embodiment of rhetoric in COP21 even though the statements given in the Leaders Event are not detached statements of the political agenda of the state. I focused on finding the means to argue for participation of different actors. I aimed to reach the answer to my research question “In the state level, what is universally seen as a just approach to climate change mitigation?” by firstly going through the statements and scanning what actors were mentioned. Secondly, I categorized claims presented in world leaders’ statements into the groups named after previously recognized actors: developed countries, all states, stakeholders, and common but differentiated participation of all states. Finally, I studied the claims presented for the participation of the specific group.

In the analysis of the chosen statements I made use of starting points of argumentation of Perelman. After categorizing the statements of countries and their claims in previously mentioned groups, I analyzed what was argued for and what was presented as a fact or truth, if the statement was aiming to convince or please the audience, and what was the assumed audience. I picked up the claims that presented different points of view of why the group of actors under examination should participate in global climate change mitigation.

In the analysis presented in the following chapters, I refer to and quote multiple statements. I decided not to choose only one of the statements to be an example of a specific argumentation because no statement belonged clearly to one group only. For instance, in the same statement, it might have been argued for reaching global climate agreement binding to all countries and appealing all states to submit INDCs, but later, argued for developed countries to take the lead and referred to the participation of non-state actors. Additionally, in general, statements were short so to include more than one statement into deeper analysis made it possible to reach more different points of view to the analysis and gain the wider view of the phenomenon under examination. Studying only one statement would not have been enough to open up the versatility of the studied phenomenon.

After analyzing the statements given in the Leaders Event, I analyzed the Paris Agreement applying the same steps: first, focusing on the named actors and then, getting deeper into analyzing the starting points of the argumentation and argumentation techniques.

In the following chapters I analyze the arguments for the participation of developing countries, all states, stakeholders, and common but differentiated participation of states in climate change mitigation. I study the starting points of the argumentation and the argumentation techniques used and apply the findings to the previous research of participation in climate change mitigation.

5 ARGUMENTATION FOR PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The argumentation for the participation of developed countries in climate change mitigation aimed to convince the audience on two issues: on the one hand, why developed countries should act and on the second hand, why developing countries should not. In general, the argumentation for participation of developed countries was based on the dissociation of developed and the developing countries. In the argumentation, the differences were found for instance on the historical responsibility and ability of the developed and developing country groups. The groups were seen as internally homogenous: the heterogeneity within the groups was not mentioned in the statements.

In the following subchapters I analyze world leaders' argumentation for the participation of developed countries. I start with analyzing arguments appealing to historical responsibility, continue with arguments appealing to ability and finish with the reasoning why developing countries should not participate in global climate change mitigation.

5.1 Historical responsibility

Historical emissions and historical responsibility were among the main arguments presented in the statements of world leaders to support the participation of developed countries in climate change mitigation. Both developed and developing countries appealed to historical emissions but, however, to reach different objectives. I will discuss this below.

In appealing to historical responsibility, one of the determining elements was that the historical emissions were presented as apolitical facts. In the argumentation, quasi-logical arguments were presented: it was argued, or even presented as a truth, that great historical emissions lead to responsibility to address climate change. For instance, in the statement of Germany, it was stated as the following:

Fair [agreement] means that the industrialised countries have to play a leading role as regards the development of decarbonisation technologies. It was us who caused the emissions of the past. Now we have to develop the technology needed to reduce emissions in the future and to make it possible for

developing countries to reduce their emissions. (Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, 30.11.2015)

Germany appealed to historical responsibility of industrialized countries to convince the audience about that they should help developing countries by developing new technologies. In terms of Perelman, Germany used an argument appealing to reality by appealing to succession: causing emissions in the past causes responsibility to industrialized countries to take the leading role in technology development and help developing countries to reduce their emissions.

It should be noted that Germany did not talk about emission reductions or fulfilling responsibilities but instead, emphasized developed countries developing technology, taking the leading role, and helping developing countries. According to Okereke and Coventry (2016, 837), this is typical for developed countries: if they happen to agree that they should cut their emissions, they prefer to refer to their technological and economic capabilities instead of culpability of causing climate change.

Differing from argumentation of developed countries, southern negotiators use the “multiple sin” types of arguments (see Kortetmäki 2013). Southern negotiators often require emission reduction and adaptation support from northern countries. Additionally, southern countries require the right to develop and economic growth without emission reduction obligations. (ibid., 79) This was also present in the statements of the world leaders.

Developed country parties over the years through Conference of Parties have been called upon to provide political leadership in climate change taking into consideration their historical responsibility. We must categorically state that they have failed to take the lead especially in reforming their industrial processes. As a result the world is suffering from the impacts of climate change. (President of Botswana Seretse Khama Ian Khama, 30.11.2015)

They [industrialized countries] have accepted their historical responsibilities in contributing to the precarious climate environment we currently live in. Their record, to date, in living up to their obligations and commitments under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, has been well below expectations. (President of Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 30.11.2015)

Like Germany, also Zimbabwe and Botswana appealed to the historical responsibility of industrialized states to take the lead in climate change mitigation. However, Zimbabwe and Botswana based their argumentation on the claim that industrialized countries had not met their current emission reduction obligations and commitments and argued for the

instant implementation of the previously agreed obligations and commitments. For instance, Botswana appealed to succession, “cause and effect” reasoning, in its statement. Botswana claimed that due to industrialized countries’ fail to meet their obligations, the world is now struggling with the effects of climate change. In the statements of Botswana and Zimbabwe, emission reduction obligations were seen as apolitical, top-down commitment that is not to open for discussion but a responsibility to be fulfilled.

The historical responsibility argument was not only used to convince industrialized states to develop new technologies and meet their obligations, but also to provide adaptation help to developing countries.

Mr. President, we are not the cause of climate change. Those who have a historical responsibility for the problem have a moral responsibility to fix it. They must help us adapt to the unrelenting and inevitable consequences already unleashed by the greed and abuse of the resources of our planet. (Prime Minister of Saint Lucia Kenny D. Anthony, 30.11.2015)

For instance, Saint Lucia appealed to historical responsibility to convince industrialized states to help vulnerable countries to adapt the effects of climate change. Saint Lucia did not blame industrialized countries directly for causing climate change and the suffering its effects have caused. However, Saint Lucia blamed industrialized countries indirectly for greed and abuse of resources. Saint Lucia used dissociation as an argumentation technique in its statement: it separated the “innocent” ones and the responsible ones from each other.

It should be noted that Saint Lucia did not appeal to historical responsibility to convince industrialized countries to cut their emissions or help developing countries to cut theirs but to convince industrialized countries to provide adaptation help for developing countries. The argument of Saint Lucia is a good example of the wider understanding of the participation in global climate change policy as in its statement, Saint Lucia did not focus solely on the emission reductions.

It was also appealed to historical responsibility in order to convince industrialized big emitter states to agree on the new global climate agreement. For instance, Dominican Republic appealed directly to the developed countries:

Es el momento para que los países desarrollados que aún no han anunciado recortes significativos, den un paso al frente y acepten su responsabilidad histórica. Y el momento también de que los grandes países emergentes, que

emiten un creciente porcentaje del CO₂, asuman su nuevo papel ante la comunidad internacional. (President of Dominican Republic Danilo Medina Sánchez, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, Dominican Republic appealed to the industrialized countries to announce significant emission reductions and agree on the new global agreement. Dominican Republic used the increasing amounts of emissions of developed countries as a justification to accept the new climate agreement. In the statement of Dominican Republic, it could be read that the state saw industrialized countries as guilty ones to the failures of global climate negotiations.

