

# Governance of hybrid networks in organisations and society

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## **ABSTRACT**

This chapter examines hybridity in organisations and society from a relational perspective. Within organisations, previous examinations of hybrids has concentrated on their forms, rationales and identities but have given less attention to the hybridity of networks. In society, strict separation between government, civil society and the economy has complicated the possibilities to comprehend and analyse hybrid mixtures between these parts of society. The idea is that social intercourse induces hybrid formations and that networks themselves embody a variety of hybrid arrangements. The developments of organisations as nodes (e.g. state-owned enterprises (SOEs), social enterprises (SEs)), dyads (public–private partnerships (PPPs)), the management of common-pool resources, professionalism) and networks (international commercial aviation, the state of Singapore) portray the relational hybrid forms in practice.

## **1 Introduction**

Hybridity deals with the interplay between government, civil society and the economy. It refers to goal-oriented activity in joint ownership, incongruent goals and parallel institutional logics, multiplicity in sources of financing and the changing nature of financial and social control between these realms of activity (Johanson & Vakkuri 2017). Previous literature has given attention to hybridity within organisations in incorporating contradictory goals (Besharov & Mitzinneck 2021), but there has been much less focus on the formation of hybrid networks and interactions between constituent parts of society (Vakkuri & Johanson 2020). The building ground for this chapter is the tripartite distinction of the levels of relational analysis: 1) the node, 2) the dyad and 3) the network. The basic ingredients of network nodes as actors and their interrelations allow the

examination of the relationships within the most important topics of hybridity in society and organisations (Simmel 1950).

In this chapter, we elaborate hybrids as relational constructs according to institutional trajectories: organisations and society (see Table X.1). Hybridity has been studied across social science disciplines, which necessitates considering a number of theoretical perspectives. The concept of hybridity as a combination of different species makes it an anomaly, but in social life, it is equally possible to see hybridity as central to understanding in developing something that we now see as purity (Stross 1999).

Table X.1. Hybrid arrangements among institutional trajectories and relational emphasis.

	<b>Institutional trajectory</b>	
	Organisation	Society
<b>Relational emphasis</b>		
Node	Hybrid organisations	Hybridity within parts of society
Dyad	Hybridity across organisations	Hybridity between parts of society
Network	Hybrid network industry	Hybrid network society

Networks expand disciplinary lines and levels of analysis with ease. On the most general level, the concept of networks enables us to see both organisations and society from a single, unified perspective. Interaction patterns establish grounds for the formation of hybridity, and the continuous patterns of interaction institutionalise these patterns, but the process is not determinate. Here, the enquiry relates to interrelations within organisations and parts of society, which are essentially collective actors that comprise a number of individuals. We examine the economy, government and civil society as spheres of network activity extending institutional lines.

In an analysis of networks in social life, it is helpful to see social life as comprising three features. First, there are entities (nodes), such as people, organisations and societies. Second, the actors possess attributes, such as ownership structure (organisations) or constitutional form (nations). Third, lines (edges) connect actors and nodes in a social network (Figure X.1). Connections can be diverse in nature, including the flow of resources, personal sentiments or command and control (Wasserman & Faust 1994). In this sense, network concepts enable the analysis of any type of social life. The dyad is the smallest social structure in networks. All social structures can be decomposed into constituent parts between two actors regardless of the size of the network. Buyer and seller, manager and subordinate or joint memberships create dyadic bonds between actors. The attention could be on the focal actor, its internal relations (ego) or its contacts (alters),

and the focus might be on the types of actors that are bounded together or on the types of connections that unite them.




Figure 1. Network and its parts.

Attention can be given to the form of networks and their formal properties, such as the number of ties (density) or nature of the social processes. The diffusion of innovation or the spread of infectious diseases could be studied without paying attention to the context or nature of the relationships. In contrast, content-oriented views look at networks' developments through the activities of the actors within the network, through narratives, stories and case examinations, in an attempt to describe unique idiosyncratic events (Erikson 2013). In the following, the network approach provides a broad outline for the analysis of hybridity by introducing a case examination of hybrid arrangements. We propose the following three lines of inquiry: 1) how to deal with the levels of society in research on hybridity, 2) how to deal with interaction in the creation of hybridity and 3) how the government, the economy and civil society reflect hybridity.

The analysis follows a sequence of institutional trajectories. First, we introduce the organisational point of view prior to the elaboration of society's perspective. The examination within these areas of analysis proceeds in a bottom-up fashion. We begin with an analysis of the nodal properties of hybrid constellations and proceed with elaborations on their dyadic and network features. The concluding section offers a combined view of hybrids according to alternative trajectories and subjects of relational examination.

## 2 Hybrid organisations

## State-owned enterprises (SOEs)

There are some common themes in SOE research: 1) a dichotomous view of the ownership issue, 2) disagreement about the influence of state ownership on firm performance and 3) a focus on SOEs in the Chinese economy (Bruton et al. 2015). One study (Aguilera et al. 2021) of SOEs in some 130 countries over the past 50 years revealed a small negative effect of state ownership on firm financial performance and high heterogeneity across countries in the size and direction of this effect. Overall, the political ideology and political institutions in a country influence both the willingness and ability of state owners to pursue business and social goals simultaneously.

