

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

Party Split and Cohesion Loss

Case Eduskunta 2017

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Parliamentary politics is governed by a set of rules which steer conduct. How rigid is this conduct in unusual circumstances?

When The Finns Party split in the middle of the parliamentary year of 2017, half of the party representatives was lost by a Government party to the Opposition. This thesis is a case study of how the elected representatives acted out their policies in plenary sessions after the parliamentary base was dramatically altered. The voting results are studied by utilizing a commonly used index tool in order to make the changes in voting preferences intelligible. A simple linear regression model reveals the differences of parties regarding policy preferences. The data of the plenary sessions from 2017 is courtesy of Antti Pajala from the University of Turku. The archive of plenary sessions in the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta are public data and available in the eduskunta.fi website.

The issues voted upon in plenary sessions are generally drafted by the Government coalition. Therefore the Opposition is primarily the underdog as a mover in policy space. It tends to correct its position depending on the bills Government presents.

A single large party splits, and the split sides, entrenched against one another, do not display similarities in the formerly united party groups. The formerly unified party groups fulfill their role in both Government and Opposition side respectably, but only to an extent.

The Blue Reform acts out the role of a pivotal Government ally. The Finns Party on the other hand, after siding with the Opposition, doesn't enlarge its unity. Its role as a member of the coalition only partly explains the actions the Opposition ensues in plenary votes.

Key words: Eduskunta, plenary sessions, voting, cohesion, populism

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1. INTRODUCTION

According to the report on social climate by Koivisto(2017), the views of Finnish legislators and the Finnish commerce professionals are at odds. This cleavage concerns the predictability of current political affairs in Finland. The reasons why top ranking industry officials haven' currently been too optimistic, lie in the distrust in development of streamlining legislature in order to increase investment in Finland. The Sipilä cabinet, the 74th government of Finland, had been in power for two years in June 2017. The cabinet was originally formed by the Centre Party(KESK), National Coalition(KOK) and The Finns Party(PS). The selection of a new chairman in The Finns Party convention, resulted in its coalition partners to declare distrust in the possibility of continuing in the same cabinet coalition. The reasons for this where said to be differences in world view. Before PM Sipilä was able to declare his cabinet to be defunct and new parliamentary election to be called, the Finns Party cabinet ministers informed that they had quit The Finns Party and where eager to continue working in the same cabinet with PM Sipilä. This was a dramatic twist in Finnish politics and took a heavy toll on Finns Party (in terms of the amount of MPs), whose rise from a marginalized group to a prominent cabinet member party within a decade, now saw half of its parliamentary seats(including their cabinet ministers) taken from them in just one sudden event. This change in the parliamentary base made the government and opposition sides more even, at least if measured by head count. One wonders how could this sort of a blow to a parliamentary party affect its political work.

2. AIMS OF THIS STUDY

The Elected Members of Parliament do not always vote according to their party line. They also do not always vote exactly for the line their constituencies are predicting. The complete unity in voting in the parliamentary plenary sessions is called total cohesion. This has been the theme of several academic publications across decades, Rice(1925), Lijphart(1963), Poole & Rosenthal(1985), Hug(2005), Pajala(2013) among others. They have aimed at understanding why would representative Members of Parliament(MPs) deviate from the stance of their parliamentary party group(PPG). When looking at issues being voted upon, it is also possible to point at what is the standing of the legislators in regards to their preferences and ideology. The expected probability of deviant action inside voting blocs is one of the most influential aspects of cohesion studies. This way the representativeness of political parties can also be assessed against the policies of their respected parties proper(Hix & Noury, 2016). The event of a comparatively large party splitting into two rivaling factions in parliament, which serves as the premise for this study, makes one wonder of the effect on voting cohesion between respected party groups within a common coalition, as well as between rivaling coalitions that encompass several parliamentary party groups. The subject of this study is the plenary votes during the parliamentary year 2017 of the Finnish Parliament 'Eduskunta'.

3. BACKGROUND ON VOTING COHESION STUDIES

3.1. An account on notable abbreviations

It is not only conversation on political parties that use various abbreviations, but there are also organizations and concepts that are more commonly known by their abbreviation form than a bulky long form. For the sake of consistency, the original Finnish language abbreviation of the Finnish political parties is used, as in the data of voting activity inside the Finnish parliament Eduskunta during 2017.

EPG(s) - European Parliamentary Group(s)

EP - European Parliament

KD - Christian Democrats(*Fin. Kristillisdemokraatit*)

KESK - Centre Party of Finland(*Fin. Suomen Keskusta*)

KOK - National Coalition Party(*Fin. Kansallinen Kokoomus*)

MEP(s) - Member(s) of European Parliament

MP(s) - Member(s) of Parliament

PPG - Parliamentary Party Group

PS - The Finns Party(*Fin. Perussuomalaiset*)

RKP - Swedish People's Party of Finland(*Fin. Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue*)

SDP - Social Democratic Party of Finland(*Fin. Suomen sosiaalidemokraattinen puolue*)

SIN - Blue Reform(*Fin. Sininen Tulevaisuus*)

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

VAS - Left Alliance(*Fin. Vasemmistoliitto*)

VIHR - Greens(*Fin. Vihreät*)

3.2. Stuart Rice and Simon Hix

The Rice Index has for decades been a universally used measure to Quantitative measures in the study of politics. Stuart Rice himself talked about the problematics of political representativeness(1938). He was a staunch advocate of using commonplace data to be used in tapping to the will of the public. The index that bears his name is a simple one, and has been used in several publications to reveal the amount of cohesion policy makers have inclusively within their associated group and also in exclusive circumstances. This sort of quantitative tool can help to understand the polarity of groups. Rice(1925) describes the index measurement tool from the perspective of the United States Congress as Democrats voting alongside and against the Republicans. For the reader that points to the fact that the American system is dominated by two rivaling factions, it needs to be pointed out that yes, this is correct, but in the democratic process, the possibility that groups outside the realm of two can exist, even in the United States context.

The study of voting cohesion has gone a long way, and that in the European context, the data of the studies regarding multiparty systems is well established. Additionally, in this study as well as in many others, the members of a given parliament are divided into natural subgroups in order to understand the possible breaks in cohesion to imply the emergence of voting blocs according to their proximal affiliation.

Votes do 'swing' and quantifiable measurement casts light on to the actions of the voter in a way that was formerly looked at, according to Rice, in an un-neglectful fashion. With this sort of tool that Rice insisted to be used, full unity, or total cohesion, =”1” and total non-unity, meaning that the votes are distributed fifty-fifty among both arguments of the issue, as *nil*. This is the unity within a voting set, such as the entire parliament, or just a single party group. Formal notation of the votes cast inside parliament, according to Rice, is illustrated in Figure 1.

$$RI_i = 2 * \left(\frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i\}}{Y_i + N_i} - .5 \right)$$

(Figure 1. The representation of the voting cohesion measurement model by Rice)

As Hug(2005) points out, the United States roll-call votes are something that have been studied by academics for long time due to their public availability. Taking the vote by roll call means that the representatives give their vote by vocally expressing it, as their name is called one by one. Hug's study made the comparison between the United States Congress, The European Parliament and the Swiss lower house in order to specify the differences on the publicity of votes. For instance, if only a subset or final votes of a given parliament are made public, it is possible that the discourse between legislators is not being revealed in a transparent manner. This is important, as the parliaments in different countries do not necessarily yield their voting results to the public and, it can be argued, result in decrease in the probability of MPs voting in an assumed manner.

In cases where Members of The House of Representatives or other similar legislators vote on issues, there is the possibility for the decision to abstain from a given vote, whether it is for strategic or other reasons. The study on United States Congress roll-call votes conducted by Poole & Rosenthal(1985), used a computer program to quantifiably describe the preference movement of legislators and the deviance thereof. In its essence, the study was influential in examining legislator voting activity. This has pressured academics to tweak the fundamental idea of Rice's agreeability Index in ways that are exemplified by studies such as the one of Hix, Noury & Roland(2018). Their enhanced cohesion measurement makes the natural options of MPs more distinct, so that the *nil*, or non-cohesiveness that Rice talked about, is emerged from legislators not voting in unison when there are three possible voting options. That is, voting option "YES" is preferred by 1/3 of voters, as well as the two other options("NO" and "ABSTAIN"), such that *Cohesion=0*.

$$Hix AI_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2} [(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i, N_i, A_i)}$$

(Figure 2. The representation of the voting cohesion measurement model by Hix)

We can look at mathematical formulation depicting how to illustrate cohesion, but there is one thing that we should understand first and foremost: If we think about a group of people that are aimed to make a collective decision, it is beneficial to find the right size group depending on the issue being decided upon. For the sake of illustrating voting cohesion, the short article by Sheila Margolis(2011), hints that even a group of seven might be too big for optimal decision making. This is on the lines of several business managers' nuggets on how big a decision making group should perhaps be. The pizza-rule by Bezos(Choi, 2018) is tangent to all sorts of self-help, but we indulge them to make sense of group cohesion. What this means is that a group that is affective in decision making should perhaps, according to this example at least, not be larger than a group that can consume two pizzas. Let's then suppose, for argument's sake, that a group of six people is of proper size for optimal decision making. When six individuals are torn between two possible outcomes, three of them votes for option A and the other three votes for option B, the result for this is that the group is stuck in their polarization. *There is no winner*. That is what zero('0') means when talking about cohesion in regards to plenary voting.

Let us then think about another situation, where two possible options are still available, but a third possible option, C, is additionally presented. Suppose the same six people that were previously divided by the two options are now similarly divided by three options. Two of them vote for A, another two for B, and the third pair votes for C. Yet again the situation is that there are no winners. The cohesion is '0', but we cannot utilize the Rice index, as it doesn't take into account a third option. This is why the Hix Index is useful for detecting the 'no win situation' as zero '0', but still yields similar cohesion values overall as the Rice Index does.

The inherent problem of understanding voting cohesion in certain parliaments is that, unlike the United States, the votes are not been made available, or a roll call vote is requested as a strategic measure. What this means is that in certain situations, the representatives are able to vote on some issues in secret, so that their personal opinion is not revealed to their own party comrades, other party representatives, or respected constituencies. The strategic possibilities of certain votes might imply that the cohesion values published might be skewed to be too high or low, indicating selection bias, when voting activity is scrutinized.

After the final legislative issues of the seventh European Parliament(EP7) became to be decided by roll call votes, the study of the voting cohesion within the European Parliament could be assessed in the light by comparing the era before and after the voting procedure change. During one era the roll call votes for final issues were not mandatory, during another era the final issue roll call votes were mandatory. Therefore Hix, Noury & Roland(2018) had the control and treatment they needed in order to examine whether there was a substantial difference in the voting patterns of the Members of European Parliament(MEPs) before and after the final legislative roll call vote procedure had taken effect. No major differences were found with the mandatory and requested roll call vote cohesion, but this leaves the question whether cohesion is prone to shift aggressively one way or another if some roll-call votes would be secret.

3.2. Voting in a variety of contexts

Plenary votes are taken in plenary sessions of a parliament. Plenary sessions are the bread and butter of the parliamentary representative's working days. The modern systems of electrically aided voting is something that makes parliamentary roll call voting fast, efficient, and easy to document. The technology of the modern plenary or roll call voting had been in existence for a long time before its official utilization and the original patent for this influential technology was appropriated by none other than Thomas A. Edison(Edison, 1869). A system to aid in roll call voting had been proposed since the 19th Century, but had first been met with suspicion and fear that it would affect the opinions of legislators and policy overall.

The electronic voting system obviously catches on eventually in the The United States House of Representatives and has had its latest upgrade was during the tenure of the 105th Congress(Straus, 2008). In the publication by Cox & McCubbins(1991), the roll call votes within the United States House of Representatives were examined to understand the intra party cohesion of the representatives, as well as the evolution of deviance in voting within established voting blocs. Studies concerning legislative voting in the United States revolves around the frame of the dualism, given the American political system is hard wired to distribute legislative power to two powerful political entities.

The primary motivation in this research, is that the presumption of a political party will vote in accordance to their predetermined ideology, can be premature. The study of congressional voting by Jaenicke(2002) examines the positions the Republican and Democrat legislators take in various issues. To be more precise, the study looks at the historical development of intra-party cohesion in regards to abortion issues. Abortion has polarized legislators since it was first been discussed in the United States Congress. The data indicates that during the timespan from mid 1970s up to the 21st century, the trend has been towards taking a stance on this issue has moved towards Extremes. This means that during the course of time, an increased number of Democrats in the House of Representatives have become more interested in voting pro choice, the colloquial for maintaining the legal status of abortion. On the other hand, there is also a trend of Republicans voting exactly the opposite. However, mixed opinions also reside within these party groups. The extreme Christian conservative views(against family planning, abortion)within the Republican Party is a relatively new phenomenon in contemporary politics, whereas the attitudes on libertarian fiscal policy and hostility towards a welfare state is something that is mostly shared among all Republicans. This is just a tangible example of what the decrease of cohesion within a party group might mean.

In order to obtain increased roll call voting openness in the United States, govtrack.us (Tauberer, 2018) has collected and examined the roll call votes of the United States Congress. Tauberer's recent remarks on the value of democratic representation of the Senate, the upper house of Congress, has not only been the descriptive of roll call votes passing with smaller margins than ever before in the US history, but that the representation of the legislators voting is of

constituencies that do not represent the majority of the population. This means that given that states have similar representation despite their population size, an unanimous coalition of representatives of small states can increase the value of their mutual voting power regardless of majority public opinion. Without sounding too obscure, we can look at the much reported confirmation case of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, where the comparable representation of states in the Senate triggered outrage for the decision deemed undemocratic(Feldman, 2018). The smaller states, having the same number of senators as the large ones, seemed to be able to wield voting power to shift issues strategically. Without taking sides on the issue, it must be taken to account that varying parliamentary systems are the produce of decisions by people, whose views and strategic conduct are bound to their respected time.

When looking at the voting activity of the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA), the way representatives group in coalitions and voting blocs is multifaceted, and have natural subgrouping due to various national interests being embedded within. The natural sub-groupings, such as a group of countries that share similar cultural traits as well as geographical proximity, tend to form blocs that tend to vote on similar lines. The investigation by Hosli et al.(2010) used the cohesion variance of the European Union(EU) within the UNGA as a case study. The cohesion variance of the organization that started of as an alliance of few European nation to boost certain economic realms, and eventually building up to become a tightening union of independent(and interdependent) nations within a same union, has had the trend of increased uniformity throughout time. Whether we see the trend of voting unity of the EU move toward one direction or another , the catalyst for the movement seemed to be the gradual expansion of the union's borders. That is, the cultural similarity or difference of a joining state in comparison to the rest of the already-member-states, impacts the unity of decision making. There was an increase in abstaining votes after the European Community first started to take its unionized shape. this trend started to wain after the European nations emerged as a somewhat unitary political body with shared interests during the gradual self-destruction of the socialist block in eastern Europe by the end of the 20th century.