5.2 Ability

In addition to historical responsibility, in the argumentation for the participation of developed countries, it was appealed to the greater ability of industrialized countries to tackle climate change. In this argumentation, it was made use of hierarchies and quasi-logical argumentation: it was claimed that the capacities to tackle climate change turns into responsibility to reduce emissions.

We therefore urge industrialized nations to make deep and urgent greenhouse-gas emission cuts. Countries in a position to do so should generously contribute to climate finance that is both accessible to small island developing and vulnerable states as defined under the Convention. (Prime Minister of Fiji Josaia Vorege Bainimarama, 30.11.2015)

In accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, developed countries which, we have to recall, have the historic responsibility for climate change and which have the necessary financial and technological capacities. These countries must set an example by substantially reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. (President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh, 30.11.2015)

For instance, Fiji and Djibouti based their argumentation on the greater ability of industrialized countries to reduce emissions. In their argumentation, Fiji and Djibouti made use of hierarchies by categorizing states according to their capacities to tackle climate change. Djibouti referred especially to financial and technological capacities. In its statement, Djibouti used quasi-logical argumentation to justify the need of developed countries to reduce emissions and take the lead: Djibouti argued that due to their historical responsibility and financial and technological capacity, developed countries must reduce their emissions and take the lead in climate change mitigation.

Differing from Djibouti, Fiji based its argument on authority: the Convention. By appealing to the authority, Fiji aimed to depoliticize the discussion of whether or not industrialized countries should participate in global climate change mitigation.

5.3 Because developing countries should not

In addition to arguments of historical responsibility and ability, the audience was tried to convince by arguing why developing countries should not be obligated to participate in global climate change mitigation. In the argumentation, the justification of why developing countries should not participate in climate change mitigation turned into the claim that developed countries should participate. This argumentation technique was not used among developed countries.

In this argumentation, it was argued that due to limited ability, small contribution to global emissions and causing climate change, and the need to develop and tackle poverty, developing countries should not participate in climate change mitigation. For instance, in its statement, Zimbabwe presented as a fact that African countries have contributed less to global emissions and hence, causing climate change.

Developed countries must assume their leading role in combating climate change. [...] African countries have collectively pledged mitigation efforts up to 2020 that exceed those of developed countries. We have done so, in spite of the fact that we contribute less to climate change, and in spite of our limited capacities to withstand its destructive effects. We cannot, and we will not, assume more obligations. Doing so will dent our development aspirations and, in particular, our efforts to eradicate poverty. (President of Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 30.11.2015)

Zimbabwe aimed to convince the audience by using quasi-logical argumentation: Zimbabwe claimed that if developing countries are assumed more obligations, it will undermine the development of developing countries and have negative impacts in poverty reduction. By this claim, Zimbabwe argued indirectly for the participation of developed countries.

In the statements in which it was appealed to reasons why developing countries should not be obligated to participate in global climate change mitigation, the global North and the South, and thus, developed and developing countries, were dissociated from each other.

Africa with a contribution to emissions of 2% is like a victim. It is victim of the greenhouse gases of developed countries so the polluters have to pay according to the universally admitted principle of the polluter pays [...]. (President of Niger Issoufou Mahamadou, 30.11.2015)

For instance, in the statement of Niger, African countries were presented as victims, and thus, strongly dissociated from developed countries. In its statement, Niger used a quasi-logical argument by stating that the act of polluting leads to responsibility to pay. Niger aimed to strengthen its argument by appealing the commonly known principle of polluter pays. Niger also made use of hierarchies in its argumentation: it claimed that only 2% of the global emissions are emitted in African countries making the statement that the bigger amount, 98%, of the global emissions, are emitted in other countries. However, Niger did not specify what industrialized countries should pay for: in its the argument, it was only stated that industrialized countries should bear their responsibility. According to Perelman (1996), leaving the statements undefined can be used to convince a wide, even universal, audience. This might have been the aim of Niger.

5.4 Possibilities

In addition to appealing to the guiltiness of industrialized countries, their historical responsibility, and greater ability, the audience was also aimed to convince by appealing to possibilities that addressing climate change provides. However, this argumentation was rarely used in the statements given in the Leaders Event.

However, the onus is clearly on the industrialised nations to give us a fighting change. It is, of course, a moral imperative. But these nations should also realise that the sooner they refigure their economies to wean themselves off carbon, the better they too will be. Because they are merely delaying the inevitable day of reckoning. It is simply not sustainable economically and environmentally and actually undermines the potential for future growth. (Prime Minister of Fiji Josaia Vorege Bainimarama, 30.11.2015)

If, for instance, Zimbabwe associated climate change mitigation with responsibility and obligations of industrialized countries, Fiji associated it with opportunities, wellbeing and growth: in general, with the common good. In its argumentation, Fiji aimed to convince the audience by appealing to succession: according to Fiji, creating a low-carbon economy will lead to increase in well-being. However, the argument of Fiji also included the presumption that if developed countries do not take the chance, they will cause irreversible harm to others.

In summary, for the participation of developed countries, it was appealed to their historical responsibility, greater ability, the issues due to which developing countries should not participate, and the possibilities that addressing climate change offers. In the next chapter, I analyze the argumentation for participation of all states.

6 ARGUMENTATION FOR PARTICIPATION OF ALL STATES

The argumentation for the participation of all countries aimed to convince the audience of the need of all states to make effort to address climate change, reach global climate agreement, and set national emission reduction targets. In general, in the the statements given to support participation of all states, the need for common effort, collaboration and global participation were emphasized. Hence, arguers shared the presumption of the need of the participation of all states in order to address climate change. However, the claims for participation of all states should be separated from the claims for common but differentiated participation analyzed in the chapter 7 of this thesis.

In the following subchapters, I analyze argumentation for the participation of all states. I start with analyzing arguments appealing to global nature of the challenge and continue with analyzing arguments appealing to improving the conditions in poor and vulnerable countries and finish with the analysis of arguments appealing to fulfilling responsibilities.

6.1 Global nature of the challenge

In the argumentation for participation of all states, it was often appealed to the global nature of climate change. Arguments appealing to the global nature of the challenge aimed to convince the audience that it is necessary for all states to act to promote common good and address the common challenge. The arguments shared the presumption about the global nature of the problem and thus, also the need for global collaboration to address it.

Just as it is necessary to be united in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism and radicalism, we must also stand united in our efforts to reach a climate agreement. (President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gjorge Ivanov, 30.11.2015)

Mr. president, ladies and gentlemen, we are fighting a battle. A battle against ourselves and against time. Our battle where we need the world to stand together if we are to win. And in order to win, we need action now. [...] Mr. president, ladies and gentlemen, we can win this battle but we can win only if we truly, truly want to win and only if we act with solidarity and with unity as a global family. But we cannot delay, we must not delay. The time for action is now. (Prime Minister of Cook Islands Henry Puna, 30.11.2015)

Macedonia and Cook Islands, for instance, argued for global cooperation by basing their arguments in the global nature of the climate change. For instance, Macedonia aimed to convince the audience of the need to act together by appealing to the latest terroristic attack happened in France 2 weeks before the Paris Climate Conference. In terms of Perelman (1996), this is called an argument establishing the real. By associating climate change with the recent terroristic attack, Macedonia aimed to make a general rule about how to act in case of global problems: by standing united. In the case of climate change negotiations, Macedonia appealed to uniting for reaching the global climate agreement. In addition to Macedonia, also Cook Islands had chosen to use fight related words. To convince the audience, Cook Islands appealed to universal values such as common good and solidarity, and concrete values, such as family. Collaboration and participation of all states was presented as a vital tool to reach the objective or “win”, as Cook Islands stated.

