United We Stand Divided We Are? Diverging European Views on the Transatlantic Partnership
TIENHAARA, TARU (2005)
TIENHAARA, TARU
2005
Kansainvälinen politiikka - International Relations
Yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta - Faculty of Social Sciences
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Hyväksymispäivämäärä
2005-12-12
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:uta-1-15262
https://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:uta-1-15262
Tiivistelmä
Hakutermit:
EU-maat, ulkopolitiikka, Yhdysvallat, Irakin sota, integraatio -- Eurooppa
This thesis is about the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union toward the United States. In 2002 and 2003 EU member states were divided over what to do with Iraq: some aligned themselves with the US position, others were against the use of force. I assume that European governments did not consider Iraq and its alleged weapons programmes a direct threat, and their positions had more to do with their views on the transatlantic partnership than Iraq. My approach is based on social constructivism, therefore I consider identity-related issues as more important than for example economic interests.
I analyse European responses to the Iraq crisis from January 2003 until the outbreak of the war in March 2003. The primary sources are statements made by the leaders of the largest EU member states: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Poland, as well as joint declarations by two or more of these countries. Poland was not a full member of the EU in 2003, but I included it in the case study in order to assess the impact that the EU's 2004 enlargement might have on the transatlantic partnership. The method used is discourse analysis with special attention to fact construction and persuasion strategies. The EU is a unitary actor in trade issues, and therefore an important one. To compare CFSP with the Union's trade policy, I shortly discuss the EU-US banana dispute.
Despite its member states' differences, the EU was not wholly paralysed with respect to Iraq. However, its own member states as well as the US mostly circumvented the CFSP apparatus. There was wide agreement among the European leaders that the EU should act as one, but nobody seemed willing to change the already chosen position in order to achieve unity. A central problem was who is allowed to speak for Europe. The traditional Franco-German axis was perceived as arrogant, speaking for the whole EU without consulting others. This was challenged by the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland and others who aligned themselves with the US view. However, individual EU member states cannot influence the major issues of the world. With respect to the Iraq crisis, neither the anti-war nor the pro-war fraction had much influence on the US. Had the EU acted as one, its views would have been far more difficult for the US to ignore. All of the six major EU member states have some kind of a "special relationship" with the US; I suggest delegating all of these to the EU, turning them into one special and equal transatlantic partnership.
EU-maat, ulkopolitiikka, Yhdysvallat, Irakin sota, integraatio -- Eurooppa
This thesis is about the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union toward the United States. In 2002 and 2003 EU member states were divided over what to do with Iraq: some aligned themselves with the US position, others were against the use of force. I assume that European governments did not consider Iraq and its alleged weapons programmes a direct threat, and their positions had more to do with their views on the transatlantic partnership than Iraq. My approach is based on social constructivism, therefore I consider identity-related issues as more important than for example economic interests.
I analyse European responses to the Iraq crisis from January 2003 until the outbreak of the war in March 2003. The primary sources are statements made by the leaders of the largest EU member states: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Poland, as well as joint declarations by two or more of these countries. Poland was not a full member of the EU in 2003, but I included it in the case study in order to assess the impact that the EU's 2004 enlargement might have on the transatlantic partnership. The method used is discourse analysis with special attention to fact construction and persuasion strategies. The EU is a unitary actor in trade issues, and therefore an important one. To compare CFSP with the Union's trade policy, I shortly discuss the EU-US banana dispute.
Despite its member states' differences, the EU was not wholly paralysed with respect to Iraq. However, its own member states as well as the US mostly circumvented the CFSP apparatus. There was wide agreement among the European leaders that the EU should act as one, but nobody seemed willing to change the already chosen position in order to achieve unity. A central problem was who is allowed to speak for Europe. The traditional Franco-German axis was perceived as arrogant, speaking for the whole EU without consulting others. This was challenged by the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland and others who aligned themselves with the US view. However, individual EU member states cannot influence the major issues of the world. With respect to the Iraq crisis, neither the anti-war nor the pro-war fraction had much influence on the US. Had the EU acted as one, its views would have been far more difficult for the US to ignore. All of the six major EU member states have some kind of a "special relationship" with the US; I suggest delegating all of these to the EU, turning them into one special and equal transatlantic partnership.