SOEs in China portray some of the hybrid aspects of combining policy and business goals. Over half of Chinese SOEs follow a mixed governance system that combines traditional state-centric and more recent shareholder-centric approaches. The three old committees (the Communist Party Committee, the labour union and employees' representative meetings) and the shareholder regime (shareholders' general meetings, the board of directors and a supervisory board with employee participation) are present, resulting in a highly decentralised management structure and the integration of native Chinese and Western corporate cultures. The mixed regime aims to accommodate multiple goals at the same time: 1) incentives for managers, 2) advantages for employees through shareholding, 3) the integration of interests and 4) democratic management. In a mixed setting, the state-centred regime aims to prevent manager corruption through the political education of party members, while the shareholder-centred regime promotes the motivation of employees through financial rewards (Hua et al. 2006).

Chinese SOEs behave as market operators substituting private enterprises, providing social services and catering for government as a general source of funds. In this way, the establishment of Chinese SOEs follows European developments of SOEs in mixing a number of political, ideological, social and economic motives (Toninelli 2008). More than 40% of China's non-agricultural GDP is still accounted for by SOEs and entities directly controlled by SOEs. Chinese SOEs have shown profitability, and the results originate not only in their efficiency but also in their ability to use nationally owned resources without pay or with a nominal price. They also have access to cheap loans from state-owned banks and direct government subsidies (Brodsgaard & Li 2013). In a critical tone, Kroenig (2020) argues that the Chinese economy has already used easy fixes in the effort to develop industries, such as moving agricultural peasants as a workforce to urban factories, which is likely to make the next steps into more innovative industries difficult in a rigid institutional environment.

## Social enterprises (SEs)

Within civil society, the combination of commercial revenue and social benefits in specific organisational forms is gaining ground in many countries. The evolution of non-profits raises questions of management structures, goal orientation, financing opportunities and legal forms. The SE sphere has received the most attention in the US and Europe. Sometimes, the formation of SEs takes place by creating subsidiaries to accommodate the unrelated business activity of the non-profit in the US in particular. European SEs typically involve multiple stakeholders on their boards, whereas US SEs emphasise professional business management in board membership but may include alternative governance arrangements, such as advisory boards, to accommodate stakeholder interests (Kerlin 2020).

Non-profits have become more entrepreneurial, but there is still a strong emphasis on creating mission-related revenues in which beneficiaries pay at least some part of the service. The spectrum of SEs operates in a field bordered by two dimensions: the strength of the intended social impact and the level of economic self-sufficiency. Most often, there is a strong motive to find solutions to social problems, but the level of economic self-sufficiency varies more among SEs. Furthermore, SEs are able to incorporate innovative practices into their activities. The culture-based rejuvenation of regenerated urban areas and new approaches to mental health treatments exemplify the innovations of SEs (Krlev & Mildemberger 2020).

Social finance deals with investments in social and environmental causes. The financial instruments include social investments, impact investments, social impact bonds, crowdfunding, microfinance schemes and green finance. Although SEs can be partners in the realisation of social impact bonds or crowdsourcing schemes (Kerlin 2020), these instruments often relate to for-profit activities and originate from different legal environments and cultural surroundings. For instance, social impact bonds are UK-based agreements by the government to pay investors for an improvement in specific social outcomes once it has been realised. Impact investors take the risk, and once the intended outcome has been reached, the government pays for the success (Han et al. 2020).

SEs serve entrepreneurial motives by easing restrictive constraints on legal forms, which enables the formation of credibility and branding. Social cooperatives in Italy offer one example of a new type of mixed structure. Social cooperatives enjoy tax benefits, but their financing options and profit distribution are restricted. They are required to provide social, educational or health-related services rather than simply serving the interests of their members. These and other legal forms offer improved branding opportunities for hybrids, but at the same time, they suffer from

difficulties in finding their mission, accountability, financing and operations (Abramson & Billings 2020).

### 3 Hybridity across organisations

#### Public–private partnerships (PPPs)

PPPs showcase the aspect of dyadic interaction across institutional lines as they cross the borders between government and economy and/or government and civil society. Most PPP arrangements deal with the construction of physical infrastructure, but there is increasing interest in applying PPPs to social infrastructure in education, healthcare and care of the elderly (Oktavianus et al. 2018). In dyadic interorganisational networks, the most prominent concept of hybridity has been within transaction cost economics in finalising make-or-buy decisions. In this respect, hybridity refers to a contracting arrangement that is more secure than market transactions but less certain than the implementation of orders within an organisation. Economic exchange involves costs other than direct production costs, such as making contracts and overseeing the continuity of agreements. The nature of these costs defines the most fruitful governance structure, whether it be non-organised markets, contracts (networks, hybrid contracting), business organisations (hierarchy), regulation or public agencies (Williamson 1999). The use of concepts such as hybrid contracting and networks is confusing in the analysis of public–private interaction as the contractual arrangement takes place between two different governance structures (business organisation and public agency). Contracting is particularly relevant in the examination of public–private interactions as the institutional attributes of the actors differ from one another.

PPPs are long-term contracts between two units whereby one unit acquires or builds an asset or set of assets, operates it for a period and then hands it over to a second unit. Such arrangements are usually between a private enterprise and the government, but other combinations are possible, such as with a public corporation as one party and a private non-profit institution as the second. These schemes are described variously as PPPs, private finance initiatives (PFIs) and other project structures combining designing (D), building (B), owning (O<sub>1</sub>), financing (F), operating (O<sub>2</sub>), managing (M) and transferring (T) schemes. Various combinations of these elements occupy the position between public and private institutions (Sarmiento & Renneboog 2016).