Climate change is unquestionably the largest challenge faced by humanity to its scale and impact it has on people’s lives. The preservation of the climate system is therefore at the heart of the international community’s concerns. Combating the causes and mitigating the effects of this phenomenon requires efforts by each one of us. So it is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a level that would permit us to achieve the objective of the convention. [...] Ladies and gentlemen, the republic of Angola wants to send a clear message here which aims to call up on all the nations of the world to together ensure the protection and preservation of the climate system which is a precious commodity upon which humanity depends. (Vice-President of Angola Manuel Domingos Vicente, 30.11.2015)

In addition to Macedonia and Cook Islands, Angola based its statement on the global nature of the problem. As Macedonia, also Angola presented the claim as an unquestionable truth. Thus, both Macedonia and Angola had the presumption that the claim – in this case the global nature of climate change – is already commonly agreed among the audience. Hence, there was no need to argue for it (see Perelman 1996, 156). However, what was not yet widely accept and hence, needed to be argued according to the statement of Angola, was global participation and collaboration in climate change mitigation. As Angola saw a need to argue for global participation and collaboration in climate change mitigation, Angola did not see addressing climate change and taking part in global climate change mitigation as a widely accepted truth (see *ibid.*, 156).

Argumentation for participation of all states included a presumption of that all countries do not act for common good – climate change mitigation – yet.

We have not caused climate change. We cannot solve it on our own. [...] We need global partnership and cooperation to overcome climate change. We are ready to be true partners, to chip in. We already announced we will create a carbon neutral economy, reducing emissions by 64 percent by 2030. Many agree that this is more than our fair share. We need to see matching actions and support from our partners. (Prime Minister of Ethiopia Hailemariam Dessalegn, 30.11.2015)

For instance, in its statement, Ethiopia appealed to its small global impact and used it to argue for the participation and cooperation of all states to address climate change. Ethiopia shared the assumption of the common challenge but argued that global cooperation and participation of all states is necessary by hierarchizing states based on the amount of their historical emissions. It should be noted that appealing to small emissions of a country can also be used to argue for participation of industrialized countries (see chapter 5 of this thesis). However, even though Ethiopia used hierarchies in its argumentation, it also unwound them by calling other states partners and presenting itself as an ambitious emission reducer instead of a small, poor and powerless country.

Additionally, in the argumentation for participation of all states, audience was appealed to by arguing for reaching the new climate agreement. In these arguments, it was indirectly made use of the previously failed attempts to reach a new climate agreement to push delegates to reach the new agreement. Behind these arguments, there was a strong will to reach the new agreement.

Angola among many other speakers in the Leaders Event argued for the climate agreement that would include all states. Often the need for the new climate agreement was left without reasoning which also tells about the strong will to reach the new agreement among states. However, the need for participation of all states was aimed to justify in order to convince the audience.

As demonstrated by the intergovernmental panel on climate change IPCC, the causes of climate change are linked to human activity. It is therefore at our level that we can reverse the deterioration process which already affects us. It is vital that this conference achieves an adoption of an ambitious and legally binding agreement for all the parties. (Vice-President of Angola Manuel Domingos Vicente, 30.11.2015)

Here in Paris Australia supports a new – and truly global – climate agreement. (Prime Minister of Australia Malcom Bligh Turnbull, 30.11.2015)

Yes - here in Paris, we must reach a comprehensive, legally binding agreement that will hold the increase in global average warming to below 2

degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. All economies, both developed and developing countries, as well as major emitters must be part of this agreement. Only such universal participation under the new agreement can bring a real change of the current growing trends in greenhouse gas emissions which contribute to climate change. (Prime Minister of Czech Republic Bohuslav Sobotka, 30.11.2015)

In the statement of Angola, the participation of all the parties was associated with ambitiousness and success. For instance, to support the argument, Angola stated as a fact that there is a link between human activity and the causes of climate change. Angola aimed to strengthen this claim by appealing to authority, IPCC. To justify why it is vital to adopt the agreement that includes all the parties, Angola formed a quasi-logical argument and stated that due to the link between the impacts of climate change and human activity, the direction of the process can be changed.

In addition to Angola, also Comoros argued for participation of all countries and saw it as vital. However, Comoros did not associate the need for cooperation with success but with necessity and urgency.

We must accept the reality. The climate change is progressing more quickly than international climate change negotiations. We therefore must do things differently, we need to act quickly, we need to prioritize the global interest through the adoption here in Paris of a global ambitious and legally binding agreement which should be applicable to all parties in order to keep the temperature rise under 2 degrees. Time is running out. (President of Comoros Ikililou Dhoinine, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, Comoros used a quasi-logical argument and stated that if “we” do not prioritize the global good and adopt a global agreement, the global temperature rise will exceed 2 degrees Celcius. Hence, Comoros casted adopting an agreement applicable to all states as a must, even as a truth or a fact, if the goal of 2 degrees Celcius is wanted to reach.

According to Smith (2007, 203), industrialized states can appeal to the global nature of the problem to cast developing states as the ones that are not taking responsibility for a global problem. However, in the statements appealing to the global nature of the climate change problem, this was not often the case as many of the arguers were developing countries. By these states, appealing to the global nature of the problem was used to convince the other states to join the arguer state to act to tackle the common problem.

Participation of all was also associated with the common good in the statements given in Leaders Event. For instance, Sri Lanka stated:

We must seize this unique opportunity in Paris to create a turning point by recognising our universal responsibility to protect and safeguard our fragile planet for the benefit of all. (President of Sri Lanka Maithripala Sirisena, 30.11.2015)

By appealing to the common good the orators, such as Sri Lanka, aimed to reach the acceptance of the universal audience. By appealing to commonly accepted values, orators aimed to reach the acceptance of the largest audience possible (see Perelman 1996).

6.2 Improving conditions in poor and vulnerable countries

In addition to global nature of the challenge, argumentation for participation of all states was also used to justify by appealing to improving the conditions in developing countries.

We feel that all nations should cooperate to forge policies that could ensure sustainable economically viable and environmentally balanced development, so is, to guarantee all people's the right to development. (Vice-President of Angola Manuel Domingos Vicente, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, Angola claimed that all states should cooperate to ensure and promote development. Angola aimed to strengthen its claim by appealing to globally accepted authority – human rights. By not defining the right to development, Angola aimed to convince large, even universal audience, as according to Perelman (1996, 34), value stays universal if not defined.