Because the data by Hosli et al.(2010)is had been collected from a long timeframe, the case study looked at internal cohesion through the backdrop and evolution of the transnational political

trends. The votes within such a colossal body, the interests of the people involved, vary in accordance to shifts in high profile international issues. Across time, the global narrative regarding these issues have not necessarily restricted the representatives to use their voice contrary to their primary ideological viewpoints.

The votes in the UNGA are not legally binding within the national level legislative bodies. Voting contrary to a state's national political pragmatism is not necessarily something that happens causally from in regards to a UNGA resolution. It should be considered more of an act as a catalyst towards an increased good for all in accordance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR). To put it more bluntly, the countries that have had their track record on human rights questioned, might aim at boosting their market value on these issues, in the eyes of the international community. -The signaling increased attention towards human rights violations in their jurisdictions.

The occurrences in UNGA voting activity have been highly influenced by the waning of colonialism, as well as the power, or in recent decades the lack of, Soviet influence throughout the world. Recently, the growing interest by scholars and policy makers alike to establish the rise of China as a global power and map out the shifts in cohesion within UNGA to determine, whether Chinese global influence is seen as an asset for regional powers(Brazys, Dukalskis, 2017). In the hypothesis it was asked whether countries that are keen to export to China's large market, would gradually start to side with China on weighty global issues during a period of ten years in the beginning of the 21st century. The results did suggest that many countries, many with their track record on human rights been questioned, had gradually started to side with the normative stances China took against major western powers. This could be considered as an advancement of China's movement towards being a legitimate challenger for the global hegemony of the United States within the UNGA and beyond.

The nature of the UNGA, as expressed in the publication by Primiano & Xiang(2016) and enforced by Lijphart(1963), is that although acts of voting blocs tend to primarily differentiate among geopolitical or ideological factors, they are prone to form smaller or intersectional blocs regarding the issue in question. This view is at least partly strengthened by Lai & Lefler(2016)

in their publication examining the regional representation of United Nations member states geographical positioning within the United Nations Security Council. Their concluding remarks state that polarizing issues such as national or international security can decrease the probability of a certain geographic area player to vote in a heuristically predictable way. In other words, the countries that usually vote in relative unison with their geographic peers, might tend to slip on doing this when the issue is related to their own state's national security or sovereignty.

3.3. The systems and the agenda

The study on the 'unity' of a voting bloc of legislators in Westminster style parliamentary systems, illustrates the strong majority government bloc as a driving force for agenda setting. The Westminster style system can be considered the most influential of all parliamentary systems in place in modern democracies. The forcefulness of the government in a government-opposition-voting acts as a catalyst for an opposition to increase cohesion by undermining MPs personal preferences. This characteristic is stated as important to note in the comparison between the voting cohesion within the bicameral Parliament of the United Kingdom and the unicameral Parliament of Scotland (Dewan & Spirling, 2011). Simply put, during roll-call votes on decisive issues in Parliament, the influence of the parliamentary system design tends to overshadow the influence of agendas themselves. The opposition draws its force from voting as a bloc against the government no matter what the issue is. A simulation that draws varying sized blocs from a normal distribution indicates that the opposition coalition turns to voting on line with the government coalition as its size diminishes.

The representatives of respected parties within a coalition, be it government or opposition, have various preferences towards issues been decided upon. Some of these preferences might carry enough weight to supersede either the positive relationship between the legislator and the legislator's own constituency, or expected homogeneity of a PPG as a whole. The legislator's preferences are always torn between the will of the people who voted for him/her, the will of the party that supports him/her, and the political rivals which aim to subjugate him/her. To exemplify this, the publication of party cohesion in and out of the European Parliament (EP) by McElroy &

Benoit(2012) notes that the ideological positions of party members shift based on whether their attendance is national or transnational, much the same way as in the case by Lai & Lefler(2016). In addition to this, the size and track record of a PPG or a coalition constructed of several PPGs, can affect their expected probability of successfully affecting legislation(Laver, Schofield, 1998, p. 149). With at least all this taken into account, it can be considered superficial to try to understand parliamentary parties' legislative actions only with 'moving one way or the other'(such as socioeconomic left or right). The vote swing might be much more subtle. By looking at various European parliamentary systems, there is a wide array of differences in coalition sizes and the longevity of cabinets. The heterogeneity of parliamentary systems makes the prediction of voting difficult, as in many instances larger party systems decreased the cabinet life expectancy, and still this is not the truth in every single case.

In the European Parliament(EP), not all issues in are decided by vote, but as a roll call vote can be requested by e.g. opposition group member, it can be used to measure the unity for the voting blocs themselves. The way that a possible penalty procedures might be inflicted by the group leaders towards group members for inadequate cohesion, can be illustrated as a game theoretical model, aimed at predetermining voters actions. The position taken by Carubba, Gabel & Hug(2008) about the measurement of voting cohesion, being that roll call votes 'should' give a good view of political decision making, is that legislators are representative of their constituencies. However, The strategic preferences of voting makes the study of this activity fairly difficult, as finding a proper random sample of votes and trying to determine how sincere the legislators are, is overshadowed by the strategic nature of roll-call voting. If certain strategically important votes are not available for studies, the measurement for cohesion can be questioned.

The game theoretic model where the party leader uses best judgement, given that the ideal points of two opposing forces(i, j) reside in the opposite ends of a one dimensional policy space. The game commences with one, both or either of the opponent leaders requesting for a roll-call vote based on their best guess of an outcome. Whether the vote is secret or not, depends on who requests. In this case the vote is secret when no leader requests it. By using sub-game perfection to flesh out equilibrium rates. This is intended to draw a wide range of observations that could be utilized to understand the quality of a sample when studying the unity of voting blocs.

The leaders of legislative voting blocs that know the possibilities and constraints of how roll call voting, can affect overall discipline. In the Carrubba, Gabel & Hug paper(2008), asking for a roll call vote acted as the sequential "function of disciplining efforts", it could be that the efforts of bloc leaders might, with their own action, make voting unity seem stronger than it actually is. The model sequence is that there is a proposal for which the parties either do or do not request a roll-call vote on. If there is a vote, the party leaders set a level of discipline for deviation.

In the publication by Mühlböck & Yordanova(2012), the selection of roll call votes for study purposes comes with an expected bias due to the the fact that roll call votes might act as a strategic measure for voting blocs to achieve increased cohesion. The best way to get a glimpse of cohesion in roll-call votes is to compare situations where the process of roll call votes is automated and compare it to when it is not. This had been made possible with the case of the European Parliaments legislative issues, a final legislative decisions are called as roll call votes every time by automation after 2009(European Parliament, Rules of procedure, 2010). Interestingly enough, the voting cohesion in the European Parliament seems to have increased after roll call votes had been automated, which adds to the narrative that not only are the legislators necessarily not just pawns for pre whipped agendas, but that the understanding of cohesion in various domains can seem slippery to attain.

The PPG leaders' ambitions to curb heterogeneity within a voting bloc('whipping') is outlined in the publication by Bailer(2018), which scrutinizes these practices across five European parliaments, encompassing seventy-six PPGs. Overall it is the larger and established parties that tend to be pressured to guide their flock in a certain direction in voting. In smaller groups this is not unprecedented, but voting tends to be more relaxed, and members votes represent their conscience. The ways of which MPs are penalized for deviating from their common group view can be anything from depriving of possibility to travel to not been given media coverage. Interestingly, dissenting members might also be penalized by giving them privileges or access to delegations, so that the person in question could be steered away from e.g. a committee assignment. The data that had been collected regarding these issues was the comparison between specialist in and group leader interviews. The results stem from interview data.

The House of Lords is the upper house of the British Parliament. It is not democratically elected, but appointed by the monarch with the advice of the Prime Minister of the day and of the House of Lords Appointment Commission. Some of the seats of the Lords is acquired by inheritance. The role of the House of Lords(parliament.uk) is to check the bills for which the lower House of Commons has decided upon, but do not necessarily alter their decisions, but act more as an advisory body. The majority of the seats corresponds to the political affiliations of the House of Commons, although the House of Lords is numerically superior to the lower house. The research done of the voting cohesion of the British House of Lords by Russell(2012) implies that punishing and rewarding isn't necessarily what yields the increase in cohesion. The premise for the study, which was conducted from a Social Psychology perspective, doesn't find the deviators from cohesion to have any sort of common nominator. This is due to the scarcity of lords voting against their bloc and thus the phenomenon of 'voting deviance' being random in nature. The overall cohesion of voting in the chamber tends to be very high indeed. However there is little of no acts of whipping concerned. It therefore presumed that high cohesion can perhaps also be attained by common sense of duty and that certain plenary measures aiming to steer legislative voting might in some circumstances be excessive and counterproductive.

In 'Multiparty Government' by Laver & Schofield(1998, p. 24), the northern European intra party cohesion is coined having 'Scandinavian iron discipline'. This means that although Western European democracies tend to act with a high unanimity, in the case of the Northern European countries this is even more so. In the case of Iceland(Kristinsson, 2011), the overall cohesion in the plenary voting of the Icelandic Parliament(Althingi) is very high.

The publication by Pajala(2013) regarding voting cohesion in the Finnish Parliament 'Eduskunta' since the the end of the Second World War, reinforces that there is a strong cohesion within all the contemporary Finnish parliamentary party groups(PPGs) throughout time, and that Finnish PPGs have increased their cohesion recently. The left-right-narrative has not disappeared, but in order to understand the plenary voting preferences of legislators, a multifaceted examination on how party cohesion within a given parliament is affected throughout and within the PPGs is of heightened interest. No matter what the measuring benchmark is in regards to unity of voting bodies, the

comparison between actors is essential. It is meaningful to look for alternative spaces in which to look at differences in preference. If a government coalition tends to vote in a single bloc, understanding opposition voting could be measured against the government bloc vote.

It is also important to be aware, that the decrease in cohesion is intertwined in the size of the PPG itself. Desposato(2005) points out and suggests how the pitfalls of varying sized parties being measured via same cohesion scores could be avoided. The relative size of PPGs and their cohesion values is something that should be kept in mind when going through various sets of voting data. When looking at 'hotspots' of decreased cohesion across all the PPGs, the relative change in cohesion values can be small. This would imply that the deviance from majority position is an outlier. At the same time the same amount of deviance in regards to amount of votes, can be quite substantial to a smaller PPG. The smaller PPGs lose cohesion more rapidly, but will never drop to as low as a larger PPG would.

KD(PPG size 5)			PS(PPG size 18)		
y/(n)	n/(y)	Cohesion(RIce)	y/(n)	n/(y)	Cohesion(RIce)
5	0	1	18	0	1
4	1	0,6	17	1	0,888888888888889
3	2	0,2	16	2	0,777777777777778
2	3	-0,2	15	3	0,666666666666667
1	4	-0,6	14	4	0,555555555555556
0	5	-1	13	5	0,444444444444444
			12	6	0,333333333333333
			11	7	0,222222222222222
			10	8	0,111111111111111
			9	9	0
			8	10	-0,111111111111111
			7	11	-0,222222222222222

Figure 3. The proportionate effect on party size in regards to cohesion values. Tables represent the possible cohesion values of a small party(left) and a party more than three times larger than the small party(right). The cohesion value of the smaller party decreases more rapidly if PPG member deviates, but the worst possible cohesion can never be as bad as with the larger counterpart.

4. REPRESENTATION

4.1. Fitting Finnish politics into policy space

The publication by Koivula & al.(2019) discusses the representativeness of Finnish political parties by comparing the social status of party members to respondents who themselves claimed where most likely to side with any given political party that was available to them to vote. The data is very timely in regards to legislative's actions in 2017.

Overall, the members of parties tend to be of higher social status than the people that are willing side with them by voting. This means that the social standing of the representative differs from that of the constituency, and thus one could argue, that the representativeness can be considered symbolical. In recent times, the established larger parties had lost member base, while newer parties, whose members and voters share opinions with just some hotly debated issues, have risen in prominence. To understand this phenomenon, we can look at the negative trend on the amount of party membership in Finland(Suomen Vaalitutkimusportaali, 2016). The membership of the three largest parties(KESK, KOK, SDP) have decreased to less than half of their size in 1980. This is a tell tale sign of voters not being interested in congealing their political beliefs, and that political parties might need to move a bit in policy space to get acquainted with their constituency.

The measurement on the traditional economic left-right scale has been accompanied by the GAL/TAN scale, both of which illustrate Koivula & al. descriptions. The GAL/TAN is the abbreviation for 'Green, Alternative, Libertarian' opposed to 'Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist'. In a scale when the left and right are situated on polar opposites of a horizontal axis, the GAL/TAL cuts them vertically from the middle. The TAN end of the spectrum tends to have a strong affiliation to Euroscepticism, as demonstrated by Hooghe, Marks & Wilson(2002) in their study of 125 European political parties. Furthermore, the traditional leftist parties that had formerly been assimilated to the labour movement, and have had reservations towards the EU, have moved to the

center where supporters of European integration reside. With a few exceptions, this has happened with the Green parties all over Europe. What comes to Euroscepticism, Brigevich, Smith & Bakker(2017) note that political parties within the western and eastern European party families are distributed differently on both the Left/Right and the GAL/TAN scale.

The relatively short time eastern European countries had to endure on their own between the eras of communist totalitarianism and entering the European Union. This is reckoned to be so because of the societal cleavages that had time to develop during the Cold War era, paved a way for the traditional pre-Soviet societal cleavages to cement themselves in the power vacuum the Russian led socialist empire left behind. This is how the eastern European parties positioned economically to the left are inclined to be for law and order, whereas their western counterparts celebrate multiculturalism and liberal values. The parties on the extreme right, which have increased their support throughout Europe in recent years, are situated deep in the TAN end of the scale. The European political party competition evaluation by Marks et al.(2006) describes both the opposite radical Left-GAL and Right-TAN as Eurosceptical. However, in eastern Europe, "*...contrast to the West, radical Left and radical Tan values tend to combine in the same parties.*"

The Finnish business and policy forum EVA(Elinkeinoelämän Valtuuskunta) published a measure over societal values that indicated four of the largest parties in Finland to be more liberal than the Finnish populace on average. They are the Swedish People's Party(RKP), National Coalition(KOK), Green League(VIHR), and The Finns Party(PS). The reasons to why this is so, in regards to the minor parties, can be attributed to the high levels of attractiveness towards either liberal or conservative values on single specific areas of interest among respondents. According to the summary notes(Metelinen, 2018), this might echo the shift towards 'identity politics' that downplay robust and broad political agendas in order to focus on single hot issues. As an example of this, the Greens would have ideologically been situated left-centrist with the Social Democrats(SDP) without having exceptionally high regard towards the freedom of identity. This single aspect of the Green Party is so prominent that it drags them on the value chart away from other generally likeminded parties such as The Left Alliance and Social Democrats. With the Finns Party(PS), who's low grade on freedom of identity drags them down from the liberal end of the scale, ending at somewhere on the same line's as the Greens(VIHR) on the liberal-conservative-

axis. To put it another way, The Finns Party could be considered pretty liberal if it weren't for their negative stance towards freedom of identity. The Greens on the other hand would situate themselves more conservative left if it weren't for strong support towards the same thing that The Finns are against. In general, The Finns Party tend to be apprehensive towards The Green Party's global environmental outlook. These two parties have a different direction on the scale of preference, but they meet somewhere in the same realm. This can be understood, as Metelinen puts it, "being liberal in their mindset, for totally different reasons".