Risk is central in defining individual projects. The business partner shares some part of the risk in cases of cost and temporal overruns, but at the same time, they can enjoy benefits from the expedient fulfilment of projects and cost savings. A contract is fundamental in defining the delegation of risks and benefits. As the contract cannot completely dictate every interaction, it

makes sense to formulate contracts to include incentives for efficiency (Hart & Holmström 1987). There is a need for dynamic contracts in the sense that unforeseen incidents can be accommodated in projects. Relational informal contract mechanisms offer practical tools for overcoming unexpected occurrences. This requires goodwill in the form of fairness and responsible action by both parties (Demirel et al. 2019). The public procurer has its own obstacles in employing partnerships. Consequently, PPP arrangements have been accused of not being accountable and transparent enough for public scrutiny as private contractors impose restrictions on democratic openness and make it difficult to evaluate the value for money (Bloomfield 2006). However, while PPPs impose restrictions on external openness to the general public, they can provide sufficient internal transparency to the public procurer of infrastructure and services (Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen 2015).

### Common-pool resources

One relevant topic that is difficult to situate is the management of common-pool resources, which are inherently hybrid goods consisting of both public and private properties. From a network perspective, government, business and civil society are possible parties involved in controlling the hybrid nature of the resources, which advances different possible dyadic pairings between providers and beneficiaries. This approach is based on the study of easily depletable resources in which possible beneficiaries are difficult to exclude (e.g. forestry, fisheries, irrigation systems). The empirical solution escapes both central government intervention and outright privatisation and instead points to the importance of local governance arrangements (Araral 2014). In practice, local communities can effectively manage these resources themselves if they have enough room to operate, a clear identity, collective decision-making and sanctioning structures, fair distribution of benefits and working relationships with other levels of authority (Ostrom 1990).



An extract from Elinor Ostrom's Nobel lecture illustrates the point of joining the provider and beneficiary:

*Carefully designed experimental studies in the lab enabled us to test precise combinations of structural variables to find that isolated, anonymous individuals overharvest from common-pool resources. Simply allowing communication, or "cheap talk," enables participants to reduce overharvesting and increase joint payoffs, contrary to game-theoretical predictions. Large studies of irrigation systems in Nepal and forests around the world challenge the presumption that governments always do a better job than users in organising and protecting important resources. (Ostrom 2009).*

The relationship between provider and beneficiary is an important aspect of the dyadic properties of hybrids. Within public administration, the discussion of new public governance (NPG) encapsulates a similar discussion within public service delivery. The argument is that public services are delivered within public service systems that include service users, local communities and technologies. Co-production and co-design take place in the management of individual services and co-production and co-innovation within the operation of service systems (Osborne et al. 2016). For instance, patients take part in the design of their treatment with healthcare providers, and tenants help in the construction and maintenance of their future accommodation in non-profit housing schemes (Brandsen et al. 2020). Here, the hybridity is no longer the property of the service but the property of intersectoral interaction.

### Hybrid professionals

An element of hybridity is the presence of professional occupational groups within organisations. The commonly cited characteristics of professions include 1) a shared ethical code, 2) an altruistic mission, 3) esoteric knowledge, 4) an intrinsic definition of qualifications and 5) an organised union (Goode 1957). The very concept of professionalism refers to self-determination in performing work. In another sense, it deals with incorporating the operational principles of a professional ethos as a genuine part of civil society into business firms and public agencies. It can be seen not only as interaction between individual professionals and managers but also as a dyadic link between a professional association and the management of the organisation.

Increased development in inter-organisational interactions has resulted in hybrid contracting arrangements between different organisations. Such arrangements require new ways of assessing risk and accountability, which highlights the need for managerial skills to deal with assessing such

risks and new accountability structures. Certain professions, such as medical doctors, have sometimes shown a willingness to incorporate managerial knowledge into their professional practices (Miller et al. 2008).

Theoretically, developments in hybridisation might erode the organisational control of professionals. In the jurisdictional battle for professional self-control (Abbott 1988), taking up managerial tasks or adding new financial and other skills might be instrumental in retaining professional positions rather than other professional groups taking over managerial and other specialised duties. This new type of professionalism refers to a hybrid of professional and managerial principles (Pekkola et al. 2018) in which professionals consider organising to be an important task, dealing with contradictions between these principles and adopting organising as part of the job (Noordegraaf 2015).

Still, the changing role of professionals may also lead to the dilution of professionals with other occupational groups. A fundamental change within organisations has been the adaptation of team-based structures comprising multi-professional teams that combine the expertise of numerous occupations. Together with other developments in flexible specialisation and a decrease in the levels of hierarchy, new organisational forms work against occupational segregation. Consequently, the new organisational order dictates that professional groups are less able to insulate themselves from interactions with, and the influence of, other occupations, which does not allow professional closure instrumental in the building of tightly knit communities (Janhonen & Johanson 2011).

#### 4 Hybrid network industry: international commercial aviation

*While international aviation is linked to many important economic and ecological issue-areas or 'cobwebs'..., it differs from most business involving services or commodities by directly engaging the national security interests, the sovereignty, and the prestige of almost all countries of the world. (Jönsson 1981, 274)*

The development of international aviation since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century includes an array of top-down attempts by governments to agree upon joint global business management rules. Despite these attempts, the development of institutions has been slow and has proceeded through a mixture of bottom-up private initiatives and top-down government interventions

(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2021). Within commercial aviation, hybridity appears in many forms. On the organisational level, private shareholder companies, government-owned flagship carriers and mixed ownership structures formed by both public and private shareholders continue to operate. The aircraft manufacturing business is focused on by only a few manufacturing firms, which are connected to national governments through direct government stakes, contracting deals and/or military aircraft development. As a result, the global aviation regime is a complex network of organisations and institutions that represent public-private interaction at multiple levels of governance.