We are here today because we committed to it already at Rio summit in 1992. We committed to fight together the negative impacts of climate change on the life of our planet Earth. Guinea-Bissau believes that the time has definitely come to implement the climate program by adopting an international commitment to collective action with the follow up to common objectives and affective sharing of responsibilities amongst international players." [...] "We were considered by the gap 2013 adaptation report on Africa as being the first most vulnerable African country and the second country the most vulnerable in the world to climate change. This is, therefore, the main reason why Guinea-Bissau is ready and indeed wants to contribute to the global efforts to reduce greenhouse gases between now and the end of the century. (President of Guinea-Bissau José Mário Vaz, 30.11.2015)

Mr. president, my country is a small country. In fact on the world map, it is a series of small dots in the vast Pacific ocean. We didn't cause the environmental problems of today but we want to be part of the solutions. [...]

Mr. president, although we face a lot of problems being on the frontline of climate change, we aspire to do more as we have outlined in our submitted INDCs. (Prime Minister of Cook Islands Henry Puna, 30.11.2015)

In addition to Angola, also Guinea-Bissau based its argument for participation of all states in climate change mitigation on improving the conditions in developing countries. However, Guinea-Bissau appealed to reducing vulnerability instead of appealing to the right to development (cf. statement of Angola). What should be noted is that Guinea-Bissau used the same argumentation technique than Ethiopia. Both countries aimed to justify their claims using the presumption that was usually used to reach an opposing objective. For instance, Guinea-Bissau used its vulnerability to justify its participation in climate change mitigation whereas in other statements, small emissions and high level of vulnerability were used to convince the audience about the need for releasing them from the obligations (e.g. statements of Saint Lucia and Zimbabwe). Also Cook Islands used the small size of the country and the negative impacts of climate change it has faced to argue for its participation in addressing the global problem, not to withdraw itself from the active actors. Hence, the participation of all states could also be justified by the means that usually were used to justify the claims for participation of industrialized countries. This reveals that the starting points of the argumentation play a significant role in argumentation in general and in international climate negotiations.

6.3 Fulfilling responsibilities

For the participation of all states, it was also argued by appealing responsibilities. These arguments shared the presumption that addressing climate change is not a political, debatable issue but a previously agreed responsibility that needs to be fulfilled.

Combating the causes and mitigating the effects of this phenomenon requires efforts by each one of us. So it is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a level that would permit us to achieve the objective of the convention. (Vice-President of Angola Manuel Domingos Vicente, 30.11.2015)

For instance, Angola aimed to justify the claim of the need for efforts from every state by appealing to the authority: the UNFCCC. Angola used quasi-logical argumentation by arguing that to achieve the objectives of the convention, global action is necessary. Angola stated UNFCCC above the states in the hierarchy: UNFCCC states the objectives and states act as implementers of the emission reductions decided on the higher level of

authority. By appealing to the higher authority or responsibilities, a complex political issue is presented as a simple one.

In addition to Angola, also Mongolia appealed to the duties to convince the audience. Mongolia argued that the currently living own the safe planet to the next generation.

For the first time in human history, more than 150 heads of state and government gathered today in one spot. For the first time we have come together to agree on the epic-scale contract to save the mother-earth. It is our shared duty to hand over our one blue planet, safe and sound, to our next generation. (President of Mongolia Elbegdorj Tsakhia, 30.11.2015)

By appealing to the duty to save the planet for next generations, Mongolia aimed to justify efforts to reach the new climate agreement and appeal to the delegates. Mongolia presented the on-going negotiations as a unique opportunity for the delegates to reach the new agreement. However, Mongolia appealed also to the common good: to safe planet. However, Mongolia associated the unique opportunity and promoting common good with duties: actually, there is no choice but a must to protect the planet. By this argumentation, the audience was aimed to convince of the need of participation of all states to reach the new climate agreement and to address climate change.

7 ARGUMENTATION FOR COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED PARTICIPATION

The argumentation for common but differentiated participation had common elements with the argumentation for the participation of all states as they both shared the presumption of that all states should participate in climate change mitigation. However, the argumentations for participation of all states and for common but differentiated participation differed from each other: in the argumentation for global participation, it was focused on the need of participation of all states but common but in the argumentation for differentiated participation, it was focused on creating differences between states. Hence, I decided to analyze the argumentation for common but differentiated participation of all states separately from the argumentation for participation of all states.

As analyzed in the previous chapter, in argumentation for participation of all states, common good, cooperation and global effort were emphasized. Instead, in argumentation for common but differentiated participation, the categorization of states was used as a starting point of the argumentation.

[...] the outcome of this conference must be ambitious, legally binding, and must ensure global participation. Further, it must take into consideration, these special circumstances and needs of those countries that are most vulnerable: small island developing states, least developed and low-lying states [...]. (Prime Minister of Barbados Freundel Stuart, 30.11.2015)

For instance, in its statement, Barbados categorized states according to their assumed special circumstances, needs and vulnerability. Barbados assumed that small island developing states, least developed states and low-lying states belong to the group of most vulnerable states. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 66–67) call this as a premise to the argument concerning the preferable. In argumentation, premises concerning the preferable are used to reach a specific audience: the order of the issues in the hierarchy can be arranged to please the audience of the moment.

In the following subchapters I analyze argumentation for common but differentiated participation. I start with analyzing arguments appealing to differences in capabilities, continue with arguments appealing to differences in historical responsibility and finish with argumentation based on the claim about effectiveness and common good.

7.1 Differences in capabilities and resources

In the statements given in the Leaders Event in COP21, it was common to justify the claim for differentiated participation by appealing to the different capabilities of states. This point of view was based on categorization of states according to their capabilities: one of the starting points of the argumentation and presumptions was that there are differences in the capabilities of states.

The responsibilities and obligations should be allocated to parties not only on the basis of their greenhouse gas emissions, but also considering their capacities and the gross domestic product. Countries that largely contribute to emissions and have the economic strength to undertake measures, must take more ambitious goals. At the same time, we need to find a way to jointly assist the least developed countries meet the requirements of a new climate agreement. (Prime Minister of Croatia Zoran Milanovic, 30.11.2015)

For instance, Croatia associated big emitter and economically strong states with the need to set ambitious goals, and the least developed countries with the need of support. In its statement, Croatia presumed that big emitter states are also economically strong and able to undertake climate change mitigation measures. Croatia presumed that the economic strength automatically means ability to undertake measures to tackle climate change. Additionally, in the statement of Croatia, the least developed countries were assumed to not be able to meet the requirements of the new climate agreement without any assistance due to their limited capacities.

Among many other states, Netherlands shared the presumption that the capabilities differ among states. However, differing from Croatia, Netherlands emphasized the changing nature of the capabilities. Netherlands argued that the ability of a state should define the contribution of the state to the climate change mitigation: the North–South divide should not be the frame that defines the level of contribution to climate change mitigation but the ability to participate.

It [the agreement] needs to take account of the great diversity of nations and the developments in each of them. The traditional divide between rich and poor and north and south is no longer all defining. Countries' capabilities change. And it's important that each contributes according to their ability. (Prime Minister of Netherlands Mark Rutte, 30.11.2015)

It can be interpreted that Netherlands took part in the on-going discussion of the responsibility of emerging economies, such as China and India. In 2006, China, the state

that is categorized in UNFCCC as a developing country, became the largest emitter of the world, and it is expected that the emissions of India will overtake emissions of Western Europe by 2019 (Jinnah 2017, 286). Previously, for instance United States had criticized the idea of the right to develop of developing countries (see Okereke & Coventry 2016, 836–837). Now, in its statement in the Leaders Event, Netherlands argued that the changing abilities of states should be taken into account in contributing to climate change mitigation. This argument included a presumption that the development of states means not only capability but also negative impacts to the climate and hence, the more developed ones should participate more in climate change mitigation.