In regards to outright populism, Finland is experiencing similar shifts in political partisanship as the rest of the western democracies. The acting as cabinet ministers of The Finns Party decided to split the party in order to continue the cabinet of PM Sipilä. The cabinet was on the brink of toppling due to the other cabinet partners, distrust in the freshly elected new leadership of the Finns Party(PS). The new party chairman Jussi Halla-aho had previously appeared in media for negative views on immigration in comparison to other party platforms. His writings on cultural differences, which the Finnish Supreme Court ordered to be taken down, but published again by Keronen(2012), can be considered highly derogatory and offensive. Being elected as the chairman of PS, the government coalition partners assumed, that the vote ushered the Halla-aho line on immigration to become the new PS mainstream. This was something which the KESK and KOK representatives wanted to keep away from(Pitkänen & Westinen, 2019).

In spite of this systemic cleavage, the Eduskunta is quite peculiar in that its inherent ideological divides among MPs have traditionally been curbed to such an extent, that even MPs holding polar opposite values on the traditional left-right axis, have been able to establish working coalition cabinets(Westinen, 2015, p. 251).

The studies on voting cohesion address the deviation for members voting within any PPG as legislators, balancing their expected utility, whether it be pecuniary or otherwise. The PPG is often represented as anthropomorphic. Inside it holds individuals that are simultaneously in debt to the constituency and to the party proper for their position in parliament. The preferences of the constituency and of the party proper cannot be considered to be uniform because of disproportionate information. Given that the party proper is in the position to 'hold enough

information to represent', they will try to perhaps "please the Downsian median voter", as described by Hindmoor(2005). Because there are more than three parties active in Finnish politics at any given time, which are not outright considered to be rational players, we mustn't delve too deeply into Downs' rationale. However his influence in democratic action can be considered to be well established. In a situation where two candidates compete for office, the one with an agenda resembling closest to the median voter drawn from normal distribution, wins. When there is more than two candidates, the prediction of the probability of winning decreases. McGann, A. J., Koetzle, W., & Grofman, B. (2002) urge precaution on emphasizing Downs' model too lightly. Their study suggests that in a situation where the median space is prone to be crowded by a multitude of candidates, the winner is situated somewhere between the median voter and the population mode. In a sense, when there is glut of preference sharing the space in the proximity of the median, winners emerge from unsuspected places.

4.2. Catch-all, Populism and the Others

The peculiar aspect of contemporary policy making and the recent evolution of political parties, is the aspect of "catch-all policy" and the "catch-all party". These definitions, which are debatable, are essentially the 'increased appeasement of a heterogeneous mass of voters, by toning down established political ideologies that have formerly been in the center of established polities that sprout from the idea that political entities represent social classes.' By looking at how MPs decide to act in polarizing plenary voting issues, we can assess whether or not they are 'contaminated' by "catch-all preference" and decide to act accordingly.

The way to achieve this is to look at the PPGs political doctrines and how they manifest in plenary voting. On these grounds, and with the tools available, it should also be possible to assess the scale to how much catch-all policy is influenced by single politicians or PPGs. For this, it is needed to look at what issues decrease PPG voting cohesion in Eduskunta plenary voting, is the decrease in voting cohesion relevant and can the issues being voted on act as nominators to determine whether or not the decrease in voting cohesion is caused by catch-all influence. A brief overlook on catch-all-policy in its earliest form would be as follows:

As Europe was in a rebuilding phase once more after the devastation of the Second World War, one Otto Kirchheimer took on the task to understand the recent and yet-to-be-unfolded evolution of political parties in Western Europe. His concerns are collected together in the publications of Krouwel (2011) and Williams (2009) to unravel Kirchheimer's idea, which during his lifetime, as well as today, is quite malleable as much as fluid: 'the catch-all party'. There are a number of ways that this type of party can be described.

1) The catch-all party works to lure voters that do not adhere to the idea of traditional social classes that have previously been located the center of established parties' policy. This means that although social classes in previous might not have been fixed, citizens wouldn't experience voting for a certain party to be signaling of one's position in social hierarchy. The economic increase of Western European nations during the decades following the Second World War has raised an ever increasing amount of average people to make up the middle-class. Citizens from various backgrounds start to relish from goods that are available through pecuniary assets, which in turn have been made available through technology aided merit, so that former social classes start to lose their meaning.

2) The catch-all party prefers ideological fluidity. This can be considered to be just plain revisionism where the prior ideology is tweaked to appear more appealing, or it can be considered to be the discarding political ideologies to achieve a similar results.

3) Catch-all parties tend to have strong and prominent leaders, which convey the party's vigor and

4) they take political risks in order to increase their voter base. What this could mean is that a catch-all party might relay a message that alienates its traditional constituency, but simultaneously increases the appeal to the median voter in order to increase popularity. Kirchheimer was worried that established parties would gradually be contaminated by 'catch-all-ism'.

The race to catch the median voter has become more of an attractive action. In the absence of traditional interest group backing, which the large established parties have a firm grip on, the smaller new parties have campaigned with polarizing issues such as climate, income redistribution, immigration and suspicion towards the globalism. Most effectively growing their voter base, the Finns Party (PS) and the Green League (Vihr.) have located themselves to the opposite poles of the social dimension. These new parties also communicate their message of increasing democracy, by

aiming to decrease power distance between the party proper and their constituencies. What this means is what message populist parties in Europe (and elsewhere in the developed world) try to narrate to their would-be-supporters, that they represent the will of the people and democracy in its purest form (Bowler et al., 2017). It should also be put into consideration, that if we consider this meaning that the increase of direct democracy from the populist viewpoint aiming to reduce power of representatives in decision making, there is also discontent towards political referendums, and voters vent their frustration by siding with populists. In a populist worldview, representative elite politicians, are more 'middlemen', than representatives of the common folk. This hints to the possibility, that direct democracy to elect a populist candidate also comes with the preference of increased centralization of power, which echoes the 'catch-all party' position of having a powerful leader in the reins. -Whether this is true or not, it should be noted that the European populist movements of recent decades have overwhelmingly been lead by powerful rhetoric of single individuals.

In the Finnish example, it was the change of chairman of a populist party that brought about the event of the Finnish government resignation in 2017, as well as the split of The Finns Party. We mustn't discredit the notion of populism when looking through these issues. According to Riker (1988, 11-14), the populist interpretation of voting as a vessel of democracy in action is moral, almost magical quality to it in comparison to a liberal view, where voting is a tool, a means to an end result.

The Koivula et al. (2019) data is timely in regards to the inner workings of Finnish politics during 2017, as it was in part collected after the Sipilä cabinet took office in 2015 and before the summer of the 2017 parliamentary year. The results regarding issues on income inequality, immigration and climate, positioned the Finns and the Greens as polar opposites. The results didn't support the hypothesis that smaller parties have reduced social status differences between party members and voters, not at least how members and voters themselves perceive it. However, it is evident that the Finns have tapped into the voters, which are likely to be against outside threats such as increase of immigration. The opposing sides in social issues tend to race towards the median voter, and meeting at the center on the left-right-axis. However, in unaccustomed events, it could be that the so-called median is not situated in the place we expect it to be. In the case of the Finns Party, or

any other European populist party for that matter, a crisis can act as an aid in gaining ground over mainstream parties. As implied by Ylä-Anttila(2017), the economic concerns over the northern EU countries bailing out their southern counterparts debts was the backdrop of the populist landslide in the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2011. The Finns Party managed to sell the Finnish populace the idea that the eurozone elite was fooling Finland to pay for expenses they themselves didn't have the possibility to enjoy. The mainstream parties rushing towards the median value position found their expected voter base thinned as the attractiveness of agendas had shifted away from the mainstream, and into areas where xenophobia and opposition of elites reside. When large parties rush to the Centre, trying to conquer the hearts and minds of the median voter, the policy space of the median voters becomes crowded for many simultaneous actors. Simultaneously the fringe policy space leaves its (smaller compared to the mainstream)policy actors more proliferated in comparison to the larger parties. What is also important to note with this kind of populist phenomenon, is that it is enforced by the fact that populist agendas are not immediately accessible to the mainstream parties, as they would need time to either convince the electorate of their position as counter-populist elite or wait for the voters to forget this. It seems that if the policy space where the larger parties fish for voters, gets crowded, and simultaneously the policies untouchable to the larger parties increase, the populist party might get the upper hand.

When one tries to understand how political parties establish their activities, it can be beneficial to look at are the differences which separate the parties from one another. This means that it is useful to arrange the ideological aspects of several political parties in a common space. One could argue, that a party is the way it is because another party is stands for something else. Established political parties tend to carry a lot of historical baggage with them in terms of who's been supporting them across time.

4.3. Power Triad is shaken

In the case of Finland, the brief and compact summary by Sundberg(1994) opens up the way political parties have experienced pressure to become more dynamic in their relation to voters, and also to evolve to legitimize their place in a post-industrial society. This is important to note, because the largest political parties in Finland have grown connected to interest organizations

whose original function was to mobilize social classes before and during industrialization. The social democrats(SDP) were tightly connected to labor unions, of whose power the employer organizations were actively trying to curb, manifesting in the policies of the bourgeoisie party, National Coalition(KOK). The Agrarian League, later to be known as the Centre Party(KESK), were focusing establishing voter bases in the rural areas and their producers' organizations whilst Finland, as it happens, was a late bloomer in industrialization(Michelsen, Kuisma, 1992). Paradoxically this has made The Centre Party the largest party both organizationally and by support, however it is practically a pariah in the largest metropolitan area. These, the largest three and their intermingling strifes have had a huge influence on how Finnish politics has developed into during a century of independence. The concentration of power to the organization close to the largest three parties has not gone unnoticed, but the vicarious way the interest organizations and the parties have conducted their mutual businesses, seem to have cemented the largest parties into their top positions. This could be considered as a text book example of the workings of a 'mass party'.

Christoforos Vernardakis(2012) examined the evolution of mass parties in his publication involving the peculiarities of Greek political parties. The emergence of the PASOK party after the tumultuous era of 'dictatorship of the colonels' was in its essence, a populist movement. The feeding of the population's urge to increase consumption via the adaption economic liberalism spiraled to excesses where prosperity started to become a borrowed asset. As these economic failings overflowed into the everyday occurrences of the people, meaning that the people's credit became intertwined to the support of the ruling populist policy, it was only a matter of time when Greece needed a helping hand from other EU member states in order to pursue the upkeep of their normalized level of consumption(Arvanitopoulos, 2018). The irony of the Greek case is that populist policy can vicariously be the result of EU-critical populism seeping into the parliamentary realms of other western democracies. Finland was one of these countries. Because this power play is intricately connected to social classes, the constituencies' views on who belongs to what social class cannot be discarded up front in legitimizing power allocation between parties. Because of the conjointment of a political party and an interest group begets payoffs, the questioning of the role of the interest group in society is prone to affect the probability of the large parties' ultimate payoffs negatively. The Greek government bailout of 2010, being negotiated between PM Papandreou and

the European Troika, was so unpopular within the EU, that within a year parties like the Finns Party had swollen from a fringe group, to a key player in Finnish politics.

Looking at the movement in policy space by French parties in the Fifth Republic, Hale Williams(2009) is inclined to conclude that over time the French political parties displayed centralizing tendencies in their policy. This could mean that the assumptions Kirchheimer made as a contemporary, about political parties evolving to catch the median voter where feasible, but in the French case happened regardless of political parties. In addition to this, the assumption that catch-all tendency would undermine small parties was premature. The organization itself, regardless of size, can be a substantive determinant.

In the 2009 publication by Christopher S. Allen, the 'catch-all-party thesis' is assessed against the political events of Germany and Sweden. In both of these cases, the social democrats mended their policies in order to engage with the median voter in the political center. This sort of movement was initially very similar to what Kirchheimer originally predicted would happen when large political entities form political alliances to catch a larger share of voters. This activity revealed itself to be unfit to retrieve long lasting political prowess. When the social democrats seemed to abandon their proletarian roots, the voters that found appeasement in these traditional cleavages turned to other, more opportunistic movements on the fringes of the same political space that the social democrats now thought of as worthy of neglect. As the EU grew and blue collar voters found aspects as globalism and increased immigration suspicious, former fringe groups as Green and Leftist parties became more prominent, as they didn't have to fight as much for the left wing voters who the social democratic parties 'left to their own devices', to establish voter base within higher educated technocrats and middle class. Before the first decade of the 21 century had come to a close, the catch-all policy of moving towards right-to-the-center, had made the renewed social democracy lose its dominance. This sort of activity seems to have opened a gateway to other movements from the fringes of Western politics.

5. LITERATURE REVIEW

Distinguishing voting blocs is something that has been of great interest in scholars studying large voting bodies such as the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA), as well as the United States Congress. The overlying assertion is that voting blocs tend to form even in situations where legislative voters tend to vote unison based on common agendas and policy even without mutual counsel. The work of Ball(1951), MacRae(1954) and Lijphart(1963) are quite robust in findings about voting in unison being more prevalent with groups that share attributes of geographical or demographical similarity. However, by utilizing statistical data, we can achieve increased certainty that the discovered results are not contaminated by policy issues alone, as cohesion across the legislature might appear in unexpected places. This means that possible log-rolling policies of voting blocs can result in unexpected and counter intuitive movement across policy lines. This means that elected officials will work/vote counter to their own policy in order to please political opponents, expecting the opponent to return the favor.