As nodes, the most obvious demarcation line between airlines is the ownership structure, which might involve purely private shareholders (private), both public and private shareholders (mixed forms) or predominantly government-owned entities (public). Of the top 100 airlines, 60 have private ownership, 15 mixed ownership and the remaining 25 state ownership (Hanlon 2007). The trend has been that formerly government-owned national flag carriers have been privatised. However, there is significant regional variation in the ownership structures of airlines. The US, Europe and Latin America are dominated by private airlines, whereas emerging airline markets in the Middle East are dominated by government-owned operators, and airlines in Africa and the Asia-Pacific are divided roughly into equal shares of public and private operators (IATA 2011).

Basically, modern airlines have the option to choose from three different business models: 1) the full-service carrier model, 2) the low-cost carrier model and 3) the charter carrier model. Most well-established carriers attune to the full-service carrier model in their operations, which includes cargo, passengers and maintenance as the core business. This model also includes global reach through a hub-and-spoke network, which takes passengers from regional airports to international hub airports to connect flights (Cento 2009). The change in the business model into full-service carriers and low-cost carriers has influenced the significance of ownership form. Most importantly, it has pushed traditional airlines, including those with public and mixed ownership, into the full-service carrier group. This group aims to combat tightening competition with participation in alliances and offers a variety of destinations through hub-and-spoke networks rather than the point-to-point travel offered by low-cost and charter carriers. In this sense, the business model has entwined with the form of ownership structure; government and mixed ownership structures are integral parts of the full-service carrier group.

The dyadic nature of air travel originates from bilateral air service agreements between national governments that make decisions about how transborder traffic between the two countries operates (Prokop 2014). Despite liberalisation, the basic structure of bilateral agreements on the use of domestic airspace is still operational. The interesting hybrid twist is that these

intergovernmental agreements establish operating rights for commercial airlines. To put it differently, bilateral intergovernmental contracts create dyadic government–business links at both departure and destination points. For a long time, US aircraft manufacturing companies, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas, could benefit from government contracts when developing new designs, mainly for defence purposes (Boeder & Dorman 2000). In Europe, many governments have direct stakes in the Airbus Group.

In network industry, the most striking development of hybridisation within commercial aviation has taken place at the global level. The formation of three global air alliances is a typical hybrid constellation based on transaction cost logic. They are not organisations arranged under unified command or a hierarchical, vertical division of labour, nor do they represent unsecured transactions of atomistic markets. Instead, the alliances are tied together through cooperative agreements in code sharing, scheduling and shared loyalty programmes (Tugores-García 2013). These practices have been flexible enough to allow for changes in partnership structures.

## 5 Hybridity within parts of society

The development of modern states has been a slow process. Some hindering factors relate to governments' internal functioning, while others address governments' interactions with the economy and civil society. Personal commitments, in contrast to a commitment to a merit-based system and the slow development of institutionalised norms to enforce obedience to these norms, have posed obstacles within states. In the economy, the persistence of personal ties have hindered the expansion of markets, and in civil society, active citizenship has emerged slowly. Workforce availability was instrumental in the emergence of capitalism as a standard form of production, but it also required new ways of legitimising the government. The development of a rational judicial system and the monopolisation of the means of physical coercion were the most important legitimisation strategies of the new rule. In the area of public administration, the establishment of a salaried civil service and an ideology of loyalty enabled the development of an accountable modern bureaucracy (Ertman 2005).

### Hybridity of government

Hybridity within governments is a two-sided issue. First, hybridity deals with the continuum between democratic and authoritarian governments. In the analysis of democracy, one question

pertains to whether elections coincide with other democratic features, such as freedom of association and expression. In addition to democratic electoral Western countries and authoritarian regimes (e.g. Russia and China), there are ambiguous hybrid countries, such as the Ukraine, Venezuela, Indonesia and Turkey, which may impose restrictions on elections and freedoms of expression but are not outright autocratic (Diamond 2002). The major democracy indices such as Polity IV (Marshall & Cole 2017) and Freedom House (Repucci & Slipowitz 2021) recognise these hybrid types but name them differently as ‘anocracies’ or ‘partly free’, respectively.

The second aspect of hybridity within government has to do with the interface between politics and administration, which has its roots in the strict separation of these realms of activity. The administration–politics dichotomy discussion reached some closure in the 1980s when a pure hybrid model of government was introduced. Politics and administration had tentatively become a hybrid, eliminating the need to separate political decision making from the formulation and implementation of goals (Aberbach et al. 1981). The exact reference to the type of hybridity is not altogether clear in this analysis (Lee & Raadschelders 2008). It is possible to see hybridity as a type of ‘revolving door’ in which top officials and politicians move back and forth between parliaments and bureaucracies in their careers, or it might be a motivational construct for elite consensus, which combines political leadership in the control of bureaucracies with the corresponding favourable attitudes of civil servants towards their political masters. This discussion of the division between politics and administration has not faded away as their roles may change over time (Baekgaard et al. 2022).

### Hybrid economies

The academic discussion on political economy includes a useful elaboration of economic systems. Although many countries around the globe have market economies, there are still significant differences among economic regimes, resulting in qualitatively different types of economic systems (see Deeg and Jackson 2006). The varieties of capitalism view offer an egocentric view of the functioning of the whole economic system. In essence, it takes the viewpoint of an individual firm (ego) and its relations to other firms (alters). It also considers the relationships between alters.