All states that argued for differentiated participation argued for greater climate change mitigation obligations for developed countries than for developing countries. This can be seen for instance in the statement of Ethiopia.

[...] every nation has to contribute. Of course, national contributions need to be differentiated, reflecting responsibility, need and capacity. [...] If poor people like us can resolve to create carbon neutral economy, surely better placed nations can and should do more. [...] If the poor people in Ethiopia can sacrifice savings and labor, surely better placed nations can and should do more to support them. (Prime Minister of Ethiopia Hailemariam Dessalegn, 30.11.2015)

In the statement of Ethiopia, it was assumed that the ones now contributing to the climate change mitigation are the poor developing countries such as Ethiopia itself. Hence, Ethiopia had the different presumption than for instance Netherlands about who is now contributing to climate change mitigation. Even though in the statements of the both countries it was appealed for the common but differentiated participation of all states, the presumptions behind the argumentation differed from each other. Netherlands presumed that developing countries are the ones that have the negative impact in climate due to their economic development, but Ethiopia saw that the situation is the opposite. Unlike Netherlands, Ethiopia assumed that developing countries are actually the ones that have a positive impact to the climate due to their climate change mitigation efforts, and the ones who should do more are the developed countries.

For the differentiated participation of all countries it was also argued by appealing to differences in resources. These arguments were based on a presumption of hierarchies and dissociation of states with resources and states with the political will from each other. This can be seen for instance in the statement of Nauru.

The task will not be easy and it will not be cheap. The scale of the transformation required will be unprecedented, requiring all of us to re-examine failed ideologies and to confront powerful entrenched interests. We have grown complacent in our inspirational rhetoric and good intentions. I do not doubt their sincerity. But this all must change here in Paris. Vulnerable countries and communities alone can no longer be left to pay the price of climate change. [...] We must now make sure that every country is able to achieve – and over-achieve – their climate mitigation and adaptation goals. Those with resources must step up and help those with the political will. (President of Nauru Baron D. Waga, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, Nauru indirectly referred to developed countries as states ‘with resources’ and developing states as states ‘with the political will’. Nauru argued that in addition to developing countries, developed countries should also participate in paying for the harm caused by climate change. The argument of Nauru included the presumption that currently developing countries are bearing the burden of climate change whereas developed countries are not as they lack political will to contribute to climate change mitigation. Nauru dissociated having the resources and having the political will from each other: states are categorized according to which one of these two elements the state has. Nauru associated the political will with developing countries and the resources with developed countries: the option that a state could have both was not presented in the statement of Nauru.

7.2 Differences in historical responsibility

In addition to ability, it was also appealed to different historical responsibilities to justify why participation in climate change mitigation should be differentiated. As analyzed in the previous chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, arguments appealing to responsibility aimed to depoliticize the discussion by appealing to an authority. Often these arguments were not justified otherwise: the responsibility was seen as a sufficient justification for the claim. This was also visible in the argumentation for the common but differentiated participation of all states. Even though it was presumed that responsibilities to participate in climate change mitigation are differentiated, the similar presumption of the apolitical need to fulfil responsibilities was present in the argumentation.

Stemming the tide of climate change is a global challenge that requires collective action. Our responsibilities, however, are not evenly spread. States with deep carbon footprints and history of large emissions should take the greatest responsibility in redressing the situation. (Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, 30.11.2015)

For instance, in the statement of Pakistan, states were categorized according to the amount of their historical emissions and further, to define the amount of their responsibility to address climate change. Pakistan formed a quasi-logical argument by stating that the historical emissions define the responsibility of a state to contribute to climate change mitigation: the bigger historical carbon footprint, the bigger responsibility to address climate change.

As previously analyzed in this thesis, historical responsibility argument can be used to argue for industrialized countries to take the leading role and undertake measures to combat climate change. However, as seen for instance in the statement of Pakistan, historical responsibility argument could also be used to justify the differentiated participation of every state as every country has produced some emissions (see also Grubb 1995, 491).

7.3 Effectiveness and common good

For the differentiated participation of all countries, it was also argued by appealing to effectiveness: common but differentiated participation was seen as the most effective option to combat climate change. The argumentation was based on the presumption that differentiated participation – the most effective option to address climate change – creates global good. For instance, this approach was visible in the statements of China and Brazil.

We should create a future of win-win cooperation, with each country making contribution to the best of its ability. For global issues like climate change, a take-more-give-less approach based on expediency is in nobody's interest. The Paris Conference should reject the narrow-minded mentality of "zero sum game" and call on all countries, the developed countries in particular, to assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes. - **We should create a future of the rule of law, fairness and justice.** It is imperative to enhance the standing and role of international law in global governance, ensure effective observance and implementation of international rules, uphold democracy, equity and justice, and build international rule of law. (President of China Xi Jinping, 30.11.2015. Bolding original.)

The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is the cornerstone of the proposed agreement. Far from weakening our efforts to tackle climate change, differentiation is a condition to its global effectiveness. The Paris agreement should therefore provide the conditions that will ensure that all developing countries can walk the path of the low-carbon economy while overcoming extreme poverty and reducing inequalities. It is therefore very important for this conference provide unmistakable decisions on the relevant

means of implementation. (President of Brazil Dilma Vana Rousseff, 30.11.2015)

To convince the audience about the differentiated participation, in its statement, China associated differentiated participation with ‘win-win outcomes’. China argued for its point of view by claiming that it is possible to reach win-win outcomes and thus, the common good, with the differentiated participation. Hence, the differentiated participation was seen as a mean to reach common good.

Behind the argumentation of China, there was a presumption of the different abilities of states and hence, categorization of states. China argued quasi-logically that the ability of a country defines how much it should contribute to climate change mitigation. Even though China appealed to all countries to contribute more to climate change mitigation, the ones that were especially expected to contribute more were the developed countries. China presumed that developed countries have the greater ability to contribute to climate change mitigation than the developing countries, and, due to the greater ability, they should contribute more. According to the argumentation of China, this would promote common good.

Brazil shared the view of China about differentiation as a mean to promote common good and make global climate agreement effective. Brazil assumed that by differentiating responsibilities of states, it would be possible for developing countries to reach low-carbon economy and reduce poverty and inequalities. In the statement of Brazil, differentiation was presented as a mean to achieve all the before mentioned goals at the same time. However, Brazil did not define what it meant by differentiation: which actors or states should contribute, how much, and why.

In the statements given in the Leaders Event, it was also argued directly for the greater participation of developed countries to make the strongest impact. For instance, India stated that as the (historical) emissions of the ‘advanced nations’ are bigger than the ones of developing countries, developed countries could make the greatest impact.

We hope/ advanced nations/ will assume ambitious targets/ and pursue them sincerely.// It is not just a question/ of historical responsibility.// They also have the most room/ to make the cuts/ and make the strongest impact.// And, climate justice demands/ that, with the little carbon space we still have, developing countries/ should have enough room/ to grow.// [...] The principles of equity/ and common/ but differentiated responsibilities/ must remain the bedrock/ of our collective enterprise/ across all areas/ -

mitigation,/adaptation/ and means for implementation.// Anything else/ would be morally wrong.// Equity means that/national commitments/must be consistent/ with the carbon space nations occupy.// (Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, 30.11.2015. Slashes original.)

