Philosophical Temptations. A Grammatical Reading of the Later Wittgenstein.
HAUTAKANGAS, SAMI (2001)
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HAUTAKANGAS, SAMI
2001
Filosofia - Philosophy
Taloudellis-hallinnollinen tiedekunta - Faculty of Economics and Administration
Hyväksymispäivämäärä
2001-06-07Sisällysluettelo
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4 ABBREVIATIONS 5 1 INTRODUCTION 6 2 LOGICAL ATOMISM 13 2.1 The Characteristics of Logical Atomism 13 2.1.1 Logical atomism and understanding the later Wittgenstein 13 2.1.2 The requirements of language 21 2.1.3 The first requirement: unambiguity 23 2.1.4 The second requirement: the link between language and reality 27 2.2 The Tractatus as the Final Stage of Logical Atomism 31 2.2.1 The nature of logic in the Tractatus 31 2.2.2 The nature of language in the Tractatus 34 2.3 The Role of Definitions in Logical Atomism 41 2.3.1 Definitions and the structure of language 41 2.3.2 Ostensive definition as an anchor to reality 43 3 WITTGENSTEIN'S ANSWER TO LOGICAL ATOMISM 45 3.1 Problems in the Relation between Definition and Meaning 45 3.1.1 The use of Augustinian picture 45 3.1.2 Names and naming 53 3.2 Attacking the Idea of The Complete Analysis 58 3.2.1 Rethinking the concepts of simplicity and exactness 58 3.2.2 Questioning the generality of concepts 69 3.2.3 Resisting the undebatable theses of philosophy 73 4 THE ROLE OF DEFINITIONS IN THE INVESTIGATIONS 76 4.1 Definitions and Language 76 4.1.1 Definitions in the learning of language 76 4.1.2 Definitions and philosophical knowledge 77 4.2 Definitions and Philosophical Method 82 4.2.1 Duty of a philosopher defying definition 82 4.2.2 Philosopher as a general practitioner 88 4.2.3 The use of metaphors 90 4.2.4 The use of examples and other methods 95 5 CONCLUSION 99 BIBLIOGRAPHY 103
Tiivistelmä
The general question that gives the structure for this work is: "What kind of answer the later Wittgenstein was to the so called logical atomism?" More specifically this work will concentrate on the question of how the role of definitions in language changed due to Wittgenstein's change of perspective, as it is in the focus of this change and as a single question should bring out best the relevant features of the topic.
The twofold task of this work is to locate some essential points where confusions about the thoughts of later Wittgenstein often occur and to show how these confusions are related to the issues Wittgenstein was dealing with. It is important to understand how it is that such obviously wrong accounts can be given, important to see what Wittgenstein is doing in those passages which certainly do seem to provide support for these accounts, if he is not taking those views. (In fact, what he is doing cannot be understood unless it is clear why it is easy to misunderstand those passages.)
The adopted approach means also applying one of Wittgenstein's explicated methods on philosophical problems, i.e. the task is to locate the philosophical problems and to search what kind of thinking has caused them, which in many times reveals that the problem was not where it was first looked at. This task is pursued by using the original texts and literature to present the key features of the philosophical shift from the views of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein of the Tractatus to later Wittgenstein and at the same time to provide interpretative tools to help in understanding the later Wittgenstein.
In this work an attempt is made to show that in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is giving an answer to the views of Frege and Russell and his earlier views, which can be described as transcendental, or entailing foundational convictions similar to those of transcendental philosophy. According to the interpretation contained in this work, by giving this answer Wittgenstein is not constructing a new theoretical framework, from the point of which the earlier framework is criticized, but applying different methods to the earlier notions. The transcendental interpretations that have been commonplace in secondary literature inevitably fail to recognize this as they rely on the same basic convictions as the view Wittgenstein is answering to.
In this work an analysis is made, according to which the requirements of exactness and precision have their origin in the rules of extensional logic and in the essentially referential idea of meaning. And these requirements can be seen to boil down to two core requirements entailed in logical atomism (a label for the Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein line-of thought the later Wittgenstein sees as the other part of his dialogue), which together with the craving for generality give roots for the philosophical problems Wittgenstein is answering to.
These requirements can be found also within the transcendental interpretations of the later Wittgenstein, which in this respect fail to see what is really new in the later Wittgenstein's thinking. The interpretation suggested by this work of the later Wittgenstein is close to Kuusela's and Wallgren's interpretations by being non-transcendental, grammatical, and sees the later Wittgenstein as making a genuine contribution to philosophy. This contribution is not in the form of systematic theory, but in the form of analytic skills that help one to trace the theoretical frameworks from which the issues seem problematic and in this way to clarify and dissolve philosophical problems.
The twofold task of this work is to locate some essential points where confusions about the thoughts of later Wittgenstein often occur and to show how these confusions are related to the issues Wittgenstein was dealing with. It is important to understand how it is that such obviously wrong accounts can be given, important to see what Wittgenstein is doing in those passages which certainly do seem to provide support for these accounts, if he is not taking those views. (In fact, what he is doing cannot be understood unless it is clear why it is easy to misunderstand those passages.)
The adopted approach means also applying one of Wittgenstein's explicated methods on philosophical problems, i.e. the task is to locate the philosophical problems and to search what kind of thinking has caused them, which in many times reveals that the problem was not where it was first looked at. This task is pursued by using the original texts and literature to present the key features of the philosophical shift from the views of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein of the Tractatus to later Wittgenstein and at the same time to provide interpretative tools to help in understanding the later Wittgenstein.
In this work an attempt is made to show that in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is giving an answer to the views of Frege and Russell and his earlier views, which can be described as transcendental, or entailing foundational convictions similar to those of transcendental philosophy. According to the interpretation contained in this work, by giving this answer Wittgenstein is not constructing a new theoretical framework, from the point of which the earlier framework is criticized, but applying different methods to the earlier notions. The transcendental interpretations that have been commonplace in secondary literature inevitably fail to recognize this as they rely on the same basic convictions as the view Wittgenstein is answering to.
In this work an analysis is made, according to which the requirements of exactness and precision have their origin in the rules of extensional logic and in the essentially referential idea of meaning. And these requirements can be seen to boil down to two core requirements entailed in logical atomism (a label for the Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein line-of thought the later Wittgenstein sees as the other part of his dialogue), which together with the craving for generality give roots for the philosophical problems Wittgenstein is answering to.
These requirements can be found also within the transcendental interpretations of the later Wittgenstein, which in this respect fail to see what is really new in the later Wittgenstein's thinking. The interpretation suggested by this work of the later Wittgenstein is close to Kuusela's and Wallgren's interpretations by being non-transcendental, grammatical, and sees the later Wittgenstein as making a genuine contribution to philosophy. This contribution is not in the form of systematic theory, but in the form of analytic skills that help one to trace the theoretical frameworks from which the issues seem problematic and in this way to clarify and dissolve philosophical problems.