There are two basic or pure types of capitalist systems: liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the US, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany. These represent ‘pure’ types of economies that function as referents for mixed or hybrid types of economies. In LMEs, firms manage coordination mainly through hierarchies and markets, that is, arm’s-length relations

and high levels of competition. In CMEs, firms enable coordination also through non-market institutions, that is, strategic interaction through social networks. An LME's advantage arises from the flexibility of these coordination arrangements. For CMEs, the comparative advantage arises from cooperative behaviour among actors, which is based on information exchange and sanctioning defections (Hall & Soskise 2001).

The key insight of the pure types is that coordinated economies work better in industries with incremental innovation and that liberal economies are more suitable in industries with radically new technologies. Interestingly, based on empirical evidence in OECD countries, Witt and Jackson (2016) found that CMEs had some advantages in industries with incremental innovation but that LMEs did not fare any better in industries with radical innovations. They argued that certain types of hybrid economic arrangements might be more successful than pure ones.

Following the introduction of the basic dichotomy, the finding in other economies was that they do not fit well with the clear-cut dichotomy (Hancké et al. 2007). For instance, it has proved difficult to locate Asian economies through the underlying dimensions of LMEs and CMEs (Witt & Redding 2013) (see the case of Singapore in this chapter). In other cases, there are mixed-market economies that seem to fall in between the pure types. In Southern Europe, such as in Spain and Italy, economies suffer from internal cleavages, typically between the large-scale manufacturing industry and small businesses. The trade unions are strong enough to have political influence but too weak to make long-term binding contracts (Molina & Rhodes 2007). Elsewhere, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to new types of market economies in Central Eastern Europe and other countries in the former Soviet bloc. The main divisive line in dictating the subsequent development of these economies was influenced by the type of emerging dominant coalition within these countries. A more liberal type of capitalism grew from the coalition between new business leaders and former dissidents in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, whereas the coalition between the old political elite and the technocrat business elite produced a patronage type of capitalism in other countries, such as Russia, the Ukraine and Romania (King 2007).

### Civil society as hybrid

There may appear to be a separation between pure and impure types of hybridity within government and the economy, but as an aggregate, civil society has hybrid elements in its constitution. Put differently, 'The term "civil society" would not apply to a particular sector, but to a relationship among the sectors, one in which a high level of cooperation and mutual support prevailed' (Salamon & Anheier 1997, 65). Following this line of thought, 'Civil society is the sphere

of institutions, organisations and individuals located among the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests' (Anheier 2004, 20). With respect to these ideas, the question is not so much to define the clear borders between civil society and other parts of society but instead to understand how societies formulate their relationships with these institutions of civil society that are by nature able to cross over institutional barriers or are embedded within them.

In its internal constitution, civil society consists of two broad separate activities. First, there is the service production role of non-profit organisations (NPOs), which may add to or replace public services. Second, civil society incorporates an advocacy role for groups that would not otherwise be able to have their voices heard (Anheier et al. 2020).

The service provision role of NPOs includes alternative trends. The developments between NPOs, government and business follow four different constellations in international setting: 1) enabling, 2) charity, 3) restrictive and 4) drifting and transition. Enabling relationships builds upon mutually supported policies for government–non-profit interaction across sectors. It promotes capable public and non-profit sectors and extensive collaboration and enables regulation and credible regulation. Charity-based constellations offer tax incentives for a transparent culture of philanthropic giving and the substitution of public services by NPOs. The role of the state is to prevent abuse, and there are limits to the advocacy role of NPOs. Restrictive constellations create obstacles to the operation of non-profits, limit foreign funding and do not tolerate non-profit advocacy roles. Repression and outright conflict between NPOs and the government might be relevant features of their interaction. Drifting and transition describe mixed elements in the lack of political incentives for change. This constellation emphasises the service role of non-profits but is ambivalent in finding a way to develop and control the third sector (Philips & Blumberg 2017).

Bringel and Mckenna (2020) portray the advocacy role of civil society in an international setting. They advance three alternative theoretical viewpoints in dealing with those who find it difficult to raise their voices: 1) labour internationalism, 2) polity models and 3) a postmodern turn, which describe developments of framing activism and more recent developments in globalisation. Labour internationalisation portrays industrial society as a product of the dynamics of capitalism rather than as a construct of a nation state. Advanced capitalist nations combatted labour internationalisation with both offensive and defensive tactics. As an offence, nations compensated sinking profits partly caused by the strengthening of labour by exploiting other, more vulnerable populations. As defensive tactics, firms shared some of their profits with professional management and pacified employees through favourable pricing policies. The polity model is an inherently state-centric idea that emphasises the importance of political processes. It deals with the ways in

which active groups are able to raise resources and mobilise constituents to influence public policy. In a postmodern turn, nation states can no longer be taken as given. There is no absolute separation between the local and global, such as within the environmental movement, nor is there clear separation between material claims for wealth distribution and the identity-based claims related to issues such as ecology, gender and ethnicity.

## 6 Hybridity between parts of society

### Government and society

It seems that hybrid types of governing systems, such as 'anocracies' or 'partly free', do not work any better than autocracies or full democracies. The findings of comparative studies on democracy point out that relaxing autocratic control creates obstacles to retaining state control on physical violence and that slightly less repressive rule does not lead to improved domestic order or increased administrative capacity (Carbone & Memoli 2015). Moreover, small incremental changes in autocracies towards democracy open up new possibilities for corruption (Alon et al. 2016).