A meaningful way to determine the position of any party in any given policy, is to make comparison between other political actors regarding concurrent issues. The publication by Poole & Rosenthal(1985) and also of Ordeshook(1986) demonstrate the movement of legislators in policy space. The legislators might not only move in counterintuitive directions, but do not necessarily have perfect knowledge of outcomes or the movement of rival factions. Therefore there's room for error, not only about where the movement in policy space is headed, but what exactly is the countermeasure for the movement.

Even in situations where the movement is based on single 'Yes' and 'No' alternatives(and in lot of the cases this is the way the situations are framed), we should be able to scrutinize whether the countermovement of 'Yes' opposed to 'No'), is headed to an opposite direction in policy space, or perhaps even the same direction with varying volume. In addition, possible selection biases on the data are prone to appear if not all of the data is available(Hug, 2005).

The influential study by Sieberer(2006) on the cohesion of eleven Western parliamentary democracies since 1945, not only outlines the terminology of cohesion studies, but also describes the troubles of representation among MPs as a mouthpiece of their own constituency, as well as the constituency of the entire PPG. The central themes in cohesion studies are the unity of preference, as well as the underlying threat of punitive measures aimed at keeping the voting bloc in check. In regards to deviating from PPG line, the most volatile PPG members are the ones that in the Westminster style system would be called 'backbenchers', the ones without larger responsibility to speak on behalf of the PPG, or who do not hold a portfolio.

The task of finding uncontaminated information from voting data is difficult, as the measures inside PPGs aimed at increasing cohesion can make the MPs vote in a manner that is signaling false unity. The study by Carubba, Gabel & Hug (2008) make it very clear, that if parliamentary roll call votes are requested because they are a measure of ensuring maximum cohesion, the specifically requested votes themselves do not indicate genuine preference. The PPGs variety on opinion, size, as well as the initiate positioning in policy space make the movement within policy space difficult to predict in a single universal manner.

The study on European Union states voting cohesion within the United Nations General Assembly by Hosli et al.(2010) demonstrates how the enlargement of the EU can be seen as a catalyst for an enforcement of European states to vote as a single voting bloc. The voting data from UNGA sessions from the 1950s onward up until the beginning of the 21st century reveal the gradual curbing of the variety of voting options European member states have preferred. The options in this case being the 'Yes', 'No' or to 'Abstain'. The comparative number of 'No' votes starts to decline as Italy enters the EU, but until new member states enter, a bulge of 'Abstain' votes emerges, until dwindling in the end of the 1980s. At this time the proportionate amount of 'Yes' votes starts to dominate the representative votes, as the proportionate amount of agreeability increased. It is feasible to think that legislation such as the Single European Act(SEA) enforced in 1987, brought about the shift towards a heightened unity among the EU states in UNGA, mirroring the unity it had overall. The constant sum game of voting in an environment such as UNGA can result in situations of poor cohesion, where the shares of voting possibilities are equally distributed, meaning the lack

of unity. With time and active lobbying of common unifying themes, unity grows, meaning that one voting option might become dominant.

In Finnish context, Subgrouping the voting data is something that helps in determining the preferences of both single legislators and PPGs. The work by Pajala(2010) distinguishes the themes voted in the plenary sessions of the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta. These are subcategories that extract hidden information about legislator preference. The personal preferences for an MP are the pork-barrel amendments that can be issued regarding a bill. These sort of amendments can only be issued regarding the MP's own district, and can therefore be vital to the legislator's future career prospects as a representative of a constituency. The budgetary votes are dominant in Eduskunta, and their amount somewhat skew the cohesion values compared to similar parliament settings. This means that the votes that show prominent decrease in cohesion on both government and opposition sides, tend not to be budgetary votes. What it comes to abstentions, they are regarded as a rare event in Eduskunta. The importance of plenary votes can be determined on whether they are the final votes or not. The final votes cannot be altered by amendments.

In the study on the cohesion of the Icelandic Althingi, Kristinsson(2011) argues that some votes might be technical in nature, and therefore the final votes are essential in determining whether the cohesion value on the issue has validity. The Icelandic roll call votes in plenary sessions are scarce and the relative small size of the parliament itself makes it possible for single MPs to request a roll call vote. Also, the way MPs are selected in the Althingi is, at least compared to other Northern European counterparts, very inclusive. This should decrease cohesion due to lack of centralized structures in nomination. The primaries are open and the lay members of parties are usually included in the selection of party delegates. The party cohesion in the Icelandic Althingi is however not affected negatively from this sort of openness in the selection of its policy-makers.

Whether or not the final votes on bills is thought of as important to legislators, the study by Mühlböck & Yordanova(2012) present the Members of European Parliament(MEPs) by acting out agency of two principles. As with national parliaments, the MEPs have commitments to higher, in this case the transnational European Parliament level, as also on a national level. The roll-call votes in the EP are expected to be, as much as in any parliament for that matter, prone to both acting out

in fear of penalizing by the group and by signaling expected cohesiveness. The introduction of automated final roll-call votes in the EP since 2009 might have made the former selection bias (roll-call votes on request) disappear and thus make the data on cohesion more robust. Expecting to find cohesion on roll-call votes decrease due to the diminishing of whipping or urge in signaling, the opposite happened. Cohesion increased possibly because the automation of roll-call votes of less important issues made MEPs more relaxed in siding with the EPG line.

Measuring the cohesion of several PPGs against one another should at least be a determinant of the position PPGs take on the economic Left/Right axis, where the Right represents the increased economic power for the individual, as the Left represents safeguarding the masses by concentrating economic power to the realm of the state.

Pajala(2013) graphically demonstrates the movement in policy space in the work involving Eduskunta plenary votes since World War II up until the year 2011. For exemplifying the movement in policy space, several plenary vote mean values prior 1991 are discussed in order to understand the current state of Eduskunta cohesion. The plenary votes after 1991, deemed the third era of plenary vote legacy in Finland, is the most salient involving contemporary plenary sessions. The government cohesion has strong unity against the coalition of a heterogenous body of the opposition, which loses their shared total cohesion time and time again. The model which is aimed to deepen the knowledge retrieved through the Rice Index(*Figure 1.*), compares the position of the opposition against the strong cohesion of the government coalitions strongest cohesive point. The model yields vectors showcased as a fan that indicates how far the opposition parties are in comparison to the right most position of the government coalition. Simplistically, the government coalition, being the primary catalyst for drawing legislature, tends to have incentive to be cohesive simply for this reason. Therefore the government standpoint mean can act as a benchmark for everything else that happens, primary what the opposition coalition decides to vote.

Political parties are not unitary in form. According to Katz & Mair(1993), the organizational structures, activities and evolution of parties depend on, among other things, their supporter base and their positioning in a market space of voter-attractable ideas. The central office is a place where, at least in a nominal sense, the party policy decides and is distributed further. The central

office is of primary importance to 'mass parties of integration', which have corresponded to the political needs for representation of a specific subset of society. Traditional labor movements are an example of this. The central office is however of little significance to a 'cadre party', as it is generally clustered around single powerful candidates and their issues, as well as keeping the power distance between delegates and lay members short. This sort of party works more or less as a 'utility maximizing company', aiming to centralize power to its own elites.

The perception of the types of parties and their evolution is further portrayed by Enroth(2017). He argued that phenomena such as cartellization of political parties does not necessarily mean that these parties do absolutely not represent their constituencies, but the problem is that it is difficult to retrieve the information when and how representation takes place, if it does take place.

When a mass party of integration orientates to act as a catch-all party, (it is argued) this results in the central office losing power to public officials that aim to convey the party message to the electorate by more direct means. In this sort of circumstance, the central office becomes more of a service provider. Hence the parties are predisposed to a constant sum game (The constant sum being the total number of eligible voters of all of the political entities) to attract following, as well as the possibility(or increased probability)of change in conduct.

As Wolinetz(2002) described it, as a party begins to compete in elections, it wakes up from its slumber to fulfill the role of a traditional 'mass party' or a 'cadre party'. The party gets together for a fervent discussion of its policies and about the measures to reach the electorate. The parties that engage in 'catch-all policy', the catching of the undecided electorate by stretching the boundaries of the party's sphere of influence are of great interest in the study of western democracies. This is caused by the pressure of the traditional parties, acquiring their votes from traditional socio-economical cleavages, to look for new voter bases from an increasing middle-class society. The movement in looking for these new areas of support can be either from left to right or vice versa. This sort of movement involves the dilution of at least some aspects of the party's ideology, but the most intriguing part of this sort of action, is that other parties might be prone to be contaminated by this sort of activity as well.

Wolinetz aimed at establishing a new way of classifying party properties by their aimed end results, for which there are three. The *'policy seekers'* work to achieve a foothold in policy space by attractive ideas of how liberal democracy could work. Their policies can be left and liberal, as well as right wing with well defined policies. The *'vote-seekers'* aim to win elections everywhere possible and utilize non-political marketing machinery with a small and tight-knit central party organization. Example of this being the German Christian Democratic Union. The *'office-seekers'* are ready to give up rigid policy goals to get into power. Their position towards political competition cannot be too harsh, because of their objective is to be able to establish affluent coalitions with increased payoffs for themselves. Though varying in size, they are usually connected with established interest groups in order to function. These descriptions are not to be taken as strict ones, but help to understand the ways political parties in western democracies move in policy space. It is possible that by catching a larger amount of votes in elections, parties use a composite of ways to achieve their objectives. Therefore there isn't just catch-all parties that suddenly arrive in the political arena, but established parties can adopt policies that help them move about in a catch-all manner. However, according to Wolinetz, it is the *'vote-seeking parties'* that tend to be the *'catch-all parties'* that are volatile from election to election. These parties take risks, downplay ideology and their policies are directed by their leader.

Political coalition do not only happen when likeminded parties work together. In fact, the study of political coalitions has for a long time tried to find the right nominators in understanding the payoffs coalition partners are expected to get. As illustrated by Hix et al.(2005) about the cohesion of the European Parliament, the pivotal players in a coalition can sometimes be small parties that supplement the policies of the larger parties. By pivotal it is meant that the small parties can act as a tool to achieve the minimal winning coalition. There is also the possibility to build a coalition through minimal agreeability, which could be an explanation for large and comparatively homogenous groups sticking together despite of disagreements on national level.

The paper by Hindmoor(2005) about the British New Labour rising to new prominence in the 1990s has reservations about the economic model by Downs(1957) about political parties' movement in policy space. It is true that the New Labour changed their policy derived from their prominent political thinkers from the beginning of the 20th century(Gani, 2015). By decreasing the emphasis

on the tracts of the UK Labour Party's which had socialist connotations. Eventually the constitution was rewritten as to be more attractive to the median voter, leading to the then Labour leader Tony Blair to become the youngest Prime Minister since 1812. Hindmoor argued that although the New Labour was able to catch the majority vote by moving right in policy space, it was also able to make the electorate to perceive the the Labour movement in a new light. The peculiar aspect of this, according to Hindmoor, was that the Downsian model suggests the voters having perfect information on policy. Therefore its presumptions on the prevailing of the New Labour could have differed to what actually occurred.

The description of political position grown out of proportion does not help understanding how political entities go about their business. The enrichment of policy space with additional direction to take(in addition to socio-economical Left and socio-economical Right) can help at pinpointing more accurately the political party's or party group's course. In the work by Benoit & Laver(2006), the geographic of the subjective policy space of a party illustrates why individuals holding differing political beliefs find it hard to work together, and also the fact that the subjective differences in the political landscape can help in interpreting group(as to some degree the individuals')political actions. But the problem that is encapsulated within, is that the political positioning does not only involve the positioning of a political entity in policy space given a specific issue, but also the way the other political entities move within the same political space. Therefore the preferences of political entities(such as PPGs in this case) cannot be necessarily examined without looking at the preferences of similar entities that move in the same policy space. Quoting Benoit & Laver(2006) *"Indeed humans who are... unable to see the world through the eyes of others... are typically considered... mentally disturbed and or sociopathic."*

It is very difficult to create a single universal model for political competition. The policy dimensions considered important to one party, may not be considered at all important to the next. Therefore, when the party adjusts its position on issues, the movement in policy space depicting the event, is subjective to the party's preferences. In other words, the actions political parties take in regards to issues do not yield a certain sort of outcome. Due to the mutable components that characterize the political party, it is often depicted as an anthropomorphic actor. To find the policy dimensions that are most important to any given party in any given setting, it could be helpful to

flesh out the most important data involved by assessing whether it is natural data or just second hand information. The former can be used to formalize the technical nature of phenomena such as voting cohesion, whereas the latter, such as information derived from interview data, are always more susceptible to a range of biases. An example of this could be that the person being interviewed gives answers that he/she thinks the interviewee wants to hear. The problem with this sort of data acquisition is that the information gathered really manifests itself during the interview, unlike datasets that are formed through party actors 'on the go'. The electronically collected data from plenary votes is one of these circumstances. To make movement in policy space more easily understandable, Benoit & Laver(2006, p.72) approach the issue with an allegory. The visual perception of the human eye for color is multifaceted and is usually controlled by things like 'hue' , 'brightness'. The colors on a computer screen look different when any one of these aspects are adjusted. However, in order for the human eye to see the color change, the adjustable values are connected to a degree. "... *Hue of an object cannot be assigned without also assigning its brightness...*". To understand this allegory we can go back to the political positioning of the Eduskunta parties PS and Vihr., which in spite of their massive differences in one axis, led them to have similarities in another.

The scale of socio-economics is the most used metric to identify a preferred policy for a party. In the Finnish context these aspects of both 'social' and 'economical' are rather distinct from one another, and drive policy on which ever side a party tends to take. In comparison, political parties in European countries have their character defined by the position on EU-polity. In Finland this aspect of political parties tends to be weak(Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 132).

The study of the socio-economic left-right factor doesn't explain everything about policy, nor does it help in integrating an infinite amount of additional factors if the results should be kept elegant. However, the position a party takes on a certain issue will affect its movement on the socio-economic scale (Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 153). An example of this could be the stance a political party takes towards environmental policy, encompassing the preference of(among others)lowering carbon emissions and curbing deforestation. If a party looks at there sort of values favorably, it can affect its velocity and distance in the movement on the socio-economic left-right-axis.

Environmentalist parties typically situate themselves on the left side of the Likert scale. Therefore their preferences lie within the direction of a strong state control of economic resources. Therefore it is in their position to favor the distributing of government subsidies towards environmental issues, rather than calling for the same end results be met by the power of market liberalization. The movement from left to right is therefore more rigid than the other way around, unless there are other grave issues that play part in the introduction of such measures. The positioning on the right is of economic self-determination, which ultimately coexists with individual responsibility (of one's own opportunity cost at least). Therefore on a longer timespan, all other things equal, the movement from right to left is a safer bet than movement towards left to right. This example, which is not applicable in real life, illustrates the theoretical movement in a single policy dimension by supposing that the opportunity of a shared cost trumps the opportunity of shared responsibility.