For India, however, differentiation of participation was not seen only as a mean to make the greatest impact but also as a morally right thing to do. India categorized states according to their historical responsibility, the ‘room to make emission reductions’ and the ‘carbon space’ the states occupy. Hence, India argued that differentiating responsibilities is not only effective but also moral. The argument of India was, hence, partly based on the presumption of the developing countries’ right to develop and that the current development situation is unjust and differentiation in global climate change mitigation is needed.

8 ARGUMENTATION FOR PARTICIPATION OF STAKEHOLDERS

In the argumentation for participation of stakeholders, claims were often made without justification. Based on the approach of Perelman (1996), I assume that orators held participation of stakeholders as a commonly agreed value as they did not see the need to argue for it. As the justifications were not often provided in the statements, in the following subchapters, I focus on analyzing the presumptions of argumentation for participation of stakeholders. I start with analyzing the arguments appealing to acceptance and implementation of climate policy, continue with arguments appealing to responsibility, and finish with the analysis of the arguments appealing to knowledge sharing.

8.1 Acceptance and implementation of climate policy

In the argumentation for participation of stakeholders, arguments often included the presumption that stakeholders, especially people, are an objective of education. In this argumentation, education of stakeholders was argued to be a mean to get people's acceptance to the government's climate policy. This was seen essential to make the required changes in the society. This reasoning was visible for instance in the statement of Fiji.

So Mr President, I call on the community of nations to accentuate the positives of change with their people and not to the negatives rather than turn a blind eye to the crisis we face, confront it head on. For Governments to patiently explain to their nations and communities that there is no option other than to take radical change on carbon emissions now – however painful – to avoid even more pain further on. It is a matter of political will and of education, of world leaders taking their people with them. Using reason to marginalize the climate change deniers. Using persuasion to win over the climate skeptics. Mr President it will require courage and it will require difficult choices. (Prime Minister of Fiji Josaia Vorege Bainimarama, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, Fiji argued that educating people is necessary to make them accept the radical emission reductions and changes they require. This claim was built on the presumption of upcoming climate crisis and the commonly agreed objective to avoid the crisis. Fiji used quasi-logical argumentation to justify the urgency of the need of action:

if emissions are not cut, world will face a crisis. Fiji continued that to avoid the crisis, big societal changes are required, and to make big changes, inclusion or at least the acceptance of stakeholders is necessary. In its statement, Fiji stated that education and persuasion of people are necessary means to get the acceptance of the stakeholders.

In addition to Fiji, also China argued for participation of stakeholders and shared the presumption of the top-down approach in national climate policies. However, the approach of China included more participatory elements than the one of Fiji: Fiji argued for educating people whereas China argued that stakeholders should be included in international cooperation on climate change.

The Paris agreement should help galvanize global efforts and encourage broad participation. The agreement should provide institutional arrangements that propel countries to make concerted efforts. Besides governments, it should also mobilize businesses, non-governmental organizations and all players in society to participate in international cooperation on climate change, thus raising public awareness of pooling resources on climate change. (President of China Xi Jinping, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, China saw the public awareness as a value: China did not see the need to justify why raising public awareness is important. However, China did not specify the means by which stakeholders could participate in international cooperation on climate change to raise the awareness among public.

In addition to education and raising the awareness, in the statements of world leaders, participation of stakeholders was associated with the implementation of climate policy. For instance, Netherlands stated that:

And third, there needs to be a bigger role for companies, consumers, cities and civil society organisations. Climate policy can only work if it penetrates to the deepest roots of our society and people's behaviour. For that to happen we need every conceivable party to work together – nationally and internationally. (Prime Minister of Netherlands Mark Rutte, 30.11.2015)

Netherlands saw participation of stakeholders as a vital part of the successful implementation of climate policy. However, stakeholders were not seen as active actors but as implementers of the policy formed in the state level. However, Netherlands' argument for the inclusion of stakeholders included a presumption that the behavior of people is not climate friendly and it should be changed. Thus, in the statements given in the Leaders Event, stakeholders were not only assumed to be the objectives of education

but also actors that have power to influence to the amount of global GHG emissions. However, even though Netherlands saw the stakeholders as partly responsible ones to address climate change, Netherlands shared the top-down approach with for instance China and Fiji.

Tackling climate change also requires an active engagement of local governments, civil society, businesses and academia. The contribution of rural communities and of indigenous peoples is vital. We are, after all, talking about deep, sweeping changes in productions and consumption standards; hence the huge opportunities that now emerge for developing new technologies. (President of Brazil Dilma Vana Rousseff, 30.11.2015)

The statement of Brazil included the same presumption than the statement of Netherlands: stakeholders produce emissions by consuming and hence, increase the global emissions. In the statement of Brazil, it was deduced that, hence, the consumption habits of stakeholders should be changed to tackle climate change. In the statement of Brazil, participation and contribution of stakeholders was seen as a non-debatable value as it was also in the argumentation of China.

However, the arguments presented for the participation of stakeholders in the implementation of state-level climate policy do not take into account the different abilities of people to participate. For instance, it is not taken into account that in the both developing and developed countries there are people with the great ability and resources, and people with lesser ability and resources. The differences in wealth within people in the same country can be big. To answer the problem, Harris (2013, 147) have suggested that if states should act according to the CBDR, they should also encourage their citizens to act according the principle. However, this point of view was not presented in the statements given in the Leaders Event in COP21.

8.2 Responsibility

In the argumentation for participation of stakeholders, participation of stakeholders was, in addition to top-down approach, approached from the bottom-up point of view. These claims shared the presumption that citizens – not states – are the responsible ones to act to address climate change. This view can be seen for instance in the statement of Kiribati.

For what we do in our national boundaries, whether we like or not your excessive emissions become ours, has ripple impacts on the rest of the world.

We have a responsibility, as global citizens of this one global community, to look out for each other [...]. (President of Kiribati Anote Tong, 30.11.2015)

We all have a role and a duty to play in regards this critical issue – not only as leaders but as individual citizens of this global community. (President of Kiribati Anote Tong, 30.11.2015)

In the statement of Kiribati, responsibility to mitigate climate change was seen to belong to the world leaders as ‘global citizens’, not as the leaders of states. Hence, Kiribati shifted the responsibility from states to citizens and individuals. Kiribati used quasi-logical argumentation: Kiribati stated that due to the global impacts of the national emissions, every citizen or a head of state as a global citizen is a responsible one to act for common good and look out for each other.

In its statement, Kiribati made the duty to combat climate change personal and shifted the focus partly from the harm caused to the environment to the harm caused to people. According to Harris (2013, 133) shifting the focus on the suffering of people can make it more difficult for governments to avoid climate change mitigation. However, in the statement of Kiribati, the responsibility to address climate change was relied on the shoulders of individuals instead of states. Thus, the statement supports the responsibility of the individuals and the claim that the responsibilities of the past generations are heritable (see e.g. Shue 2010, 105).