Within government ranks, the hybridisation poses problems for government–society interaction as the actual integration of bureaucrats' and politicians' careers severely impairs the quality of government. Such integration may proceed in a corporatist fashion by failure to restrict career opportunity in formally closed 'career systems' or by allowing outright patronage and clientelist interaction between politicians and bureaucrats in an open position-based recruitment system. One of the main findings of the empirical analysis is that a de facto integration of political and administrative careers does not produce good governance (Dahlström & Lapuente 2017). Instead, such public administrations appear to be more corrupt, less efficient and less active in reformation efforts. One of the underlying causes of these problems is that speaking truth to power becomes more difficult as individual actors are aware that their future prospects depend on compliance and conformity to the rules of politics and administration. It is indicative that nearly failed states such as Nicaragua and Venezuela score high on patronage, and there are similar tendencies in decomposed European countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Countries such as France, Italy, Turkey and Greece, as well as Paraguay, Pakistan and Serbia, represent corporatist tendencies

A patronage relationship is a reciprocal exchange of favours between two individuals of different status and power, usually involving favours given by the patron to the client in exchange for the



client's loyalty and political support. Patronage is sometimes distinguished from clientelism by scale. Patronage is more individualised, whereas clientelism involves larger-scale exchanges of favours between patrons and clients through intermediaries (Fukuyama 2018). In patronage, employment in the state is the key resource that can be offered to any possible recipient in society. In clientelism, subsidies, loans and jobs function as commodities intended for party supporters as compensation for electoral support. In corruption, public decisions are the prime resource traded for financial resources. Private businesses are the typical beneficiaries of corrupt public decisions. While corruption is most often illegal, patronage and clientelism are not always against the law (Kopecký Mair 2012).

The consequences of corruption and patronage are not self-evident as it is possible to see them as devices for lubricating economic and political interaction among otherwise hesitant partners. However, research shows that the negative consequences of corruption far exceed its positive aspects. In the economy, corruption distorts markets and decreases the security of property rights, productivity and economic growth. Within government, corruption decreases government quality, which results in inequality and environmental pollution (Lambsdorff 2007). The forms of patronage have both negative and positive consequences. Patron–client relationships might sometimes be beneficial for community development, resource mobilisation and even economic growth. The problem is that patronage does not promote open government; it may result in difficulties in allowing political change and indifference among public officials towards suitable public investment targets (Binkerhoff & Goldsmith 2004).

### [Economy and government](#)

Different types of economic systems also involve different interactions between the government and the economy. In LMEs, governments typically keep some distance from private businesses. In CMEs, the government plays an enabling role in the economy. It provides more extensive social security for workers whose skills have become obsolete in the job markets. However, the government plays an even more extensive role in Southern European mixed or hybrid types. In these economies, the public sector must continually resolve grievances between conflicting parts of the economic system. This often requires public funding and direct government involvement in economic exchanges (Deeg 2009). The state plays an important role as a direct producer of goods, a regulator of the economy and a solver of coordination problems within the economy. The role of the state as a compensator of the 'first resort' is strong (Molina & Rhodes 2007).

Developments in other hybrid Central Eastern European countries and other countries in the east of Europe represent two divergent tendencies. In the more liberal capitalist countries, the

economy is driven towards foreign trade and technology development with little coordination among industries but continuous dependence upon foreign investments. In patronage-type capitalist systems, there are patron–client relationships within business firms, and clientelism plays an important role between the political and business elite and within business groups. Despite the large size of government in these countries, the capacity of the government has remained low, which has resulted in a lack of public services. The production of raw materials is the most important source of foreign trade, and political institutions orient themselves to one party dominance through dishonest and restricted elections (King 2007).

### Civil society in society

According to the social origin perspective, the size of civil society is inversely proportional to the scope of government in providing benefits and services to citizens, but there is significant variation in voluntary action among countries that advance the importance of the state and historical path-dependent developments across societies (Anheier et al. 2020). The differences in US and European voluntary activity over the past decades illustrate these temporal contextual influences.

Historically, civil society has secured resources differently in the US and Europe (Defourny & Nyssens 2014). The economic downturn and corresponding cutbacks in public spending in the 1970s directly hit the funding of non-profits, which then sought new, market-based ways of gathering resources to secure the fulfilment of their social missions in the US. In contrast, structural unemployment became a problem in many European countries starting in the 1980s, and numerous initiatives were connected to a more active labour market policy. Non-profits in the US and Europe have employed different strategies for obtaining new resources. In the US, they established market activities – often unrelated to their social missions – to advance their causes. Scouts selling cookies to finance their camping trips is one example of such an activity. In Europe, resources were gathered more in alignment with NPOs’ social missions. For instance, a preoccupation with unemployment led SEs to create jobs within their own organisations, often with government aid. The different developments in the US and Europe illustrate the embeddedness of hybrid activity in a variety of institutional contexts. Increased reliance on market-based activity has been a lifeline for the production role of civil society in the US, whereas in Europe, social organisations have the backing of national governments and the EU (Kerlin 2006).

In a somewhat more abstract way, the nature of civil society can be expressed by two relatively simple network concepts: bonding and bridging. Bonding refers to the formation of trust and

reciprocity within a community. Frequent interactions within the group enable the formation of a common identity and common practices and customs, all of which create a sense of togetherness and social cohesion. Cohesive social groups have a financial effect as they tend to lower transaction costs. Thus, as part of a tightly knit social group, favours or 'credit slips' in return for work done for others are likely to be returned on some later occasion (Coleman 1988). Bridging refers to contacts with groups other than one's own. These contacts are important for getting new information, but they are also instrumental in integrating society as a whole (Granovetter 1973).