Looking for a publication that can help at getting as broad a picture as possible about legislative voting, Hix & Noury's 'Government-Opposition or Left-Right' (2016) is comprehensive. The study takes into account the possibilities hinted by previous publications about the importance of party positioning on the Government-Opposition axis as opposed to simply determining whether policy is driven by a traditional ideological left-right split. The vast amount of data looks at the legislative votes in sixteen parliaments across the world, which utilize roll call voting in its decision making. Legislators, as the representatives of their constituency, are expected to have payoff to please the constituency, as their respected cost have been to cast a vote. They are in a position of being the agent in multiple principle-agent-problems. They are responsible to both the constituency as well as the party. Connected into this is the cost the legislator might suffer from voting against coalition or party lines. These aims become blurred as the issues are decided in a case-by-case-manner, and the expected payoffs are covered by the general will of the Government or Opposition.

The backlash to post-materialistic ideas within the general populace feeds polarization and decreases willingness for public debate. One could argue that populism only describes the other side of the argument. If there is a huge increase in polarization, there could possibly be an umbrella term to help understand the political polar opposites moving about simultaneously. This is why societal occurrences and political cleavages resulting from it could perhaps be looked at through (but not being restricted to) the idea of 'catch-all policy' and how it has evolved after the concerns

Kirchheimer had about the post WWII Europe (Safran, 2009). The policies of both Nazi Germany were so close in recent memory at this point, that the party that 'catches all' was undoubtedly formed from the trepidation that such totalitarianism would possibly happen again. The idea behind this was that a party that can gain control over extra-parliamentary actors such as trade unions, and at the same time have populist attractiveness towards the majority of voters, can also actively reduce the strength of a possible opposition. Kirchheimer also saw that the influence of mass media would make politics a game of unbridled popularity seeking. Because of the horrors of WWII still in recent memory, the original envisaged causal chain had the end result being something on the lines of what happened in Germany when a fringe group suddenly becomes the largest party and starts to impose its doctrines to everyone else. Kirchheimer didn't live to see the emergence of post-materialistic movements in western democracies, and that they would be complimented by political parties from various ideological standpoints. Environmentalism or nationalist fervor in Europe and in the United States have personal appeal in the voting public in an era where real fears of totalitarianism, either of the left or right, glooms in the distant past.

When looking at the overarching interest for populist policy in western democracies, insecurity for one's wellbeing is something that, according to Inglehart & Norris (2017), acts as the catalysts in the disdain towards post-materialistic outlook on life and society in general. Generally speaking, the possibilities of a high standard of living overall increased interest towards a post-materialistic outlook. This is generally the interest in social equity. In recent decades, the composition of the political parties increasing their sphere of influence within Europe has revealed peculiarities in how these parties work, as portrayed by Marks et al (2006). If we would need to look at statistical measures which could demonstrate the changes illustrates the position the populations of western democracies have, the life expectancy measure is something that is worth looking at. High income countries have experienced increase in life expectancy for decades, but during recent years life expectancy has stagnated and with some countries, turned to the decrease. In the United States, life expectancy has stagnated in comparison to other high income societies. According to the study by Ho & Hendi (2018), this trend paints a shadow of suspicion about life expectancy in the US. A question can also emerge, about whether or not this trend is correlated in some way with the same insecurities that spawn materialistic viewpoints.

In Europe, the ways political parties act out their role in policy space differs depending on where , and in which country, the party is situated. In addition to this, the parties that are either left- or right wing, grab on to ideas considered to be populist in different ways. Left wing parties tend to take differing roles in western Europe, than in the former Soviet block. Being at the epicenter of the dissolution of the iron curtain, the newly unified Germany of the late 1990s could be considered an interlude to the populist wave that emerged in the wake of massive European integration of the 2010s. However, populism didn't come right after the Cold War ended. Something else happened first. The German SPDs acts to delude its connotation on labor class and tried to attract the attention of voters of a higher social status. Initially it worked much the same way as with the New Labour movement in the United Kingdom(Blyth & Katz, 2005). However, the alienation from the base following through catch-all policies can arguably make a party's position erratic, as the former mass following of these parties started to look for 'non-elitist' candidates(Patton, 2014).

6. EVENTS LEADING TO 'JUNE'

6.1. Old trends and new

Finnish parliamentary democracy has a history predating its independence. Finland enjoys the oldest universal suffrage in Europe and election results are determined by the d'Hondt formula (Nurmi & Nurmi, 2015). The makeup of socio-political cleavages in Finland is illustrated by the presence of four influential political parties throughout the history of Eduskunta. These parties are the Centre Party (KESK), National Coalition Party (KOK), Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Swedish People's Party (RKP). The Swedish speaking minority has had RKP established as a power base to uphold the culture of Swedish speakers, meaning mainly to withhold the position of Swedish language as the second language of rule, side by side with Finnish.

During the decades before entering the Second World War and many decades after, the parliamentary system was relatively unstable if measured by the longevity of cabinets. The tables that illustrate the work of Laver & Schofield (1998, p. 148), tell the tale of immense instability in cabinet composition up until the 1970s. During the time after 1945 up until 1971, the average lifecycle of an acting cabinet was only thirteen months. The average amount of political parties involved in these cabinets was five. For comparison's sake, the average lifecycle of twelve western European cabinets (including the nordic countries Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) during the same timeframe, was 27 months. The average amount of parties involved (including Finland) was 3.4. This however doesn't mean outright that the excess amount of parties tend to make the cabinet volatile to imploding. What it might suggest, is that too many cooks working on the same dish, might 'botch the seasoning'. What this means is, that the cabinets are more durable when the majority coalition cabinets that are either single majority, or minimum winning cabinets compared to the Opposition. They also tend to last longer than cabinets that have a surplus in majority. An allegory of this would be like there is too much parties sharing the goods. It seems that a minimum winning cabinet is almost as strong as a majority cabinet.

The way Finnish cabinets have been formed seems to have an enormous urge for inclusivity, meaning that common burdens of the nation should be shouldered together (Westinen, 2015 p. 251)

The three large parties introduced earlier, radiate the tripolar balance (Westinen, 2015 p. 82) of power based on established socio-socio-political cleavages. The National Coalition (KOK), which, from its establishment in 1918, has kept close ties to the employer organizations and has splintered once when the Christian Democrats (KD) formed their own fringe group based on christian nationalism that opposed increasing socio-liberal attitudes.

The current Social Democratic movement in Finland is based on the work of the minority group that abandoned violent efforts in the wake of the Finnish civil war. It splintered in the 1950s, when the group coining itself The Social Democratic Union of Workers and Smallholders (TPSL) were worried about the SDPs leadership's efforts in trying to dilute the emphasis on class struggle and pull the party in the direction of a catch-all party in regards to ideology. The Finnish Social Democrats trace their history to the end of the 19th century and have been the main party backed by the labor unions, the same way as its nordic counterparts. One thing it doesn't share with its nordic counterparts, is the skepticism towards EU integration. Quite the opposite, it was the Finnish SDP with its allies that were originally thought of entering the EU could be the best way to achieve political goals (Raunio, 2010).

The Centre Party (KESK) with its heritage of supporting the agricultural producers as well as small farmers, has had its supporters spread across the sparsely populated country. The small farmers grievances towards large agricultural producers has made it a coalition collaborator in various cabinets with the Social Democrats (SDP). The tensions inside the Centre Party (KESK) resulted in the establishing of the Finnish Rural Party (SMP), which had a formidable success with its rhetoric of a new cleavage between the political establishment and the common people. Eventually the SMP also split because of personality differences. The splinter group this time being the Finnish People's Unity Party (SKYP). SMP experienced severe financial troubles and consequent bankruptcy in the wake of the Finnish recession of the 1990s (Arter, 2010) and its active members ultimately found a political home from the new Finns Party (PS) led by Timo Soini. The Finns Party (PS) splintered once more during 2017, curbing the distrust between coalition members and enabling for the Sipilä

cabinet to remain in power. The splinter group see-sawed on what would be an appropriate name for the new party, but eventually settled in Blue Reform(Sininen Tulevaisuus, SIN). Therefore, possibly because of the changing cleavage structure in the developed world, the splintering of parties seem to be more prevalent in the former agricultural section(base of which is KESK)of the Finnish power politics tripolarity.

Political parties splitting is not a new phenomenon in Finland. However, there are only few cases where a formerly non-existing or unknown political entity suddenly arrives, increasing its holdings of substantial power in Eduskunta. The classic example of this is the sudden emergence of the Finnish People's Democratic League(SKDL), that was a left-wing cooperation party mostly consisting of members supporting communist ideals(Ruosteenoja, 2007, p.4). In historical perspective, SKDLs arrival on the political stage in October 1944 happened exactly after the ban on communist activities in Finland had been lifted a month earlier. In the 1945 parliamentary elections SKDL prevailed as the second largest party in Eduskunta with almost a quarter of the seats.

Another surprising turn in Finnish Parliamentary democracy was the landslide victory by the Finns Party in the 2011 parliamentary elections, resulting in the increase of 34 seats in the 200 seat Eduskunta. The reason why the split of The Finns party should perhaps also be considered as a similar turning point in Finnish parliamentary democracy, to that of the events of 1945 and 2011, is because the splinter group Blue Reform managed to keep on to several important cabinet portfolios. There are two sides to this. Although a fringe group holding the positions of Foreign minister, Minister of Defense, Minister for Sport Culture and European Affairs, Minister of Social Affairs and Health and Minister of Labour, the estimated budget of all of these ministries exceeds that of the ministries held by the largest party (KESK) by almost four fold. According to Laver & Schofield(1998, p. 172-174), it seems that in several European democracies, larger parties in the coalition tend to give away portfolios to smaller parties that act as a sort of an auxiliary force in the building of a coalition. Cabinet building is a constant sum game, where the larger players lure smaller parties into cooperation with cabinet portfolios that might seem attractive, but take a huge chunk of the state budget compared to the ministries held by e.g. the party of the Prime Minister. This could be used as a way of finding a scapegoat in advance if things at the end of the term don't

work out very well with such 'expensive' ministries such as the Ministry Social Affairs and Health or the Ministry of Education and Culture(Valtion budjetti, 2019).

6.2. Populism creeping over

The wording frequently used in trying to describe recent political upheaval in western Europe, is 'the rise of populism'. This phenomenon's rise to prominence has of rising interest to scholars of the political discipline ever since the Euro Crisis of 2008. Outlined by Copelovitch, Frieden & Walter(2016), the crisis was due to disproportionate intra-European growth, leading to incentivizing of lending in certain areas of the European Monetary Union(EMU). To give a realistic picture of what sort of phenomenon is at hand, the study by Algan et al.(2017) which distresses that the increased economic instability has fueled both distrust in governments in the western developed world, as it has fueled distrust in interpersonal relations.

Not all of EU member states have experienced the near catastrophic unemployment levels like that in the southern most parts of Europe, but it seems that the relative amount of interest in populist policy is more prevalent in regions most hit by effects of globalism such as unemployment. The rising discontent towards elected leaders is also supported by Pew Research(2013). The anti establishment upheaval of the masses on different parts of Europe become localized inside countries. An example of this could be the right-wing populism in the north of Italy, which has experienced very different circumstances than the south of the country. The distrust in transnational political bodies and their representativeness across Europe has spawned the electoral success of both populist Left and populist Right depending on which one taps into the vein of a certain region's national sentiment.

Unemployment seems to have a strong effect on the peripheral economic losers of globalization and resulted in the population starting to favor regional nationalistic ideals. Examples of this are the French Front Nationale, AfD in Germany, the Austrian Freedom Party, Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn of Greece, the Swedish Democrats and UKIP in Britain. However, because of the phenomenon is affecting all high income democracies, we can see parallels to Donald Trump being elected president of the United States. Because insecurities are not only the breeding ground to right

wing parties, we can also see left-wing populist fringe groups, such as Podemos in Spain, experiencing relative rise in popularity. It is documented that historical economic insecurities have had similar outcomes, but the fact that the European Union has had the intent of slowly and steadily tried to become a body to increase happiness and security to its peoples, which still spawns populist outcry, tells of structural inadequacies of its makeup.

As the rise of Right-TAL-populism has managed to influence every state in Europe during recent times, the reservations of mainstream centrist parties to this new phenomenon has increased. What has also increased is the self-feeding of discontent in confrontational nationalist parties. Despite The Finns Party(PS) getting a landslide victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections, becoming the third largest party, it didn't rise into a cabinet position(Westinen, 2015 p. 250; Pajala, 2013). The reservations on the Finns Party left them with no other options than to mobilize a strong Eurosceptic opposition. The Finns Party decided to remain in opposition for the time being and their voters tended to agree(Raunio, 2016). Before the 2011 parliamentary election the Finns Party had naturally become close to their supporters in anti-immigration online communities and were able to recruit members and parliamentary candidates(Hatakka, 2017). Anti-immigration policy had been a marginal phenomenon in the sense that it had been discussed in a very consensual manner. The Finns Party started to change this by its activists taking on the online community, much the same way as other nationalist anti-immigration activists and anti-jihadists across Europe and America.

7. PROTOCOL OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING

7.1. Modeling legislative action

It is proper to distinguish the way that legislative decision making is conducted in Eduskunta. The protocol in question is quite weighty, but it helps to understand what sort of journey an initiative goes through until it can ultimately be discussed in plenary session and be written down in the law books. However, in the Finnish Eduskunta, a bill doesn't need a vote for it to become law. The plenary session can just decide to be unanimous(Pajala, 2010). All information regarding the Eduskunta protocol is mainly referring to the Legislative Drafting Guide of the Collection of Finnish Laws, Finlex(lainvalmistelu.finlex.fi).

When changes to the legislature is being demanded, it can happen from one of six sources: The Government, the Parliament Eduskunta, certain ministry, stakeholders or or authorities responsible for implementation, the European Union(EU), whether the initiative is being of instrumental or legislative nature, or from citizens themselves. The last one mentioned of initiative starting points had been put into place in 2012(Finlex, 2012) and gives the citizens a more direct way to contribute to legislative affairs in Eduskunta, if one or several citizens of voting age are able to collect 50,000 supporting statements within six months. The citizen's initiative does appear in legislative plenary votes to a degree in the plenary sessions of 2017 as well, in the case where an already passed citizen's initiative would be revoked(Pohjanpalo, 2017).