8.3 Knowledge sharing

In addition to responsibility, in the bottom-up argumentation for participation of stakeholders it was also appealed to education but not of stakeholders: of states. For instance, Canada argued for bottom-up knowledge sharing as the following:

Our plan [a pan-Canadian climate change framework] will build on the efforts of local governments, indigenous organizations, businesses, youth, the academic community, and nongovernmental organizations, many of whom will be represented in Paris in the coming days. [...] The [Paris] agreement also requires a prominent role for the private sector and multilateral institutions to mobilize finance. Those who can act, must. (Prime Minister of Canada Justin P. J. Trudeau, 30.11.2015)

In the statement of Canada, as in the statement of Kiribati, stakeholders were presumed to be responsible actors and hence included in climate change mitigation and emission reduction. However, in the statement of Canada, the responsibility of stakeholders was

extended and the responsibility of states decreased by planning to build a states' climate change framework on the basis of the efforts of stakeholders. Even though Canada left the roles of different actors open, in its statement the state was described as an objective of education instead of being the teacher.

Compared to the top-down approach, the state and the stakeholders changed places in the bottom-up approach. In the bottom-up approach, it was assumed that stakeholders should share their knowledge to the state, not vice versa.

Third, and very importantly, we will work with our provinces, territories, cities and Indigenous leaders who are taking a leadership role on climate change. Indigenous peoples have known for thousands of years how to care for our planet. The rest of us have a lot to learn. And no time to waste. / But they are not alone. Canadian cities have also long been leaders in the fight to create clean growth and combat climate change. There's a lot that we, in other orders of government, can learn from our cities. (Prime Minister of Canada Justin P. J. Trudeau, 30.11.2015)

In its statement, Canada continued argumentation for collaboration of different sectors and levels. The claim of Canada was based on the presumption that other actors, such as indigenous peoples and cities, have knowledge that the state does not have and of which the state could benefit. In the statement of Canada, it can be read that the collaboration between stakeholders, cities, and the state is something new because the state has not received the knowledge from the stakeholders yet, at least not with regard to addressing climate change.

Even though there are lot of discussion about if the states or the individuals should be the responsible ones to reduce emissions, in none of the statements the orator appealed only to the need of participation of stakeholders. The participation of stakeholders in climate change mitigation was seen as a complimentary element and the main debate was held about which ones of the states should act, how, and why.

9 ANALYSIS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

In this chapter, I present the analysis of the Paris Agreement (PA). As statements are not justified in the Agreement, its analysis is primarily based on the starting points of the argumentation. I study, for instance, what the different actors are associated with and what presumptions the Paris Agreement contains.

One of the significant presumptions of the Agreement was a presumption of different national circumstances. It was stated as the following in the first page of the Agreement:

In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances [...]. (PA, 1. Italics original)

The presumption of different national circumstances defines the nature of the Agreement. It should be noted that in the argumentation of states in the Leaders Event, the principle of CBDR was also often mentioned but in those statements, it was associated for instance with differentiated historical responsibility of states due to different historical emissions (see e.g. the statement of India). However, in the Paris Agreement, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was associated solely with different national circumstances.

In the Agreement, as mentioned before, it was assumed that circumstances vary between states and the groups of developed and developing countries. However, different circumstances were associated with developed and developing countries.

From the developed and developing country groups, the group of developing countries was associated with special circumstances, specific needs and vulnerability. However, in the Agreement, it was not defined what is meant with these terms.

Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the Convention [...]. (PA, 1. Italics original)

In the Agreement, the heterogeneity of the national circumstances within the group of developing countries was recognized at some extent. For instance, it was stated that the

needs of particularly vulnerable states to address climate change should be recognized. Additionally, the group of the least developed countries was separated into its own group.

Taking full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries with regard to funding and transfer of technology, [...].
(PA, 1. Italics original)

In the Agreement, the least developed countries were associated with the need of funding, transfer of technology, and the need to take their needs and situations into “full account”, as the needs of developing countries in general were needed to “recognize”. Developing countries’ need of support was justified by the effective response to the climate change and the implementation of the Agreement.

The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement. (PA, art. 3)

As previously analyzed, developing and the least developed countries were associated with specific needs and special circumstances. However, presumptions of the circumstances, needs and capabilities of the developing and developed countries varied significantly as developed countries were associated with lead-taking, emission reductions and providing support. These significantly differing presumptions of the capabilities and circumstances of developed and developing countries reveal that the North-South divide was present in the Paris Agreement.

Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances. (PA, art. 4.4)

Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. (PA, art. 9.1)

As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts. (PA, art. 9.3)

In the Agreement, developed countries were associated with the circumstances that enable them to take the lead, reduce emissions and provide support. It can be interpreted that developed countries were assumed to have the capability to act, and hence, they should participate in climate change mitigation and support the others. From this ability-focused point of view, it was also argued in the Leaders Event (see chapter 5.2 of this thesis).

Alternatively, it can also be interpreted that as developing countries have more challenging national circumstances, there are no other options among actors that could combat climate change. Hence, the responsibility falls on developed countries. This point of view supports the previously introduced argumentation for the participation of developed countries justified with the claim that developing ones should not participate (see chapter 5.3 of this thesis).

According to Harris (2013, 47), the central frame for international climate negotiations has been emphasizing the differences between developed and developing countries – the global North and the South – and requiring more actions from the other party. Developed countries have required emission reduction commitments from the developed countries and developing countries have required emission reductions and development assistance from the developed countries (Harris 2013, 47). In the Paris Agreement, this confrontation between developed and developing country groups and the North and the South could be seen framing the agreement: even though the principle of CBDR was based on the different national circumstances in the Agreement, only the groups of developed, developing and the least developed countries were recognized in the Agreement. Hence, even though the differing national circumstances of states are respected and taken into account, the North–South divide appeared to influence significantly to the state groupings in the Agreement.

However, regardless of the North–South divide, some responsibilities were directed to all states in the Paris Agreement. The Agreement required all states to “undertake ambitious efforts” with “progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties” (PA, art. 3). Additionally, the Paris Agreement required all states to cooperate to enhance capacity-building of developing countries (see PA, art. 11.3) and provide information of their anthropogenic emissions, progress, climate change impacts and adaptation (see PA, art. 13.7–13.9). Hence, the Agreement supports participation of

all states in climate change mitigation. Participation of all states was also argued for in the Leaders Event (see chapter 6 of this thesis).

The Paris Agreement also took stakeholders into account. In the Agreement, stakeholders' participation and engagement was given value *per se*.

Affirming the importance of education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels on the matters addressed in this Agreement,

Recognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate change, [...]. (PA, 2. Italics original)

In the Agreement, stakeholders were approached from the top-down point of view: it was assumed that the active actor is a governmental body and stakeholders are close to objects of education and participatory initiatives from the top. However, the participation of stakeholders was seen as a valuable element in the Agreement as it was seen also in the statements of the world leaders (see chapter 8 of this thesis).

Even though stakeholders were not directly mentioned when referred to sustainable lifestyles and consumption in the Agreement, they were indirectly referred to be in an important position in addressing climate change even though the responsibility was directed to the developed country parties.

Also recognizing that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead, play an important role in addressing climate change, [...]. (PA, 2. Italics original)

As it was required for developed countries to take the lead in sustainable lifestyles, consumption, and production, the importance of stakeholders to live in a sustainable way was defined based on their place of inhabitation. In the Agreement, it was not recognized that there are poor people in developed countries that consume minimally, and rich people who consume over their need in developing countries as only developed countries were expected to take the lead in promoting sustainable lifestyle. Hence, the determining factor of the importance to participate in addressing climate change by sustainable consumption was the individuals' country of inhabitation – if the country belongs to the group of developed or developing ones.