The ideas of bridging and bonding are part of the discussion of social capital. In essence, social capital is the value embedded in social relationships. Social capital significantly influences the functioning of the government (Putnam et al. 1993). Trust and reciprocity among citizens are important determinants of a society's functioning, including that of government institutions. Putnam's study of the development of Italian regions over the centuries indicates the existence of marked differences in the social capital of different regions. This, in turn, helps explain why Northern Italy has progressed into prosperity, while Southern Italy has stagnated. In brief, participation in voluntary organisations and thus bridging was dominated by egalitarian membership in the north, whereas voluntary participation was much more hierarchical with the presence of feudal landlords, the catholic church and the mafia in the south.

## 7 Hybrid network society: Singapore

A view of complete networks requires taking a view of society as a whole. As discussed in this chapter, hybrid forms exist between pure types of LMEs and CMEs and in government, between democracy and autocracy and between types of public bureaucracies. The role of civil society is portrayed according to different trajectories for its role in modern societies. The operation of the small island state of Singapore illustrates some of the developments in these realms of activity.

Singapore gained independence in 1965. Currently, it is a wealthy city state in Southeast Asia, with a population of 5.3 million people and an area of around 660 square kilometres. Its major languages are English, Malay, Mandarin and Tamil, and it hosts many religions. At the time of gaining independence, Singapore's prospects were not particularly good. It was a small, underdeveloped country equipped with no natural resources and a population from a variety of sources with little shared history.

Theoretically, Singapore offers a good example of the different aspects of hybridity. First, it is among the wealthiest nations in the world and is equipped with a unique hybrid economic structure (see Witt & Redding 2013). Second, Singapore is a hybrid type of democracy. Although multiparty elections have taken place during the whole of its independence, there is systematic misconduct to suppress support for anyone other than the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), which has been a constant dominant political force and currently has 82 of 101 seats in parliament (Jones 2020).

In government, the ruling party's strategy has been that of co-optation by inducing economic growth, political stability and social cohesion and the provision of working opportunities for the expanding middle class. The government has avoided obvious patronage in public affairs and has employed low-intensity coercion such as lawsuits to quiet opposing voices. Election rigging has included detaining opposition leaders, denying campaign rallying and increasing registration fees for prospective candidates. As pointed out, the political system is 'free enough for citizens to confer legitimacy, but unfair enough to ensure PAP's dominance' (Morgenbesser 2017, 212). Economic growth has allowed the government to improve public services and provide housing and employment for citizens. However, since financial crises of 2009, there has been more widespread political unrest due to recession, an ageing population and an influx of immigrants (He 2020).

Within public administration, the politicisation of bureaucracy as an inducement of corruption does not fit the case of Singapore. It is an exceptional case of a relatively uncorrupted country with a highly politicised bureaucracy (Girling et al. 1997). It is an interesting exception to the perils of hybridisation within government. It might also be that some of the design features of the civil service have impeded patronage among its ranks. The government's policy has been to attract the 'best and the brightest' to seek employment in the government. The civil service of the Singapore government is built upon meritocratic recruitment, and there is a clear division of employees into specific categories according to their education and salary levels (Quah 2010).

Economically, Singapore followed export-led growth in the 1960s and underwent industrial upgrading in the 1970s, followed by knowledge-intensive growth at the beginning of the new millennium. Foreign investments (FDI) and government-controlled SOEs represent the most important types of capital ownership in the country. The importance of foreign investments has resulted in the adaptation of domestic policies according to the requirements of foreign partners. Within the domestic scene, the strength of SOEs in strategic business sectors, such as banking and energy, enables government control of production (HE 2020). SOEs were reorganised under a single holding company, Temasek Holdings, in 1974. Together with sovereign wealth funds,

government-controlled business activity contributes some 12–15% of the operating costs of the government's annual budget. State officials have a right to veto any business proposition made by the companies covered by the holding company (Huat 2016).

For civil society, it is fair to say that Singapore's orientation towards civil liberties is highly restrictive. Most organisations of more than 10 people are required to be registered and approved by the government. Only registered associations may participate in political action. The independent labour unions ceased to represent employees in collective bargaining in the 1960s. Industrial relations were organised in line with government policies in a symbiotic relationship with the ruling party, buttressed by financial perks to loyalists (He 2020). Other ordinances further limit the freedom of speech and assembly as necessary to prevent protest and criticism that could culminate in 'public nuisance'. The top-down orientation of civil society builds more upon the civic nature of society in emphasising the duties of citizens than their option to exercise civil rights (Hammett & Jackson 2018). Lack of judicial independence, media censorship and restrictions on religion and freedom of speech lead to the stifling of civil society (Morgenbesser 2017).

The developments of economy, politics and civil society in Singapore illuminate the practical implications of hybridity. From the perspective of democracy and civil liberties, this arrangement is far from ideal. Still, autocratic rule has not plunged the country into the corrupt neo-patrimonial rule witnessed elsewhere. Economic growth has lifted Singapore to become one of the richest countries in the world, and wealth has improved the livelihoods of most citizens, not only the ruling elite (Jones 2020). This is not to suggest that economic progress is an acceptable trade-off for democracy. The point is that hybrid societies may incorporate positive features that we in the West warmly embrace, but at the same time, they may possess negative features that we would gladly abandon. In this way, hybridity advances conflicting ideas and value regimes that are not easily combined.

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Table X.2. Relational issues facing hybrid arrangements in organisations and society.