After an initiative has been delivered to the proper authorities, being the appropriate ministry, with also the ministry of justice playing a large role, proper measures are done so that the draft can become an actual bill. However, for any initiative to be ready for the assessment of a parliamentary plenary vote, it must first go through four cycles of preparation, where preparatory bodies examine the legal aspects of the initiative, as well as monetary aspects regarding it. Consultation is also

asked from stakeholders for the same reason. One of the cycles can last from four to six weeks, as possible alternative options are considered and the draft, so it can become a bill, is meticulously scrutinized to create a proper legally valid text both in Finnish and Swedish.

After preparation the bill is delivered to the Government to look at it once more and make necessary changes. Several cycles to change the bill can be made and the minister that is responsible for the bill in question can revoke it at this point. This means that if the bill concerns e.g. forestry, the minister of agriculture and forestry should have an increased interest on the lifecycle of the bill.

After the bill is given an "ok" by the government, it is printed and dispatched to the Eduskunta plenary session, where it is reviewed once more in committees linked to the proper ministry and needed changes are requested with the state officials contributing. Possible amendments are proposed and the bill draft is then sent to committees so that further drafting is contributed by professionals of the given issue and addresses countering the proposal can be drafted. The committees can now decide whether to go forward with the bill or not. The countering views for the bill are examined by the ministry officials, so that if the bill can be brought to a plenary session with the views of all it concerns are taken into account. After all this it is time for Eduskunta to take measure on what to do with the bill. Whether or not a vote on the bill is issued, depends on the dealings inside the plenary session. The vote regarding a bill is possible to arrange in a manner of legislators being for or against it. However, it is quite usual that the propositions by MPs are made to compete head-to-head against other proposals depending on what the order of the vote is.

The decision over the order of the vote, which is in the hands of the chairman council(Puhemiesneuvosto). This is an issue that should be highlighted. Ordeshook draws(1986, p. 56, 65-66) from the Arrow's Impossibility and Condorcet paradox literature and states that this sort of agenda setting eats away from simple majority decisions being the best indicator of proper democratic process. The order of issues opposing one another is not trivial, because there is a possibility for the outcome to change in an alternative order of vote. For an example we can look at the government long term budgetary plan regarding the timeframe 2018-2021. The discussion regarding the government measures in utilizing the optimism in the state's financial prospects,

Time	Yes	Nay	Absent	Empty	
6/28/17	114	33	14	38	Kannanotto, Pia Viitanen / Kari Uotila
6/28/17	85	65	14	35	Kannanotto, Eva Biaudet / Pia Viitanen
6/28/17	128	22	15	34	Kannanotto, Ozan Yanar / Eva Biaudet
6/28/17	86	64	14	35	Kannanotto, Peter Östman / Ozan Yanar
6/28/17	92	73	0	34	Kannanotto, Jari Ronkainen (moniste) / Peter Östman
6/28/17	137	26	0	36	Kannanotto, Kari Uotila (moniste) / Jari Ronkainen
6/28/17	90	74	0	35	Kannanotto, mietintö / Kari Uotila

Table 1. Empirical example of pre-determined voting order in action

turned to a melange of various large political issues that have plagued the relationship between the government and opposition for several years. Among other things, the polarizing healthcare reform proposals and measures towards curbing unemployment were hotly debated. MPs Viitanen, Uotila, Biaudet, Yanar, Östman and Ronkainen issued their PPGs proposals respectably on spending measures and they were put into vote. During 28th of June the opposition proposals from MPs had been put into voting order which Eduskunta accepted. One by one the proposals issued by several opposition MPs(record PTK 77/2017)where voted down, first against one another, and the prevailing proposition was put into vote against the government stance(record PTK 78/2017 vp). The relative closeness of the various propositions prevailing are illustrated in *Table 1*, where the prevailing votes are shown in bold. Had the chairman committee decided on a different order of vote, one might speculate how it could have influenced the outcome. The order originally presented for the objections for the budget bill was 1.Viitanen(SDP), 2.Yanar(Vihr.), 3.Uotila(Vas.), 4.Biaudet(RKP), 5. Östman(KD), 6. Ronkainen(PS), 7. Uotila(Vas.). It can be speculated that if the order first presented haven't been altered, the last objection on line being voted against the Government proposal might have been different. Worthy to note is that no matter which Opposition PPG objected, the majority of the Government coalition(PPGs KESK and KOK) are firmly voting in unison. These groups voted for both the SDP and Vihr.(the main critics of Government policy)objection proposals to oust the proposals of both RKP and KD, which are ideologically nearest to Government policy. In a sense, the Government coalition voted to prevent small centre-right parties to influence the drafting of Government policy from the Opposition side. The newly established PPG Blue Reform(SIN) did not vote according to the Government majority on most of the issues, although it would have had a pivotal role, had it stucked to the stance of the Government majority. In spite of this, SIN returned to corroborate within its coalition on the last vote enforcing

the original Government proposal against the winning Uotila. Had the last objection proposal been from the KD or RKP PPGs, the Government PPGs might had to consider amending their own budget draft with tax decreases(RKP proposal) or distribution of monetary benefits for businesses starting up, both of which are usually favored by at least the KOK representatives.

7.2. The Role of Committees

Eduskunta's records regarding its own rules of engagement are stipulated by the workbook dating back from 1908, which is readily available on the Eduskunta website. From its opening the election of committees is discussed as they are the driving force in monitoring the drafting of bills and proposals. Since the details of any given bill or proposal, being it an issue that will be voted on or not, are not possible to be rigorously scrutinized during plenary sessions, the main body of this sort of work is done inside the committees. Because of this, the committees are the place where the contents of any given draft is meant to be finalized as well as possible. This is why the preferences of any given PPG regarding legislature, as well as the deals which PPGs make between each other, are prevalent behind the committee sessions commencing behind closed doors. The amount of committees in the committee workbook from 2015 states that the amount of permanent committees, which are the Great Committee of issues regarded as general, as well as the special committees, which together amount to 15. The Great committee has 25 members and 13 reserve members. Other permanent committees have 17 members and 9 reserve members respectfully. There is also the possibility of the establishment of temporary committees if needed. The voting inside the committees proceeds in the manner of the vote for the chairman of Eduskunta, by closed ballots. In these sort of circumstances the leaders of PPGs can be tempted to steer the PPG line towards the platform of the party proper.

8. NATURAL DATA

8.1. Origins

The plenary voting data about the parliamentary year 2017 of the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta is the courtesy of Antti Pajala, who's studies on voting cohesion in the University of Turku are well established, as is his contributions to related literature. See Pajala(2010; 2013; 2014) and Solvak & Pajala(2016).

The original interest in looking at the natural voting data of this particular parliamentary year, was because, in addition to several well publicized and polarizing incidents during this particular year, of the sudden split of the Finns Party. If one is interested in how PPGs cast their vote in plenary sessions, the question arises of how one party suddenly becoming two, influences the voting cohesion of the legislators in question(i.e. The Finns vs The Blue Reform).

The amount of issues which were decided by vote in the plenary sessions of Eduskunta amounted to 1013 in the year 2017. Echoing the work of Pajala(2010), the overall cohesion of all PPGs seem to be high. At least when looking at single PPGs in the case of the parliamentary year 2017, the supposition for formidable cohesion in the Nordics(Laver & Schofield, 1998), seems to be true in this case.

The first valuable information that can be extracted by the natural voting data is the fact that the plenary votes in Eduskunta are not distributed evenly across the year. This fact has also been established in a previous study on Finnish Parliament plenary voting by Pajala(2010). During the first quarter of the parliamentary year, Eduskunta voted on only 1.28% (13) of the issues of that particular year. During the second quarter, there were votes on 9.18%(93) of all the issues. There were no plenary votes cast on the third quarter. The majority of all the plenary voting issues, 89.54%(907), were processed during the end of the year. A majority of them during December.

Because of the skewness of the plenary votes happening so far at the end of the year, it is infeasible to compare the Finns Party(PS) PPG voting activity during the time it hadn't been splintered into two separate PPGs and the time when the splintering had happened. There is still possible to look at how the two political entities behave in plenary votes after the split, in the context of previous information acquired about Government PPG voting activity and Opposition voting activity.

When looking at μ (mean) cohesion values, the overall cohesion of the Eduskunta as a whole is Rice $\mu = 0,4074$, and Hix $\mu = 0,5531$ respectably. It would seem that MPs do not use their option of 'Abstain' very much throughout Eduskunta. This entails the Hix value being larger than the Rice value. Cohesion Indices of separate PPGs do indicate that some of the legislators vote Abstain sometimes, but this seems to be a random event. Better than supposing this, we can try and distinguish the importance of the Abstain possibility to legislators with very simplistic algebra.

There are large parties (>35MPs) and not so large parties (= or <35MPs) in Eduskunta.

By eyeing the results of the Rice Index values and Hix Index values, one can see the push of the nominal cohesion μ up on the Hix Index in the way that can be most visible with large parties.

In smaller parties, the shift from nominal Rice $\mu = 0,4074$ to Hix $\mu = 0,5531$ isn't as prevalent than with large parties. This means that the small parties' cohesion isn't affected by the amount of cohesion change the shift from Rice μ to Hix μ offers. When we take μ of all the large parties' shift from Rice \rightarrow Hix (=Hix μ - Rice μ) and compare it to the small parties' shift from Rice \rightarrow Hix, the proportionate change is three times more prevalent in small parties than large ones. This is illustrated in *Figure 3*. The KD cohesion drops dramatically when losing even one vote, but will never plummet as low as the PS cohesion could, because of the differences in PPG size. For the same reason KD cannot have its cohesion drop to 0, because of its odd number of MPs.

Since the shift is least visible, yet same time more prevalent in small parties, we have to conclude that abstaining it is not a phenomenon that is common and that we can make robust determinations about the voting cohesion of 2017 without taking into account the Abstain votes initially. \rightarrow We

will thus use only Rice Index values. Empirically, we can count the issues where government coalition MPs voted to abstain, and find out that respectably the Abstain vote was used three times(0.2% of all issues voted and 1/4 of all 'loss of total cohesion-votes') with KESK, one time(0.09% of all issues voted and 1/13 of all 'loss of total cohesion-votes') with KOK, and twelve times(1.2% of all issues voted and 3/8 of all 'loss of total cohesion-votes') with SIN. The popularity of use of the Abstain vote was large enough to look at abstaining as a separate measure all by itself.

The Rice Index value indicates that throughout 2017 the votes for the government position is at least twice as prevalent as the votes opposing it. The abbreviation of the issues discussed are shown in the *Table 2* and are translated into English therein. During the year in question, the number of issues where 'Yes' votes prevailed, amounted to 1007(99,4%). Government coalition won them. There were also five(0,49%) issues where the majority voted 'No'. On one of these cases, Opposition coalition won. In one case the vote between 'Yes' and 'No' was tied(0,0987%). This single case prompted the Finnish national news network YLE to write about it(Auvinen, 2017), which in a sense is a telltale sign of the expectations of the legislative power between government and opposition coalitions. The issue itself was for reserving funds from the complementary state budget estimate to tend for the needs of war veterans. The tied vote lead to a rare closed ballot vote, which the opposition ultimately won.

The examination of expected cohesion Index values reveals, that the smaller PPGs are in a favorable position in comparison to larger ones. It is true that by losing one vote, larger PPGs cohesion diminishes less than the cohesion of the smaller party. However, the larger parties have more MPs to keep in check in regards to voting in unison. The smaller parties can be expected to keep up higher cohesion rates with less numerical representation because of the group size, or lack of it.

The issues that experienced no dwindling in cohesion amounted to 407, totaling approx. 40% of all issues that were voted on. This means that approx. 60% of all issues that were voted on had some amount of lack of cohesion inside some of the PPGs. Because the overall cohesion of all of the PPGs was high, it is safe to assume that PPGs didn't disagree on certain specific degrees across Eduskunta, but were divided in certain issues regarding a certain Parliamentary Party Group. The

extensive lack of unity on issues doesn't happen simultaneously across several parties of the same coalition. Also, we should look at how extensive the break in cohesion was on certain PPGs, as single MPs voting against their group preference (Total cohesion - one vote) can be considered outliers, as their single personalized behavior doesn't make a difference in the majority's stance.

The issues that made the respected PPGs to lose their total cohesion throughout 2017 can be looked at a coalition level, when we can see that certain issues that were voted upon made the legislators divided as a group. We can see that votes concerning the the state budget, as proposed by the government coalition, are the ones that mostly made the opposition coalition to lose their cohesion as a group.

If we select the issues where cohesion was lost, but do not take into account the cases where total cohesion suffers by one vote, there's possibility to get an idea about what sort of policy suggestions divided the MPs, how much so, and to perhaps indicate what direction did they move in terms of policy space.

8.2. 'Absent' votes

The absent votes, which the Rice index doesn't take into account, do occur with all of the PPGs. It is however important to note, that in regards to the whole PPG, single absent votes do not make a whole lot of difference on the outcome. However, by studying how often the abstain vote was used, we can be able to see if it has strategic importance.

When we look at how many times the absent-vote appeared overall, we may perhaps assess 1) what where are bills where the absent vote is used, 2) whether there is more than one absent vote from a PPG during a plenary vote, 3) whether the amount of the strategic absent votes reveal patterns in reference to PPG size.

The government coalition used the option for abstain in a handful of issues. With KOK, having just a single absent vote during the whole year (issue VNS 4 mentioned in chapter 7.1. where Vihr. and RKP proposals were head-to-head), and SIN, of whose MPs pressed the abstain button twelve

times during the year. These were rogue votes regarding Government budget and interpellation, and where cast by two MPs, party secretary Torvinen(mainly) and Turunen. The absent votes of KESK were different. They were given in three cases, only one of which was a single absent vote. The issues regarded the retracting of the law for gender neutral marriage and a single budget issue regarding the work of the Ministry of Transport & Communication.

In comparison to PPG size of the opposition coalition, the PS had the most notable relative use of the absent vote during the course of the year. When we compare the amount of single absent votes to multiple absent votes regarding a single issue, we see that PS was the one that preferred to use the absent vote as a group. For comparison, the Swedish People's Party's legislators used the abstain vote in almost 6% of all the issues during 2017. This is by far the largest amount of issues where any given PPG uses the possibility to abstain. However, in only eight of these there were more than one MP involved. Therefore the relative amount of absent votes, taken into account single votes and PPG size, is much larger in the case of PS, with its six multiple absent votes in comparison to the cases where a single MP decided to abstain. From the Opposition PPGs, PS used the vote to abstain on a variety of issues. These were the citizen's initiatives; the gender neutral marriage issue(KAA 2/2016), as well as the reform of alcohol policy. In addition to this, budget reform involving taxes and transport were also prone to cause abstentions with PS. With the RKP, the abstentions mainly involved the same transport and communications ministry issues which tended to have a polarizing effect throughout the Opposition. In addition to this, labor issues and taxes also caused single RKP MPs to abstain. Single SDP MPs abstained mostly on issues regarding Transport and Communication Ministry issues. There was also a single Government report regarding income tax which made the SDP MPs abstain as a group. Vas. MPs abstained mainly on social and environmental issues. PPG Vihr. abstained because of risk management on behalf of the state(O 72/2016), as well as agriculture, transport, social and taxation issues. KD MPs abstained on issues regarding unemployment.