10 CONCLUSION

In the previous chapters, I have introduced the debate of the responsible ones to tackle climate change, different equality principles to approach climate change, and the research material and method used in this thesis. Additionally, I have analyzed statements given in the Leaders Event and the Paris Agreement by using rhetorical analysis. In this concluding chapter I discuss the results of this research and summarize them.

According to the analysis of the research material, it cannot be said that the Agreement would support the polluter pays principle even though it was stated in the Agreement that industrialized countries should take the leading role and mobilize climate finance. According to the analysis presented in the chapter 9, the Paris Agreement is based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. However, the differentiated principles were justified by the assumption of different national circumstances. Hence, the agreement took only the current circumstances of countries into account, not how these circumstances have been reached. Hence, the analysis of the Paris Agreement does not support the view of Neymayer (2010) and Grubb (1995) who argue for taking the cumulative emissions into account in defining who should address climate change.

The beneficiary pays principle, however, can be seen to be applied at some extent in the Paris Agreement as the developed nations are required to mobilize climate finance for the less developed. For instance, Caney (2010, 128) sees that the industrialized countries have reached the current national circumstances by the help of polluting activity. However, as previously said, the Paris Agreement only took the current circumstances of the states – not how they have been reached – into account, so the beneficiary pays principle cannot be said to be applied fully in the Agreement.

Compared to other equality principles discussed in this thesis, the ability to pay principle can be seen as the principle that best describes the approach of the Agreement. As previously stated, according to Caney (2015, 382), the ability to pay principle does not aim to define the polluters or the ones who caused the problem but aims to define who afford to combat climate change. Hence, as the Agreement defined the responsibilities of states according to their current national circumstances, the ability to pay principle can be seen to be applied in the Agreement.

Grubb (1995, 469) reminded previously that in addition to national circumstances, also other elements, such as the strength of the institutions, have an impact on a state's capacity to address climate change. However, this view was not recognized in the Paris Agreement. As analyzed in the chapter 9 of this thesis, the Agreement categorized developed and developing countries into their own groups without recognizing heterogeneity within the groups (see also Okereke & Coventry 2016, 836). Developed countries were presumed to have national circumstances that enable them to take the lead in climate change mitigation and provide support for developing countries even though the group of developed countries is not internally homogenous. Even though the UN sees that there are 197 states in the world, the states were separated into three groups only: developed, developing and the least developed countries. The presumption of the homogeneity of the groups was visible in the Agreement: the circumstances in developing countries or in so called non-Annex I countries – which China and India are members of – were assumed to not be in favor of ambitious emission reductions or mobilizing climate finance. In addition to the Paris Agreement, the assumption of the greater ability of the developed countries argument was visible, for instance, in the statements of Fiji, Djibouti and Zimbabwe. In their statements, the greater ability argument was used to justify the participation of developed countries in climate change mitigation. The heterogeneity within developed or developing countries was not referred to, and hence, the reminder of Grubb (ibid.) was ignored in the Agreement and in many statements.

As only states can be the parties of the Paris Agreement, the agreement included requirements to states. Hence, the Agreement supported the view of theorists – such as Caney (2010) – who support the responsibility of states to tackle climate change. However, the views of Kortetmäki et al. (2013), Harris (2013), and Agarwal & Narain (1990) that emphasize the importance of taking consumption habits into account in defining the responsible actors in climate change mitigation, were ignored in the Agreement. Even though the Agreement did not require action from the other actors than states, the Paris Agreement valued education, public participation and engagement of various actors in addressing climate change. In the Agreement, participation of stakeholders was seen as a value *per se*, and so it was in the statements arguing for participation of stakeholders analyzed earlier in this thesis. As in the Paris Agreement and the statements of world leaders, participation of stakeholders was rarely presented

justifications or reasoning for but instead, it was assumed to be accepted and valued among the audience as there was no need to justify the statements carefully.

It can be interpreted that the Paris Agreement supports the point of view that the currently living should participate in climate change mitigation. The importance of combating climate change was not denied as almost all states committed to the Agreement. Additionally, adopting a new global climate agreement was not left for future generations. Hence, reaching the Paris Agreement supports the view of Tremmel (2014) that the currently living should apply the precautionary principle to avoid a climate catastrophe and aim to improve the life of future generations (also Gardiner 2010b).

Additionally, the Paris Agreement supports the argumentation for the effective response to the climate change and implementation for the Agreement. In the Agreement, as well as in the statements of e.g. China and Brazil, it was supposed that the support from developed countries to the developing countries would be needed for the effective implementation of the Agreement.

From the previously analyzed argumentation in the chapters 5–8 of this thesis, in the Paris Agreement, it could be seen the application of the argumentation for recognizing different capabilities of states, differences in the national circumstances of states, and stakeholder education and engagement in addressing climate change. However, according to this research, the argumentation based on the (historical) responsibility of any state, possibilities, fulfilling responsibilities, knowledge sharing, or implementation of climate policy by stakeholders was not applied in the Agreement. At least these before mentioned points of view were not visible in the final version of the Paris Agreement.

In this thesis, I analyzed the statements of the world leaders given in the Paris Climate Conference in the Leaders Event in November 2015, and the outcome of the conference, the Paris Agreement by using rhetorical analysis as a research method. As the research question, I presented: ‘In the state level, what is universally seen as a just approach to climate change mitigation?’.

By analyzing the statements of the world leaders given in the Leaders Event in COP21, I found out that states argued for the participation of different actors – developed countries, all states, and stakeholders – and for common but differentiated participation of all states in the context of climate change mitigation. The analysis of the world leaders’ statements

revealed that states have different presumptions about who should participate in and who is currently contributing to global climate change mitigation.

The argumentation techniques used in the statements occasionally reminded each other but, depending on the starting points of the argumentation and presumptions of the orator, the same argumentation technique could be used to promote different objectives. As the statements given in the Leaders Event were short and the arguments and claims often lacked reasoning, the starting points of the argumentation had an important role in the analysis. This was also the case in analyzing the Paris Agreement as the Agreement did not include the reasonings behind its statements.

The analysis of the Paris Agreement revealed that the result of the COP21 is a combination of the differing points of view of the actors who should participate in climate change mitigation. However, in Paris climate negotiations, it was managed to name the responsible ones and their responsibilities to combat climate change: states agreed that industrialized countries should take the leading role in combating climate change and mobilize climate finance, and all states shall prepare and communicate of nationally determined contribution to climate change mitigation. According to this research, the common but differentiated responsibilities remained as a bedrock of the global climate change mitigation policy. However, the principle was tied to different national circumstances, not for instance to different historical emissions.

The results of this research revealed that in the state level, there is no universally shared view about a single responsible actor or a single responsible group of actors to tackle climate change. However, universally, it was seen that GHG emissions should be reduced and, in addition to developed countries, also developing countries were expected to aim to reduce emissions. Universally, it was also accepted that in climate change mitigation, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities should be applied in the light of different national circumstances.

Even though 185 states have committed to the Paris Agreement, the results of this research do not reveal if adopting the Paris Agreement or its negotiating process managed to unify the differing presumptions of the responsible ones to participate in climate change mitigation or the ones that currently contribute to climate change mitigation among states. Further research would be needed to find out how the almost universally accepted

approach to climate change mitigation can be implemented and what are the universally accepted means to mitigate climate change if they exist.

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