<b>Hybrid organisations</b>	<b>Hybridity within parts of society</b>
How to integrate and separate policy, for-profit and voluntary activities in the internal operation of organisations	How to combat hazardous hybrid interactions, such as: a) Career integration between bureaucrats and politicians (government), b) Internal cleavages (the economy), c) Hierarchical interactions (civil society)
<b>Hybridity across organisations</b>	<b>Hybridity between parts of society</b>
How to build up dyadic interactions between: a) Purchasers and providers (e.g. PPP), b) Providers and beneficiaries (e.g. common-pool resources), c) managers and professionals	How to induce reciprocity while avoiding: a) Clientelist and patrimonial relationships, b) Unilateral dependencies on government, c) Repression of association
<b>Hybrid network industry</b>	<b>Hybrid network society</b>
How to mix collaboration and competition in ambiguous institutional environments	How to combine seemingly incompatible institutional elements without resorting to oppression of interaction

The discussion of the relational aspects of hybridity raises a number of questions. Sometimes governing hybridity necessitates a balancing act among parallel and opposing forces. In other instances, hybridity represents an effort to build genuinely new interaction patterns to settle the issues at hand, but it is also the case that hybridity brings out restrictions on interaction patterns. Table X.2 sums up the main relational issues, which are further elaborated in the concluding section. There are three main views on hybrid arrangements: 1) hybrids as average (Karré 2022), 2) hybrids as improvement and 3) hybrids as degradation. It is not uncommon to see hybridity situated in the middle ground between extreme positions. Here, the concept of hybridity as an average position refers to a continuum between full democracies and outright autocracies. Another aspect of hybridity is hybrid vigour (Stross 1999), which refers to the improvement of hybrids in contrast to their pure predecessors witnessed by hybrid professionals. Hybridity may also refer to the degradation of the beneficial properties of the original species signified by the overlapping careers of bureaucrats and politicians, leading to bad governance. Sensitivity to different types of relational patterns enables identifying the virtues and the vices of hybrid formation.

## 8 Conclusions: hybridity in a relational context

Despite the predominance of organisations as a prime focus of hybridity in previous research, this chapter points out that hybridity appears in the fabric of society covering developments in the economy, civil society and government. The alternative trajectories of organisations and society presented here show clearly that both avenues enable studying the relational aspects of hybrids as singular entities and dyads as well as networks as a whole.

In organisational trajectory, the essence of hybridity often resides in the specific types of network forms. The PPP illustrates this point. It is a dyadic contractual network arrangement between a public procurer and a private provider. Individual choices often form the building ground for hybrid network formation. Professionals finding employment in organisations may build up hybridity between the authority of the management and the influence of the professional association. Moreover, the nature of hybridity may change through switching the empirical focus. Within the discussion of common-pool resources, the hybrid nature of the good allows alternative provider–beneficiary pairs (government, business, community). As the attention orients to the provision of public services, the main aspect of hybridity appears not in the service itself but in the co-production between operators of different institutional origin. Within the hybrid network industry in international commercial aviation, international contracting efforts and trends of deregulation have not faded government influence on the final say of allowing or denying the operation of foreign airlines in national airspace. This puts forward the need to mix collaboration and competition across levels of governance.

This examination puts forward the role of hybridity at different levels of society. In a sense, considering the nature and interplay between organisations among growing levels of aggregation is a tool for understanding the reasons for hybrid activities. For instance, the role of SOEs is significantly different between the US and China, which is not easy to comprehend without taking into account the differences in their economic and political systems. Even similar hybrid arrangements have unique meanings in different contexts. A view of the hybrid network society in Singapore puts forward a unique combination of economy, polity and civil society, which has produced increasing levels of wealth of the population at the expense of democratic and civil liberties. Admirers of Singapore’s economic miracle in Western liberal democracies would not embrace the whole state-centric package with its undemocratic tendencies, but the relatively good governance without an expansion of political liberties in Singapore continues to incite interest in autocratic China (Ortmann & Thompson 2016).

Prior literature has provided critical information regarding the excessive focus on the hybridity of organisations at the expense of other important levels of societal activities (Vakkuri & Johanson 2020; Vakkuri et al. 2021). However, this chapter has also demonstrated the limitations of the current theoretical understanding in capturing the complicated and multifaceted interactions between levels. While the perspective of network governance may seem like a plausible, promising line of argumentation for transcending organisational boundaries, it actually provides another set of theoretical concepts and contexts that need to be associated with existing ones. In theorising the hybridity of organisations, networks and societies, it is necessary to develop more sophisticated theoretical-conceptual models for linking hybridity with different levels of societal and institutional activities. Thus, strategies adopted at the organisational level may contribute to complicated impacts on public policy design. Without understanding such inter-linkages, the research faces the risk of being institutionally hollow.

Hybrids are curious creatures. We may walk a hybrid dog, drive a hybrid car or eat hybrid food. Technological advancements and the evolution of societies are likely to provide us with plenty of new hybrid forms. The conceptual problem is that the wide applicability of hybrids requires the need to define them when used in specific instances. This discussion shows that hybridity refers to many types of public and private interactions that do not conform to any single theoretical framework, but it offers a workable theoretical tool to integrate separate academic discussions under the same topic of interest. We are fundamentally dealing with artefacts of the human mind, which are often intangible, difficult to observe and escape detailed measurement. In this sense, the occurrence of hybridity is a signal of flawed categorisation on the surface level, but it may refer to incomplete theoretical thinking on a more fundamental level. Hybrids challenge previous assumptions by bringing up non-conforming cases worth further scrutiny.

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