8.3. Indicators

The movement that the Opposition takes in policy space can be looked through how large the cohesion of a given Opposition group is in a specified situation. This information is compared to both the Government coalition and the Opposition coalition as a whole. To retrieve a proper

understanding of the plenary votes, we can look at the freedom of movement. That is how much the unity of a single PPG suffers in comparison to all the other PPGs. In addition to the freedom of movement, the amount of cohesion(or the lack of) is looked at as an indicator in the circumstances which the the various issues being voted upon, present.

The median cohesion of the Opposition cohesion presents a marker for which the cohesion of the single opposition PPGs can be compared with. The extreme cases where cohesion is lost are the ones that are closest to the RICE Index 0, yet not being so. This group of cohesion scores below Opposition cohesion median. If we take as an 'example PPG', which performs a subset of issues with the cohesion below Opposition median. Then we will be able to determine how much the Opposition is able to travel towards the Government stance in this particular context. This means that from all of the 1013 issues being voted upon, the issue groups being determined to be part of a group set by the indicators, are pulled out in order to establish an idea of the movement Opposition needs to take in order to achieve at least some of its policy goals.

Opposition Cohesion Indicator = OCI

OCI 1: The amount of issues where the PPGs indicate single MPs deviating from the majority position could be considered as an indicator for individual freedom of movement when looked at several issues simultaneously. These deviating votes can also be seen as outliers in regards to single issues.

OCI 2: The issues where voted with a cohesion value above median. The cohesion doesn't suffer substantially.

OCI 3: The positions taken on issues one way or the other draw near to one another, and cohesion suffers substantially.

All of the movement indicators should be compared to the total cohesion of PPGs. This reveals the distance the Opposition PPG travelled towards the Government coalition Mean standpoint, as the

total cohesion of an Opposition PPG can side with the Government coalition in some instances.

Examples of this:

-Issue HE 161/2016, 7th of April 2017, Opposition PPG(RKP) voted with total cohesion supporting the Government proposal of the 2. part of law draft involving transport and communication services accessibility.

-Issue VK 4/2017 vp, 8th December 2017, Opposition PPG(KD) voted with Government stance against interpellation on growing inequality.

9. HYPOTHESES

9.1. The Finns Party as a phenomenon

The Finns Party have generated a significant amount of studies regarding their emergence to the Finnish political scene as populist, far-right, nationalist, opportunistic or other similar denominators which the rest of the Finnish political parties do not adhere to. In a sense, the Finns Party have been the odd one out because they have established their voter base on large and polarizing issues such as immigration and reservations towards the EU. Furthermore, their dissimulation towards the socio-economic left to right axis makes their movement in a Likert scale difficult to determine beforehand. This means that The Finns Party's luring of voters with populist issues had been targeted towards both the working population, as well as eligible voters outside this realm. They've therefore tried to capture votes from a larger horizontal area of the Likert scale than the other parties, which are still quite rigid in their movement outside the traditional class cleavages. The characterization of the Finns Party has been looked through the literature regarding the emergence of post-materialistic tendencies in the policies of European democracies. Because of this, there is no perfect characterization that makes The Finns Party totally different from all the other Finnish parliamentary parties, but the aspects that make The Finns Party what it is, can perhaps be characterized, to a degree, based on their movement in policy space.

The movement in political space is best assessed by natural data of plenary votes, as other second hand information, such as interviews, are more prone to biases. Intra-party cohesion is something that can help to estimate the power a PPG has to affect legislation, whether they side with the government coalition or not. Because The Finns Party displays characteristics differentiate from the other parties, we can assume that their voting cohesion in comparison to other parliamentary party groups voting cohesion can vary as well, given that the given characteristics are well grounded.

9.2. Comparison of platforms

When looking at the party platforms of Finnish political parties, how parties define themselves, some aspects are visible from the first lines of these manifesto's. All of the Finnish parliamentary party platforms are available online and are, excluding the platform of the Social Democratic Party, fully accepted by the parties' central authorities. The difference of the Social Democrats is that their 'draft' platform, written in 2018 as an extension of the principles from the 2017 party convention, gives the party members as well as others to comment and discuss the platforms various items.

Some of the parties' agendas represent political ideals that stem from historically transnational movements such as labor movements and environmental awakening. These ideals are prominent in the platforms of the Social Democrats, Left Alliance and the Greens. Similar connotations have also emerged in the platform of the National Coalition party which positions itself as 'blue-green' bourgeoisie movement, but is more subtle in its viewpoints than with their traditional left wing counterparts. What this means is that KOK implies that being environmentally well-informed is a form of sophistication, whereas the Greens(Vihr.) regard the environment as something that humans need to adapt to. Minority issues are also prominent in the platform of the Swedish People's party platform that emphasizes Finland being a country with two distinguishable identities and cultures living side by side, the Finnish speakers and the Swedish speakers. This overarching agenda is seasoned with calls for universal acceptance for tolerance and belief in a brighter future. The Centre Party has similar aspects in its vast 101-point program of inclusiveness of all Finnish people and the rejection of positioning itself in either the left or right wings of the political spectrum.

The subtlety of the effusive wording seen in the platforms of both the National Coalition's, Swedish Peoples Party's and Centre Party's platforms, is also manifest in the platform of the Blue Reform, which however stresses the Finnish people itself as an independent actor in a sea of nation states.

The platform of the Finns Party emphasizes its differentiation from all other parties, being straight forwards and 'telling the truth no matter what'. It also emphasizes its detachment from traditional

cleavages resulting from close assimilation to non-parliamentary organizations which has influenced the policies of the traditionally powerful and large parties such as the Social Democrats and National Coalition. The differentiation from mainstream parties has been the lifeblood of the Finns Party from its inception and has formulated its policy in a similar manner that the party's predecessor Finnish Rural Party(SMP) differentiated as the opponent of political elites with the powerful rhetoric of their long standing chairman Veikko Vennamo. His political disciple Timo Soini looked for powerful speakers to interpret the sentiment of native Finns that felt let down by their position in a globalizing society. Soini has used aspects of his mentor's rhetoric to approach the 'common Finn', to speak their language and even go over the top with it. Soini coined words not formerly used in Finnish politics, like 'Jytky', a colloquial describing the PS crashing into the political mainstream, as well as using Fennificated terms such as 'ploki' to mean his personal weblog. (*National Coalition Party platform, 2019; Centre Party platform, 2019; Blue Reform Party platform, 2019; True Finns Party platform, 2019; Swedish People's Party platform, 2019; Social Democratic Party platform, 2019; Left Alliance party platform, 2019; Greens Party platform, 2019; Christian Democrats Party platform, 2019*)

9.3. The null Hypothesis(H0)

H0= A party which is irregular in terms of platform, could be considered populist, having catch-all tendencies or being other ways irregular in comparison to platforms of other parties, can be expected to move in similar fashion as any other party in policy space.

9.4. The Hypothesis 1(H1)

H1= A party which contests over voters that prefer policy outside the mainstream, having populist tendencies by challenging alleged political elites, displays differing movement in policy space as the parties which it challenges.

10. MODEL




Figure 4. Party positioning on the socioeconomic (Left-Right) and postmaterial (TAN-GAL) axes in the beginning of 2017 according to Koivula et al. (2019)

The final votes for amendments in bill drafts are issued so that the final position by the Government is usually 'Yes'. This can be seen from the votes where the most preferred amendment text is first voted on sequentially, after which the preferred amendment proposal is voted against the Government proposal 'Yes', Opposition proposal 'No'.

In general, all of the MPs from respected PPGs want their preferred outcome to be fulfilled in the plenary votes. Each one of the MPs have their ideal points in policy space, which are situated in or to a close proximity of the policy points illustrated by *Figure 4*. For every MP, the preferred outcome is a vote where the distance from the preferred policy, as demonstrated by the party's platforms, is as short as possible. This means that with every MP inside a PPG, there is a minimum amount of compromising of the preferred position on a given issue.

The Government coalition is usually responsible for the original drafts of bills, which the Opposition might, or might not try to amend. Therefore the Government coalition is not usually

expected to move away from its preferred policy space. There are exceptions to this. For example, the citizen's initiative to repeal another citizen's initiative for gender neutral marriage (KAA 2/2016) was lobbied by then Government PPG member Mika Niikko (PS). This rare occasion broke the cohesion of the Government front by one of their own. In hindsight, Niikko (Tamminen, 2015) was one of the MPs that moved to the Opposition after the reshuffle of the parliamentary base. The Government coalition partners need to draft their bills so that their MPs won't fall in a situation where voting for the Government draft conflicts the will of the MPs constituencies. Sometimes this sort of conflict does occur, and the Government is not able to vote with total unity.

Because the Opposition is usually in a reactionary position, it is expected to move in policy space by not only the constraints that their MPs have set, but also the position that the Government sets with its drafts. Therefore the Opposition is exposed to more constraints in its movement towards its own preferred policy space than the Government coalition.

In essence, both the Government and Opposition coalitions are trying to maximize their utility. The expected utility in a situation where the Opposition is exposed to more constraints than the Government coalition, results in the expected utility from movement of the Government being larger than of the Opposition coalition.

The movement in the Likert scale (*Figure 4*) should be more prominent with all the Opposition parties. These parties have heterogeneous platforms, particularly PS against all the other Opposition PPGs. As the respected Opposition PPGs vote while losing cohesion (the MPs are divided over 'Yes' and 'No'), the respected preferences for particular issues are could be revealed.

By determining what the policy position is likely to be by voting 'Yes', we will have the supposed direction the Government coalition takes almost every time they vote.

As illustrated by Pajala (2013), the movement of the Government coalition can be quite rigid, as its members do not tend to deviate, given the power of being in the position of the prime policy maker. Therefore the Opposition movement against the Government standpoint is revealing on where the costs and payoffs lie.

If we consider the respected coalitions voting preferences being the movement in sprints from one position to another, we can develop some kind of an idea of what kind of distance the Opposition coalition could go in order to its members to 1) keep their promises to their own constituencies, 2)

keep their relationship towards other members intact, 3) safeguard the unity of the group so that it doesn't lose its majority voting constituency, and possibly be eligible for re-election.

If assumed that the PPG leader acts as a focal arbiter, the unified will of a PPG can be directed to achieve a common goal more likely than just the group members acting out their personal preferences in a plenary voting session. Considering a situation where a varied amount voters elect either one of two worthy possibilities, Myerson & Weber(1993) consider the focal arbiters to be major opinion leaders, possibly aided by mass media. If we consider the closed setting of an Eduskunta plenary vote to have similar focal arbiters, they would most likely be acting to achieve a common, unified preference inside, but not limited to, committees. If the Government coalition enjoys a majority position, the movement of a Government coalition PPG positions itself in a relatively staunch preference point, where from little or no deviating movement is thought to be probable.

If we would consider the Government and Opposition PPGs to be positioned in a manner of a game, where movement across the one dimensional policy space occurs sequentially, the Government PPG has advantage of moving first. Hence the Opposition is constantly moving to correct its own movement and weigh its movement options against its own utility. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the amount of movement in policy space (to correct its position)is greater on the Opposition side, its means to draft legislation being restricted in comparison to the Government coalition. The differentiation of single Opposition PPGs can be determined by what is the distance they are respectfully willing to travel in policy space to satisfy the policy positions. These position are, similarly to the Government's, the constraints their constituencies, peers and party proper have set.

By extracting a sample of issues large enough to represent the voting activity of the year in question, there is also the possibility to compare the similarities of the Opposition PPGs and determine whether there are outsiders within the Opposition bloc.

11. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

11.1. Issue Classification Abbreviations

The issues being voted upon in plenary sessions of 2017 in the Finnish Eduskunta amounted to 1013, and the government coalition sat on the drivers seat of policy making. Therefore the government coalition acted as the prime mover in almost all cases where the decision to cast a vote was made.

2017					nr. of votes	%
Majority Yes					1007	0,994076999012833
Majority No					5	0,00493583415597236
Majority Abstain					1	0,000987166831194472
	Abbr. clarification	Abbr. meaning	nr. of votes		%	
VNT	Valtioneuvoston tiedonanto	Government statement	26	0,0256663376110563		
VNS	Valtioneuvoston selonteko	Government report	26	0,0256663376110563		
HE	Hallituksen esitys	Government motion	785	0,77492596248766		
VK	Välikysymys	Interpellation	41	0,0404738400789733		
O	Asiantuntijalausunto	Specialist testimonial	27	0,0266535044422507		
KA	Kansalaisaloite	Citizen's initiative	108	0,106614017769003		
TOTAL			1013	1	1013	1

Table 2. All plenary vote categories, abbreviations and abbreviation meanings.

In the same way as Pajala(2013) draws attention to the voting activity of the Opposition, the plenary voting of 2017 can be looked at in similar fashion. The mean stance taken by the Government on votes is primarily that of voting 'Yes' to the bills it itself drafts. Therefore the movement towards the Government standpoint by the Opposition is primarily (but not absolutely) the relative amount of voting 'Yes'. The mean cohesion of the Government coalition during 2017 was (RI)0.99497. The most prominent issue classification was 'HE', which is the Government's motion/proposal, usually regarding the state budget or amendment to legislation. These issues comprise of 77.5% of all issues voted for during 2017.

11.2. Opposition Having Total Cohesion

The issues driving the Opposition for achieving total cohesion, 'Rice Index 1', are plentiful yet varied. A single Opposition PPG can have total cohesion voting 'Yes' on one issue and total cohesion voting 'No' on another. Drawing an example from *Figure 5*, The Finns(PS) MPs voted 'Yes' with total cohesion on 256 issues(blue column), whereas the issues where the fully cohesive support was for 'No', 461 issues(green column). This is the starting point for the Opposition coalition in regards to what their totally cohesive preferences are.




Figure 5. Relative amounts of issues Opposition voted with total cohesion during year 2017. 'Yes'-votes are the blue columns, 'No'-votes are the green columns.

11.3. OCI1

The relative amount of freedom of Opposition PPGs is counting the amount of issues where cohesion was lost by a single MP voting against the group majority. At minimum these cases were at least five times more prevalent in the Opposition coalition than the Government coalition. Since the assumption for this sort of minimal deviation can manifest from any one of the PPG members, the dividing of the amount of issues with the amount of respected PPG members, can give us a nominal figure of representative's voting volatility in his/her own group on average(*Table 3*).

	MPs	Amount of cohesion break by 1 vote issues	Break by one vote divided by legislators to see average single representative volatility
PS	18	59	3,27777777777778
RKP	10	99	9,9
SDP	36	78	2,16666666666667
Vas	12	58	4,83333333333333
Vihr	15	67	4,46666666666667
KD	5	132	26,4

Table 3. Average single representative volatility.

The amount of volatility is predominant in smaller PPGs, whereas the largest opposition PPG(SDP) is least volatile to single MPs voting against the majority line. The smallest party in Eduskunta, KD, has the single member volatility more than ten times that of SDP.

11.4. OCI2

When drawing comparison between the PPGs which had cohesion above the Opposition coalition median, we must all address to what direction the cohesion moves proportionately. In an illustration of these cohesion values, we see the preferred direction the Opposition PPGs start to take. In *Figure 6* the proportions of Yes and No majorities issues is illustrated by a bar table. As cohesion decreases, part of the Opposition PPGs (PS, SDP, Vas) start to show immediate attraction towards the average Government stance, whereas other PPGs tilt toward the similar direction only slightly. In comparison to single vote deviation(OCI1), the preference of the smallest party KD doesn't drastically tilt towards Government or Opposition. A similar phenomenon can be seen with Vihr.




Figure 6. Opposition coalition majority votes for either 'Yes' (blue column) or 'No' (green column) in situation where cohesion has dropped but is still above Opposition median.

11.5. OCI3

Voting cohesion drops below Opposition coalition median. The movement towards the Government coalition standpoint seems to be enhancing with the issues that influence the cohesion negatively (*Figure 7.*). The results for the KD PPG cannot be seen, as its cohesion cannot drop below the median cohesion of the Opposition coalition, as illustrated in chapter 3.




Figure 7. Opposition coalition majority votes for either 'Yes'(blue column) or 'No'(green column) in situation where cohesion has dropped below Opposition median. KD is not included as its PPG is too small to present such low cohesion figures.

11.6. Random Sample

By extracting a random sample from all of the issues being voted for can help to determine the relationships between the Opposition PPGs in regards to how they vote. The random sample is comprised of 65 issues which should represent, to some extent, the overall composition of the plenary vote issues of 2017. The sample is comprised of 2 interpellations(VK), which are the Opposition's offensive towards the Government by issuing a vote of confidence. All of the other issues of the sample are Government motions(HE). Firstly, to see what sort of 'role in coalition' a single Opposition PPG has on votes, we compare the respected PPG votes majorities(how did the majority vote on an issue), to the Opposition majority vote overall. This can be illustrated with *Table 4*. The issue HE 161/2016(First proposal, Part IV, Chapter 2, 2§, report) which was one of a series of bills proposing the development of a national MaaS(Mobility as a Service) framework(Liikennekaari), and of which MP Katja Taimela aimed to seek an amendment via vote according to an objection concerning the acquirement of information by authorities. The proposal bearing Taimela's name was voted down.

HE 161/2016						
OppMaj	KDMaj	PSMaj	RKPMaj	SDPMaj	VasMaj	VihrMaj
NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES

Table 4. HE 161/2016(First proposal, Part IV, Chapter 2, 2§, report). The majority responses of the Opposition coalition. PS and Vihr: majorities voting against Opposition majority.

On all of the 65 issues that comprise the sample, we can see that the Opposition majority is driven by the largest opposition party, drawing its likeminded comrades in its wake. By ordering the parties on who's majority standpoint fits best to the Opposition coalition majority, we see (Table 5.) that the left wing parties are closest to the overall Opposition majority. In addition to this, when looking at how all Opposition parties vote relative to one another, we also see that the 'most prominent likeness to one another' can be found from within the traditional left wing parties(SDP, Vas.).

VOTING SAMPLE, (similarity to Opposition Majority)		Reordering	
PS	67,692 %	SDP	90,77 %
RKP	52,3 %	Vas.	81,538 %
SDP	90,77 %	Vihr.	76,92 %
Vas	81,538 %	PS	67,692 %
Vihr	76,92 %	KD	64,615 %
KD	64,615 %	RKP	52,3 %

Table 5. The largest Opposition PPG (upper right)drives the Opposition majority with smaller left wing counterpart voting similarly.

The likeness of voting behavior across the Opposition PPGs is illustrated in Table 6, where the of the left wing Opposition PPGs are situated on the top of the likeness scale. This could imply that the voting behavior the largest Opposition PPG is reinforced with smaller like minded parties acting as additional enforcement.

VOTING SAMPLE, (similarities between PPGs)		Reordering	
PS similar to RKP	49,23 %	SDP similar to Vas.	84,615 %
PS similar to SDP	61,538 %	Vas. similar to Vihr.	83,0769 %
PS similar to Vas.	58,46 %	SDP similar to Vihr.	72,3 %
PS similar to Vihr.	63 %	PS similar to KD	70,769 %
PS similar to KD	70,769 %	Vas. similar to KD	69,2 %
RKP similar to SDP	55,38 %	PS similar to Vihr.	63 %
RKP similar to Vas.	53,8 %	SDP similar to KD	63 %
RKP similar to Vihr.	55,38 %	PS similar to SDP	61,538 %
RKP similar to KD	44,615 %	PS similar to Vas.	58,46 %
SDP similar to Vas.	84,615 %	Vihr. similar to KD	58,46 %
SDP similar to Vihr.	72,3 %	RKP similar to SDP	55,38 %
SDP similar to KD	63 %	RKP similar to Vihr.	55,38 %
Vas. similar to Vihr.	83,0769 %	RKP similar to Vas.	53,8 %
Vas. similar to KD	69,2 %	PS similar to RKP	49,23 %
Vihr. similar to KD	58,46 %	RKP similar to KD	44,615 %

Table 6. The left wing parties(upper right corner of the reordering) seem to have more in common with one another than the remainder of the Opposition coalition. Comparison to Figure 12. suggests that a part of the Opposition coalition votes as a bloc, a part does not. The remainder PPGs(PS, RKP, KD)do not present similarity towards each other the way that the left wing parties do.

11.7. Most polarizing issues

Generally speaking, the issues for which the cohesion of the Opposition parties took the most hit, where concerning certain large bodies of issues. An exception of this was one very formidable occurrence which decimated the cohesion of PS but for which the the other Opposition PPGs voted with unison. This is the case of the Government informing of the changes in the parliamentary base, which meant the split of the Finns Party. The largest 'unity deceiver' body was the issues concerning the Ministry of Transport and Communication. In a sense, this can be due to the fact that the purpose of the combined law package for transport and communication aimed to assemble relevant laws in one place so that future innovation involving transport and communication services wouldn't be curbed by excess bureaucracy(Faktalehti 48/2017). These large legislative changes are usually expected to last a long time, possibly years, and comprise the bulk of the Government work during its tenure. During such a timeframe the increased information on the issue at hand might tend to shift perceptions on what should be done. However, these issues

affected the smaller Opposition PPGs more than the large SDP, which although its cohesion suffered, was able to hold its own through relative unity. This meant that SDP cohesion on the issues on the aforementioned ministry ranged from RI 0.5 to RI 0.8. In comparison, with the issues regarding the same ministry, PS cohesion suffered with values RI <0.1 to RI 0.4. RKP values ranged from RI 0.1 to 0.3. The cohesion decrease of both Vas. and Vihr. were similar (mean RI 0.2) but with less variance. Other prominent cohesion decreaser bodies involved the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry-issues as well as the changes(liberalization) in alcohol legislation.

11.8. Simple Linear Regression

For issues where the Opposition PPGs lack cohesion, voting 'Yes' seems to increase in prominence. To see if this is valuable information, a simple linear regression can be used to reveal if Opposition parties voting with the Government(which overwhelmingly votes 'Yes').

The independent variables of choice are the respected Opposition PPGs proportion voting 'YES'.

$X=SDP(\%YES*), Vas(\%YES*), Vihr(\%YES*), PS(\%YES*), KD(\%YES*), RKP(\%YES*)$

$Y=Opposition(\%YES*)$

**(Proportion of available votes)*

The dependent variable is the Opposition proportion voting 'YES'. These variables do not use the Rice Index, but the proportionality takes into account all of the votes at hand in a given issue voted. This includes the 'Abstain' votes. The random sample is 65 issues voted from across the timespan of 2017. Using an online tool(GraphPad), the results are illustrated in the corresponding *Table 7*.

	R ²	P
SDP	0.7078	<0.0001
Vas	0.5427	<0.0001
Vihr	0.3525	<0.0001
PS	0.2551	<0.0001
KD	0.07328	0.0292
RKP	0.06011	0.0490

Table 7. The samples of the Opposition PPG votes have a p-value <5. The sample size is of good representation.

SDP voting 'Yes' explains the whole Opposition voting similarly in 70% of the cases, R² being 0.7078. More than half of the votes by Vas. can be explained similarly. The drop in the proportion of variance in the case of Vihr. votes indicate the sporadic way the Greens voted in comparison to the whole Opposition's attraction in voting with the Government. The variance of PS representatives voting with the Government is only a quarter of the votes. By comparing the regression charts of SDP, PS and Vihr., the way that the 'Yes' votes are distributed act as an aid to understanding whether the respected PPGs votes indicate similarity in the movement in policy space.




Figure 8. SDP votes for YES(X), Opposition as a whole votes YES(Y). The issues which drove the SDP YES votes has an impact on the Opposition as a whole. The YES votes are clustered in the upper right corner.




Figure 9. PS votes for YES(X), Opposition as a whole votes YES(Y). The YES votes on the right are distributed along the vertical line, differentiating from SDP of Figure 9.




Figure 10. Vihr. votes for YES(X), Opposition as a whole votes YES(Y). The Vihr. votes had the closest R^2 value to PS when the variance to Opposition is been compared. The vote distribution of Vihr. differs substantially from PS of Figure 10.

12. CONCLUSION

The largest parties that had been dominating the Eduskunta since 2011 are positioned on different areas of the socioeconomic Left-Right and GAL-TAN axes. The National Coalition(KOK) and Centre(KESK) parties are situated on the right, and the Social Democrat(SDP), Greens(Vihr.), Left Alliance(Vas.) and Finns Party(PS) are situated on the left, with the Vihr. and PS situated themselves curiously on opposing positions on the GAL-TAN axis. From these assumed positions, movement occurs in a parliamentary context with every occurring plenary vote. The movement of the Government coalition, encompassing of the KESK, KOK, PS, as well as PSs successor party SIN, is rather rigid as the Government coalition is the prime drafter of laws and proposals that either go to a plenary vote or not. In addition to this, the Government coalition is strong in numbers, having the majority representation throughout 2017. All of the other parties correct their positioning depending on what the bill might entail and therefore are expected to either stand their ground or take leaps towards the Government proposals.

As the plenary votes go ahead, the issues that do not have the power to break Opposition cohesion tend to be votes primarily against Government proposals. At least with one group, encompassing of SDP and Vas., takes this position. The other parties of the Opposition, PS(which was an Opposition party throughout the majority of the plenary votes of 2017), RKP and KD, didn't overwhelmingly vote against Government proposals with full unity. In fact, RKP, which had participated in several Government coalitions with KOK, tend to side more to the Government side with its total cohesion votes.

With the issues where Opposition cohesion was lost, the main Opposition parties SDP, Vas. and Vihr. take their leap towards the Government stance. This is illustrated in the comparison of *Figure 5* and *Figure 6*, showing that the preference for the majority of the MPs flip and the predominant columns(blue/green) change places. This effect is present also as the cohesion of the Opposition PPGs drop to their lowest points.

When looking at the positions of the Opposition PPGs in their starting position, nominally the position they have as their cohesion is total, it can be determined which sort of distance the majority of these PPGs are willing to travel (proportion of voting 'Yes' with the Government) as their cohesion suffers. Taking into account the Rice Index value of the full unity votes and comparing them to the plenary votes where cohesion suffered the most, the distance Opposition PPGs travel in policy space can be plotted to a graph which illustrates comparisons between the respected Opposition PPGs.




Figure 11. The Opposition PPG movement from Opposition towards Government as cohesion decreases. The left wing parties Vas. and SDP seem to move furthest towards Government despite their relative size difference to one another. The distance PS takes can be deceiving, as its preferences differ and its movements takes a deviating route to the larger Opposition coalition members.

The parties that are positioned furthest from the Government(SDP, Vas., Vihr.)take larger leaps towards the Government propositions. As their preferences on issues are similar to one another, it can be assumed that they are moving as a bloc. What could see as enhancing this assumption is the fact that Vas. and Vihr. are smaller PPGs by members of MPs. Despite this Vas. seems to move even further than any other Opposition PPG, possibly trusting on the sympathies of others in this bloc. PS also travels a long distance towards Government in a similar situation, but as its preferences on issues differs substantially from both the left wing parties, as well as from the remaining parties, its motion toward this direction differs. In regards to the null hypothesis(H0) The linear regression analysis gives further information on the preferred movement of PPGs, so that respected and particular preferences of Opposition PPG movement is highlighted, mirroring the respected party platforms. The regression analysis doesn't support (H0), as the graphic depictions of PS and Vihr. votes(*Figures 9. & 10*) illustrate these parties having somewhat small role in explaining the Opposition preferences overall, and also move differently in comparison to one another. The effect is similar, but the path leading to results differ. For this same reason, Hypothesis 1(H1) seems to capture the essence of PPG movement in this case study.

Furthermore, the fact that the party SIN, which encompassed of roughly half of the PS at the beginning of the parliamentary year, satisfied its role as a Government coalition partner right until the year was out. PS on the other hand is the odd one out even in a very heterogenous Opposition.

13. DISCUSSION

Looking at the movement of PPGs in policy space justifies the use of the Rice index, as a PPG moving one way or the other is enough to determine policy preference in most issues voted. Also, the cohesion calculated by using this particular index has its grounding in previous cohesion studies involving the Finnish Eduskunta. The possibility to use one's vote to abstain has some popularity and therefore the Abstain-votes couldn't be left out of this study, nor should they be ignored in future studies. If however the preferences in political entities would be looked at whether they vote 'Yes' or 'No', a linear regression is perhaps not the best way in trying to understand these sort of movements. A logit model would satisfy this need better.

The Government coalition being the main force in drafting legislature can be solid even in situations where the composition of parliament suddenly starts to favor the Opposition. In fact, these sort of situations should bring about caution in the Opposition camp as long as the Government doesn't lose its majority position. Laver & Schofield(1998) have specifically underlined this, as it is possible that governments of minimal winning coalition can be very fit to govern, at least until the next election, and that a surplus majority government is not a recipe for success indefinitely.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1(1)

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